NATION-BUILDING IN THE GUATEMALAN COUNTRYSIDE A Thesis Submitted to the Committee on Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Arts and Science

TRENT UNIVERSITY Peterborough, Ontario, Canada Copyright by Devon McKinnon 2010 History M.A. Graduate Program January 2011

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ABSTRACT Nation-Building in the Guatemalan Countryside Devon McKinnon This thesis seeks to explain why Guatemala's military-government escalated its use of violence in the countryside from 1978 to 1985. Antonio Gramsci's hegemony theory is used as a theoretical perspective to guide the analysis of this work. In terms of Gramsci, the military engaged in extreme violence against individuals, institutions, and whole communities because they were perceived to be part of a counter-hegemonic movement that threatened the military-dominated status quo. As a result, the military attempted to destroy these social movements and replace them with military-dominated institutions like model villages and civil patrols. Furthermore, the military tried to gain the allegiance of the rural populace through social programs and ideological indoctrination. These initiatives were designed to increase the hegemony of the military in the eyes of the rural inhabitants.

-Keywords: Guatemalan military, Mayans, political violence, authoritarian revolution, Antonio Gramsci.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank David Sheinin, Tim Stapleton, Antonio Cazorla Sanchez, and Jim Handy for their contributions to my work. Also, thanks to Christopher Evelyn, Derek Lipman, Pauline Harder, and Ivana Elbl for their feedback on earlier drafts of this project. Finally, thanks to Carolyn Kay for her comments on my past work.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract Acknowledgements Table of Contents Introduction: Hegemony, Nationalization, and the Guatemalan Military Chapter 2: Explaining the Escalation of Violence in Guatemala: An Analysis of the Historiography Chapter 3: The Counter-Hegemonic Movement in Guatemala Chapter 4: Military Violence in the Guatemalan Countryside Chapter 5: Building Hegemony in Rural Guatemala Chapter 6: Mechanisms of Control and Integration: Model Villages and Civil Patrols Chapter 7: Guatemala and the United States: An Uneasy Alliance Conclusion: Military Hegemony in the 1980s and Beyond Bibliography

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22-34

35-62

63-93 94-128

129-147 148-179 180-189 190-204

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Hegemony. Nationalization, and the Guatemalan Military From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, Guatemala's military-government escalated its violent campaign against the Mayans1 in the countryside. Although individuals living in cities were prone to attacks from the military, police, and right-wing death squads, it was those in the countryside, especially the northwest region who experienced the brunt of the terror.2 The principally Ladino3 officers conducted a rural counterinsurgency that targeted individuals, associations, and whole villages thought to be a threat to the military-dominated status quo.4 The military used violence as part of a plan to reestablish its control over the countryside. I will use Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony to analyze the relationship between the Guatemalan military and the Mayans in the countryside. For the portion of my thesis where I deal with the diplomatic and military support given to Guatemala by the United States, I will use a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework, best articulated by Robert W. Cox and William I. Robinson, who applied Gramsci's hegemony theory to international relations.

In Guatemala the term "Mayan" was a label given to the 21 ethnic groups that represented 60 percent of the country's population. Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 582. 2 For more information on military violence against urban dissidents after 1954 see Henry Frundt, Refreshing Pauses: Coca Cola and Human Rights in Guatemala (New York, 1987); Debra LevensonEstrada, Trade Unionists Against Terror: Guatemala City 1954-1985 (Chapel Hill, 1994); Thomas F. Reed and Karen Brandow, The Sky Never Changes: Testimonies from the Guatemalan Labour Movement (Ithaca and New York, 1996). 3 In Guatemala the term "Ladino" is a socially constructed cultural group that is distinct from Mayans. Although the exact definition of a Ladino is somewhat fluid in Guatemala, it generally refers to individuals that have adopted European culture, particularly in terms of speaking Spanish. The Ladinos controlled the government, military, and economy throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Kay B. Warren, "Interpreting La Violencia in Guatemala: Shapes of Mayan Silence & Resistance," in The Violence Within: Cultural & Political Opposition in Divided Nations, ed. by Kay B. Warren (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, 1993), 26; Peter Calvert, Guatemala: A Nation in Turmoil (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), 21-22. Jim Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala: Reconciliation and the Indigenous Accords," in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, ed. by Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), 284-286. 5 Robert Cox is useful to this study as his theoretical framework helps to contextualize the Guatemalan military's violent campaign by looking at how the United States influenced the ideas and

Antonio Gramsci believed that after a dominant class, or a coalition of groups, establishes itself as the leaders of a state, it solidifies its power base by offering concessions to subordinate classes. These concessions make elite-rule look benevolent, so that lower classes will endorse the elites' power and its dominant role in capitalist production.7 In this way, the dominant elites create a cultural, economic, and political unity that allow for its interests, along with the lower classes' general interests, to be met.8 Gramsci wrote that the general interests the government seeks to fulfill are fluid and subject to change depending upon the strength of civil society institutions.9 If the lower classes have a strong presence within these institutions, the elite class will rein in its interests to appease the demands of the lower classes.10 However, the actions of the elite are presented as the best means for all groups in society to meet their needs,11 In terms of Guatemala, the upper class was mainly comprised of the economic
actions of the Guatemalan military elites. For instance, Cox's assertion that a global hegemon will often use concessions and ideological indoctrination to enhance its hegemony is useful in understanding why the U.S. offered military aid to Guatemala, and how the U.S.'s advocacy of anticommunism affected military elites. Robinson's work is useful because his concept of "promoting polyarchy" shows that elites consent to elections because the participation of non-elites classes is restricted to voting, which allows both domestic and international economic elites to maintain their interests. His ideas help to underline why political elites in Guatemala and the U.S. both consented to having national elections in Guatemala in 1985. Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method," in Approaches to World Order, ed. by Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair (Cambridge and New York, 1994), 134, 137; Robert W. Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order," in Approaches to World Order, ed. by Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 517-518; Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 120; William I. Robinson, "Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S. Foreign Policy," Theory and Society 25, 5 (October 1996), 623-626; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, May 14, 1984, GU01013, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Guatemala: Central American Policy and U.S. Relations, P2-4, 7-8; Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 110. 6 Antonio Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, ed. by David Forgacs (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 205-206; Mark Neufeld, "Democratization in/of Canadian Foreign Policy: Critical Reflections," Studies in Political Economy 58 (Spring 1999), 113. 7 Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 126. 8 Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 205-206; Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II, trans, and ed. Joseph A. Buttigieg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 183. 9 Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 192, 205-206. 10 Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 205-206. 11 Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 205-206.

elites and the military. From the colonial period until the 1940s the military was used to enforce the exploitive economic system that enriched the Spanish and Ladino economic elites while subjugating the Mayan laborers. The military used coercive tactics to subdue Mayan rebellions in the countryside, to make sure that plantations owned by the economic elites had their labor needs met, and as a means to forcefully evict the Mayans from communal lands so this land could be used by the economic elites.12 By the 1960s the military became more powerful than the economic elites, so it dominated this alliance, although the military hierarchy continued to ensure that the interests of the economic elites would be upheld.13 After achieving hegemonic status in the 1960s, military officers commonly embraced the notion that the military should use authoritarian principles to correct Guatemala's socio-economic problems while at the same time destroying any internal resistance to these changes, especially from communist movements.14 This type of national security state allows the military to control internal security, which "encompasses every aspect of life: social, economic, and political spheres."15 In order to prevent social upheaval, the military-government gave concessions to the Mayans by providing them with jobs, and by allowing rural Mayans to maintain traditional political and religious local governments that exercised significant autonomy

Robert H Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle For Democracy (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 54-55; Victor Montejo, Voices from Exile: Violence and Survival in Modern Maya History (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 28-30. 13 Cesar D. Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," in Latin American Insurgencies, ed. by Georges Fauriol (Washington, 1984), 104; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 117. 14 Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, "The Development of Military Autonomy and Corporateness in Central America," in Democracy Under Siege: New Military Power in Latin America, ed. by Augusto Varas (Westport, 1989), 167. 15 J. Patrice McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State: The Case of Guatemala," Socialism and Democracy 6, 1 (1992), 127.

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from the central government. At this time the elites were not trying to establish a hegemonic order by integrating the countryside into the central government, they were trying to maintain traditional governance structures so rural Mayans would govern themselves, and the economic elites would have access to Mayan workers in the process.17 So while Guatemala's social situation was different from what Gramsci was writing about, the elites were still giving concessions to the lower classes in order to maintain social cohesion, but they were largely unsuccessful as rebellions did frequently occur in the countryside. Since the elites were in control of the state but lacked the consent of the rural Mayans, they were merely dominant, not hegemonic. Gramsci wrote that when elites are able to gain the consent of the lower classes by granting concessions and through ideological indoctrination, hegemony is maintained with only minor elements of coercion.18 By contrast, when the political elites are not accepted, they resort to coercion to maintain control of the state.19 Even though violence was used consistently to enforce economic and social conditions in the countryside, the military escalated its use of violence because its control over the state was threatened by three movements that occurred from the 1960s to the 1990s. First, there was an

Richard Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits: The Cultural Effects of State Repression Among the Q'eqchi' of Guatemala," Critique of Anthropology 11,1 (1991), 50; Arturo Arias, "Changing Indian Identity: Guatemala's Violent Transition to Modernity," in Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1540 to 1988, ed. by Carol A. Smith and Marilyn M. Moors (Austin, 1990), 232; Greg Grandin, "To End with All These Evils: Ethnic Transformation and Community Mobilization in Guatemala's Western Highlands, 1954-1980," Latin American Perspectives, 24, 2 (March, 1997), 9. 17 George Black, "Military Rule in Guatemala," in The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America, ed. by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr (Wilmington, 1997), 59-60; Charles D. Brockett, Land, Power, and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central America, 2nd ed (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), 110-111. 18 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II, 52-53. Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 127. 19 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II, 32-33.

unsuccessful rebel movement in the 1960s that mainly recruited in Ladino communities.20 Second, community organizations developed in the countryside that were autonomous from the central government, and they represented the interests of the oppressed masses.21 Finally, there was a renewed rebel movement that gained a great deal of popularity during this time.22 In terms of the community organizations, when the military was unable to conduct disaster relief effectively in the wake of a massive earthquake that struck Guatemala in 1976, community organizations expanded their operations in order to assist in the reconstruction.23 Antonio Gramsci pointed out that one way that the legitimacy of an elite class can decline is if it is unsuccessful in its attempt to fulfill a political obligation that other political classes expected of the elites.24 The military's impotent response to the 1976 earthquake would certainly qualify as a major political failure that simultaneously undermined the military's legitimacy and made community

Hilde Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations: A Search for Causes: A Study of Guatemala and Costa Rica (The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 91; Timothy P. WickhamCrowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 217. 21 Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 284-285. 22 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 133; Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 40-41; Michael Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," Anthropological Quarterly 58, 3 (July 1985), 94; George Black, Milton Jamail, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala (London and New York: Zed Books and North American Congress on Latin America, 1984), 4; Arias, "Changing Indian Identity," 252; Despite its popularity within Guatemala, the guerrilla movements of the 1970s and 1980s were at a disadvantage because they were only receiving minor amounts of aid, training, and advice from Socialist countries. Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 112; Danuta Paszyn, The Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change in Central America, 1979-1990: Case Studies on Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 111, 113. 23 Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 27; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again! Recovery of Historical Memory Project (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999), 210; Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 94; Simone Remijnse, Memories of Violence: Civil Patrols and the Legacy of Conflict in Joyabaj, Guatemala (Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 2002), 8485. 24 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans, and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 210.

organizations more popular. The guerrillas and community organizations, which included catechists, village elders, rural cooperatives and the Committee of Campesino Unity (CUC), were undermining the interests of the elites by trying to precipitate a revolution, by creating economic opportunities that were outside of the plantation system, by espousing the concept that Mayans and Ladinos should be treated equally, and by strengthening existing institutions and creating new ones that allowed the rural population to exert more control over their lives. To use Gramscian terminology, the government was concerned that these groups were forming a counter-hegemonic bloc that represented a competing political, economic, and moral authority."7 Since these groups were undermining the military-dominated status quo. the military resorted to violence against representatives from these groups, along with the communities that supported them. Lucas Garcia began escalating military attacks against these groups claiming that they were affiliated with the guerrillas. Lucas Garcia's claim docs not hold up to scrutiny. Many of the individuals targeted by military violence were not guerrilla sympathizers but were involved in non-violent community organizations in the countryside.'*' The fallacy that military operations were directed only at guerrillas and the communities that supported them is illustrated by the high amount of violence directed at areas with strong
Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 27; Archdiocese of Guatemala. liuau mala Sever Again, 210; Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala." * * * Kemiinsc. Memories of Violence, 84-85. 26 Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 5; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala. 12'. Anecla Delli Sante, Nightmare or Reality: Guatemala in the 1980s (Amsterdam: Thela Publishers. |ww,,. 47-44. Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 205-206; Cox and Sinclair. "Grams*, i. Hegemony, and International Relations," 128-129. 28 Warren, "Interpreting La Violencia in Guatemala," 35, 37. 29 Beatriz Manz, Refugees of A Hidden War: The Aftermath ofCounieriiiMimenry in Guatemala (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 98; Frederick H. Gareau. Stale Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism (Atlanta and London: Clarity Press and Zed Books, 2004), 57-58.

community organizations and minimal affiliation with the guerrillas. This trend can be seen most explicitly in Rabinal, a municipality in Baja Verapaz, as well as Chimaltenango, and southern El Quiche.30 Greg Grandin correctly interprets the military's violence against community organizations as an attempt to destroy opposition to the government, and subsequently incorporate rural villages into the state through military-controlled institutions.31 During Lucas Garcia's war against the guerrillas, in order to limit the amount of aid given to the guerrillas by rural communities military tactics changed from using selective violence to perpetrating large-scale massacres of suspected guerrilla sympathizers.32 The military was very suspicious of the communities that guerrillas operated in, so its criteria for what made someone a guerrilla sympathizer was very broad, which led to excessive acts of violence. Army intelligence defined the level of suspected guerrilla penetration in particular communities, and categorized them as red, pink, yellow, or green. Villages defined as "red" were subject to the most far-reaching violence including massacres because these communities were thought to be controlled by the Marxist guerrillas, and by extension international communism. If villages were categorized as "pink" or "yellow" more selective violence was used to force suspected sympathizers into fleeing the country or else complying with military rule. Finally, "green" communities were subject to surveillance by the military, but violence was rarely

Carol A. Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala: Economic Reorganization As A Continuation of War," Latin American Perspectives 17, 4 (1990), 16, 24; Rolando Alecio, "Uncovering the Truth: Political Violence and Indigenous Organizations," in The New Politics of Survival, ed.by Minor Sinclair (New York, 1995), 26-30. 31 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 129. 32 Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 91.

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used as the guerrillas were thought to have little to no influence in these areas. Lucas Garcia's use of brutal violence against members of community organizations, suspected guerrillas, and their supporters led to the deaths of more than 10,000 non-combatants.34 In the later stages of his presidency, Lucas Garcia began to place more emphasis on creating social programs in the countryside in order to gain the consent of the population. This approach was outlined in a proposition by Navy Captain Juan Fernando Cifuentes called "Operation Ixil" in May 1981. In an effort to assert army hegemony in the region, this proposal suggested that the army set up an extensive number of social institutions under the direction of the Section of Civilian Affairs and Community Development (S-5). S-5 units were set up in the Ixil Triangle, the department of Alta Verapaz, and Huehuetenango, areas that had a significant guerrilla presence.35 This plan entailed that the military use coercion to replace institutions that undermined its hegemony while trying to gain the consent of the population through civic action. After Lucas Garcia was deposed as President. Ri'os Montt endorsed the need to use both concessions and violence to win the consent of the population in the army proposal National Plan for Security and Development, which was written in April 1982. Rios Montt believed this new approach would defeat the guerrilla groups, and also legitimize Guatemala's military government at home and abroad. Military officials believed that by destroying the guerrilla movement and increasing the government's presence in the countryside that the population would willingly consent to being
Frank M. Afflitto and Paul Jesilow, The Quiet Revolutionaries: Seeking Justice in Guatemala (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 25-26; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 582. 34 Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984), 180. 35 George Black, "Under The Gun," NACLA Report on the Americas 19, 6 (November 1985), 1416. Black, "Under The Gun," 11.
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integrated into the military-dominated status quo. The military's counterinsurgency plan, which was sometimes referred to as "rifles and beans", involved rewarding rural inhabitants who were loyal to the government by giving them housing, food, and employment.38 Military officials were adamant that in order for a community to be seen as loyal to the government they must establish a civil patrol unit. The tasks of the civil patrols included searching the surrounding area for guerrillas, acting as buffers to protect soldiers during military raids, and in some cases serving as combatants in military operations.39 On the other hand, if communities were seen as threatening to the government, the military often used scorched-earth tactics to destroy these areas, and afterward the survivors were moved to military-controlled villages.40 The purpose of Rios Montt's counterinsurgency plan was to kill guerrilla combatants and their supporters, and separate the guerrillas from the population that was providing them with food, supplies, and combatants. After establishing firm control over the countryside, the military planned to hold federal elections which they hoped would increase their domestic and

Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy (Managua: Guatemalan Church in Exile, 1989), 5; Craig W. Nelson, Kenneth I. Taylor and Janice Kruger, Witness to Genocide: The Present Situation of Indians in Guatemala (London: Survival International, 1983), 10; Jennifer Schirmer, "The Looting of Democratic Discourse by the Guatemalan Military: Implications for Human Rights," in Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America, ed. by Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (Boulder and Cumnor Hill, 1996), 87. 38 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3, 1983, GU00903, Secret Intelligence Research Report, Guatemala's Guerrillas Retreating in the Face of Government Pressure, i, 7-8; Chris Krueger and Kjell Enge, Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands (Washington: Washington Office on Latin America, 1985), V. 39 Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 82. 40 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3, 1983, GU00903, Secret Intelligence Research Report, Guatemala's Guerrillas Retreating in the Face of Government Pressure, i, 7-8; Krueger and Kjell Enge, Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands, V; Tom Barry, Inside Guatemala (Albuquerque: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1992), 58-59.

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international legitimacy.41 Despite the military's more "humanitarian" approach, however, military violence increased during Rios Montt's sixteen and a half months in power as over 12,000 people were killed or disappeared.42 Rios Montt's strategy in Guatemala closely mirrors counterinsurgency theory, which was described by Frank Kitson. According to Kitson, the most effective way for the military to overpower an insurgency is to combat them by force, and also to provide social services as a means to get the populations' support. Kitson suggested that if the economy is improved, and the government attempts to correct specific grievances that the population has against the government, then the insurgency can be defeated more easily. If the government operates like this then the population is more likely to view the counterinsurgency as a liberating force, which increases its hegemony.43 Rios Montt acknowledged the validity of counterinsurgency theory as he placed a strong emphasis on the need for civic action as a means to increase the military's legitimacy in the countryside. After an internal army coup replaced Rios Montt with his defense minister Mejia Victores in early August 1983 the military continued to increase social services in the countryside. Under Mejia Victores, the military institutionalized its control over the countryside by creating the Inter-Institutional Coordinating Committees (IICC), development poles, and the role of the S-5 was greatly expanded. With these structures in
Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 7-8; Black, "Under The Gun," 11; Richard Alan White, The Morass: United States Intervention in Central America (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984), 115. 42 M. Gabriela Torres, "Bloody Deeds/Hechos Sangrientos: Reading Guatemala's Record of Political Violence in Cadaver Reports," in When States Kill, ed. by Cecilia Menjivar and Nestor Rodriguez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 149. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 50-51,79. 44 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, December 1983, GU00990, Secret Intelligence Summary, Military Intelligence Summary, Volume VIIILatin America, P3.

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place, the military controlled development projects, the model villages, and the civil patrols. These institutions gave the military the power to engage in large-scale statebuilding activities.45 Under Mejia Victores military violence continued, although violence in the countryside declined because the guerrillas were no longer a serious threat to the military.46 Military campaigns in the countryside during this time still killed thousands of civilians.47 Outside of concessions, Gramsci wrote that an elite class can also use ideological indoctrination, particularly through the church, education system, intellectuals, political clubs, and the press to propagate the idea that its rule is legitimate.48 These institutions encourage the need for all classes to work toward the preservation and extension of the capitalist economy.49 Since these institutions try to legitimize the elite agenda, they set limits on political participation by articulating what are legitimate and illegitimate demands to place on the state.50 Institutional restrictions limit criticism that undermines the hegemonic order, such as attacks against the capitalist system, so political accountability primarily consists of holding free elections.51 This style of top-down governance is anti-democratic because members of the lower classes have no legitimate

Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 65-67; Black, "Under The Gun," 12. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 29; Susan Burgerman, Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 57. 47 W. George Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts: Life and Death in Guatemala (Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 1995), 65. 48 Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International Publishers, 2000), 124-125; Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II, 52-53. 49 Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 126; Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, "Consciousness, Myth and Collective Action: Gramsci, Sorel, and the Ethical State," in Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, ed. by Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (Cambridge, 1996), 32. 50 Antonio Gramsci, Pre-Prison Writings, ed. Richard Bellamy, trans. Virginia Cox (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 333-334; Robinson, "Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S. Foreign Policy," 636. 51 Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 126; Robinson, "Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S. Foreign Policy," 636.

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mechanisms to control the political platforms their "representatives" are elected on, nor are they able to hold officials accountable for their actions after they are elected.52 In Guatemala, the military tried to indoctrinate the Mayans with nationalist and anticommunist ideas.53 In terms of nationalism, when Rfos Montt assumed the presidency, he emphasized the need to propagate nationalist rhetoric in the countryside in order to integrate the Mayans. According to neo-Gramscian scholars Craig Murphy and Enrico Augelli, political elites try to foster a sense of collective identity with the lower classes by using social myths - in particular, nationalism. In other words, nationalism is used to elicit support from non-elites for elite agendas.54 It was due to Rfos Montt's desire to gain the favour of the masses that he promoted the need for nationalism as a bulwark against communism.55 The army undermined Indian culture and encouraged the various ethnic groups in rural communities to embrace Guatemalan nationalism. Furthermore, schools funded by the state often discouraged the use of Mayan languages in favour of using Spanish, the language of the Ladino elite.56 When the rural Mayans took part in military training, or they became involved with the civil patrols or the model villages, the military tried to gain the allegiance of the rural Mayans by propagating anticommunism.57 This anticommunist discourse depicted the guerrilla groups of the 1970s and 1980s as subversive proxies for international communism that sought to overthrow capitalism and create a status quo characterized by

Robinson, "Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S. Foreign Policy," 636. 53 The Guatemalan military's anticommunist disposition was shaped in part by American aid, training, and encouragement. Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 120. 54 Augelli and Murphy, "Consciousness, Myth and Collective Action," 27, 29. 55 Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 140. 56 Black, "Under The Gun," 21. 57 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 128-129; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 58-59; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 148.

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violence and economic exploitation.58 Since the military was fighting these guerrillas, it was portrayed as the savior of Guatemala, and anyone who assisted the military by joining the military and the civil patrols was vindicated for helping to prevent the spread of communism in Guatemala.59 During the course of their state-building in the countryside, officials from the Guatemalan military lost legitimacy as political actors because the military's campaign was brutally violent. In response to this, military elites organized civilian elections in 1985 that were meant to increase the hegemony of the military internally, and also make the military look like a legitimate political institution internationally, particularly in the United States.60 Internally the 1985 election was a military-controlled transition to civilian rule where military interests were protected by institutional restrictions. For example, no political candidate for president was willing to address important issues such as land reform, or holding members of the security forces responsible for human rights abuses.61 Furthermore, the political parties primarily represented the interests of the economic elite, and largely ignored left-wing interest groups such as unions and community organizations. Another institutional restriction as the Amnesty Law that was passed by President Mejia Victores. This law protected members of the armed forces from facing prosecution for any politically motivated crimes committed from March 23rd, 1982 to January 14th, 1986. This law, which was endorsed h> the incoming

Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal T\rann\ < Ni N nrk and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1987), 182; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project. 111. Autkln vest of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 128-129. 59 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 58-59; Black. Jamail. and Chinchilla. Garrison Guatemala, 148. 60 Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 113; Schirmer. Tin- dimit nmlan Military Project, 32-33. 61 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 96. 62 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 156.

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candidate Vinicio Cerezo, allowed the military to remain the most powerful interest group in Guatemala. The 1985 elections represented the military's attempt to maintain hegemony by other means. The Christian Democrats may have won the election, but only after a significant role for the military was guaranteed.64 The military wanted to be seen as a legitimate institution within Guatemala, but since its credibility was so low, they needed to enter into an alliance with the Christian Democrats and other social groups. This process approximates what Gramsci called transformismo, which involves members of the elite assimilating potentially dangerous leaders of subordinate social groups so they will not become counter-hegemonic institutions that threaten elite interests.65 The military entered into an agreement with the Christian Democrats that allowed the military to continue its operations against the rebels and other groups that opposed elite interests.66 The 1985 elections also occurred because the United States was pressuring the Guatemalan military to moderate its policies. Due to its vicious counterinsurgency, the military was considered a pariah on the international stage which affected the amount of aid they were receiving, especially from the U.S.67 This diplomatic pressure began under Jimmy Carter who was alarmed by the military's use of violence against non-combatants, so he said that in order for Guatemala to receive military aid in the future its human rights

Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 32; Jim Handy, "Resurgent Democracy and the Guatemalan Military," Journal of Latin American Studies 18, 2 (November 1986), 408. 64 Black, "Military Rule in Guatemala," 363. 65 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume I, ed. Joseph A. Buttigieg, trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg and Antonio Callari (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 137; Neufeld, "Democratization in/of Canadian Foreign Policy," 104, 107. 66 J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore and London: John's Hopkins University Press, 1998), 46; Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States, 56. 67 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 7-8; Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 113; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 158; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 32-33.

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record would have to improve. Guatemala's President Kjell Laugerud Garcia scoffed at this proposal and refused to accept any new military aid from the United States. The U.S. responded to Laugerud's intransigence by cutting off military aid, and by scrapping a multilateral development bank loan to Guatemala. Although Carter refused to send additional military aid to Guatemala, he ceded to hawkish interests by continuing to send Guatemala the military supplies they had agreed to sell them prior to the embargo.69 When Laugerud was replaced as president by Lucas Garcia, the Carter administration reaffirmed its offer to send military aid to Guatemala if they decreased human rights abuses against non-combatants. Lucas Garcia also proved unwilling to agree to this demand, so relations between the U.S. and Guatemala during Carter's term in office were strained.70 Carter was encouraging the Guatemalan government and other American allies to improve their human rights records because he thought this would enhance American hegemony. This policy would enhance American hegemony in two ways. First, a human rights crusade was an issue that many American voters responded favourably towards, so it made political sense for Carter to endorse this policy.71 Second, Carter believed that if American allies moderated their policies they would be seen as more legitimate rulers, which would increase social stability. This was important because if these allies were
Juan Carlos Zarate, Forging Democracy (London and New York: University Press of America, 1994), 63. David W. Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 206; Congressional Quarterly, U.S. Foreign Policy: The Reagan Imprint (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1986), 68; Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 137; Zarate, Forging Democracy, 63. 70 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 6, 1980, GU00669, United States Department of State, Conditions for Improved Relations with Guatemala, Pl-2; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 18, 1980, GU00670, Melvin E. Sinn, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Emissaries to President Lucas, Pl-2. 71 Clair Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 54-55.
69

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seen as legitimate rulers, it was less likely that left-wing groups hostile to American interests would assume power in these countries.72 However, there were divisions within the Carter administration on his human rights policies, most notably between Cyrus Vance, Carter's Secretary of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor. While Vance was a proponent of pressuring other countries to improve their human rights records, Brzezinski believed the American government should focus its efforts on preventing Soviet expansion, in part by forging closer ties with anticommunist states.73 Although both policies would inform Carter's thinking, over time the focus of his foreign policy became containing the Soviet Union.74 Carter's anti-communism led him to support El Salvador and Nicaragua's governments, along with the mujahideen in Afghanistan against left-wing enemies. However, while Carter was undoubtedly anticommunist, his commitment to human rights was genuine as he did encourage El Salvador and Nicaragua to reduce human rights abuses against civilians in exchange for American aid.75 Carter's policy towards Guatemala, then, must be understood as a mix between wanting to improve Guatemala's human rights record, and wanting to give Guatemala aid to suppress the leftist rebel movement because the rebels were threatening to overthrow an anticommunist American ally. Neo-Gramscian scholar Robert W. Cox claimed that hegemonic states have the
William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Oakleigh, Cambridge, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15-16. 73 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force Vol 1 (New Brunswick and Oxford, Transaction Books, 1988), 142; Timothy P. Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter: U.S. Foreign Policy, 1977-1981 (West Haven: University of New Haven Press, 1994), 13-14. 74 Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy, 53-54, 63-64; Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After. 2nd ed. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 206-207, 210-211. 75 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason & Power (New York: Hill and Wang Books, 1986), 32, 123125; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, "Elites, Elite Settlements, and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 1950-1980," Social Science History 18, 4 (Winter 1994), 567-568; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 73.

17

freedom to meet their economic interests. However, in order to maintain a consensual economic order, they must also meet the basic interests of subordinate states.76 In world hegemony the economic, social, political, and cultural institutions of the dominant state influence the elite social strata of the weaker states.77 The weaker states adopt some elements of the hegemonic state into their ideology while attempting to avoid any significant deviations from their domestic values.78 These international social relationships create universal norms and institutions that establish general rules of behavior that states and members of civil society must follow to maintain the hegemonic order.79 In terms of Carter, he tried to influence American allies to improve their human rights records, and if these allies were involved in military campaigns against communist movements, they should limit attacks against civilians. In an effort to make this policy into an accepted international norm, Carter used coercion by cutting American aid to governments that used violence against civilians, and used concessions by offering military aid to governments that embraced his human rights-centric foreign policy. After becoming president in 1981, Ronald Reagan developed a foreign policy in Central America that highlighted the need for the U.S. to use its economic and military strength to rollback the gains made by the Soviet Union during the Carter administration.80 Reagan's foreign policy in Central and South America involved sending aid to anticommunist allies, and undermining left-wing governments, especially

Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 134. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 137; Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order," 517-518. 78 Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 137. 79 Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 137. 80 David F. Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 194; John Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 163.
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Nicaragua. As a result, Reagan encouraged the Guatemalan military to continue its fight against its "Marxist" rebel enemies. Reagan also pushed for Guatemala to receive more aid, but for the most part his requests were rebuffed by Congress. The Reagan administration also gently encouraged the Guatemalan military to implement political reforms that would culminate in free federal elections.82 American officials told Garcia that holding elections and limiting attacks against civilians would placate Congress, which would allow more American aid to flow into Guatemala. However, Garcia still refused to change his tactics because they were succeeding at undermining the guerrillas' military campaigns.83 Since Lucas Garcia would not change counterinsurgency tactics, the Reagan administration asked that Guatemala receive more aid by claiming that the majority of the violence was done by the rebels, and the Guatemalan military was decreasing its attacks against non-combatants. Reagan officials said that Guatemala was moving toward democracy, and that American aid would facilitate this process.84 Similarly under Rios Montt and Mejfa Victores the Reagan administration continued to claim that Guatemala's government was committed to democracy and reducing human rights abuses despite mounting contrary evidence from human rights groups.85 Given his

Jeremy Brown, Explaining the Reagan Years in Central America (London, Lanham, and New York: University Press of America, 1995), 255-256. 82 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3, 1981, GU00690, United States Department of State, U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala, 1-2, 8-9; Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan/Owl Book and Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 109; Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 159. 83 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, April 28, 1981, GU00701, Alexander Haig, Secretary of State, Initiative on Guatemala, Talking Points for General Walters, P3-6; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, September 22, 1981, GU00728, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Ambassador Walters' Call on President Lucas: Bilateral Issues, PI; Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 161-162. 84 Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1991), 61; Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 162-163; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 74. 85 Jeff McMahan, Reagan and the World: Imperial Policy in the New Cold War (London and Sydney: Pluto Press, 1984), 76; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 74; National Security

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objectives in Central America, it's not surprising that Reagan obsequiously praised the 1985 elections as a massive achievement in democratization. As a result of the elections, Congress agreed to increase the level of aid sent to Guatemala. The diplomatic support and military aid provided by Carter and Reagan was instrumental in allowing the military to carry out its violent campaign in the countryside. This work will have eight chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. Chapter two analyzes how the historiography on Guatemala interprets the increase in military violence from 1978 to 1985. The three different perspectives that are used to explain this trend are that the military was combating a communist rebel movement, it was used to preserve the exploitive economic status quo, and it was an attempt to destroy the Maya as an ethnic group. The strengths and weaknesses of these arguments will be analyzed in light of my argument that the violence was done as part of a plan to integrate rural Guatemala into the state in order to enhance the military's hegemony. Violence was directed at autonomous village organizations and the guerrillas because these groups resisted calls for rural integration. My third chapter briefly analyzes the groups and institutions that formed a counter-hegemonic movement against the government in the 1970s and 1980s. The reasons why the military found these groups threatening, which were outlined above, will be elaborated in greater detail. These groups, in essence, represented a threat to the military-government's hegemony, so they were systematically destroyed and replaced by military-controlled institutions including civil patrols, model villages, and development
Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, November 15, 1983, GU00982, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, CPD for FY-85 Security Assistance Program, P2-5. 86 James Painter, Guatemala: False Hope, False Freedom (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations and Latin American Bureau, 1987), 107-108; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Con sent, 110.

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poles. Chapter four examines how military violence aimed at community organizations and the guerrillas escalated under Lucas Garcia from selective violence to massacres of whole communities that were thought to be sympathetic to the guerrillas.88 Under Rios Montt, military violence continued, but he made more use of social programs to gain the allegiance of the rural inhabitants rather than primarily using violence to undermine the guerrillas.89 After an internal army coup brought General Mejfa Victores to power in August 1983, the military's tactics changed very little, except that violence in the countryside declined because the guerrillas were no longer a serious threat to the military.90 Chapter five illustrates how the military conducted a state-building plan as a means to re-establish its hegemony in the countryside. Through a combination of violence, development programs, and institutionalization of the countryside, the military tried to integrate the Mayans by replacing autonomous community organizations with military-controlled ones. The military also tried to gain the consent of rural Guatemalans through ideological indoctrination, by providing employment opportunities, and by

Carol A. Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatcnul.i I ..Knumic Reorganization As A Continuation of War," Latin American Perspectives 17, 4 (1W0). 11. \S ils..n Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits," 47-48. 88 Patrick Ball, Paul Kobrak, and Herbert F. Spirer, State Violcm , . (..u, main N60-1996 (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science. IMWi. 2*> 2". 7fv Hey. Gross Human Rights Violations, 91; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Attain. 21V Suvjnne Jonas and Thomas W. Walker, "Guatemala: Intervention, Repression, Revolt, and NcinxuicJ "transition." in Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America, ed h\ Iliorn.iv W. Walker and Ariel G. Armony (Wilmingston, 2000), 8-9. 89 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 38,45; Michael McC'Imtivk. Tin American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala (London: Zed Hooks Lid. 1985), 224-225; Hector Gramajo Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990: A Perspective from Inside Guatemala's Army," in Democratic Transitions in Central America, ed. by Jorge I. Dominguez and Marc Lindenberg (Gainesville, 1997), 115. 90 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 29; Burgerman, Moral Victories. 57.

giving them food, clothing, and aid. After the army gained almost complete control over the countryside, they held free elections in 1985 that put a civilian government in power. The sixth chapter analyzes how the army used the civil patrols and model villages to encourage national integration. The civil patrols were used to involve rural inhabitants in its war against the guerrillas as patrollers guarded communities from the guerrillas and took part in military combat operations. Also, the patrols often functioned as a militarydominated leadership structure in their respective villages. Members of these patrols were imbued with anticommunist and nationalistic ideology which was meant to align the patrollers with the military.93 In model villages the rural population was subject to ideological indoctrination, and involved in development projects that were meant to teach the Mayans about the benefits of working for the Ladino state.94 Chapter seven will focus on the U.S. government's influence on Guatemala, particularly during the Carter and Reagan administrations. It analyzes how the Carter administration wanted to help the Guatemalan military defeat the rural guerrilla groups by providing them with aid, but they demanded that the government reduce its violence against civilians before this would be done. Reagan believed Carter's human rights policy had undermined American allies, and he felt the only way for America to re-establish its role as a global hegemon was to implement an aggressive anticommunist foreign policy.

Jennifer Schirmer, "The Guatemalan Politico-Military Project: Whose Ship of State?" in Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy, ed. by Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), 67. 92 Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala (New York: Americas Watch, 1986), 2; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 82, 90-91. 93 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 119-121; White, The Morass, 110-111. 94 Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits," 47-48; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 81-82.

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Explaining the Escalation of Violence in Guatemala: An Analysis of the Historiography The historiography that interprets why the military escalated its use of violence in the countryside is highly contentious. Broadly speaking there are three interpretations given to explain the violence. First, the military is thought to have used violence against the guerrillas, along with community organizations and sections of the rural population believed to be aiding this communist insurgency.95 A second perspective does not discount anticommunism as a rationalization for the military's actions, but the escalation of violence is explained principally as a class war. From this perspective, the military is defined as an agent of the economic elite that targeted community organizations because they fought for the interests of the poor, and these organizations were gaining in popularity during the 1970s and 1980s.96 A third explanation for the violence is that it was an attempt by the Ladino elites to undermine Mayan cultural identity.97 While all three perspectives are to varying degrees correct, Gramsci's hegemony theory helps to contextualize the violence as an attempt by the military and economic elites to destroy the guerrilla groups, along with non-violent community organizations in the countryside, as these groups had formed what Gramsci would call a counter-hegemonic movement. While these groups were targeted by Lucas Garcia, Ribs Montt, and Mejfa Victores, the military's strategy was adjusted under Rios Montt and Mejfa Victores.98 Rather than

Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 113, 115-116. Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 117; Susanne Jonas, "Elections and Transitions: The Guatemalan and Nicaraguan Cases," in Elections and Democracy in Central America, ed. by John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (Chapel Hill and London, 1989), 131. 97 Victoria Sanford, Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala (New York: Houndmills, Basingstoke, and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 78, 101-102, 152-155, 178. 98 Romeo Lucas Garcia, "We Do Not Violate Human Rights in Guatemala," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 138;
96

yi

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simply using violence to eliminate social movements that threatened the military's interests, the military under Rios Montt and Mejia Victores made a more concerted effort to use concessions and ideological indoctrination to integrate the countryside into the state, and enhance the military's hegemony in the process. Part of this integration involved ladinization, so the third perspective mentioned above is partially accurate." In his essay "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990: A Perspective from Inside Guatemala's Army" Hector Gramajo, a former General of the Guatemalan military, claimed that violence was directed at the guerrillas and their supporters, and that in order to overpower this insurgency the military had to curb civilian political institutions and civil rights. While Hector Gramajo does admit that the violence was in some cases excessive, he wrote that the military sought to protect civilians in the countryside. He backed up this claim by pointing out that the military expanded its institutional reach into the countryside by increasing the National Reconstruction Committee's involvement in rural communities, and by establishing the development poles. Beyond these acts, Hector Gramajo maintained that Rios Montt tried to include the Mayans in Guatemala's economic and political life, most notably by including Mayans in the Council of State. According to Hector Gramajo, these measures were all part of the military's National Plan for Security and Development and were designed to win the hearts and minds of the citizenry so they would reject the guerrillas and embrace Guatemalan nationalism. Military violence, then, was simply a temporary measure that
Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996, 76; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 29, 38, 45; Burgerman, Moral Victories, 57; Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 210. 9 McClintock, The American Connection, 224-225; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 117-118; Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 115; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 142-143; Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 36; Robert Trudeau and Lars Schoultz, "Guatemala," in Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America, ed. by William M. LeoGrande, Kenneth E. Sharpe and Morris J. Blachman (New York, 1986), 40-41; Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 1989), 7-8.

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was done in order to destroy the rebel movement and its supporters before Guatemala's political structures transitioned to democracy.100 Hector Gramajo's justification for military violence mirrors that of other military elites, which is hardly surprising as Hector Gramajo was a career soldier in the Guatemalan military.101 By characterizing military violence in this way, these military elites were trying to legitimize their use of violence as a noble fight against the expansion of international communism. This rationalization for military violence has an important omission as it does not address why the military killed individuals who worked for community organizations that had little or no affiliation with the guerrillas. His work does make passing mention of the jailing and forced exile of political figures, the jailing of journalists, and he implies that the Church of the Poor was targeted because some members were thought to have supported the guerrillas.102 Besides this, he does not address why non-violent organizations with a negligible connection to the guerrillas were targeted by the military. For instance, an organization that built schools and health clinics in rural areas was targeted.103 In addition, Hector Gramajo's interpretation seems incomplete because there is evidence that the military consciously exaggerated the extent to which community organizations supported the guerrilla groups. An example of this occurred in September 1981 when the military harassed former members of the Radio Association of the Voice of Atitlan, which was located in Santiago Atitlan. The army forced these individuals to go to a nearby military base by threatening to kill their
Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 112-122. Sanford, Buried Secrets, 152-155; According to Hector Gramajo "I have served in the army as director of the National Defense Staff and army inspector, general (1982-1983); as zone commander for the Guatemala City Military District and as adviser to the head of state as a member of the Council of Commanders (1984-1985); as chief of the National Defense Staff (1986); and as minister of national defense (1987-May 1990)." Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 111. 102 Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 19804990," 113, 115-116. 1 Brown, Explaining the Reagan Years in Central America, 242.
101 100

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families and destroy their property. After being held at the base for 15 days, these individuals were forced to announce that they were either guerrilla members or otherwise affiliated with the guerrillas to domestic and foreign members of the press. During this press conference, the military also coerced other individuals to lie and say that they were former members of the guerrillas who were seeking refuge at the military base. If the military was driven solely by a desire to destroy communist groups, attacking the Voice of Santiago Atitlan seems unnecessary. This was a community organization that taught literacy, organized cooperatives, and provided information about health, culture, and religion. This group used the radio to broadcast its various programs into neighboring villages. Despite the fact that this group was clearly non-violent, several of its members were kidnapped and tortured.104 Another indication that military violence was not just directed at suspected communists was that for hundreds of years before the Soviet revolution occurred, the military was using violence to ensure upper class economic interests.105 Furthermore, the military also continued to use violence against noncommunist enemies well after communism fell in the Soviet Union, and after the peace agreement was signed between the military and the guerrillas in 1996.106 The brutal murder of Guatemalan Bishop Juan Gerardi in April 1998 was a good example of this
Shelton H. Davis and Julie Hodson. Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala: The Suppression of a Rural Development Movement (Boston: Oxfam America, 1983), 9; Mendoza, 'Testimony," 130-132. 105 Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 54-55. 106 A good example of the military's attempt to paint any group it found displeasing as communist was given by Victoria Sanford. When Sanford took part in the excavation of mass grave sites in Plan de Sanchez, which is in Rabinal, as part of the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation (FARG) she wrote that a subcommander operating out of an army base in Rabinal told the locals that "[t]he anthropologists, internationals, and journalists are all guerrilla[s]." He then told the residents that if they cooperated with these groups then they would be viewed as guerrilla sympathizers which "will bring back the violence of 1982." The army hierarchy later retracted his statement claiming that the subcommander's statements did not reflect the military's official policy. Despite retracting his statement and transferring him to another base, it's likely that the subcommander's perspective was shared by many members of the military as FARG members received numerous anonymous death threats while they conducted their work. Sanford, Buried Secrets, 17,44-45.

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trend.107 Nevertheless, while Hector Gramajo's rationalization for military violence is narrow, anti-communism was undoubtedly an important reason why the military escalated violence in the countryside. This perspective was confirmed by Frank Afflitto and Paul Jesilow, who wrote that the military would escalate its level of violence proportionately based on to what extent the community was seen to be pro-guerrilla.108 Indeed, the UN noted that the military's main targets were the guerrilla groups and their alleged supporters. The UN pointed out that when the guerrillas left a particular village after trying to indoctrinate the local population, the military would often get wind of this and respond by using massacres and scorched-earth tactics to destroy these "subversive" communities.109 Beyond this, it is clear that members of the military embraced a virulent form of anticommunism as military officials tried to imbue the rural population with anticommunist ideology during military training, during civil patrol duty, and when they lived in model villages.110 Furthermore, military officials often justified their violent policies to the U.S. government as a fight against communism.111 From a Gramscian point of view, the military's use of disproportionate violence against civilians suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers makes sense. Although the

Rachel A. May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny': Violence and Popular Movements in Guatemala," Latin American Perspectives, 26, 2 (March 1999), 77; For more information on the murder of Juan Gerardi and the subsequent criminal investigation, please read Francisco Goldman, The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed the Bishop (New York: Grove Press, 2007). Afflitto and Jesilow, The Quiet Revolutionaries, 25-26. 109 United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.html (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraphs 34, 35. 110 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 128-129; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 58-59; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 148. 111 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 18, 1980, GU00670, Melvin E. Sinn, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Emissaries to President Lucas, Pl-2; Sanford, Buried Secrets, 154-155.

107

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military vastly outnumbered the guerrillas in terms of the number of regular combatants at its disposal, the military had 17,000 troops and the guerrillas had 6,000 at their height of popularity, members of the military elite were concerned that the guerrillas were
119

receiving substantial social support from the rural population.

As a result of these

concerns, to use Gramscian terminology, the military elite believed that this popular armed revolutionary group would continue to expand to become a counter-hegemonic movement that had the potential to overthrow the military-government and impose an order that would undermine the military, and empower the Maya politically, economically, and racially.113 While scholars are correct to point out that some community organizations were targeted because they collaborated with the guerrillas114, in many cases non-violent community organizations were attacked because they represented an economic threat to the military and economic elites.115 The idea that the military was engaging in a class war against the rebels and community organizations was best illustrated b\ Susanne Jonas in her book The Battle for Guatemala. Jonas concluded that the gmernment resorted to coercive tactics in order to maintain capitalist production by enforcing the bourgeoisie's exploitive relationship with the Mayan underclass. The military supported the bourgeoisie because they were politically aligned, and because hijrh ranking members of
Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, "The Hidden War: Guatemala^ C\uniiTiriMir>:i tv> Campaign," in Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and U.S. Policy in the ivsii\. cil h> \<>ru Hamilton, Jeffrey A. Frieden, Linda Fuller, and Manuel Pastor, Jr. (Boulder and London. I l)KK i. I V\ Hl.uk. "Under The Gun," 14-16. 113 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 210; Gramsci. Tlu .\nt<niii< (Iramsci Reader, 205-206; Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations.' 12s I ?y. Diane M. Nelson, A Finger In The Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala (London. Hcrkclc) and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 18-19. 114 May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 76. 115 United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.html (accessed October l()ih. 2009), paragraph 16.

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the military had business interests to defend.11 Equally important, Jonas deduced that Guatemala's military used violence in the countryside to destroy the growing sense of class consciousness in the region. Mayans' notions that they were oppressed members of the semi-proletariat class - if they were landless peasants or migrant workers - or members of the informal proletariat in urban areas threatened the economic control of the bourgeoisie. Class consciousness became more defined and radical as Mayans were forced from their land because of a subsistence crisis, and because of the bourgeoisie's use of coercive tactics to expand its control over agricultural lands. Furthermore, Guatemalan peasants were discouraged from practicing subsistence agriculture in favor of working at large agribusiness firms. These factors, along with the unwillingness of Guatemalan politicians to represent the interests of the poor, led Mayans to react more desperately and violently against attacks on their economic autonomy. The Mayans began to organize themselves in order to recapture their land, and avoid being forced to labor on Ladino plantations. The army sought to protect the economic status quo by coercing Mayan communities, through threats and violence, to become a docile agricultural workforce for elite plantations.117 A positive aspect of this analysis is that it lends itself to Gramsci's notion of hegemony. As Jonas pointed out, the military and the economic elites formed an alliance that allowed them to exert control over the Guatemalan state. As mentioned in the introduction, if the lower classes have a strong presence within civil society, the elite classes will often temper their interests accordingly in order to maintain social cohesion. Since the Mayans in the countryside tended to be politically isolated in their local

116 117

Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 117; Jonas, "Elections and Transitions," 131. Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 7, 105, 117, 133-135.

29 communities, the military and the economic elites often did not rein in their interests, and they ensured that their interests would be met through coercion.118 Jonas' analysis shows that when the counter-hegemonic movement in the countryside began to expand under Garcia, rather than placating this movement with political or economic concessions, the military sought to destroy all opposition, whether it was militant or reformist.119 A

drawback of Jonas' analysis is that it neglects the importance that race had to the actions of the Guatemalan military. To her credit, she does note that military violence was done in part to destroy "Mayan culture, identity, and communal structures" as part of a genocide.120 The notion that the military intended to commit systematic genocide against the Mayan population was also stated by Victoria Sanford. In her book Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala Sanford claimed that the army's campaign of genocide had three stages. First, they conducted massacres in rural villages and destroyed the local food supply. Second, the military hunted down civilians who survived the massacres or bombing raids and escaped into the mountains. Finally, the military harmed individuals after they had surrendered to the military and were forced to join model villages and later development poles.121 Sanford explained that the military intended to commit genocide because Lucas Garcia and Rfos Montt admitted that they were using extreme violence against individuals and whole villages that were thought to be proguerrilla. In Sanford's estimation, this means that the military connected ethnicity with
Rigoberta Menchii and the Committee of Campesino Unity, "Weaving Our Future: Campesino Struggles for Land," in The New Politics of Survival: Grassroots Movements in Central America, ed. by Minor Sinclair (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995), 49; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 140141; Gordon L. Bowen, "Guatemala: The Origins and Development of State Terrorism," in Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, ed. by Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), 290. 119 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 117. 120 Susanne Jonas, "Guatemala," in Politics of Latin America: The Power Game, 3 rd ed. ed. by Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost (New York and Oxford, 2009), 279. 121 Sanford, Buried Secrets, 78,101-102.
118

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subversion. She elaborated that since the military targeted civilians, and because military violence was directed at both moderate and revolutionary opposition, the violence was genocidal. Sanford also noted that all of the 626 villages that were destroyed during the violence had Mayan populations in them. Furthermore, Sanford claimed that genocide occurred because the military tried to undermine Mayan cultural practices by destroying maize, preventing religious worship, and by burning huipiles (a garment worn by
i no

Mayans). While it is certainly correct to conclude that the anticommunist disposition of the Guatemalan military was exacerbated by racism123, Sanford was inaccurate to describe it as a genocidal campaign. While Sanford conceded that the military used violence partly because they viewed their targets as communists, this perspective was overshadowed in Sanford's analysis by the idea that the military's main motivation was precipitating genocide against the Maya. Although the Mayans were the main targets of the military's violence, the UN Truth Commission documented that during the civil war approximately 17% of the killings were of non-Mayans.124 While it is possible that some of these Ladinos were killed by the guerrilla groups, since the military is estimated to have killed between 93 and 97 percent of the total number of victims, it's fair to say that Ladinos
19S

were a significant target of military violence.

Another indication that the military was

not trying to commit genocide was the uneven nature of the violence. The violence varied
Sanford, Buried Secrets, 152-155, 178. The idea that the military used violence because they saw the Mayans as more susceptible to communist indoctrination because they were racially inferior to Ladinos was echoed by Jim Handy and Jennifer Schirmer in their respective studies on Guatemala. Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil, 250-251; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 45. 124 Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 279. 125 Robert Parry, "Reagan & Guatemala's Death Files," in Defining the Horrific: Readings on Genocide and Holocaust in the Twentieth Century, ed. by William L. Hewitt (Upper Saddle River, 2004), 248.
123 122

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from areas where there were massacres and whole communities were destroyed, to areas that did not experience any violence during the counterinsurgency. Several areas experienced intermediate levels of violence such as small-scale military attacks and structural violence.126 The uneven pattern of violence makes it more likely that the military was engaging in a war against guerrillas and community organizations that were more popular in some areas than in others. If the violence was genocidal then the military would likely try to kill Mayans across the whole country, rather than in specific areas. Furthermore, the soldiers in the Guatemalan military were often of Mayan descent, so it seems unlikely that the military would actively recruit Mayans if they planned to annihilate this ethnic group.127 In her book A Finger in the Wound, Diane Nelson adds another reason to disbelieve the idea that military violence was done primarily to destroy the Mayans as an ethnic group by pointing out that the guerrilla war that began in the 1960s along with the newer guerrilla movements of the 1970s and 1980s were led by Ladinos. Due to this fact, Nelson interprets the guerrilla movements in part as Ladinos fighting other Ladinos in order to gain control over the state, and by extension Mayan laborers. In terms of the 1960s guerrilla movement, Nelson points out that since these rebels mainly recruited Ladinos, the military mainly targeted Ladinos during its counterinsurgency campaign.128 It seems clear that the military was not trying to eliminate the Mayans, although racism certainly exacerbated anticommunism and other class-based interests to create a volatile situation in the countryside.
Warren, "Interpreting La Violencia in Guatemala," 28. Roger Plant, "Indigenous Identity and Rights in the Guatemalan Peace Process," in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. by Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), 324. 128 Nelson, A Finger In The Wound, 77-78, 91 (note 20).
127 126

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Nonetheless, race was an important element of the military's strategy in the countryside because the military was trying to ladinize the Mayans as a means to encourage nationalism. Members of the military believed that since the Mayans were largely isolated from state institutions that they were culturally backward because they had not been adequately exposed to Ladino culture and values. Due to this backwardness, the Mayans were more susceptible to communist indoctrination. As a result, the military felt the need to expand its reach into the countryside to facilitate the ladinization of the Mayans. If the military was successful at imbuing the Mayans with Ladino culture it was felt that they would side with the military against the guerrillas, and that after the war Guatemala would develop into a cohesive, modern state.129 The Guatemalan military's interest in using ladinization was articulated well by Jennifer Schirmer who wrote that the military killed village elders and other individuals who educated the rural population about indigenous traditions. The military also supported local leaders who discouraged Mayans from identifying themselves as Mayans, and instead promoted the need for local residents to embrace nationalism, and by extension abide by the dictates of the military-government.130 Schirmer accurately contextualizes the military's use of violence as being part of its plan to precipitate an authoritarian revolution. She noted that the military elite represented its actions as being part of a plan to move Guatemala towards democracy. However, she argued that the military's conception of democracy was shallow as they would use violence against individuals who dissented from the military's ideology, even if this dissent was moderate and based on legitimate grievances. The author felt this distaste for political freedom

129 130

Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 13-14; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 146. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 59-60.

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originated from the military's tendency to believe that any opposing ideology was the result of manipulation by subversive left-wing groups. The military responded to this alleged sedition by using violence against groups and individuals deemed to be dangerous to Guatemalans. Beginning in 1982, the military, under the direction of Rios Montt, changed course by attempting to manufacture consent in the countryside by using violence, providing aid to farmers, and inundating rural Mayans with government propaganda.131 This policy was called the "Rifles and Beans" plan, and it involved the military using 70% of its resources to provide shelter, work132 and food to Mayans living in war-torn areas (the "beans" part of the plan), and continuing its counterinsurgency against the guerrillas and other subversives (the "rifles" portion of the plan). It was thought that this plan would lead to economic and political stability, and it gave the military the opportunity to re-educate the peasants by encouraging them to embrace anticommunism and Guatemalan nationalism.133 Although Schirmer does not use a Gramscian theoretical framework, her interpretation of why the military used violence applies closely with Gramsci's concept of hegemony. An important element of her analysis is her idea that the military was imposing a top-down revolution that entailed state-building in the countryside. As part of
According to Schirmer, the military endorsed a paternalistic propaganda where the state would dominate the Mayans, and the Mayans were encouraged to embrace Spanish culture and values, as well as adopt the entrepreneurial capitalist spirit so Guatemala could be modernized. The propaganda also glorified the military's war against the guerrillas and spoke of the state's plans to involve the Mayans in development projects. Furthermore, government propaganda highlighted the government's respect for religious and indigenous rights, and their eventual plans to become an elected democracy. This propaganda was mainly used in model villages, and the need to align with the military was reinforced through civil patrol duty. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 58-59, 81-82, 95, 111, 114. 132 The military believed that if the Mayans were working on development projects that were important to the state they would be filled with a sense of nationalism that would undermine rebel propaganda. Members of the military also believed that if the Mayans relied on the government for wages they would align with them out of necessity. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 64, 73-74. 133 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 1, 9, 23-25, 38, 81-82, 95, 111, 114, 254-257.

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this process, the military used concessions and ideological indoctrination to try to gain the allegiance of the rural population, two elements that Gramsci underlined as being important tools that elites used to strengthen their hegemonic control over the state. Beyond Schirmer's work, elements of the three interpretations detailed above can be contextualized with Gramsci's theory of hegemony. The military used violence in the countryside to combat the guerrillas and their suspected supporters, a process that was radicalized by racial hatred towards the Mayans. Furthermore, the military also tried to destroy non-violent community organizations primarily because they threatened to undermine the military and economic elites' desire to ensure that a steady number of Mayan laborers would work on elite plantations.134 To use Gramsciun terms, these groups were forming a counter-hegemonic movement that threatened to overthrow the militarydominated status quo as the aforementioned groups were encouraging political and economic development that was autonomous from the central government and the plantation economy. Furthermore, there were concerns that sonic of these groups were unifying the rural population along economic, ethnic, and political lines. The following chapter will elaborate on these ideas to explain how these organizations became a counter-hegemonic movement, and why the military responded to these groups with brutal violence.

Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 105.

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The Counter-Hegemonic Movement in Guatemala Strategists in the Guatemalan military targeted Catholic organizations, cooperatives, the CUC, village elders, and the guerrilla groups because these organizations threatened government interests. The guerrilla groups were perceived as the most dangerous anti-military movement, so individuals and institutions that were thought to support the guerrillas were viciously attacked by government forces. During its

counterinsurgency against the guerrillas, the military also targeted individuals affiliated with the cooperatives and village elders, people who often had little or no affiliation with the guerrilla groups.136 The purpose of attacking these organizations was because their ideas and activism in the countryside threatened the military's economic and political interests, so they had to be destroyed. Under Ribs Montt and Mejia Victores, this desire to destroy movements that opposed military interests should be understood as part of a larger state-building operation. Military strategists under Rios Montt and Mejia Victores wanted to impose an authoritarian revolution as a means to win its counterinsurgency against the guerrillas, and in order to gain control over the countryside more generally by replacing autonomous rural organizations with military-controlled institutions like model villages, civil patrols, the S-5, and the National Reconstruction Committee, a process that is discussed at greater length in chapters five and six.137 Since the military's main objective was to integrate the countryside under the military's control, the aforementioned groups were threatening to military interests. The
Brian Egan, '"Somos de la Tierra': Land and the Guatemalan Refugee Return," in Journey's Of Fear, ed. by Liisa North and Alan Simmons (Montreal, Kingston, London, Ithaca, 1999), 98; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, July 13, 1977, GU00509, Cyprus Vance, U.S. Department of State, Draft Human Rights Evaluation Report Prepared by ARA/CEN, 31-32. 136 Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States, 57-58; Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 14-15, 29, 32. 137 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 129; Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 19801990," 120-121; Black, "Under The Gun," 20-21.
135

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ideology and actions of these groups were dangerous to military officials because they sought to create a revolution, facilitate greater economic autonomy in rural areas, establish racial unity between Mayans and Ladinos, and create or maintain autonomous governance structures.138 These rural organizations were threatening to the elites not just because they sought to rally the poor together to end their subordinate status, but also because they were autonomous from state institutions and urban intellectuals who supported the status quo.139 Although the aforementioned institutions did not have a unified ideological agenda, Gramsci pointed out that counter-hegemonic movements did not have to be interconnected to be threatening; these movements in their totality add up to an attempt to bring about a new political and moral order through reform or revolutionary methods. These movements occur in response to a crisis or series of crises that undermine the hegemony of the ruling class.140 The officials from these movements, then, arc the intellectuals who propagate the ideas of the counter-hegemonic movement. These intellectuals are either organic intellectuals, intellectuals from the lower classes, or they are traditional intellectuals who have co-opted the ideas of the counter-hegemonic movement. In either case, these intellectuals function to uphold the interests of the individuals affiliated with the counterhegemonic movement both in terms of their day-to-day economic and political needs and also by encouraging the formation of a consciousness that encourages solidarity in the movement. The latter objective is meant to create assertiveness in the movement that will

Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 5; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 127; Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 47-49. 139 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 123-126; Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 284-285. 140 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 210; Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 205-206; Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 128-129.

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eventually be used to institute more far-reaching reform or revolutionary objectives.141 A declining hegemon will try to encourage these organizations to embrace the interests of the ruling elite as a means to legitimize its rule. In instances where this is unsuccessful, the ruling elites often resort to coercion to undermine these counter-hegemonic organizations, which was the case in Guatemala.142 Community organizations developed very gradually in Guatemala. In the early-tomid 20th century, Mayans developed community organizations in order to defend their land from incursions by economic elites who sought to expand their land ownership at the expense of the Mayan communal farms. Since the Mayans made their living principally through subsistence farming, selling crafts, and agricultural wage labor, it was in their best interests to form or maintain community self-help organizations in an effort to ensure their economic interests.143 Mayan organizations expanded substantially during the "Ten Years of Spring" from 1944-1954. Unfortunately for the Mayans, after the military coup in 1954 there was a re-ascendency of conservative economic and political interests, which led to the military using violence against rural community groups.144 Nevertheless, extensive Mayan involvement in rural community organizations continued for several decades prior to La Violencia taking place. The main organizations in the countryside during this period were cooperatives145, as well as programs that sought to

Gramsci, Pre-Prison Writings, 10-11, 336. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II, 25, 32-33. 143 Richard N. Adams, "Conclusions: What Can We Know About the Harvest of Violence?" in Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis, ed. by Robert M. Carmack (Norman and London, 1988), 278-280. 144 Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 284. 145 As a result of funding from missionaries and the U.S. Alliance for Progress initiative, a great deal of money was put into establishing "agricultural, consumer, and credit" cooperatives in rural areas. This led the number of cooperatives in Guatemala to expand substantially from 145 in 1967 (which involved 27,000 members) to 510 by the mid-1970s (involving 132,000 members). Shelton Davis and Julie Hodson noted that "[by the mid-1970s] [fjifty-seven percent of these cooperatives were located in the
142

141

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improve the quality of life of rural Guatemalans through "literacy, health, and other development programs."146 These social betterment institutions were flourishing by the 1960s and 1970s.147 Community organizations were given an added boost in 1975 and 1976 when President Laugerud Garcia eased restrictions against these organizations and moderate political parties. Both groups were given the opportunity to assemble freely and demonstrate against the government. Equally important, community organizations in rural Guatemala expanded substantially as a form of disaster relief in response to a major earthquake that occurred on February 4th, 1976. The resulting destruction left 22,000 people dead, 77,000 injured, and one million people had their residences destroyed. After the government

was unable to effectively coordinate disaster relief and reconstruction efforts, local urban and rural committees were formed to achieve these purposes. These reconstruction committees dealt directly with international relief agencies in a highly successful campaign to rebuild and aid areas affected by the earthquake. As a result of this reconstruction effort, rural residents substantially expanded their involvement with community organizations. Although the committees that were formed were typically apolitical and primarily concerned with disaster relief, their existence represented a threat

western and central highlands where they were having a major impact on Indian political attitudes, marketing strategies, and agricultural techniques." The western and central highlands were the areas where much of the violence would take place in the 1970s and 1980s. Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 1, 14. Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 1,3. 147 Along with this development, during this time period there was also a greater awareness of domestic and international news after more rural inhabitants got access to transistor radios. Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 1, 3. 148 Philip Berryman, Christians in Guatemala's Struggle (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1984), 24-25; Thomas M. Leonard, Central America and United States Policies, 1820-1980s (Claremont: Regina Books, 1985), 21-22.

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to the military's legitimacy as a hegemonic actor in Guatemala.149 Gramsci pointed out that one way that a crisis of hegemony can occur is when political elites fail to fulfill an important responsibility that is expected of them by the other political classes.150 The military-government's inability to provide adequate support for the large percentage of its citizens who were suffering from the effects of the earthquake delegitimized the military while empowering the counter-hegemonic movement. Very importantly, many of these community organizations stayed in place well-after disaster relief was completed to focus on development initiatives. Since the counter-hegemonic institutions were so successful at ensuring disaster relief, community solidarity, and increased economic development, they gained a great deal of popularity.151 Shortly after the local reconstruction committees began working in earnest, soldiers occupied the countryside claiming that they sought to assist with disaster relief. The military's true intentions became evident after they targeted officials from the popular organizations. Rachel A. May incorrectly analyzes the calculus of the military by claiming that in 1976 the military began attacking these institutions because in some cases they were associated with the guerrilla groups.152 While this is arguably the case in the later years of the insurgency, this assessment is incorrect with reference to military violence in 1976. As Shelton H. Davis and Julie Hodson note, the military began killing "innocent peasants, religious personnel, and community leaders" before the guerrillas
I C-3

became an established presence in the countryside.

Furthermore, during the war there

Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 27; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 210. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 210. 151 Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 94; Remijnse, Memories of Violence, 84-85. 152 May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 76. 153 Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 4.
150

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were several examples of rural communities that where targeted by the military despite the fact that there was only a very small, or non-existent guerrilla presence in the region. As expected, the main targets in these areas were the community organizations that stood outside of the government's control and/or conducted initiatives against military interests. This was most notably the case in the Baja Verapaz municipality of Rabinal and Chimaltenango. In southern Quiche, the guerrillas were present in the area, but the community organizations operated largely independent of the guerrilla groups. Nonetheless, these three communities were viciously attacked by the military, which indicates its interest in undermining political groups that were outside of its control, even if they were clearly not affiliated with the guerrillas.154 Nevertheless, the military mainly escalated its use of violence because some organizations in rural Guatemala were perceived, usually falsely, of wanting to overthrow the government. After a failed coup attempt in the 1960s, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) regrouped, and former members went on to play instrumental roles in forming the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) in 1972, and the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (OPRA) in 1978.155 These rebel groups had to varying degrees a Marxist

Carol A. Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala: Economic Reorganization As A Continuation of War," Latin American Perspectives 17, 4 (1990), 16, 24; Alecio, "Uncovering the Truth," 26-30; This perspective was confirmed during personal interviews. With reference to San Andreas, Chimaltenango, and Solola during the Lucas Garcia presidency, the general consensus was that the military targeted development organisations that were apolitical and not affiliated with the guerrillas because they were a form of autonomous community development. Interviews with former members of an NGO that operated in Guatemala, March 9, 2010, March 14, 2010, April 7th, 2010. 155 Ilja A. Luciak, After The Revolution: Gender and Democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 130; Fried, Gettleman et al., "Part Four, Chapter II: People's Revolutionary War and the Guerrilla Movement, Editors' Introduction," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman et al. (New York, 1983), 259; Geographically speaking, during the 1970s and 1980s the EGP was principally located in "El Quiche, Alta and Baja Verapaz, Huehuetenango, and Chimaltenango". On the other hand, the FAR was primarily based out of Guatemala City, Chimaltenango, and to a lesser extent Peten. The ORPA mainly operated in "San Marcos, Quezaltenango, Solola, Totonicapan and Huehuetenango". Finally, the PGT operated mainly in Guatemala City and also in the plantation areas of

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orientation, and also sought to end racial and religious discrimination.156 The main thing that set the EGP apart from the guerrilla movement of the 1960s was the interest of its leadership in gaining the allegiance of the Mayans in the highlands. In Ixcan, northern Quiche, the EGP principally accomplished this by becoming members of these highland communities long before taking part in any revolutionary activity. If the inhabitants of these areas showed an interest in supporting the EGP, the rebels would set up self-defense units.157 In Quiche more generally, the EGP systematically took part in political dialogue with the Mayan inhabitants in order to gain their loyalty. The rebels also gained the allegiance of the Mayans through deed as well; they killed Luis Arenas Barrera, a notoriously disliked landlord in 1975 on account of his tactic of giving out loans at extremely high interest rates, which led many individuals in the region to become indebted to him.158 The EGP was utilizing, in practice if not in theory, a Maoist insurgency approach as they tried to gain the loyalty of the rural population in order to create the proper conditions for a revolution. In this way. the HGP forces wanted to build their counter-hegemonic movement slowly and not engage in guerrilla warfare until the

the Southern Coast. Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, i n i n . Hc>. Grass Human Rights Violations, 92. 156 Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 41; Officials from the guerrillas urklcrsi....d the importance that embracing Mayan culture and religion had to increasing the legitimacy ol the guerrillas in the eyes of the indigenous inhabitants. It was with this calculus in mind that the rebel groups nude uw ol "Indian religion, myth, and symbols" in its propaganda. Since the rebels were trying to o\crthrou the existing order to establish their own hegemonic order, it was essential for the rebels to contrast their respect for indigenous culture with the military's distaste for Mayan culture. In this way they could encourage adherence to the counter-hegemonic movement by showing how mey would establish a political order thai would better represent the interests of the Mayan majority. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrilla* an J Revolution in Latin America, 249; Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 205-206. 157 May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 75; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 37. 158 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 245; Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 93.

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EGP became strong enough to overpower the Guatemalan military, at which point the EGP would construct their own hegemonic social order.159 The guerrilla groups also gained more followers as a result of the guerrilla movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In terms of Nicaragua, the Sandinista victory in 1979 gave hope to the guerrilla groups in Guatemala. The Sandinista victory also showed the rural population that a guerrilla victory was possible, which led to increasing social support for the guerrillas in Guatemala.160 Another important regional event that spurred on the Guatemalan guerrillas was the powerful guerrilla movements that began a war with El Salvador's government in 1979.161 Support for the guerillas increased substantially as a response to increased military repression in the countryside. Two specific instances of government violence that led to significant increases in social support for the guerrillas were the Panzos massacre and the burning of the Spanish Embassy. These events, along with military attacks against institutions that tried to improve quality of life for the rural inhabitants, led many people to conclude that the government was trying to subvert independent political power in the countryside in order to maintain the economic status quo that was disadvantageous to many farmers. As a result, conditions in the countryside became radicalized as more rural inhabitants joined the guerrillas to protect themselves and their communities from government violence, to avenge the death of family and friends, and also in hopes of using violence to improve socio-economic conditions in the
159

Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans, and introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret.) (New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1961), 44, 68; Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 33-34. 160 Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 97. 161 Jonas, "Guatemala," 278; Liisa L. North and Alan B. Simmons, "Fear and Hope: Return and Transformation in Historical Perspective," in Journeys Of Fear, ed. by Liisa L. North and Alan B. Simmons (Montreal and Kingston, 1999), 11-12.

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countryside.

In the early years of the guerrilla movement, the main people who joined

the guerrillas were young Mayan farmers who were typically well-educated and members of progressive communal groups. As the violence increased in the late 1970s, traditional Mayan leaders increasingly endorsed the guerrillas. Despite mounting support for the guerrilla movement, the military was still aligned with some village elders along with the merchant middle class. While the radicalization of rural society increased membership in the guerrillas, these groups, especially the EGP and ORPA, also facilitated this process by holding armed propaganda meetings. At these meetings, the guerrilla members would often make speeches to community members in order to justify their fight against both the economic elites and the military-government. During these speeches, the guerrilla representatives typically claimed that they would protect men from being drafted into the military, and would organize local self-defense militias to fight against any military units in the area.164 The EGP and ORPA used armed propaganda meetings in more than seventy communities, principally in the central and western highlands, as well as in the Pacific and Southern Coasts.165

Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 133; Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 40-41; Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala." 94; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 4; Arias, "Changing Indian Identity," 252. 163 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 39; Brocket!, Land, Power, and Poverty, 110-111. 164 While in most cases the guerrillas seem to have tried to garner support from the local community by gaining their consent, there is some evidence that individuals were coerced to join the guerrilla forces. United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: Human Rights Violations, Acts of Violence and Assignment of Responsibility, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/conc2.html (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraph 137; Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 29, 32. 165 Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 32; Shelton H. Davis, "Agrarian Structure and Ethnic Resistance: the Indian in Guatemalan and Salvadoran National Politics," in Ethnicities and Nations: Processes of Interethnic Relations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, ed. by Remo Guidieri, Francesco Pellizzi and Stanley J. Tambiah (Austin, 1988), 94; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, November 1979, GU00615, United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIIILatin America, P2.

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Typically after a lengthy attempt to imbue the rural residents with their ideology, the guerrillas would take part in combat operations against the military in respective areas. By 1978 the guerrillas were occasionally engaging in hit-and-run attacks against the army.166 Guerrilla attacks against the army escalated by 1979 as the FAR and ORPA guerrillas operated throughout the highlands. The FAR and ORPA military campaigns were typically viewed favourably by the highland population.167 Also in 1979, the EGP substantially expanded the number of communities that were under its control in Quiche, particularly in the Ixil area.168 The Guerrilla Army of the Poor became the most popular rebel group, and by mid-1981 its units were present in two-thirds of all Guatemalan communities; when combined the guerrilla groups maintained either political cadres or combat units in every province in Guatemala except one by late 1981.169 At its height the guerrillas had 4,000 to 8,000 regular combatants, 10,000 irregular forces, as well as tacit support from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of rural residents.170 Despite being popular in the countryside, the guerrillas were rarely able to engage in coordinated attacks, but by 1981 they had more successes in joint missions. Common targets for these coordinated attacks were army garrisons, military convoys and police stations.171

Berryman, Christians in Guatemala's Struggle, 39; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 91. John A. Booth and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America, 2nd ed. (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 45. 168 Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 94. 169 Peralta, "The Hidden War," 155-156; Leonard, Central America and United States Policies, 1820-1980s, 23. 170 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 133; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 39, 41. 171 Michael McClintock, The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1985), 218; Outside of combat, the guerrillas used violence against individuals who were affiliated with the military. This included attacks against pro-military politicians, military commissioners, soldiers not engaged in combat, and members of the police. The guerrillas also attacked civilians who functioned as informers for the military, and villagers who allowed their property to be used by the military to conduct its operations. Another group of civilians who were targeted by the guerrillas were large landowners. Outside of killings, the guerrillas also destroyed government buildings. While admittedly the guerrillas did engage in violence against civilians, the crimes they committed were
167

166

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The EGP, ORPA, FAR, and PGT united into a single organization, the URNG on January 25th, 1982. The URNG's manifesto called for an end to military violence, racial equality, and a redistribution of wealth to curb the power of the economic elites. Furthermore, the manifesto called for the establishment of a new inclusive government that was representative of the popular movement. Internationally this government was meant to deal principally with poor countries and become members of the non-aligned movement.172 After unification, the guerrillas engaged in more extensive operations against the military, but there continued to be internal squabbling and coordination problems between the guerrilla groups.173 Equally important, the military believed that this unity of the guerrilla forces made them more formidable opponents, so the military escalated violence against the guerrilla groups and their alleged supporters.174 This change in military strategy is discussed at greater length in chapter four. Outside of the guerrillas, the military also tried to justify its violence against the Catholic Church, the CUC, the cooperatives, and other groups by claiming that these organizations endorsed the guerrilla revolution. In terms of the Catholic Church, there

relatively small in number compared to the military. Handy, Gift of the Devil, 252; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 57; Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 51; Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 55-56. Paszyn, The Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change in Central America, 1979-1990, 109-110; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 112. 173 Paszyn, The Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change in Central America, 1979-1990, 111. 174 Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 91-92; The military's use of massacres and scorchedearth destruction of whole communities that had recently been visited by the guerrillas was a major reason why social support for the guerrillas declined in the countryside. Beyond this, the popularity of the guerrilla groups declined because the guerrillas sometimes killed community leaders and military commissioners who were perceived to be against the rebel movement. In cases where these men were popular, this led community members to become disillusioned with the guerrillas. Within the guerrilla movements themselves, morale declined in large part due to military violence, lack of medicines, and hunger. Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 136-141; United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.html (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraphs 34, 35; Adams, "Conclusions: What Can We Know About the Harvest of Violence?" 287; Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits," 46-47; Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 95-96; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 17, 223.

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were isolated cases of religious officials becoming organizers on behalf of the EGP. Furthermore, David Stoll noted that in Quiche there were some examples of priests who joined the EGP as combatants. While some members of the Church of the Poor took

part in the revolutionary movement, it appears that this was not a widespread ideological belief in this organization. Nevertheless, some military officials did perceive the Church of the Poor to be Marxist. As a result of this perception, the military harassed, exiled,

and killed more than 100 religious officials.177 Violence against progressive members of the Catholic Church became so acute that in 1980 every Jesuit priest was pulled out of El Quiche due to concerns over the level of violence in the countryside.178 By comparison to the Catholic Church, there was even less evidence of a connection between the CUC and the guerrilla groups. One link between these groups was that both wanted a more equitable distribution of income, forced recruitment into the military to stop, and an end to military violence in rural Guatemala.179 Also, the CUC had an indirect alliance with the guerrillas as the CUC joined the FP-31, a mass organization of clandestine groups. Nevertheless, the CUC never officially aligned with the guerrillas, nor did this organization ever elucidate a specific ideological platform.180 The military also claimed that cooperatives, human rights organizations, along with non-violent

David Stoll, Between Two Armies In The Ixil Towns of Guatemala (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 169-171. 176 Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 255; Peter Calvert and Susan Calvert, "The Military and Development," in Rank and Privilege: The Military and Society in Latin America, ed. by Linda Alexander Rodriguez (Wilmington, 1994), 182. 177 Margaret E. Crahan, "A Multitude of Voices: Religion and the Central American Crisis," in Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and U.S. Policy in the 1980s, ed. by Nora Hamilton, Jeffry A. Frieden, Linda Fuller, and Manuel Pastor, Jr. (Boulder and London, 1988), 236; Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 98. 178 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 243. 179 Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 105-106. 180 May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 85.

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organizations that built schools and health clinics were aligned with the guerrillas.181 It's likely that the military was exaggerating the extent to which community organizations were affiliated with the guerrillas as the military even disparaged the use of organic gardening on the grounds that it was a subversive activity.182 Despite the military's embellishment, it's clear that there was a popular guerrilla movement that had some support among community organizations in the countryside. Since military propaganda characterized the guerrillas as seeking to establish a social order where Mayans would be exploited and attacked by members of the guerrillas, this clearly represented a threat to the status quo.183 In instances where military officials did not agree with this more idealistic motive for fighting revolutionary movements, these movements were still threatening as they sought to overthrow the socio-political order that provided the military and economic elites with a privileged status. The revolutionary movements were also threatening to the military in the short term as the guerrillas used violence against members of the elite, and destroyed property owned by them. As mentioned above, Gramsci noted that a hegemonic class has to fulfill certain obligations for the subordinate classes in order to ensure that the lower classes do not lose faith in its ability to rule appropriately. In order to prevent the lower classes from developing a crisis of confidence, the Guatemalan military needed to protect members of the economic elite and their property from guerrilla violence, so they resorted to extreme violence to suppress the guerrilla threat.

Brown, Explaining the Reagan Years in Central America, 242; Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 139; Edward L. Cleary, The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 1997), 122. 182 Brown, Explaining the Reagan Years in Central America, 242. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 111.

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While guerrilla violence was a major reason for the escalation of military violence in the mid-1970s, when military units began occupying northern Quiche in greater numbers in March 1976, these units principally killed members of progressive social movements like the church and the cooperatives, and to a significantly lesser extent guerrillas members were also killed by the military.184 It is significant that the military was more interested in targeting the progressive groups rather than the guerrillas because it helps to convey that military attacks against progressive groups occurred because military officials found them threatening outside of their often tenuous connection to the guerrilla groups. An important reason why the military used violence against non-violent community organizations was because these groups were encouraging greater economic autonomy in the countryside. Catholic organizations, for example, became targets of military violence even though they were initially welcomed into Guatemala following the 1954 coup as they preached anti-communism to the rural inhabitants. These Catholic organizations began converting the Mayans to the Roman Catholic faith, and they also helped to fund and maintain agricultural cooperatives.IX> Gradual I v Catholic groups became an important leadership structure in rural Guatemala, often at the expense of traditional Mayan leaders. In communities where Catholic Action groups were prominent, rural residents often worked with these groups to pursue development initiatives. During the course of their missionary work, manv members of Catholic

organizations began to shift away from the conservative policies vi the institutional

Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 41; Richards, "Cosmopoluan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 94. 185 Montejo, Voices from Exile, 39. 186 Brockett, Land, Power, and Poverty, 110-111.

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Church of Guatemala toward more progressive ideas.187 Eventually this cleavage between the conservative ideas of the institutional church and the progressive ideas of some catechists led the latter group to establish the "People's Church". This development was partly fostered by the endorsement of liberation theology by the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965, as well as by the Episcopal Conference of Medellin, which occurred in 1968.188 Liberation theology attacked the typically held Christian notion that suffering was necessary to cleanse a person's soul, and instead focused on the idea that suffering could be overturned by forming social movements that would educate the population about structural violence and seek initiatives to alleviate poverty.189 The main social movement that was used by Catholics to achieve this end was the Christian Base Communities.190 This ideological change approximates Gramsci's description of the role that traditional intellectuals would play in a counter-hegemonic movement. He wrote that some intellectuals who functioned to uphold the old order, in this case officials from the

While some members of the clergy did adopt a more reformist mindset, there were deep ideological divisions within the Catholic Church hierarchy between conservative and progressive religious officials. Some conservative members of the clergy served as apologists for military crimes, and they were also affiliated with the MLN and other conservative parties that were associated with the military. There is also evidence that members of the Catholic Church tacitly consented to the actions of death squads such as White Hand and An Eye for an Eye. In general terms the Catholic Church was very cautious about condemning military violence, particularly prior to the Pope's denunciation of Rios Montt in 1983. Berryman, Christians in Guatemala's Struggle, 15, 32-35, 42, 72-73; Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits," 41-42; Maureen E. Shea, Culture and Customs of Guatemala (Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 2001), 15,17; Alain Rouquie, "Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military Dominated Polities in Latin American," in Armies & Politics in Latin America, ed. by Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1986), 455-456. 188 Davis, "Agrarian Structure and Ethnic Resistance," 96; Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 39; Alan McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States in Latin America Since 1945 (Washington: Potomac Books, 2006), 83; United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed J^onfrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.htrnl (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraph 16. 189 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 83. 190 Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 93.

187

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Catholic Church, would become intellectuals in the counter-hegemonic movement after an ideological shift.191 Whether they were of a reformist or revolutionary orientation, the Catholic Action groups sponsored a network of cooperatives, peasant organizations, and literacy programs throughout the highlands. According to Greg Grandin, by the late 1960s the Catholic Action groups also "gave classes in community organizing and self-defense, offered study groups, and formed Christian base communities."192 After the devastating earthquake in 1976, the number of Catholic Action groups increased substantially. Furthermore, the Catholic Action groups involved in reconstruction also became more powerful after forming more lasting alliances with lay organizations, peasant leagues, and labor unions which were also helping to reconstruct and develop the countryside. objectives of the People's Church were made explicit in a letter created during Guatemala's Catholic Bishops' Conference in July 1976 which condemned the government for using violence against innocent civilians, for not allowing representatives of "the people" into government, and for condoning the illegal seizure of native land by wealthy Ladino farm owners.194 According to Ixil-spcaking Indians in northern El Quiche, Mayans became guerrilla combatants because Catholic groups successfully imbued them with a more progressive mindset, and they wanted to struggle to end the pervasive inequality between wealthy Ladinos and the Mayan majority.195 Since these The

Gramsci, Pre-Prison Writings, 336; Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 47-49. Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 127; Davis, "Agrarian Structure and Ethnic Resistance," 96; Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 14. 193 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 127; Davis, "Agrarian Structure and Ethnic Resistance," 96. 194 National Security Archives, El Salvador, 1977-1984 Collection, October 25, 1977, ES00041, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America, PI6. 195 Davis, "Agrarian Structure and Ethnic Resistance," 96; Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 93.
192

191

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Catholic groups worked to imbue the rural inhabitants with either a reformist or a revolutionary ideology, these groups functioned to create organic intellectuals in the countryside. Gramsci wrote that in order for a counter-hegemonic movement to grow, this movement must foster the development of intellectuals from the masses.196 Members of the People's Church were targeted with violence by the military and death squads in part because they threatened the economic interests of the wealthy.197 Another group that found this ideology ominous was the Catholic Church which had long supported the Guatemalan elites and shared in the spoils of economic exploitation of the poor in Guatemala. Aside from the People's Church, the cooperative movement was

also targeted because it encouraged greater economic autonomy in the countryside. The cooperatives expanded substantially during the 1960s and 1970s, fostered in part by government encouragement under the Laugerud Garcia presidency.199 Furthermore, the cooperatives increased their operations by helping to rebuild communities after the 1976 earthquake.200 Through funding and assistance from international donors, reconstruction committees, the Catholic Church, and the Christian Democratic Party, local communities were rebuilt successfully in part because they allowed local inhabitants to have more of a say in economic and political matters at the local level. More importantly, since the

196

Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International Publishers,

2000), 73. Carol A. Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala: Economic Reorganization as a Continuation of War," Latin American Perspectives 17,4(1990), 11, 35-36; David Stoll also suggested that Catholic catechists were targeted by the military because of their connection to the Christian Democratic Party, and because Catholic representatives had accused the military of committing human rights abuses. Stoll, Between Two Armies In The Ixil Towns of Guatemala, 90. 198 Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 47-49. 199 W. George Lovell, "Resisting Conquest: Development and the Guatemalan Indian." in Central America: Democracy, Development, and Change, ed. by John M. Kirk and George W. Schuyler (New York, Westport, London: Praeger, 1988), 106. 200 Lovell, "Resisting Conquest," 106.
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cooperatives were a national movement, this allowed rural communities to be linked together at both the local and the national level.201 Since these cooperatives were threatening to the military, under Lucas Garcia the government claimed that more than 250 co-ops were Marxist front groups, and they refused to officially register these co-ops. Garcia's administration also undermined the cooperatives by cutting national funding for the National Cooperative Institute.202 When the government resorted to using violence against cooperative officials and members, this forced several cooperatives to shut down their operations. In San Andreas, for instance, a housing cooperative stopped operating for three years due to concerns that the army or death squads would harm individuals affiliated with this cooperative.203 According to Kay B. Warren, San Andreas was not atypical; when government violence increased in the early 1980s nearly all community organizations, excluding religious groups in some cases, closed down because government violence was often directed at "potentially political" groups such as these that held private meetings.204 During the early years of Lucas Garcia's rule, in villages that managed to become relatively autonomous from the economic elites by forming community organizations, the military's typical strategy was to assassinate the leaders of these organizations as a means to intimidate people from taking part in these groups. Rural repression against cooperatives and other local

organizations became acute after Rios Montt declared a state of siege in 1982.206 The CUC was also targeted by the military because it undermined elite economic

Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 93-94. Handy, Gift of the Devil, 242. 203 Warren, "Interpreting La Violencia in Guatemala," 35. 204 Warren, "Interpreting La Violencia in Guatemala," 32. 205 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 242-243. 206 Warren, "Interpreting La Violencia in Guatemala," 32.
202

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interests. The CUC accomplished this by aligning with the CNUS, an umbrella union movement in urban Guatemala shortly after the CUC's creation in April 1978.207 These two organizations maintained close ties during the late 1970s. This relationship was important because it established a popular alliance between urban and rural workers.208 Ideologically speaking the CUC was interested in improving the quality of life of the rural inhabitants by fighting for legal titles to land, greater access to social services, civil rights, and wage increases. In this respect the CUC complemented the "more traditional forms of rural organization, such as agricultural workers' unions and peasant leagues" but in some cases the CUC replaced these organizations.209 More importantly, the CUC undermined elite economic interests because this organization spearheaded a massive agricultural strike in 1980. The 15-day strike began in February and occurred in response to poor working conditions and low wages. The strike occurred in the plantation-rich Southern Coast and involved 75,000 or more workers in the sugar, cotton, and coffee industries. Importantly, this strike managed to

unite farmers across ethnic lines as Ladinos and Mayans both participated in the strike. Furthermore, the strike also united a diverse array of farmers such as permanent workers, day-laborers, and migrant workers.211 The CUC's main objective during the strike was to raise the daily minimum wage from $1.12 to $5.00. The government eventually stopped

May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 82. May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 82; Shelton H. Davis, "Introduction: Sowing the Seeds of Violence," in Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis, ed. by Robert M. Carmack (Norman and London, 1988), 17-20. 209 Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 13-15; Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman et al., "Part Three, Chapter II: Struggles in the Countryside, Editors' Introduction," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 193. 210 Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 107-108; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 128-129. 211 Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 107; Davis, "Agrarian Structure and Ethnic Resistance," 98.
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the strike by offering to increase the minimum wage to $3.20. Despite the government's pledge, agricultural elites were assured that the government would not enforce this new minimum wage. The economic elites exacted their revenge for the strike by firing 10,000 workers. More significant, however, was the military's revenge; military violence

increased substantially against urban and rural union leaders and members. According to Charles Brockett, in 1980 "about 110 union leaders as well as over 300 peasant leaders were killed."213 The strike in 1980 hardened the resolve of the military to ensure that elite economic interests were preserved at the expense of the rural farmers and their representatives. The military's steadfast support for the economic elite led to greater economic problems for the rural inhabitants, a process that radicalized them. By the late 1970s, Mayans were being evicted from their land by the military and economic elites, particularly in the Northern Transversal Strip. This land theft had some important implications. For one thing, since land was increasingly used to farm cash crops for export, this left less land for subsistence agriculture, leading to escalating amounts of malnutrition during the 1970s and 1980s. Malnutrition was also exacerbated by the increasing Mayan population.214 Another important impact of the land seizures was that many Mayan men became migrant farmers on the modern agribusiness firms of the Southern Coast in an effort to make ends meet. It was here that migrant farmers met Mayans and Ladinos from different areas, which led many of these farmers to increase their economic solidarity. This enhanced interest in political issues was largely unprecedented as Mayans were typically forced to endorse whichever candidate the
212

213

Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 107-108. Brockett, Land, Power, and Poverty, 114. 14 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 133, 135; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 94-95.

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landlord they worked under wanted in power. Since they were migrant workers, this patronage system did not apply to them, so they could vote for whoever they wanted. However, since no mainstream political party was advocating the interests of poor farmers, this often radicalized these individuals.215 This radicalization led to the expansion of class consciousness among the farmers, which was important to the development of the counter-hegemonic movement. According to Gramsci, class consciousness involved an evolution of identity whereby members of the working class would stop identifying themselves as members of an industry and instead forge an identity based upon their membership in the working class."16 The class consciousness of the rural Mayans similarly evolved beyond their tendency to identify themselves based on ethnic, linguistic, or regional criteria, and instead they developed greater solidarity with other farmers and began to see themselves as oppressed members of the agricultural proletariat.217 Since the Church of the Poor, the cooperatives, the CI C, and the guerrillas218 were using reformist and revolutionary tactics u> tr> to achieve substantial reforms to the economic system, they were viewed as thrcatenmi; b> the economic and military elites. Since both elite groups required that Mayans continue their agricultural work, particularly their seasonal work in the Southern Coast, these groups had to be undermined or completely destroyed to protect this exploitive economic system.219 Community organizations were also curbed because lhc\ encouraged racial unity,

Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 133, 135; Hey, Gross Human Rn;ht\ \ /Litmus. 94-95. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II, 183. 217 Warren, "Interpreting La Violencia in Guatemala," 26; Gramsci. I'n--I'ri\<>u Writings, 10-11. 218 In terms of economic reforms, the EGP promised to institute a lain) rclorm. improve working conditions, increase educational opportunities, and allow more access to clccinciix. Philip Berryman, Stubborn Hope: Religion, Politics, and Revolution in Central America (Marvknoll and New York: Orbis Books and The New Press, 1994), 112; Sanford, Buried Secrets, 84. Tom Barry, Guatemala: The Politics of Counterinsurgency (Albuquerque: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1986), 57-58.
216

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particularly as a means to pursue economic advancement. In terms of the CUC, it was an important, and from the military's point of view threatening, institution because it was the first organization that managed to unite Mayans and Ladinos en masse.220 In terms of the Mayans, the CUC was an important milestone for this ethnic group because it was the first large-scale peasant organization that was organized by the Mayans, and just as important, its leaders were also Mayans. Since the CUC was a popular national movement, this led to a wide variety of Mayans, who lived in different areas and used different languages, to be united behind a single organization.221 The CUC also served an important function as it sought to unite Mayan and Ladino farmers. As a result of the actions of the CUC and other institutions in the popular movement, the traditional animosity between Mayans and Ladinos declined considerably.222 The CUC's decision to unite these ethnic groups was thoughtful; in many cases poor Ladino farmers and their Mayan counterparts had dovetailing grievances - there were fewer opportunities for subsistence agriculture, they worked for wages on plantations, and the increase in the rural population was damaging to their economic prospects.223 In sum, the importance of the CUC was best articulated by Greg Grandin when he wrote "[concentrating its demands on specific everyday issues such as access to credit, land titles, fair prices for both goods that campesinos bought such as fertilizer and agricultural products that they
Davis, "Introduction: Sowing the Seeds of Violence," 17-20. Davis, "Introduction: Sowing the Seeds of Violence," 17-20; Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 13-15; The CUC's success at uniting Mayan groups was evident when CUC officials organized a protest march against the government in Guatemala City on May Day, April 18th, 1978. During the May Day march, thousands of Mayans from a variety of different ethnic and linguistic groups, among them the Quiches, Cakchiqueles, Tzutuhiles, Mames, and Kekchis, marched as members of the CUC as part of a massive demonstration against the government. The cohesion among the Mayan groups in Guatemala City was surprising to many observers as the Mayan groups had not marched with such a high degree of solidarity since a peasant insurrection reached the capital in 1839. Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 95-96; Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 18. 222 Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 17-18. 223 Adams, "Conclusions: What Can We Know About the Harvest of Violence?" 278.
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sold, adequate plantation wages, and an end to military repression, the CUC developed a revolutionary ideology that rejected the legitimacy of the state and placed a united Indian-Ladino peasant movement squarely within the growing popular movement."224 The guerrillas and the Church of the Poor also encouraged racial unity. The guerrillas, for instance, tried to incorporate Mayans across ethnic and linguistic lines into their movement by wearing traditional Mayan dress, and also by using local Mayan languages when they made speeches. In a similar manner, the Church of the Poor

recruited followers by claiming that all poor people, Mayan and Ladino alike, should be supported by the People's Church. This call for racial unity and increased rights for the poor was threatening to the military. The military used violence against organizations

that encouraged racial unity as the status quo required that Mayans be exploited economically and also remain second-class citizens in terms of social and political power. In terms of the latter, this was done to discourage social unity of the poor against the rich as poor Ladinos were encouraged to adopt racist ideas that discriminated against poor Mayans. Diane Nelson wrote that the government was pretty successful at imbuing poor Ladinos with this mindset as a common refrain in rural Guatemala was "we may be poor, but at least we're not [Mayans]." The prospect of poor Mayan and Ladino farmers

Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 13-15. .. Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 32; Davis, "Agrarian Structure and Ethnic Resistance," 94; While the guerrillas did encourage racial equality as part of a plan to recruit the Mayans, there is some evidence that the Ladino guerrilla leaders may have been somewhat racist towards the Mayans. When the guerrillas were put on the defensive militarily in 1982, the EGP and ORPA neglected to discuss how the status of Mayans would change if the guerrillas successfully overthrew the government. However, the assertion that the guerrilla leaders were racist or perceived as racist is speculative; there is no evidence that the racism of the guerrilla groups, real or imagined, damaged the reputation of the guerrillas. Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000), 225. 226 Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 47-49. 227 Nelson, A Finger In The Wound, 78.
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uniting to demand changes to economic, social, and political conditions was frightening to members of the elite. Calls by community organizations to preserve or enhance Mayan identity also undermined the military's attempt at ladinization. This was an important reason why village elders were targeted for violent reprisals as they were responsible for documenting the history of the ethnic group they led.228 As village elders were seen as arbiters of Mayan culture, killing them was necessary to encourage the rural inhabitants to embrace Ladino culture. Indeed, the military was somewhat successful in achieving this goal as there is evidence that the killing of village elders, along with other attacks against Mayan culture, led to decreased understanding of Mayan identity and culture in younger generations of indigenous people.229 In related attacks, the military actively persecuted and punished individuals who embraced their ethnic identity by speaking Mayan languages and by wearing traditional Mayan clothing. Furthermore, the military prevented many individuals from taking part in cultural and religious ceremonies and rituals, which undermined Mayan culture.230 The explanation that village elders were killed in part to suppress Mayan culture is given added credence because the military also actively suppressed Mayan culture when new Mayan soldiers were given basic training.231 This will be discussed further in chapter four.

Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits," 50. United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report /english/concl.html (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraphs 6264. 230 United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.html (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraphs 6264. 231 Montejo, Voices from Exile, 63; Jennifer Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the American Way: The History and Consequences of U.S. Involvement in Torture (Boston: Bacon Press, 2005), 155.
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With their attempts to encourage economic autonomy and racial unity, some of the community organizations were creating national political movements that could potentially overthrow the exploitive status quo. CUC officials, with their status as middle peasants, tried to create a national movement by using their authority as influential members of the community. These officials worked though kin networks, communal organizations, and religious groups to expand the CUC's membership both within and outside of their local communities. Furthermore, CUC officials propagated their message over the radio and by holding talks, usually under the auspices of the Catholic Action groups.232 Through these methods, the CUC became a national movement with important bases in northwestern Guatemala, as well as in the Pacific, Atlantic, and the South Coast, areas where many of the plantations were located. Unfortunately these national

ambitions were curbed by military violence and the CUC went underground from 1982 to 1986. Many officials from the CUC were killed or escaped to exile, so the CUC largely lacked effectiveness after government violence subdued the organization in 1982.234 On the local level, the military tried to create or maintain leadership structures that embraced the status quo. If local leaders were perceived as disloyal to the military they were killed and replaced by individuals who were loyal to the military, such as other elites, members of the military or civil patrol members. This point was made very eloquently by Jennifer Schirmer when she wrote "[Hector] Gramajo and [Juan] Cifuentes's Strategic Appraisals in 1980 and 1981, for example, sought to create a radically altered cultural and religious i.e. apolitical sanctioned Mayan. They attempted to

Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 21-22. Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 19-20; Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 94. 234 Grandin, "To End with All These Evils," 13-15, 20.
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create an indigena who is not so much tied to local tradition as he is loyal to national symbols, the state, and by extension, the army."235 Schirmer believed that there could be two underlying assumptions to the military's plan: either they believed in the racist conception that Mayan communities had unchanging social structures, or they sought to reestablish the power of the village elders at the expense of the far-more progressive cooperative and catechist movements. The second assumption seems more likely because village elders were often a conservative force that worked with wealthy Ladinos and the military to maintain social control in the countryside.236 The military's attack against local governance structures was an indispensible aspect of its authoritarian revolution. Individuals affiliated with the military overtook local leadership structures if a given community was governed by untrustworthy elements, such as progressive or militant elders, members of the cooperative movement, or religious officials who threatened military interests.237 The military wanted political structures to be in the hands of individuals who embraced nationalism and respected the military's role as the dominant hegemon in Guatemalan society. In order to ensure that military interests were upheld, military officials also sometimes dominated existing Mayan governance structures.238 In either case, if the military officials were successful, they would have created, fostered, or modified local political structures so the political elites supported the military's objectives in the countryside. Beatriz Manz made a similar observation with reference to local political power in the Ixcan, noting that local elites
235 236

Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 59-60; Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 100. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 59-60; Brockett, Land, Power, and Poverty, 110-

111. Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 100. United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.html (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraphs 6264.
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did not hold power in any meaningful sense but functioned to carry out orders from military authorities.239 In sum, the military's escalation of violence in the 1970s and 1980s occurred as a result of its interest in upholding the status quo. The status quo involved protecting plantation owners from having their economic interests undermined by unions and community organizations that encouraged autonomous economic development in the form of communal plots and subsistence farming. Furthermore, the military sought to replace Mayan culture with Ladino culture, and to dominate political structures in the countryside. Although the popular movement was not cohesive, in general terms these groups sought to give rural residents more control over their economic and political future by encouraging them to join cooperatives, religious groups, and peasant unions. While in some cases these popular organizations were run by Ladinos with somewhat racist ideas, in general these movements seemed interested in maintaining Mayan culture and bringing Ladinos and Mayans together. In other words, this popular movement was a counter-hegemonic bloc that represented an imminent threat to the hegemonic order that the military and the economic elites controlled. The counter-hegemonic bloc tried to undermine the military-government in an effort to create a new political, economic, and moral leadership structure in Guatemala's government.240 In essence, the counterhegemonic movement was trying to accomplish a war of position and a war of maneuver. It was a war of position because the aforementioned groups were trying to imbue the rural inhabitants with an ideology that rejected the military-dominated status quo and legitimized the counter-hegemonic movement as the basis for a new social order. It was a

239 240

Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 142. Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, 205-206.

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war of maneuver because the guerrillas were trying to overthrow the military in order to establish a new historic bloc.241

Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 207; The historic hi. v. is j description of the social relations that exist in a given state. Since these social relations arc fluid. uitalv M i>t the social relations of a state are always changing. According to Gramsci, the historic bloc can rv defined by analyzing the superstructure of a given society. The superstructure is made up ol two important structures, the social relations that occur in civil society, along with the social relations involved in the "political society or the state", the official structures that the ruling elites use to govern the state. Antonio Gramsci, Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans, and ed. Derek Boothman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), xii; Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings, 124-125.

241

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Military Violence in the Guatemalan Countryside In the previous chapter it was determined that the military used violence against the guerrillas, non-violent community organizations, and their supporters because these groups encouraged revolutionary violence, autonomous economic organization, racial unity, and independent rural governance. This chapter contextualizes the violence that occurred during la violencia by showing that violence has been used systematically in Guatemala since the colonial period to enforce the economic status quo, in part by suppressing multiple Mayan rebellions against members of the economic elite.242 From a Gramscian perspective, the state's use of violence is understandable because Mayan resistance to the economic system implies that political elites were unsuccessful in their attempts to gain the allegiance of the Mayans through concessions and ideological indoctrination. As this was the case, the elites, through the use of the military, would need to use violence to ensure their control of the state.243 During Guatemala's colonial period, Spaniards traveled to Guatemala to use its inhabitants and resources to acquire enough wealth to become members of the Spanish court. In an effort to control the Mayans, the Spaniards brought members of the Roman Catholic clergy into Guatemala in order to convert the Mayans and to destroy religious and cultural Mayan symbols. The Spaniards clearly disdained the cultural and spiritual traditions of the Mayans, and they believed religious conversion would partially ladinize the Mayans, which was a necessary prerequisite for social stability. Since the Spanish colonialists claimed they were civilizing the Mayans, any act of defiance by the Mayans was viewed as ungrateful and insulting. The Spanish would retaliate by using the military to commit individual or
Montejo, Voices from Exile, 28-30. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II, 32-33; Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 127.
243 242

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collective reprisals against Mayan communities.244 The system of economic inequality between the Spaniards, along with their racial descendants, the Creoles, mestizos, and Ladinos, and the Mayans became particularly pronounced after individual Mayans, or whole communities, were forced to either labour or provide a tribute to a particular Spanish landlord. By the end of the sixteenth century, the system had changed as rural Mayans were now required to labour on behalf of the Spanish crown.245 The system of social and economic inequality between the Ladinos and the Mayans could also be seen in Ladino conceptions of nationalism. The racial descendants of the Spaniards often identified themselves as Guatemalans, and believed that only individuals who were racially "white" should be considered a part of the nation. By extension, since the Mayans were considered inferior to Ladinos, they were always treated like second-class citizens.246 The Ladino-dominated economic and political elites used the proceeds of Mayan labour, particularly in the coffee industry, to modernize Guatemala's institutional and economic structures. These reforms worked out well for the economic elite, which solidified its need for cheap Mayan labour. As a result, the economic elite used the military to maintain a constant presence in the countryside in order to control the Mayan farmers.247 Until 1944 the military's main functions were to ensure that the plantation owners had a sufficient supply of labour, to suppress peasant uprisings, and to force the Mayans off of communal lands that were redistributed to the

Montejo, Voices from Exile, 28-29. Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 14. 246 Montejo, Voices from Exile, 36. 247 Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 282; Prior to the liberal reforms, the military was used by individual members of the economic elite and other political groups to enforce their interests in rural areas. The liberal reforms made the military into a professional, state-controlled institution, but the military still functioned as an enforcer for the economic elite. Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 54-55.
245

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economic elite.248 The government also controlled the Mayan farmers by passing legislation, most notably the vagrancy laws of 1934. These laws required Mayans to carry documents that indicated that they had completed their obligatory labour for the government. The amount the farmers were required to work varied based on the size of their private plots, but generally they had to work between 100 and 150 days each year.249 The military's role in Guatemala was expanded substantially after the CIAsupported coup in 1954. The United States trained the military and police forces in Guatemala, and also gave the Guatemalan government $60 million dollars worth of military aid from 1950 to 1977.250 In the early period of the Cold War, Guatemalan officers believed that the military's role should be expanded beyond providing internal and external security for the state. They identified themselves as members of the most important institution in Guatemala, and as such they needed to be the arbiters of Guatemala's future. This reappraisal of the military's role in Guatemala entailed its direct control over Guatemala's economic, political, and social institutions. By extension, the military came to see individuals and institutions that opposed the military's vision of Guatemala's future as seditious.251 The main concerns of the military were controlling the Mayan agricultural workforce and undermining any political challenge to its authority.252 In the early 1960s, after a group of left-leaning officers unsuccessfully staged a coup, they went into the countryside to fight against government forces. Even though the military was able to suppress the rebels easily, the guerrilla war greatly radicalized the Guatemalan military's anticommunist ideology. Prior to the guerrillas appearing in
248 249

Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 54-55. Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 14. 250 McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State," 133. 251 McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State," 130-131. 252 Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 284.

66 Guatemala, the military was greatly alarmed by the Cuban revolution of 1959 as Cuba's professional army surrendered to a guerrilla movement. Taken together, the early guerrilla movement in Guatemala and the Cuban revolution led members of the Guatemalan military to elevate the importance of anticommunism to their worldview.253 This anticommunist ideology was further intensified as military officers often congregated together which limited the amount of ideas they encountered, leading them to develop a crude understanding of anticommunism. Military officers tended to identify themselves as arbiters of national security, and since the guerrillas were seen as proxies for international communism, they were destroyed along with their rural supporters.254 In 1960, the military began working in tandem with death squads and members of the police in its war against alleged communist infiltration. Furthermore, as it would come to pass in the late 1970s, the military and death squads worked together to murder or disappear civilians who opposed the military's brutal tactics under the guise that these actions were part of the guerrilla war.255 In conjunction with its anticommunist ideology, the military also used violence in order to maintain an obedient rural workforce. The military continued to enforce the economic interests of the elite classes because the military was still closely aligned with them, and several members of Guatemala's officer class were now part of the economic
Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 284; Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala: Crisis and Response," in Report on Guatemala: Central America and the Caribbean Program, ed. by School of Advanced International Studies (Boulder and London, 1985), 52; Jonas and Walker, "Guatemala," 4; Alfonso Yurrita, "The Transition From Military to Civilian Rule in Guatemala," in The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, ed. by Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson and Juan Rial (Massachusetts and Toronto, 1990), 78. 254 Peralta, "The Development of Military Autonomy and Corporateness in Central America," 166-167. 255 Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 50-51; Jonas and Walker, "Guatemala: Intervention, Repression, Revolt, and Negotiated Transition," 7; Bonnie Tenneriello, Geoff Thale and Richard L. Millett, "Unfinished Business: Military Reform and Peace Processes in El Salvador and Guatemala," in Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition, ed. by Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold-Bliss (Coral Gablesnj, 1995), 183.

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elite.256 A mutual interest of the economic elite and the military was subverting any attempt at land reform. The military used violence against individuals and organizations that advocated agrarian reform because the land redistribution plan accomplished by President Arbenz was associated with communism, and increased attempts by rural Mayan representatives to play a greater role in national politics.257 The military also continued to forcefully move Mayan communities from their fertile communal lands in the south to the highlands in northwest Guatemala. Since farming plots in the highlands tended to lack soil fertility, this required many Mayans to migrate to plantations in the southern coast to become seasonal labourers.258 Military ideology was also influenced by the racist notion held by members of the Ladino-dominated officer class that the Mayans were inferior to them. Although Mayan groups were separated from one another by differences in language and dialect, they were often identified as a homogenous group due to their style of dress, their allegiance to their local community, their use of communal economic development, and their spiritual practices.259 Ladinos claimed the Mayans were inferior to them because the Indians were "dumb, lazy, unwilling to work, and uncultured". The military's racist attitude towards

the unassimilated Mayans helps to explain why members of the military sometimes used excessive violence against individuals who represented no threat to the military. For instance, violence was used against people who were not affiliated with the guerrillas, did

Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 117. Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 2-3; Marion Ciborski, "Guatemala 'We Thought It Was Only The Men They Would Kill,'" War's Dirty Secret: Rape, Prostitution and Other Crimes Against Women, ed. by Llewellyn Barstow (Cleveland, 2000), 134-135. 258 Rigoberta Menchu and the Committee of Campesino Unity, "Weaving Our Future," 47-49. 259 Warren, "Interpreting La Violencia in Guatemala," 26; Linda Green, Fear As A Way Of Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 27; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 104. 260 Rigoberta Menchu and the Committee of Campesino Unity, "Weaving Our Future," 49; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 140-141.
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68 not present an economic threat, and were not involved in community organizations. Furthermore, since the Mayans were considered more susceptible to communist indoctrination due to their inferiority, the military committed collective reprisals such as massacres and scorched-earth destruction to punish communist infiltration in rural villages.261 Racial discrimination also manifested itself in the tendency of some military personnel to humiliate and degrade Mayans during counterinsurgency operations. According to eyewitness accounts, Mayans were subject to abusive language, violence, shouting, and they were sometimes forced to labour for members of the military.262 In some cases members of the military used their knowledge of traditional Mayan beliefs to magnify the terror felt by local populations. For example, corpses were mutilated and defaced, sometimes by forcing objects into the victim's mouth, which had the added significance of making it impossible for their souls to enter the afterlife. Equally important, in some cases Mayans were naked when they were killed. This is important because unless a Mayan is wearing their traditional clothing after their death, they would be unrecognizable to their ancestors which limited their ability to enter the afterlife.263 These ideological precepts were part of the military's training program for new recruits. Officially, all men in Guatemala were required to do a stint in the military, however, in many cases this law was not complied with. It was more common for young men and boys to be coerced into the military through mass conscription drives that
Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 9. Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 141. 263 Judith N. Zur, Violent Memories: Mayan War Widows in Guatemala (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), 79; Another example that conveys the racism felt by members of the military towards the Mayans was when the military desecrated or destroyed traditional Mayan spiritual sites, and when they tortured Mayans in local churches. Another example of the military's tendency to desecrate holy sites was given by a woman who was interviewed by a representative of the Archdiocese of Guatemala. She claimed that her son was forcibly taken by the military to an area the inhabitants used to pray to their ancestors. When she found his body, she saw that he had been tied up, burned, flogged, and left for dead. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 3; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 47.
262 261

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occurred during market days, religious services, sporting events, and local festivals. After selecting army recruits, the young men were told that if they did not join the military they would be killed because they were obviously affiliated with the guerrillas.264 Thousands of men and boys, some of whom were under fifteen years old, were forcefully recruited into the military during its counterinsurgency. Conscription was very unpopular, particularly in the early 1980s when escalating military casualties led to more extensive recruiting. Forced recruitment was criticized by rural organizations, the Catholic Church, political figures, and the guerrillas. Despite its unpopularity, the military continued to use conscription until the mid-1990s.265 Once they became a part of the military, the largely Mayan recruits were encouraged to carry out orders immediately and brutally, embrace Guatemalan nationalism, and adopt anticommunist ideology. The objectives of this military training are very much in keeping with Sandra Whitworth's analysis of how Canadian military training aimed to shape recruits. According to Whitworth. military training is designed to suppress individuality so the new recruits will align themscKes behind the military. As a result, aspects of identity that differentiate the new soldiers from each other, such as race or homosexuality, are suppressed through insults, humiliation, harassment, and violence. Whitworth claimed that military training was meant to create a "mthtan/ed masculinity"

Barry, Inside Guatemala, 49; Jennifer Harbury, Bridge of Outrun i Monroe Common Courage Press, 1995), 143; Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal T\ mnn\. 4*>. (iareau. State Terrorism and the United States, 52. 265 United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH >. Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: Human Rights Violations, Acts of Violence and Assignment of Responsibility, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/conc2.himl (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraph 97; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 181-182; Barry, Inside Guatemala. 49: James Dunkerley, The Pacification of Central America: Political Change in the Isthmus, 1987-199* (New York and London: Verso Publishers, 1994), 23.

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that made recruits hyper-aggressive, misogynistic, and racist.

In Guatemala, one of the

main components of the three month basic training program was to destroy the sense of indigenous identity in the new recruits. By virtue of their ethnicity, Mayans were targeted with harassment and violence, especially for speaking Mayan languages. The military also encouraged ladinization by forcing new recruits to take Spanish lessons. This training encouraged the Mayans to take on a Ladino identity, including the racist conceptions commonly held by Ladinos about the Mayans.267 Military training was also designed to brutalize new recruits and force them to obey orders. Military officials told the recruits that they would become important people after their training as they would have the power of life and death over others.268 A training session in Barillas, El Quiche brutalized their recruits by forcing them to shoot a group of dogs before subsequently eating them and drinking their blood. This tactic was not an isolated incident; other individuals who went through basic training described how they were told to raise a puppy, only to have to kill it later. Brutalization was also accomplished through beatings, forcing recruits to lie in sewage, and enacting harsh punishments, particularly for not obeying orders.2 9 Furthermore, soldiers were constantly provided with methamphetamines to foster a more violent disposition.270 The military also encouraged obedience by getting soldiers to police each other, and in some cases by administering punishments to soldiers who did not follow orders. Another method the military used to ensure obedience was to put spies in with the other trainees. These spies
266

Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism & UN Peacekeeping (Boulder and London: Lynn Rienner Publishing, 2004), 86,155-156, 161-162. 267 Montejo, Voices from Exile, 63; Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the American Way, 155. 268 Montejo, Voices from Exile, 63. 269 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 127-132; Grandin, Empire's Workshop, 90. 270 Interview with a former member of an NGO that operated in Guatemala, March 9, 2010.

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would tell military officials if a recruit said something disparaging about the military.271 Furthermore, the military tried to ensure obedience by gradually involving the soldiers in repression, which had two important effects. First, after killing someone the soldier had implicated themselves in the terror, so they risked being killed by other soldiers if they tried to desert their duties. Second, by involving themselves in killing, it encouraged soldiers to not talk about the crimes of the military as they might be killed, or otherwise marginalized for their dissent.272 Since soldiers were taught to be obedient, when they were ordered to kill individuals or whole communities, they often carried out their orders without investigating why these people were considered subversives. To make matters worse, soldiers were often given promotions or extra privileges if they killed efficiently, organized massacres, or employed cruelty during military' operations.273 Military training was also meant to instill a sense of anticommunism and nationalism into the new soldiers. Military officials used ideological indoctrination to persuade the new recruits that the military functioned to protect Guatemala from communism. The recruits were lauded for joining the military because otherwise Guatemala would be destroyed by exploitive communist agents. Military ideology claimed that the guerrilla groups were responsible for Guatemala's poverty, and if the rebels overthrew the government then communist groups would steal land and resources from the rural inhabitants.274 In other words, the military was attempting to dehumanize

Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 34-36. Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 129-132. 273 Victor Montejo, Testimony: Death Of A Guatemalan Village, trans. Victor Perera (Willimantic: Curbstone Press, 1987), 39; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 129; Individuals involved in the civil patrols were similarly rewarded with gifts if they carried out orders brutally. The objective behind doing this was to enhance group loyalty and make the patrollers more likely to act aggressively towards the individuals they monitored. Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 23-24. 274 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 128-129.
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the guerrilla groups and the individuals who supported them.

After their training was

over, recruits were sent to areas they were unfamiliar with and told that some or all members of a community were affiliated with the guerrillas. The high number of casualties attests to the fact that the military was largely successful in its attempt to make recruits into obedient soldiers who would carry out attacks against suspected guerrillas and their sympathizers.276 The military began a gradual escalation of violence in the early-to-mid 1970s at the behest of members of the economic elite who demanded that Mayan and Ladino farmers working on plots in the north be removed so minerals could be extracted from the area. The military and the death squads forcefully removed or killed peasants in the northern departments of El Quiche, Peten, and Alta Verapaz.277 In 1975 the military also increased their operations in areas of Guatemala where reformist community organizations were gaining strength such as the Ixcan and Ixil regions. Furthermore, military operations were expanded in El Quiche at the insistence of the landowning elite after rural Guatemala was devastated by an earthquake in 1976. The landowners felt threatened by the community organizations that were helping to reconstruct rural areas, as well as the organizations administering development programs. The military claimed that its expanded presence in the countryside was done to ensure that law and order was maintained during reconstruction. Equally important, the military justified its operations in Quiche as an attempt to eliminate the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, which had begun

Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 28. Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 31; Montejo, Voices from Exile, 63. Bowen, "Guatemala," 290.

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operations shortly after the 1976 earthquake.278 By the late 1970s, the military expanded its operations by also fighting in Baja Verapaz, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Guatemala City, and in the south lands.279 Since the military was making extensive use of force to maintain its control over the countryside, it only exercised a limited hegemony. By contrast, an expansive hegemony involves a variety of classes and other social groups consenting to the rule of the elites. President Kjell Laugerud Garcia's tactic of using violence against individuals who encouraged governmental reform was also illustrated during the Panzos massacre in May 1978. Kekchi-speaking Indian farmers in Panzos, which is a city in the department of Alta Verapaz, had been lobbying the government to be granted legal titles for the land they occupied and worked. The government agreed to this request, but when the Indians went en mass to the town square to collect their land titles they were approached by landowners, government officials, and a large group of soldiers. An argument ensued between a farmer and a soldier that escalated into violence when the farmer believed the soldier was insulting him. After the soldier was wounded, the military, along with members of the police, opened fire on the crowd killing more than one hundred of the farmers. The military claimed, contrary to eyewitness statements and media reporting, that the actions of the soldiers were motivated by self-defense as the assembled Mayans had engaged in a coordinated attack against the soldiers in order to secure their firearms. Contrary evidence from campesino eyewitnesses suggested that the attack against the
Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 4;Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 43; Bowen, "Guatemala," 290. 279 Virginia Garrard-Burnett, "Profile: Guatemala," in Women & Civil War: Impact, Organizations, and Action, ed. by Krishna Kumar (Boulder and London, 2001), 68; Trudeau and Schoultz, "Guatemala," 37; United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.html (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraph 27. 280 Steve Jones, Antonio Gramsci (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 52.
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soldier was an isolated incident as the crowd had peaceful intentions. While some of the farmers brought machetes to the town square, this was because they planned to go work in the fields after obtaining their land titles. The perspective of the campesino leaders that the military had engaged in an unprovoked massacre was given added credence after it was discovered that the military had dug mass graves in the area two days prior to the confrontation.281 President Laugerud Garcia decided to reverse his earlier decision to let rural community groups operate with relative autonomy from the central government because he was under pressure from the economic elite to destroy individuals and organizations that were jeopardizing elite control over Mayan labor. By the end of Laugerud Garcia's term in 1978, his administration had been unsuccessful in its attempts to undermine the guerrilla movements or the expansion of community organizations.282 Despite coming to power as a result of electoral fraud, Lucas Garcia claimed that his administration would obey the law, and not commit human rights violations against civilians.283 However, Lucas Garcia's pledge to respect human rights was tested three months into his presidency when the government instituted a price increase for bus fares from 5 to 10 cents, which led to protests, rioting, and strikes. These protests were
National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, June 1, 1978, GU00520, George R. Andrews, United States Embassy in Guatemala, More on Campesino/Military Clash in Panzos, Pl-3; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, June 5, 1978, GU00521, George R. Andrews, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Panzos Episode, PI; Nancy Peckenham, "Fruits of Progress: The Panzos and Spanish Embassy Massacres in Guatemala," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 203-204; Davis, "Introduction: Sowing the Seeds of Violence," 17-20; As suggested above, there are disputes about what exactly transpired at Panzos. According to Greg Grandin, some witnesses claimed that the protestors antagonized the military by "banging their machetes together, throwing chilli in the eyes of the troops, and demanding the installation of an 'Indian king.'" Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 1. 282 Schirmer, "The Guatemalan Politico-Military Project," 66; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 39; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, June 28, 1978, GU00525, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Panzos, PI. 283 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 14, 1978, GU00516, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, The Lucas Victory: Implications, P2-3; James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America (London and New York: Verso Press, 1988), 484.
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organized primarily by left-wing students, unions, and urban political movements. At first Lucas Garcia considered giving into the demands of these groups, but soon he decided to end the riots with violence, and after one week 30 people were killed, 300 individuals were wounded, and 800 people were put in jail by military and police forces. In the end Lucas Garcia reduced bus fares to its original price, but his largely coercive response set the precedent for how he would handle reformist groups in the future. The protests that the bus fare increase created was the first major challenge in many years that the urban popular movement engaged in against the military.284 In Guatemala City, Lucas Garcia ordered the military and death squads to assassinate groups deemed to be reformists; in particular, he targeted union leaders, popular organizers, left-wing academics, students, urban sections of the guerrilla movement, and political officials. In terms of the latter category, the army targeted influential members of left-of-center political parties such as the Democratic Socialist Party (PSD), the Christian Democratic Party (DC), and the United Front of the Revolution (FUR). In addition, government security forces assassinated Alberto Fuentes Mohr and Manuel Colom Argueta, who were the leaders of the Social Democratic Alliance. Garcia claimed that politically-motivated murders were not the work of the

military, but involved the guerrillas and the death squads fighting each other independent of the government's involvement. In reality the death squads were taking orders directly from President Lucas Garcia. The military created lists of people to be killed and these
National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, November 1979, GU00615, United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIIILatin America, 1; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 50-51; Berryman, Christians in Guatemala's Struggle, 38; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, December 5, 1978, GU00539, David Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Lucas' First Five Months, P2. 285 Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 45; May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 76; Jonas, The Battle For Guatemala, 148-149.
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lists were later vetted in meetings between representatives from the military, police, and the chief of staff before being passed along to the death squads.286 In the countryside, the army and death squads primarily used targeted assassinations against individuals involved in community organizations that pursued reformist social change in Guatemala. This conclusion was also reached by Patrick Ball, Paul Kobrak and Herbert F. Spirer when they wrote "the army appears to have killed many other catechists, health workers, bilingual teachers and other community organizers simply because they were agents of change or an example of a new assertive ethnic identity in a politically repressed region - the western highlands and adjacent lowland jungles - precisely at the time guerrilla armies began to focus their attention there."287 Political murders in Guatemala escalated during Lucas Garcia's term in office; by 1981 right-wing security forces were killing on average two-hundred fili\ to three hundred people every month.288 It was in this atmosphere where the military responded w ith violence against individuals and organizations that called for reform that the Spanish Embassy massacre occurred. K'iche and Ixil Indians assembled in the capital in January ll>X() in order to protest the increased militarization of the Ixil area. In particular, the protestors wanted the government to set up a commission to investigate who was responsible lor the kidnapping and murder of nine farmers from Uspantan, El Quiche. These protestors were unsuccessful in their attempts to get an audience with President Lucas Garcia, and they
286

Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, "Terror and Violence As Weapons ()f C'tiunk-nnsur^'cncy In Guatemala," trans. John Beverly. Latin American Perspectives 7, 2-3 (19X0). I OS-110. Pas/yn. The Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change in Central America, 1979-1990. 1 10; Mack. "Military Rule in Guatemala," 359; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 180; Sante, Nightmare or Reality. 25. 287 Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996. 76. 288 Richard Millett, "The Central American Militaries," in Armies & Politics in Latin America, ed. by Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York and London, 1986). 213.

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were also prohibited from stating their demands at a congressional session. The protestors were also repressed by government security forces while in Guatemala City; while nearby police headquarters, the legal advisor used by the protestors was assassinated. In a last ditch attempt to have their grievances relayed to government decision-makers, on January 31 st , 1980 the protestors peacefully occupied the Spanish Embassy along with some students and members of rural community organizations. The Ambassador to Spain Dr. Maximo Cajal y Lopez told the protestors that if they agreed to leave the embassy peacefully he would present the protestors' demands to government officials. However, after telling the police that the protestors had agreed to peacefully withdraw from the embassy, the police refused to allow anyone to leave the building. In front of television cameras, members of the police threw incendiary devices into the Spanish Embassy, engulfing it in flames. Once the fire began the police would not permit anyone to leave the embassy, and they prevented rescue workers from extinguishing the fire. As a result of their actions, thirty-nine people died.289 In addition to attacking individuals and organizations that advocated reform, the Guatemalan military continued to target guerrilla members and their suspected supporters. The aggressive anticommunist ideology of the Guatemalan officers became more acute as members of the military believed that communist movements were flourishing in Central America. Military officers became more anxious when they saw the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, along with the continued fighting between
Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996, 23; Davis, "Agrarian Structure and Ethnic Resistance," 98; Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 1-2; Arias, "Changing Indian Identity," 253; This account was disputed by the military and academic David Stoll, both of whom claimed that the military was not responsible for starting the fire. In terms of Stoll, he claimed that the protestors set the embassy on fire themselves, an idea that was rejected by the Spanish military and the Historical Clarification Commission after separate investigations. Victoria Sanford, "Between Rigoberta Menchu and La Violencia: Deconstructing David Stoll's History of Guatemala," Latin American Perspectives 26, 6 (Nov, 1999), 38-39.
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government forces and left-wing rebel groups in El Salvador and Honduras.290 Undoubtedly this alarm translated into the military intensifying its ferocious assault on the countryside.291 President Lucas Garcia said that the guerrillas in Guatemala were undermining the well-being of all Guatemalans by terrorizing the population. He claimed that the military's counterinsurgency was trying to destroy these movements, which were being financed and encouraged by the Soviet Union and Cuba, so that Guatemala could become united, free, and prosperous. By extension, the guerrilla groups were blamed

for making rural Mayans into victims by bringing their illicit movement into the countryside, which forced the hand of the government security forces. The military also tried to propagate the idea that most of the violence was committed by the guerrillas, despite widespread eye-witness accounts that contradicted this assertion.293 As the popularity of the guerrilla groups increased in the countryside, the guerrillas escalated their military campaigns to include more battles with military forces, rather than using the hit-and-run tactics that were common in the 1970s. As a result, the military hierarchy now felt the need to engage in more large-scale operations against the guerrillas, and the communities that supported them."94 The typical strategy in

Yurrita, "The Transition From Military to Civilian Rule in Guatemala," 81; Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 101; Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 114. 291 Jonas, "Guatemala," 278; North and Simmons, "Fear and Hope," 12. Paszyn, The Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change in Central America, 1979-1990, 113; Garcia, "We Do Not Violate Human Rights in Guatemala," 138; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 145; The army propagated these ideas to the Guatemalan public through "radio, television, and print media." Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 29. 293 Davis and Hodson, Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala, 4-5; Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 114. 294 The military's overly-broad definition of who was considered a subversive led to an extreme escalation of violence. The military's tendency to be imprecise when defining enemies was evident in army manuals that outlined tactics that could be used to identify which members of a community were in league with the guerrillas. One manual encouraged soldiers to leak information that the army would invade a respective community, and whoever remained when the military arrived was clearly being protected by the guerrillas. This same manual also claimed that guerrillas were probably protecting anyone who did not take

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communities thought to be aligned with the guerrillas was to massacre the local population, and use scorched-earth tactics in order to destroy the villages, and the guerrilla's social base of support along with it. In essence, the military made extensive use of massacres and other types of brutal violence due to its anticommunist ideology and racial hatred. According to Greg Grandin, the military "murdered children by beating them on rocks as their parents watched. They extracted organs and fetuses, amputated genitalia and limbs, committed mass and multiple rapes , and burned some victims alive." The military commonly conducted

massacres as a means to kill every member of the community, including women and children. Approximately half of all of the massacres perpetrated by the Guatemalan army involved the killing of every child in the community. According to the Archdiocese of
extra precautions to avoid being kidnapped by right-wing security forces. Amnesty International, Guatemala: The Human Rights Record (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1988), 97-98. 295 Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996, 26-27; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 91, 145; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 213-215. 296 Instances of rape are especially high in Guatemala because officers actively encouraged soldiers to take part in the practice. It was claimed by multiple witnesses that officers instructed soldiers how to rape by using prostitutes and other women. One particularly gruesome variation of gang rape was to have soldiers who were not infected with sexually transmitted diseases have sex with the Mayan women first, and then allow infected soldiers to have their turn. In the Guatemalan military, rape was used as a form of amusement, it was used to torture women, it functioned as a method to relieve the frustrations of military service, and women were also made into sex slaves for the soldiers. Torres, "Bloody Deeds/Hechos Sangrientos," 159; Pedro Luis Ruiz, "Testimony: Pedro Luis Ruiz, Indian peasant and former member of the Guatemalan army," in Tyranny on Trial, ed. by Susanne Jonas, Ed McCaughan, and Elizabeth Sutherland Martinez (San Francisco, 1984), 69-71; Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States, 49-51; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 76-81; Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 155; For more information on instances of rape that occurred during the counterinsurgency, please read Marion Ciborski, "Guatemala 'We Thought It Was Only The Men They Would Kill,'" Pp. 124-139 in Llewellyn Barstow, ed. War's Dirty Secret: Rape, Prostitution and Other Crimes Against Women (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2000); Virginia Garrard-Burnett, "Profile: Guatemala," Pp. 68-79 in Kumar, Krishna, ed. Women & Civil War: Impact, Organizations, and Action (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); For analysis on war rape more generally, please read Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis and London, 1996); Vesna Kesic, "Establishing Rape as a War Crime," Pp. 269-293 in Buchwald, Emilie, Pamela R. Fletcher and Martha Roth, ed. Transforming a Rape Culture (Minneapolis, 2005); Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism & UN Peacekeeping (Boulder and London, 2004); Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York, 1975); Cynthia Enloe, "Manoeuvres: When Soldiers Rape," Pp. 117-123 in Buchwald, Emilie, Pamela R. Fletcher and Martha Roth, ed. Transforming a Rape Culture (Minneapolis, 2005). 297 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 3.

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Guatemala, in some cases the military conducted massacres against women and children exclusively when men were either not present when the massacre occurred, or they were killed in an earlier massacre.298 In some cases massacres were not committed due to anticommunism and racism, but they were done, at least in part, out of a desire to achieve financial gain. After committing massacres, members of the military commonly plundered livestock, food, and other items for personal use. Plundering also occurred in situations that did not involve massacres; members of the military rationalized that since the village probably supported subversion that they did not deserve to keep their
299

property. By November 1981 the military began Operation Ashes, a major offensive aimed at reclaiming communities that were sympathetic to the guerrillas.300 Military strategy in late 1981 and early 1982 involved taking control of the logistically important PanAmerican Highway, which meant conducting operations in the towns of Chimaltenango and southern El Quiche. Furthermore, the armed forces wanted to militarize the central highlands because it was an area that was important to the guerrillas as it lay between the western mountain regions and Guatemala City. The army also sent troops to pacify guerrilla movements and their supporting villages in El Quiche, Huehuetenango, San Marcos, and Alta and Baja Verapaz in 1981 and 1982. Furthermore, military raids were conducted in Guatemala City in an attempt to destroy the urban wings of the guerrilla movements. Thousands of civilians were killed during these raids primarily because the guerrilla groups were in the process of expanding their base of support in the countryside,
Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States, 48-49; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 75; Angela Delli Sante confirmed this trend by pointing out that it was common practice for the military to torture and murder children who were non-combatants. Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 33. 299 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 41, 172. 300 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 45.
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and in many areas they had only a few combat units that were able to fight off the military forces.301 The Chief of Staff of the Guatemalan Army General Benedicto Lucas Garcia, the President's brother, blamed the civilian casualties on the guerrillas because they refused to wear a uniform to distinguish themselves from innocent civilians in nearby villages. However, while admitting that the government forces had accidentally killed some civilians, General Benedicto Garcia told journalists during a tour of a combat zone in western Guatemala that the majority of the violence and destruction was caused by the guerrilla groups.302 The scorched-earth tactics begun under President Garcia were meant to displace entire villages thought to be sympathetic to the guerrillas. When razzing villages, the military usually destroyed local harvests , so the displaced

villagers did not have enough food to eat personally, or enough to feed members of the guerrillas. Typically if the survivors were not killed by bombing or massacre, the military would relocate them to strategic hamlets.304 In these military-dominated villages, the surviving Mayans were encouraged to produce crops for export on plantations owned by the economic elite rather than practice subsistence agriculture. This is significant because one of the drives of the military's

authoritarian revolution was to ensure that Mayans principally functioned as agricultural laborers for the national economy. If they were successful, the military would strengthen
Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996, 26-27; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 213-215. 302 Marlise Simons, "Guatemalan Indians Crowd into Mexico to Escape the Widening War," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 250; Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman, "Search and Destroy in Chupol: Daily Life in Occupied Guatemala, by an Indian woman and a Catholic Priest," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 241-242. Since the Mayans held a particular reverence for corn, they had a negative visceral reaction when the military destroyed their corn crop as part of their scorched-earth tactics. Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 584. 304 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 38-39; Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States, 57-58. 305 Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala," 13; Calvert, Guatemala, 129.
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the exploitive economic status quo, and re-established an important basis for its hegemony. Another important component of these military-dominated villages was the civil patrols. Since the military lacked the manpower and resources to have units occupy vast stretches of territory in rural Guatemala, the high command decided that civil patrols should be organized in these communities. The military could rely on the civil patrols to guard and police their local communities, which allowed the military to send troops to areas of conflict rather than using them to guard pacified communities.306 The civil patrols will be discussed at greater length in chapter 6. Much like his predecessor President Laugerud Garcia, Lucas Garcia continued to use violence in the countryside in part because of the military's allegiance to the economic elite. The dominance of the military was predicated in many ways on the economic elite's continued economic success. As a result, the military continued attacking elements that were threatening to the economic elite, such as the rebels, leftwing politicians, and communal organizations. By the late 1970s, the military developed a vested interest in using violence to enhance business opportunities because members of the military were prominent fixtures of the business community, and many members of the military received kickbacks from Guatemalan businesses. Members of the Guatemalan military became wealthy because of their desire for personal enrichment, and because they wanted the military, or individuals with strong allegiance toward the military, to exert more control over the economy to ensure economic stability. Although the economic elite and the military had similar economic interests, officers in the military believed they should gain as much control over the economy as possible because they had
Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 220; Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 40-46; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 24-25.
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the national interest at heart whereas some non-military members of the economic elite would make selfish decisions that benefited their companies, but hurt the national economy.307 With these dual motives in mind, the military had gained control over 46 state institutions by the end of Lucas Garcia's rule. Members of the military had significant investments in agribusiness, cattle ranching, finance, media, tourism, real estate, and the production of military equipment such as munitions and armoured vehicles. Military officers relied so heavily on using their political position with the

military to acquire personal wealth that they resisted calls for free elections because they feared that non-military politicians might reign in their future business interests.309 It was these common interests between the military and economic elite that caused the military to force peasants off of their land in northern Guatemala so economic elites, including members of the military, could use the land for their economic projects. In the 1960s, the rural inhabitants in northern Guatemala had managed to establish thriving agricultural cooperatives after acquiring their lands from the government with financial assistance from Christian missionaries. However, in the late ll)70s the farmers were forced off this land so the economic elite could use this arci tor cattle ranching, mineral extraction, oil drilling, and to establish hydroelectric plantv I urthermore, the military wanted to establish major highways in the northern frontier /one. which required the removal of peasants in the area.310 The military's actions in the northern frontier zone

Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala." 11. Vi M. Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 57; Black. "Milnar\ Rule in Guatemala," 350, 360-361; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 128; Gabriel Aguilera IVralia. "The Militarization of the Guatemalan State," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, cd. b\ Jonathan I., l-'ried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 118; Peralta, "The Development of Militarx Autonomy and Corporateness in Central America," 169. 309 Trudeau and Schoultz, "Guatemala," 33. 310 May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 77; Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala," 13; Calvert and Calvert, "The Military and Development." 182.
8

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are a significant manifestation of their desire to remake Guatemala from the top-down. In this case, the interests of the economic elite and the military are given primacy, and the lower classes are forced to adjust to these interests. After Rios Montt came to power, the military adjusted tactics by putting more emphasis on gaining the allegiance of the rural inhabitants through consensual means. This change in strategy was underlined by General Hector Gramajo, who co-authored the National Plan for Security and Development, when he claimed that under Lucas Garcia the military's strategy was to use force 100% of the time, with no significant attempts to try to gain the consent of the population through non-coercive means. On the other hand, the counterinsurgency plan under Rios Montt, which was called "rifles and beans" by members of the military, involved providing aid and development assistance to 70% of the population while using force against the 30% of the population that were considered subversives. Hector Gramajo believed this new strategy would successfully integrate the Indians into the state because it was a cheaper, more humanitarian approach to winning the counterinsurgency than what Lucas Garcia had used.311 By enhancing social programs in the countryside, the military had some success at gaining the sympathy of the rural inhabitants. Even in situations where individuals had seen soldiers commit violence in their communities, they believed that since the government was providing them with development assistance that it must have been the guerrillas in disguise who perpetrated the violence. This ambiguity was augmented in communities that were poor and isolated
311

Dunkerley, The Pacification of Central America, 78-79; Noam Chomsky, introduction to Bridge of Courage, by Jennifer Harbury (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1995), 19-20; The idea that the beans and bullets program was intended to integrate Indian communities into the state was also made by Harris Whitbeck, who was an advisor to Montt. Grahame Russell, Sarah Kee, and Ann Butwell, Unearthing The Truth: Exhuming A Decade of Terror in Guatemala (Washington: Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean (EPICA) and Center for Human Rights and Legal Action (CHRLA), 1996), 42.

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because people in these areas lacked access to information, so they sometimes fell prey to military disinformation that claimed local violence was the result of guerrilla machinations or local disputes.312 The counterinsurgency placed so much emphasis on development because the military elite believed that rural inhabitants supported the guerrillas in part because of economic problems in Guatemala. The Mayans typically lived in bitter poverty due to a lack of employment opportunities and poor distribution of income. Furthermore, these economic conditions were exacerbated by an economic recession that hit Guatemala in 1981, leading to a drop in prices for coffee, cotton and sugar, Guatemala's main exports. The military's strategy was to gain more control over the rural economy in order to provide economic opportunities that would benefit the national economy.313 To meet this end, the army used the Committee for National Reconstruction (CRN) to set up a food for work projects, mainly as a means to reconstruct rural Guatemala. However, in areas of conflict the military insisted that in order for the inhabitants of the region to qualify for assistance from the CRN their communities would have to form civil defense patrols. This plan was summarized very bluntly by an officer who claimed that "If you are with us, we'll feed you, if not, we'll kill you."314 Since the guerrilla forces were largely on the run and unable to protect many rural communities at this time, the communities largely had no choice but to comply with the military; by the end of 1982, hundreds of villages

Russell, Kee, and Butwell, Unearthing The Truth, 11-12; Interview with a former member of an NGO that operated in Guatemala, March 14, 2010. 313 Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 117-118. 314 Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 584; Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 60; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3, 1983, GU00903, Secret Intelligence Research Report, Guatemala's Guerrillas Retreating in the Face of Government Pressure, Pi, 7-8.

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lie

were participating in the civil defense patrols.

Although the civil patrols were initiated

under Lucas Garcia, it was not until Rios Montt took power that the patrols were greatly expanded, and they began to serve an important function to the counterinsurgency campaign.316 In terms of combat, Rios Montt continued the violent strategies utilized by Lucas Garcia. The "bullets" part of the plan was rationalized by Rios Montt when he said that for every combatant there were ten non-combatants who were providing support to the guerrillas. Rios Montt's press secretary Francisco Bianchi elaborated further that the military was not targeting innocent civilians because these communities were supporting the guerrillas, which made them enemies of the state. In December 1982 Rios Montt concurred with this statement, claiming that "[w]e don't have a scorched-earth policy. We have a policy of scorched Communists."317 The military campaigns, which were codenamed Victory 82 by the military, occurred from April to December of 1982 in the northwestern highlands. The military swept through Chimaltenango, El Quiche, Huehuetenango, the Ixil Triangle, the Ixcan region, as well as Alta and Baja Verapaz. Since the military had a very broad and paranoid conception of what a subversive was, these campaigns killed many and forced others seek refugee status in Chiapas, Mexico.318
Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 60; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3,1983, GU00903, Secret Intelligence Research Report, Guatemala's Guerrillas Retreating in the Face of Government Pressure, Pi, 7-8. 316 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 42. 317 Amnesty International, Guatemala, 96; McClintock, The American Connection, 258; Rios Montt's distaste for the guerrillas had a religious component as well. Rios Montt claimed that he was God's representative, and as such since the guerrilla groups and their supporters rejected his authority, they were also going against the will of God. David Stoll, "Evangelicals, Guerrillas, and the Army: The Ixil Triangle Under Rios Montt," in Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis, ed. by Robert M. Carmack (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 90-91; Efrain Rios Montt, "A Pacification Program for Guatemala," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 147. 318 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 24-25; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 257; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 7.

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Military units were principally sent to communities that were suspected of having a strong affiliation with the guerrillas. A respective rural community would be given a color classification that corresponded to the perceived level of guerrilla penetration in the area. The military believed that red communities were thoroughly penetrated by the influence of the guerrilla groups, so military campaigns in these areas sought to destroy all of the community's inhabitants. In pink and yellow villages the military principally used selective violence both to intimidate guerrilla sympathizers, and to encourage these subversives to seek refuge in other countries. On the other hand, green villages were largely not subjected to violence, but these communities were still monitored by the military.319 The goal of this stage of the counterinsurgency was to separate rural communities from the guerrillas, integrate members of the communities who were loyal to the military, and kill members of the guerrillas and their sympathizers because they were undermining the military's hegemony.320 After military operations were completed in a given community, the military and civil patrol forces would search the surrounding area for Mayans who had fled to avoid the violence. When security forces located the internal refugees they shot individuals who were thought to be subversives, and let everyone else live. In many cases the military's criteria for who should be considered a subversive was imprecise; on several occasions the military simply shot people who tried to evade capture. For those internal refugees who were not killed, security forces would relocate these individuals to holding centers or refugee camps. Afterward these refugees

Afflitto and Jesilow, The Quiet Revolutionaries, 25-26; Since the military's violence was directed at subversives, any violence against individuals or communities thought to be friendly to the military was punished harshly. Killing army collaborators undermined the military's interest in further integrating communities into the state under the army's rigid control. Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 171. Barry, Guatemala: The Politics of Counterinsurgency, 20.

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were typically relocated to a more permanent residence in villages thought to be loyal to

321

the government. In military terms, the rifles and beans program was a success. By late 1982 the combination of army assaults, scorched-earth destruction, and civil patrols had undermined the guerrilla groups, along with their social base of support in northwestern Guatemala. The government was able to extend its authority so it largely dominated areas that were formally under guerrilla control such as Chimaltenango, El Quiche, and Huehuetenango. Jim Handy thoughtfully pointed out that by the end of Rios Montt's

rule the military had destroyed village autonomy and dominated the rural economy. The military had effectively re-established its hegemonic status in the countryside by undermining the guerrillas, taking over rural leadership structures, and by ensuring that rural labor primarily benefited the national economy.323 Violence declined after Rios Montt was ousted from power since the guerrilla forces were nearly defeated by 1982. As a result, Mejia Victores relied less on massacres and more on selective assassinations and disappearances to attack guerrilla sympathizers and other subversives. In areas where guerrilla units no longer formed a large presence the military rebuilt villages under army control. However, in areas where the guerrilla groups were still popular, military tactics continued to involve massacres, scorched-earth tactics, and the forcible resettlement of internal refugees into military-controlled villages. By 1984 the guerrillas were largely isolated in the countryside, which led to a

Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 118-119. Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 60-61; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 29; Peralta, "The Hidden War," 159. 323 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 255. 324 Trudeau and Schoultz, "Guatemala," 40; Burgerman, Moral Victories, 57.

89 decline in human rights abuses.325 After the 1985 elections brought Vinicio Cerezo to power, he showed himself to be unable or unwilling to curb the military's power. His attempts to curtail them were largely superficial, including his disbanding of the Department of Technical Investigations (DIT). The DIT was the intelligence wing of the police department that was associated with the practice of assassinations and disappearances under the military government. His disbanding of the DIT was not significant because most of the former DIT members were transferred to other police units, and the military was in favour of shutting down this institution. Furthermore, Vinicio Cerezo did not open an investigation into the DIT's role in past repression, and only one member of the DIT was ever charged with a crime in connection to its repressive operations.326 Despite his modest attempts to demilitarize the police force and society more generally, Vinicio Cerezo enhanced the military's power by increasing the number of troops in the army from 51,600 to 60,000 between 1985 and 1991. Also, in terms of troops Vinicio Cerezo did allow the military to continue to engage in conscription, and many communities continued to participate in civil patrol duty.327 As a result of Vinicio Cerezo's passive approach to containing the excesses of the security services, human rights abuses were high under his administration. The military and the police continued to target individuals who threatened to investigate past human rights abuses, along with social activists. In 1987, Americas Watch claimed that under
325

Burgerman, Moral Victories, 57; Zarate, Forging Democracy, 68. Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 9; Jim Handy, "Democracy, Military Rule, and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala," in Central America: Democracy, Development, and Change, ed. by John M. Kirk and George W. Schuyler (New York, Westport, London: Praeger, 1988), 31. 327 James Dunkerley and Rachel Sieder, "The Military: The Challenge of Transition," in Central America: Fragile Transition, ed. by Rachel Sieder (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 1996), 84-85.
326

90 Vinicio Cerezo there were more than 100 instances of political murder every month.328 Although Vinicio Cerezo claimed he would not scrutinize abuses committed by the security forces prior to his presidency, he did claim he would aggressively investigate any human rights abuses committed during his tenure in office. Despite the pervasive

abuses by members of the military, none of its members were successfully imprisoned for committing a political crime. Vinicio Cerezo blamed the increasing social violence on the guerrillas and drug traffickers. He also claimed that the high number of disappearances was not the work of the security forces, but was the result of individuals running away from family disputes.330 Vinicio Cerezo's rhetoric on ensuring justice for those who were killed during his administration was replaced by calls to ignore past and present human rights violations so Guatemala could become a more integrated nation. The violence became so bad by the late 1980s that even the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala and the State Department, formerly ardent apologists for military violence, criticized the extent of human rights abuses in Guatemala. Despite the mounting evidence to the contrary, Vinicio Cerezo still claimed that the security forces were not responsible lor committing human rights abuses, a position he was widely criticized for."1 In terms of the military's continued counterinsurgenc> operations in the countryside, Vinicio Cerezo endorsed its war against guerrilla groups and popular movements. He aligned with the military by rejected repeated oilers b> representatives from the URNG to negotiate an end to hostilities in the countr\ side According to Vinicio
Jonas, "Elections and Transitions," 140; Zur, Violent Memories. } . (ian-ju. Stale Terrorism and the United States, 56; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 68. 329 Jonas, "Elections and Transitions," 140; Barry, Inside Guatemala. ^ VW 330 Barry, Inside Guatemala, 33-35; Amnesty International, Guatemala. MM I. 331 Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 77-78. 331 Booth and Walker, Undcr.stamiini; Central America, 4647; Rodolfo Paiz Andrade, "Guatemala 1978-1993: The Incomplete Process of the Transition to Democracy," Democratic Transitions in Central America, ed. by Jorge I. Dominguc/ and Marc Lindenberg (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 155.
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Cerezo, he would not consider negotiating with the guerrillas, and the only way for the guerrilla war to end was through force, or if the guerrillas accepted the government's amnesty offer. Since the amnesty was disadvantageous to the guerrilla groups, the fighting continued.332 By continuing its war in the countryside under civilian leadership, the military was able to maintain its hegemony by other means. Having a freely elected civilian president in power legitimized the counterinsurgency as the military could now legitimately claim that its counterinsurgency was legal, where the guerrillas were fighting outside of the law. Since the military was now fighting a legal counterinsurgency, this deprived the guerrillas of an important justification for its conflict with the military - that the military government was an imposed order without a legal justification to conduct a war. The military also used Vinicio Cerezo to absorb criticism from domestic and international sources regarding Guatemala's declining economy, human rights abuses, and the lack of domestic reforms.333 In 1987, the military conducted a major operation called Campaign Plan 1987. According to Colonel Terraza Pinot, the military planned to uphold the democratic order by destroying the remaining guerrilla units, and by continuing to occupy the countryside.334 The military conducted operations against the guerrillas and popular organizations in Huehuetenango and El Quiche. Massacres and scorched-earth destruction of houses and crops was also utilized during this military campaign. This generalized violence against potential supporters of the guerrillas created a large number of civilian casualties.335
332

Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 247-248. Schirmer, "The Looting of Democratic Discourse by the Guatemalan Military," 88-91. 334 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 7-8, 12. 335 Handy, "Democracy, Military Rule, and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala," 31-32; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 247-248, 255, 263; Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996, 29; Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 76-82.
333

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After Vinicio Cerezo left power, the military continued to use violence against the leaders of popular organizations and political parties. Violence was also directed at Communities of Population in Resistance, which were nomadic communities that were hiding from the military. Furthermore, the military used massacres to attack refugees

who returned to their communities. While massacres were primarily conducted from 1981 to 1983, the military did continue to commit massacres until 1995.337 Even after signing the peace accords in 1996, lawlessness and vigilante justice, especially in the form of acts of lynching, became the norm.338 Members of the security forces continued to target social activists, judges who refused to uphold military interests, and women.339 Furthermore, violence was also used for "social cleansings, targeting delinquents and randomly killing poor urban youths on the chance that they might belong to gangs." After studying the murder rate in Guatemala after the civil war. the World Bank concluded that compared to the U.S. Guatemala had a murder rate that was approximately fourteen times as numerous.340 Since its inception, the Guatemalan military took part in a coalition with members of the economic elite first as a junior partner, then as a senior partner after the guerrilla war began in the 1960s.341 Military force was directed at violent and non-violent organizations that threatened its hegemony by calling for changes in the exploitive
United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.html (accessed October 10th, 2009), paragraph 27; North and Simmons, "Fear and Hope," 12-13. 337 Burgerman, Moral Victories, 73; May, '"Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny,'" 77; Francisco Goldman, The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed the Bishop (New York: Grove Press, 2007), 22; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 256-257. 338 Afflitto and Jesilow, The Quiet Revolutionaries, 9. 339 Jonas, "Guatemala," 292-293. 340 Goldman, The Art of Political Murder, 337; Luciak, After The Revolution, 239-240. 341 Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 284; Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala: Crisis and Response," 52; Jonas and Walker, "Guatemala," 4.
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economic, political, and social systems that were disadvantageous to the poor, particularly Mayan agricultural workers. Since the military still targeted non-violent social activists after the peace accords were signed, this helps to prove that military violence was in part directed at community organizations because they were agents of change, and not because they were perceived to have a connection to the guerrillas. However, while violence was used by the military systematically through its history to subdue protests directed at the elites, the military did not rely exclusively on force to discourage reform or revolutionary change, but they also provided concessions and ideological indoctrination to the lower classes to meet this end. This idea will be explored in greater depth in the following chapter.

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Building Hegemony in Rural Guatemala As a result of the guerrilla war in the early 1960s, the military attained hegemonic status. Military officials used the military's conflict with the guerrillas as a means to justify the further militarization of the state, particularly in terms of political structures.342 By the mid-1960s, the military required that any political party that was running for elected office must have its political program accepted by the military. In practice, this typically involved the military selecting a candidate for president and negotiating with one or more of the right-wing political parties so this candidate could run under the label of an established party. As a result, from 1966 to 1985 political party officials needed to be accepted by the military, and in many cases these political representatives came from a military background. If someone tried to gain elected office without being properly vetted by the military, they were commonly exiled or assassinated.343 Even under the civilian rule of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, who was President from 1966-1970, the military demanded autonomy for its counterinsurgency operations, and military interests dominated his term in office.344 By the mid-1960s the military was unrivalled as a hegemonic institution because the economic elite and labour unions lacked unity, and the Catholic Church did not play a significant role in urban political structures.345

Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 284; Gleijeses, "Guatemala: Crisis and Response," 52; Jonas and Walker, "Guatemala," 4. 343 Susan Burgerman, "Making Peace Perform in War-Transition Countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua," in Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States, ed. by Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Robert L. Ayres (Washington, 2006), 258; Burgerman, Moral Victories, 54; Rouquie, "Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military Dominated Polities in Latin American," 455. 344 Calvert and Calvert, "The Military and Development," 181; Jonas and Walker, "Guatemala," 7. 345 Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 104; The economic elite became a junior partner to the military in part because they became divided by changes to the Guatemalan economy in the 1960s and 1970s. While coffee production was still an important source of wealth in the economy, as a result of the Central American Common Market in the 1960s cotton and sugar production increased substantially in Guatemala. In addition, foreign companies put a great deal of capital into extracting oil and nickel in Guatemala. Since industry, commerce, and finance had become important components of

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Furthermore, it can be speculated that Mayan members of the rural commercial middle class likely supported the military in the 1960s as they were enthusiastic military supporters in the mid-1970s.346 To use Gramscian terminology, the military had successfully constructed a hegemonic bloc as the other classes in Guatemala largely consented to the military's control over political and civil society.347 With its newfound political power, the military engaged in state-building to align the rural inhabitants behind the military. An important component of this plan was to pressure the rural Mayans to embrace Ladino culture and values in order to integrate Mayans into the state. Since there was mutual animosity between Mayans and Ladinos348, and Mayans tended to feel allegiance to their local community rather than to the state, neither the Ladinos nor the Mayans believed that Guatemala was a nation in any meaningful sense.349 Military strategists under Rios Montt and Mejia Victores were explicit about the need for ladinization so Guatemala could finally become a nation. For instance, General Hector Gramajo stated that "Guatemala is not yet a nation and we are still in a phase of nation-building." Military officers believed that in order for Guatemala's economic capacity to expand, Mayan backwardness needed to be corrected. Poverty was not interpreted as being the result of centuries of brutal exploitation of the

Guatemala's economy, this led to divisions within the economic elite. Peralta, "The Militarization of the Guatemalan State," 117. 346 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 39. 7 Gramsci, Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks, xii, 357; Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International Publishers, 2000), 124-125. 348 It was common for Mayans to adopt a discriminatory attitude towards the Ladinos as the Ladinos were accused of being brutish and disrespectful of indigenous ways of life. Menchu and the Committee of Campesino Unity, "Weaving Our Future," 49; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 140141. 349 Menchu and the Committee of Campesino Unity, "Weaving Our Future," 49; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 140-141.

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Maya by Ladinos, but instead was associated with Mayan culture and values.350 In Guatemala the labels "Ladino" and "Mayan" were not considered racial categories so much as cultural and value-based ones. As a result, the military encouraged the Mayans to adopt Ladino culture, particularly in terms of wearing European-style clothing, espousing Spanish customs, assuming a Spanish diet, and speaking Spanish. However, the degree of ethnic flexibility varied by area; in some places a person would still be considered a Mayan even if they adopted Spanish customs or became wealthier.351 Representatives from the military stated that the best means to ladinize the Mayan population was through civic action programs and military service. According to Hilde Hey, these social programs included "adult education, building schools, digging wells for drinking water, health care and construction of roads".352 Another commonly used civic action program was teaching the Mayans Spanish. By 1982, the military was giving Spanish lessons to 455,000 Mayan children; the military mainly initiated these programs in areas where the military fought against the guerrillas. In terms of military service, it was believed that if Mayans were soldiers under ladino officers that they would embrace Ladino culture. After their compulsory military service was complete, the officers hoped the Mayans would inculcate their villages with the Ladino culture they had learned.353 In other words, military officials believed that military service and encouraging ladinization would make the Mayan inhabitants more sympathetic to the military, which would help them win the counterinsurgency, and maintain control over rural Guatemala after the war.

350

Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004),

55-56. Calvert, Guatemala, 21-22; Peter Wade, Race and Ethnicity in Latin America (London and Sterling: Pluto Press, 1997), 45. 352 Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 140-144, 146. 353 Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 140-144, 146; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 260.
51

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Outside of the military, calls for ladinization were also coming from intellectual circles. Non-Indian intellectuals who wrote on the divisions between Mayans and nonMayans believed that before Guatemala could be modernized, Mayan groups needed to give up the cultural and social practices that made them backward. These intellectuals claimed that Mayan cultural practices retarded national development and also hurt the state's racial unity.354 In his work, Gramsci claimed that organic intellectuals exist in order to reinforce the ideas and values of whichever class they speak on behalf of. In this case, the intellectuals are propagating the social and cultural ideals that are shared by many members of the economic and military elite.355 These intellectuals were effectively adding credence to the racist notion that Mayans were inferior to Ladinos, and they needed to be ladinized before Guatemala could become a modern state. During the counterinsurgency, military officials also tried to cultivate support for the military in the countryside through social programs. Although Lucas Garcia's war in the countryside did not make extensive use of social programs as a counterinsurgency tactic, near the end of his presidency Lucas Garcia changed course and decided that conducting a counterinsurgency based mainly on military force uas inefficient and counterproductive. For one thing, the heavy focus on force w . as thought partially

responsible for pushing communities into the arms of the guerrillas It u as with these

Carol A. Smith, "Introduction: Social Relations in Guatemala met I inn. anil Space," in Guatemalan Indians and the State 1540 to 1988, ed. by Carol A. Smith anil Manlvn M Moors (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 5. 55 Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings, 118. 356 In some cases, however, the Lucas Garcia administration used ci\ ic action in an attempt to win over the rural population. Ricardo Falla pointed out that in the Ixcan the mihtar\ was involved in the local cooperative movement, and it transported some of the agricultural products made h\ the rural inhabitants to nearby areas. Nevertheless, the author noted that the military made less use of en K action after the Sandinista revolution occurred, and it stopped almost completely when the military began its scorchedearth campaign against the guerrillas in the area in April 1981. Ricardo Falla. Massacres in the Jungle: Ixcan, Guatemala, 1975-1982 (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). 182.

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concerns in mind that Juan Fernando Cifuentes submitted his proposal called "Operation Ixil" which called for the military to continue its battle tactics, but also focus more attention on gaining the consent of the population through social programs. Juan Cifuentes believed that the popularity of the guerrilla groups had expanded substantially because these groups told the Mayans that if they supported the guerrillas that their long history of oppression could be overturned. The Operation Ixil proposal suggested that the military relay a similar message of hope, and follow through on this message by setting up more social programs under the military-controlled organization the Section of Civilian Affairs and Community Development (S-5). The S-5 units would have sweeping authority, which included its control over "civil government, legal affairs, public security, public health, social welfare, public finance, education, labor, commercial and industrial activity, agriculture, price controls and rationing, property registers, supplies, public works, communications, transport, information and broadcasting (in conjunction with Army psychological operations, or 'Psyops'), and displaced persons."357 After conducting its military operations from late 1981 to early 1982, the military set up S-5 units in the Ixil Triangle, the department of Alta Verapaz, and Huehuetenango. It was hoped that by increasing access to military-sponsored social programs that communities would offer their allegiance to the Guatemalan state, and would only take part in community organizations that the military supported.358 Despite Lucas Garcia's change in counterinsurgency tactics, younger officers within the military were organizing a coup against him because his counterinsurgency tactics were hurting the army's domestic and international hegemony. Many members of

Black, "Under The Gun," 14-16. George Black, "Under The Gun," 14-16.

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the military believed that his policies were increasing army casualties, turning the army into a pariah on the international stage, and fracturing the army's unity. In terms of the guerrilla war, the younger officers saw that rural communities were aligning themselves with the increasingly well-organized guerrilla groups, and without a change in tactics, the military might not quell the guerrilla forces. There was great fear among the younger officers that its war against left-wing subversion would escalate into a full-scale civil war. Lucas Garcia's policies were blamed for the significant casualty rates in the field in large part because his counterinsurgency was mainly focused on using force, rather than pursuing anti-poverty initiatives in the countryside that would alleviate social support for the guerrillas.359 Furthermore, they felt that corruption by members of the high command was leading to equipment shortages as money earmarked for military resources was squandered by the elites.360 The army was also experiencing equipment shortages as a result of its international isolation. The brutal counterinsurgency tactics had made Guatemala unable to purchase some essential equipment, such as helicopter spare parts from the United States. Since the junior officers believed that the only way to win the guerrilla war was to receive more aid from the United States, they wanted to reform army tactics so the Guatemalan military was seen as a legitimate institution by the U.S. government and the global community more generally.361 As a result of these grievances, the junior officers planned a coup that would allow them to engage in direct military rule. They claimed that without their leadership the army might lose the counterinsurgency, which would likely fracture the military, and cause its legitimacy as a social institution to
Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 115; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 159. 360 Millett, "The Central American Militaries," 213; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 182. 361 Black, "Under The Gun," 11; Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 93-94; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 182.
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decline. These junior officers believed that the military must protect its hegemony because otherwise there would be no group left in Guatemala that could adequately govern.362 These junior officers also felt compelled to organize a coup because the Lucas Garcia regime's widespread corruption was delegitimizing the military government's hegemony at home and abroad. Military elites took part in many economic projects in order to receive kickbacks from these endeavours. This was particularly the case with the construction and maintenance of hydroelectric dams, ports, and highways. The

extensive and increasingly public corruption of the Lucas Garcia administration led sections of the military and business elite to lose faith in his regime. Corruption was one of the stated reasons for Rios Montt's coup in March 1982, and he reinforced this idea by firing several corrupt military officials from public office.364 Lucas Garcia's corruption was also evident during the 1982 elections as Lucas Garcia loyalists perpetuated an electoral fraud to give his political ally General Angel

Black, "Under The Gun," 11; Schirmer, "The Looting of Democratic Discourse by the Guatemalan Military," 87-88; Although the most important sources of dissatisfaction came from the powerful economic elites and the military, there were other social groups in Guatemala that wanted Lucas Garcia and his allies out of power. Lucas Garcia's brutal counterinsurgency tactics were off-putting to both members of the middle class and the Catholic Church. Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 53. 363 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 174; Berryman, Christians in Guatemala's Struggle, 38; Cesar D. Sereseres, "The Guatemalan Legacy: Radical Challenges and Military Politics," in Report on Guatemala: Central America and Caribbean Program, ed. by School of Advanced International Studies (Boulder and London, 1985), 38. 364 Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 113; McClintock, The American Connection, 224-225; Raymond Bonner, "A Guatemalan General's Rise To Power," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 126; In terms of anticorruption, later in his term Rios Montt used the slogan "I don't steal, lie, or abuse [power]" to indicate how his administration differed from Lucas Garcia's. He propagated this slogan, along with other ideas that highlighted the need to fight against cowardice and opportunism in order to win the counterinsurgency. State employees under Rios Montt were forced to wear an "oath of honesty" which had Rios Montt's slogan on it. In a similar vein, the soldiers under Rios Montt were also given a handbook that encouraged the soldiers to be courteous and respectful to the local populations during counterinsurgency operations. The handbook also discouraged theft, bribery and property destruction. Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 122, 126; Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 62-63.

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Anibal Guevara the presidency. However, the blatant nature of the fraud caused vocal protests in the military and in society at large. Shortly after the elections on March 9th, the military, now aligned with some members of the political elite, overthrew Angel Guevara and installed a three-man junta, headed principally by Rios Montt.365 The junta members justified their actions in a radio address from the National Palace by saying "[Given] the situation to which the country has been taken by means of the practice of fraudulent elections, accompanied by the deterioration of moral values, the splintering of democratic forces, as well as the disorder and corruption in public administration, it has become impossible to resolve these problems within a constitutional framework. All of which makes it imperative that the Army assume the government of the Republic."366 The junta members claimed they would also curb the influence of the death squads.367 After there were increasing tensions within the junta, on June 9th Rios Montt decided to dissolve it and take control of the state. Within the military, Rios Montt's

decision to dissolve the junta was seen favourably because he recognized the importance of implementing social programs and using psychological warfare to win over the rural inhabitants. As well, Rios Montt was respected for being a career soldier whose actions were guided principally by anticommunist ideology. In other words, Rios Montt and the young officers shared an ideological outlook, so the young officers believed he was wellsuited for the job. Since the Guatemalan military had gained near autonomy in Guatemala's political life, no other institution had the power to resist Rios Montt's palace
365

Coats worth, Central America and the United States, 191; Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 45-46; Jim Handy, "Resurgent Democracy and the Guatemalan Military," Journal of Latin American Studies 18, 2 (November 1986), 402. 366 Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 108. 367 Amnesty International, Guatemala, 54-55. 368 Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 117; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 133; Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, 493.

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coup in any meaningful way. With Rfos Montt now firmly in control, he went about militarizing the state even further. At a National Forum, which was organized by the Private Enterprise Council of Guatemala, a military spokesman explained that Rfos Montt wanted the military to fulfill an authoritarian revolution because the military had the nation's interests at heart. Military officials wanted to expand the military's institutional reach into the countryside, and in the process increase the legitimacy of these military-dominated institutions.370 At the same National Forum, General Hector Gramajo elaborated that after Rfos Montt's coup the military officers were trying to move Guatemala towards democracy through its control of major economic, political and social institutions. He said that if the military had not taken over the government then Guatemala would have devolved into factionalism because no other institution or combination of institutions had the power or the vision to remake Guatemala from the top-down.371 The military leaders had an elitist conception of the role of the military, which was articulated clearly by Rfos Montt in a national speech. He said "[W]e do not want them to come and congratulate us. Do not even come near us. We are professional soldiers, and we are in a political and social position to guarantee you Guatemalans a future within the framework of peace, tranquility and justice." With its goal of remaking Guatemala to suit the military's

interests, the military took control of social security, emergency services, prisons, and education among other institutions. Furthermore, military officers now controlled half of

Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 137; Peralta, "The Development of Military Autonomy and Corporateness in Central America," 164, 168. Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 1-2 371 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 1-2. 372 Jose Efrafn Rfos Montt, "Speech by General Jose Efrafn Rfos Montt," in The Politics of Antipolitics, ed. by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies (Wilmington, 1997), 214.

369

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all senior cabinet positions.373 Rios Montt further militarized the state in July by firing 324 village mayors in order to replace them with individuals who were loyal to the military. The mayoral appointees that Rios Montt sought to put in power were threatened with legal sanctions if they did not take their positions in the countryside. This measure had two important intentions. First, it allowed Rios Montt to use his anti-corruption crusade as a means to undermine other political parties in Guatemala as the mayors who were replaced largely came from parties not directly controlled by the military. Second, as Rios Montt was determined to fulfill an authoritarian revolution, he wanted to eliminate rural government structures that were outside of the military's control. By replacing the local mayors who were elected in free municipal elections he effectively undermined relatively autonomous local government structures.374 The military also expanded its control over rural Guatemala by increasing the number of military bases in the highlands and the southern coast. Its stated objectives were to secure the countryside from subversive elements, to gain the allegiance of the population, and to protect important economic investments. After Rios Montt fell from power, the Mejia Victores administration continued the work of its successor by expanding the military's presence in the highlands and southern coast, and by establishing military bases in other important areas such as municipal capitals and model villages.375 Despite the military's increasing control over Guatemalan society, the military's direct control over major political structures was always meant to be a temporary, albeit
Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 137-138; Black, "Under The Gun," 12. Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 62-63; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 138; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 261. 375 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 230; Krueger and Enge, Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands, VI.
374 373

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open-ended commitment. Rios Montt intended to hold elections, but only after the rebel groups had been destroyed, rural regions were economically, socially, and racially integrated into the state, and the military had successfully entrenched its role as a hegemonic institution in Guatemala. John Booth and Thomas W. Walker pointed out that despite paying lip service to the idea of having free elections, Rios Montt likely did not intend to have elections because he undermined other political parties and increased army control over the electoral process.376 However, these seemingly contradictory signals coming from Rios Montt can be more accurately interpreted as his attempt to make sure that after free federal elections brought a civilian candidate to power that the army's influence would remain paramount. During an internal military discussion, Rios Montt informed army commanders that national elections would be postponed until after Guatemala's economic problems were resolved, something he thought would take approximately seven years to accomplish.377 With Rios Montt's decision to remain head of stale indefinitely, he set about gaining the consent of the population by passing an amncst\ decree that benefited both members of the armed forces, and to alesser extent, individuals who were affiliated with the guerrilla groups. In terms of the guerrillas, Rios Montt claimed that the decree would allow the rebels to rejoin civic life without having to serve jail time lor their crimes against the state. According to Rios Montt, if the amnesty was accepted by both the

Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 46; An electoral relorm thai undermined the established non-military parties was a decree which stated that a political parn would he officially recognized with fewer signatures on its application than had been required pre\ n>u\l\ This allowed a flood of new parties to come onto the scene, which diluted the social support for the established political parties. Robert Trudeau, "Guatemalan Election of 1985: Prospects for Democracy," in Elections and Democracy in Central America, ed. by John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (Chapel Hill and London, 1989), 101-102. 377 Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 121.

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armed forces and the guerrillas, then Guatemala would be able to achieve social peace.378 Members of the military had every reason to endorse the amnesty program because it excluded them from prosecution if they committed any crime while they were conducting counterinsurgency operations. This amnesty was applied to both crimes committed in the past, as well as crimes that might occur in the future.379 However, the amnesty offer was not nearly as enticing for members of the guerrillas. If they chose to comply with the amnesty program, the guerrilla members were ordered to give their weapons to either a representative of the Guatemalan Red Cross, or else bring them to a nearby military post by the end of June. Representatives from the guerrilla organizations instructed their followers to not accept the terms of the amnesty because its intention was not to integrate the guerrillas back into society but to protect members of the military from prosecution. Guerrilla combatants were clearly suspicious of the amnesty as less than 300 people surrendered their arms, although army sources falsely claimed that 2,000 people accepted its amnesty by June 30th. Individuals affiliated with the guerrillas were correct to be suspicious; those who turned themselves in to local military authorities were typically kidnapped and tortured by the army. Furthermore, the amnesty was used as a public relations tool to blame the guerrillas for any further violence that occurred as a result of the counterinsurgency. As Rios Montt explained during a speech to the Guatemalan Managers' Association "The amnesty gives us the juridical framework for

Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 85. Despite the amnesty program's implication that members of the security forces were committing crimes against civilians, curiously the minister of defense Mejia Victores claimed that this was not the case. In an interview Mejia Victores stated that no member of the military had used violence against non-combatants, and that the sources that claimed otherwise were front groups for international communism. Dana Martin and Nina Schwarzschild, "Appendix Five: 1983 Update: The Militarization of Rural Development," in Witness to Political Violence in Guatemala: The Suppression of a Rural Development Movement, ed. by Shelton H. Davis and Julie Hodson (Boston, 1983), 5.
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killing...anyone who refuses to surrender will be shot."380 By characterizing the amnesty in this way, Rios Montt was propagating the idea that the government was benevolent and looking out for the best interests of the lower classes, which would increase the military's hegemony.381 After the amnesty expired on June 30th, Rios Montt declared a state of siege that was implemented nationally, although mainly enforced in areas that guerrilla groups operated in, most notably El Quiche, Huehuetenango, San Marcos, and Quezaltenango. The state of siege eliminated fundamental human rights such as habeas corpus as well as restrictions against unlawful search and seizure. Rfos Montt also established special military tribunals that ruled on cases involving newly illegal political offenses. The military tribunals issued the death penalty for political crimes such as using non-official military sources to discuss the rural counterinsurgency in the press, possessing a large amount of weapons, and taking part in actions deemed to be terrorism by the state.382 Military officers claimed that the civilian courts were largely impotent when it came to prosecuting members of the guerrillas due to legal restrictions, and because judicial authorities were being intimidated and kidnapped by the guerrilla groups. The special tribunals gave the military the opportunity to combat alleged subversion within the bounds of the law. According to Rios Montt "We invited the [subversives] to lay down their arms. We had military encounters, there was a war.. .Later, we legalized a concept of special powers because the violence did not permit us to impart justice. And we

Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 85; Nelson, Taylor, and Kruger, Witness to Genocide, 8; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 135. 381 Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 126. 382 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, December 1983, GU00990, Secret Intelligence Summary, Military Intelligence Summary, Volume VIIILatin America, PI; Amnesty International, Guatemala, 55-56; McClintock, The American Connection, 231.

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gathered up the assassins and criminals, we judged them and we shot them, but in accordance with the law." In practice the tribunals often did not target the guerrillas, but they functioned to attack common criminals, the poor, and members of the police and military under Lucas Garcia who were corrupt or excessively violent. However, the military still maintained that the tribunals were prosecuting members of the guerrilla groups, so most defendants before these tribunals were identified as guerrillas.383 During these proceedings, the defendants usually had inadequate access to counsel, and confessions they made while being tortured were admissible as evidence. Amnesty International documented that the military tribunals killed at least 15 people from September 1982 to March 1983.384 A principal concern of Rios Montt's regime was to integrate the Mayans civically, economically, and racially. In terms of civic integration, Rios Montt stipulated that Mayan delegates join the Council of State, an institution that had representatives from the military, economic elite, along with professional bodies that were non-political. The Council of State served to provide feedback to Rios Montt on potential legislation. The Mayan delegates were not chosen by their communities but were appointed by the National Reconstruction Committee. The Committee only nominated Mayans who were seen as sympathetic to the military. Mayan participation on the Council of State is a great example of what Rios Montt's administration tried to accomplish: they wanted the Mayans to integrate further into the state, but only in a subordinate position. Since the Council of State had no practical function and merely served to advise the military

Jennifer Schirmer, "Universal and Sustainable Human Rights? Special Tribunals in Guatemala," in Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. by Richard A. Wilson (London and Sterling, 1997), 163-167. 384 Amnesty International, Guatemala, 102-104.

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hierarchy, the military could easily dominate the Mayans on the council but at the same time increase its legitimacy in Mayan communities by claiming that it was offering more opportunities for Mayan political representation.385 In civic and racial terms, the military under Rfos Montt was engaged in a nationalization drive that sought to ladinize the Mayans in order to make Guatemala into a more cohesive nation. The military elites knew that with the lack of aid coming from the United States that it was not financially viable to expand the number of troops in order to occupy the countryside. Instead the military thought victory against the guerrillas would occur if the military could win the hearts and minds of the rural inhabitants. Rfos Montt claimed that the guerrilla groups were becoming more powerful because historically the Mayan groups had been ignored by the central government.386 According to Rfos Montt, Guatemala's internal security would be assured if there was mutual trust between the government and the people, so Rfos Montt decided to propagate nationalist sentiment and encourage civic action programs to meet this end. Defense minister Mejfa Victores said that racial integration was essential to this nationalism drive as he wanted to eliminate an indigenous identity in order to replace it with a sense of Guatemalan nationalism. Rfos Montt infused his own religious fundamentalism into this nationalism drive by suggesting that the state should encourage the preservation of both the traditional family and Christian values.387 National integration was accomplished by

Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 138; Unknown, "The Rios Montt Regime," in Report on Guatemala: Central America and Caribbean Program, ed. by School of Advanced International Studies (Boulder and London, 1985), 6; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3, 1983, GU00903, Secret Intelligence Research Report, Guatemala's Guerrillas Retreating in the Face of Government Pressure, Pi, 7-8. 86 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 37; Calvert, Guatemala, 111; Nelson, Taylor, and Kruger, Witness to Genocide, 10. 387 Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 109; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 140; Montt, "A Pacification Program for Guatemala," 146-147.

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forcing Mayans to speak Spanish instead of Mayan languages, by preventing them from wearing their traditional clothing, and by not allowing them to take part in traditional religious fiestas.388 The military pursued its authoritarian revolution by expanding military institutions into the countryside. Aside from combat objectives, the military had three main aims in the countryside. First, they wanted to initiate top-down reforms to prepare the rural inhabitants for civilian elections. However, they wanted to justify the prominent role of the military so that any civilian political party would need to establish a partnership with the military in order to rule. Second, the military wanted to maintain more control over the economy in order to lessen poverty in the countryside, and to prevent guerrilla sabotage of important rural production centers. Third, the military tried to reeducate the population to reject the ideas of the guerrilla movement and instead embrace anticommunism, and by extension, recognize the importance of the military in its fight against forces of international communism.389 In essence, the military required that a large amount of financial and human resources be utilized in order to reorganize the countryside to embrace its role in the Guatemalan state. The rationale behind this tactic was best illustrated by Colonel Hugo Alvarez who said that the military must engage in total war because the guerrilla groups had permeated into every level of society. As a result, in order to ensure national security the military took a leading role in precipitating national development.390 Military strategists believed that the Committee for National Reconstruction was

Black, "Under The Gun," 21; Nelson, Taylor, and Kruger, Witness to Genocide, 14. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 24-25. 390 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 3; Black, "Under The Gun," 13.
389

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an essential institution for its counterinsurgency because it encouraged the population to view the military's actions in the countryside as positive. In 1978, the CRN expanded the number of social programs in the countryside in fields such as health, education, housing, finance, and infrastructure development. Under Rfos Montt, the role of the CRN expanded as it was given control over the development side of the counterinsurgency effort. It initiated the Plan of Assistance to Conflict Areas (PAAC) which directed international resources from the World Food Program and other sources to assist in Guatemala's reconstruction. The CRN also helped to organize the Inter-Institutional Coordinating Committees (IICCs) under Mejia Victores, and they worked closely with the S-5 units to design the model villages. With these combined functions, the CRN was at the center of the military's development plan.391 Another important organization that enforced the military's will in the countryside was the S-5. When internally displaced refugees were found by the military or the civil patrols, they were presented to members of the S-5 units who sent them to a village that was under the government's control. The S-5 worked in conjunction with the CRN to organize work projects, distribute resources to local residents, organize and train the civil patrol units, and control the re-education process.392 Under Mejia Victores, the S-5 units were also put in charge of maintaining the development poles.393 The military used the CRN and S-5 to integrate rural communities further into the state. In particular, according to Colonel Mario Rene Enriquez Morales, it was a stated goal of the military to create a new class of leaders and bureaucrats in rural communities who embraced the army's

391

Morales, "Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990," 120-121; Black, "Under The Gun," Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 75. Barry, Guatemala: The Politics of Counterinsurgency, 25.

20-21.

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counterinsurgency goals.394 This objective is very much in keeping with counterinsurgency strategy as political or military elites are supposed to train local administrators to run social programs and ensure that revolutionary activity is curbed in rural areas.395 Evidently the military wanted local leaders who would remain loyal to the military even after elections brought civilian politicians to power. Rios Montt increased the legitimacy of his development drive by involving evangelical Christian missionaries in its implementation. Ribs Montt gave support to these groups because he had a religious affiliation to the fundamentalist sect Del Verbo. As a result, the military aligned themselves with evangelical missionaries, and attacked Catholic workers because they were viewed as subversives.396 This perspective was also widely endorsed by members of the middle and upper classes. These classes were uneasy with Ribs Montt's fundamentalist faith as they were more comfortable with political elites in Guatemala espousing orthodox Catholic ideals. However, there was widespread agreement that rural catechists should be attacked because thc\ were closely aligned with the guerrillas. Rios Montt's faith was also not very controversial at the lime because the sect Del Verbo only accounted for 1,000 members of Guatemala's 1.3 million Protestant believers.397 Officials from evangelical organizations, most nouhlv Pat Robertson, provided rhetorical support for Rios Montt's policies. Robert son claimed that Rios Montt moralized his domestic policies in an effort to help ordinary Guatemalans and prevent the spread of oppressive Soviet communism. Other evangelical officials ai:reed with this

Barry, Guatemala: The Politics of Counterinsurgency, 3: While. Tin M.THW. 122: Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democrats, < v John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Siriita;\ of Counterinsurgency (St. Petersburg and Florida: Hailer Publishing, 1966), 98. 396 Jeffrey Klaiber, The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1998), 221; White, The Morass, 122; Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus. 494-495. 397 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, 494-495.

394

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characterization by claiming that reports of human rights abuses under Rios Montt were either overstated, or the result of disinformation by left-wing groups. Protestant groups also sent out a booklet in the countryside claiming that Rios Montt was "the savior of Guatemala".398 The evangelical missionaries were part of the intellectual class in Guatemala since they propagated the virtues of Rios Montt's rule in order to uphold the
5QQ

status quo. Protestant missionaries also provided funding, and took part in social programs in the countryside. In terms of funding, Rios Montt claimed that the expenses of the development side of his counterinsurgency strategy should not concern the Guatemalan government because the missionaries had pledged to give the government billions of dollars to support its efforts. Although this funding actually ended up being millions rather than billions of dollars, the Protestants were still important financial contributors to Guatemala's nationalization drive. Hundreds of American evangelical missionaries

converged into the Guatemalan countryside to assist in community development projects. According to Beatriz Manz, the evangelical relief organization Foundation for Aid to the Indian People provided resources to support military programs such as "food relief, Food-for-Work, road construction, and model village aspects of the army's counterinsurgency plan."401 A military coup overthrew Rios Montt because the military's hegemony was
Klaiber, The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America, 220; Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 62; Stoll, "Evangelicals, Guerrillas, and the Army," 91-92; Berryman, Stubborn Hope, 121; However, Protestant groups were not united in their support for Rios Montt. A Guatemalan Protestant group called Evangelic Confraternity accused Rios Montt of purposely misleading Protestant officials into believing that his policies were just. They pointed out that Rios Montt's inhumane methods violated Christian teachings, and they rejected his use of religious jargon to legitimize his counterinsurgency strategies. Berryman, Stubborn Hope, 121. 399 Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings, 44. 400 White, The Morass, 96; Stoll, "Evangelicals, Guerrillas, and the Army," 91-92. 401 Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 62; Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 98.
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undermined by Rios Montt's violent counterinsurgency, his hesitancy to have civilian elections, and his endorsement of the military tribunals. His brutal counterinsurgency campaign was well known in the international community, and in order to enhance their status as legitimate leaders in Guatemala, a new military leader needed to be installed. The violence in the countryside became so objectionable that in June 1983 garrison commanders in Quezaltenango, Huehuetenango, San Marcos and Santa Cruz del Quiche protested the counterinsurgency tactics, and in some cases refused to carry out certain operations demanded by Rios Montt. Military officials realized that if they replaced Rios Montt with a head of state that was seen as legitimate on the international stage, they could shed their pariah image and acquire military aid from the United States. Relations between Rios Montt and the U.S. had soured slightly after he refused to join a coalition of Central American militaries in CONDECA, which was dedicated to overthrowing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.402 The military officials behind the coup, along with members of the economic elite, wanted civilian elections to occur in Guatemala. In terms of the military, they thought that civilian elections would legitimize the military's counterinsurgency, which would help them to facilitate American aid.403 The military elites were also hoping that with a civilian government in power that other countries would be more willing to trade with Guatemala, and a more stable economic environment would encourage greater capital investments. Furthermore, having civilians in power would allow the military to focus on conducting its counterinsurgency operations rather than continuing the burdensome task
Handy, "Resurgent Democracy and the Guatemalan Military," 404; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 153-154; McClintock, The American Connection, 237. 403 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, May 14, 1984, GU01013, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Guatemala: Central American Policy and U.S. Relations, P2-4, 7-8.
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of managing the economy.404 The decision of these military officials was also influenced by pressure from the economic elites to allow free elections in the near future.405 Mejia Victores also stopped the military tribunals because they were criticized in the international community for their ability to carry out capital punishment, the secrecy of the trials, and having the appearance of being show trials. Most importantly, Rios Montt put six prisoners on trial shortly before a visit by Pope John Paul U. The Pope asked for clemency for the six individuals, but to no avail. Shortly before the Pope's arrival, the prisoners were executed. Vatican radio criticized Rios Montt's decision, particularly his use of religious arguments to justify the executions. The Guatemalan military was pressured by the European parliament, the Inter-American Commission, U.S. Congress, and the State Department to end the Special Tribunals. Mejia Victores buckled under the international criticism and decided to end the Special Tribunals within a few days of taking power.406 Since military elites planned to organize elections soon, military development programs were expanded in the countryside in an attempt to gain consent for its continued hegemony under civilian rule. Mejia Victores endorsed the plan Firmness 83 as the basis for his counterinsurgency. The plan allowed the military to gain greater control over all private and public institutions involved in social services and development in the countryside.407 The military commander in a conflict zone had authority over all military

Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 158; McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State," 142-143. 405 Trudeau and Schoultz, "Guatemala," 39; Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, 497-498; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 186; White, The Morass, 126. 406 Schirmer, "Universal and Sustainable Human Rights," 163-165, 169-171. 407 This control over development was extended even further in November 1984 when a law was put on the books which granted the military nearly complete control over all projects that involved reconstruction or development in the countryside. Beatriz Manz, "Dollars That Forge Guatemalan Chains,"

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and civil issues. Any order that the commander gave to private or public institutions had to be followed or else the individual, and in some cases the institution itself, was considered subversive.408 Under Firmness 83, the military focused on rebuilding villages in former conflict zones, including the creation of model villages, as well as on implementing infrastructure projects. When these processes were in full swing, military elites effectively controlled the state; Mayans were largely living in areas under the military's control, they were working on development projects that benefited the national economy, and institutions were set up to allow the military to maintain a permanent presence in the countryside.409 One of the most important institutions that ensured military hegemony in the countryside was the IICC which was established in October 1983 and expanded across the state by December 1984. This institution was headed by the military, and it absorbed all rural civilian institutions that were deemed to be essential to maintaining Guatemala's national security. The military's definition of what institutions needed to be controlled by the military for security reasons was extremely broad so it gave the military de facto control over rural Guatemala, particularly in terms of development.410 The IICCs were introduced in order to replace the traditional Indian councils that were considered potentially subversive by the military. The IICC was directly controlled by the military which set its agenda, and had a veto on all matters. Furthermore, all members of the IICC were appointed by the commandant of the local army garrison. The IICCs would allocate

in Anthropologists in the Public Sphere, ed. by Roberto J. Gonzalez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 60. 408 Barry, Guatemala: The Politics of Counterinsurgency, 24. 409 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 7-8; Black, "Under The Gun," 12; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 65, 67. 410 Black, "Under The Gun," 12, 14-16; Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala," 15.

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resources for development projects, provide sustenance for local villagers, organize the villagers for work, and make decisions about community leisure activities.411 The IICC followed military interests by making sure that money was mainly funnelled into development projects that best served the military's counterinsurgency objectives such as the expansion of roads in the countryside. Development programs were largely stagnant except in areas with rich natural resources. The IICC's main contribution to local development was that it rebuilt local communities that were affected by government violence, including the construction of model villages.412 The IICC was also in charge of maintaining rural education which had two key objectives. First, the military used schools as a means to indoctrinate the pupils with nationalist and anticommunist ideology. Second, the schools were meant to increase literacy in the countryside which would allow the residents to better understand the army's ideology.413 The military also institutionalized its presence in the countryside by creating development poles in June 1984.414 The development poles were an important institution because they encouraged national integration in economic and civic terms. Relating to national integration, the development poles had two fundamental objectives. First, they were meant to encourage greater access to economic opportunities which was important because the poverty of the rural Mayans, and their corresponding backwardness, had made them easy prey for the guerrillas. In a complementary process, Mayan cultural and intellectual backwardness would also be corrected by national education which was

Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 148; White, The Morass, 121. Krueger and Enge, Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands, V. 413 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 260. 414 Black, "Under The Gun," 14-16.
412

411

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meant to increase their intelligence, and encourage national integration.415 Second, since the development poles were in areas under military control, it prevented the guerrilla groups from operating in these areas. Beyond these considerations, since the development poles were constructed in areas that were sites of military-guerrilla violence such as the Ixil Triangle, Playa Grande, Chacaj, and Chisec, the residents of these regions were forced to support the military's counterinsurgency.416 The military felt that these measures would reverse the pro-guerrilla sympathies of some members of the population, and encourage national integration more generally. Contrary to the military's claim that they wanted to create self-sufficient Mayan communities, their actions indicate that they were trying to make the communities reliant on the military authorities for survival. For instance, because of the war's devastating destruction of agriculture and village infrastructure, individuals in these communities relied on the government for sustenance, water, shelter, and other essential items. Furthermore, since economic opportunities in development poles were very scarce, many people ended up working in exploitive industries such as plantations or sweatshops. What the military did accomplish with the development poles was to get the Mayans to work in industries that benefited the economic elite and the national economy more generally.417 By 1984 the military had entrenched its position in the countryside, so they embarked on two interconnected plans in 1984 and 1985: Institutional Re-encounter 84 and National Stability 85. The former plan involved continuing both operations against

Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 101. Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 104-105; Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 16-18; Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 28-29. 417 Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 101; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 75; Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala," 14.
416

415

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guerrilla groups, and the drive to rebuild homes and infrastructure destroyed by the counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore, Institutional Re-encounter 84 stipulated that the military was going to ensure that free elections for the Constituent Assembly occurred on July 1, 1984. The assembly members were given the task of writing another constitution for Guatemala in preparation for federal elections in the following year.418 National Stability 85 stipulated that the military sought to become more involved in social programs in the countryside, and it also wanted to use its institutional presence to encourage greater participation in the 1985 federal elections. The latter idea had an internal and an external calculus. Internally the military elites believed the military's hegemony would expand because it facilitated Guatemala's democratization. This idea was declared most explicitly by Colonel Terraza Pinot, when he slated that "[Governmental institutions] paid close attention to the political developments, motivating the active forces in the country to achieve massive participation in the upcoming elections. With this attitude they gave impetus to the democratization process and returned to the people of Guatemala the sovereign right, which resides only in them, to elect the destiny of the nation."419 The external calculus involved the military having elections as a means to legitimize Guatemala's leadership structua- so Guatemala could try to regain its strong influence in Central American politics.4"' The military elites, then, were engaging in what Gramsci called transformismo as thev were Irving to legitimize their rule domestically and internationally by letting freely-elected civ iluns exercise control over the formal structures of political power, which would enhance its hegemonic
Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, anil Democracy, 7-8; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 23-24; Black, "Under The Gun." 14. 41 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, ami Democracy, 7-8; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 23-24. 420 Black, "Under The Gun," 14.
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status. The military could bring potentially subversive political parties into the fold under the military's control while the military could continue to dominate political life behind the scenes. This was designed to undermine the possibility that these political parties would become counter-hegemonic organizations that threatened the social and political interests of the military.421 The 1984 Constituent Assembly election had an ambiguous legacy. On the one hand, the elections were free and involved a relatively high voter turnout (72.66%). The elections were won by a moderate coalition that included the Christian Democrats and the Union of the National Center.422 However, on the negative side, while the elections themselves were free of corruption, they took place during a period of intense political violence. In addition, civil patrols or military authorities were required to supervise the activities of any assembly or association that was outside of the government's direct control. Furthermore, the military made sure that no radical groups took part in rallies or other activities as all groups had to acquire permission from the military to engage in public demonstrations. The Constituent Assembly was also viewed negatively because the constitution it produced legalized the civil patrols.423 Prior to the 1985 elections, the military had entrenched its institutional presence in the countryside. Since the military was now the strongest political actor in Guatemala, military elites felt assured that its interests would be upheld by whichever civilian political party came to power. Mejia Victores was so confident that the military would
421

Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume I, 137; Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 130-131. 422 Peralta, 'The Development of Military Autonomy and Corporateness in Central America," 165; Zarate, Forging Democracy, 69-71; Leonard, Central America and United States Policies, 1820-1980s, 2223. 423 Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 46; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 95-96; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 155.

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remain largely in control after the election that he candidly stated "[The military] will never organize a fraud. We have no need to." 424 However, the military elite still reserved the right to take a more active role in the government if the popularity of reformist or revolutionary movements that threatened the status quo increased.425 The military also ensured its continued hegemony in Guatemala by passing an amnesty law in 1986. The law stated that no members of the military would be put on trial for having committed any politically-motivated crimes during the period after Ribs Montt's coup and before the inauguration of President Vinicio Cerezo. The incoming president expressed his support for the military by endorsing the amnesty law. He explained his support for the military with his revealing statement "We are not going to be able to investigate the past. We would have to put the entire army in jail."426 Since the amnesty law was supported by the military and other political elites, it adds credence to Antonio Gramsci's notion that law is used by the elite classes to impose rules and regulations that are necessary to uphold the interests of the elite.427 The 1985 election was a military-controlled move towards democracy. The military's control over this process was evident because the Christian Democrats were the only left-wing political party that was allowed to participate. The political parties that took part in the elections primarily represented the interests of the economic elite and the military, so the elections were another means to maintain the status quo.428 As a result,

Handy, "Resurgent Democracy and the Guatemalan Military," 408; Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 287; Black, "Under The Gun," 23. 45 Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, 42; Trudeau and Schoultz, "Guatemala," 42-43. Brian Loveman, For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1999), 217; Barry, Inside Guatemala, 35.
427

424

Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume III, trans, and ed. Joseph A. Buttigieg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 84. Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 156.

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none of these parties endorsed much-needed socio-economic reforms such as land reform, or sought to hold members of the security forces accountable for past human rights abuses. Furthermore, the political parties expressed their admiration for the military, and they refused to engage in negotiations with the guerrillas.429 The eventual winner Vinicio Cerezo promised to curb human rights abuses and embark on a development program. Unfortunately for Vinicio Cerezo, the military and economic elites would not allow any major social or economic reforms such as tax reform or land redistribution.430 Despite these drawbacks, the 1985 election was largely seen as legitimate in the international community. This was mainly because there was no apparent electoral fraud.431 Susanne Jonas correctly criticizes these elections because they reinforced socioeconomic inequalities, and Guatemala lacked autonomous popular organizations that would give rise to legitimate democratic movements. Jonas is correct to criticize these

elections as they closely resemble what neo-Gramscian sociologist William I. Robinson called "polyarchic elections". Robinson claimed that polyarchic reforms allow elite rule to be maintained, but with a very narrow expression of mass participation in the form of elections. These elections involved carefully chosen elites competing against one another for political office. Their political platforms were designed to satisfy the needs of local and international business interests, and also appeal to the general interests of the population. Polyarchy contrasts from popular democracy because it does not involve
429

Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 96; Trudeau and Schoultz, "Guatemala," 42-

43. Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala," 8; Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 115-116; McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State," 140; Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics, 71. 431 Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkley, London and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 393. 432 Jonas, "Elections and Transitions," 130-131.
430

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participatory democratic structures where the masses are directly involved in decisionmaking that is aimed at improving socio-economic conditions.433 In sum, polyarchic elections are a means by which elites legitimize their attempts to perpetuate socioeconomic inequality in the communities they rule over.434 Robinson claimed that the United States tried to "promote polyarchy" in allied regions, and Guatemala was no exception. Ronald Reagan was interested in sending the Guatemalan military aid but his attempts were largely rebuffed by Congress, so he tried to put a positive spin on the elections, hoping that this would convince Congress that democracy was flourishing in Guatemala. With this objective in mind, Reagan sent funding and advisors to Guatemala primarily through the Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy to monitor the elections. The Reagan administration also lionized the election process in the press both in the United States and in Guatemala.435 In its attempt to promote polyarchic elections, the Reagan administration, along with the State Department, presented the elections as solidifying a nearly-complete democratization process in Guatemala.436 During Vinicio Cerezo's term in office, military officers were given important government positions that allowed them to maintain a heavy influence over foreign and domestic policy, especially in rural development. For instance, the military continued to control the development pole system, and Vinicio Cerezo infused the civil patrols and

Robinson, "Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S. Foreign Policy," 623-626. 434 Neufeld, "Democratization in/of Canadian Foreign Policy," 114. 435 Robinson, "Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S. Foreign Policy," 623-626; Zarate, Forging Democracy, 69-71; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 110. 436 Painter, Guatemala, XIV; The Reagan administration was successful at convincing Congress to increase aid to Guatemala as a result of its "democratization". During Vinicio Cerezo's administration, the U.S. sent Guatemala aid in the amount of $800 million dollars. Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 77-78.

433

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model villages with funding to develop them further, and to construct roadways to connect the model villages.437 By the late 1980s, there were military bases in nearly every one of Guatemala's 22 departments, and garrison posts were typically present in areas with a population of 10,000 or more people. At this time, the Guatemalan military was still conscripting approximately 10 to 20 percent of young males into the military, so its effect on rural communities was still significant.438 Although the military continued to dominate Vinicio Cerezo, there were two coup attempts in August 1988 and May 1989.439 He was able to hold on to power with the support of his defense minister Hector Gramajo. However, afterward Vinicio Cerezo relied even more on the military to maintain his power, so he became even less inclined to criticize the military, which led to increased human rights abuses against representatives of the popular movement, especially at the end of his term. The U.S. State Department documented six thousand assassinations in 1990 alone, 304 of which were categorized as political assassinations.440 Vinicio Cerezo's ineffectual leadership largely allowed the military and the economic elite to meet their interests. As a result, the military continued to function as a hegemonic institution until the mid-1990s in part because Vinicio Cerezo supported the military, particularly by allowing it to be autonomous.441 In light of this, the elections should be viewed as a publicity stunt to enhance the legitimacy of the counterinsurgency

Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 32, 34, 124; Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 33. 438 Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala," 10. Klaiber, The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America, 229; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 250-262; Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, 54-55. 440 Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, 54-55; Dunkerley and Sieder, "The Military: The Challenge of Transition," 83-84, 86; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 255, 263; Lovell, A Beauty the Hurts, 92-93. 441 Black, "Military Rule in Guatemala," 363; McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State," 121.

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operations. Leading up to the 1996 peace accords, the military lost esteem and became a dominant political actor rather than a hegemonic one.442 This decline in legitimacy occurred because of corruption in the military, and more importantly because its brutal tactics were condemned at home and abroad. Relating to the latter, the military was criticized for prolonging the war with the guerrillas.443 As a result, moderate members of the military called for an end to the civil war. After an initial hesitancy to enter into negotiations with the guerrillas, the military became more amenable to pursuing a negotiated settlement to the war after it was clear that neither side would win a decisive military victory, and that the military could likely end the war by providing minimal concessions to the rebel groups.444 The accords stipulated that the military would remain under civilian control, and it would only be concerned with defending the country against external attacks. Internal security was going to be ensured by a revamped civilian national police force. In addition, the budget and troop levels in the military were to be cut considerably, and the civil patrols were disbanded.445 Despite the military's begrudging support for signing the peace accords, when it

Jonas, "Guatemala," 280-281; Barry, Inside Guatemala, 3-4, 7. Linda Green, Fear As A Way Of Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 49; Susanne Jonas, "Between Two Worlds: The United Nations in Guatemala," in Peacemaking and Democratization in the Western Hemisphere, ed. by Tommie Sue Montgomery (Miami: North-South Center Press at the University of Miami, 2000), 91, 94; William Stanley and David Holiday, "Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility: Peace Implementation in Guatemala," in Ending Civil Wars, ed. by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 431; Burgerman, "Making Peace Perform in War-Transition Countries," 261, 265-266. 443 Green, Fear As A Way Of Life, 49; Susanne Jonas, "Between Two Worlds: The United Nations 444 Green, Fear As A Way Of Life, 49; Susanne Jonas, "Between Two Worlds: The United Nations in Guatemala," in Peacemaking and Democratization in the Western Hemisphere, ed. by Tommie Sue Montgomery (Miami: North-South Center Press at the University of Miami, 2000), 91, 94; William Stanley and David Holiday, "Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility: Peace Implementation in Guatemala," in Ending Civil Wars, ed. by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 431. 445 Jonas, "Guatemala," 287-288.
443

442

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came to implementing them, the military, economic elites, and political elites were hostile to this process. The peace accords dictated that the Guatemalan government needed to reform the legislative, judiciary, and electoral systems. Members of the government dragged their feet when implementing these reforms, often finding ways to prevent these reforms from occurring. For instance, the government allowed the military to continue its role as an enforcer of internal security after there was an increase in common crime. To this end, the military dominated the civil police force which was understaffed and lacked the budget to control domestic crime.4'46 Furthermore, in 1999 conservative groups began a disinformation campaign that successfully delegitimized a referendum that asked citizens whether they wanted to introduce constitutional amendments that would help with the implementation of the peace accords. Since these groups prevented the full enforcement of the peace accords, internal security became chaotic as the police and the military were unable or unwilling to control internal security. As a result, violence against politically dissident individuals and groups continued.447 Since the military was in a weakened state, the popular movement began to cautiously expand and establish new leadership structures.
K

Rural communities re-

established unions and other organizations that sought to enhance labor rights, development, education, and health.449 The gaining strength of progressive organizations was also illustrated by the increasing involvement of several lelt-w mg political parties in

Jonas and Walker, "Guatemala," 21-22; Stanley and Holiday. "Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility," 449; Jonas, "Guatemala," 288-292. 447 Jonas and Walker, "Guatemala," 21-22; Jonas, "Guatemala," 289-291. 448 Tenneriello, Thale and Millet, "Unfinished Business," 191. 449 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 49;

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Guatemala's national politics, beginning with the presidential elections in 1995.450 The late 1980s and 1990s saw the creation and revival of several groups that were either organized by Mayans, or fought for the interests of Mayan communities. These new organizations included that Mutual Support Group (GAM) and the National Coordination of Widows of Guatemala (CONAVIGUA). This time period also saw the resurgence of the CUC and the Council for Highland Ethnic Communities (CERJ). According to Jim Handy "[t]hese organizations were tremendously important through the early 1990s in focusing public attention on demands for ending militarization in the countryside, disbanding the civil patrols, ending forced recruitment, as well as accounting for the dead and uncovering clandestine cemeteries."451 Nevertheless, despite the expansion of civil society institutions that undermined the military's hegemony, members of the military, particularly high-ranking officers, were still powerful because they operated with near impunity from criminal or war crime prosecution. By the late 1990s, no Guatemalan officer had been punished for committing a human rights-related crime by being imprisoned or convicted in a court of law. However, Guatemalan courts did successfully prosecute lower-ranking soldiers and civil patrol members. Members of the military had relative impunity because they were given a partial amnesty, and the only institution that could investigate members of the military for committing human rights abuses was the National Police which was affiliated with the military, and dominated by it at least until the late 1980s.452 In instances where

Tenneriello, Thale and Millet, "Unfinished Business," 191. Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 49-50. 451 Handy, "Reimagining Guatemala," 289. 45 Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations, 133; Goldman, The Art of Political Murder, 25; Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996, 114; Tenneriello, Thale and Millet, "Unfinished Business," 195-196.

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military personnel were charged with human rights abuses, the trials tended to move very slowly. In most cases the military imposed very minor punishments against senior members of the military by forcing them to retire or by removing them from positions of authority.453 The only major exception to this impunity was when the individuals thought to have killed Guatemalan Bishop Juan Gerardi were convicted of his murder. However, these individuals were likely convicted because the Bishop's murder was well-known internationally; for the most part the courts were largely unwilling or unable to prosecute senior military officials.454 The military's continued status as a powerful political actor helps to convey that its brutal counterinsurgency, combined with attempts to precipitate an authoritarian revolution, met with some success. Even to the present day, mainstream political parties continue to embrace military concerns by upholding business interests and other conservative social forces. Beyond this, political elites during the 1990s propagated the need to maintain law and order with the assistance of the military.455 However, in spite of these accomplishments, the military fell short of its original intention of integrating rural Guatemala into the state through the use of military-dominated organizations. The resurgence of popular organization in the 1990s that undermined military interests helps to convey the lack of success the military had at gaining the consent of the rural inhabitants. The rural inhabitants preferred to deal with organizations that were autonomous from the military, and fought for their economic and social rights. So the
453

Goldman, The Art of Political Murder, 25; Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996,114; Tenneriello, Thale and Millet, "Unfinished Business," 195-196. 454 Afflitto and Jesilow, The Quiet Revolutionaries, 9; One reason that members of the justice system were unwilling to prosecute members of the military is because witnesses, lawyers, and judges were intimidated and killed for trying to prosecute some members of the military. Amnesty International, Guatemala, 128. 455 Jonas, "Guatemala," 280-281, 295; Barry, Inside Guatemala, 3-4, 7.

128 element of the military's authoritarian revolution that entailed destroying community organizations that opposed elite interests, and replacing them with military organizations in order to enhance the military's hegemony failed as the latter organizations were imposed, and unpopular.

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Mechanisms of Control and Integration: Model Villages and Civil Patrols The military used model villages and the civil patrols as a means to integrate the Mayans into the state, and to win its counterinsurgency against the guerrillas. The use of population relocation and self-defence squads is in keeping with counterinsurgency theory. John J. McCuen claimed that relocation was necessary in order to ensure the safety of the population from rebel attacks, and to fight with fewer restrictions against the guerrillas.456 In a similar manner, he encouraged the use of self-defence squads so the population can protect themselves against the guerrillas.457 In terms of the model villages, when internal refugees were located by government security forces, or when they were forced to turn themselves in to military authorities due to hunger or lack of medical supplies, they were often relocated to model villages.458 At its high point, there were approximately 24 model villages that held between 50,000 to 60,000 rural inhabitants.459 While the military provided some funding to construct and maintain the model villages, it was principally funded through USAID and the United Nations. In terms of the latter, the UN controlled the Food for Work program which provided rations for individuals who helped to construct the model villages. Over the course of 1982 and 1983, the military assumed control over the Food for Work program through the National Reconstruction Committee.460 Construction of the model villages mainly took place from mid-1983 to

McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, 52, 153. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, 57-58. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 130; Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 179. 459 Zur, Violent Memories, 73; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 117; In addition to the model villages, many rural residents were forced to spend three months in a re-education center run by the military before they were allowed to resettle. The military had re-education centers built in Xemamatze and Las Violetas. Sanford, Buried Secrets, 169, 172. 460 Black, "Under The Gun," 18-19.
457

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late 1984; the first model village to become operational was Acul in December 1983.461 According to Beatriz Manz, the internal refugees involved in model village construction were "compelled to fix roads, labor at military bases, build latrines, repair cemeteries, create parks, make community wells and shelters for washing clothes, pick up garbage in the streets, or any other task the commander may want done."462 Model village construction ensured that Mayan labor was used for projects that were important to the military. In this way, the military provided the rural inhabitants with jobs that benefited the state, while at the same time undermining the rural population's ability to support the guerrillas by controlling the amount of food and other supplies given to them.463 Model villages were a major component of the military's authoritarian revolution as military strategists used the model villages to destroy autonomous community organizations, and it allowed the military to use Mayan labour for the state's advantage. The model villages also served an important function to the counterinsurgency because it separated the rural inhabitants from the guerrillas, and the military used the villages to reeducate the rural population. Model villages allowed the military to suppress community organizations, particularly leadership structures like cooperatives.464 Military strategists undermined community organizations in model villages by strategically designing these communities so that a military post was situated above them so soldiers could see most of the buildings from this location. Of particular importance was for buildings that could hold a large number of people, such as a school or a church, to be fully visible to

Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 155. Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 41-42. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 73-74. Egan, '"Somos de la Tierra,"' 98.

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members of the military.465 To make surveillance easier, the houses and infrastructure buildings were heavily concentrated and constructed along a grid pattern. Although these security measures were officially in place to make sure the guerrillas did not infiltrate the area, it was also used by the military to undermine communal organizations.466 The presence of community organizations also declined because the military populated model villages with individuals who had diverging ethnicities, social affiliations, and spoken languages. As a result, individuals in these communities seldom worked together to form community self-help organizations.467 Under Rios Montt and Mejia Victores, the military used the model villages to undermine communal organizations in order to replace them with military-controlled or military-sympathetic organizations as a means to enhance its hegemony. The military officials who ran the model villages should be considered intellectuals who sought to legitimize the military-dominated status quo. As such, these individuals used the model villages to destroy communal organizations because they were placing demands on the economic elite and the military that were counter to their interests, and by extension, threatening to the hegemonic order.468 William I. Robinson contended that every hegemonic order establishes "ideological, institutional, and structural constraints" in order to legitimize the fundamental concepts of the hegemonic social order.469 In the case of Guatemala, the model villages were used to convey the fundamental ideas of the military-dominated social order by articulating what were legitimate and illegitimate
465

Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 71; Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain

Spirits," 49. Egan, '"Somos de la Tierra,'" 98; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 71. Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 106; Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 32, 34. 468 Augelli and Murphy, "Consciousness, Myth and Collective Action," 32. 469 Robinson, "Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in U.S. Foreign Policy," 636.
467 466

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demands for the lower classes to make of the upper classes. Any demand that might undermine the core interests or ideas of the hegemonic order would be viewed as illegitimate.470 In Guatemala by replacing autonomous village organizations with military-dominated ones, the military sought to make sure that the economic status quo was not threatened by calls for independent economic development, demands for better working conditions, or the proliferation of peasant unions. Aside from destroying community organizations, the model villages also further integrated the Mayans into the state by encouraging them to play a larger role in the national economy, rather than practicing subsistence agriculture. Integrating Mayan labour further into the economy was seen as essential in order for Guatemala's agricultural industry to be modernized.471 Military strategists also rationalized that increasing Mayan involvement in the economy would also affect their political consciousness. According to military officials, Mayans regarded the central government with suspicion largely because they were cut off from urban economic structures.472 Therefore, military elites believed that if they encouraged the Mu\uns to farm cash crops that these farmers would embrace the mercantilist spirit and become \aluable contributors to the national economy. Thus, the political elites hoped that integrating the residents of these model villages into the national economy uould. b\ extension, eventually result in them accepting the norms of the political chics '

Robinson, "Globalization, the World System, and 'Democrat.) Promotion in U.S. Foreign Policy," 636; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 30. 471 Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgencv in Guatemala." 103: Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 43; Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Socien in Guatemala." 12. 472 Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 43; Smith, "The Militarization of CIMI Society in Guatemala," 12. 473 Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 43; Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala," 12; Peralta, "The Hidden War," 160-161.

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Military strategists also used model villages to facilitate the military's authoritarian revolution as it played a role in undermining the guerrillas, a necessary precondition for the militarization of the countryside. The military achieved a major victory in its counterinsurgency by mid-1983 as a significant amount of the rural population lived in military-controlled areas. This factor, combined with the expansion of the civil patrol system, largely cut off the guerrillas from the portion of the rural population who were sympathetic to them.474 The model villages further assisted the military's counterinsurgency effort because the military put a great deal of effort into re-educating the inhabitants of these settlements. The ideological indoctrination that was attempted in model villages, as well as in re-education centers outside of the model villages, was accomplished by the S-5 units. The S-5 units were organic intellectuals for the military as they functioned to uphold the military's ideological worldview.475 When dealing with individuals in model villages, the S-5 units tried to create an identity centered on social unity and support for the military's counterinsurgency goals.47 When discussing the ideological re-education of the rural population, military representatives often used paternalistic language to describe this process. For instance, Major Saul Figueroa Veliz, who headed the Office for Civilian Affairs division in Coban, Alta Verapaz, claimed that Indians were very impressionable by virtue of their intellectual inferiority, which the guerrillas used to their advantage by indoctrinating them with communist ideas. He also claimed that the Indians probably did not leave the communities they lived in with the guerrillas (usually in the mountains) to join the model villages because they felt an ideological commitment to the
474 475

Handy, "Resurgent Democracy and the Guatemalan Military," 403. Jones, Antonio Gramsci, 84-85. 476 Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 62.

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military, but because these guerrilla communities lacked medicine, food, and water. As a result, it was seen as necessary to mould these refugees into supporters of the military.477 The military's re-education program primarily highlighted the need for communities to embrace nationalism and anticommunism. In terms of nationalism, military representatives encouraged the rural inhabitants to reject their identity as Mayans, or members of a particular community, in favor of a civic identity centered on Guatemalan nationalism.478 To reinforce nationalist rhetoric, the Mayan residents were forced to be present when the Guatemalan flag was raised and lowered each day. Furthermore, the Mayans were expected to sing songs with nationalist overtones in hopes that it would strengthen their feelings of patriotism.
9

This nationalist ideology typically

defined the proper civic attitude as one that revered the military, and by extension "ideal citizens" were obliged to obey the orders of military officials. Therefore, military propaganda reinforced the idea that aligning with the military would be beneficial both in the short term and in the long term. In the short-term, rural residents were told that if they were loyal to the military they would be provided with aid. In addition, it was in their long-term interests to support the military because military elites planned to usher in a political order that was democratic, prosperous, and humanitarian.480 Under Rios Montt, this nationalist rhetoric was also infused with evangelical Protestant ideas. Evangelical preachers worked under military authorities to promote the idea that Mayans should be loyal to the state rather than to local indigenous groups

Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 114; Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 176, 179. 478 White, The Morass, 96; Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 36. 479 Brockett, Land, Power, and Poverty., 121. 480 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 58-59; Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 36, 141.

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because aligning with the state would lead to economic prosperity for the Mayans.481 These preachers also claimed that Mayans would be more likely to attain economic success if they abandoned their Mayan identity in favor of a Ladino one.482 By extension, the evangelicals promoted the need for Mayans to practice rigid obedience to military officials. The need for rigid obedience also manifested itself in Protestant groups and military representatives telling the Mayans to hate the Catholic catechists who had increased violence in the countryside.483 Protestant preachers were also useful to the military because they discouraged the use of communal services and community action, which Catholic groups had advocated, in favor of a religion that preached the importance of an individual's relationship with God. In this way, religion was practiced on an individual level or in small groups, which was helpful to the military because it would diminish community solidarity against the military on religious grounds.484 As a result of both genuine interest on the part of the population and pressure by military officials and Protestant preachers, by the early 1990s 35 percent of the populace defined themselves as evangelical Protestants. However, many of these individuals converted to Protestantism in order to save their lives as the military attacked Catholic organizations but supported Protestant groups.485 Aside from nationalism, the military promoted an anticommunist ideology in the
Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 96; Shea, Culture and Customs of Guatemala, 16-18; McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State," 139. 482 Shea, Culture and Customs of Guatemala, 16-18; Protestant missionaries worked in conjunction with military officials to undermine Mayan culture. Nonetheless, in some cases there were attempts by the military to integrate Mayan and Ladino cultures rather than enforcing a Ladino identity. For instance, S-5 representatives often used traditionally-dressed Mayan girls at ceremonies when model villages and other projects were launched. Handy, "Resurgent Democracy and the Guatemalan Military," 403; Barry, Inside Guatemala, XVI. 483 McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State," 139; Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits," 47-48. 484 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 47; Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits," 47-48. Shea, Culture and Customs of Guatemala, 16-18.

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model villages that aggrandized the military and demonized the guerrillas. The military was portrayed as fighting a popular war against the guerrilla groups, which the rural population supported by joining the civil patrols.486 At a civic meeting in the model village Acamal, military representatives claimed that the guerrillas could not provide a better life for the Mayans, but if they aligned with the military they would be given social assistance. This idea was commonly stated in other model villages as well.487 According to Jennifer Schirmer, model village residents were also subjected to other forms of promilitary propaganda as they were forced to "listen to military marches on a record player, sing the 'Hymn of the Civil Patrols' in Spanish, and to participate in organizing 'Queen of the Patrols' festivals during traditional days of celebration."488 The military's S-5 units also used propaganda to attack the Soviet Union, and the guerrilla groups more generally. In terms of the Soviet Union, films were shown which depicted Soviet elites living decadently while their subjects lived in poverty. The film contrasted the Soviet Union with America where people were rewarded for their hard work with material goods. The films also showed American workers living freely while their Soviet counterparts were violently abused by the Soviet military.489 In a similar manner, army rhetoric claimed that the URNG was using coercion to exploit the rural Mayans.490 The military also claimed that the guerrillas were responsible for destroying the majority of the villages in the countryside. S-5 representatives reasoned that the military provided the Mayans with shelter and food, so it did not make sense that soldiers

Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 58-59. Krueger and Enge, Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands, 44-45. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 111. Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 182. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 111.

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destroyed their homes in the first place.491 Rural residents were told that they had been deceived by the guerrillas into thinking that the military was responsible for committing massacres and destroying rural property.492 Furthermore, military representatives claimed that the guerrillas wore military uniforms when they conducted massacres in an attempt to frame the military.493 According to Amnesty International, however, the opposite was the case. In its report, AI noted that there were several instances where government soldiers tried to frame the guerrillas by dressing in civilian clothes or olive-green clothing (what the guerrillas typically wore) when they attacked a village. The intent of this action was to get the local population to turn against the guerrillas and support the military's counterinsurgency. In many cases this tactic was not convincing to the villagers because the soldiers used Galil rifles and armored vehicles during their ambushes, equipment the guerrilla groups largely lacked access to.494 The military's re-education campaign was a major component of the rigid schedule that S-5 authorities imposed on model villages. This schedule set aside time for ideological indoctrination, work, sleep, and little else. In its report, the Archdiocese of Guatemala claimed that the typical model village schedule forced the residents to spend hours each day listening to speeches that justified the military's counterinsurgency and discussed the importance of the civil defense patrols.495 The model villages, then, were used by military strategists to enhance its hegemony by undermining the guerrillas and community organizations, while at the same time attempting to gain the population's
Black, "Under The Gun," 22. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 58-59; Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 182. 493 Black, "Under The Gun," 17. 494 Amnesty International, Guatemala, 66-67, 94-95. 495 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 118; Outside of speeches, the military also transmitted its propaganda in the model villages through the use of radios and pamphlets. Berryman, Stubborn Hope, 120; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 71.
492 491

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allegiance by providing them with jobs and through ideological indoctrination. Despite the exhaustive effort made by the S-5 units and other military representatives to reeducate individuals in the model villages, their work appears to have been done in vain. Through interviews, academic Richard Wilson concluded that the military was rarely if ever successful at getting model village residents to believe that it was mainly the guerrillas who attacked their communities. It appears that few of these individuals genuinely consented to the actions of the military, but they obeyed military authorities largely out of fear. In other words, model village residents realized that the military was going to remain in charge and their survival depended on agreeing to abide by military dictates, such as its demand that rural Guatemalans form civil patrols in their local communities.496 In the end, although the model village system was successful in that it separated the guerrillas from the population and undermined associations that threatened the military, it largely failed in terms of the military's overall plan of integrating the Mayans into the state.497 Aside from the model villages, military strategists also attempted to win the counterinsurgency by getting local villagers to form civil patrols, a practice that commenced under Lucas Garcia in late 1981 and early 1982, and expanded substantially in 1983 and 1984.498 The number of individuals in the patrols jumped considerably from 300,000 in late 1982 to 500,000 in November 1983, to its highpoint of 1,300,000 in late 1984.499 After the mid-1980s, membership in the civil patrols declined to 800,000 in

Wilson, "Machine Guns and Mountain Spirits," 47-48; Brockett, Land, Power, and Poverty, 121.
497

Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 140-141. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 128; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 90-91. 499 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 90-91.
498

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1987, and then to 500,000 in 1992.

Jean-Marie Simon claimed that there were such a

large number of patrollers because the military conscripted men who were older and younger than the required age to take part in patrol duty. He wrote that "[a]lthough officially the civil patrol system includes only men between the ages of eighteen and fifty, there are patrollers as young as eight and as old as seventy."501 Although officially taking part in the civil patrols was a voluntary commitment, multiple sources have shown that the military coerced people to join. A common claim was that military officials would tell the residents of a particular area that in order to prove their commitment to the army they would have to take part in the local civil patrol. The implicit threat of this ultimatum, which in some cases was explicitly stated by military officials, was that if they did not take part in the civil patrols, they would be viewed as guerrilla sympathizers. The military frequently humiliated , exiled, tortured, or murdered individuals and in

some cases their families if a man refused to join the civil patrols.^ The purpose of the civil patrols was to involve local villagers in the counterinsurgency, to function as an intelligence network for the military, and to undermine communal organizations. Furthermore, the military used ci\ il patrol duty as a means to indoctrinate the patrol members with anticommunist and nationalistic ideology.
Klaiber, The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Uitm \m< n, u 221. lirockett, Land, Power, and Poverty, 120; Civil patrol membership declined after 1984 in an-j> thai Jul not have a guerrilla presence, and were not considered strategic targets by the military. Ifthc memrvr* il these communities requested individual or collective exemptions from patrol duty in order in lake part m migrant farming or for other reasons, the military commonly ceded to these demands. Archdiocese < > i (.u.nemala. Guatemala: Never Again, 119-121; Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala." lw 501 Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala. 26 2S 5 Frank Afflitto provided an example of how the military used humiliation to punish someone for not taking part in the civil patrols. He wrote that after one man declined to join his ltv.il ei\ il patrol that he, along with his wife and children, were forced to stay in a latrine hole for eighteen da\ s l-rank M. Afflitto, "Intended Social Effects of a Culture of Impunity: The Case of Guatemala.'" in Cultural Shaping of Violence: Victimization, Escalation, Response, ed. by Myrdene Anderson (West I.ala\ctie. 2004), 245-246. 503 Ciborski, "Guatemala 'We Thought It Was Only The Men They Would Kill."" 126; Afflitto, "Intended Social Effects of a Culture of Impunity," 245-246; Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 40; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 8, 119-121.

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Official military sources claimed that the civil patrols were formed by communities to defend themselves against the guerrillas. Military representatives highlighted the voluntary nature of the patrols, maintaining that the military hierarchy was largely not responsible for the creation or implementation of the patrols.504 The purpose of these exaggerations and outright lies was to legitimize the counterinsurgency by defining it as a war that the military was fighting with the strong support of the population. The military tried to convey the "popular" support the rural inhabitants had for the counterinsurgency by having public ceremonies to celebrate the establishment of new civil patrol units, events that were attended by both Guatemalan reporters and members of the international
505

press. The main functions of the civil patrols was to guard their communities, and in some cases to take part in combat alongside military units. Guard duty in the civil patrols typically entailed a shift lasting 24 hours, which occurred anywhere from every three days to every two months, depending on the size of the community and the number of men available to patrol.506 If an individual reneged on their civil patrol obligations, punishments were harsh and included jail sentences.507 The main tasks of guard duty were to document the movement of people and vehicles, interrogate suspected guerrillas, and to locate secret camps where internal refugees or guerrilla members were hiding.508 Since military officials were concerned that some members of the civil patrols were sympathetic to the guerrillas, they often used the threat of draconian punishments to force
Zur, Violent Memories, 95; Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 152. Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 18-20, 23-24. 506 Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 51 507 Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 38,40. 508 W h i t e Tne Morass, 109-110; Ciborski, "Guatemala 'We Thought It Was Only The Men They Would Kill,'" 126; Krueger and Enge, Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands, 25.
505 504

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compliance. If a patroller failed to report a suspicious incident or person, or they were suspected of giving sensitive information to the guerrillas they were sometimes killed. According to America's Watch, punishments were particularly severe "in areas genuinely contested by the guerrillas, [as] PAC members are made to understand that their choice is not between loyalties but between self-preservation and death."509 The civil patrols also accompanied army units to take part in combat, to search for guerrilla settlements, to perpetrate massacres, and in order to draw guerrilla fire as a means to shield the soldiers from being attacked."I0 In terms of the latter function, if individuals in a particular patrol were not seen as entirely loyal to the military, they were forced to stay in front of the soldiers, and in some cases they were told to hold fake guns to attract enemy fire. A patroller would be given a gun if they proved their loyalty to the military by taking the initiative in terms of torturing suspected guerrillas or conducting massacres. If a given patroller was not seen as worthy of receiving a gun, they were given machetes, clubs, or sticks.511 When determining whether a patroller was loyal to the military, part of the military's calculus was to use a racial disparity by assuming that Ladinos who volunteered for the civil patrols or as armed auxiliaries in the military reserves were more trustworthy than the Mayans. Typically the Ladinos were given power over the Mayan members of a given patrol. In any event, if a unit was seen as loyal, beyond receiving firearms, they were also given more autonomy by the military to

McClintock, The American Connection, 252-253; Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 49-50; Margaret Popkin, Civil Patrols and Their Legacy, ed. by James J. Silk (Washington: Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, 1996), 13. 510 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 82, 90-91; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 122. 511 McClintock, The American Connection, 252-253; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 122; White, The Morass, 109, 111.

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conduct military raids on suspected enemy villages.512 Related to combat, the civil patrols also gathered intelligence on behalf of the military. Principally the military was interested in which community members had suspected alliances with the guerrillas, and also who was affiliated with sociallyprogressive organizations that threatened military interests.513 To meet this end, the military demanded that patrollers monitor social networks in their local community, and also attend meetings held by progressive groups. Moreover, the military also encouraged the patrollers to document the amount of food consumed in their communities in order to determine whether anyone was giving food to the guerrillas.514 In some cases patrollers would take advantage of their power as military informants to settle personal grievances by falsely claiming that the person or people they had disputes with were guerrilla sympathizers. In many cases if an individual was denounced by a patrol member, military authorities would often kill this alleged "subversive".515 Outside of combat-related functions, the civil patrols also assisted the military by overtaking traditional self-government structures in rural areas.516 This entailed the patrols exercising either complete control over village governance, or in the very least overshadowing the traditional governance structures in respective villages. Since the civil patrols worked under the military's authority, the patrols were ideal agents to assist the military in imposing its authoritarian revolution. By extension, military officials hoped the military's hegemony would expand if they replaced unsympathetic local elites with
512

McClintock, The American Connection, 255; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never

Again, 122. Richards, "Cosmopolitan World View and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala," 94-95. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 90-91. 515 Remijnse, Memories of Violence, 158. 516 The civil patrollers were also obligated to take on other non-military functions such as construction, road work, and food allocation. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 90-91; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 262; Trudeau and Schoultz, "Guatemala," 41.
514 513

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civil patrol members as this would allow the military to exert more control over the rural population. For instance, the civil patrols undercut the Catholic Church as well as the cofradia religious groups because these organizations were outside of the military's control.517 The civil patrols functioned as a pro-military governance structure during the counterinsurgency, and to a far lesser extent, after the war officially ended in 1996.518 Another function the civil patrols served for the counterinsurgency was that the patrols were used to imbue the rural inhabitants with anticommunist and nationalistic ideology. The military claimed that someone should be considered a guerrilla if they opposed the interests of the military or the civil patrols. This argument even extended to children in communities thought to be controlled by the guerrillas. According to one civil patroller interviewed by Amnesty International, children were targeted because it was feared that they were sympathetic to the subversive ideas their parents espoused.519 Military elites hoped that patrol members would spread this aggressive anticommunist ideology in their own communities.520 Along with anticommunism, the Guatemalan military also tried to align the patrol

Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 2; Nonetheless, the civil patrols were not just an institution the military used to enforce its will, but in some cases the patrols proved useful to local communities as they were sometimes used to arbitrate local disputes, encourage social or economic stability, and negotiate with the government. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 132. 518 Remijnse, Memories of Violence, 20; Even though the civil patrols were disbanded in most communities as part of the peace settlement between the government and the guerrillas, many former patrollers continued to use violence in their local communities. For instance, former civil patrollers and exsoldiers used lynching as a means to attack suspected criminals. Remijnse, Memories of Violence, 247. 519 Ciborski, "Guatemala 'We Thought It Was Only The Men They Would Kill,'" 126; Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 147-148; Amnesty International, Guatemala, 99; The notion that parents spread their subversive ideas to children may be the reason why a fourteen year old boy was killed in Nebaj by a soldier. Originally the military sought to locate the boy's father, but after they were unable to find him, they abducted his son instead. After the boy was stabbed to death by a soldier, an officer told the civil patrollers that they should kill at least two or three people each night. This child may have been killed because it was assumed that he was subversive because his father was thought to be subversive. Another possibility is that the boy was killed to make his father suffer so he would see the terrible hardships that aligning with the guerrillas had led to. Stoll, Between Two Armies In The Ixil Towns of Guatemala, 106-107. 520 Barry, Inside Guatemala, 53.

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members behind the military by using nationalistic arguments. Colonel Roberto Matta, who was the commander in charge of operations in El Quiche, explained that the military had successfully encouraged civil patrollers to feel pride that rather than being passive victims of guerrilla violence, they stood up for themselves by fighting off the rebels. Roberto Matta saw added significance to the civil patrols because the rural Mayans, who had traditionally been isolated from the central government, were now becoming more integrated into the state by actively participating in the military's counterinsurgency.521 According to a 1984 military booklet on the civil patrols, it was an implicit objective of the military to use the patrols to "organize the population civically and politically". Accordingly, nationalist rhetoric focused on the idea that the patrollers were helping the military to subdue a subversive movement that used violence and deception to meet its devious ends.522 The army's decision to use the model villages and civil patrol duty to encourage rural residents to embrace anticommunism and nationalism was a very important element of its state-building plan. Any successful hegemonic order rests on the ability of the intellectuals to get members of the lower classes to believe that they share a common identity with the upper class(es).523 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy elaborated on this idea by pointing out that dominant political movements often used nationalist rhetoric to reinforce the idea that the political elites were working for the best interests of

White, The Morass, 110-111. Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 20-21; In the military-produced booklet "Self-Defense Civil Patrol" military representatives described the nature of the civil patrols in the following way "I am a victorious soldier/Of the Civil Defense/Always side by side like a brother/With the brave Army/For my country Guatemala/My blue and white flag/For my home, my ideals/I shall fight with fierceness.. ./I swear to my country/To defend it to the death/To reject the subversives/And to help my neighbours/At daybreak/With my hand I'll till/But my gun always ready/To fight for Guatemala." Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 74-75. 523 Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 132.
522

521

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the nation, rather than for their own class interests.524 The Guatemalan military tried to get the rural inhabitants to embrace an identity centered on Guatemalan nationalism and anticommunism in an attempt to win over the allegiance of the rural population. While the civil patrols were useful to the military as they played an important role in undermining the guerrillas and grassroots political organizations, the patrols were less successful at ensuring the military's hegemony in the countryside. In large part the civil patrols did not help to legitimize the military's rule because patrol duty was often viewed as a burdensome obligation.525 The main reason there was discontent with the civil patrols was because it took up so much time, and as a result it limited the ability of farmers to tend to their work. Since patrol duty was unpaid, taking part in the patrols actually led to increased poverty, which was often accompanied by more instances of hunger in rural areas. Patrol duty also hurt economic security because farmers who typically traveled to the southern coast or to Mexico to work as seasonal laborers were sometimes not allowed to travel because of their patrol duties. In instances where a patroller was granted permission to migrate for work, they were still obligated to find someone to take on their patrol responsibilities during their absence, which typically involved them having to pay someone to take their place. Since men were obliged to

spend a great deal of their time on patrol, women were often forced to labor on their

Augelli and Murphy, "Consciousness, Myth and Collective Action," 29. Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 33; Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 79; In her study of the civil patrols in Joyabaj, Simone Remijnse claimed that there were only a slim minority of people who strongly supported the civil patrol system. She further pointed out that most individuals tolerated the patrols, while a courageous minority publicly attacked the patrols. An Americas Watch study of the civil patrols came up with similar results with reference to the patrols from Chimaltenango. Remijnse, Memories of Violence, 296; Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 33, 38. 526 Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 41, 78-79, 121; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 45.
525

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behalf.527 Furthermore, women were affected by the civil patrols because as mentioned patrol duty was despised by the majority of people. As a result, since men could not openly criticize the patrols, they sometimes relieved their frustrations by drinking alcohol and beating their wives.528 In sum, while the military was able to use the civil patrols to gain control over the countryside, they were unable to create an authoritarian revolution as rural inhabitants largely did not consent to the military's rule.529 The military was missing an important component of hegemony - having a population that was largely united behind the military's values and objectives. Unfortunately for the military, conditions were not ideal in the countryside as the rural inhabitants were largely hostile to the military, and rural communities tended to lack unity as a result of the civil patrols, and because of the army's tactic of encouraging villagers to denounce one another as guerrilla sympathizers.530 In terms of the patrols, community members found it difficult to trust individuals who participated in the civil patrols because in sonic cases they were responsible for committing crimes against local residents. While in sonic cases this behavior was easier to forgive because patrollers were forced to take part, there were examples where patrollers took advantage of their near iinpunii> in order to rape, assault, kill, and steal from individuals in their charge.531 In addition, commumn solidarity deteriorated as a result of the army encouraging community nicmrvrs to inform on one

Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 79; Jonas, The Battle for Guuti-nutlit. Ill Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 79. 529 Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 81-82. 530 Americas Watch Committee, Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 73-74. 531 United Nations' Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH). Guutenuilu: Memory of Silence. Conclusions: The Tragedy of the Armed Confrontation, 1999. English translation: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/concl.html (accessed October lOih. 2009), paragraph 50; Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project, 95; Ciborski, "Guatemala 'We Though! Ii Was Only The Men They Would Kill,'" 135; Montejo, Voices from Exile, 68.
528

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another. The results of this policy led not only to neighbors denouncing one another, but also to family members selling one another out to military authorities.532

Garrard-Burnett, "Profile: Guatemala," 73.

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Chapter 7: Guatemala and the United States: An Uneasy Alliance In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, both Carter and Reagan aimed to provide adequate funding for the Guatemalan military so it could suppress the leftist rebel movement, and gain control over its population more generally. As a result, the Guatemalan military was able to commit massacres in the countryside in part because of both tacit and direct support from the United States government. Ironically, both the Carter and Reagan administrations had to pressure the Guatemalan government to decrease its attacks against civilians so that Congress would agree to send them military aid. Carter and Reagan had divergent agendas: Carter wanted to publicize a human rightscentric foreign policy whereas Reagan focused on imposing a fervent anticommunist ideology. Nonetheless, both agendas sought to legitimize the U.S.'s role as a global hegemon. According to Robert W. Cox, world hegemony is realized by establishing economic, political, and social structures that encourage the cohesion of norms among dominant and subordinate states. The most essential aspect of this process is the acceptance of the dominant state's mode of production by all states within its sphere of influence. In the case of the U.S., world hegemony was advanced through the offer of concessions to weaker states, aimed at making the U.S. appear more benevolent. Weaker states were additionally tempted to align themselves with the U.S. as a means of achieving success on the international stage.533 The Carter and Reagan administrations promoted the need for socio-economic reforms and democratic elections in Guatemala since both Carter and Reagan preferred that allied governments had a consensual relationship with the population they ruled
533

Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 126, 134-137.

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over.534 Nonetheless, the main objective the U.S. government had in Guatemala was making sure a government amenable to ensuring U.S. interests was in power. Consequently, both Carter and Reagan preferred to deal with a coercive, US-friendly government rather than a reformist or communist-inspired civilian government even while voicing concerns over Guatemala's human rights record.535 The belief that Guatemala was within the U.S. government's sphere of influence has a long history in U.S. politics. The United States intervened in Guatemala and Central America more generally by using the Monroe Doctrine to justify its actions.536 In 1954, for example, the United States conspired with Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and others to overthrow President Jacobo Arbenz in favour of a military dictatorship sympathetic to U.S. interests.537 After assisting with the coup in 1954, the United Sates provided the Guatemalan government with significant amounts of military and economic aid until 1977 when Carter refused to provide them with additional aid.538 In particular, the U.S.

Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in the 80s and 90s: Issues and Controversies from Reagan to Bush (New York and London: New York University Press, 1992), 2526; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 585-586; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 6, 1980, GU00669, United States Department of State, Conditions for Improved Relations with Guatemala, Pl-2. 535 Noam Chomsky, Turning the Tide: US Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace (Boston: South End Press, 1985), 82; 536 Stephen M. Streeter, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives," The History Teacher 34, 1 (Nov, 2000), 71. 537 For works that address the US role in the overthrow of Arbenz, see Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1982); Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala Rebels, Death Squads and US Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIAs Classified Account Of Its Operations in Guatemala 1952-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); and Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution And the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 538 From 1954 to 1966, the U.S. government sent the Guatemalan military US$9.3 million in direct military aid, as well as US$756,000 in other defence funding. By 1964, "military assistance program (MAP) deliveries amounted to 14.5 percent of Guatemala's defense budget of $11 million." Calvert, Guatemala, AA.

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played a substantial role training and equipping Guatemala's military and police force.539 Training included the instruction of members of the armed forces on torture techniques by C.I.A. operatives.540 Torture was also taught to senior members of the Guatemalan military at the School of the Americas. Training manuals for the School of the Americas, released to the public in 1996, encouraged recruits to use interrogation techniques such as beatings, torture, the arrest of relatives of the detainee, and murder. Graduates from the program included General Hector Gramajo, the former Secretary of Defense in Guatemala, as well as Colonel Julio Alpirez, who is best known for allegedly killing U.S. citizen Michael Devine, as well as Efrain Bamaca Velasquez.541 As Noam Chomsky puts it "the 'solution' to social problems in Guatemala, specifically attributable to the 1954 intervention and the form of U.S. assistance since that time, has been permanent state terror."542 The training and aid from the United States encouraged the Guatemalan military to adopt U.S. military ideology, including anticommunism and national security strategies more generally.543 Anticommunism clearly had an indigenous component in the Guatemalan military that U.S. military advisors were happy to foster. Nonetheless, anticommunism was not always accepted by the soldiers. In the late 1950s, for example, many officers still held progressive beliefs that contradicted the fanatical anticommunist rhetoric of the U.S. military. After the populist officers unsuccessfully staged a coup inside the military on November 13, 1960, they were purged, and anticommunist rhetoric
539 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 101; Ernest Evans, "Revolutionary Movements in Central America: The Development of a New Strategy," in The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America, ed. by Howard J. Wiarda and Mark Falcoff (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987), 180. 540 Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the American Way, 171-172. 541 Gill, The School of the Americas, 49; David W. Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine, 205. 542 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 72-73. 543 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 120.

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became more widespread and the Guatemalan military manipulated the U.S. government's preoccupation with anticommunism to serve its interests.544 Any heavyhanded military response to civil unrest in Guatemala was explained to the U.S. using anticommunist rhetoric.545 The U.S. government, however, did not require much convincing to accept the idea of a communist threat. Americans had long considered many left-wing reformist groups in Guatemala to be communist-inspired.546 When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, he propagated the idea that establishing a foreign policy based upon ensuring universal human rights would enhance American hegemony.547 Carter envisioned the United States leading a global movement to ensure the rights and dignity of all human beings, seeing this as the logical next step in the larger battle against institutionalized racism begun in World War U. According to Carter, his view on human rights was also shaped by his active participation in the civil rights movement during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.548 By extension, Carter felt the Democratic Party should encourage improvements in human rights around the world as they had done for blacks in the American South during the civil rights movement.549 He likewise believed that focusing on human rights would unite the Democratic Party because American voters were passionate about this issue.550

Peralta, "The Development of Military Autonomy and Corporateness in Central America," 164. Zarate, Forging Democracy, 61-63. 546 Richard H. Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History," Political Science Quarterly 95,4 (Winter 1980-1981), 638-639. 547 Carter, Keeping Faith, 20. 548 Henry Raymont, Troubled Neighbors (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2005), 212; Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter, 2-3. 549 Frye Gaillard, Prophet From Plains: Jimmy Carter and His Legacy. (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 2007), 15-17. 550 Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy, 54-55; Smith, Morality, Reason & Power, 6-7; Raymont, Troubled Neighbors, 216; Members of the Democratic Party believed it was no longer tenable to support repressive anti-communist governments because they were creating popular opposition movements that threatened the stability of these states. In order to increase the legitimacy of these
545

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Aside from the more idealistic motives for promoting human rights internationally, Carter saw his human rights campaign as a means to rejuvenate America's hegemony as a world power. Hence the reduction of human rights abuses in countries allied with the U.S. would have the added advantage of putting the U.S. in a better position to highlight the abuses committed by the Soviet Union and its allies at a time when the United States' legitimacy had declined because the American populace, and the world at large, was increasingly skeptical of the U.S. government's motives due to its involvement in Vietnam.551 In addition, American hegemony was weakened because of its declining economy in the late 1960s and early 1970s leaving multiple nations vying for hegemonic status, most notably Japan as well as several European countries.552 Carter's personal conviction that the U.S. was experiencing a spiritual crisis, along with Congressional pressure, motivated him to advance a foreign policy centered on improving human rights.553 Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State under Carter, elaborated on what the Carter administration sought to protect people from. He stated that individuals should not be subjected to government coercion in the form of "torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment." Additionally, he said all individuals had the right to use civil and political liberties such as "freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly; freedom of speech..." According to Vance, the Carter administration would ensure these rights through diplomacy and by withholding aid from
governments, the Democratic Party wanted to encourage improvements in civil and human rights. Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter, 11; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 15-16. 551 Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy, 54-55; Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 263-265. 552 Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations," 136, 140; McCormick, America's Half-Century, 195. 553 Morris, Jimmy Carter, 263-265; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 73; Gaillard, Prophet From Plains, XL

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offending nations.554 In other words, Carter wanted to ensure that subordinate nations abided by his pledge to improve human rights, and he was willing to use coercive diplomacy to meet this end.555 However, Carter's human rights policy was inconsistent because some members of his administration felt this policy was not useful, and there were disputes on how to best implement this policy. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski discouraged Carter's stance on human rights, believing it to be unenforceable. Brzezinski argued that the United States must expand its alliances with anticommunist governments and aggressively combat Soviet expansionism with U.S. military action.556 This perspective was also shared by most members of the National Security Agency as well as the Defense Department.557 Jimmy Carter often took a pragmatic approach when dealing with these differing
ceo

perspectives on human rights.

However, the human rights-centric policies initiated by

Cyrus Vance were usually unsuccessful, and as a result Carter hej:an embracing Brzezinski's perspective.559 Carter's foreign policy also took a rij:hi turn as a result of several confrontations his administration had with the Soviet I'nion As a means to retaliate against the Soviet Union, the Americans improved U.S. relations with China and added nuclear weapons to NATO's arsenal. U.S. policymakers were anxious over the Soviet Union's military campaign in Africa, the USSR's decision to ami Hastem Europe with SS-20 missiles, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and its imohement in the

Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force Vol 1, 141-142. Cox and Sinclair, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations." 127 556 Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter, 13-14. Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy, 63-64; McCormick. America's HalfCentury, 200. 558 Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter, 13-14. 559 Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy, 63-64.
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Nicaraguan revolution.560 Consequently human rights initiatives were put on the back burner, and the administration's primary foreign policy interest was taking a tough stand against communist expansion.561 While Carter did criticize the human rights records of some states, he became increasingly hesitant to criticize allies that were important to American interests, such as Iran, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea.562 In practice, relations between the U.S. and Guatemala were strained during the Carter administration. Jimmy Carter condemned the Guatemalan junta due to its aggressive designs towards Belize, and because he wanted Guatemala to serve as an example to publicize his human rights crusade. In terms of Belize, in 1976 the military junta stated openly that it intended to annex Belize. President Carter objected to this military posturing partly because Belize was a British colony. In terms of human rights, Carter stated that human rights violations would have to decrease in order for the Guatemalan government to receive American military aid.564 Carter's sentiment was echoed in a report given by Cyrus Vance to Congress in March 1977 that criticized Guatemala's human rights record.565 The Guatemalan President Kjell Laugerud Garcia resented the Carter administration's imposition on Guatemala's sovereignty and refused further American military aid.566 Congress and Carter decided to

McCormick, America's Half-Century, 206-207, 210-211. Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy, 53-54, 63-64. 562 Iran was important for American interests because of its oil resources, where the Philippines and South Korea housed strategically important American military bases. Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter, 15. 563 Peralta, "The Development of Military Autonomy and Corporateness in Central America," 169; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March, 1977, GU00506, United States Defence Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary: Section VIIILatin America, PI-2 564 Zarate, Forging Democracy, 63. 565 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August, 1978, GU00527, United States Defence Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIIILatin America, P2 566 Zarate, Forging Democracy, 63; White, The Morass, 104; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, July 18. 1978, GU00526, Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in
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cut off military aid and arms sales in 1977, as well as stop multilateral development bank loans.567 Nevertheless, the military equipment and aid already promised to Guatemala continued to enter the country until 1980.568 From 1979 to 1980, Guatemala was sent $34 million in military aid, mainly through the Department of Commerce.569 In addition, although from the period 1980 to 1983 two multilateral development bank loans to Guatemala were cancelled due to concerns over human rights, five loans were given by the Carter and Reagan administrations during this time. Guatemala's government also benefited from U.S. trade as sanctions were not imposed.570 When Lucas Garcia came to power in July 1978. the United States government was hopeful that his regime would be beneficial to the United States. A report from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala stated that Lucas Garcia would pose no threat to vital U.S. interests in Guatemala. The cable went on to say that any dramatic changes Lucas Garcia may have planned would be prohibited by the military and economic elite.571 The U.S. Embassy also felt optimistic about Lucas Garcia because he said Guatemala was in the
Guatemala, Background for Human Rights Speeches: Guatemalan Perceptions of Our Policies, Pl-2; Administration officials were not in sync on the best strategy to use to pressure Guatemala to improve its human rights record. For instance, Cyrus Vance predicted that because of President Laugerud Garcia's pride he would resent a public denunciation of Guatemala's human rights record by the U.S. government. Vance believed quiet diplomacy was the best strategy to use to encourage an improvement in human rights, and it would also persuade Laugerud Garcia not to annex Belize. National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, July 13, 1977, GU00509, Cyprus Vance. U.S. Department of State, Draft Human Rights Evaluation Report Prepared by ARA/CEN, P31-32. 5 7 Zarate, Forging Democracy, 63; Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine, 206; Congressional Quarterly, U.S. Foreign Policy, 68; Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 137. 568 Zarate, Forging Democracy, 63; White, The Morass. 104. 569 Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 157; With its decrease in military aid, the United States was no longer Guatemala's primary military supplier. Guatemala's main sources of military hardware were Israel, Taiwan, South Africa and Argentina. The Guatemalan army had access to Galil weapons, Bell helicopters, Pilatus aircraft, Arava cargo planes and surveillance equipment. A portion of the military aid received from Israel was underwritten by the U.S.. Israel also sent advisors to train the Guatemalan army and police forces. Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine, 206; William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2004), 236; Zarate, Forging Democracy, 68. 570 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 139. 571 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 14, 1978, GU00516, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, The Lucas Victory: Implications, P3-4.

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U.S.'s orbit, and he wanted U.S. military aid to flow with fewer restrictions into Guatemala. Furthermore, the U.S. Embassy was impressed that President Lucas Garcia

seemed interested in improving Guatemala's human rights record. Embassy officials pointed to Lucas Garcia's inaugural address where he discussed the need to assert the rule of law and institute reforms to reverse social and economic inequalities as evidence of his progressive intentions. Lucas Garcia's inaugural address convinced representatives from the U.S. Embassy that he would agree to receive military aid that was tied to improvements in human rights.573 Within less than two months, reports began to surface in the U.S. government that President Lucas Garcia had approved the use of death squads to combat the growing guerrilla insurgency in rural Guatemala.574 The State Department issued a report detailing evidence from NGOs, along with eyewitness statements, that described the human rights abuses the army and police force were perpetrating in the countryside. The report also claimed the police would commonly not investigate violence in the countryside.575 The State Department responded to this development by telling the Guatemalan government that while it encouraged the use of violence against rebel groups, the U.S. government would withhold military and economic aid if abuses against civilians were not curtailed. State department officials also demanded that the individuals responsible for the violence
National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 17, 1978, GU00519, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Conversation with President-Elect Lucas, Pl2,5. 573 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, July 18. 1978, GU00526, Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Background for Human Rights Speeches: Guatemalan Perceptions of Our Policies, P2-3. 574 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, September 1, 1978, GU00531, Richard Feinberg, United States Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Direction of Human Rights in Guatemala, PI. 575 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, September 25, 1979, GU00602, Mark L. Schneider, United States Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Government Involvement in Category I Violations, PO-1.
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be held accountable in Guatemalan courts.

Lucas Garcia responded incredulously that

the Guatemalan government was dealing with a guerrilla insurgency that "would not follow the rules", so he needed to use radical means to beat them.577 He claimed he was under pressure from the lower and middle classes to destroy the guerrillas, and going through legal channels was impossible because leftists had infiltrated the legal system. Lucas Garcia also claimed that non-leftist judges were being intimidated by the guerrillas.578 Despite these tensions, the United States continued to train and fund the Guatemalan military by other means.579 For instance, the Pentagon continued to train Guatemalan soldiers, and non-military aid still flowed between the two countries.580 Furthermore, Guatemala's government purchased $8.5 million dollars worth of equipment from private U.S. companies during the Carter administration.581 The U.S. military also supported the Guatemalan military during the Carter presidency by training their soldiers covertly in Chile and Argentina, and more openly through the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS).582 Members of the U.S. military encouraged their Guatemalan counterparts to view Carter and the State Department, whom the Guatemalan elites viewed as Marxists, as a temporary

National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 6, 1980, GU00669, United States Department of State, Conditions for Improved Relations with Guatemala, PI-2. 577 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 18, 1980, GU00670, Melvin E. Sinn, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Emissaries to President Lucas, Pl-2. 578 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 18, 1980, GU00670, Melvin E. Sinn, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Emissaries to President Lucas, Pl-2. 579 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 188. Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (London and New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), 261. 581 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Considered (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988), 97; Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 139. McClintock, The American Connection, 216.

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problem.583 The military also expressed their support when high-level U.S. military brass publicly met with Guatemalan military representatives and expressed sympathy towards the military's domestic campaign. Although Jimmy Carter reduced the amount of military aid sent to Guatemala in 1977, his overall human rights policy was applied inconsistently. The Carter administration continued to support repressive governments and groups that upheld American interests in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. To Carter's credit, while he did support these oppressive regimes, in many cases he pressured these allies to moderate their policies and reduce violence against civilians. In El Salvador, the Carter administration criticized the fraudulent elections in 1977 that brought General Carlos Humberto Romero to power and his subsequent human rights abuses against civilians. The Salvadoran government was using violence to destroy left-wing rebel groups, which included both reformist and revolutionary groups, and its supporters.585 Under Carlos Humberto Romero's guidance, in addition to attacking members of the leftist insurgency, the military, police, and death squads also targeted poor people and their representatives,
co/r

including labour leaders, religious officials, activists, and teachers.

Furthermore, the

death squads threatened and killed politicians who proposed moderation and compromise to end the guerrilla insurgency.587 Carter responded to these human rights abuses by suspending Inter-American Bank loans to El Salvador.588 Carlos Humberto Romero
Zarate, Forging Democracy, 63; McClintock, The American Connection, 216. McClintock, The American Connection, 216. 585 Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 38-41; William Deane Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 1-2; Smith, Morality, Reason & Power, 123-125. 586 Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 95-96; Stanley, The Protection Racket State, 1-2. 587 Stanley, The Protection Racket State, 1-2. 588 Smith, Morality, Reason & Power, 123-125.
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reacted to this by rejecting U.S. military aid. However, during Carlos Humberto Romero's stint as president, economic aid from the United States increased. Although Carter claimed this economic aid was given to El Salvador to fund social programs, it was commonly used to cover budget deficits caused by escalating military expenditures.589 In October 1979, Carlos Humberto Romero was overthrown as president and replaced by a revolutionary junta. The junta was comprised of a shaky alliance between right-wing interest groups and military officials on the one side, and center-left political moderates on the other. The Carter administration encouraged the actions of the moderate wing of this junta. Unfortunately for Carter, the moderates frequently had their progressive legislation, most notably an attempted land reform, blocked by right-wing interest groups. Within a few weeks the right-wing faction of the junta managed to outmaneuver the moderates, and eventually most of the moderates either resigned their government posts, or they were thrown out by the dominant right-wing coalition within the junta.5 The junta proved unwilling to curb human rights abuses by state security personnel and the death squads. Despite the escalation of government violence, Jimmy Carter resumed military aid to El Salvador fearing that the left-wing rebels might overtake the government to create '"another Nicaragua'".591 In December of the following year, three American Catholic nuns and one other worker were killed by Salvadoran soldiers. Jimmy Carter suspended military aid once more, and sent in a team

Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 135, 168; Smith, Morality, Reason & Power, 123-125. 590 Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 38-41, 96-99; Raymont, Troubled Neighbors, 229. 591 Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 38-41.

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to investigate these allegations.592 In his memoires, Carter wrote that he demanded justice for the nuns, a reform of the justice system, free and fair elections, and a land reform from the Salvadoran junta. Carter claimed that he held strong on this policy and refused to give them weapons until they made these reforms.593 In reality, Carter actually increased the level of economic and military aid to El Salvador in the later stages of his presidency despite its horrifying human rights record.594 During Carter's term in office, the Salvadoran security forces and death squads killed over 14,000 people.595 Carter's human rights record is further blemished because his administration provided Anastasio Somoza's regime with military and economic aid, as well as diplomatic support.596 Although Carter tried to force Anastasio Somoza to lift Nicaragua's state of siege and end censorship by refusing to send his government an Inter-American Development Bank loan, the U.S. continued to provide other forms of aid until 1979.597 Despite Carter's view that Anastasio Somoza was repressive, he continued to deal with them because there were no moderate elites in Nicaragua who were popular, could control the economy, and were able to ensure U.S. interests in the region. Nevertheless, Carter continued to pressure the Anastasio Somo/a's government to reduce human rights abuses by cutting American aid to Nicaragua in IW7MOn July 19th, 1979, the Sandinistas managed to overthrow Anastasio Somoza's regime The Sandinistas were

Smith, Morality, Reason & Power, 123-125. Carter, Keeping Faith, 585-586. 594 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 145; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Cnn\mt. 73. 595 Stanley, The Protection Racket State, 263. 596 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 202. 597 Wickham-Crowley, "Elites, Elite Settlements, and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 1950-1980," 567-568.
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in a coalition with political moderates, elites who felt excluded from the economic and political spoils, and dissatisfied sections of the military.598 Furthermore, the Carter administration also showed its disinclination to establish a foreign policy based on universal human rights when they supported the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Carter gave these Islamists extensive aid and training so they would fight against the Soviet Union, who had invaded in December 1979.599 The reason Carter supported El Salvador and Nicaragua was because these governments were truly under siege from left-wing guerrillas. By comparison, in the mid to late 1970s Guatemala only faced a minor rebel insurgency, and could easily sustain its military campaign without U.S. aid.600 Carter applied firm pressure on the Guatemalan government to reform its political system and reduce violence against civilians because it could conceivably do this without losing its war against the rebels. In addition, since Guatemala had no significant U.S. economic interests, the Carter administration could attack its human rights record without fear of a significant economic backlash.601 Jimmy Carter's human rights policies show that he does not have a principled criticism of human rights abuses, but a pragmatic one.602 Carter was a firm believer in the tenets of the Cold War, so he was willing to support brutal right-wing regimes in El Salvador and Nicaragua, as well as the mujahideen in Afghanistan against left-leaning opponents to
Richard Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," Comparative Politics 24, 4 (July 1992), 380-385; LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 279. 599 Smith, Morality, Reason & Power, 32. Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 73; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, May 1, 1975, GU00495, Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defence, Military Security Assistance FY 1977-1981, P272. 601 Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 97. 602 The distinction between a "principled" and a "pragmatic" critique is made by Chomsky. If Carter's human rights policy was truly principled, he would decry every regime that committed extensive human rights abuses because violence is immoral. Since he supported several violent regimes, his critique of human rights must be viewed as pragmatic. He still supported violence against leftist opponents, but encouraged the reduction of violence against non-combatants. Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 252.
598

162 sustain the U.S. imperial project. From the standpoint of maintaining U.S. hegemony, Carter's policies make sense. As mentioned above, American hegemony over subordinate states is experienced as an economic, political, and social relationship. Since the U.S. government's main concern was to expand international capitalism as it served American interests, Carter administration officials encouraged allied governments to use violence against any domestic groups that threatened the economic interests of the Americans or local elites. This is essential for maintaining American hegemony for several reasons. For one thing, if a U.S.-friendly government was overthrown and replaced by individuals who were hostile to the United States this represented a threat to American economic interests in the region. If the state in question had no substantial American economic investments, this would still be threatening to the U.S. government because it would undermine American political hegemony. If a state, particularly in Central America which was considered to be in the U.S. government's sphere of influence, adopted a development model that sharply contrasted from the American version this would be threatening on its own, and it would also serve as an example to other states that it is possible to develop outside of the U.S.'s influence. If states embraced alternative economic development models, this would also diminish American hegemony because losing allies is an affront to America's prestige as an eminent political power. In essence, the Carter administration encouraged the killing of political groups that threatened allied governments because these allies were upholding the political, economic, and social interests of the United States. By contrast, Carter offered financial and diplomatic concessions to allied governments if they would curb their use of political violence against civilians who were not threatening to American

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interests. Carter requested that allied governments improve their respective human rights records in part to expand American hegemony as it would allow these governments to appear more legitimate to Congress and to their own people. If the governments were seen as more legitimate, this would increase social stability which would be beneficial for American interests. On the other hand, if these American allies were challenged, the Carter administration could send military aid to suppress these subversive movements, so long as the governments avoided harming civilians. Ronald Reagan assailed Carter's human rights policy for selling out American interests to the Soviets. Reagan claimed that Carter's leniency when dealing with the Soviet Union had led to a weakening in American prestige, which encouraged the Soviets to more aggressively incite left-wing terrorism against U.S. allied governments.603 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Ambassador to the UN, agreed with this assessment adding that Carter's human rights policy was inconsistent as it commonly "condemn[ed] government 'repression' while ignoring guerrilla violence..." 04 The Reagan administration supported authoritarian governments battling leftwing insurgencies because they thought the Soviet Union was a totalitarian force bent on global domination. In his memoirs, Reagan claimed that Cuba and Nicaragua, at the behest of Moscow, were training and aiding rebels to overthrow US-friendly governments in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Mexico. Reagan went on to say that since Vladimir Lenin, the Soviet Union had sought to take over Eastern Europe, then Asia, and finally Latin America in order to destroy American capitalism. Jeff McMahan correctly points out that the Reagan administration's appraisal

Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 194. Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force Vol 1, 138, 143.

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of Soviet expansionism allowed the U.S. to represent itself as a liberating force for the weak, which legitimized its foreign policy.605 For the Reagan administration, a more aggressive fight against communism was necessary to re-establish American hegemony in the world. Reagan believed that making full use of America's economic and military power would counteract the gains made by the Soviet Bloc, which would expand America's hegemony.606 Reagan stated that failing to defend U.S. interests in Central America would destroy American credibility, and diminish the effectiveness of U.S. alliances, most notably NATO. Henry Kissinger,

who was chairman of the President's Commission on Central America, elaborated that if the U.S. did not succeed in Central America, its allies in the Persian Gulf would lose faith in the U.S.'s ability to protect their mutual interests, and they would look to other nations
r. 608

for support. The Reagan doctrine promoted the need to rollback the gains made by the Soviet Union.609 This entailed undermining left-wing governments already in power, and supporting anticommunist governments who endorsed U.S. policies.610 In Central America, the Reagan administration had three central aims. First, they wanted to increase the amount of military aid given to authoritarian regimes like Guatemala and El Salvador. Second, they supported the Contras as they fought to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Finally, they would increase U.S. economic investment and development aid
Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York and London: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 238239,471; McMahan, Reagan and the World, 13-14. 606 Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 163. 607 McMahon, Reagan and the World, 8-10; Paul Boyer, ed., Reagan as President: Contemporary Views of the Man, His Politics, and His Policies (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 1990), 239. 608 McMahon, Reagan and the World, 8-10. 609 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 157. 610 Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 194.
605

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to stabilize allied states.611 The Reagan administration wanted to fund US-friendly regimes so they could destroy their internal revolts, and work with the Contras to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The Reagan administration also claimed that by providing authoritarian regimes with aid, they could pressure them to institute democratic reforms through quiet diplomacy. Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote that the U.S. government could encourage reforms in authoritarian countries because the economic and social power of these regimes is multifaceted, which meant the government's power was limited. By contrast, she believed totalitarian regimes, a euphemism for Soviet Bloc allies, held a monopoly of power that prohibited dissent from the central ideology. She claimed that while

authoritarian regimes have become democracies in the past, there were no comparable examples of totalitarian states becoming democratic.614 Kirkpatrick claimed the U.S. should support friendly authoritarian regimes because otherwise these states might fall prey to communist machinations, as had happened in Nicaragua.615 In a related statement, Secretary of State Alexander Haig said that only Soviet-allied nations should be attacked for their human rights records. According to Haig, since the Reagan regime announced its principal interest was not preserving human rights but preventing global terrorism, authoritarian regimes should not be condemned for combating internal subversion.
!

In his memoirs, Reagan showed that

he supported this position by referencing his dealings with El Salvador. He stated that
Brown, Explaining the Reagan Years in Central America, 256. Thomas Leonard, Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1991), 183. 613 Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force Vol 1, 139. 614 Kirkpatrick references the transformations of Spain, Portugal, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bangladesh as examples of this trend. Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force Vol 1,139. 615 Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force Vol 1,138. 616 Raymont, Troubled Neighbors, 236.
612 11

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while it was clear that the government was murdering civilians, the pro-Soviet rebels were far more brutal than the government. Reagan also wrote that supporting the Salvadoran government through aid and diplomacy led to a reform of its judicial system, and to free elections in 1984 that brought Jose Napoleon Duarte to power.617 Although Congress was hesitant to endorse sending military aid to governments that committed gross human rights violations, they did acquiesce by providing economic aid that Central American governments used to cover budget deficits that were created by increased military spending. The economic aid to Central America jumped from

$185.5 million under Carter to $739.5 million under Reagan. In Guatemala specifically, aid increased from $26.6 million to $82.5 million under the Reagan administration.619 The Reagan administration claimed they wanted the Guatemalan government to defeat the "Marxist" rebel groups while attempting to limit its violence against civilians. In addition, Washington wanted to increase economic and military aid to Guatemala so the military could better combat the guerrillas, and so Guatemala's economy could stabilize. They also discussed the need for Guatemala to eventually become a representative democracy; and for the government to enact political reforms to meet this end.620 The Guatemalan military tried to establish closer relations with the Reagan administration before he came to power by hiring the public relations firm Denver and

Reagan, An American Life, 478. Cole Blasier, "The United States and Latin American Democracy," in Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, ed. by M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1987), 229. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 168. 620 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3, 1981, GU00690, United States Department of State, U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala, 1-2, 8-9.
1

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Hannaford to improve its image, and divert attention from its human rights record.621 Members of Reagan's transition team responded favorably to this by visiting Guatemala to establish ties with the right-wing military and civilian forces - individuals often involved with the death squads. Reagan administration officials were so impressed

with the Guatemalan government that once they came to power, although Guatemala was not high on Reagan's agenda, he asked that levels of military and economic aid be increased. His initiative was blocked by Congress. This was not a critical rebuff for the Reagan administration as the Guatemalan military was still receiving U.S. aid through existing contracts and through funding from the Agency for International Development.623 By early March of 1981, the State Department was aware that President Lucas Garcia had ordered political assassinations. It noted that while there was violence on all sides of the conflict, the main sources of repression were the Guatemalan military and the death squads.624 A similar report from the CIA in April detailed indiscriminate killing of non-combatants by government forces in Cocob, near Ncjah.'~N tVspite these alarming reports, Reagan officials did not admonish the Guatemalan go\ eminent lor its human rights abuses. The Reagan administration's policy of non-inter\ention in Guatemala's affairs was elucidated during a meeting between Deputy Secretary of IVfense Clark and Guatemala's Foreign Minister Rafael Castillo in May 1981. During this meeting, Clark stated that the U.S. government would not publicly condemn Guatemala's human rights
Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 139,145. Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 197. 623 Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United Sunt \. ami the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan/Owl Book and Henry Holt and Companv. 20071. 109: Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 159. 624 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection. March 3. 1981, GU00690, United States Department of State, U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala, P7-8. 625 Parry, "Reagan & Guatemala's Death Files," 249.
622 621

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record.626 Clark elaborated that a country's human rights situation was an internal matter, and President Lucas Garcia had American support for its war against the Cubansponsored insurgency. Despite heavy documentation of human rights abuses in Guatemala, in June 1981 Reagan offered to sell Guatemala 50 Vz ton trucks and 100 jeeps. Reagan did this by removing these items from a list of military equipment prohibited by the human rights embargo.628 The Reagan administration used the same tactic when they sold Guatemala 25 Bell helicopters through the Department of Commerce in 1981.629 These civilian helicopters were outfitted with guns upon arrival, and used during military campaigns in the countryside.630 The U.S. military also trained Guatemala's air force how to use the American-made helicopters in combat. When Reagan officials criticized Guatemala's human rights abuses, they made it clear that they were doing this not out of principle, but to limit attacks from Congress. When General Walters visited Guatemala on April 28th, 1981, he said that Guatemala should attempt to limit its killing of innocent bystanders, and have federal elections in 1982 to appease Congress. Walters said that Secretary of State Haig supported Lucas Garcia's fight against the Marxist guerrillas, but in order for military aid to increase
626 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 161; Clark's perspective on quiet diplomacy was not shared by all Embassy officials. For instance, Embassy officer Raymond J. Gonzales wrote a report condemning the Guatemalan government for their abduction and killing of two priests in January 1982. He claimed that by not denouncing the Guatemalan government publicly, the U.S. was serving as an apologist for their corruption and violence. National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, January 13, 1982, GU00753, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, GOG Officials Implicated in Arrest of Priests and Nuns and Murder of Sexton, 1-3. 627 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 161. 628 Parry, "Reagan & Guatemala's Death Files," 249; Institute for Policy Studies, "Behind Guatemala's Military Power," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. by Jonathan L. Fried and Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, 1983), 132. 629 Institute of Policy Studies, "Behind Guatemala's Military Power," 132; Sikkink, Mixed Messages, 159-160. 630 McMahan, Reagan and the World, 76; Sikkink, Mixed Messages, 159-160. 631 Bowen, "Guatemala," 296.

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between the two nations, Guatemala would have to improve its image with the American people and Congress. President Lucas Garcia responded to Walters that his

counterinsurgency tactics would not change because they were effective against the rebels.633 On July 30, 1981, Stephen Bosworth, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, testified before a Congressional committee that of all of the politically-motivated violence, the left-wing rebel groups were responsible for most of it.634 He said the Guatemalan military was successfully combating the insurgency while attempting to limit its violence against non-combatants. Bosworth also claimed the Guatemalan government would be more open to U.S. influence if increases in military and economic aid were endorsed by Congress. Bosworth's testimony was directly contradicted by Amnesty International which reported that the government was responsible for the majority of the murders in Guatemala. Despite the findings of this report, the State Department

declared in a paper released in December 1981 that the violence was primarily caused by the rebels.636 Lucas Garcia held elections for the presidency of Guatemala in March 1982. The Reagan administration hoped that holding these elections would encourage Congress to approve a resumption of military aid. The elections ended with an ally of Lucas Garcia's

National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, April 28, 1981, GU00701, Alexander Haig, Secretary of State, Initiative on Guatemala, Talking Points for General Walters, P3-6; National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, September 22, 1981, GU00728, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Ambassador Walters' Call on President Lucas: Bilateral Issues, Pl-2. 633 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 161-162. 634 Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991), 61. 635 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 162-163; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 74. 636 Parry, "Reagan & Guatemala's Death Files," 250.

632

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assuming the presidency in clearly fraudulent elections.637 After the electoral fraud, it became clear to U.S. officials that in order to resume aid, they would need a legitimate president in power.638 They believed that Lucas Garcia and his allies were corrupt and unable to properly fight the insurgents. When Rios Montt seized power shortly after the election in March, the Reagan administration tried to portray him positively as a pious, born again Christian who was curbing human rights abuses.640 With Lucas Garcia now out of power, the State Department admitted that his government had tortured and murdered its own citizens, but Rios Montt was improving Guatemala's human rights record. This characterization was conveyed most explicitly by State Department human rights officer Dale Shaffer who said that massacres in Guatemala had come to an end.641 Stephen Bosworth agreed with this appraisal stating that the human rights situation had improved dramatically from Lucas Garcia to Rios Montt.642 These sunny assessments did not match up with the grim reality in Guatemala. The State Department was lying about the human rights situation; after Rios Montt's coup rural repression increased substantially.643 Three weeks after the coup, U.S. Embassy official Frederic Chapin claimed that Guatemala's human rights improvement warranted a restart of military aid.644 This idea

McMahon, Reagan and the World, 76. McClintock, The American Connection, 226-227. 639 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 147-148. 640 McMahon, Reagan and the World, 76. 641 Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 110. 642 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 14; Thomas O. Enders, "FY 1983 Assistance Requests." Department of State Bulletin, 82, 2064 (April 1982), 85. 643 Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 110; The evidence indicating that human rights had improved under Rios Montt was very limited. There was a somewhat favourable report by the UN that discussed advances Rios Montt had made since coming to power. This report was overshadowed by overwhelming evidence from Amnesty International, America's Watch, and other human rights groups that documented increasing violence in the countryside. David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 98-99. 644 McClintock, The American Connection, 228.
638

637

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was repeated by Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders who claimed that violence against civilians was almost nonexistent under Rios Montt. He claimed that Rios Montt was charting a new path in Guatemala, and he should be encouraged by the U.S..645 In April, claiming good behavior on the part of Guatemala's government, Reagan ended the arms embargo by agreeing to sell them $4 million dollars worth of helicopter parts. Congress objected to the sale of the helicopter parts, and declined to fulfill the administration's request that military and economic aid be increased in 1983. Nevertheless, the U.S. government did aid Guatemala by approving a multilateral bank loan in October 1982.646 Both the State Department and the U.S. Embassy claimed that violence was declining under Rios Montt. However, both did concede that they seldom investigated the allegations against the government. It was also common for Embassy officials to not trust the statements made by refugees about their treatment in Guatemala. U.S. Ambassador Chapin explained that eye-witness statements from Guatemalan refugees living in Mexico were not important to investigating human rights abuses because he "wouldn't believe a goddamn thing any Mexican told me."647 While the U.S. government was optimistically reporting on Rios Montt's human rights record, Amnesty International released a report in October 1982 that claimed Guatemalan soldiers "destroyed entire villages, tortured and mutilated local people and carried out mass executions." The report showed that the Guatemalan government had escalated its use of scorched-earth tactics in villages.648 The Reagan administration

645 646

Chomsky, introduction to Bridge of Courage, 17. Trudeau and Schoultz, "Guatemala," 44-45. 647 Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny, 114. 648 Chomsky, introduction to Bridge of Courage, 18; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 582.

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responded to criticism by human rights organizations by attacking these groups. Thomas Enders stated that the Reagan administration tried to debase the claims of human rights organizations because their criticism was going to antagonize Rios Montt from pursuing democratization.649 The State Department claimed that Amnesty International and Americas Watch were biased towards left-wing interest groups, so they overlooked guerrilla violence and exaggerated government violence.650 This criticism was also leveled at human rights groups by the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala. They claimed these organizations were waging a disinformation campaign at the behest of international communism mainly by gathering their information from communist front groups. It was unclear to Embassy officials to what extent these human rights groups were aware they were being manipulated by Communists. The Embassy held human rights groups responsible for unnecessarily propagating the guilt of the Guatemalan military to the media, church groups and other organizations. In a similar vein, U.S. government officials believed that human rights groups tried to influence Congress to prevent an increase in military aid to Guatemala, which was necessary to destroy the rebel movements.651 In December, when the Rios Montt government was at the height of its abuses in the countryside, Ronald Reagan met with Rios Montt in Honduras.652 Reagan stated publicly that Rios Montt was '"a man of great personal integrity'" who was committed to creating democratic change in Guatemala.
649 650

He went on to say that Rios Montt was

Zarate, Forging Democracy, 66-67. Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 78-79. 651 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, October 22, 1982, GU00866, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Analysis of Human Rights on Guatemala by Amnesty International, WOLA/NISGUA, and Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, PI-3. 652 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 188. 653 Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 139.

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receiving a "bum rap" from human rights organizations.654 Reagan's attempts to put a positive spin on Rios Montt's presidency were a failure.655 In December 1982, the U.S. National Council of Churches released a report detailing the government-sponsored violations of human rights in Guatemala. In addition, Americas Watch, Amnesty International and independent journalists were writing about the escalation of violence in Guatemala.656 By late 1982, U.S. officials were less compelled to ask for increases in aid as Guatemala had largely crippled the guerrilla movement.657 However, the State Department continued to portray Rios Montt as a progressive leader. Reagan utilized

this positive press to unilaterally lift the arm sales ban in January 1983. He stated that given improvements in human rights, he would sell Guatemala $6.3 million dollars worth of helicopter parts, radio equipment and other items.659 Rios Montt said that Guatemala had inadequate foreign exchange to purchase these items, and he requested that any surplus items the U.S. had be given to him as a gift.660 When this request was rebuffed, Rios Montt asked American officials if he could borrow ten helicopters for three months, and also provide Guatemala with a loan that would allow him to procure the helicopter parts.661 Congress would not approve a loan to Guatemala to facilitate this purchase.662

Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 116; Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 74. 655 McClintock, The American Connection, 218. 656 Bowen, "Guatemala," 293. 657 Grandin, Empire's Workshop, 109. 658 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 74. 659 Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 199; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 63. 660 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, January 13, 1983, GU00896, Frederick Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Next Steps for Guatemala, Pl-2. 661 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, July 25, 1983, GU00943, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Stone Mission: Meeting with President Rios Montt and Foreign Minister Castillo, Pl-2. 662 Congressional Quarterly, U.S. Foreign Policy, 79.

654

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However, Congress did agree to increase economic aid to Guatemala from $15.5 million to $29.7 million from 1982 to 1983.663 In spite of the fact that Reagan officials did not sell the Guatemalan government the helicopter parts, they still had a great deal of faith in Rios Montt. They continued to discuss positive developments in Rfos Montt's presidency, serving as apologists for the terror he was precipitating.664 Their support for him was so unwavering that when the U.S. caught wind of a military plot to overthrow Rios Montt, they vehemently denounced this development. Paul Taylor, a U.S. Embassy staffer, wrote to Guatemalan officials telling them that the instability caused by a coup would embolden Guatemala's critics, and make U.S. cooperation harder to facilitate.665 Furthermore. U.S. Ambassador Frederic Chapin threatened to withhold aid from the National Liberation Movement if Rios Montt was deposed as president:666 Despite U.S. warnings, Rios Montt was removed from power and replaced by Defense Minister Mejia Victores. Although U.S. officials preferred to deal with Rios Montt, they wasted no time propagating the virtues of Mejia Victores so military aid to Guatemala could resume. The State Department confessed that conditions under Rios Montt's rule had been atrocious, but Mejia Victores was dramatic alls improving human rights standards. For his part, Mejia Victores did pay lip ser\ ice to the importance of

Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 63. Parry, "Reagan & Guatemala's Death Files," 251. 665 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection. June 7. I W . GU00921, Paul D, Taylor, United States Embassy in Guatemala, General Echeverria's Letier as Pan of a Coup Plot, P2-3. 666 Bonner, "A Guatemalan General's Rise To Power," 128. 667 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 74.
664

663

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democratization and individual liberties.

However, in the first stage of his presidency,

he actually increased the level of repression in Guatemala.669 After the death squads murdered three individuals who worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development in November, the Reagan administration postponed the sale of U.S. helicopter parts to Guatemala. Reagan's displeasure with the Mejfa Victores regime was short-lived as he sent the helicopter parts the following month.670 Reagan officials claimed that escalating U.S. aid and training of Guatemala's military would encourage a favorable attitude towards U.S. interests, encourage stability in Guatemala by democratizing the government, and it would provide the government with funds for its civic action programs.671 For Reagan's part, he also wanted to bring Guatemala and the U.S. together so they would join the Central American Defense Council (Condeca) with Honduras and El Salvador. This organization's central mandate was to bring together right-wing governments in Central America to depose the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.672 In May 1984, the C.I.A. suggested that the United States increase aid to Guatemala because the regime was taking steps that were detrimental to American interests. Agency officials were concerned that Guatemala was asserting itself as a hegemon in Central America, which meant American influence in the region would wane. A dominant position for Guatemala was particularly troubling to U.S. interests
668

Zarate, Forging Democracy, 68. McMahan, Reagan and the World, 78. 670 Parry, "Reagan & Guatemala's Death Files," 251. 671 National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, November 15, 1983, GU00982, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, CPD for FY-85 Security Assistance Program, P2-5; Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 199-202. 672 McMahan, Reagan and the World, 78.
669

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because portions of Guatemala's military resented the United States for its lack of support during Guatemala's civil war. It was believed that increasing aid would turn Guatemala into a more fervent ally, so its power ambitions could work to the U.S.'s advantage.673 Reagan showed his support for the Embassy's position by again requesting the re-establishment of military aid and an increase in economic aid to $35 million for 1985. Congress rejected the request for military aid, but they did approve funding to train Guatemalan military officers. In addition, Congress did agree to provide Guatemala with economic aid, but they went below Reagan's request by sending Guatemala $12.5 million.674 From 1982 to 1984, the Reagan administration managed to provide Guatemala with tanks and gun sights worth $36 million and $7 million dollars respectively through indirect channels. Congress would not allow military aid to flow into Guatemala until 1986, well after Guatemala's elections brought Vinicio Ccrezo to power. In 1986, Congress also sent $104 million dollars worth of economic aid to Guatemala.675 By this time the rebel movement had largely been destroyed, so human rights abuses were much lower than in the early 1980s. Assessing Reagan's legacy on Guatemala tends to fall into two categories: historians who believe his administration sought democratic change, and other theorists
National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, May 14, 1984, GU01013, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Guatemala: Central American Policy and U.S. Relations, Pl-2; A similarly themed report came out of the CIA in late 1984. This report stated that Guatemala's military was losing morale because they lacked the necessary equipment to win a decisive military victory against the insurgents. The officers also blamed the poor military equipment for the escalation of military casualties. The report stated that giving Guatemala more aid would lead to the destruction of the guerrilla forces, and to a subsequent liberalization of its political structures. National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, December 19, 1984, GU01028, Central Intelligence Agency, Guatemala: Military Problems, P8. 674 Congressional Quarterly, U.S. Foreign Policy, 66. 675 Painter, Guatemala, 107-108. 676 Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 124-125.
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who believe Reagan supported Guatemala primarily because of a shared anticommunist ideology. In terms of the former, Juan Carlos Zarate's book Forging Democracy takes the Reagan administration at its word that its motives for seeking greater aid were to end the left-wing insurgency and push the Guatemalan elite towards democratization.677 Howard Wiarda confirmed this perspective, adding that from 1982 to 1985 the Reagan administration moderated its policies and encouraged a stronger emphasis on human rights and development in Central America.678 In his book In the Name of Democracy, Thomas Carothers claimed the Reagan administration had a moral drive to spread democracy in Central America, while making sure U.S. political and economic interests were assured.679 Historians who believe anticommunism was the primary objective of Reagan's policy towards Guatemala rightly show that his administration actively lied about Guatemala's human rights record to encourage Congress to increase aid.680 These historians also attack the idea that Reagan sought to democratize Guatemala because his administration's zealous support of the military was destructive to democratic movements. Kathryn Sikkink, in her work Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy

and Latin America, shows that U.S. officials gave rhetorical and moral support to the Guatemalan military that they required in order to continue its slaughter in the countryside. Noam Chomsky agrees with this assessment, showing that U.S. officials

677

Zarate, Forging Democracy, 65. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in the 80s and 90s, 25-26. Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 1-5. 680 Consent, 110. ' Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Manu, 681 Jonas, "Elections and Transitions," 128. Transiti 682 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 180.
678

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clearly knew about the human rights abuses of Lucas Garcia, Rfos Montt and Mejfa Victores, but would not condemn them until they were out of power.683 Susanne Jonas presents a compelling case that the U.S. wanted to support anticommunist movements, regardless of how popular they were in their respective countries, rather than foster democracy in Central America. Jonas shows that Reagan officials established "counterinsurgency democracies" that subverted any reformist, nationalist or socialist movements, primarily by using heavy-handed tactics to destroy these movements, and control its population.
84

The Reagan administrations

preoccupation with anticommunism led them to encourage the Guatemalan military as they slaughtered tens of thousands of people.685 The main concerns for both Carter and Reagan was re-establishing American hegemony in the world, and aggressively combating reformist and communist movements that threatened U.S. interests. The main difference between the two men was the approaches they utilized. Carter wanted to renew America's credibility in the world by publicizing a human rights crusade, in part by condemning Guatemala's record. His human rights policy was hypocritical because his objection to human rights abuses could not be reconciled with his tactic of supporting anticommunist governments that were having difficulty subverting left-wing rebels. By contrast, Reagan supported Guatemala because he thought American hegemony would be re-established if the U.S. adopted a more aggressive anticommunist foreign policy. Under Reagan's foreign policy, human rights was of little importance compared to having a government that would ensure U.S.

Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 110. Susanne Jonas, "Elections and Transitions," 128. Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, 73.

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interests by destroying left-wing opposition.686 Since Guatemala's government was fairly loyal to the US, the Reagan administration only applied mild pressure to democratize as they were doing America's bidding in Central America.687

The Reagan administration also served as an apologist for anti-communist regimes in Argentina, El Salvador and Chile. Brown, Explaining the Reagan Years in Central America, 251-252; Raymont, Troubled Neighbors, 241. 687 Reagan's actions in Guatemala help to prove Noam Chomsky's analysis of how the U.S. government viewed democratization in Central America. According to Chomsky: "We are to understand, then, that 'democracy' is a system that rejects democratic forms so as to facilitate reduced consumption and super exploitation, with state control over the economy in coordination with domestic conglomerates and international corporations, a pattern closer to traditional fascism than to democracy. All makes sense, however, when we take the term 'democracy' to mean domination of the economy and social and political life by domestic elements that are properly sensitive to the needs of corporations and the U.S. government." Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, 108.

686

180 Conclusion; Military Hegemony in the 1980s and Beyond The previous chapters have shown what the major internal and external causes were that led the military to escalate its level of violence in the countryside. Principally the military was interested in destroying any counter-hegemonic institution in the countryside. Under Rios Montt and Mejia Victores, this violence was a component of the military's plan to integrate the rural population further into the state in order to win its counterinsurgency, and to ensure the continued hegemony of the military and economic elites. In terms of the counter-hegemonic movement, the military found these groups threatening because they advocated revolution, they wanted Mayans and ladinos to be economically and racially equal, and they encouraged the proliferation of rural governance structures that were autonomous from the central government. The leaders of these movements were the intellectuals of the counter-hegemonic movement who articulated the need to reform or overthrow the current social order to create a more progressive one. Prior to the military's escalation of violence, most of the organizations in the popular movement used non-violent means to meet their ends, but when these organizations grew substantially in size and in some cases forged links with the guerrilla groups, this made the government more fearful of reformism, and the military reacted violently. The authoritarian revolution that the military sought to push through in the countryside required loyal local leaders, so the military tried to co-opted or otherwise control these organizations. Ideally the military wanted either apolitical leaders or leaders who sought to legitimize the military's role and embrace nationalism. When this could not be done, these community organizations were destroyed and replaced with militarydominated institutions like the civil patrols, model villages, the S-5, the National

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Reconstruction Committee, the Inter-Institutional Coordinating Committees, and the development poles. In other words, in an attempt to counteract the military's waning hegemony in the 1970s and 1980s, the military modified or created leadership structures in the countryside that embraced military ideology. Relating to this idea, under Rfos Montt and Mejia Victores the military also tried to enhance its hegemony by providing concessions to the rural populace, and by inundating the rural population with military propaganda. In terms of concessions, each of the military governments to some extent set up social programs and institutions that were designed to show the rural population that the government was benevolent and looking out for the best interests of the rural populace. This was most notably evident with Rfos Montt's "Riffles and Beans" program, along with other f'ood-for-work programs that the military set up. Along with providing concessions, the military also sought to gain the allegiance of the rural inhabitants through ideological indoctrination. The military's ideology was conveyed to the population through traditional forms of media like radio and print, but also as a part of military training, re-education centers, Protestant missionary agitation, and civic education in the model villages and civil patrols. The miluar\ s ideology was meant to legitimize the social order that was dominated by the nuhtar\ and the economic elites. With this in mind, the military pushed an ideological platlonn that highlighted nationalism and anticommunism. In terms of nationalism, this rhetoric was expressed both as a racial concept in terms of the need for Mayans to embrace ladino culture and values, and also as a civic concept. As a civic concept, the militar\ sought to convince the rural inhabitants that military officials were legitimate political representatives, and as

182 such the rural population should work towards the preservation of the military-dominated status quo. By extension, the military tried to indoctrinate the rural population with military values like anticommunism so individuals in the countryside would embrace the military, and fight against the guerrilla groups. As was shown, the military was only marginally successful at imbuing the rural inhabitants with nationalist and anticommunist ideology. As Gramsci pointed out, when governments are not able to gain the allegiance of some members of the populace, they resort to using coercion. Since Guatemala's military government was in a state of crisis because of the counter-hegemonic movement, its extensive use of violence, and its poor handling of disaster relief after the 1976 earthquake, the military escalated its use of violence to contain these criticisms. This combination of using concessions, ideological indoctrination, and violence to reacquire military hegemony in the countryside was particularly prevalent in the model villages and the civil patrols. The model villages were designed to implement the military's authoritarian revolution as they sought to undermine the guerrilla groups, and integrate the population into the state. The military tried to accomplish this by using intimidation and surveillance to make sure that community organizations were weakened, and by assimilating the Mayan population further into the national economy. The civil patrols were useful to the counterinsurgency as the military coerced the rural inhabitants to form civil patrols that would guard local areas from the guerrillas, take part in combat duty, spy on the local inhabitants, and suppress community organizations that were outside of the military's purview. Unfortunately for the military, its attempt to create an -authoritarian revolution with the model villages and civil patrols proved largely

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unsuccessful as these institutions were unpopular, and they weakened community solidarity. Nevertheless, these two institutions were instrumental in helping the military to overpower the guerrillas, and destroy autonomous community organizations which were the main reasons why the military used violence in the countryside. Outside of using violence to undermine the guerrillas and the other organizations in the popular movement, the military also used violence to force rural farmers out of northern Guatemala at the behest of the economic elite. This violence shows that the military's main class ally was the economic elite as the military forced peasants to go to the western highlands so the economic elite could use this land. So the military's main interests during the 1970s and 1980s was winning the counterinsurgency, gaining control over the countryside, and making sure that the economic elites were relatively happy with how the military was governing. Since the military establishment agreed on these basic goals, when military elites were removed from power, it was generally because there were disputes on how to best attain these goals, rather than debating the merit of the goals. When Lucas Garcia's political ally General Angel Anfbal Guevara was removed from power, this was because of an ideological split within the military as the individuals who perpetrated the coup wanted to remove Lucas Garcfa's ally because they wanted to make more use of social programs in the counterinsurgency, the corruption was delegitimizing the military as rulers at home and abroad, and they felt Lucas Garcia's policies were fracturing unity in the army. In this sense, both the military elites behind the coup and the economic elites wanted military officials to be viewed as legitimate political elites around the world in part because it would be easier to get U.S. military aid.

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In 1983, despite the fact that Rios Montt had largely destroyed the guerrillas, had allowed the military to gain control over rural leadership structures, and had ensured that rural farmers were largely labouring for the national economy, he was overthrown. The military and economic elites viewed Rios Montt as a liability because his brutal tactics were viewed unfavourably by people at home and abroad. The military coup organized by Mejia Victores also sought to push for elections in Guatemala because the military was seen as illegitimate rulers internationally, so it would be best to control power behind the scenes, but allow civilians to control the formal democratic structures. The military elites hoped that with this kind of an arrangement they could receive military aid from the U.S., and Guatemala's stagnant economy might improve as more states would trade with Guatemala and invest capital in the state. Furthermore, having a civilian president would help to justify the military's counterinsurgency because Guatemala's freely elected political elites would support the military's war against the guerrillas, which would give the military's counterinsurgency a legal sanction. In the lead up to the two elections in 1984 and 1985, the military promoted the need for the elections in the countryside, and they also sought to permanently establish the military's presence in the countryside so that regardless of which political party won the election, the party in question would have to align with the military in order to function as political elites. The military was engaging in Gramsci's notion of transformismo as they co-opted the civilian political parties so they would embrace military interests. By doing so, the civilian political parties reinforced military interests by legalizing the civil patrols, by passing an amnesty that prevented members of the military from being tried for political crimes, and by not advocating a much-needed land

185 reform. From 1985 to the present, the civilian political parties showed that they were unable or unwilling to curb the military's power, so demilitarization did not occur in any meaningful sense. Since the military maintained a strong influence over Guatemala's political and social structures, they exercised a limited hegemony during this time. The Guatemalan military received varying levels of aid and support from the Carter and Reagan administrations during its counterinsurgency as both administrations wanted to support allied governments that were fighting revolutionary left-wing groups. These revolutionary movements were threatening to the United States because they sought to overthrow American allies that were trying to maintain the economic, political, and social relationships between the U.S. and allied states that was the basis for American hegemony. As a result, both administrations provided aid and encouragement to several governments that were battling left-wing insurgencies that threatened American interests. However, Carter's relations with the Guatemalan government had the added dimension of his drive to improve the human rights records of American allies. So while Carter wanted to provide the Guatemalan government with aid to suppress the left-wing guerrillas, he was concerned about the government's attacks against civilians, so he cut military aid to Guatemala. Carter offered the Guatemalan government concessions, in the form of economic and military aid, if the government would decrease its violence against noncombatants, and moderate its policies more generally. Although Carter was not successful in Guatemala, one of the broader objectives of his human rights policy was to enhance America's domestic hegemony as U.S. citizens would view the Carter administration as benevolent for trying to improve human rights standards across the world. Furthermore, Carter felt that if U.S. allies improved their human rights records

186 that these countries would be more stable, which would be good for the allied governments, and good for U.S. political and economic interests. In sum, Carter seemed willing to support American allies that were threatened by a left-wing insurgency if the ally in question tried to limit its killing of non-combatants. In some cases Carter would not enforce his human rights policy on allied nations if they were essential to American interests, or if the government was truly struggling to suppress left-wing movements. Nevertheless, even in instances where American allies like El Salvador and Nicaragua were combating threatening left-wing movements, Carter did encourage these allies to moderate their repressive policies. The Reagan administration thought that Carter placed too much emphasis on human rights, which had allowed the Soviets to incite successful revolutions against U.S. allies in Nicaragua and Iran. Rather than focus on human rights, the Reagan administration sought to push through a more aggressive anticommunist foreign policy that would put the Soviet Union and its allies on the defensive. To meet this end, Reagan wanted to provide economic and military aid to anticommunist governments. The Reagan administration believed that if this measure was successful then U.S. hegemony would expand substantially at the expense of the Socialist Bloc. In terms of Guatemala, the Reagan administration wanted to increase American aid to Guatemala, but this was largely blocked by Congress. Reagan officials told the Lucas Garcia administration that if the Guatemalan military moderated its policies by killing fewer civilians and by implementing democratic reforms, then Congress would likely allow more aid to flow into Guatemala. After Lucas Garcia refused to moderate his policies, the Reagan administration still tried to get Congress to send more aid by misrepresenting the extent

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of the human rights abuses in Guatemala. However, it eventually became clear to the Reagan administration that Lucas Garcia and his allies should not lead Guatemala because they had committed a widely-reported electoral fraud, and they were having trouble overpowering the guerrillas. After Rios Montt assumed the presidency, the Reagan administration propagated the idea that human rights violations were declining under Rios Montt, and they publicly attacked human rights organizations for contradicting this idea. The Reagan administration made similar claims after Mejia Victores took power. Although the Reagan administration only had limited success in getting Congress to increase aid to Guatemala while the military held political power, he still provided indirect aid to the military. American support for the Guatemalan military also took more subtle forms. For instance, the U.S. government refused to admit many Guatemalan refugees, and they pressured Mexico to abide by a similar policy.688 To make matters worse, in the early 1990s the U.S. government threatened to deport individuals who had fled to America to avoid government repression in Guatemala and El Salvador because the U.S. government refused to classify them as '"political refugees.'" Howard Zinn correctly pointed out that the government's calculus for not defining them as political refugees was because otherwise this would undermine American claims that these allied governments were curbing their use of violence against civilians.689 In sum, the military elites escalated their use of violence because they defined their enemies increasingly more broadly as time went on. Initially the military used violence to reinforce the interests of the economic elite. By the late 1970s the government made more use of violence against community organizations for this reason. More
688 689

Sante, Nightmare or Reality, 4. Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005),

648.

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importantly, the military defined the guerrilla groups as the biggest enemy of the Guatemalan state. The Guatemalan military claimed that the guerrillas sought to overthrow the current government in order to install an exploitive Marxist government. In other words, military rhetoric claimed that the military and the population more generally were being victimized by these guerrilla groups, so they needed to be suppressed. The military also used anticommunism as a catchall in order to legitimize its attacks against community organizations. While some individuals in the popular movement did support the guerrillas, the military also targeted these groups because they were forming a counter-hegemonic movement. Near the end of Lucas Garcfa's term and into Rios Montt's tenure as president, the military's definition of who was an enemy broadened as the military used massacres and scorched-earth tactics to destroy whole communities that were thought to support the guerrillas or community organizations that undermined the status quo. This process of defining enemies more broadly was exacerbated by Ladino racism towards the Maya.690 The military's attempt at state-building had mixed results As mentioned they did overpower the guerrilla groups, and they did integrate the rural population under the state's control. In addition, the Guatemalan population did not \ icw the military dictatorships in a completely negative light. For example, during the national election campaign in 1989-1990, Rios Montt was viewed very favorabK. as u as his party the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). Even though Rios Montt could not rule due to constitutional restrictions, many members of the population were attracted to Rios Montt

The notion of "defining enemies" was used skilfully by Omer Barim w uh reference to Nazism and anti-Semitism in Germany. Bartov explores these ideas in the article Omer Baru>\. "Denning Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust," The American Historical Review "103, no. 3 (June 1998): 771-816.

690

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because his "moral authoritarianism and political iconoclasm appealed to a populace rocked by economic crisis, crime, and social disintegration." Furthermore, Rfos Montt was popular because he appointed Mayans onto the Council of State, which helped to convey that he wanted greater Mayan involvement in political structures.691 On the other hand, the military's state-building operation was incredibly violent, it fared poorly in terms of economic development,.and it led to social disintegration in the countryside.692 The latter repercussion occurred because "[t]he counterinsurgency strategy, and the impunity with which actions were carried out, paralyzed people and they began to adapt their behavior to a hostile environment." As a result, many rural

communities were unable or unwilling to create local, regional, or national self-help organizations.694 In other words, the military's attempt at state-building had a devastating impact on the rural population. The military's escalation of violence is a grim example of the destructive potential that anti-communism, nationalism, racism, as well as economic and political oppression can have. The negative impact that the military's state building plan had on the rural population was summed up brilliantly by the Guatemalan Church in Exile when it wrote "the army has made itself the guardian of the national soul, imposing on the people, through the force of its arms, a national destiny contrary to the people's interests."695

Barry, Inside Guatemala, 3-4, 7; Nelson, A Finger In The Wound, 101. Barry, Inside Guatemala, 5. Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again, 11-12. Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War, 140-141. Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio, Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy, 143.

190 Bibliography Primary Sources; Americas Watch Committee. Civil Patrols in Guatemala. New York and Washington: Americas Watch, 1986. Amnesty International. Guatemala: The Human Rights Record. London: Amnesty International Publications, 1987. Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again! Recovery of Historical Memory Project. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999. Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio. Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy. Managua: Guatemalan Church in Exile, 1989. National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, May 1, 1975, GU00495 Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defence, Military Security Assistance FY 1977-1981, Pages 208277, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/GU/00495/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March, 1977, GU00506, United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary: Section VIELatin America, Pages 1-4, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com. catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00506/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, July 13, 1977, GU00509, Cyprus Vance, U.S. Department of State, Draft Human Rights Evaluation Report Prepared by ARA/CEN, Pages 31-32, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com .catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00509/all.pdf National Security Archives, El Salvador, 1977-1984 Collection, October 25, 1977, ES00041, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America, Pages i-18, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.cat l.lih.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/ES/ 00041/all.pdf National Security Archives, El Salvador, 1977-1984 Collection, October 25, 1977, ES00041, United States Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America, Pages i-18, Online:http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/ES/ 00041/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 14, 1978, GU00516, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, The Lucas Victory: Implications, Pages 1-4, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib. trentu.ca: 8080/nsa/documents/GU/00516/al I.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 14, 1978, GU00516, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, The Lucas Victory: Implications, Pages 1-4, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib. trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00516/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 17, 1978, GU00519, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Conversation with President-Elect Lucas, Pages 1-5, Online: http://nsarchive. chadwvck.com.cat 1 .lib.trentu.ca: 8080/nsa/documents/GU/00519/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, June 1, 1978, GU00520,

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George R. Andrews, United States Embassy in Guatemala, More on Campesino/Military Clash in Panzos, Pages 1-4, Online: http://nsarchive. chadwvck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00520/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, June 5, 1978, GU00521, George R. Andrews, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Panzos Episode, Pages 1-2, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.cat 1 .lib.trentu.ca: 8080/nsa/ documents/GU/00521/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, June 28,1978, GU00525, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Panzos, Pages 1-2, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwvck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/ documents/GU/00525/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, July 18. 1978, GU00526, Davis Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Background for Human Rights Speeches: Guatemalan Perceptions of Our Policies, Pages 1-4, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/ GU/00526/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August, 1978, GU00527, United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIELatin America, Pages 1-6, Online: http://nsarchive. chadwvck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00527/ all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, September 1, 1978, GU00531, Richard Feinberg, United States Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Direction of Human Rights in Guatemala, Pages 1-2, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwvck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00531/ all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, December 5, 1978, GU00539, David Eugene Boster, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Lucas' First Five Months, Pages 1-7, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.cat 1 .lib. trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00539/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, September 25, 1979, GU00602, Mark L. Schneider, United States Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Government Involvement in Category I Violations, Pages 0-4, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca: 8080/nsa/documents/GU/00602/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, November 1979, GU00615, United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VHJLatin America, Pages 1-7, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwvck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00615/ all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 6, 1980, GU00669, United States Department of State, Conditions for Improved Relations with Guatemala, Pages 1-3, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib. trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00669/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, August 18, 1980, GU00670, Melvin E. Sinn, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Emissaries to President Lucas, Page 1-2 Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.

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trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00670/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3, 1981, GU00690, United States Department of State, U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala, Pages 1-11 Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/ documents/GU/00690/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, April 28, 1981, GU00701, Alexander Haig, Department of State, Initiative on Guatemala: Talking Points for General Walters, Pages 1-7, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com. cat 1 .lib.trentu.ca: 8080/nsa/documents/GU/00701/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, September 22, 1981, GU00728, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Ambassador Walters' Call on President Lucas: Bilateral Issues, Pages 1-3, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00728/ all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, January 13, 1982, GU00753, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, GOG Officials Implicated in Arrest of Priests and Nuns and Murder of Sexton, Pages 1-5, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/ GU/00753/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, October 22, 1982, GU00866, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Analysis of Human Rights on Guatemala by Amnesty International, WOLA/NISGUA, and Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, Pages 1-26, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00866/ all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, January 13, 1983, GU00896, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Next Steps for Guatemala, Pages 1-6, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca: 8080/nsa/documents/GU/00896/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, March 3, 1983, GU00903, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Guatemala's Guerrillas Retreating in the Face of Government Pressure. Pi-33, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/ documents/GU/00903/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, June 7, 1983, GU00921, Paul D. Taylor, United States Embassy in Guatemala, General Echeverria's Letter as Part of a Coup Plot, Pages 1-3, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.catl. lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00921/all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, July 25, 1983, GU00943, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, Stone Mission: Meeting with President Rios Montt and Foreign Minister Castillo, Pages 1-4, Online: http://nsarchive.chadwvck.com.catl.lib.trentu.ca:8080/nsa/documents/GU/00943/ all.pdf National Security Archives, Guatemala and the U.S. Collection, November 15, 1983, GU00982, Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy in Guatemala, CPD for FY-85

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