THE NEW TRIAD, BUNKER BUSTERS AND 'COUNTERPROLIFERATION WARS':

Nuclear Primacy and Its Implications for Canadian Security Policy

By David S. McDonough

he Bush administration has proposed some very significant revisions to American nuclear strategy. These revisions were first introduced in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a classified document that envisions a "New Triad" military doctrine consisting of offensive strike systems (nuclear and conventional), defences (active and passive), and a revitalized defence infrastructure, which would be bound together by a sophisticated command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) system.1 This document, while ostensibly a blueprint for the US nuclear arsenal, provides the basis for a significant transformation of the wider US military architecture. This point is reiterated by Keith B. Payne: "Despite its title, the scope was much broader than nuclear matters. It was a strategic posture review, the Pentagon's first strategic policy initiative to depart fundamentally from a Cold War-era policy orientation."2 Nuclear weapons are, however, incorporated as a central element of this strategic military posture. This is not merely hypothetical. In fact, these modifications have been further codified in National Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17)3, and many are in the process of being implemented in US nuclear war plans and operational policies. While not a radical departure from previous administrations, the New Triad does represent the most recent mani-

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festation of a little noticed trend in post-Cold War US nuclear strategy the incorporation of "counterproliferation" as an integral mission for the US nuclear arsenal. The rationale for much of these developments is the predominant US perception of the threat posed by the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to adversarial or revisionist "rogue states." This threat perception is not limited to Washington. In fact, many countries including Canada are beginning to recognize that such proliferation will be a critical challenge in the 21st century. However, it should also be recognized that the current administration's plans to increase reliance on nuclear weapons as a response could potentially have detrimental consequences, not only to the strategic stability among the established nuclear weapon states (NWSs), but perhaps more importantly, to the strategic stability between the US and its rogue state adversaries. The dangers posed by this example of "vertical" nuclear proliferation, which is essentially what the US is pursuing, have not received much attention in Canada. This is certainly understandable. For the most part, interest in these issues has declined in the post-Cold War period, when the threat posed by such arsenals was perceived (falsely) to have been reduced. Moreover, Canada is not a nuclear power, nor is it directly involved in the formulation of US nuclear strategy. As a "middlepower," and an increasingly marginalized one at that, Canadian policy has frequently focused on alternative, and often less strategic, concerns.4 Despite such preoccupations, American nuclear strategy particularly under this administration is not an issue that should be dismissed lightly. Canadian international influence may have indeed deteriorated in recent years, and our attention has been justifiably focused on domestic and continental security, but our security interests are still very much international in scope. American nuclear strategy cannot be disassociated from either Canada's long-standing support for multilateral non-proliferation measures, nor from its prefer-

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ence for international and regional strategic stability. Canadian policy-makers who ignore these developments may inadvertently find their influence even further limited, at a time when the international environment has become far less amenable to Canadian security and interests. Historical Context The Bush administration's nuclear strategy, while featuing some elements that are novel, is not a radical departure from the policies of previous administrations. Much of the foundation for the New Triad actually originated as early as the Cold War, when US nuclear planners were intent on mitigating the importance of a Soviet nuclear deterrent.5 "Counterforce" targeting of an opponent's military capabilities and command and control infrastructure, which are featured quite prominently in the New Triad's emphasis on counterproliferation missions, were originally conceived as a necessary component to the US deterrence of its Soviet adversary. In the post-Cold War period, the emphasis on targeting of Third World and rogue state adversaries has only increased the necessity for even more specialized (e.g. counterproliferation-based) counterforce capabilities. A common public misperception is that, during the Cold War, the US emphasized "countervalue" targets against Soviet cities, for example and unusable nuclear weapons. It was during this period that the US had publicly accepted the mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine: if one side decides to initiate an attack, the other side would have sufficient second-strike nuclear forces to inflict an unacceptable degree of destruction on the initiator. This doctrine stemmed largely from the development of a Soviet nuclear deterrent, and later, the seemingly inevitable development of nuclear parity between the two superpowers. Indeed, this may be one reason why so many people were surprised by this administration's very explicit emphasis on counterforce targeting in the Nuclear Posture Review and its concept of the New Triad.

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However, this perception of US Cold War nuclear strategy is false. In fact, despite an official adherence to MAD, the US had consistently emphasized a mixture of both countervalue and counterforce targeting against the Soviet Union. Nuclear counterforce options against the Soviet nuclear arsenal and later, its political and economic foundations were an integral if often unrecognized part of American nuclear war plans since the Eisenhower administration's fixation on nuclear overkill during the 1950s.6 The Kennedy administration did attempt to reject the overkill features of its predecessor, preferring instead "flexible" nuclear options, based on preemptive counterforce nuclear capabilities and the ability to withhold attacks on several categories of targets (the "no cities" version of counterforce).7 But despite initially accepting the idea of MAD and its need for second-strike forces and countervalue targeting, it would continue to emphasize such potentially destabilizing first strike targeting options. Subsequent administrations would expand on this proclivity towards counterforce weapons and flexible targeting. The Nixon administration emphasized the need to maintain "sufficiency" in nuclear capabilities, to reinforce the US ability to deter the Soviet Union, and therefore promulgated Single Integrated Operating Plan 5 (SIOP-5) which featured selective nuclear options, and enshrined the Soviet recovery economy as a central "withhold" option in US nuclear war plans. Such withhold options would be critical in any American attempt to achieve intrawar deterrence and war termination during a protracted nuclear exchange. Following a Nuclear Targeting Policy Review, the Carter administration introduced the "countervailing strategy," the goal of which was to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving any definition of victory in the event of a nuclear war. The administration's Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) codified this doctrine, while the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy 80 (NUWEP-80) followed through on this strategy, by emphasizing a more survivable command, control and communications system for the United States to allow it to bet-

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ter survive a protracted nuclear war and expanding the target list to include political as well as economic and military targets.8 The Reagan administration was particularly attached to this "warfighting" role for its nuclear arsenal, to achieve "escalation dominance" or the ability to "contain or defeat the adversary at all levels of violence with the possible exception of the highest."9 The need for such a doctrine was particularly acute, given the growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities and the perceived arrival of nuclear parity. The National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) of October 1981 even had the goal of "prevailing" in a nuclear war of up to 180 days. To achieve this goal, there have been six revisions to the nuclear war plan (SIOP-6A to SIOP-6F), and yearly NUWEPs to guide these revisions. In turn, this led to an emphasis on decapitation strikes against the Soviet leadership and military capabilities (e.g. mobile or relocatable targets) by such hard target kill weapons as the new MX intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the Trident II D-5 sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and the potential for damage limitation capabilities inherent in such programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).10 The New Triad may advocate new nuclear capabilities, but this merely reflects the long-standing American fascination with counterforce, as opposed to countervalue weapons. The nuclear capabilities advocated by the current administration are geared towards counterproliferation missions,11 and as such, represent specialized counterforce weapons for the destruction of an adversary's military forces (especially those related to chemical and biological capabilities). That the targets for these counterforce weapons were often non-nuclear Third World countries is also not a new development, but rather has its origins with the fall of the Soviet Union, when much of the policies developed to achieve escalation dominance over the Soviet Union were shifted to the newly recognized rogue state threat. The post-Cold War period while witnessing the end of the Soviet Union, the primary rationale for the US nuclear arsenal also

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saw the growing American fixation on rogue states. "Horizontal" proliferation to these "states of concern" had replaced the Soviet Union as the primary strategic threat facing the United States.12 This change in threat calculation was reinforced in two key incidents in the early post-Cold War period. First, there was the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the implicit danger of chemical or biological weapons use by Iraq. This led the US not only to undertake active and passive defences for its troops, but also to attempt conventional strikes to pre-empt possible Iraqi use of WMD.13 This was followed by the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea. While the development of a couple of nuclear weapons was considered a real danger, the possibility that the regime might develop a dozen weapons made this incident an even more serious crisis this number of weapons could potentially be sold to other countries or lead to the nuclearization of other regional countries. Reports even indicate that the US briefly considered pre-emptive military action against Pyonyang between 1993 and 1994.14 With the seemingly inevitable horizontal proliferation of WMD, the Defence Department introduced the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI), a new proposal that envisioned using US military force as a means to address the threat posed by rogue states and WMD. As pointed out by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the CPI accepts that proliferation could still occur despite the best efforts of non-proliferation: "At the heart of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, therefore, is a drive to develop new military capabilities to deal with this new threat."15 While introduced as a conventional doctrine, counterproliferation would be incorporated as an integral part of American post-Cold War nuclear planning. Both the 1990 Military Net Assessment and the Reed Panel recommended the incorporation of Third World targets into US nuclear war plans. These recommendations would be formalized in SIOP-93. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) even attempted

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to further reinforce this new counterproliferation role with what has been termed the "Silver Books," classified documents with "plans for military strikes against WMD facilities in a number of 'rogue' nations."16 This controversial initiative was eventually terminated, but counterproliferation would be a feature of American nuclear policy throughout the 1990s. This was made abundantly clear in the process leading up to the 1994 NPR, when despite Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton Carter's early efforts to reduce the number of nuclear targets and therefore the nuclear arsenal, STRATCOM was, by and large, successful in codifying such expanded mission requirements for the US nuclear force structure.17 In the post-Cold War period, the United States has expanded on its traditional counterforce emphasis on nuclear weapons; the missions have become more specialized, for purposes of counterproliferation, while the targets are now spread throughout the Third World. Counterproliferation has, indeed, become a central rationale for both the existing nuclear force structure, as well the development of new nuclear capabilities. This has taken place despite public adherence to negative security assurances, which are assurances to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) that they would not be targeted by nuclear weapons, provided that they are not allied to a nuclear power. The Implementation of the New Triad The 2002 NPR expanded on many of these historic developments in its concept of a New Triad. Offensive strike systems, which include nuclear and conventional weapons, constitute the first leg of this strategic triad. Conventional weapons would be emphasized in order to reduce collateral damage and conflict escalation. However, as the NPR goes on to note, "Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)."18 The strike element of the New Triad would be supplemented with two other integral components. The development and deployment of active and

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passive defences would be emphasized, in the event that offensive capabilities fail to deter an adversary's attack. In addition, both offensive and defensive legs would be enhanced with a responsive defence and especially nuclear infrastructure. The NPR also outlines a number of defence policy goals that the New Triad would help to achieve, including (i) the assurance of security partners and allies, which refers to US positive security assurances as well as extended deterrence guarantees; (ii) the dissuasion of potential adversaries from even pursuing threatening (e.g. WMD) capabilities; (iii) the reinforcement of the credibility of US nuclear deterrence; and (iv) the provision of greater military flexibility in order to defeat adversaries.19 Based on the Bush administration's frequent emphasis on its pre-emptive/preventive doctrine, enshrined in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) document and demonstrated in the 2003 Iraq War, one can also argue that a hidden goal of the New Triad is to reinforce the American ability to preempt potential adversaries.20 New nuclear capabilities are advocated in order to deal with a number of potential threats and problems. According to the Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hardened and and Deeply Buried Targets, "structures ranging from hardened surface bunker complexes to deep tunnels" can be used by adversaries to house WMD as well as command and control facilities, and are therefore seen as a growing danger in the post-Cold War period.21 The US estimates that there are over 10,000 underground facilities (UGFs) worldwide, many of which constitute hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs), and that this number will no doubt increase.22 The need to deal with mobile and relocatable targets, which can be weapon systems armed with WMD, is a second justification for new capabilities, and places a need to further develop intelligence collection and tracking capabilities. The third justification is the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). New capabilities are necessary to both identify agent production and storage facilities, and to deny access to, immobilize, neutralize or destroy such agents.

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Lastly, the US also perceives a need to develop new capabilities in order to improve the accuracy of and, in the event that the US has to defeat an adversaries capabilities, reduce the collateral damage caused by its nuclear weapons. The NPR is a congressionally mandated review of the "policy, strategy, plans, stockpile, and infrastructure for US nuclear forces,"23 and as such, is only a blueprint for the US nuclear arsenal. One must therefore examine how this blueprint is operationalized and implemented. The devil is in the details, as they say. In that regard, it is clear that the New Triad is not some hypothetical concept, but has already had a very real impact on operational policy in a number of areas. First, the NPR advocates a planned force structure composed of between 1700-2200 warheads by 2012, which would entail the elimination of the MX Peacekeeper missile force, a reduction in the number of Trident II ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the removal of a number of warheads on the existing ICBM and SLBM force. This number has since been agreed to and codified by the US and Russia in the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), better known as the Treaty of Moscow. This treaty seems to reflect the Bush administration's ambiguity towards arms control agreements, as well as give both countries a great deal of flexibility in implementing the proposed nuclear weapon reductions. For instance, not only are verification protocols conspicuously absent from this "anti-arms-control arms control treaty,"24 but it is also notably silent on warhead stockpiles, tactical nuclear weapons, the elimination of multiple-warhead land missiles and the destruction of delivery systems. Implementation of the NPR's proposed force structure has already begun; this has reduced the operational nuclear warheads in the US stockpile to an estimated 5,300, down from an estimated 10,600 in 2002 (and 7,000 as early as a year ago). Only 10 MX missiles are still on alert, out of a total force of 50 the remaining 10 missiles were deactivated in mid-2005. Four Trident II SSBNs have also been removed since 2002.25 Furthermore, in 2004, the US announced that

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"almost half" of its total stockpile would be retired by 2012, and eventually dismantled this would make the total stockpile consist of an estimated 6,000 warheads. This, it should be noted, is a departure from both the NPR and previous Bush administration statements, which had initially wanted a much larger stockpile as part of its "responsive nuclear force" hedge and "inactive stockpile." Second, following from the NPR's emphasis on HDBTs and WMD facilities, the Bush administration appears intent on developing new nuclear capabilities for the destruction of such targets. The US is studying (i) the development of "bunker busters" or earth penetration weapons (EPWs) that would be capable, hypothetically, of destroying HDBTs; and (ii) using nuclear weapons as agent defeat weapons (ADWs) for the destruction of chemical and biological weapons and their facilities. These weapons are envisioned to have kinetic earth penetration capability, as well as a low-yield warhead to minimize fallout (or potentially large-yield warheards for deeper facilities). The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), which is the Bush administration's EPW project, is studying possible modifications that would give an existing US nuclear warhead some degree of earth penetration capability (beyond the B61-11 kinetic EPW nuclear warhead, which is only capable of pentrating to a depth of 30 feet).26 The development of smaller-yield, minature nuclear weapons of less than 5 kilotons, which would eventually require nuclear testing, is still only hypothetical the majority of the funding for the administration's nuclear plans has gone to the RNEP project (a modification of an existing nuclear warhead that does not require testing) rather than to the Advanced Concepts Initiatives examination of new lowyield weapon concepts.27 But given the work being done to revitilize the US nuclear infrastructure, their development remains a distinct possibility in the near future. Third, the US is implementing a number of modernization plans for its nuclear delivery systems. The Minuteman has a $6-billion modernization program, which would improve the missile's accuracy as

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well as extend its service life. The Air Force has already begun seeking conceptual designs for a missile to replace the Minuteman in 2018. What is more, since the START II Treaty is no longer in force, both Russia and the US will be maintaining (and perhaps expanding) those missiles with Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology. The NPR has placed the fleet of Trident SSBN and its SLBM force, which represents 48 percent of the existing operational strategic weapons, at the center of the US nuclear deterrent. The retirement of the MX missile force has only increased its importance, as the SLBMs have taken over many of the targets previously covered by the MX missile. Not surprisingly, the SLBM's D-5 missile, which has an already impressive hard-target kill capability, will soon have a much more lethal accuracy due to the Navy's three year Enhanced Effectiveness Re-entry program to provide the Mk-4/W76 re-entry vehicles with GPS-like accuracy. Another modernization program, to replace the re-entry vehicle's fuze, will lead to re-entry vehicles (designated Mk-4A/W76-1) with increased lethality. Furthermore, the Navy has plans for an eventual Trident SSBN replacement, as well as to develop a new submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (SLIRBM) for these submarines (with plans to test this missile in 2005).28 In the long-term, the US is also studying new types of "global strike" delivery systems for its conventional and nuclear armaments, such as the Manoeuvrable Non-Nuclear Re-entry Vehicles (MNNRVs) and/or the Common Aero Vehicles (CAVs). The MNNRV would rely on manoeuvres and a high re-entry rate to evade defences, and would allow for precision attacks against HDBTs and hard surface targets. The CAV would combine high manoeuvrability and an ability to deliver an assortment of advanced munitions that are currently only deliverable by aircraft. The possibility that the CAV, and even the more explicitly non-nuclear MNNRV, would be used for nuclear strikes cannot be dismissed.29

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Fourth, the emphasis on HDBTs and the destruction of biological and chemical agents represents another rationale for the incorporation of non-nuclear rogue states in US nuclear targeting. The NPR does explicitly mention North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya as countries that could be involved in immediate, potential and unexpected contingencies. Proactive counterproliferation, it should also be remembered, has become a dominant component of the US national security strategy. As the 2002 NSS makes clear, "Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries."30 This was further elaborated in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the classified version of which states: "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force including potentially nuclear weapons to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies."31 In response, the Bush administration has placed a renewed emphasis on "adaptive planning" for the rapid generation of nuclear war plans32, as well as on "crisis action planning" for limited strike options against unexpected contingencies; such developments would help to ensure increased, flexible, and selective nuclear options against rogue states.33 The Strategic Warfare Planning System (SWPS) had already undergone a major modernization, which was finally completed in 2003, and which gave the ability to formulate limited options within 24 hours. The Bush administration seeks to expand this capability, and has therefore initiated a new modernization plan (SWPS-M, later renamed the Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network [ISPAN]) that seeks to develop even quicker and more adaptive nuclear planning through greater reliance on computer models. That being said, the Bush administration also released in October of 2003 a very traditional SIOP, which emphasized the counterforce

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targeting of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, as well as decapitation strikes against the command, control and leadership of those countries.34 (This incidentally should be the last SIOP, as the US has formally changed the name of its nuclear war plan to Operations Plan or OPLAN 8044.35) Fifth, the NPR advocates a blurring between nuclear and conventional weapons as part of the offensive strike leg of the New Triad. For example, the Navy has plans to transform its four recently retired Trident II SSBNs into conventional cruise missile and special forces platforms. The US has also been looking at the potential development of conventional ICBMs, and particularly at the conversion of the now almost entirely deactivated MX ICBM force. As pointed out in the 2004 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of Strategic Strike Forces, the MX ICBM still has a long service life, would be capable of very large conventional missiles, and would give the US a prompt strike capability against buried, time urgent targets.36 The report also offers a number of other recommendations, including the development of a non-nuclear intermediate range missile for the Navy, as well as the conversion of a number of Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs), and their prospective replacements, for conventional missions. This blurring between conventional and nuclear weapons can also, perhaps most importantly, be seen with the merging of US Space Command (SPACECOM), which had responsibility for missile defence, into STRATCOM. The new STRATCOM, which traditionally dealt with nuclear policy, has been assigned four missions: (i) global missile defence; (ii) global strike, or the ability to quickly hit any target on earth37; (iii) Department of Defense Information Operations; and (iv) C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). What impact this will have on operational US nuclear policy, on its nuclear force structure and targeting plans, remains to be seen. But it does appear to further conflate conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as formally place

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missile defence into a command that has traditionally overseen US nuclear policy. As such, it represents a move towards incorporating defensive systems into the US nuclear posture a goal that was enshrined in the first- and second-leg of the New Triad. While missile defence is ostensibly a defensive system, its potential to provide damage limitation capabilities in support of US nuclear forces, as well as the need to connect such defensive systems into the US offensive battle management system, makes its integration in the new STRATCOM a very real and, to an extent, logical possibility. Theatre nuclear planning has not been exempt from these developments. According to a recent draft of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the "Use of nuclear weapons in a theatre requires that nuclear and conventional plans be integrated to the greatest extent possible and that careful consideration be given to the potential impact of nuclear effects on friendly forces." Geographic combatant commanders are also given the authority to request Presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons in a wide variety of first-use and pre-emptive situations, including for use against overwhelming conventional forces; for the purpose of war termination; for pre-emptive attacks against an adversary's WMD facilities; and even "to demonstrate US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary's use of WMD."38 This doctrine has an expansive view on the utility of nuclear weapons, and stands in sharp contrast to previous doctrines, which placed greater emphasis on "nuclear policy constraints"39 as opposed to nuclear weapons utility. Lastly, a critical foundation for the Bush administration's vision of nuclear weapons is a revitalized nuclear infrastructure. Despite the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which relies on computational and simulational experimental facilities and "virtual testing/virtual proto-typing," numerous problems with the current infrastructure are identified. Not only are improvements deemed necessary, but the administration seems keen to have a revitalized capability to develop new warheads and to resume nuclear testing. As the NPR states, there

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is the need for a nuclear weapons complex that will be able to "design, develop, manufacture and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required."40 Following from this perspective, the US seems intent on re-establishing a significant pit production capability. Plutonium pits are a hollow shell of plutonium in every nuclear warhead surrounded by chemical explosives, these "pits" are a necessary trigger component for a nuclear explosion. In 2003, a plutonium pit was completed the first new plutonium pit since the closure of the pit facility at Rocky Flats, Colorado in 1989. This seems to be part of a much larger goal, since the Bush administration has proposed a Modern Pit Facility that would cost $2-4 billion in construction and up to $300 million in annual maintenance, and would be capable of producing between 125 and 450 pits annually. The Bush administration is also continuing with its efforts to reduce the readiness time for nuclear testing, down from its current 24-36 months to 18 months. The Nevada Test Site is the focus of the Enhanced Test Readiness program, and has already received up to $24.9 million in 2004 and $22.5 million in 2005. Of course, one can argue that some improvements need to be done for the maintenance of the US nuclear stockpiles. However, these changes to the US nuclear infrastructure do seem excessive and, it should be remembered, associated with a policy that envisions new nuclear capabilities and potentially smaller-yield mini-nukes. As John Gordon, the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) points out, "it may be appropriate to design, develop and produce a small build of prototype weapons both to exercise key capabilities and to serve as a 'hedge,' to be produced in quantity when deemed necessary."41 While the Spratt-Furse amendment banned research on nuclear warheads of less than 5 kilotons, the administration has successfully repealed part of that law the Warner amendment passed on a 59-38 vote, and permits research on, but not development of, low-yield nuclear weapons.42

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This is not to say that these developments are irreversible. In November of 2004, the US Congress took the unprecedented step of cutting and/or reorienting funding for many of these programs for FY2005. Specifically, the request for $27 million for the RNEP project has been cut, while the $9 million request for new nuclear weapon concepts has been re-oriented towards increasing the reliability of existing nuclear warheads as part of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Furthermore, only $7 million will be released for the construction of a Modern Pit Facility and $22.5 million for the reduction of the nuclear test preparation period, as opposed to the Bush request for $30 million for each respective program.43 However, it remains to be seen whether this Congressional opposition will continue. The Bush administration is already pushing Congress to support a $4 million Department of Energy request for the RNEP project, alongside $4.5 million of complementary funding for the Pentagon (and $22.5 million over the next two years). The $9 million for new nuclear weapon concepts may now be a part of RRW, but there are continuing questions regarding whether this program will simply be "a back door for the administration to circumvent congressional opposition to new warhead designs for new and destabilizing nuclear strike missions."44 The Bush administration appears, despite these recent Congressional setbacks, intent on pursuing its drive for developing new nuclear capabilities during its second term. Implications for Canadian Security Policy Canada is a self-professed middlepower, a classification which denotes a countrys inability to wield much influence when acting alone, but ability and often interest in working with like-minded powers on various issues, as a means to multiply its influence. This can be seen in this country's integral role in the development of the United Nations; as a peacekeeper, in order to eliminate potential AmericanSoviet flashpoints; its place in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

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(NATO); and most recently, as part of its involvement in NATO peace enforcement activities as well as in various multilateral security initiatives. Working through multilateral institutions is therefore Canada's preferred approach for dealing with security issues, as opposed to acting alone or even working in ad hoc coalitions. Given that the defence capabilities and, therefore, foreign policy influence of Canada has eroded in recent years,45 the importance of such institutions has only increased. However, while Canada may prefer multilateral solutions, geographical and geopolitical realities must also be accepted.46 This is especially true for Canada, which occupies a critical and, in the post9/11 security environment, increasingly ambiguous strategic position beside the United States. The US interest in working at unilateral solutions for dealing with the threat of terrorist organizations and rogue states, and of ignoring or dismissing traditional multilateral solutions, has never been greater. A grand strategy of "primacy," whereby the US seeks to preserve its "supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any global challenger," appears to guide the policies of the current administration.47 The Bush administration's revisions to US nuclear strategy represent the most explicit manifestation of the post-Cold War emphasis on unilateral "nuclear counterproliferation" against rogue states. This requires new strategic strike capabilities and more flexible and adaptive nuclear war plans, and represents an American attempt to not only develop specialized capabilities against rogue states, but in fact to outdistance any potential nuclear adversary. It should be remembered that dissuasion, explicitly mentioned in the NPR as a goal of the New Triad's strategic posture, represents the concept of of fielding a military force so dominating that it prevents adversaries from contemplating resistance.48 This goes to the very heart of the Bush administration's drive towards strategic primacy. In the words of President George W. Bush, America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge.49

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The New Triad is therefore a critical component of this highly ambitious grand strategy. With its emphasis on sophisticated strategic capabilities, spearheaded by offensive nuclear strike systems and incorporating conventional offensive and defensive capabilities, the New Triad offers a vision of American strategic dominance or, to put it squarely in the context of its grand strategy, "nuclear primacy."50 This provides the fundamental guidance for the Bush administration's force structure and policies. The impact of this development on the international security environment is uncertain but, in all likelihood, potentially detrimental in a number of areas: on the non-proliferation regime; the strategic stability between the established NWSs; and the strategic instability between the US and its rogue state adversaries. As such, it touches upon various aspects of Canadian international security policy. First, the Bush administration's revisions to American nuclear strategy challenges one of the basic precepts of Canadian international security policy, namely that multilateral non-proliferation measures are the foundation for dealing with the threat of WMD proliferation. Like most middlepowers, Canada has been an ardent supporter of the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) regime, and the norms and institutions underlying this regime, which are embodied in a number of international treaties, including the NPT, BTWC, CWC, CTBT and various fissile and missile regimes.51 In contrast, the Bush administration viewing the growing WMD programs of its adversaries seems highly dismissive of such measures, preferring instead unilateral or ad hoc means for dealing with this post-Cold War danger. As implied throughout this paper, counterproliferation provides a guiding force for the Bush administration's nuclear strategy, and in many ways, for its entire national security strategy.52 Counterproliferation is not, however, non-proliferation. To some extent, these are mutually exclusive concepts. The non-proliferation regime seeks to prevent the proliferation of WMD, while the coun-

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terproliferation doctrine accepts that proliferation will indeed take place, and seeks to prepare military forces sufficient for dealing with such a threat. Of course, counterproliferation can be seen as a necessary and prudent adjunct to non-proliferation, as was the case for the most part with the Clinton administration. The Bush administration seems, however, far less inclined to rely on multilateral nonproliferation measures, preferring to place its bet on unilateral, proactive counterproliferation. While the Clinton administration's 1999 National Security Strategy detailed a number of multilateral initiatives, including the NPT and the CTBT, "the Bush document outlined nonproliferation activities in one paragraph that only mentioned a recent Group of Eight agreement to assist with weapons disposal in Russia."53 A good example of the disdain that the current administration has for multilateral non-proliferation can be seen with its treatment of the NPT, long regarded as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. For example, by explicitly targeting NNWSs, the US has effectively ended the negative security assurances that were first given out by President Carter in 1978. These assurances are commonly considered an integral if not codified NWS obligation arising out of the NPT. "They have been viewed by NNWSs as one of their major requirements for achieving an adequate balance between their obligations and those of the nuclear weapons states."54 It is true that the US, like many NWSs, has not always followed its negative security pledges. A good example of this is the "calculated ambiguity" doctrine, which seeks to give uncertainty on whether the US would indeed attack a NNWS adversary with nuclear weapons in the event of retaliation.55 But this ambiguity is dramatically clarified by the growing incorporation of such states in US nuclear war plans; the US may still retain a doctrine of public ambiguity, but there is nothing ambiguous about its operational nuclear plans. Relatedly, by explicitly maintaining the nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future, the Bush administration nuclear strategy seems to

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be contrary to the goals enshrined in Article 6 of the NPT, which states that Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.56 The dismissal of Article 6 is further evident in the apparent need to begin nuclear testing. This would not only effectively destroy any chance of resurrecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and therefore give China, India and Pakistan a possible excuse to resume testing themselves, but would also reinforce the impression that the US has no intention in pursuing what the NPT terms "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms raceand to nuclear disarmament." This change in US emphasis will likely have a detrimental impact on Canada's stated goal of dealing with horizontal WMD proliferation in a multilateral framework. While both Canada and the United States do indeed share similar threat perception, their respective views on the means for dealing with that threat may only widen in the future. The impact that this will have on the Canada-US strategic relationship is unknown. However, one should not be optimistic on this front. There is a distinct possibility that the recent bilateral acrimony evident during Canada's refusal to join the US coalition of the willing to undertake regime change in Iraq, and its refusal to formally approve US plans for national missile defence may not be foreign policy aberrations, but rather an ominous prelude for things to come. Second, the Bush administration's nuclear strategy may have an uncertain, but potentially detrimental impact on strategic nuclear stability among the great powers, particularly among such established

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NWSs as the United States, Russia and China. Stability between these powers is an important prerequisite for an international system based on multilateral cooperation and normative institution-building, and is therefore very much in the Canadian national interest. To put it simply, when such stability is lacking, the possibility for a middlepower like Canada to be ignored, and even stepped on, is substantially increased. The argument that the New Triad will have a detrimental impact on the strategic stability between the established nuclear powers follows closely on criticisms of missile defence. According to such criticism, missile defence will lead to both Russia and China initiating countermeasures to compensate for any US missile shield, and raise the spectre of a renewed and cascading arms race.57 The New Triad's incorporation of offensive and defensive systems increases the strength of such an argument, since the nuclear policy planners of both countries will have to take into account the threat posed by US counterforce capabilities, as well as the damage limitation capabilities inherent in missile defence, on their respective arsenals. For example, earth-penetrating counterforce weapons that are meant to hit the HDBTs and mobile and relocatable targets in rogue states would also be ideal weapons for first-strike counterforce attacks against China and Russia. On one hand, China has long maintained a "minimum deterrent"58 against US forces, composed of a small number of liquidfuelled ICBMs that, given their lack of mobility and small numbers, would be very vulnerable to a US first-strike. China is suspected of having only 18 ICBMs (the DF-15) that are capable of reaching the continental United States (CONUS).59 While it does have an additional 12 ICBM-classified missiles (the DF-4), this delivery system is generally not considered capable of reaching CONUS. Not surprisingly, the Chinese nuclear deterrent, an integral component of any feasible Chinese military attack on US-allied Taiwan, has been undergoing a modernization program. This could potentially see its nuclear

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forces expanded to include up to 100 ICBMs capable of hitting the United States (based on the DF-31 and DF-31A missile), as well as improved accuracy, lighter warheads, a more robust C3I system and new solid-fueled and potentially MIRVed ICBMs. This modernization program, which would exist irrespective of US nuclear developments, will likely accelerate as a result of the growing emphasis on American counterforce capabilities.60 On the other hand, Russia has a declining number of strategic warheads,61 and would be very keen to maintain its deterrent in the face of the growing sophisitication of the US strategic arsenal. This would necessitate a robust command and control infrastructure that would be more capable of surviving a US decapitation strike evident in the development of the key leadership and nuclear command system facilities deep in the Yamantau and Kosvinsky mountains62 and in the development of advanced weapon systems that would be better capable of mitigating any US damage limitation capability. Russia has already indicated that it would maintain its inventory of MIRVed ICBMs, and has recently announced progress in the development of the Bukavu SLBM and the mobile Topol-M ICBM, the latter of which is a hypersonic and manoeuverable ballistic missile that would be "capable of penetrating any missile defense system that could conceivably be developed in the next several decades."63 One could also conceivably expect a renewed "launch on warning" posture for the Russian strategic arsenal, in order to better prevent a US first-strike capability.64 That being said, strategic stability between these powers is based on a more substantive footing than during the Cold War.65 Modifications to their arsenals may be necessary, to better secure the viability of their respective nuclear deterrents, but a renewed arms race is by no means a certainty. However, the Bush administration's fixation on strategic primacy provides a problematic environment for the pursuit of such strategic nuclear capabilities. While primacists may assume that other countries would acquiesce to perpetual US pre-eminence, it is more than likely that one will see increased balancing

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behavior on the part of both Russia and China. As noted by Posen and Ross, "States coalesce against hegemons rather than rally around them."66 This increases the possibility that the US relationship with both countries will deteriorate, perhaps to the point of featuring stark adversarial characteristics. If so, the potential for arms races and strategic instability will undoubtedly increase.67 Third, there is also the potential for the deterioration of strategic regional stability between the US and its rogue state adversaries. In sharp contrast to the stability commonly associated with the established NWSs, the relationships between the United States and various rogue states are rarely if ever characterized as stable, even at the best of times. It is also fair to say that these adversarial relationships have only increased with the current administration. As the 2002 National Security Strategy makes clear, "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends."68 The US invasion of Iraq, and its continuing tensions with Iran, Syria and North Korea, are indicative of this fundamental instability. Strategic instability therefore provides a necessary and, potentially, worrisome context for the New Triad's emphasis on new nuclear capabilities for counterproliferation missions against these states. As mentioned earlier, the stated goals of the Bush administration's New Triad include making the US deterrent more credible against these adversaries, and increasing the US ability to dissuade hostile states from even pursuing WMD programs. This creates an impression that strategic stability between the United States and its adversaries will be enhanced. Unfortunately, this impression is also misleading. Nuclear targeting of rogue states armed only with suspected chemical and biological weapons, rather than deterring or dissuading them from pursuing such programs, may simply make WMD, and especially a nuclear deterrent, even more tempting. As Scott Sagan makes clear, a strong reason (and the dominant explanation) for the acquisition of

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nuclear weapons is the need to increase national security against foreign threats.69 One can equally apply this rationale for the acquisition of various kinds of CBWs. Relatedly, the Bush administration's nuclear strategy also envisions the need to defeat rogue states armed with WMD. Given the possibility that the US attempt to deter and dissuade such states from even acquiring WMD will have the opposite impact, to actually abet the horizontal proliferation of WMD, the need to defeat such states may become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Unfortunately, the New Triad may also give the US a false sense of security in its ability to deal with the WMD of rogue states, and increase the temptation for it to undertake regime change campaigns against these states. This represents a vision, not of reinforced strategic stability among these the US and its potential adversaries, but rather of US-led "counterproliferation wars." For example, the US may believe that its more credible nuclear capabilities can be translated to the intrawar deterrence of a rogue state's WMD capabilities (e.g. in the midst of a regime change campaign). Alternatively, such weapons could be seen as a feasible means to retaliate in the event that WMD are employed by its adversaries, or even as a means to pre-empt such capabilities.70 As such, the New Triad is a means to eliminate the possibility, however remote, that the US might itself be deterred from intervening against a rogue state due to the latter's WMD capabilities.71 Does this mean that US nuclear developments, accelerated under the Bush administration, will automatically lead to strategic instability? Fortunately, no it is possible that such blatant nuclear primacy may lead to a rogue state being deterred from ever brandishing and employing their weapons and even dissuaded from seeking such asymmetrical counters. However, this outcome cannot be guaranteed, and it is equally possible (and in this authors opinion, more likely) that strategic instability between the US and these countries will continue to deteriorate.72 Of course, one should not overstate the impact that these nuclear developments will have on the threat perception of

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rogue states the existing power imbalance between the US and its rogue state adversaries is more than sufficient to justify WMD deterrent capability. But the New Triad, with its emphasis on damage limitation and specialized counterforce capabilities (the necessary ingredients for a pre-emptive, first-strike posture), may lead already insecure rogue states to adopt ever more destabilizing employment strategies for their own WMD deterrents. The possibility for conflicts which could escalate and feature the use of WMD, by rogue states and/or the US, should not be discounted. As can be seen with this admittedly brief analysis, the Bush administration's emphasis on nuclear primacy, as an integral part of its wider goal for grand strategic primacy, provides for an uncertain and potentially dangerous international security environment. This should be a concern for Canada, as it affects not only our support for the non-proliferation regime, but our vital interest in a cooperative international security environment. It is not necessarily in Canada's interest that the 21st century be defined by unilateral American strategic dominance, the gradual deterioration in relations between the established nuclear powers, and periodic US-led counterproliferation wars, which may even feature the use of WMD. Unfortunately, Canada's ability to have any real impact on these developments is minimal. To put it simply, vertical nuclear proliferation by the United States may be of concern for the international community including Canada but this community is largely impotent to discourage such developments. As a marginal middlepower, with a long history of free-riding on our Southern neighbour, it would be hubris to think that this country's arguments and policies would have any impact in the corridors of Washington. That being said, the divergence of interest on means for dealing with rogue states can also be seen as an opportunity to improve and supplement multilateral non-proliferation measures. While one can be critical of its current policies, the US does have cause for concern over the utility of the non-proliferation regime; the ability of this regime to stop determined

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proliferators can certainly be questioned. Fortunately, Canada does seem to have partially recognized this reality, as evident in its belated decision to take part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It is true that such an arrangement may not be perfect, and may require some compromises on Canada's part. However, the potential role for an innovative middlepower should not, and must not, be underestimated. Conclusion The nuclear strategy of the Bush administration is centered on a New Triad that envisions new nuclear and conventional counterforce capabilities for flexible and selective "global strikes" against rogue states, supplemented with active defences for purposes of damage limitation. By incorporating and expanding on the policies of its predecessors, the Bush administration has indeed made some significant revisions to American nuclear strategy, and placed it squarely as an integral component of its wider vision for strategic primacy. The impact that these revisions will have on Canada is a little more ambiguous. It is true that these revisions affect, and should be a concern for this country. But they do so in a primarily indirect way by having an impact on strategic stability and the international security environment, and therefore, on Canadian national interests. Perhaps more importantly, it remains to be seen what a middlepower like Canada can do to mitigate these policies. These changes are largely the result of a shift in US perception of what constitutes strategic threats, and Canada should not fool itself that arguments to the contrary will have an even minimal impact on this threat perception. Despite such limitations, it would be prudent for Canada to renew its emphasis on dealing with the threat posed by the horizontal proliferation of WMD for Canada's own security interests; to show the United States that its neighbour is indeed serious about this threat; and as a means of eliminating the rationale for continued US emphasis on nuclear weapons. It is true that Canada's ability to deal with US

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vertical proliferation is minimal to non-existent. However, continuing efforts to deal with horizontal proliferation could conceivably reduce a central rationale for the expansion of the US nuclear arsenal. Notes:
1 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, January 8, 2002) (hereinafter the Nuclear Posture Review). Excerpts of this document are available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
2

Keith B. Payne, "The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, n. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 135-151.
3 NSPD-17 has also been codified under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4 (HSPD4). While the classified document has yet to be released, the public version (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction) can be found at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd/pdf.

This has been a constant critique of Canadian international security policy in the 1990s, which has, under the leadership of Lloyd Axworthy, often focused on issues of "soft power" while ignoring or dismissing traditional "hard power" concerns. For good examples of these kinds of critiques, see Fen O. Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," International Journal, vol. 53, n. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 379-406; Kim Richard Nossal, "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International Citizenship' in Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal, vol. 54, n. 1 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 88-105. For an interesting defence of the Axworthy Doctrine, see Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy," International Journal, vol. 56, n. 1 (Winter 2000-01), pp. 1-18. This argument can be found in David S. McDonough, "Nuclear Superiority or Mutually Assured Deterrence: The Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent," International Journal, vol. 60, n. 3 (Summer 2005). pp. 811-823. See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security, vol. 7, n. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71 and Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 19491954," International Security, vol. 13, n. 3 (Winter 1988/89).
7 6 5

See Fred Kaplan, "JFK's First-Strike Plan", Atlantic Monthly, vol. 288, n. 3 (October 2001). For an interesting critique on the flexibility, if not the pre-emptive basis, of Kennedy's nuclear strategy, see Francis J. Gavin, "The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe during the 1960s," International History Review, n. 23 (December 2001), pp. 847-875.

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8 This strategy, while also featuring weapons development, placed the primary importance on

the need to develop a sophisticated and robust C3 capability. See Walter Slocombe "The Countervailing Strategy," International Security, vol. 5, n. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 18-27.
9 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 131. Escalation dominance has its intellectual roots in the work of Herman Kahn at Rand in the 1950s, specifically his idea of the escalation ladder and the need to control and dominate the escalation process. 10 See Desmond Ball and Robert C. Toth, "Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes," International Security, vol. 14, n. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 65-92. For a good look at the threat of decapitation, see John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy, n. 45 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 18-28. 11 For instance, both counterproliferation and the New Triad focus on shallow buried targets, advanced energetic materials (i.e. extreme heat, chemical reaction or thermobaric effects), hard and deeply buried targets, special operations forces, and capabilities against mobile missiles. For further information on counterproliferation, see Center for Counterproliferation Research (CCR), The Counterproliferation Imperative: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges, CCR Report (Washington, DC: National Defense University, November 2001), Chp. 5.

See Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
13

12

See Barry R. Schneider, Future war and counterproliferation: US military responses to NBC proliferation threats (Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger, 1999). For more on the threat posed by Iraq's WMD capabilities during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, see Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999) and Amatzia Baram, "An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, n. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 25-39.

14

For a detailed account of the 1994 North Korea crisis, see Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Non-proliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

15 While no White House factsheet was presented on the CPI, Les Aspin's remarks has been posted on the Federation of American Scientists' website, at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm. 16

British American Security Information Council (BASIC), "Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy," BASIC Research Report (February 1998), p. 15. Silver Books stands for Silver or Strategic Installation List of Vulnerability Effects and Results. While this project was terminated, a Silver Book was developed for European Command, and one was in development for Pacific Command. See Hans

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Kristensen, "Targets of Opportunity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, vol. 53, n. 5 (September/October 1997), pp. 22-28. For more on the disproportionate role and influence of STRATCOM in the formulation of US nuclear forces, see Hans Kristensen, The Matrix of Deterrence: US Strategic Command Force Structure Studies (Berkely, CA: The Nautilus Institute, May 2001), pp. 1-23. This report details numerous STRATCOM studies such as the Phoenix Study, the Sun City Study and the Sun City Extended Study that heavily influenced the US government's nuclear policies throughout the 1990s.
18 19 20 17

Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 12-13. Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 12-14.

See Roger Speed and Michael May, "Dangerous Doctrine," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 38-49.

21 Department of Energy and Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets (Washington DC: Department of Energy and Defense, July 2001), p. 8. The Report identifies two types of facilities: (i) the shallow "cut and cover" design, which would have a concrete structural overburden of less than 10 feet of thickness to protect tactical facilities; and (ii) the much harder facilities with strategic functions, which could have a concrete overburden equivalent to 70 to 300 feet, redundant ventilation, power, and communications systems, and sophisticated camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques. A slightly modified HDBT classification scheme is outlined in Michael A. Levi, "Fire in the Hold: Nuclear and Non-nuclear Options for Counter-Proliferation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, 31 (November 2002).

This figure is from Defense Science Board Task Force on Underground Facilities, which is quoted in Nuclear Posture Review, p. 46. The NPR goes on to note that, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1,400 of these UGFs are known or suspected of housing strategic facilities, many of which are deep underground. Kurt Guthe, "The Nuclear Posture Review: How Is the 'New Triad' New?" Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessements (2002), p. 1. The NPR became a a congressional requirement due to Section 1041 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398), October 30, 2000.
24 23

22

Philippe Lagasse, "The SORT Debate: Implications for Canada," IRPP Working Paper Series, No. 2003-01 (October 2003).
25

Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "US nuclear forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 73-75.

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26

The RNEP project is officially a Phase 6.2/6.2A feasibility and cost study, intended to examine the possibility of increasing the earth penetration capability of the B61 and B63 nuclear bomb. However, the Bush administration's FY2005 request did specify a five year plan that went into cost estimates for Phase 6.3 on development engineering, and Phase 6.4 on production engineering. See Jonathan Medalia, "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Budget Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009," CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report to Congress (January 10, 2005,) available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32347.pdf.

27 For example, in the FY 2005 budget request, the Bush administration asked for $27.6 million for the RNEP program, and an additional $9 million for the study of new nuclear weapon concepts. See Karin Yourish with Matthew Johnson, "Proposed Energy Department Budget Would Boost Funds for Nuclear Weapons,"Arms Control Today (March 2004). 28 For these developments, see Norris and Kristensen, "US nuclear forces, 2005" and Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, and Christopher E. Paine, Nuclear Insecurity: A Critique of the Bush Administration's Nuclear Weapons Policies (National Resources Defense Council, September 2004), pp. 9-15. 29 See Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF), "The Shape of Things to Come: The Nuclear Posture Review, Missile Defense, and the Dangers of a New Arms Race," WSLF Report (April 2002) and WSLF, "The Military Space Plan, Conventional ICBMs, and the Common Aero Vehicle: Overlooked Threats of Weapons Delivered Through or From Space," WSLF Information Bulletin (Fall 2002). Both weapon systems seem to be based on the Reagan administration's research on a nuclear Manoeuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MARV).

The National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002), p. 14. This document can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
31 See Nicholas Kralev, "Bush Approves Nuclear Response," The Washington Times, January 31, 2003.

30

This can be differentiated from "deliberative planning," which emphasizes large pre-existing nuclear war plans in the form of the Single Integrated Operating Plans. These plans will still continue, in the form of OPLAN 8044, but with a more rapid production time. Crisis action planning has been codified in CONPLAN 8022-02, which is a pre-emptive "global strike" contingency plan against unexpected imminent threats, such as in Iran and North Korea, involving precision kinetic (conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic effects. Under this plan, nuclear weapons would be given a prompt strike capability (minutes to hours) against targets not included in the pre-existing nuclear plans, in order to destroy an enemy's launch of a nuclear strike or to destroy a critical HDBT. See Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Mission Creep: The Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation on US
33

32

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Nuclear Policy and Planning," Presentation to The Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.nukestrat.com and William Arkin, "Not Just a Last Resort?" Washington Post, May 15, 2005, p. B01.
34

Norris and al., Nuclear Insecurity, pp. 1-8.

35 The name was formally changed at a conference in 2003, though OPLAN 8044 has been used throughout the 1990s to refer to the SIOP's implementation plan. It remains to be seen whether this name change will become permanent. See Hans Kristensen, "US Changes Name of Nuclear War Plan," Nuclear Brief (December 21, 2004), available on The Nuclear Information Project website, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/siopname. htm. Interestingly, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard B. Myers has recently used the term "strategic deterrence response plan" to describe the US nuclear war plan this has a strong resemblance to the unsuccessful proposal by former STRATCOM commander General George Lee Butler to use the term "National Strategic Response Force" See General Richard B. Myers, "Written Posture Statement to SASC, HASC amd HAC-D," (February 16 and 17, 2005), at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/Testimony_Myers0216-1705.pdf.

Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of Strategic Strike Forces (Washington DC: Defense Science Board, February 2004), pp. 5-13. The US attempt at operationalizing "global strike" can be seen in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's approval of a top secret "Interim Global Strike Alert Order," which in turn led to CONPLAN 8022-02 and the incorporation of nuclear weapons in this pre-emptive contingency plan. See footnote 33. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Pub 3-12 (Final Coordination [2] draft, March 15, 2005) p. III-2, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP312_05draft.pdf.
39 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Pub 3-12 (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 15, 1995), p. III-2. It remains to be seen whether the new document gives any greater authority to the combatant commanders in terms of release authority. As the old document notes, "Each commander with a nuclear planning capability identifies and requests authorization to strike any targets necessary to accomplish the mission." (p. III-4). 40 41 38 37

36

Nuclear Posture Review, p. 30.

John A. Gordon, Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Services (February 14, 2002), available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2002/2002-02-14-TESTI MONY-US_Armed_Services_NPR.pdf.

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42

Christine Kucia, "Congress approves research on new nuclear weapons," Arms Control Today (June 2003).

Wade Boese, "Congress Axes Funding for New Nukes," Arms Control Today (December 2004). Daryl G. Kimball, "Replacement Nuclear Warheads? Buyer Beware," Arms Control Today (May 2005). Also see Wade Boese, "US Weighing Nuclear Stockpile Changes," Arms Control Today (May 2005) and William J. Broad, "US Redesigning Atomic Weapons," New York Times February 27, 2005.
45 44

43

For a good overview, see Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003). Numerous reports from academics and nongovernmental organizations reiterate this point. For a good overview, see Barry Cooper, Mercedes Stephenson and Ray Szeto, "Canada's Military Posture: An examination of Recent Civilian Reports," The Fraser Institute Critical Issues Bulletins (January 2004), available at http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/publications/pdf/cooper_CanadaMilitaryPosture_jan04.pdf
46 This argument is reiterated in Ko Colinj, "Weapons of

mass destruction: A medium-power

concern," International Journal, vol. 59, n. 2 (Spring 2004).

47

Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," International Security, vol. 21, n. 3 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 32. A blueprint for such a grand strategy was first brought to light in 1992, with the leak of then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz's controversial Defense Policy Guidance (1994-1999). For further information on this document, see Patrick E. Tyler, "US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 7, 1992. For a good discussion on the writing of this controversial document, see James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004).

War with Iraq: The New US National Security Strategy," Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Public Interest Report, vol. 55, n. 5 (September/October 2002), pp. 3-4, available at: http://www.fas.org/faspir/2002/v55n5/v55n5.pdf George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy," Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2002.
50 49

48 Carl Kaysen, John D. Steinbruner, Martin B. Malin, "Behind the Prospect of

This does not mean that the non-nuclear elements are not an integral component of the New Triad. However, such components are featured in what is formally a review of the US nuclear posture, and are seen in a context that has traditionally been dominated by US strategic nuclear weapons capabilities. For these reasons, and despite its wider strategic nature, this author has chosen to use the term "nuclear primacy."

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51 The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC);

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Other non-proliferation agreements include the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the Australia Group, on chemical and biological materials, as well as the most recent Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
52 See Jason D. Ellis, "The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and US National Security," The

Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, n. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 115-133.

53

Christine Kucia, "Counterproliferation at Core of New Security Strategy," Arms Control Today (October 2002). Other treaties mentioned in the 1999 document include the BTWC and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreements. It should also be noted that the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction does outline these multilateral non-proliferation measures (though with the conspicuous absence of the CTBT).
54

George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, "Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1993), p. 11. Such assurances are commonly seen as being a necessary condition for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to relinquish their nuclear weapons in 1994, and for the NNWSs to support the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Also see George Bunn, "The Legal Status of US Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 1-17. Calculated ambiguity was coined by former Secreatry of State James A. Baker, who used it to describe US policy during the 1990-91 Gulf War. As Baker writes, "I purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation." Quoted in William Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 16, n. 4 (Autumn 1996), 3-18. Also see Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," International Security, vol. 24, n. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 85-115. Article 6, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (July 1, 1968), at http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html.
57 56 55

For a good example of the critique on missile defence, see Ernie Regehr, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, Report of the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies (December 2003). Also see the contrasting arguments by Fergusson and Ross in this volume.

58 According to one author, minimum deterrence has shifted towards a more robust "limited deterrence" strategic concept. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, vol. 20, n. 2 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42.

122 DAVID S. MCDONOUGH

While it does have an additional 12 ICBM-classified missile (the DF-4), this delivery system is generally not considered capable of reaching CONUS. For a recent sober assessment of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, see Jeffrey Lewis, "The Ambiguous Arsenal," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 3 (May/June 2005), pp. 52-59. The NPR does also explicitly point to China as a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency. The immediate contingency is regarding a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan. The potential contingency consists of plausible but not immediate dangers, which can include "the emergence of a new, hostile military coalition against the United States or its allies." See Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 16-17. For more on the impact that the NPR has had on China, see Joanne Tompkins, "How US Strategic Policy is Changing China's Nuclear Plans," Arms Control Today (January-February 2003).
61 For more information on the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, see Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russian nuclear forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 70-72. 60 59

The Yamantau facility is a leadership relocation facility, while the Kosvinsky facility houses the Russian nuclear command system. As such, it is a critical link to the 'Dead Hand' communications network for semi-automatic retaliation in the event of a decapitating strike. See Bruce G. Blair, "We Keep Buiding Nukes for All the Wrong Reasons," Washington Post, May 25, 2003, available at http://www.cdi.org/blair/new-nukes.cfm.
63 Nikolai Sokov, "Military Exercises In Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated By Strategic Rocket Success," Center for Non-Proliferation Studies Research Story (February 24, 2004), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040224.htm. It should be noted that in the 2004 exercise that featured both weapon systems, the Bukavu SLBM failed to launch. 64

62

For more on the Russian 'launch on warning' nuclear posture, see Bruce G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Also see Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1993).
65 See Frank P. Harvey, "The future of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence," International Journal, vol. 58, n. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 321-346. 66 67

Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," p. 43.

For this argument, see David S. McDonough, "The 'New Triad' of the Bush administration: Counterproliferation and escalation dominance in US nuclear strategy," International Journal, vol. 59, n. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 613-634.
68

National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 14.

THE DILEMMAS

OF

AMERICAN STRATEGIC PRIMACY

123

See Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, vol. 21, n. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 54-86. While Sagan does accept the importance of what he terms the 'security model' for nuclear proliferation, he also accepts the role of domestic politics and norms as explanatory variables.
70

69

This author takes a more sanguine view on the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used as part of a first-strike pre-emptive attack against a rogue state. A 'commitment trap' may have been created on nuclear pre-emption. However, one should also recognize that such a trap is based on public communication of such threats, and such pronouncements, on the issue of nuclear as opposed to conventional pre-emption, has not been a feature of the Bush administration. For more on the commitment trap, see Sagan, "The Commitment Trap," pp. 85-115. Of course, while not part of the official US doctrine, nuclear pre-emptive strikes appear to have been incorporated into operational planning, as seen in the crisis action planning and prompt strike capability of CONPLAN 8022-02.

71

The fear of a rogue state deterrent, and the need to counter such a deterrent with enhanced nuclear capabilities, has be raised by a number of prominent analysts. See Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (New York: Lynne Rienner, 1999) and Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001). Interestingly, both authors are prominent members of the National Institute of Public Policy, and were involved in writing the influential document, Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces. This document is acknowledged to have heavily informed the 2002 NPR, and many of its authors, including Keith Payne, would go on to hold positions in the Bush administrations Pentagon.
72

For the opposite perspective, see Payne, "The Nuclear Posture Review," pp. 135-151.