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Iterative Set Theory Author(s): M. D. Potter Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 171 (Apr.

, 1993), pp. 178-193 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2220368 . Accessed: 19/09/2011 01:40
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ThePhilosophical Vol.43,No. 171 Quarterly ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00

ITERATIVE SET THEORY


BY M. D. POTTER

This article' is intendedforphilosophers who are interested in the role set theoryhas played in the foundationsof mathematicssince 1900. Much of what is said here is elaborated at greater length,with the I should at the technicaldetails spelt out, in my set-theory textbook.2 outset warn those of a sensitivedispositionthat this article contains platonistlanguage which theymay findoffensive. I. THE ITERATIVE CONCEPTION What I shall be discussing is an axiomatization,ofa sortwhichhas been developed in the last twentyyears or so, of the traditionaliterative sacks with conceptionofsets.That is to say, setsare collections-as-one, objectsin them,objects witha lasso around them,whatevermetaphor you please. So to some extent,at least, the changes which would be wroughtif we adopted these axioms would be cosmetic: the surface but the underlying reality being description would be different, describedwould be the same. Thus thisis not at all the sortof project Quine, forexample, was engaged in when he wroteMathematical Logic and New Foundations: the notion of set which Quine was tryingto have been entirely based on axiomatize,iftherewas one, must,I think, an analysisofthesyntactic explanationfortheknownparadoxes in the so-called naive conception of what a set is, and therefore must have been essentially negativein character.Quine's was, in otherwords,a view. one-step-back-from-disaster Axiomatizationsof the iterativeconception,on the otherhand, are, it is surely now generally recognized, positive in character. No
' This talksI gave to the?-club at Cambridge in 1990 and the paper is derivedfrom to themembers conference at St Andrewsat Easter 1991. I am grateful LogicandLanguage of thoseaudiences who made helpfulremarks, and to PeterSullivan. 2 M. D. Potter,Sets:an Introduction (OxfordUP, 1990).
OX4 IJF,UK ofThePhilosophical 108CowleyRoad, Oxford 1993.Published ? The editors Publishers, Quartrly, byBlackwell and 238 Main Street, MA 02142,USA. Cambridge,

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mathematicianseriously doubts that iterativeset theoryis consistent. And thereasonforthisfactis notjust thattheaxiomshave been around foreightyyears (most of them anyway) and no one has yet found a contradiction.Afterall, mathematicians routinelyuse only a tiny fragment of the generality permitted them by the theory, and presumably only by pushing the theory to its limits could a contradiction be obtained. Not onlythat,but hardlyanyone (as faras I know) has seriously tried to find one.3 Nor is there any means available to us of deciding how long is an appropriate time to wait beforedeclaringa theory secure. So our confidencein the consistency of ZF is not due simplyto the fact that we have not found a contradictionyet; ratheris it due to a of the intuitive basis forthe axioms. This view is generally recognition now, but itis worthnotinghow rarelyit is accepted by mathematicians to be foundexpressed in theliterature before the 1950s.What was much more common until then was to view the paradoxes as exhibitinga genuine contradiction in our intuitive conception. For instance, Hermann Weyl in 1949: 'The attitudeis frankly pragmatic;one cures the visible symptoms[of the paradoxes] but neitherdiagnoses nor attacks the underlyingdisease.'4 Or, even more starkly,Quine in 1941: 'Common sense is bankrupt,forit wound up in contradiction. Deprived of his tradition,the logician has had to resort to mythmaking.'5 According to this view, the object of a good axiomatization is to retainas many as possible of the naive set-theoretic argumentswhich we remember withnostalgiafrom our days in Cantor's paradise, but to those argumentswhich lead to paradox. stopjust shortof permitting This certainlyappears to have been the motive of Zermelo's axiomatization: 'There is at thispoint nothingleft forus to do but to proceed in theoppositedirectionand, starting from settheory as itis historically to seek out the for given, principles required establishing the foundations ofthismathematicaldiscipline.In solvingthisproblemwe theseprinciples to exclude all must,on theone hand, restrict sufficiently on contradictions the take them wide and, other, sufficiently to retainall that is valuable in this theory.'6 In other words, absence of
3 The position is differentfor Quine's systems which I mentioned earlier: mathematicians have setout to findcontradictions in them,and did at first achieve some successin thatenterprise beforeQuine adjusted his axioms appropriately. C. H, H. Weyl,Philosophy andNatural Science ofMathematics (PrincetonUP), p. 231. 5 W. V.O. Quine, Mathematical Logic(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP), p. 153. 6 E. Zermelo, iiberdie Grundlagender MengenlehreI', translated 'Untersuchungen inJ. van Heijenoort(ed.), From toGodel:a Source BookinMathematical 1879-1931 Frege Logic, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1967), p. 200.
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is to be regarded,in Bourbaki's words,'as an empirical contradiction factratherthan as a metaphysicalprinciple'.7 There was a timewhen it was popular to regard this gung-ho pragmatismas an inevitable concomitantofplatonism:'The platonistcan stomach anythingshort ofcontradiction; and when contradiction does appear, he is contentto remove it with an ad hoc restriction.'8 This characterization of unfair. platonismas a positionwithoutprinciplesnow seems a trifle II. HISTORICAL REMARKS ABOUT ZERMELO'S AXIOMATIZATION I quoted just now fromZermelo's 1908 paper, 'Untersuchungenuiber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre', in which he gave his axiomatization. I think it would be helpful to make a few remarksabout Zermelo's paper and the way in which his ideas were developed later. The firstthing to observe is that although Zermelo 1908 is often quoted as the birthplaceof the cumulative iterativehierarchyof sets, thereis in factno mentionofit there:ifZermelo knewabout it then,he was keepingveryquiet about it. In particular,althoughhe did assume the axiom of choice, he did not assume foundation, the which is really the key to the iterativeconception. Fundierungsaxiom, That was not introduceduntilthe late 1920s. One ofZermelo's pre-publication ofhis system does have it as drafts an axiom thatno setcan belong to itself, whichis a consequence of (but weaker than) foundation.To understandwhy he dropped even this weak versionfromhis system we need to rememberwhy he wrotethis ofa well-ordering on any set had His first of existence the paper. proof not because it used the in had been criticized 1904.9 It only appeared forthe first axiom of choice (which he stated explicitly time) but also ordinal numbers.Remember that because it made use of transfinite the fact that the class of all ordinals is not a set, which is now generally called the Burali-Forti paradox despite never having been to wellknown: ithad beenknown was bythen known toBurali-Forti himself, Cantor in at least 1899 and was explicit in Russell's Principles of which appeared in 1903. So there was a widespread Mathematics, suspicion that there was somethingfishyabout ordinals, a suspicion
7 N. Bourbaki, 'Foundations of Mathematics for the WorkingMathematician', J. Logic,14 (1949), p. 3. Symb. 8 W. V. O. Quine, Froma LogicalPointof View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1953), p. 127. 9 E. Zermelo, 'Beweis, dass jede Menge wohlgeordnet werdenkann', Math. Ann.,59 (1904).
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whichZermelo triedto caterto byprovidinga second proofofthewellof set with an axiomatizationof a system orderingprinciple,together formalized. could be in which this proof theory Now Zermelo was at thisstage (and perhaps later too) verymuch more a workingmathematicianthan a philosopher.So his approach was pragmatic. His axiomatizationconsistssimplyof thoseprinciples he needed in order to make his second proof of the well-ordering out theaxiom thatno principlework.So I suspectthatthereasonhe left was simplythathe did not use it in his proof. set belongsto itself This pragmaticapproach seemsto have been repeatedseveraltimes in the developmentof the standard formofZF which took place over thenexttwenty-five years.Take theordinalsas an example. Zermelo's did not include ordinals. So proofswhich make use ofordinals system did not seem to be formalizablein it. For thisreason Kuratowski in 192210 generalized the means by which Zermelo had got fromhis first theorem(which used ordinals) to his second proofofthewell-ordering (whichdid not). Kuratowskiprovideda generalmethodforconverting any proofwhichuses ordinalsinto one whichdoes not and which,as a Now it was thiswork in Zermelo's system. consequence,is formalizable whichled Kuratowskito discoverZorn's lemma ten yearsbeforeZorn did. But the fact that it is not called Kuratowski's lemma tells us about theworking theyare not practicesofmathematicians: something going to give up a usefultool just because it cannot be formalizedin What happened insteadwas thatwhen Mirimanoff Zermelo's system. of the and then von Neumann developed an explicit representation Zermelo seems to have in ordinals set theory(one which,incidentally, not axioms were in or Zermelo's strongenough toyedwith 1915 so"), of enough of the ordinals to be useful.The key to give representations development here was when von Neumann saw that he could guarantee the existence of representationsof enough ordinals by Of course, adding what is now called theaxiom schemeofreplacement. I should make it clear that it was not the need for a satisfactory embedding of the theoryof ordinals in set theorywhich led to the in a ofthereplacementaxiom: Cantor had statedit informally invention letterto Dedekind'2 in 1899 as an expressionof his (to some extent doctrine,and there is no theologicallymotivated) limitation-of-size
10K. Kuratowski, 'Une methode d'elimination des nombres transfinisdes raisonnements mathematiques',Fund.Math.,5 (1922). Set Theory andLimitation " See M. Hallett,Cantorian ofSize (OxfordUP, 1985), p. 276ff. 12 of thisletterappears in van Heijenoort (ed.), FromFregeto An English translation 'The Rediscovery of the Cantor Godel,pp. 113-17. See also I. Grattan-Guinness, 73 (1974). Dtsch.Math.-Ver., Dedekind Correspondence', Jahresber.
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evidence that he saw the connection von Neumann drew with the ofordinals (because thereis no evidence thatit had occurredto theory Cantor to model theordinalsin settheory by means oftheMirimanoff/ von Neumann trick). But it was that connection which led to its Even von Neumann himselfadmitted that the widespread adoption. axiom ofreplacement, just regardedas an axiom withoutregard to its usefulconsequences,'goes a bit too far'.13 If you want anotherexample oftherole ofpragmaticconsiderations in thedevelopmentofZF, considertheway thatindividuals(sometimes called atoms) were eliminatedfromit. Zermelo's originalsystemhad certainlyenvisaged the existenceof individuals,that is to say objects which are in themselves set-theoretically opaque, so that nothingcan but about theirinternalstructure, be said in thelanguage ofset theory which can serve as building blocks fromwhich sets can be formed. - the reductionism What happened in the 1920s was thatset-theoretic can theories be mathematical of that other showing programme a modelled in set theory was an outstandingsuccess.To within very small margin of errorall mathematical theoriescan be so modelled. Moreover the presence or absence of individuals has no effect whatsoeveron thisclaim. So postulatingthe existenceof individuals without ofthesystem increasestheontologicalcommitments increasing is moralwhichwas the itsexplanatorypower.What is surely surprising drawn fromthisfact,namely that we should outlaw individualsfrom This simplesidestephas, it seemsto me, led to a greatmany thetheory. What startedout as no in thesubsequentliterature. misunderstandings Zermelo's set theoryis more than a relative consistencyresult if Peano arithmetic is consistent too has been distorted then consistent, whichholds thatthenumber2 is theset{(, {(}}. It intoa bizarreheresy is surelyunexceptionablethatwhateverelse thenumber2 is or is not,it is certainly set-theoretically opaque: it is,in a word,an individual.The that whichwe gain by pretending economyofontologicalcommitment the number 2 is {(, ))}}is spurious. It is not that the advantages of postulatingwhat we need are those of 'theftover honest toil', to use Russell's famous phrase.14It is rather that having stolen (when we we now have no axiomatized set theory)enough to last us a lifetime further need ofcrime.
13 von Neumann, 'Eine Axiomatisierung der Mengenlehre',J. reine angew.Math., J. 154 (1925), p. 227. 14B. Russell,Introduction toMathematical Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1919), p. 71.
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III. THE SCOTT/DERRICK AXIOMATIZATION known The discussionso farhas been an attemptto focuson thesystem in thesettheorists' argotas 'ZA' ('Z' forZermelo,'A' foratoms). This is Zermelo's originalsystem withoutthe axiom of choice but essentially withtheaxiom offoundation and a slighttechnicalstrengthening ofhis not quite axiom of infinity to ensure the existence, unfortunately of the set ofall hereditarily finite sets. provable in Zermelo's system, which I shall state is based, more The axiomatizationof thissystem thanis thetraditional one, on theiterative conceptionofset,an directly in of which has detail intuitive been given by Boolos.15 ZA, description in a with is a first-order then, language just one binary theory expressed convenience 'e'. We shall assume for thatwe have a predicatesymbol so that Russellian definite 't!x0(x)' means the operator'i!', description x such that b(x). unique Definition {x: # (x)} = Iy(VZ) (Z y > 0 (z)). A is an individual. ifA = {x: x e A}; otherwise Definition A is a set for exists Axiom scheme of separation {x: x e A and #((x)} anysetA. Accordingto the iterativeconception,setsare created stage-by-stage, using as theirelementsonly those which have been created at earlier stages. In order to stressthe temporalmetaphorI shall call the stages days;and insteadofsayingthatone day is a memberofanother,I shall The set of all days earlierthan a given day is called its say it is earlier. all ofa history is thesetwhichhas as itselements The accumulation history. and subsetsofall thedays withall theelements theindividualstogether the guidingprinciple With thisterminology, belongingto the history. of the iterativeconceptionis that each day is the accumulation of its history. This way of describingthe iterativeconception was formalizedby The disadvantage of his account is that it treats the Dana Scott.16 notion of a 'day' as primitive.It was John Derrick (in unpublished work) who saw that ifwe proceed in the opposite direction,defining first 'accumulation', then 'history'and 'day', we can achieve what we want withoutthe need foran extraprimitive. Definition Definition acc(A) = {x:xis an individualor (3B A)(x Borx _ B)}. if (V_ e ) (D = acc (_ ! is a history D)).

15G. Boolos, 'The Iterative Conception of Set', J. Phil., 68 (1971); reprintedin Selected 2nd edn P. Benacetrafand H. Putnam (eds), Philosophy ofMathematics: Readings, (Cambridge UP, 1983). 16 D. Scott, 'AxiomatisingSet Theory', in Axiomatic Set Theory, Part II (Providence, R.I.: AmericanMathematical Society,1974).
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Definition If. is a history, acc(.) is called a day. Theorem (Scott/Derrick) The days are well orderedby membership. Axiom of creation Every set belongsto some day. ifitis not theearliestday and has no Definition A day is called a limit withrespectto membership). (i.e., no immediatepredecessor yesterday Axiom of infinity There is a limitday. all the sentenceswhich are to derive as theorems These axioms suffice taken as axioms in the more traditionalaxiomatization of ZA. The details are in my book. (The systemaxiomatized thereis actually a in is not important one called GA, but the difference slightly stronger the presentcontextand the proofsare easy to adjust.) IV. HOW FAR CAN YOU GO? The only doubt which remains about the adequacy of ZA for mathematical purposes concerns whetherthe process of set creation goes on long enough. There is a limitday, we have asserted,but our axioms stopjust shortof requiringthereto be a second limitday. As I explained in part I, mathematicianshave long been used to assuming the axiom scheme of replacementin order to ensure the existenceof enough ordinals for their purposes (to prove Hartogs' lemma, for ifwe out thatwe do not need replacement example). However, it turns of'ordinal'. definition startfroma different Frege and Russelldefinedthecardinal ofa setA to be thesetofall sets equinumerouswithit; by analogy we may definetheordinal ofa wellsetsisomorphicto it. orderedset (A, <) to be thesetofall well-ordered in ZA (or in any sane works of these definitions neither Unfortunately, settheory)because the'sets'in questiondo notexistunlessA is iterative was inventedby Dana whichgetsround thisdifficulty empty.The trick in the 1950s. Scott and AlfredTarski17 of a set to be the earliestday which containsit. Define the birthday Then the cardinal of a set A is definedas follows.There are certainly some days whichcontainsetsequinumerouswithA. Of all such days let DA be the earliest:it must exist because the days are well ordered by ofA be the set card(A) ofall sets 'earlier than'. Now we let the cardinal are and whichhave birthday DA equinumerouswithA. In otherwords, the elements of card(A) are the sets of earliest possible birthday
17 D. Scott,'Definitions in AxiomaticSet Theory',Bull. Am.Math.Soc., by Abstraction 61 (1955); A. Tarski, 'The Notion of Rank in Axiomatic Set Theory and Some of its Applications',Bull. Am.Math.Soc.,61 (1955).
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ofa wellequinumerouswithA. In thesame way, we definetheordinal orderedset (A, < ) to be thesetofall well-ordered setsofearliestpossible birthdayisomorphicto (A, <). It is now an easy matterto prove the familiar contextualproperties: twosetsare equinumerousifand onlyif theyhave the same cardinal; two well-orderedsets are isomorphicif and only iftheyhave thesame ordinal. Now a descriptive set theorist would disagreewithwhat I have just said - thatmathematics does notneed theaxiom ofreplacement. There are results about thefinestructure ofsetsofreal numbersand how they mesh together which requirereplacementfortheirproof.The clearest known example is a resultof Martin'8 to the effect that every Borel which has been shown by Harvey Friedman'9to game is determined, I stand by my claim: I do not believe need replacement.Nevertheless, that explicituses of replacementare going to seep throughinto more in theway thatusesoftheaxiom of and moreareas ofpure mathematics choice became pervasivein the first halfof thiscentury. to To say that mathematiciansdo this is the issue. However, dodge in thehierarchy notgenerallyuse setswhichoccur higherthanleveloW2 is no reason to deny the existenceof such sets.The titleof thissection, after all, is not 'How farneed you go?' but 'How farcan you go?'. The usual answer to the latterquestion is 'As faras you like'. This sounds limp, but what else can we say? If we are pressed to reply in terms withinthe theory thenwe have no choice but to itself, comprehensible the Fifth since such answeris contradictory. Amendment, any plead to deflectthe forceof thisfailureto respondis to One way of trying draw an analogy with the attemptto count all the natural numbers. of theordinalscannot,on pain ofcontradiction, The order-type be an of but neither can the the numbers be a natural ordinal, order-type natural number.If we do not findthe latterfactproblematic,thenwe have - it is argued - no reason to be troubledby the former. However, thisresponseis inadequate. In orderto say what theordertypeofthenaturalnumbersis,we have to generalizetheconceptnumber us from what an ordinalis,but itis plain thatwhat prevents bydefining is what the of the ordinals is not that the saying order-type concept is insufficiently ordinal general. Quite thereverse.If someone asks to be of theordinals,we shall not have answeredthemif told theorder-type we first ofall restrict themeaningof'ordinal' artificially: havinglearnt the generalconcept,we cannot unlearnit. In thesame way, collecting fromthe resulting collection all sets,but merelywithholding together
'9 H. Friedman,'Higher Set Theory and Mathematical Practice',Ann.Math.Logic.,2 (1971).
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18 D. A. Martin, 'Borel Determinacy',Ann.Math., 102 (1975).

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the title'set' is cheating: ifsomeone replies 'When I said "all sets", I meant all', thereis nothingwe can say in response. a setofall sets,even thoughwe appear The factthatwe cannot form over all sets,has been used bysome as a stickwith to be able to quantify which to beat the platonistconceptionof set theory, since ifwe are to imagine the process of set creation to be already finished (as the demands thatwe should), thenitisdifficult to understand why platonist we should not now collect all the sets togetherto forma new one, or indeed why they are not already so collected. The alternative (canvassed, forexample, by Lear20)is to imagine the extensionof the toindexsetsaccordingto whentheycome to conceptsetas notyetfixed, fall under the concept, and consequently to adopt intuitionistic semanticsforset theory. The platonistneed not concede thisground.It is possibleto treatthis matterinstead as an example - Skolem's paradox is another- of the importanceof keeping track of the linguisticstandpointfromwhich are made. When we talk about setswithina fixedlanguage, assertions we cannot talk of a set of all sets: grasping thisfact is an immediate consequenceofgraspingtheiterative conceptofsetat all. When we step outside such a language into an identical meta-language, we may talk of a set (in the meta-languagesense) of all sets (in the coherently nor surprising. object-language sense). This is neithercontradictory What is more,itis notevidencethatthere'really'is a setofall sets:when we talk about all sets,we succeed in talkingabout all setsjust because we understandthe universalquantifier. Moving into a meta-language in the meaning of the quantifierwould to demonstratea relativity succeed in provingwhat it claims only ifour grasp of meaning in the object language came to us via the meta-languagein some way. But it does not. V. IS SET THEORY SOUND FOR ARITHMETIC? ZA which I have described thetheory set theorists) So (pacedescriptive Because is adequate formathematics.But is it sound formathematics? reductionismwhich I have already of the success of set-theoretic at any rate, tend not to alluded to, thisis a question mathematicians, address: theylearn in the cradle that mathematics just is part of set theory;and ifthatis rightthen the question simplydoes not arise. But set-theoretic reductionism viewed, no more is, when correctly I made thatpointearlier.So results: thana seriesofrelativeconsistency
20

J. Lear, 'Sets and Semantics',J. Phil.,74 (1977).

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we have to address, forexample, the question whetherset theoryis sound fornumbertheory.To fixideas let us considerthe positionof a number-theorist (whom I shall forconvenience risk assuming to be withthe countingnumbersand the arithmetical male) who is familiar operationsupon them,and believes that Peano's axioms are all true wheninterpreted as assertions about them,but has no viewseitherway about the existenceof the infinite sets which a set theorysuch as ZA posits. Can we persuade him to believe that all the arithmetical assertions whichwe can proveset-theoretically about co (i.e., theobject in ZA which we have picked out to model Peano Arithmetic) are true about the countingnumbershe knowsand loves? Notice straightawaythat if the axioms of Peano Arithmeticare or falsity ofevery complete (i.e., strongenough to determinethe truth arithmeticalproposition)and set theoryis consistent, then he has no choice in the matter.To see this,suppose that 0 is an arithmetical set-theoretic claim about co. propositionand O(/)is the corresponding ifq is in Peano then Certainly (i.e., provablearithmetically Arithmetic), 0(o) is provable in set theory.And conversely ifO() is provable in set isnotprovable (sincesettheory then-i (/) isformally theory, consistent). Hence-q 0 isnotprovablein Peano Arithmetic. So 0 isprovablein Peano Arithmetic (sincewe are assumingthatit is complete). Conclusion: 0 is in ifand onlyif0() is provable in settheory. provable Peano Arithmetic All that remains,then,in order to legitimizethe use of set-theoretic arguments in number theory is the task of showing that Peano - in otherwords,a Arithmetic is completeand set theoryis consistent versionofHilbert's programme. But Peano Arithmeticis not complete. Godel's incompleteness theorem tells us that there are explicit arithmetical (finitistically which are truein some models and falsein comprehensible)assertions others. But more than that: there are mathematically interesting examples of such sentenceswhich are provable in set theory.This is much more recentinformation: the first examples were given by Paris and Harrington in 1978. The easiest to understand is Goodstein's theorem;in order to explain what it says,we need some terminology. If n is a natural number > 1, then any natural number m may be expresseduniquely in the form m=
blnc

+ b2n2 + ... + bknk,


c2 >

where b, ..., bk and c, ..., ck are natural numbers,m > Cl >

and 0 < b; < n (1 < i < k). This expression ofm is called thenormalform to the base n. Now expresseach of the exponentscl, . . , ckin normal formto the base n, and thendo the same to all the exponentsin these

...

>

Ck

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M.D. POTTER

etc. In a finite numberofstepsthisprocesswill terminate expressions, and we shall be leftwithan expression formin which no number > n is called thecomplete normalform ofmto thebase appears. This expression n. Now we are in a positionto definethe Goodstein ofa natural sequence numberm:thefirst termofthesequence is m;the (n + 1) this obtained by expressingthe nth in complete normal formto the base n + 1, changingall the occurrencesofn + 1 in thatexpressionto n + 2, and thensubtracting1. Example
+ 51 = 222 33
+

The Goodstein of51 starts as follows21: sequence


+ 222+ 2 + 1
3 1013

1+

333+

44 +

+ 44' + 3

10155 102185

55 +1 + 555+ 2

666+ + 666+ 1
77+ 888+ + 77'7 + 888 1

1036306

10695975 015151337

Thus the numbersin thisGoodsteinsequence increasewithverygreat rapidity.It is plain that51 is notspecial in thisrespect;thesame pattern theorem is therefore at first emergesforany number > 3. The following glance quite surprising. Goodstein's theorem22 The Goodsteinsequence of any positive reaches 0 in a finite number ofsteps. integer In ZA, or indeed in any theory enough to provethattheordinals strong is close to being <Eo are well ordered,theproofofGoodstein'stheorem a triviality. (Turn all the base numbersinto co: the resultis a strictly And yet decreasingsequence ofordinals < o0;hence it mustterminate.) in first-order Peano Arithmetic.23 it cannot be proved sentencesprovable in set theory The factthat thereare arithmetical but not in Peano Arithmeticunquestionably needs explanation: it seems to fight against the set-theoretically provable fact that all since it plainly followsfromthis Dedekind algebras are isomorphic,24
2 22 23

24 A Dedekind algebra is an orderedpair (A,f) such thatfisa one-to-one from function A to itself and thereis an elementof A - f[A] whosef-closureis the whole of A. The the only) example of a Dedekind algebra is the pair standard (and, up to isomorphism,

Math. London Soc.,14 (1982).

In thislist'a - b' means thata is of thesame orderofmagnitudeas b. Ordinal Theorem', J. Symb. R. L. Goodstein,'On the Restricted Logic,9 (1944). Bull. L. Kirby andJ. Paris, 'AccessibleIndependence Resultsin Peano Arithmetic',

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thatthesame arithmetical sentencesare truein all Dedekind algebras. it simplyis not the case But as we all know, thereis no contradiction: is a Dedekind algebra thateverymodel offirst-order Peano Arithmetic holds). (although the conversecertainly lies in The ambiguitywhich leads to the initial misunderstanding what we are prepared to count as 'properties'forthe purpose of the this ofcoas a Dedekind algebra interprets inductionrule.The definition rule by requiringthat co should have no proper subsetscontaining0 which and closed underthesuccessor operation.But theonlyproperties the number-theorist seems obliged to count are those which are ones. In setin his specification language, i.e., arithmetical expressible theoretic termsthisamounts roughlyto requiringonly that co should have no proper recursive subsets containing 0 and closed under in the separation axiom acting in successors.It is the impredicativity whichmakesthisambiguity concertwiththeaxiom ofinfinity possible. it would be perverse thepointofview oftheset-theorist Of course,from but there to restrict theinductionprincipleto arithmetical properties, is no reason forthe number-theorist to share thisview unlesshe can be to in the proofsin sets referred persuaded of the realityof the infinite question. So should the number-theorist proof of accept our set-theoretic Goodstein'stheorem? Suppose forthemomentthathe does believethat At first set theoryis formally consistent. sightone mightsuppose that thisis not enough. And strictly speaking that is correct.However, he mustaccept everynumericalinstanceof Goodstein's theorem.This is - that is to say, explicit because the quantifier-free part of arithmetic numericalcalculations- is complete,so thatifyou do a calculation in Peano Arithmetic and thendo it again in set theory, you get the same answer.Of course,acceptingeverynumericalinstanceis not thesame - you need theco-rule as acceptingthegeneralization to make thatstep - but I do not regard that as an importantdistinction here. I would instance of numerical a who number-theorist regard accepted every as a harmlesseccentric, Goodstein'stheorembut not the theorem itself not a dangerous schismatic. it appears that the What I have just said seems quite significant: can use set theory (at least in the specificcase of number-theorist Goodstein'stheorem)withoutbelievingit. All he has to believein is its formalconsistency. If thisis to be a genuineadvance, however,it must be possible to come to a beliefin the consistency of set theoryin some This is notimpossibletoimagine. in itstruth. way otherthanvia a belief of It is, forinstance,conceivable that we mightprove the consistency
(co,s) wheres is thesuccessoroperationon theset co ofnatural numbers.
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ZA by cut-eliminationusing transfinite induction as far as some ordinal. (It is a matter of conjecture what that ordinal would be, be considerably althoughit would certainly greaterthanE0.) Once one was in possession ofsuch a proof, it would be possibleto come to a belief in the consistency of ZA (and therefore in the validityof certain settheoretic methodsin numbertheory)via a beliefnotin sets,but merely in ordinals. Of course, for this possibilityto be interestingwe need to be persuaded thatsomeonemightbelieve in ordinalswithoutbelievingin sets.There is no doubt thatthisis in principlepossible,but itseemsmost implausible. Certainly anyone worried by the incompleteness of iterativeset theoryas to height ought to be equally worried about ordinals. What is more plausible at first sightis that someone might neverthelessbelieve in ordinals who claimed not to believe in the notionof impredicative power-set operationwhichis thefundamental to see what theclassical conceptionofset theory. However,itis difficult reason such a person might have for believing in the existence of ordinals of the size which would presumably be required for the consistency proofwe are here envisaging. In short, the possibilitythat one might be justified in using a in itsconsistency not mathematicaltheory reasonablystrong by a belief derivedfrom a beliefin the theory itself is, as a philosophicaladvance, is almost largelyillusory.Any otherroute to the beliefin consistency certain to involve essentiallythe same philosophical problemsas the direct route via truth. I cannot, therefore, see any reason why a of any in nominalistabout sets should believe the formalconsistency for I a fatal such reasonably strongtheory.(This is, think, difficulty Field.) will be able to refine his It may be that the number-theorist the decide Goodstein'stheorem.(He to when it can specification point himself on intuitive grounds that for convince could, example, Goodstein's theorem itselfshould be added to the list of axioms. thisintuition However,itis notat all clear what form mighttakeor how that he should go about obtaining it: Dan Isaacson has suggested25 thereis no way ofperceivingin purelyarithmeticaltermsthe truthof whichis not such as Goodstein'stheorem, any arithmetical proposition, In case this Peano's from obtaining an any axioms.) provable intuitionabout the truthor falsityof Goodstein's theorem- would merely postpone the problem, since any specificationfor number the obviously which satisfies theorystrongerthan Peano Arithmetic
D. Isaacson, 'ArithmeticalTruth and Hidden Higher-orderConcepts', in Logic '85 (Amsterdam:Elsevier,1987). Colloquium
25

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essential requirementthat its proofs be mechanically checkable is theorem. incompleteby Godel's incompleteness Nor is the matter immediately settled for a liberated numbertheorist who accepts the realityofinfinite setsofnumbers.For thereis stillthena choice to be made about what sortofinfinite setsofnumbers exist. In particular,it is conceptuallypossible that there could be a (consistent) variant of set theoryin which Goodstein's theorem is provably false. (Of course, the conception of infinitesets which motivated such a theorywould have to be very different fromthe iterative one whichmotivatesthe axiom system I have describedhere: it would have to be a theoryin which the ordinals could not be developed, and it would therefore presumably be highly non-wellviewsabout thebehaviourof founded.)This phenomenon- alternative infinite sets (what we mightin Hilbert's terminology call 'the ideal in different part') resulting thingsbeingprovable about numbers('the real part') - arises even more pressingly in the case of the continuum hypothesis,since in this case there is not even a consensus among mathematicians about whetherto accept it (in contrastto thesituation withordinals). Let us compare heretheattitudeofaffine towards'linesat geometers infinity': projectivemethodscan provide us with more elegant, more intuitive or moreconciseproofs oftheorems ofaffine but they geometry, do notpermitus to provethings whichwereotherwise unprovable.The affine are therefore freeto regardlinesat infinity as no more geometers than a technicaldevice and need take no view about theirexistenceor once theformal ofthemethodhas been established. reality, consistency will of course see the matter somewhat (Projective geometers Similar remarks to certain uses ofcomplex numbers differently.) apply in the theoryof real polynomialsand to the use of proper classes in set theory(what Quine calls 'virtual' classes). But the Zermelo-style must take a different number-theorist view about infinitesets: the beliefshe has about sets affectwhat he must accept as true about numbers. VI. UNDECIDABLE SENTENCES AND SECOND-ORDER AXIOMS I drew in the last part an analogy between Goodstein's theoremand otherknownincompletenesses such as the continuumhypothesis. The in these is that are patternrunningthrough examples they provable the because it ensures the existence of fresh stronger theory objects which can serve in the place of free variables in the predicate used to
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instantiate the first-order axiom scheme of the weaker theory. Goodstein's theoremis not decidable in first-order Peano Arithmetic. The continuumhypothesis is notdecidable in first-order settheory with theaxiom ofchoice. Both are provable in certainstronger systems (e.g., set theoryin the case of Goodstein's theorem,set theorywith the in thecase ofthecontinuumhypothesis). In constructibility hypothesis both cases, too, it is difficult not to come to a (but perhaps impossible) view about the truth oftheresultindependentofviewsabout the truth of the axioms of the stronger in which the resultis knownto be system So if most mathematicians believe Goodstein's theorembut provable. - thefactthatwe call one a theorem not thecontinuumhypothesis and the otheran hypothesis indicatesthisalready - it can only be because mostmathematicians believetheaxiomsofsettheory but do notbelieve the constructibility hypothesis. But thereis anothersimilarity: being shown theproofsthat theyare undecidable in the weaker systemin question does not weaken one's convictionthat theyare decidable questions.This is in contrastto the thequestionofhow manydays thereare, whichI discussed position.for earlier.There was neverany suggestion of thisbeing a question which had an answerifwe could only see it. The reason forthisdifference is thatour failureto decide Goodstein'stheoremin Peano Arithmetic, or the continuum hypothesisin basic set theory,can be traced to our failureto expressthe (platonistic)imagined contentof a second-order axiom by means ofa first-order axiom scheme- theinductionaxiom in the case of Peano Arithmetic, the separation axiom in the case of set theory. When we firstwrite down these axiom schemes we see them as second-order is assertions.(It is worthnotingthateven thisdistinction no a intends the means naive The set-theoretic by one.) platonist ofa set to contain all itssubsetsin as stronga senseof'all' as power-set possible; and in the same way the number-theoretic platonistintends axiom schemes inductionto apply to all subsetsofco.But thefirst-order can only make theseclaims forsetswhich can be definedby means of formulaein the language of the first-order theoryin question. There senseof'all' seemsto be no way available to us ofexpressing thestrong which we need, otherthan by sayingit louder, in what I describedin mybook as 'the mannerofCzech borderguards' (whichjust showshow quicklya book can date). This pointis not new; it has been made by Kreisel26: our feeling that thesequestionsought to be decidable stemsfromthe factthat theyare
26 in I. Lakatos (ed.), Problems G. Kreisel,'InformalRigour and CompletenessProofs', inthe (Amsterdam:North-Holland,1967). ofMathematics Philosophy

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indeed decidable in the second-ordersystems. So much the worse for first-order logic, you might think. But Kreisel's remark is an not a proposed explanationforan observedfactabout our psychology, the continuumproblem. It would be betterto programmeforsettling set theoryto say: the continuumquestion is decidable in second-order theextentthatsecond-order logic is decidable. The problemsinvolved here are exactlythe same as before:the reformulation in second-order termstransfers thedifficulties from set theoryto logic; it does not solve them. Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge

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