For Dr.

Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College Why have relatively few states sought to acquire nuclear weapons?

Currently there are nine Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in the world, out of the 193 United Nations member states. This is a surprisingly low number considering the power that the possession of nuclear weapons leads to. Understanding how the spread, or proliferation of the most dangerous man-made weapons has been limited is imperative for future policy analysis and recommendation. This is true irrespective of whether one believes that more states with nuclear weapons would increase order in international politics1 or that the ultimate objective should be the elimination, or at least containment of nuclear weapons2.

In this essay, I will argue that the main explanation for the limited proliferation of nuclear weapons lies in systemic features, namely the bipolar and unipolar setup since the invention of nuclear technology and the fear from the destructive effects of nuclear proliferation on international order.3 I will support this claim in two steps. First, I will propose that while nuclear deterrence increased order significantly among major powers, it would not have the same effect among smaller states, because of the fear from actual nuclear war. Second, I will show that the bipolar system during the Cold War, and the unipolar one since then, are setups that do not favour nuclear proliferation, because of the strength of the great powers. Waltz, K. 2003. More may be better in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed by Sagan and Waltz, W. W. Norton 2 To some extent in Sagan, S. 2003. More may be worse in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed by Sagan and Waltz, W. W. Norton, but Sagans argument is more concerned with the dangers of more NWS rather than the need for disarmament. Yet some of his claims are relevant for this claim. 3 However, I note that all cases have particularities and therefore no single explanation is fully comprehensive, but I believe a theoretical and structural analysis is more suitable for this essay, than a case study. 1
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For Dr. Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College I will also discuss the importance of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and whether a norm has emerged in the last more than 60 years against nuclear proliferation. While I will repeatedly acknowledge the significance of the NPT as an indicator of international cooperation, I will claim that it has not been the main reason why only nine states have acquired nuclear weapons per se. However, before expanding on these points, I would like to mention my reservations about the validity of the expression few, as there are around 40 virtual NWS4 currently around the world. These are states with the capability of developing nuclear weapons relatively quickly, in some cases under a couple of weeks. This fact raises the issue whether we should consider nuclear capability instead of actual nuclear weapons, but space limitations do not allow for a lengthy discussion on this question.

There are several reasons why a state would want to acquire nuclear weapons, from fear, prestige, through ideology and path dependency, to the perceived need to balance a local adversary. However, undoubtedly the most commonly echoed view is that deterrence of nuclear or conventional attacks by possessing nuclear warheads. I will analyse this claim for this reason and because an renowned proponent of the theory, Kenneth Waltz draws systemic implications from deterrence capabilities, which has significant relevance for my argument that the low number of NWS is mainly due to systemic factors.

Wheeler N., Ruzicka J. 2010. The puzzle of trusting relationships in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, International Affairs 86. 1. 2

For Dr. Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College The fundamental assumptions of rational deterrence theory are similar to that of realism, especially the focus on national interest that manifests in security. It is claimed that the threat of unacceptably high costs of a nuclear war change calculations about the costs and benefits of any armed or in fact non-armed conflict. The possible gains seem insignificant in any war if the possible costs involve nuclear retaliation from the enemy. Furthermore, the theory assumes that any agent who might get to possess nuclear weapons calculates rationally and therefore refrains from actually using them. In such a world, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons would decrease the likelihood of conventional war, because of the fear from nuclear war. Yet, empirically, only nine states have acquired nuclear weapons over the course of more than 60 years, which seems counterintuitive, since it would be in the interest of countries to become, or at least to try to become, nuclear powers, because they could increase order around the world via their own increased security. There is a dual solution to this problem, namely that states do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase their security and that states are limited in their policy options. I will expand on the first part of the solution now by highlighting a few problems with Waltzs argument.

Assuming rationality for any actor in the international arena is an oversimplification ignoring empirical observations and leading to mistaken conclusions. Terrorist groups are the prime example of nihilistic, fatalistic leadership where the fear from retaliation is not present, not to mention that second-strike nuclear attacks are not possible against terrorist groups since they are geographically dispersed.

For Dr. Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College Another example is when a countrys leadership fears that the mere existence of the state is at danger it is conceivable that they arrive at the decision of using nuclear weapons as a last resort, even after rational calculation. Thus, states might justifiably fear that nuclear proliferation increases the possibility of non-rational or endangered groups acquiring nuclear weapons that carries serious threats to international peace and order. Waltz argues that it is the remote threat of unacceptably high costs of destruction that prevent nuclear states from engaging in conventional war. However, this argument presupposes the existence of a nuclear threat. If the decision of a state is between seeking nuclear weapons leading to a situation where the chances of nuclear war are miniscule, but the possible destruction of such war is huge and conventional war is therefore feared and between absolutely no threat of nuclear war5 by signing non-proliferation treaties with some chance of conventional war, it is hard to make a strong case for choosing the former, given that states can be assumed to be riskaverse. Thus nuclear states are rational in not waging wars against one another, but non-nuclear states are also rational in not even seeking a situation where there is a threat of nuclear war. This conclusion supports my claim that it is due to systemic factors that only a few states sought nuclear weapons, as their basic need for security is better served in a world with few or no nuclear powers than in one with numerous NWS.

Here I assume that the chance of a nuclear war between any two states increases with the number of nuclear powers in the system and that the increase in perceivable. This is a plausible assumption, because for instance if the chance of nuclear war with nine NWS is 1:1,000,000 than this probability increases twentyfold if the number of nuclear powers increases to 15. 4

For Dr. Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College The second argument for structural causes is to be found in the relative powers of major international actors. Any international system can be described as unipolar, bipolar or multipolar depending on the number of superpowers in the system, defined as those states who have significantly more capabilities than any other. This is essentially a realist understanding of international relations, which is suitable for this analysis as I am not trying to uncover country-specific explanations, but general factors that lead to only few states seeking nuclear weapons. The post-1945, nuclear era can be characterized by two distinct periods; the Cold War with its bipolar system and the post-1990 unipolar system with the dominance of the USA.

During the Cold War the two superpowers had no intention of supporting other, nonaligning states in acquiring nuclear weapons as then the other bloc might have had the chance to find a new nuclear ally. At the same time, those states being part of either the Warsaw Pact or NATO had no real need for nuclear weapons as Mutual Assured Destruction between the two blocs was guaranteed by the superpowers. The exceptions to this pattern are the UK, France, China and India. The UK acquired nuclear weapons mainly to maintain its prestige, while France simply had little trust in the USA. India and China on the other hand were strong-enough non-aligning states to go against the will of the superpowers6.

In the post-1990 era the USA is arguably the sole superpower in the system, with several great powers like China, Japan, Russia, the EU, but none being strong enough to challenge the US.

However, note that Kennedy for instance actually considered plans on a pre-emptive attack on China in 1963, just one year before China became a nuclear power. 5

For Dr. Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College Therefore, in the current system, any state that seeks nuclear weapons has to face the political consequences of opposing the American non-proliferation policy. Since, hiding a nuclear weapon development programme is particularly hard, facing these consequences is inevitable. To make my systemic explanation more applicable to empirical facts I identify three channels through which the US can secure nonproliferation. Firstly, the US is a credible underwriter for states seeking nuclear deterrence and belonging to her alliance system. South Korea and Taiwan do not seek nuclear weapons for this reason and it is arguable that the UK could also cease her nuclear programme as second-strike assurance is provided by the US. Secondly, the Clinton administration successfully engaged in bargaining with the post-communist countries of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus and achieved that they dismantled their nuclear weapons in exchange for financial and technological help to produce nuclear energy. North Korea was also kept at bay for some time with assistance in civil nuclear technology. Finally, American commitment to pre-emptive actions if a state seeks nuclear weapons against the will of the international community, and thus is likely to pose a security threat to the international peace, and to the USA in particular, is certainly a significant possible cost for any state considering seeking nuclear weapons. The concept of pre-emption means military action when actual weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use by an adversary is imminent,7 and it has been part of US foreign policy with varying emphasis since the 1993 Defence Counter-Proliferation Initiative. To conclude, the combined strength of the USSR and the USA before 1990 and the preeminence of the USA since then, in other words the bipolar and unipolar nature of the two international systems, have been key to only few states seeking nuclear weapons.
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Litwak R. 2002. The new calculus of pre-emption Survival. 44. 4 pp. 54 6

For Dr. Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is undoubtedly the single most important document in the field of nuclear weapons proliferation. Altogether 190 countries ratified the Treaty that requires non-nuclear states not to seek nuclear weapons8, while on the other hand obliges the five recognized nuclear states (USA, Russia, France, UK, China) not to transfer any recipient nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist or encourage the acquisition of such equipment9. The Treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995, showing its consensual recognition with only a few exceptions10. The NPT also declares the desirability of nuclear disarmament, but does not specify actual steps to achieve it. However, the success of the treaty lies in its relatively restricted nature which focuses on nonproliferation and not on disarmament that would not have such unequivocal support11.

Although the success of the NPT is rarely debated, the factors leading to its realization are all the more disputed. Two competing explanations exist; one arguing that the NPTs success is the expression of the power of the USA and the former USSR, as they were committed to non-proliferation for reasons outlined earlier in this essay. The other, opposing, claim states that the nearly universal ratification of the NPT shows an emerging consensus on nuclear non-proliferation.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968. Article 2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968. Article 1. 10 The following states have not signed the treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan, the first three out of which possess nuclear weapons. North Korea was a signatory state, but withdrawn from the Treaty in 2003 and has developed nuclear weapons since then. 11 Krause J. 2007. Enlightenment and nuclear order in International Affairs. 83. 3 pp. 483-500.
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For Dr. Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College As Joseph Nye writes: The taboo against the use of nuclear weapons seems to be firmly established among the states12 According to writers echoing this view, the NPT is based on a trusting relationship between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear powers (NNWS)13. The NNWS forsake some of their security vis-vis the NWS by pledging not to seek nuclear weapons, while the NWS trust the NNWS not to move from nuclear energy to nuclear weapons. Proponents of the theory argue that even objective verification of this trusting relationship is not needed; as long as states believe in the existence of trust among each other an international society of states exists. Although it is certainly an appealing theory, because of the positive implications the existence of such an international society would mean, I do not entirely share the belief in a trusting relationship as the core reason why few states sought nuclear weapons. My three arguments against the overarching international norm are as follows. First, non-signatory states show that free riders exist in the system and that the Treaty is not effective in coercing deviators. Second, trust among NWS is not without problems, one just has to consider the disagreement between Russia, China and Western powers. Therefore even if they share a belief in nonproliferation, their trust towards each other is certainly limited. Third, I believe my previous arguments concerning the limitations to national policy formation on nuclear weapon acquisition, as a result of the bipolar and unipolar systems, show that the NPT is not necessarily built on trust, but to some extent on great power politics.

Nye J. 1986. Nuclear Ethics. New York: Free Press Wheeler N. and Ruzicka J. 2010. The puzzle of trusting relationships in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in International Affairs, 86. 1. pp. 69-85.
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For Dr. Helen Thompson Benedek Csorba Corpus Christi College All in all, the NPT indicates that states cooperate effectively and that nonproliferation is certainly the prevailing direction in the international system, however the Treaty in itself is not the cause of the limited spread of nuclear weapons and neither is the trusting relationship between signatory states.

In conclusion, only few countries sought nuclear weapons since the 1940s, because the international system was dominated by either one or two superpowers that had a vested interest in non-proliferation and because states are inherently risk-averse thus they oppose the additional risk brought about by nuclear weapons. In other words, many states are not convinced that nuclear weapons can actually increase order in international politics.