23302249

Arch. Hist. Exact Sci. 61 (2007) 337 Digital Object Identier (DOI) 10.
1007/s00407-006-0114-8
Two Traces of Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle: a Tale of Denitions in Aristotle, with a Moral
Henry Mendell
Communicated by J.L. Berggren In memoriam David Fowler In a classic paper, Wilbur Knorr [1978] presents an account of a pre-Euclidean proportion theory which he attributes to Eudoxus. This theory is characterized by the fact that in a proof that two magnitudes a and b have the same ratio as magnitudes c and d , the case where a and b are commensurable is treated rst (for generality, a determinate case), and the case where they are incommensurable is then derived from the commensurable case by a reductio ad absurdum (for generality, an indeterminate case). It remains a signicant question whether there are compelling contemporary traces of the theory.1 Arguments using proportions or mentioning proportion theory are ubiquitous in Aristotle and can furnish us with important evidence for early proportion theory. I shall argue that two traces, each nigh incoherent on its own, when taken together constitute such evidence in Aristotles corpus, as well as evidence for a more general technique of proof by determinate and indeterminate cases. These examples both afford us with evidence for Knorrs interpretation and reveal that Aristotle sometimes treats denitions operationally, where the denition is an effective procedure for constructing a problem. This procedure may be a non-necessary method, i.e., where, at least for some cases, the constuction may be achieved by other means. It may even be demonstrated and restricted, i.e., where the denition applies directly only to a subclass of the deniendum and where the other cases are then reduced to this subclass. For Aristotle, denitions that reveal essence are connected to demonstration. However, the fact that for Aristotle such real denitions could be operational and restricted and that such demonstrated real denitions occur in his own use of mathematics, I suspect, will come as news. In fact, Aristotle had the conceptual apparatus to conceive of the denition of same ratio as an undemonstrated denition of the restricted case, or as a basic theorem proving the restricted case, or as a fundamental theorem which reveals how to work from the restricted denition to all other cases, or as a generalization of all cases taken individually to the kind taken as a whole based on the fundamental theorem.
For example, B. Vitrac [1994, 5239] uses the lack of direct evidence to establish the possibility of Archimedes as the inventor of the technique.
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In this paper, then, I shall be presenting two distinct but related theses. One is the argument that there is evidence in Aristotle for Knorrs Eudoxan proportion theory. However, the vehicle of this argument will be the claim that operational, restricted, and demonstrated denitions play an important role in Aristotles scientic theory. Some may even regard this as the more signicant thesis. In fact, the realization that Aristotle can speak of these as denitions leads directly to the moral, that a central pillar of modern reconstructions of the early history of proportion theory is very unstable. TYPES OF DEFINITION Operational denition: the denition of A provides an effective method for nding As, where the construction need not be necessary, i.e., where, at least for some cases, the nding of As may be achieved by other means. Restricted denition: the denition of A only applies to some As, but by various methods, such as appeals to continuity and various intuitions, we may determine for any x whether x is A or x is not A. Demonstrated denition: a proposition such as All As are denition-of-Aor a proposition from which the denition-of-A can be straight-forwardly derived (e.g., in Aristotle, by transposing the terms in the demonstrative syllogism so as to compose them into a new term) is a fundamental theorem about A. The rst trace of Knorrs pre-Euclidean proportion theory occurs in Aristotles analysis of faster and equally fast in Physics Z 2. It provides an example of demonstrated denitions that are restricted and operational in the above senses. The second is in a argument that innite bodies cannot have nite weight in De caelo A 6, where Aristotle does distinguish between a commensurable and incommensurable case, as Knorr observed [1976, 1989].2 Yet against Knorrs use of this passage it might be argued that the incoherence of Aristotles discussion counts against its reecting any method at all. Quite the contrary, I shall argue that the best way, perhaps even the only way, to understand Aristotles argument is against the background of two types of proof reected in Knorrs account. These passages contribute, I believe, to a more general picture of early Greek mathematics, namely, that it was customary for mid-4th cent. BCE mathematicians to distinguish between a simple determinate case and an indeterminate case. They also show that we have to look more carefully at some of Aristotles claims about denitions in mathematics. Indeed, it may even lead to a modicum of scepticism about a most important use of Aristotelian discussions to reconstruct early proportion theory: his mention of the
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Knorr also uses the argument as evidence for the bisection principle, which is ubiquitous in Aristotles arguments on proportion. Indeed, one formulation of Aristotles denition of the innite in extension might be: A is innite in extension if B is a nite part of A and n n B A, cf. Physics 6.206b 337a 2. (Note that for Aristotle a point is not a part of a line.) Of course, this is the sort of innite that Aristotle denies is real.
Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

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or alternating denition of same ratio as magnitudes having the same subtraction (Topics 3.158b 2935).3 1. Two-step proportion theory According to Knorr, the Eudoxan theory of proportion was characterized by a family of techniques for determining one ratio to be the same as or larger than another. We can discern from these techniques a conception of ratio and proportion, but we need not think that they were gathered as a unied theory under a single denition in the sense of Elements v, i.e. denitions of same ratio and larger ratio. One begins with a case where only commensurable magnitudes are involved and then reduces the case where the magnitudes are incommensurable to the case of commensurables. I shall call this family of proof techniques the two-step method. In presenting the theory, Knorr suggests two denitions of same ratios, where A, B are magnitudes and m, n are integers:4 Def. 1. Def. 2a. Def. 2b. A : B = m : n if and only if n A = m B. A : B < m : n if and only if n A < m B. A : B > m : n if and only if n A > m B.
As Knorr points out, it is unimportant whether these are thought of as theorems or as proper denitions. We may then take an abstract example to see how a general proof would be reduced to these. We need to prove that two pairs of magnitudes A, B, and a, b, are such that A : B = a : b. This may be treated as two theorems, one where A, B are commensurable and one where they are not. We rst suppose that A and B are commensurable and show that A : B = a : b, e.g., by nding the common measure M of A and B. Since A = n M and B = m M, then A : B = n : m. We also prove that n : m = a : b, so that A : B = a : b. We next prove that A : B = a : b where A, B are incommensurable. Suppose that A and B are incommensurable and that A : B > a : b. Suppose also that A : B = a : b, so that A < A. We nd by a lemma (see below) A , such that A < A < A and A is commensurable with B. Hence, A : B > A : B > A : B = a : b. However, by the rst theorem, for the commensurable case, we showed that A : B = a : b, an instance of the commensurable case. Hence, a : b > a : b, so that a > a . We also prove separately that a < a . Hence, A : B = a : b < a : b, in contradiction with the previous argument. The case where we assume A : B < a : b is reduced to contradiction in a similar way. The two-step method is, in fact, more general and can also be used to show, given magnitudes A, B and a , b (arcs in every extant example), that a > b or that A : B = a : x & x < b (in effect A : B > a : b). Thus, the technique provides one avenue for comparing magnitudes. It is used by Archimedes, Theodosius, and Pappus.5
3 The passage formed the basis for O. Beckers reconstruction of early proportion theory [Becker, 1933]. All modern reconstructions start with Becker. 4 Knorr [1978, 233]. 5 Archimedes, Plane Equilibria i 67 (the fundamental theorem on the balance) and Pappus, Collectio v 12 (circle: section = circumference: arc of section) concern same ratios. Theodosius, De sphaera iii 10 (given four arcs in a conguration, to show that two are to each other as the third arc is to an arc less than the fourth) establishes in effect that one ratio is larger than another (by
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The lemma, as proved in a scholion to Theodosius, Sphaerica iii 9, is particularly important to my discussion (Scholia (ed. Heiberg), 148.1819):
If three magnitudes of the same kind are supposed, AB, G, DE, with AB larger than G and DE of any size, let it be required to nd some magnitude smaller than AB, larger than G, and commensurable with DE. Let BZ be equal to G. Bisecting DE and bisecting the half of that and repeatedly doing this, we are left with some magnitude less than AZ [cf. Elements x 1]. Let there be left DH and let it be less than AZ, while it is a measure of DE. DH either measures BZ or it doesnt measure it. First let it measure it and let ZQ be equal to DH. Since DH measures ZB, and DH is equal to ZQ, therefore DH measures BQ. But it also measured DE. Therefore BQ is commensurable with DE, while being smaller than AB and larger than G. Let DH not measure ZB, and let DH in measuring out ZB exceed it by ZQ which is smaller than DH [and therefore ZQ < AZ]. Therefore, BQ is commensurable with DE, while being smaller than AB and larger than G.
Diagram 1
assuming also the existence of the fourth proportional), while the previous theorem, iii 9 (to show that one arc on a great circle is larger than another), unambiguously concerns one magnitude being larger than another. After supplying in vi 5 an alternative proof of Theodosius, De sphaera iii 5, that one of adjacent arcs on an oblique great circle in a given conguration is larger, Pappus provides in vi 69 two proofs of the case where the arcs are not adjacent. The second proof of Pappus is two-step (vi 7 for the commensurable case and vi 89 for the incommensurable case, vi 8 that one arc isnt smaller than the other and vi 9 that the arc isnt equal to the other). Pappus is clearly using the techniques taken from De sphaera iii 9, 10 to prove this theorem. As to the theorems on spherics, Theod., De sphaera iii 9 and Pappus vi 79, the incommensurable case is divided into a case where a < b is proved impossible by reduction to the commensurable case via the lemma, and the case where a = b is shown to entail what was refuted in the rst incommensurable case. Similarly for Theod., De sphaera iii 10, the incommensurable case is broken up into two cases where the hypothesis that A : B = a : x and x > b leads to a contradiction by reduction to the commensurable case via the lemma, and then the hypothesis that x = b is shown to entail what was refuted in the rst incommensurable case. Since Pappus, Collectio v 12 is a lemma in the discussion of isoperimetric theorems, presumably based on Zenodorus (2nd cent. BCE), and may be distinguished from Archimedes use in mechanics as well as from the family of arguments from spherical geometry, there are really three extant traditions of the method, with one, namely that from spherical geometry, merely tangentially concerned with proportions (however, in presenting v 12, Pappus refers to the lemma from the Sphaerica). This accords with my overall thesis that the technique concerns the comparison of magnitudes, for which proportionality constitutes a crucial case. J.L. Berggren [1976] argues that the Archimedes theorems are spurious. His conclusion may affect how we are to think of the other two traditions and their relation to Archimedes, but it has little impact on my argument here about antecedents to all three traditions.
Here, the two cases are: one where one magnitude measures another (the determinate case), and another where it does not (the indeterminate case). The second case is direct and is not here reduced to the rst; it is genuinely distinct. We shall see an argument of this sort in Aristotle mis-identied as an argument of the commensurable/incommensurable sort. It is convenient to distinguish types of determinate/indeterminate cases. We can call the case where we examine the consequences of a measuring b, where a is a part of b, the measure case. We can call the case where a exceeds b in measuring it, i.e. where a doesnt measure b and some multiple m of a exceeds b, the suprameasure case. Note that it is unimportant whether m is the least multiple of a to exceed b. Determinate // Indeterminate Cases Measure // Suprameasure Cases: A measures B // A does not measure B & mAm>B Commensurate // Incommensurate Cases: A and B are commensurate // A and B are incommensurate and the commensurate case is reduced to the commensurate by a reductio. 2. Restricted denitions, operational denitions, demonstrated denitions, and Aristotelian denitions In what sense is the two-step method a denition of proportion? Obviously, it is not a denition in the sense of the denitions in Euclid, Elements v 5, 7, a statement which provides necessary and sufcient conditions for determining whether the term dened applies. Def. 1 can at best be thought of as a denition of same ratio for commensurable magnitudes, while Def. 2 at best tells us when ratios of magnitudes are larger or smaller than ratios of commensurable magnitudes. Neither tells us what to say when A, B are incommensurable. Given some a , b, we need a separate theorem that gives us a method for determining whether A : B = a : b. We could even imagine Def. 1 as emerging from a yet simpler notion: A : B = a : b if A measures B as many times as a measures b (m A m = B & a m = b). This denition of proportion is restricted and operational, in that the strict definition applies only a simple determinate case. The extension to the other cases is operational, in the sense that the mathematician may discover and prove families of procedures which extend the determinate case to all indeterminate cases and, in particular, by reductio, to the incommensurable cases, where a version of the required lemma is used. Restricted operational denitions and such demonstrated denitions may seem alien to some modern students of Aristotle, who may object that they could not have been 4th-century notions; yet we shall see that a reasonable argument can be made that even Aristotle considered such denitions legitimate. And if they are legitimate to Aristotle, they are, therefore, acceptable to one of the two principal theoreticians about the nature of denition in the 4th-century (Plato being the other). Hence, when we nd Aristotle
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speaking about denitions in mathematics we should not always assume that he means a statement providing necessary and sufcient conditions. Crucial to Aristotles treatment of denitions and demonstrations is the intuitive operation of term construction from propositions and proposition construction from terms. So if Some As are B is a true claim, then BA is a legitimate term to use in ones science. If BA is a legitimate term to use in ones science, this is because one minimally has a proof or assumption, Some As are B.6 This feature of Aristotles philosophy of science explains how Aristotles core notion of a real denition can be an explanatory syllogism that reveals the essence (cf. An. Post B 10). We start with nominal denitions.7 Suppose that A belongs to all B. We
Cf. Mendell [1998, 18694, 203210, 2225]. Aristotles account of denitions has three crucial ingredients, the stipulative denition of the term (normally called namelike or nominal denition), the investigators non-accidental knowledge of the instantiation of the term, and the demonstration of the essence of the deniendum which is transformed in two ways into denitions. Charles [2000] argues that these constitute successive stages of learning the deniendum. Since I am only here concerned with the arrangement of a scientic treatise, the issue of the order of investigation is unimportant. In an actual ancient scientic treatise as read by an Aristotelian, it is possible for the stipulative denition to occur rst with the existence proof later, or for the existence proof to occur before the stipulative denition, or for one or both to be omitted altogether, or for the existence proof to come only with the demonstration of the essence and real denition (in fact, an Aristotelian reader of Euclids Elements might well regard all of these possibilities as occurring there). There is also much controversy whether Aristotle classies three or four kinds of denitions in An. Post. B 10. These candidates are denitions which indicate what the name signies and do not involve an assumption of the existence of the deniendum (at least included in the class of nominal denitions), indemonstrable denitions, denitions that are the transformed conclusions of demonstrations of the essence, and real denitions that are the demonstration itself transformed. For a brief survey of the problem, cf. Barnes [1993, 2223]. I am not here concerned with the question whether nominal denitions are the same as or different from the denitions that are conclusions transformed. If these are two classes, for the purposes of mathematics, this difference would probably be merely functional. That is, the denition of triangle in the list of denitions of a science would be nonexistential, while the conclusion of the demonstration, now having existential import, might be verbally the same but belong to the other class and with a different semantic content. Charles [2000, esp. 437], produces a general argument along these lines, where he builds on the basic point that a real denition is of the thing, while a nominal denition is of the word. Bolton [1976] argues that the nominal denition and the denition as conclusion are the same class and that both assume existence. We can agree on the phenomena without worrying about the classications. Hence, it is consistent with Boltons view that Aristotle insist that only words that are instantiated can have nominal denitions and yet also insist that a nominal denition at the beginning of a treatise not include existence as part of its sense. Secondly, the difference between a nominal denition in the list of denitions at the beginning of a treatise and the transformed conclusion is that the transformed conclusion does not actually occur in the treatise as a denition separate from the nominal denition but might well occur as a term in a demonstration. No extant mathematical text has both of these two claims: rectilinear gures with three sides are called triangles and later, triangles are rectilinear gures with three sides, but a treatise might have something like (to modify Elements i 22), And so, ABC is a rectilinear gure with three sides; hence, a triangle ABC has been constructed. Thirdly, corresponding to Charles [2000] three stages of denition,
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can imagine a stipulative denition: let A be denition-of-A , e.g. let thunder be noise-in-the-cloud. One can substitute one expression for the other, noise-in-the-cloud for thunder. Secondly, denition-of-A may be thought of as a nominalization of a statement, here, Noise belongs to cloud. Next one seeks an explanatory account of why A belongs to B, e.g. why does it thunder, i.e. why does noise (of the sort that is in-the-cloud) belong to cloud, i.e. extinction-of-re:
Noise belongs to extinction-of-re. Extinction-of-re belongs to cloud. Thus, noise belongs to cloud.
The real denition of thunder is a transformation of this explanatory account, thunder is noise-resulting-from-extinction-of-re-in-clouds, where the terms noise, extinctionof-re, and cloudare transposedto construct a single term (cf. An. Post. B 10.94a 12, 1213). In other words, for Aristotle, the real denition can be the result of a transposition of a demonstration, while the nominal denition becomes its conclusion in the sense that the terms of the conclusion, noise and cloud are likewise transposed to form a single term: thunder is noise-in-the-clouds. The example here is an efcient cause, but in mathematics we would expect the demonstration that can be transposed into a denition to provide an account, for example, of why a triangle exists. Aristotle would regard a mathematical technique for proving that A belongs to B as a causal explanation of why A belongs to B. Here is a basis for operational and demonstrated denitions in Aristotle. When I speak of demonstrated denitions, I shall mean loosely any denition which is built out of a demonstration, whether in Aristotles strict sense of a transformation of a demonstration or any fundamental theorem which reveals a term.
the denition as conclusion transformed actually occurs, perhaps earlier, with the existence proof, at Charles second stage, before it is a conclusion; otherwise, there will be three verbally nigh identical denitions, the nominal denition with the deniendum term mentioned, the denition as applied to an existing entity with the deniendum term used, and the conclusion transformed. In other words, the proof of existence legitimates the deniendum expression, e.g., triangle, and its nominal deniens as terms in an Aristotelian demonstration. It would have been very reasonable of Aristotle to have argued, as he so often does, that in one sense the two denitions are the same and in another different. Hence, I am indifferently calling the nominal, i.e., stipulative denition, the nominal denition as legitimated by an existence proof, and the transformed conclusion of the demonstration of the essence the nominal denition, without making any commitment to which of these possibilities is the correct interpretation of Aristotle. As to indemonstrable denitions, these would at least include denitions of the principal kinds in the science.
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There is also a foundation for restricted operational denitions.8 In an exposition of this same account of denition at De anima B 2.413a 1120 (cf. Met. B 2.996b 1822), Aristotle provides a restricted operational denition for squaring:9
Since what is clear and more grasped according to the account comes from things that are unclear but more evident, we should attempt to explain this (the soul) again in this way. For it is not only necessary that the dening account make clear the fact that, as most denitions do, but also that the cause occur in it and be displayed. The statements of denitions are now like conclusions. E.g. what is squaring? there being an equilateral rectangle equal to an oblong. But such a denition is an account of the conclusion. The one which says that squaring is the discovery of a mean states the cause of the matter.
The nominaldenition, there-being-an-equilateral-rectangle-equal-to-an-oblong, is not exactly identical to the conclusion; it is a nominal form of the conclusion and is constructed out of it. The real denition of squaring then is a transposition of a syllogism, there-being-an-equilateral-rectangle-equal-to-an-oblong-rectangle (the conclusion of the syllogism) because-of-the-discovery-of-a-mean-proportional-of-the-thing (the middle term in the syllogism). We may reconstruct the syllogism in this way:10
There-being-an-equal-equilateral-rectangle belongs to (i.e. is constructed via) discoveryof-a-mean-proportional. Discovery-of-a-mean-proportional belongs to oblong-rectangle. Thus, there-being-an-equilateral-rectangle belongs (i.e. there is an equilateral rectangle equal) to oblong-rectangle.
This denition is restricted since it only applies to a rectangle. All other cases of squaring must be discovered by a reduction to the case of squaring a rectangle and are squarings because of that reduction. For example, in the Prior Analytics (B 25.69a 3033), Aristotle proposes the following reduction of the problem of circle squaring:
Squaring belongs to rectilinear-gure. Rectilinear-gure belongs to (i.e., is equal to) circle-with-lunules-becoming-equal-to-arectilinear-gure.
In a very useful part of his discussion, Bolton [1976, 53840] argues that there are three types of nominal denitions as conclusions of demonstrations, those that provide a part of the essence and so provide necessary conditions, those that provide sufcent conditions by picking out a characteristic subclass of the deniendum, and those that are members of the class via accidents. However, Bolton does not regard this classication as pertaining to real denitions. On demonstration of the essence, also cf. McKirahan [1992, inter alia 198208]. 9 Normally, operations are not denienda in Greek mathematics, although verbs are commonly dened. Cf. Netz [1999, 9194, 9699]. 10 Part of the interpretation of this syllogism involves lling in the appropriate sense of belongs. For a discussion of this problem, cf. Mendell [1998, 1708]. The sense of belong can vary within a syllogism, and its validity will depend on whether the conclusion involves an appropriate sense of belong in the premises. Here the sense of A belongs to B might be something like A is constructed through B or A is a possible entity on B.
Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle Circle-with-lunules-becoming-equal-to-a-rectilinear-gure belongs (i.e., is equal) to circle. Thus, squaring belongs to circle.
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We can readily imagine a general nominaldenition of squaring as nding a square equal to a given gure, but Aristotle does not treat the squaring in this way. It is also clear that this denition is operational in the sense that the real denition provides the foundation for squaring by an operation that is effective (nding the mean proportional), but not always necessary. For one can square some gures without nding a mean proportional (e.g., by cutting and pasting a 1 4 rectangle or an isosceles triangle with base twice the height). Furthermore, the operation is proved, namely one proves that any rectangle can be squared in this way and so concludes that any gure that can be found equal to a rectangle can be squared, e.g. by a theorem along the lines of Elements vi.13 and 17 or ii.14.11 In other words, squaring involves a cluster of methods of reducing a problem to squaring a rectangle. In a similar way, we can imagine a denition of same ratio which takes into account only the determinate or commensurable case, but allows us to use principles of continuity to extend the application of same-ratio to incommensurable cases.
3. The denition of Faster in Aristotle, Physics Z 2 The rst passage providing traces of arguments with determinate and indeterminate cases is Aristotle, Physics Z 2.232a 23-b 20. Aristotle provides three denitions of faster and then proceeds to prove all three from a yet more fundamental denition. Even so, all three denitions are restricted; yet each constitutes an expansion on the previous denition. To make this account at all plausible, the reader needs to bring in rich kinematic postulates that will allow one to infer from a principle about initial segments to smaller segments or that will allow one to extend the motion of one of the moving objects as needed. Once this is done, general principles of continuity will allow one to expand the restricted and demonstrated denitions to other required cases. Hence, the denitions are also operational. Finally, we shall see that the arguments involve a delicate interplay between determinate and indeterminate cases, where one determinate case provides the foundation for an indeterminate case, which then is used to establish the second
It is common for scholars to try to identify Elements vi 13 (the nding of a mean proportional) and its application to the problem at Elements vi 17 (three lines are in continuous proportion iff the square on the middle is equal to the rectangle of the extremes) with the proof mentioned by Aristotle and not Elements ii 14 (the construction of a square equal to a given rectangle). However, it seems to me unlikely that either corresponds precisely to Aristotles theorem, while the distinction between the two theorems may be more an artifact of the structure of the Elements than of the state of mathematics in Aristotles time, where proofs involving ratios of gures are postponed to Elements vi, after the presentation of proportion theory in Elements v. However, an Aristotelian might argue that Elements ii 14 is the demonstration of the fact that, and Elements vi 17 of the reason why.
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determinate case. However, it is also evident that the determinate cases are considered primary. In my discussion, I shall allow myself two functionsor more properly abbreviations. DX (t) is the distance that X travels during a time interval t . TX (d) is the time interval of Xs travel over distance d . Furthermore, d1 d2 shall mean that d1 is an initial segment of distance d2 , and similarly for times, while d1 < d2 will have its normal meaning that d1 is smaller than d2 . Obviously, if x y , it follows that x < y , but the converse will not always hold. Finally, since we shall be comparing changes, X, t, d will be the Xs travel over distance d in time t. In general, it is adequate to specify either the distance traveled or the time of travel, while the other may be omitted. Hence, X, t, will abbreviate X, t, DX (t) , and X,, d will abbreviate X, TX (d), d . Aristotle sets up an argument for the continuity and nitude of change with a discussion of faster and equally fast. We expect the denition of faster to be: 1. A, tA , dA is faster than B, tB , dB iff dA : dB > tA : tB . Although it may be implicit in some of Aristotles argumentation,12 this is not, however, the denition we nd in Aristotles works. Instead we nd some combination of the following three claims concerning A is faster than B, with the precise logical relations left open for the moment: 2a. A and B travel in time tAB and DA (tAB ) > DB (tAB ).13 2b. A and B travel a distance dAB and TA (dAB ) < TB (dAB ).14 2c. A travels a distance dA and B travels a distance dB and dA > dB and TA (dA ) < TB (dB ).15 Similarly, instead of a denition of A and B being equally fast along the lines of (1), we nd: 3. A,, dAB is equally fast with B,, dAB if [and only if] TA (dAB ) = TB (dAB ).16 We nd merely hints of the more general rule of proportion being applied:
Cf. Physics 8.215a 31216a 21. Ps.-Arist., De lineis insect. 1.968a 245. 14 Arist., Phys. 14.222b 333a 4. 15 Arist., Phys. 10.218b 1418. Aristotle here also says that A is slower than B if it moves less in more time and describes this and (2c) as dening slower. 16 Cf. Arist., Phys. H 4.249a 1213, 19, b 4. At Arist., Phys. Z 1.232a 201, there is an informal variation, that A and B are equally fast if they both travel less in less time. Throughout Physics Z, Aristotle employs a notion which we can describe as uniform periodicity, namely where, given a movement over a distance divided into equal distances (periods), every equal distance traveled is traveled in an equal time, e.g. 2.233b 45 in an argument that an object cannot move a nite distance in an innite time, or 2.233b 267 in an argument against atomism. Possibly, Aristotle would have regarded motions so analyzed in these arguments as uniform in the stronger sense that, for any division into equal distances, every equal distance traveled is traveled in an equal time, tantamount to the modern assumption that the speed of the object does not change, namely at the limit of divisions. However, it is important for us to see that the notion actually employed is, in fact, weaker.
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4. A, tA , dA is equally fast with B, tB , dB iff dA : dB = tA : tB .17 However, these denitions, (2ac) and (3), by themselves only take into account special cases, and even taken together fail to account for the situation where both the distance traversed and the time of traversal of one moving object are respectively greater than the distance traversed and the time of traversal of the other, i.e., dA > dB and tA > tB or even where dA < dB . For the Lyceum, however, they constituted all the components adequate for denitions of faster and equally fast. So ps.-Arist., Mechanica 1.848b 58:
For the faster is spoken of in two ways, since we say (2b) that something is faster if it traverses an equal place in less time, and (2a) if it traverses more place in equal time.
This nigh sets out the notions (2a) and (2b) as separate notions of faster, which need to be proved equivalent. Of greater interest is the denition of faster that Aristotle gives at the beginning of Physics Z 2 (232a 257):
. . . then it is necessary that (2a) the faster traverse a greater distance in the equal time and (2b) an equal distance in the lesser time and (2c) more distance in the lesser time, just as some dene the faster.18
Here, Aristotle maintains (2a), (2b), and (2c) as necessary conditions for faster and tells us that the three cases constitute someones denition of faster. The fact that he attributes the denition to some people is not on the radar screens of commentators. The ancient commentators Themistius, Simplicius, and presumably Alexander completely ignore it, as do modern commentators such as Heath [1949, 12830] and Ross [1934, p. 641, ad loc.],19 and for an apparently good reason. Although it is as close as Aristotle gets to an ofcial denition, they do not understand it as a denition, because they work with a notion of denition that is, in fact, more restricted than Aristotles. Aristotle lends some force to their view by proceeding to give proofs of all three and thereby implies that he has a yet more fundamental notion of faster. This more fundamental notion seems to be:
2d. What is changing earlier is faster, or What changes earlier is faster. (232a 289).20
Cf. Arist. Phys. H 5.249b 27250a 4. ` pn mgeoj ej megh diairetn (ddei tai gr Physics Z 2.232a 237: Epe d ti dnaton x tmwn e ina ti- sunecj, mgeoj d stn pan sunecj) (Since every magnitude is divisible into magnitudes, since it has been proved that it is impossible for something composed of atoms to be continuous, while every magnitude is continuous), ng h t tton n t sJ crnJ mezon a n t lttoni son a n t lttoni pleon inesai, aper rzonta tinej t tton. 19 Ross explains, i.e. some people actually use these three attributes as forming the denition of the faster. I do not see this innuendo in Aristotles aper rizontai tinej t tton (just as some people dene the faster). Aristotles implication, with or without approval, is that this is the denition that some people use. 20 pe tonun ttn stin t prteron metabllon. The reason for the ambiguity has to do with the fact that the Greek present tense may be durative, in the sense of expressing
18
17
14
H. Mendell
Furthermore, it is unclear whether this expresses a necessary condition or a necessary and sufcient condition. Hence, it may be (constantly faster): 2d.1. If A and B change over comparable changes (and start at the same time and move over the same path?), then A is faster than B [if and] only if for any point C in As change, A arrives at C before B arrives at the corresponding point in its change. or (faster for the entire change): 2d.2. If A and B change over comparable changes (e.g. both in weight or in distance or in color, etc.) and point C is some point at the terminus of Bs motion (i.e. Bs motion that is under consideration, since B might continue), then A is faster than B [if and] only if A arrives C before B arrives at C. In fact, for the arguments explicitly provided by Aristotle, dening faster only for an entire change (2d.2) is fully adequate. The biconditional version of (2d.2) is not required for the rst three proofs, while its role in the fourth proof is at best unstated. A problem also arises in the assumption that A is faster than B. Although Aristotle merely says that A is faster than B, without specifying the changes compared, the set-ups for the rst three theorems assume changes where we have A,, dAB being faster than B,, dAB while the distance of Bs motion in each theorem is always less than dAB , it will appear that the faster motion assumed in the theorem is distinct from the times and distances compared in the theorem and its proof. I shall keep this fact explicit in my discussion of the proofs. I will only turn to the difculties that this assumption involves after my discussion of Aristotles four proofs on the denitions of faster. It is also unclear what the difference is between (2d.2) and (2b), while (2d) seems to entail (2b) trivially. Hence, the fact that Aristotle gives two proofs of (2b) might suggest that he conceives of (2d) as providing a simple basic case. It is not clear, however, why Aristotle needs a circuitous route to (2b). It is signicant to my argument that Aristotle does not in fact argue for the biconditionals implicit in (2ac) but instead for the following variants: 2a . If A and B travel in equal times tAB , then A is faster than B (i.e, A, tAB , is faster than B, tAB , ) only if DB (tAB ) < DA (tAB )). 2b . If A and B travel a distance dAB , then A is faster than B (i.e, A, TA (dAB ), dAB is faster than B, TB (dAB ), dAB ) only if TA (dAB ) < TB (dAB ). 2c If A and B travel in equal times tAB (implicitly in the proof), then A is faster than B (in fact, unexpectedly, A, tAB , is faster than B, tAB , , as in (2a )) only if for any distance d where DB (tAB ) < d < DA (tAB ), it is the case that TA (d) < tAB . This is surprising as well, since, at the very least, we would expect converse claims. It is especially awkward in the matter of (2c), where the converse sufcient condition, 2c . If A travels dA and B travels dB and dA > dB and TA (dA ) < TB (dB ), then A,, dA is faster than B,, dB .
a continuing event, or punctual, here as expressing a general rule. Cf. Hasper [2003, ch. 3.5.1, 15664].
15
is both more straightforwardly true and does not require the implicit reference to 2a and the related assumption that A travels DA (TB (dB )) further than dA . This is because the antecedent of 2c and the condition of the period of travel in parentheses are merely implicit from its proof. I shall return to this matter in my discussion of the argument for 2c . The arguments all assume the following basic true principle: 5. If A travels over d1 , then d2 d1 if and only if TA (d2 ) TA (d1 ).21 (5) follows from an intuitive principle which Aristotle belabors in Physics Z, especially in his attacks on atomism:
Basic Kinetic Assumption: If A has a motion, then A moves a distance and in a time.
or more precisely:
Basic Kinetic Assumption: If A travels over d , then d > 0, so that if A travels over d, TA (d) > 0.
(5) follows since, if d2 d1 , then d1 d2 > 0, and so too for the times. Hence, if A travels over d1 d2 , then d1 d2 > 0, so that if A travels over d1 d2 , TA (d1 ) TA (d2 ) = TA (d1 d2 ) > 0. Let us turn to Aristotles arguments in the order he presents them. I. Argument for (2a ) at 232a 2731: Let ZH be the time it takes for A to travel GD. Since A,, GD is faster than B,, GD , A gets to D before B so that B is at some earlier position in this time (2d). Hence, in an equal time TA (GD), A travels more.22
Diagram 2.
21 Aristotle, Physics Z 7.237b 234; cf. 9.266a 18. Note the importance of aspect in the rst passage, since everything that is moving is moving in time, and [over] a larger magnitude in more time .... What Aristotle says is strictly true. However, it is also obvious that he would do better with an account that allows for interrupted changes, a fairly simple extension of his account. 22 Physics Z 2.232a 2731: stw gr t f A to f' B tton. pe tonun ttn stin t prteron metabllon, n crnJ t A metabblh en p to G
ej t D, oon t ZH, n totJ t B opw stai prj t D, ll'poleyei, ste n t sJ crnJ pleon deisin t tton. (Let A be faster than B. Since then what is
changing [or changes] earlier is faster, in the time in which A has changed from to , e.g. ZH, in this time B will not yet be at , but will lag behind, so that in the equal time the faster will traverse more.).
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H. Mendell
Comment: The argument assumes that A and B travel the same path. We can summarize the argument:
Assume TA (GD) is ZH and A,, GD is faster than B,, GD (this is required to apply (2d.2)). Hence, ZH = TA (GD) TB (GD), by (2d.2). Hence, DB (ZH) GD, by (5). Hence, DB (ZH) < GD = DA (ZH).
Hence, without the principle that leads to the last claim, the theorem actually proved is:
2a .1. IfA and B travel a distance dAB , then A,, dAB is faster than B,, dAB only if DB (TA (dAB )) dAB .
From this Aristotle may legitimately conclude:

2a .2. If A and B travel in a time tAB and A and B travel a distance dAB such that tA = TA (dAB ), then A, tA , is faster than B, tA , only if DB (tA ) < DA (tA ).
To get (2a .2), however, we need three intuitive assumptions about motions. I shall not formalize them, because we should think of them as informal notions that t our conceptions of continuity, space, and time. Among these are: i) it makes no difference whether the times are the same or merely equal; ii) it makes no difference whether the distance traveled is an initial segment or merely equal to an initial segment; iii) it makes no difference what B does after the time of travel being compared, B doesnt have to travel GD for A to be faster than B in the interval of travel in time ZH, but we can extend Bs travel to GD. This is comparable to ignoring an auxiliary construction in the conclusion of a geometrical theorem. We readily accept that having internal angles equal to two right angles is true of triangles, and not merely of triangles with one side extended and a parallel to the opposite side, etc. Given (2d), which covers merely the case where the faster changes in less time, these are not trivial assumptions. Why should we be permitted to extend its motion? Allowing auxiliary constructions of motions turns out to be essential to Aristotles proof technique. However, we reasonably suppose that Aristotle really wants to prove (2a ). To do this, we need to postulate or establish that if there are motions A, tAB , faster than B, tAB , , we can construct motions over dAB = MAX[DA (tAB ), DB (tAB )], where A,, dAB is faster than B,, dAB . So the part of the proof that needs to be brought in would start with As being faster than B in time tAB , but would then extend the motion to the same distances. From this Aristotles proof would follow. I will consider this construction postulate or problem later as an extension of (2d.2). For now, lets just call it the Kinetic Construction Postulate. All these assumptions and others become more important in what follows. II. Argument for (2c ) at 232a 31b 5: If we incorporate the contents of its proof from (2a ), (2c ) becomes:
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2c .1 If A and B travel over GD and A,, GD is faster than B,, GD and tAB = TA (GD), then, for any distance d where DB (tAB ) < d < GD (d < GD is also implicit) only if TA (d) < tAB .
Let ZH be the time it takes for A to travel GD. Since B is slower (since A is faster), in time ZH it only gets to a point earlier than D, e.g. E (2a ). Take any point Q between E and D. Since GQ > GE, A reaches any point Q between E and D in less time than it takes B to reach E. Here, TA (GQ) = ZK. Hence, for GE < GQ < GD, TA (GQ) < TB (GE).23
Diagram 3.
Comment: The set-up is exactly the same as for the argument for (2a ). This makes the structure of the argument completely dependent on Case (2a ) or at least its set-up conditions (2d). It also assumes (5). Thus, we can summarize the argument:
Assume B is slower than A (and A and B travel the same path from G), while TA (GD) = ZH. Hence, A is faster than B, i.e., A,, GD is faster than B,, GD . Hence, DB (ZH) DA (ZH) = GD, by (2a ) with the fact that the paths traveled are the same.
Hence (by 5), for any distance d where DB (ZH) d GD, it is the case that TA (d) TA (GD) (lets call this minimal 2c ).
Suppose for an arbitrary d , DB (ZH) < d < GD. Then it is possible to construct d = d , such that DB (ZH) = DB (TA (GD)) d GD (by the intuitive construction rules). Hence, TA (d) ZH = TB (DB (ZH)) (by minimal 2c ). Hence, TA (d ) < TA (GD) = ZH = TB (DB (TA (GD))) (by the intuitive construction rule used in the proof of 2a ).
23 ll mn a n t lttoni pleon. n gr t A gegnhtai prj t D, t B stw prj t E t bradteron n. o on pe t A prj t D gegnhtai n panti t ZH crnJ, prj t Q stai n lttoni totou. a stw n t ZK. t ` n on GQ, diellue t A, mezn sti to GE, d ` crnoj ZK lttwn to m pantj to ZH, ste n lttoni mezon deisin. (In fact it will also move more in less
[time]. For in the [time] in which A has come to be at , let B be at E, since it is the slower. And so, since A has come to be at in the whole time ZH, it will be at in a time less than this. Let it be in the ZK [time]. And so , which A has traversed, will be larger than E, while time ZK is less than the whole ZH, so that it will move a larger [distance] in less [time].).
18
H. Mendell Hence, for any distance d where DB (TA (GD)) < d < GD, it happens that TA (d) < TA (GD) = ZH = TB (DB (TA (GD))).
Strictly speaking, if we ignore the intuitive principle by which the conclusion is derived, the argument only proves that if A moves faster than B in a period where A moves the same path as B, then A also moves more than B in less time B has in the period when A has completed its journey. It is a difcult question what exactly the theorem is. One possibility is that the author conceived of it as a construction problem:
If A moves faster and in the same amount of time as B then it is possible to nd a distance that A travels that is greater than the distance of B s travel but in less time.
or more generally, but not proven by Aristotle:

If A moves faster and travels more distance than B then it is possible to nd a distance that A travels that is greater than the distance of B s travel but in less time.
In fact, this is a corollary to the rst, since if the time of A s travel is less than or equal to Bs time of travel, then we either have the required result (the time is less) or may appeal to Aristotles proof of (2c ). And if the time is greater than the time of B s travel, we need merely take Bs travel and the segment of A s travel that occurs in the same time. Note that the assumption that in the statement of the theorem above, where A moves d and DB (tAB ) < d < DA (tAB ) = GD, I set the initial condition as A,, GD is faster than B,, GD . Not even the assumption that B moves over GD appears anywhere in Aristotles proof. One might well ask whatAristotle means in his statement of the theorem that A is faster than B. Finally, recall that the proof of (2a ) assumed that B travels to D. In other words, all three intuitive assumptions and a construction postulate are required here too. One might think it necessary to postulate or establish some construction different from the construction for (2b ). Given that (2c ) needs the situation explicit in (2b ), this is not the case. III. Argument for (2b ) at 232b 514: If we incorporate the assumptions of the proof of (2a ) that are implicit via the proof of (2c ), (2b ) becomes:
2b .1 If A and B travel a distance dAB , and dAB = DB (TA (dAB )), then A,, dAB is faster than B,, dAB only if TA (dAB ) < TB (dAB ).
Aristotle uses the argument for (2c ), where A moves LM and B moves LX, to set up a situation where A and B move the same distance LX (dAB ). Here the initial set-up omits the conditions of the proof for (2a ), so that we might want to extend line LM to D (LD = dAB ) to note that it is presupposed from case (2a ) that A will travel in the same total time as B (here time C). So LD = DA (C). From case (2c ), since A, C, LD is faster than B,, LD , A will move more distance than B does in time C and in less time than C. Now suppose A moves LM in time PR. So B will move less distance than LM in more time than PR, e.g., distance LX in time C. Now the time it takes for A to move
19
LX will be less, e.g., PS PR. Now C > PR, and we supposed that DB (C) = LX. Then A travels LX in PS and B also travels LX in C, and PS < PR < C.24
Diagram 4.
Comment: We can perhaps summarize the argument in this way:

Suppose A and B move LD and A,, LD is faster than B,, LD . Let C = TA (LD), LX = DB (C). LX < LD, by (2a ). Let LX < LM < LD, and let PR = TA (LM). Hence, TA (LM) < C = TA (LD), implicit from (2c ). Hence, TA (LM) < TB (LX) = C, by (2c ). Hence, TA (LX) < TA (LM), by (5).
24 ` totwn ti In the diagram C is Greek , and X is Greek X. fanern d t tton n lttoni crnJ deisin t son. pe gr tn mezw n lttoni ` at lambanmenon n pleoni crnJ dircetai to bradutrou, at d tn mezw tj lttonoj, oon tn LM tj LX, plewn n eh crnoj PP, n tn LM dircetai, PS, n tn LX. ste e PP crnoj lttwn stn to X, n t bradteron dircetai tn LX, a PS lttwn stai to f/ ` to lttonoj latton a at latton. ste n X to gr PP lttwn, t d lttoni insetai t son. (It is obvious from these things also that the faster traverses
an equal [distance] in less time. For, since it traverses a larger [distance] in less time than the slower, but when taken itself by itself will traverse a [distance] larger than the smaller [distance] in more time, e.g. M [as larger than] , then the time P, in which it traverses M, would then be more than , in which [it traverses] . Thus if time P is less than X, in which the slower traverses , then will be smaller than X. For it is smaller than P, while what is smaller than the smaller is also itself smaller. Thus it will move an equal [distance] in less [time].) Some manuscripts have X for X. Given my argument, clearly X is the lectio difcilior, while not impossible. For further arguments on the reading, cf. Ross [1934, 641 ad b 514]. Which of the two, X or X, Aristotle wrote is indeterminate, but not crucial. The only change would be in the diagram, where C (X) will be a point on line PSRC. Note, however, that Aristotle is capable of using the same letter to refer to both a line and a point. We would need his diagram to interpret C.
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H. Mendell Hence, TA (LX) < TB (LX), by the previous two claims.
As I have emphasized, the proof presupposes that both A and B travel over LD and that As motion is faster in this travel. Again, we must suppose the three intuitive principles. However, this proof provokes many questions. Since we are told to take C = TB (LX), when we know that this is presupposed by the proof, does this mean that its author has forgotten that C is presupposed in the initial conditions of the proof? More important, why does the author want to use (2c ) instead of (2a ). The fact that LX < LD from (2a ) ensures, by (5), that TA (LX) < TA (LD) = TB (LX). Finally and most disturbing, Aristotles set-up for the proof of (2b ) already presupposes that A and B move LD and that TA (LX) < TA (LD). This is consonant with the observation made earlier that the difference between (2b ) and (2d) is not clear. It would be harsh, but not entirely unjust, to accuse the argument of being redundant. More important, however, is the problem how we would reconstruct the argument so that the proof is of (2b ) and not merely (2b .1). To do this, we would need to postulate or establish: if A and B travel dAB and A,, dAB is faster than B,, dAB , then if dAB = Max[DA (TB (dAB )), DB (TA (dAB ))], we can construct motions of A, B such that A,, dAB is faster than B,, dAB . From this construction it will follow that, in fact, TB (dAB ) > TA (dAB ) (the claim that makes the theorem look redundant), that DB (TA (dAB )) < dAB and hence that dAB = DA (TB (dAB )). In all these proofs, we have seen that we assume that the change where A is faster than B is larger than any of the motions actually involved in the proof. The alternative to this is to take the claim that A is faster than B as vague and as providing constraints on any discourse about faster. If so, Aristotles arguments, especially for (2c ) would become incoherent. In any case, it is enough for my purposes here to show that we can make good sense of these three arguments so that we can treat them seriously. Now Aristotle concludes (232b 1420) his discussion of faster with a second argument for (2b ):
Furthermore, if everything must move in an equal [time] or in less [time] or in more [time], and that which moves in more [time] is slower while that which moves in equal [time] is equally-fast, but the faster is neither equally-fast nor slower, then the faster would neither move in equal [time] nor in more [time]. And so it remains that it moves in less [time], so that the faster must also travel the equal magnitude in less time.25
The premises seem to be the following, where A and B move the same distance dAB : 6a. 6b. 6c. 6d. TA (dAB ) < TB (dAB ) or TA (dAB ) = TB (dAB ) or TA (dAB ) > TB (dAB ). If TA (dAB ) > TB (dAB ), then A is slower than B. If TA (dAB ) = TB (dAB ), then A and B are equally fast. If A is faster than B, then (A and B are equally fast) & (A is slower than B).
From this it follows that:

25 `n ti d' e pn ng h n sJ n lttoni n pleoni inesai, a t m ` tton ote sotac ` j ote n pleoni bradteron, t d' n sJ sotacj, t d bradteron, ot' n n sJ ot' n pleoni inoto t tton. lepetai on n lttoni, st' ng h a t son mgeoj n lttoni crnJ diinai t tton.
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6e. If A and B travel dAB , then A is faster than B only if TA (dAB ) < TB (dAB ). As we saw assumed in the proof of (2c ), A is slower than B if and only if B is faster than A. So, (6b) is equivalent to (with A and B switched): 6b . If TA (dAB ) < TB (dAB ), then A,, dAB is faster than B,, dAB . (6b ) and (6e) then entail: 6e . If A and B travel dAB , then A,, dAB is faster than B,, dAB if and only if TA (dAB ) < TB (dAB ). This is basically the same as (2b). Hence, it is unimportant whether the text supports (6e) or, as less likely, (6e ). Furthermore, since (6e) is more explicitly general than (2b ), one might wonder why Aristotle does not give this proof instead or whether the less geometrical qualities of the proof indicate that it represents a separate part of Aristotles oeuvre. There is a different more pressing issue. What is the foundation for (6b) and (6c). We can imagine that (3) should be taken as a biconditional and so entail (6c). So the problem is really (6b). One could derive it from (2d) understood as a biconditional. But this is pure speculation. I do not need here to explain further the argument for (6e), except to make one small observation. Since this argument is independent of Cases (2a ) and (2c ), whatever one may think of its worth, it would allow, for example, the author of the Mechanica to think of (2a) and (2b) as independent conceptions of faster. It is noteworthy that all the arguments discussed so far do not depend on the movements being uniform and that, with the possible exception of the problem of reduncancy in the rst proof of (2b ), they are rigorous, at least when appropriately understood.26 However, as a traditional denition of faster, this composite denition seems blatantly inadequate. There are then four issues that are central to our present concerns. Foremost is the fact that without a demonstration of the proportionality principle (1), the denitions do not consider all cases. However, they are also otiose because one can derive Cases (2b ) and (2c ) from Case (2a ), as Aristotle shows. Why not just dene faster as (2a) or even (2d)? Indeed, if one accepts a modicum of proportion theory and the ability to nd distances traveled from times and vice versa, then one can derive a general principle for faster from (2a). Hence, the denition either gives too much or too little. On the other hand, even if we accept his assumption of the converse of (2b ), why does Aristotle not prove the converses of (2a ) and (2c ). Finally, we need to account for the required intuitive principles, especially the construction postulates, if that is what they are. It is easiest to begin with the construction postulate. There is little reason to think that the construction postulates of Euclid, Elements i, were explicit in the time of Aristotle. Yet, we can give an analogue of the second postulate that allows a geometer to extend a given line:
Construction Postulate for faster: Suppose A,, dA is faster than B,, dB . Then if dA > dA , it is postulated to extend the motion of A to dA such that A,, dA is faster than B,, dB ,
26
Cf. Heath [1949, 129] for a different assessment.
22
H. Mendell and if dB > dB , it is postulated to extend the motion of B to dB such that A,, dA is faster than B,, dB .
We can imagine a similar postulate for equally fast:

Construction Postulate for equally fast: Suppose A,, dA and B,, dB are equally fast. Then if dA > dA , it is postulated to extend the motion of A to dA such that A dA and B,, dB are equally fast.
We can also imagine similar postulates for extending times of motions. One might object, perhaps even with good justication, that the postulates presuppose that we already know what the faster and the equally fast are. However, against this one might note that there is a good intuition that if A is moving faster than B, it can continue to move faster than B was moving, and similarly with the slower B. So too if A and B are equally fast. This is just the sort of intuition that might not be explicit in an early treatise. I would not claim that the analysis I have given that requires the Construction Postulate for faster is the only possible coherent analysis of Aristotles argument. However, it shows that we can make sense of the argument within the connes of his text and his contemporary mathematical practice. These kinematic versions of geometrical constructions form a part of general, implicit conceptions of the continuum, constructability, and so forth. They are not at all unique in Greek applied mathematics. For example, Archimedes has constructions of extra bodies in On Floating Bodies i 6 and 7, the latter requiring the construction of a body with a given volume and a given weight. I think that the three remaining puzzles drift away if we think of the denition of faster in Physics Z 2 as restricted and operational in the same way that Knorrs reconstruction of the Eudoxan theory of proportions is. The denition lays out three necessary conditions for showing that A is faster than B under different conditions. If the times of the change are the same, look at the distances; if the distances are the same, look at the times, and if neither is the case, use what mathematics you know to expand the denitions. A key to this is in the expansion from Case (2a ) to (2c ), where Aristotle assumes that A and B move in the same time. As I have been emphasizing, this looks like a kinematic version of a geometrical construction. First, the converses of (2a ) and (2c ) are fairly easy to prove by means of the very typical form of the second proof of (2b ). I also assume that one change is either faster than, as fast as, or slower than any comparable change. Suppose motions A, tAB , dA and B, tAB , dB with dA > dB . If B, tAB , dB is faster than A, tAB , dA , then, by (2a ), dB > dA . If they are equally fast then dB = dA . But A, tAB , dA is faster than or equally fast as or slower than B, tAB , dB . Hence, it is faster. The proof of the converse of (2c ) is slightly less trivial since one wants it to be a general claim that if there are motions A, tA , dA and B, tB , dB , where dA > dB and tA < tB , then A, tA , dA is faster than B, tB , dB . I leave to the reader its proof, which has the same structure but requires both construction postulates. These considerations suggest to me that although Aristotles source may have included Aristotles argument much as he presents it, the purpose of the denition cannot be merely to give necessary and sufcient conditions for saying that one thing is faster than another. Instead, the proofs must have formed part of a series of arguments establishing basic theorems comparing the motions of moving bodies. A mark of this is the
23
anomaly that although Case (2c ) is used in the argument for Case (2b ), its original form Case (2c) is listed after Case (2b) in the denition, while Cases (2a) and (2b) are privileged in the tradition. It may even be that Aristotle regards Case (2c) as a lemma for proving Case (2b). Aristotle uses Cases (2a) and (2b) in the very next proof, but not (2c).27 After all, these are the two basic cases in the tradition, but treated as fundamental theorems. We can also readily see how the basic denitions could be expanded so as to prove even the proportionality principle (1). As an illustration, suppose that the total travel of B is dB and takes place in time tB less than the time tA that A travels dA with dB < dA . Suppose that dB measures dA so that n n dB = dA . Then, take n dB of Bs motion (treating it as repeating), such that we now compare the constructed TB (dA ) with TA (dA ), where TB (dA ) = TB (n dB ) = n TB (dB ) = n tB . We are allowed to do this because we have an intuition that the motion of B may be incremented in this way, namely that if each segment is as fast as every other, then the whole is as fast as any segment. If A is faster than B, n tB > tA (case 2b). Of course, we would have to expand the story where dB is merely commensurable with dA and to where they are incommensurable. But that would take us into proportion theory and our general understanding of continua. Again, uniform motion is irrelevant as we are only comparing periods of motion. In other words, our analysis of Aristotle on faster almost forces us to distinguish cases which are trivially analyzable into Cases (2a ) and (2b ), which we could call the determinate cases, and indeterminate cases such as (2c ). (2c ) also illustrates how indeterminate cases can be built directly out of determinate cases. We can even see why (2a) and (2b) would be taken as the fundamental notions of faster. One starts from the most basic case of determinate times; the other from the most basic case of determinate distances traversed. This distinction between determinate and indeterminate cases mirrors the Eudoxan method as reconstructed by Knorr. That Aristotle refers to the criteria as someones denition of faster encourages us to look to a mathematician associated with this approach. I think that it is very reasonable to consider this denition as deriving from Eudoxus and his school. Furthermore, it may even constitute a fragment of his lost, but highly inuential treatise, Per tacn (On speeds), but may even go back to Archytas.28 For these are nigh the only candidates we have.
Cf. Physics Z 2.232b 267, where he refers to (2b) as demonstrated (ddei tai). He also uses (2a) as well as (3) in the last argument of the chapter, against atomism (2.233b 1532, cf. 1920, 267). 28 For Eudoxus, cf. Simplicius, In Arist. De caelo 494.1112. For Archytas, we know little more than that Diogenes Laertius describes him as the rst to apply mathematical principles to mechanics (Vitae viii 83 = DK 47A1.16, cf. also Vitruv. vii 14 = DK 47B7, which ascribes research on machines, and the perhaps fantastic DK 47A10B). We should distinguish this sort of effort from his duplication of the cube, which uses kinematic constructions. Aristotles apparent practice of not naming living authors may be relevant in determining the source.
27
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4. Proof by measure/suprameasure cases and by commensurable/ incommensurable cases: A conation of techniques in De caelo A 6 In De caelo A 6.273a 21b 29, Aristotle produces a somewhat notorious argument that innite bodies cannot have nite weight. I am concerned here with the more innocuous, but perplexing part of the argument, De caelo A 6.273a 27b 24, and not with the problematic case where weight is non-uniformly distributed. Earlier I distinguished two kinds of determinate/indeterminate proofs by cases. In the rst the theorem is proved for the case where one magnitude measures another and then for the case where the magnitude is a suprameasure of it, i.e. measures out a magnitude that is larger than the second magnitude. The other is Knorrs proof for commensurable magnitudes followed by a proof for incommensurable magnitudes based on the commensurable case. Aristotles argument is best understood as a proof by cases where one magnitude measures another and then where it suprameasures it. Yet Aristotle mysteriously treats the indeterminate case as though it were a commensurable case, and the suprameasure case as an incommensurable case. I shall argue that we can best understand this oddity if we suppose that Aristotle has conated the two methods. Thus, the text constitutes evidence for both types of proof by determinate and indeterminate cases. In what follows, P(v ) is the weight of a body with size v , and V(p ) is the size of a body with weight p . This is convenient because in the part of the argument in question, Aristotle assumes that weight is uniformly distributed over a given body, a general problem in Aristotles arguments on the innite. As in the previous section, v1 v2 shall mean that v1 is an initial volume of v2 , while v1 < v2 will have its normal meaning that v1 is smaller than v2 .
[Case 1] [That an innite body cannot have nite weight] is clear from the following arguments. For let the weight be nite, and let the innite body be AB, and the weight of it be G. Subtract from the innite some nite magnitude, BD. Let the weight of it be E. Then E will be less than G. For the weight of the smaller is smaller. Let the smaller measure it out as many times as you like, and let it come about that as the smaller is to the larger, so BD is to BZ. For it is possible to subtract as many times as you like from the innite. Yet if the magnitudes are proportional to the weights, and if the lesser weight is of the lesser magnitude, then the larger will be of the larger magnitude. (a 27b 5) Therefore the weight of the nite and the weight of the innite will be equal. (b 56) Moreover, if the weight of the larger body is larger, then the weight of HB will be larger than the weight of ZB, with the result that the weight of the nite will be larger than the weight of the innite. (b 68) And unequal magnitudes will have the same weight. For the innite is unequal to the nite. (b 810) [Case 2] It makes no difference whether the weights are commensurable or incommensurable. For the same argument will apply [also or even= a] when they are incommensurable, e.g., if the third E exceeds in measuring G. For if three BD magnitudes are taken together, their weight will be greater than G. Thus the same impossibility will arise. [Case 3] Moreover, it is [also or even= a] possible to take commensurable weights. For it makes no difference whether we begin with the weight or with the magnitude. For example, take E as commensurable with G, and subtract that which has the weight of E from the innite, e.g. BD. Then let it occur that as the weight is to the weight, so BD is to
Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle some other magnitude, e.g. to BZ. For it is possible to subtract as much as you like from a magnitude which is innite. For when these are taken both their magnitudes and their weights will be commensurable with one another.
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Diagram 5.
The basic interpretive problem with the text is that Aristotle provides us with several cases, but does not make at all clear why these cases are genuinely distinct. Part of the difculty, as is clear from Aristotles treatment of the innite elsewhere, is that for these types of arguments about the innite, one can get away with measures and multiples of measures. Case (1) and Case (2) each seems adequate on its own. In fact, in a similar situation where he argues that there cannot be an innite change in a nite time or a nite change in an innite time, a little subsequent to his denition of faster, Aristotle says (Physics Z 2.233b 24) that it makes no difference to the argument whether the nite portion of the nite magnitude measures it, exceeds it, or is decient.29 Again, I am only considering three of the four cases, where the weights are uniformly distributed. Aristotle argues for each case that if there is an innite body then it is of innite heaviness since otherwise a nite part of the innite will weigh at least as much as the whole innite. Suppose that AB is an innite body and G of nite heaviness, i.e. G = P(AB) and V(G) = AB. In Case (1), Aristotle derives three absurd consequences, which we must distinguish from the main argument. I hence divide Case (1) into four parts, the main argument (a 27b 5), and the three consequences (b 56, b 68, and b 810): Case 1. Aristotle starts with the body and cuts off from AB a nite magnitude DB AB, whose weight is E. He then assumes that E measures out the whole weight G and claims that there is a BZ AB such that E : G = DB : BZ, where BZ will be nite. Aristotle hence appears unnecessarily to assume the existence of the fourth proportional, a characteristic of the Eudoxan proofs of Euclid, Elements xii. The fact that E measures G and hence that DB measures BZ guarantees that BZ just is a multiple of DB and so makes that assumption uninteresting. Behind the language of proportions is merely the claim that G = n E, so that nite n DB will weigh G.
29 ` atametrsei t f' AB, lleyei, perbale diafrei gr toto d on (And this [nite part BE of AB] either measures out [nite] AB or will be decient or will
exceed it; for it makes no difference). Aristotle here is arguing that a nite change cannot be in an innite time nor an innite in a nite time. He uses only the case where BE measures AB and appears to reject the otiose form of the De caelo A 6 argument.
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Case 1 (conclusion a). Hence, the weight of nite part BZ of AB will be equal to the weight of AB. Case 1 (conclusion b). If we take HB > BZ, then its weight will be greater than G , the weight of the innite AB, the weight of the part being greater than the weight of the whole. Case 1 (conclusion c). Unequal magnitudes will also have the same weight.30 The mathematically salient point for us is that E is taken as measuring G , i.e. a measure, determinate case. Aristotle next says that it makes no difference whether we take E commensurable with G or incommensurable with it. Already, we should expect a division by cases. The result, however, is both striking and somewhat disappointing, particularly in that Aristotle starts with the incommensurable case. Case 2 (incommensurable). Suppose E exceeds in measuring out G , i.e. m m E = G . Then let n E > G , and take n DB from AB, and proceed as in Case (1), where in the example n = 3. Observe that the incommensurable case actually involves the more general situation where E does not measure G . Thus, it may actually be unclear whether Aristotle really intends E to be incommensurable with G in the standard sense. In effect, this is really a supra-measure case. If we take Case (1) and Case (2) together, we have the method of the scholion to Theodosius, where our measure of one magnitude (here every portion of the innite is a measure of it!) was rst treated as a measure of a second magnitude and then treated as exceeding it in measuring it. Even the way of expressing the supra-measure case in Aristotle and the scholion are very similar: Arist. 273b 1213: oon e [t E] trton perbllei metron t broj (e.g., if the third E exceeds in measuring G) and the scholion: a t DH t ZB atametron perbaltw lssoni auto t ZQ (and let DH in measuring out ZB exceed it by ZQ which is smaller than DH). The expression, in measuring X (out) to exceed X is very rare in Greek literature and only known otherwise in extant Greek mathematics in Platonic commentaries on number theory and commentaries on Aristotle.31
30 This conclusion is problematic only because the weight is assumed to be uniformly distributed. 31 The scholia to Theodosius are not in the latest ThesaurusLinguaeGraecae CD, TLG E. The only uses of the expression I have found are these. One author is not in the commentary tradition: Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica i.47.3.5 = Hecataeus fr. 25.431 (ca. 300 B.C.E.) tn pda metromenon perbllein toj pt pceij (the foot [of the largest statue in Egypt] in measuring exceeds seven cubits); two are neo-Platonic commentaries on number theory: Iamblichus, In Nicomachi arithmeticam intro. 53.45: toi plhrontwj atoj metrsei perballntwj llipj (either (the difference of two numbers) will measure them by lling them up, or by exceeding or by being decient) and 53.2754.5 for a similar expression: n d ge perbllonsa mtrhsij. . . (if the measuring is exceding. . . ) and Theon of Smyrna, De utilitate math. 79, 710, in characterizing a multiple epimoric ratio n m+1 : n, ` sumbanei, tan duen protentwn rimn lttwn atametrn says, toto d
tn mezona m scsh lon atametrsai, ll' poleph mroj to mezonoj,
27
Furthermore, contrast this expression with the corresponding expression in Elements v def. 4 Lgon cein prj llhla megh lgetai, dnatai pollaplasiazmea lllwn percein (magnitudes are said to have a ratio to one another which are able by being multiplied to exceed one another), and its use in Elements x 1: T G ` to AB mezon. pepollaplasisw (For G gr pollaplasiazmenon stai pot being multiplied will sometime be larger than AB. Let it be multiplied ...). In expressing variants on the bisection principle, Aristotle rarely, if ever, uses these forms.32 Note, however, that if Aristotle had used this expression, the distinction between Case (1) and Case (2) would have been effaced so that Aristotle would only have needed Case (2). In fact, in the Physics, Aristotle uses either Case (1) or Case (2).33 Case 3 (commensurable). Aristotle points out that here we can begin with the weights or with the magnitudes. This time he starts with weight E commensurable with G and marks off from AB the nite magnitude BD of weight E. Next he nds magnitude BZ AB such that E : G = BD : BZ. Hence, BZ will be commensurable with BD and is constructable from E, G, and BD.
stin ato to lssonoj mroj (And this happens whenever two numbers are proposed and the smaller in measuring the larger is not able to measure the whole, but leaves out a part of the larger which is a part of the smaller itself); and the rest are commentaries on Aristotle. Alexander, In de sensu 115.2024, explains the usage: Every magnitude is measured out by some portion of it. For even if the last measuring it out did not come together with it but exceeded it (t teleutaon atametron at m sunapartzoito at, ll' perblloi), no less would it have measured it out. Simplicius quotes the passage, In Arist. de caelo libr. comm. 220.1819. Three commentators, Themistius, In Arist. physica paraphr. 187.2427, Philoponus, In Arist. phys, 803.17, Simplicius, In Arist. phys, 949.910, uses a variant of the expression in explaining Aristotle, Z 2.233b 24. See note 29. In any case, the commentators understand the language of Aristotles argument in the same way as the usage in the scholion to Theodosius. 32 Cf. Physics Z 7.237b 2833: for when a part [of the motion] is taken which will measure out the whole, in so many equal times as the parts are, it moves the whole, so that since these are nite, by each being so-much and by all being so-many-times, then the time would be nite. For [the time] will be so-much so-many-times, as much as the time of the part multiplied by the number of parts (lhfntoj gr morou atametrsei tn lhn, n soij crnoij tosotoij sa t mri stin, tn lhn e nhtai, st' pe tata peprantai a t pson aston- a t pos ij panta, a crnoj n eh peperasmnoj. tosaut ij gr stai tosotoj, soj to morou crnoj pollaplasiasej t plei tn morwn). I suspect, however, that this passage, which asserts a correspondance between the parts
of motion and the parts of the time, only shares in common with Euclids formulation the use of multiply, which may not be enough for common heritage. 33 For Case (1), cf. Physics 10.266a 1920: otw d t D prostiej atanalsw t A a t E t B (in this way by adding to (a measure of nite umph A) I shall exhaust A and by adding to E (the same measure of distance traveled B) I shall exhaust B). For case (2) cf. Physics .10 266b 24: prj peperasmnon gr e prostiej perbal pantj rismnou, a fairn lleyw satwj (by repeatedly adding to a nite I shall exceed every determined [amount], and by taking away I shall fall short of it in the same way). It is also signicant to the uniqueness of the arguments of De caelo i 6, that Aristotle elsewhere uses simpler techniques.
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Cases (1) and (2) start with a given nite magnitude DB and proceed to look at the weight of DB to get E. Thus, one does not know when one picks DB whether its weight E is commensurable with G (or rather measures G) or not. In Case (3) Aristotles point is that we may begin with the weight instead. Aristotle could have constructed the commensurable case from the magnitude. However, the result would not have added anything to Cases (1) and (2). Given the set-up, however, this is the only way we can ensure that we have chosen a weight E commensurable with the whole weight G. For if we start with the magnitude instead, we can only construct E commensurable with G if we can pick a nite body BZ, where P(BZ) = G, which itself needs to be constructed from E. Hence, the three cases are genuinely mathematically distinct, but not for the reasons Aristotle gives:
Given: n P(x ) = P(n x ), AB innite and G nite and P(AB) = G: Case 1a: Assume, BD AB and BD is nite and n P(BD) = G. Hence, n BD AB Hence, n BD is nite and P(n BD) = P(AB). Case 2a: Assume BD AB and BD is nite and n P(BD) > G > (n1) P(BD). Hence, n BD AB and P(n BD) > P(AB). Case 3a: Assume E is commensurable with G and we can construct V(E) as nite. Hence, we can construct V(G) such that E : G = V(E) : V(G). Hence, V(G) is nite.
Aristotles argument, taken out of the context of contemporary mathematics, is incoherent. We have seen that Case (2), as argued, really belongs, as the supra-measure case, with Case (1) as the corresponding measure case. Furthermore, Case (3) actually considers a different situation, although Aristotle presents it as indifferent between the two set-ups, with Cases (1) and (2) starting from the magnitude and Case (3) starting from the weight. However, Aristotle connects (2) and (3) as providing an incommensurable and commensurable case, respectively, while it is completely inessential to (2) that the weights be incommensurable. The whole matter would have been easier if Aristotle had just told us to multiply E so as to exceed G, in other words Case (2) or even Case (1) with conclusion (b). How are we to make sense of this argument? We might imagine a dialogue where Aristotle provides Case 1, and someone objects that E might not measure G. He then says that it doesnt matter if the weights do not measure, i.e. are commensurable or incommensurable. He takes the harder case, even (= a) if they are incommensurable. Then the objector turns to the issue of the fact that Aristotle begins with the bodies and not their weights. The difculty is that we still do not know why Aristotle turns to the case where the weights are commensurable. If Case (2) is an a fortiori argument from the case of incommensurable weights, then the issue of the weights being commensurable
29
has been handled. Hence, in turning to the issue of starting with the weights instead of the body, it seems irrelevant whether or not they are commensurable. Aristotle does not mention the case where we start with incommensurable weights. The best (only?) way to make sense of this, I suspect, is if we consider Aristotle as having two argument forms in front of him. One is the method of the scholion. This involves taking a measure case, where a measures b, and a supra-measure case, where a exceeds b in measuring b. The other is the case where the commensurable and incommensurable cases are distinguished. Such sophisticated argumentation as one nds in applications of this method in Archimedes, Theodosius, and Pappus, is completely unnecessary for Aristotles argument, as is clear from its validity. If needed, he could have added:
Case 4a: Assume, E is not commensurable with G and n E > G and we can construct V(E) as nite. Hence, n V(E) is nite and P(n V(E)) = n P(V(E)) > G. Note that P(V(E)) = E.
But this is just (2a) redone. But how else are we to take Aristotles claim that there are two cases, one commensurable and one incommensurable? In other words, the measure/supra-measure method is adequate; in fact, either is adequate on its own just as they need not be distinguished. The addition of the second method, or any method that would make sense of the distinction, is not necessary. It is a psychological question whether Aristotle has a penchant for displaying arcane knowledge in his arguments. However, if we understand him as conating two arguments in his presentation in order to make use of the latest in proportion arguments, this conation makes perfect sense. Even the order of putting the commensurable case after the incommensurable case can be explained by the fact that the incommensurable case is really the supra-measure case that goes with the measure Case (1). I do not see how else to explain them. This explanation of the oddities of De caelo A 6, namely that Aristotle conates two proof techniques, requires one more thing. If Aristotle conates both methods, they must have been current in the time of Aristotle. Note that this does not imply that these methods constituted the mid-fourth century concept of same ratio.
5. The two traces summarized By themselves, De caelo A 6 and Physics Z 2 seem to tell us little about Greek mathematics in the fourth century that we could not learn from other discussions. Taken together with Knorrs reconstruction, however, they provide interesting evidence for mathematical techniques in mid-century and probably of the school of Eudoxus. If we emphasize Aristotles claim that the three claims about faster in Physics Z 2 are a denition which some people, possibly Eudoxus, held, then in addition to Aristotles arguments for the three claims we must take very seriously both the order in which Aristotle presents the three but also the role that they might play in a mathematical kinematic argument. Otherwise, their inadequacies as Academic denitions would become signicant. I have suggested that the three indicate two determinate and one indetermi-
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nate case. The conjunction of the three cases as a denition of Physics Z 2 is not at all inadequate. On this reading it represents a important conception of dening a relational concept such as faster by determinate and special cases which are then expanded to all cases by means of principles of consistency and continuity, and using analogues of geometrical constructions. De caelo A 6 further contributes to this picture. It provides strong, albeit indirect evidence for two related techniques treating determinate and indeterminate cases, where the measure/supra-measure method serves as a lemma for working with the commensurable/incommensurable method. De caelo A 6 distinguishes four cases, the measure case, an incommensurable case (really the supra-measure case), and a commensurable case, and the case not here discussed of non-uniform distribution of weight (b 236). Three of these pertain to these two methods. Together these passages cannot show that Eudoxus and his school gave a formal denition of same ratio for the commensurable case, proved theorems about it and then used reductios and other techniques to extend the theorems to indeterminate cases. They tell us little directly about 4th cent. BCE manipulations of magnitudes in normal mathematical contexts. However, given the mass of other, later evidence for a Eudoxan theory involving a simple commensurable case and an extension to the incommensurable case, as compiled by Knorr, they constitute contemporary evidence for those procedures. In fact, they may show us more, that the methods could be treated as denitions, that the methods as denitions did not need to cover all possibilities except as mathematical consequences of the cases dened via principles of continuity, and that, as one may expect, the measure case is distinct from and prior to the commensurable case. They also tell us something else. We should be cautious about what we take as a denition in 4th cent B.E.C. mathematics and how we should read a report of a denition in Aristotle. We commonly understand such reports in combination with the general view that Aristotle has a much narrower notion of denition. My goal was to show the reverse, that Aristotle is perfectly capable of treating fundamental theorems as foundations for denitions. Further, I do not claim that my story of a restricted denition of proportion completed by a real denition was a theory of proportion advocated by Eudoxus. We know nothing of his conception of denition.34
34 In his review of H.J. Waschkies, Knorr [1980, 507] says, In a half dozen passages Aristotle himself applies a technique of proportions in dealing with the problem of innite magnitudes, motions, and powers (e.g., Physics IV 8, VI 2 and 7, VIII 10; De caelo I 6 and 7). In these he invokes not the theorems but the basic notions of a pre-Euclidean technique. For Physics IV ( ) 8 see below note 39. I suspect that Knorr cites Physics Z 2 and Z 7 primarily because they illustrate what I have labled determinate and indeterminate cases. Physics 10.266a 14b 24 illustrates different uses and formulations of bisection principles, esp. 10.266a 1921, 266a 31-b 6, b 1214, cf. Z 7.238a 108, 2730. De caelo A 7.274b 335b 4 provides two examples of the assumption of the fourth proportional in a reductio.
31 335
6. The moral: Antanairesis, early proportion theory, and Topics
This story also has a disturbing moral. Very similar points may be made about the much more entrenched view that in Aristotles time, people dened magnitudes having the same ratio as having the same anthyphairesis or alternate subtraction. The basis for this is a comment by Aristotle, Topics 3. 158b 2935, and its explanation by Alexander of Aphrodisias.36 Aristotle says that the denition (or a denition) of same ratio is having the same antanairesis (ntanaresij). Alexander says that there was an ancient denition of same ratio: ratios are the same which have the same anthyphairesis (nufaresij), and adds that antanairesis in Aristotle just is anthyphairesis. Alexanders source is very likely Aristotles junior colleague in the Lyceum, Eudemus.37 There can be little doubt that Alexander and Aristotle refer to the same method as that used by Euclid in four fundamental propositions (Elements vii 12, x 23) and called by the verb nufairesai. The question we need to raise is: what would Aristotle and Eudemus mean by a denition in this case? For convenience, here is a quick, anachronistic description of anthyphairesis. We tend to dene the method recursively, but with some lip service to the difference between it and, say, continued fractions (hence the anachronism lies both in its algebraic features and its explicit use of induction). Let there be two magnitudes, x , y , with x > y . We form a sequence of numbers n1 , . . . , and a sequence of magnitudes a1 , . . . . Generally, the sequence of magnitudes is merely a catalyst for determining the sequence of numbers, whether there is a last term of the sequence of magnitudes, and if there is one what the last term is. 1. Let a1 = x, a2 = y , and n1 a number such that n1 a2 a1 and (n1 + 1) a2 > a1 . If a1 = n1 a2 , the sequence of numbers is (n1 ) and the sequence of magnitudes is (a1 , a2 ). Otherwise, a3 = a1 n1 a2 . 2. Let ni+1 be a number such that ni+1 ai+2 ai+1 and (ni+1 + 1) ai+2 > ai+1 . If ni+1 ai+2 = ai+1 , then the sequence of numbers is (n1 , . . . , ni+1 ) and the sequence of magnitudes is (a1 , . . . , ai+2 ). Otherwise, ai+3 = ai+1 ni+1 ai+2 . We can then reconstruct a ratio x : y, from a series (n1 , . . . , nm ): 1. Let bm = nm and bm+1 = 1 (alternatively, if we want the unit to be a magnitude b, let bm = nm b and bm+1 = b) 2. Let bi1 = ni1 bi + bi+1 3. x : y = b1 : b2
Saito [2003] has developed a similar thesis to the one here presented, although along different and interesting lines. 36 Alexander, In topic. libr. comm. 545.1519. 37 So Knorr [1975, 258]. One cannot draw much from the specic wording of Alexander, In topic. libr. comm. 545.16: nlogon cei megh prj llhla n at nufaresij (magnitudes hold proportionally to one another which have the same anthuphairesis), even though the expressions, x holds proportionally to y, and x and y hold proportionally to one another, do not appear in Euclid or Archimedes but appear in Aristotle over a dozen times. For Alexander also uses this expression, e.g. In Arist. meteor. libr. comm. 168.20.
35
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H. Mendell
In Euclid, we are only interested in whether there is a last term am+1 (which will be a common measure) of x and y. To establish by this method that ratios are the same, one needs to be interested only in the sequence, n1 , . . . , ni , . . . . This procedure leads to a fundamental use of anthyphairesis from at least the Hellenistic age on and probably in the fourth century B.C.E. as well. Let (n1 , . . . , nk , . . . , am ) be the anthyphairesis of the ratio a : b, and let c : d be the ratio reconstructed from (n1 , . . . , nk ). If k < m, then c : d > a : b if k is even, and c : d < a : b if k is odd. The limited, but important, evidence outside the Aristotelian corpus for interest in this sequence in the fourth century B.C.E. is outside our present concerns.38 The question may be put as follows: when Aristotle and Alexander say that there was a denition of same ratio as having the same antanairesis, (1) do they mean that there was a text which stated as much under a list of denitions, or (2) do they mean that there was a restricted denition that if a , b and c, d have respective greatest common measures by the method of anthyphairesis, then they have the same ratio, or (3) do they mean that there was a fundamental theorem which proved that a : b = c : d iff a, b have the same anthyphairesis as c, d ? In the last case, we could even imagine a nominal restricted denition of same ratio along the lines of 1 def. 1 above, or even along the lines of Elements vii def. 21: Numbers are proportional when the rst is equally a multiple of the second as the third of the fourth, whether the same part or same parts. One then extends the denition through the method of anthyphairesis. I dont here wish to argue about the important internal evidence concerning Elements xiii and x for the role of anthyphairesis, nor do I wish to deny anthyphairesis as a fundamental method reected in Aristotles text.39 I am just concerned with the claim in Aristotles Topics, a book concerned with strategies in dialectical games, usually between two players, where one player attempts to defend or reject a thesis by answering questions from a player who wishes to destroy or defend the thesis, respectively. Sometimes Aristotle seems to suggest that philosophy, the actual activity in developing denitions, uses a kind of dialectical solitaire.40 However, Topics is concerned with dialectical strategies in the arrangement of arguments, where deception and ploy might be central. In Topics 3, Aristotle offers some warnings about positions that are difcult to attack and easy to defend. These include those that are primary by nature, i.e. rst principles which require only having their terms dened, or are very far from primary hypotheses and so may use derived principles or very complex proofs.41 The reason is that in the case of primary hypotheses, the questioner needs to get the interlocutor to agree to a denition in order to pin down her hypothesis, which she will resist doing,
See Fowler [1987]. A trace of anthyphairesis may also be found at Physics 8.215b 1318, and Marrachia [1980, 2134] and Pritchard [1997] suggest that there is also a trace at Met. 15.1020b 261a 9, but these are outside the connes of my discussion. Knorr [1981] is sceptical about the Metaphysics passage. 40 Cf. Topics 1.155b 316. Philosophy and dialectic make use of the same topoi or com` filosfJ a zhtonti a autn (lns. 1011), I take the monplace arguments. In t d article as governing the whole phrase and the a as epexegetic (for the philosopher, i.e., who is inquiring by himself). 41 Cf. Aristotle, Topics 3.158a 31b 3.
39
38
33
while distant hypotheses require many steps, so that the argument might seem sophistic to the audience. Aristotle then introduces a third case where the hypothesis is near to the principles. Here too, it will be obvious to both sides whats afoot when there are denitions of the primary principles, since the steps of the deduction will be few, and so they too are hard to attack. This is then the context of Topics 3.158b 24159b 2:
With many theses, when the denition is poorly presented, it is not easy to have a dialectical dispute or to attack them, for example, whether there is one or more than one contrary to one thing. But when the contraries are dened in some manner it is easy to prove whether it is possible for there to be several contraries to the same or not. In the same way it also occurs in the case of other things that require denition. But it also resembles what happens in mathematics where some things are not easily proved due to a deciency of denition, e.g., that the line parallel to the side that cuts the plane divides similarly both the line and the area. But when the denition is stated it is straight-away obvious what is meant. For the areas and the lines have the same antanairesis. But this is the (or a) denition of the same ratio.42 And when the denitions are posited, e.g. what is line and what is circle, the rst [claims] of the elements are without qualication very easy to prove (except that it is not possible to attack many [claims] with regard to each of these since the terms in the middle are not many [cf. 158b 58]). But if the denitions of the principles are not posited, it is difcult, perhaps completely impossible. Matters in arguments are also like these.
A reader of Aristotle would normally focus on the second group of denitions, of line or circle. These are denitions of the rst kinds in geometry (the principles). Thus, when we get their denitions right, the proofs of the early propositions or elements, as Aristotle calls them, about circles and lines, and which will not involve many steps, will be hard to refute. On the other hand, the example which precedes is designed to show how clarity in denition can solve a puzzle. Note that the denition of same ratio actually explains what it is for the lines and areas to be divided similarly. Behind the informality of the description, lies a sophisticated example. Is this a case where the theorem is close to the rst principle dened? Aristotle does not say. We are left with a sic et non. As in the An. Post., Aristotle holds at Topics H 3.153a 622 that there can be a deduction of a denition and of the essence of a thing, but also that those engaging in dialectical discussions never or rarely attempt such a deduction, but that, as do geometers and arithmeticians, they assume denitions as principles.43 Now the notion of denition in dialectics is much narrower than the treatments of denition we have looked at.
In the sentence sti d' rismj to ato lgou otoj, the noun phrase, rismj to ato lgou, lacks an article but is in predicate position and so is neutral between this is a denition (among others) and this is the denition (the only one we accept). The article, I suspect, might have given emphasis on an issue irrelevant to Aristotles discussion. 43 ` n ednai de ti odej lgoi tn dialeCf. Topics H 3.153a 711: prton m
42
gomnwn ron sullogzontai, ll pntej rcn t toioton lambnousin, oon o te per gewmetran a rimoj a tj llaj tj toiataj maseij (First
it is necessary to know that no one or few of those engage in dialectical discussion deduce the
34
H. Mendell
Demonstrated denitions are rarely or not at all a part of dialectic. So too, in dialectics, Aristotle rules out restricted denitions (e.g. cf. Topics Z 1.139a 2527). That is not at issue. Hence, if Aristotle intends us to understand that his example of same ratio in Topics 3 is to function as a denition does in dialectic, it looks as if the denition under consideration would be neither restricted nor demonstrated. However, in claiming that geometry and arithmetic assume denitions as principles at Topics H 3.153a 622, Aristotle does not claim that there are no deduced denitions in mathematics, only that mathematics assumes denitions as starting points. No one would dispute that claim about mathematics, yet I do not think that it contradicts the claim that one can think of fundamental theorems as denitions or that a starting point in one treatise might be a theorem in another. Aristotle is making no claim about the role of theorems in mathematics as establishing denitions, but he also maintains here his view about real denitions and transformed demonstrations. We have seen that this account should apply as much to mathematics as to other sciences. Again, the conception of denition in dialectics is narrower. Should we take Aristotles conception of denition in dialectic as determining his use of denition in an aside on a completely different subject? There can be no doubt that anthyphairesis was fundamental to proportion theory at the time the Topics was written. It may even have constituted the basic denition of same ratio in some treatise. However, in the argument under discussion, the example of anthyphairesis merely serves to show how a clear denition can make a problem solvable. It says nothing about how we arrived at the denition. Only the next group of denitions, of line and circle, seems concerned with the rst theorems or elements in the science and so with the denitions that must appear before the rst theorems. I am not claiming that the denition of same ratio in Topics 3 was construed as a denition in any one of the three ways mentioned in Posterior Analytics B 10. My claim rather is that the passage in the Topics is not adequate to establish any one interpretation as more than one plausible story among other plausible stories. We expect that most objects in Greek mathematics will receive simple denitions providing necessary and sufcient conditions for the term dened. We are aware that, as in the case of straight (Euclid, Elements i def 4) this may lead to denitions which are barely comprehensible and certainly not operational, even if their function must have been pedagogical (where the teacher must have explained the denition in some way). My argument here has been that for certain sophisticated concepts involving fundamental relational notions, mathematicians in the time of Aristotle could take other approaches. I have also argued that whether or not same ratio was ever dened in this way, there was a proof technique which lends itself to this way of thinking. Whether or not this was also the case with the denition of same ratio as having the same antanairesis lends itself to scepticism.44
denition, but all assume this sort of thing as a starting point, such as do people involved with geometry and numbers and the other disciplines of this sort). 44 I am aware that in the early 1980s, Wilbur Knorr was reconsidering the evidence for his theories in the Physics and De caelo, but I do not know of any of his conclusions on this. See note 34 above. In the late 1980s and 1990s, Richard McKirahan, Charles Young, James Bogen, and I discussed several passages in Aristotles Physics and De caelo containing traces of Greek
35
Bibliography
Ancient Works All works other than Archimedes and the Scholia to Theodosius below employ the texts listed in Berkowitz and Squitier [1986]. Greek quotations are taken from the TLG E disk (see Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, below). Alexander of Aphrodisias. In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria. Ed. by M. Wallies. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1891. Alexander Aphrodisiensis. In librum de sensu commentarium. Ed. by P. Wendland. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 3.1. Berlin: Reimer, 1901. Alexander Aphrodisiensis. In Meteorologica. Ed. by M. Hayduck. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 3.2. 1899. Archimedes. Opera omnia cum commentariis Eutocii. 3 vols. 2nd ed. Ed. I.L. Heiberg; corrected by E.S. Stamatis. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1972 (orig. 2nd. ed. 1910, 1918, 1915). Archytas. Testimonia et fragmenta. In H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (abbrev. DK), vol. 1, 6th ed. Berlin: Weidmann, 1951 (repr. Dublin/Zurich: 1966): 421439. Aristoteles. Analytica. Ed. by W.D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964 (reprint: 1978). Aristoteles. Physica. Ed. by W.D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950. Aristoteles. Metaphysica (title of edition: Aristotles Metaphysics). Text and commentary by W.D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924 (reprint: 1970 of corrected 1953 edition). Aristoteles. De caelo (title of edition: Aristote. Du ciel). Ed. with French trans. by P. Moraux. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1965. Aristoteles. Topica et sophistici elenchi. Ed. by W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958 (repr. 1970 (1st ed. corr.)). ps.-Aristoteles. De lineis insecabilibus. Ed. by I. Bekker. In Aristotelis opera, vol. 2. Berlin: Reimer, 1831. ps.-Aristoteles. Mechanica. Ed. by I. Bekker. In Aristotelis opera, vol. 2. Berlin: Reimer, 1831. Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica, vol. 1. 3rd edn. Ed. by F. Vogel and K.T. Fischer (following I. Bekker and L. Dindorf). Leipzig: Teubner, 1888 (repr. Stuttgart: 1964). Euclides. Elementa and Scholia. 5 vols. Ed. by E.S. Stamatis after I.L. Heiberg. Leipzig: Teubner, 19691977. Hecataeus Abderitis. Fragmenta. In F. Jacoby (ed.), Die Fragmente der Griechishen Historiker #264 (Leiden: Brill, 19261958). Iamblichus, In Nicomachi arithmeticam introductionem liber. Ed. by U. Klein (after H. Pistelli). Leipzig: Teubner, 1894 (repr. Stuttgart: 1975). Joannes Philoponus. In Aristotelis physicorum libros octo commentaria. Ed. by H. Vitelli. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 1617. Berlin: Reimer, 18878. Pappus Alexandrinus. Collectio mathematica. Ed. by F. Hultsch. Berlin: Weidmann, 187678. Scholia in Theodosium. Ed. by J.L. Heiberg. Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gttingen, Philol.-hist. Kl., N.F. 19.3. Berlin: Weidmann, 1927: 166199.
proportion theory, including De caelo A 6. I beneted tremendously from these discussions. I also beneted from a discussion at the 1998 May week discussion of this passage at Cambridge University. Stephen Menns talk (and unpublished paper) for a conference in honor of Ian Mueller (April, 2002) was full of useful insights. I presented the paper at the 2002 conference on Ancient Mathematics at Delphi, where I also received many useful comments, especially from Reviel Netz and Lis Brack-Bernsen. The editors were responsible for many improvements.
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Simplicius. In Aristotelis quattuor libros de caelo commentaria. Ed. by J.L. Heiberg. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 7. Berlin: Reimer, 1894. Simplicius. In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria. Ed. by J.L. Heiberg. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 910. Berlin: Reimer, 1892, 1895. Themistius. In Aristotelis physica paraphrasis. Ed. by H. Schenkl. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 5.2. Berlin: Reimer, 1900. Theodosius Tripolites. Sphaerica. Ed. by J.L. Heiberg. Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gttingen, Philol.-hist. Kl., N.F. 19.3. Berlin: Weidmann, 1927: 2164.
Modern Works Barnes, Jonathan. 1993. Aristotles Posterior Analytics. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1st ed. 1975). Becker, Oscar. 1933. Eudoxos-Studien I: Eine voreudoxische Proportionlehre und ihre Spuren bei Aristoteles und Euklid. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie, und Physik, Abt. B 2: 311333. Berggren, L.J. 1976. Spurious Theorems in Archimedes Equilibrium of Planes: Book I. Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 16: 87103. Berkowitz, Luci and Karl A. Squitier with tech. assist. from William A. Johnson. 1986. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: Canon of Greek Authors and Works. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bolton, Robert. 1976. Essentialism and Semantic Theory in Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, II, 710. Philosophical Review 85: 51444. Charles, David. 2000. Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hasper, Pieter Sjoerd. 2003. The Metaphysics of Continuity: Zeno, Democritus, & Aristotle. Ph.D. Diss., Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Heath, Thomas L. 1949. Mathematics in Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fowler, D.H. 1987. The Mathematics of Platos Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Knorr, Wilbur R. 1975. The Evolution of the Euclidean Elements: a Study of the Theory of Incommensurable Magnitudes and its Signicance for Early Greek Geometry. Dordrecht: Reidel. Knorr, Wilbur R. 1978. Archimedes and the Pre-Euclidean Proportion Theory. Archives internationales dhistoire des sciences 28: 183244. Knorr, Wilbur R. 1980. review of Hans-Joachim Waschkies, Von Eudoxos zu Aristoteles (Amsterdam, 1977). Isis 71: 506508. Knorr, Wilbur R. 1981. Aristotle and Incommensurability, Archive for History of Exact Sciences 24: 19 (cf. A Correction to my Article Aristotle and Incommensurability, ibid. 27 (1982), 391392) McKirahan, Richard D. 1992. Principles and Proofs: Aristotles Theory of Demonstrative Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Marrachia, Silvio. 1981. Aristotele e lincommensurabilit. Archive for the History of the Exact Sciences 21: 201228. Mendell, Henry. 1998. Making Sense of Aristotelian Demonstration. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 16: 160225. Netz, Reviel. 1999. The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: a Study in Cognitive History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pritchard, Paul. 1997. Metaphysics 15 and Pre-Euclidean Mathematics. Apeiron 30: 4871. Ross, W.D. 1934. Aristotles Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Saito, Ken. 2003. Phantom Theories of pre-Eudoxan Proportion. Science in Context 16: 33147. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Disk E [TLG E]. TLG Project, University of California, Irvine, 2000. Vitrac, Bernard. 1994. Euclide, Les lments: Livres V IX. Vol. 2. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Philosophy Department 5151 State University Drive California State University Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA 90032, USA henry.mendell@calstatela.edu
(Received December 6, 2005) Published online November 11, 2006 Springer-Verlag 2006

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Arch. Hist. Exact Sci. 61 (2007) 337 Digital Object Identier (DOI) 10.

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

From this Aristotle may legitimately conclude:

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

or more generally, but not proven by Aristotle:

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Comment: We can perhaps summarize the argument in this way:

H. Mendell Hence, TA (LX) < TB (LX), by the previous two claims.

From this it follows that:

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Cf. Heath [1949, 129] for a different assessment.

We can imagine a similar postulate for equally fast:

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

tn mezona m scsh lon atametrsai, ll' poleph mroj to mezonoj,

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

6. The moral: Antanairesis, early proportion theory, and Topics

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

Two-Step Eudoxan Proportion Theory in Aristotle

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