Introduction

I've read many books on US-China relations over the years, the recent best of which include: China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia by David C. Kang, Chasing the Sun: Rethinking East Asian Policy by Morton Abramowitz, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia by Aaron L. Friedberg, On China by Henry Kissinger, and China: Fragile Superpower by Susan L. Shirk I've also attended several recent seminars on the subject, including: "G2 at GW, The 5th Annual Conference on U.S.-China Economic Relations and China's Economic Development" at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies "The Economic and Security Direction of the New Chinese Government" at The Heritage Foundation "China as a Global Power: Contending Views from China" at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars' Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, and "America and China in the Aftermath of Election and Succession: Paths and Pitfalls" at the Brookings Institution In fact, next Monday I'll be attending the "Leadership Change in China: Its Effects in East Asia and Relations with the U.S." panel, also at the Sigur Center. I mention these previous occasions and readings to point out influences on my thinking. Regardless of this influence, however, the opinions I express below are mine entirely and I accept full responsibility.

Swimming Sumos
When I first graduated from business school fifteen years ago, I was fortunate to get a consulting assignment in Ukraine, assisting SMEs. Early in my tenure there, one of my Ukrainian colleagues astutely pointed out that my real role there was as an agent of U.S. "soft power". He further explained that even though the Cold War was concluded, non-militarily, Ukraine was still one of several arenas in the soft power war still being fought between the U.S. and Russia. Within a few short years, I began to agree as I saw

events unfold, starting from the transition from Russian President Yeltsin to President Putin, the "Orange Revolution", and finally the transition from Ukrainian President Yushchenko to President Yanukovych, thus completing Ukraine's return to Russia's sphere of influence. If we fast-forward to today, we can see a similar battle for influence taking place in the Asia-Pacific region between the U.S. and China. I won't rehash here all the statistics regarding China's re-rise economically, politically, culturally, diplomatically, and militarily. Suffice it to say that China's re-emergence onto the international scene has not gone unnoticed globally, most certainly since my student days. This can be seen everywhere from the rhetoric in the recent U.S. Presidential race and debates, to the U.S.'s "pivot" or rebalancing posture towards Asia. To start, let's pivot to the pivot. Unfortunately, most of the coverage I've seen with respect to the rebalancing inevitably focuses on the military aspect. If we choose to focus on this exclusively, we can envision two huge Sumo wrestlers squaring off against one another across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. Instead of jockeying on solid ground, however, they're playing a very complex game of weiqi, or "go", at sea. As China already has or is still in the process of resolving most of it's land disputes with neighbors, it's looking to the oceans. This inevitably puts it into conflict with the current reigning seapower, the U.S, or its allies such as Japan, as in the recent Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Historically, the U.S. has only looked to China when its commercial interests there were threatened, or when using it to balance against other great powers in the area, notably Russia/the Soviet Union and Japan (past and present) and England, France, Germany, Portugal, etc. (past). No emphasis was placed on a continuous, stable, longterm relationship with either the Chinese government or its people, though exotic fascination remained in some quarters, noticeably business and religious interests.

Peace Through Trade

I would make the argument that in order for the people of China, and indeed all of East Asia, to see that the U.S. is finally willing to engage with the region in the longterm, many changes are necessary. First and foremost, the U.S. has to reconcile the "containment" versus the "engagement" arguments within itself. In order to move forward into the 21st century, the American people and government can ill afford to continue to be insular in their thinking, fighting today's "enemies" using yesterday's strategy. China is not the Soviet Union. Second, it may be clear that some Asian actors are bandwagoning, accommodating, hedging, or even, balancing with respect to China's resurgence. However, what's also clear is that most players in the area, particularly

ASEAN, are playing the U.S. and China off against one another. All desire increased trade ties with China, but still want to retain some element of the of the U.S security guarantee through its hub-and-spoke architecture in the region. In bygone eras, preeminince was primarily defined militarily. However, not only survival, but also prosperity in the 21st century and beyond is increasingly defined economically. History is littered with the corpses of once-great powers who overspent themselves into oblivion, "imperial overstretch" if you will. Today we have a historic, once-every-twenty years, opportunity to push the "reset" button on U.S-China relations as our nations undergo leadership transitions simultaneously. My experience in international marketing and business development gives me a unique perspective. In essence, international trade is the most multilateral of initiatives. Simply put, it is impossible to do alone. While strong powers, such as the U.S. and China, may prefer to deal with others on a bilateral basis, eventually they come to realize that in order to get maximum results for their efforts, a multilateral approach is indispensable. Realizing this, the U.S. is currently engaged in the ASEAN and East Asian Summits this week. Initiatives such as these are fundamental to the U.S.'s longterm economic survival and need to be emphasized more as part of the rebalancing strategem. Individually, the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement are fairly ambitious in scope and look set to achieve great things in the realm of international trade and investment. However, it makes no sense for TPP to exclude China, the world's largest exporter, and for RCEP to exclude the U.S., the world's largest consumer market. Hopefully, both powers will realize this as well and take steps to merge their initiatives, not simply for altruistic reasons, but out of mutual self-interest as both look to emerge from their respective downturns, ensuring not only economic, but political stability as well.

The Legacy of Darwin

In summation, it is probably most fitting that the initial moves of the U.S.'s rebalancing strategy included the stationing of some 2,500 Marines in the town of Darwin, Australia. Surely, one of their responsibilities will be as a type of rapid reaction force, ready to respond to any troubles in the Straits of Malacca through which 40 to 50% of all worldwide seaborne trade passes. The conclusion of Charles Darwin's seminal work, The Origin of Species, is frequently misinterpreted. Through "survival of the fittest", he posited that it wasn't the

strongest of species which were destined to survive, nor even the smartest. According to Darwin, those species which were most adaptable to change were the most predisposed for survival. It remains to be seen whether current U.S. foreign policy can continue the shift away from the Cold War, zero-sum, "containment" thinking exhibited in previous eras to the progressive, 21st-century, positive-sum, "engagement" mentality which will be necessary for our future prosperity. No less than our economic survival is at stake through this evolution from hard power to soft power to "smart power".