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G.R. No. 197384.

January 30, 2013 Facts Sampaguita Auto Transport Corporation was charged with illegal dismissal for allegedly firing Sagad when he was, as he claimed, hired as a regular employee, not as a probationary employee as the company claimed. Allegedly, sometime around September, an evaluator boarded Sagads bus. The evaluator described Sagads manner of driving as "reckless driver, nakikipaggitgitan, nakikipaghabulan, nagsasakay sa gitna ng kalsada, sumusubsob ang pasahero." Sagad he claimed that he could not have been driving as reported because his pregnant wife and one of his children were with him on the bus. He admitted though that at one time, he chased a bus to serve warning on its driver not to block his bus when he was overtaking. He also admitted that once in a while, he sped up to make up for lost time in making trips. The company further alleged it conducted a an evaluation of Sagads performance. It requested conductors who had worked with Sagad to comment on his work. Conductors revealed that Sagad proposed that they cheat on the company by way of an unreported early bus trip. Dispatcher E. Castillo likewise submitted a negative report and even recommended the termination of Sagads employment. The company also cited Sagads involvement in a hit-and-run accident. Allegedly, Sagad did not report the accident to the company. Upon conclusion of the evaluation, the company terminated Sagads employment for his failure to qualify as a regular employee. Issue The issues are (1) whether Sampaguita Auto Transport Corp. dismissed Sagad illegally; and (2) whether he is entitled to backwages and separation pay, totaling P604,050.00, after working with the company for barely five months. Held/Ratio (1) No. The SC ruled that Sagad was not dismissed without basis. During his brief employment with the company, he exhibited the tendency to speed up when he finds the need for it, very obviously in violation of traffic rules, regulations and company policy. Instead of negating the evaluators observations, his admissions make them credible. Also, the SC find no evidence that Hemoroz and Lucero had an ax to grind against Sagad so that they would lie about their impression of him as a bus driver. Significantly, their statements validate Castillos own observation that he heard talks of Sagads orders to the conductors for them to cheat on the company. The scheme, contrary to Sagads explanation, can only be committed with the cooperation, or even at the behest, of the driver, as the proposed scheme is for the bus to make unscheduled, but unreported, early trips.

The company cites Sagads involvement in a hit-and-run incident. The Traffic Accident Investigation Report45 is evidence to such incident. The report was corroborated by the sworn statements of driver of the Elf truck, UFF-597, the second party in the incident, and the driver of the White Honda City, the first party in the vehicular accident. Also, the CA misappreciated the law when it declared that the grounds relied upon by the company in terminating Sagads employment are not among those enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code as just causes for employee dismissals. Article 282 of the Code provides: Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. The irregularities or infractions committed by Sagad in connection with his work as a bus driver constitute a serious misconduct or, at the very least, conduct analogous to serious misconduct, under the above-cited Article 282 of the Labor Code. To be sure, his tendency to speed up during his trips, his reckless driving, his picking up passengers in the middle of the road, his racing with other buses and his jostling for vantage positions do not speak well of him as a bus driver. Under the circumstances, Sagad has become a liability rather than an asset to his employer, more so when we consider that he attempted to cheat on the company or could have, in fact, defrauded the company during his brief tenure as a bus driver. This calls to mind Castillos report on the low revenue of Sagads bus, an observation which is validated by the companys Daily Operation Reports from June to October 2006.50 All told, we find substantial evidence supporting Sagads removal as a bus driver. Through his reckless driving and his schemes to defraud the company, Sagad committed serious misconduct and breach of the trust and confidence of his employer, which, without doubt, are just causes for his separation from the service.

It is well to stress, at this point, an earlier pronouncement of the Court "that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine." (2) No. Even as we find a just cause for Sagads dismissal, we agree with the CA that the company failed to comply with the two-notice rule. It failed to serve notice of: (1) the particular acts for which Sagad was being dismissed on November 5, 2006 and (2) his actual dismissal. Consistent with our ruling in Agabon v. NLRC, 52 we hold that the violation of Sagad's right to procedural due process entitles him to an indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Considering the circumstances in the present case, we deem it appropriate to award Sagad P30,000.00. Adm. Case No. 6475 Facts The disbarment complain filed by Ylaya against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott who allegedly deceived the complainant and her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives. Alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land located at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition of these properties, TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa against its former registered owner. The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The respondent further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the City Government when the RTC issues the order to transfer the titles. The respondent then fraudulently without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001,4 selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So for P200,000.00.5 The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the P200,000.00 purchase price or that they would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at least P6,000,000.00 as just compensation. The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mothers sister) are his uncle and his aunt, respectively. The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint. The respondent argued that the complainants greed to get the just compensation caused her to file this "baseless, unfounded and malicious" disbarment case. The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to execute any "preparatory deed of sale" in favor of the City Government. He also denied that the Deed of Absolute Sale contained blanks when they signed it. That he January 30, 2013

filed for the spouses Ylaya and Reynold an opposition to the just compensation the RTC fixed proved that there was no agreement to use the document for the expropriation case. He also argued that it was clear from the document that the intended buyer was a natural person, not a juridical person, because there were spaces for the buyers legal age, marital status, and citizenship, and he was even constrained to file a subsequent Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs to the subject properties after borrowing them from his office. Lastly, he denied violating the Rules on Notarial Practice. Issue The issues are (1) whether the IBP violated the respondents right to due process; and (2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Held/Ratio (1) No. the respondents failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient ground to support the claim that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent was heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These pleadings, evidence and testimony were received and considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and recommendation, and were the bases for the IBP Boards Resolution. The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. As a rule, no denial of due process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case;35 what is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. (2) No. The SC set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.34 They however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients properties. We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on conflict of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

A.C. No. 6760 January 30, 2013 Facts Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The first case, involved the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela Teodoro. While the settlement proceeding was pending, Atty. Gonzales assisted Teodord-Marcial for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling of the civil cases, according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that warrants the disbarment of Atty. Gonzales. Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He asserted, however, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the cases were not identical in terms of parties, subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also opined that the complainant only filed the disbarment case to harass him. The disbarment complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, Dulay found Atty. Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping. According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-99207 hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela held the Malate property in trust for Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge I. Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial. In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime, Manuela was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila. According to the heirs, Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the issuance of letters of administration so that Manuelas properties could be inventoried and settled in accordance with law. In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a trust held by Manuela over the same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They alleged that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to Anastacio. They asked the trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names. The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other. Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207 without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In committing forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum shopping and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month from the practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would merit a more severe penalty.

Issue The issue is whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping and thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Held/Ratio Yes. Atty. Gonzales did commit forum shopping and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief sought. Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.

G.R. No. 194236. January 30, 2013 Facts XYZ declared on the witness stand that she and the appellant got married on March 3, 1990; they begot five (5) children, namely: AAA, XXX, YYY, Jr., BBB, and ZZZ. She stated that AAA is "mentally deficient," but could play musical instruments. XYZ recalled that when she was still pregnant with their fifth child, the appellant would bring AAA in a videoke bar without her knowledge, and they would usually return home at 1:00 a.m. Upon their return, AAA would complain of experiencing loose bowel movement, and of pain in her stomach. One time, when XYZ arrived at their house after buying rice, she saw the appellant embracing AAA and spreading her legs; the appellant then put his hand on AAAs breast, inserted his other hand inside her underwear, and touched her vagina. When the appellant noticed XYZs presence, he immediately stood up and instructed her to prepare food. XYZ felt "bad and afraid," but did not confront the appellant. She instead went to the kitchen to do her chores. On December 16, 2005, BBB revealed to XYZ that the appellant had raped her. XYZ requested assistance from a municipal social worker who, in turn, told her to file a case before the police. BBB recalled that while she was in her room in December 2005, the appellant grabbed her and removed her short pants and panty; the appellant then removed his short pants, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain, but could not shout because the appellant covered her mouth with his

hands.8Afterwards, the appellant inserted his penis into her anus. BBB disclosed the incident to XYZ who, in turn, accompanied her to the police. Dr. Agnes Cagadas, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, stated that she examined AAA on December 23, 2005, and found a healed hymenal laceration at 7 oclock position. She also examined BBB on the same day, and found her hymen to be intact. She, however, explained that the hymen of 96% of sexually abused children remains intact. Dr. Cagadas also testified that there could have been a penetration of BBBs inter-labia. XXX, the sister of AAA and BBB, narrated that every time the appellant came home from work, he would instruct AAA to sit on his lap; the appellant would also embrace AAA and touch her vagina. XXX added that the appellant allowed AAA to watch him take a bath.14 BBB also disclosed to her that the appellant "sodomized" her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Dr. Marlou Bagacay Sustiguer, a psychiatrist at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, testified that she conducted a psychological test on AAA, and found her to be autistic. She declared that AAA lacked motor coordination, and had a very low intelligence quotient. Dr. Sustiguer also found AAA to be incompetent to testify in court. Issue The issue is whether or not appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape under Article 266-A, in relation with Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code. Held/Ratio Yes. The appellant is guilty of qualified rape under Article 266-A, in relation with Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code. a. In Criminal Case No. 2006-174 XYZ positively identified the appellant as the person who embraced AAA and spread her legs; who held AAAs breast; and who placed his hand inside the latters underwear sometime in 2002. XYZs testimony was corroborated by the testimony of her daughter XXX who declared that the appellant would embrace AAA and touch her vagina whenever the appellant came home from work. The RTC found XYZs and XXXs testimonies credible and convincing. The CA affirmed this finding. It is settled that "the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, as it was in the better position to observe their candor and behavior on the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court; it had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under crossexamination. Its assessment is entitled to respect unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case."

b. In Criminal Case No. 2006-175 BBB positively identified the appellant as the person who grabbed her and removed her short pants and panty while she was in her room; and who thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina. The Court stress the lower court observation that BBB, who was just nine years old when she testified, spoke in a clear, spontaneous and straightforward manner. She never wavered in identifying the appellant despite the defenses grueling cross-examination. As the lower courts did, we find her testimony credible. A young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. The Court sees no plausible reason why AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen. Moreover, Dr. Cagadas concluded that there had been penetration of BBBs female organ, possibly in the inter-labia. While Dr. Cagadas found BBBs hymen to be intact, she nevertheless wrote in her Medico-Legal Report on BBB that "a finding of normal hymen does not prove nor disprove sexual abuse." She also testified that the hymen of 96% of sexually abused children remains intact. As we explained in People v. Capt. Llanto: The strength and dilability of the hymen varies from one woman to another such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse, or on the other hand, may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse can ensue. In some cases even, the hymen is still intact even after the woman has given birth. At any rate, Dr. Cagadas finding is merely corroborative; it is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. G.R. No. 186069. January 30, 2013 Facts The Spouses Cabahug are the owners of two parcels of land situated in Barangay Capokpok, Tabango, Leyte, registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9813 and T-1599 of the Leyte provincial registry. They were among the defendants in Special Civil Action No. 0019-PN, a suit for expropriation earlier filed by NPC before the RTC, in connection with its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. A suit was filed but later dismissed when the NPC opted for settlement with the landowners by paying the easement fee of 10% value of their land.

On November 9, 1996, Jesus Cabahug executed two documents granting NPC the Right of Way, in consideration of the easement fee in the sums of 112, 225. 50 and 21, 375, and a continuous easement of right of way for the latters transmission lines and their appurtenances. Jesus Cabahug agreed not to construct any building or structure whatsoever, nor plant in any area within the Right of Way that will adversely obstruct or affect the transmission line of NPC, except agricultural crops not exceeding the height of three meters high. However, under paragraph 4 of the grant, Jesus Cabahug has the option to see for additional compensation for easement fee. RTC: Jesus Cabahug filed a complaint for just compensation, attorneys fees and damages for NPCs failure to pay its demand for additional just compensation, as stated in the grant, which the NPC rebutted by saying that it already paid the said the full easement fee mandated under Sec. 3-A of RA 6395 and that the reservation in the grant referred to additional compensation for easement fee, not in full just compensation sought by the Spouses Cabahug. Brushing aside NPCs reliance on Section 3-A of RA 6395, the RTC applied the ruling handed down by this Court in Gutierrez to the effect that NPCs easement of right of way which indefinitely deprives the owner of their proprietary rights over their property falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Ruled in favor of the complainant. CA: Reversed and set aside RTCs decision saying the facts of the case are different from those obtaining in Gutierrez and that Sec. 3-A of RA 6395 only allows NPC to acquire an easement of right of way over properties tracersed by its transimission lines. Spouses Cabahug filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied due to lack of merit. Issue The issue/s are: (1) (2) (1) CA erred in disregarding paragraph 4 of the Grant of Right of Way whereby Jesus Cabahug reserved the right to seek additional compensation for easement fee; and (2) in not applying this Courts ruling in Gutierrez case. Held/Ratio SC held in favor of the complainant (Spouses Cabahug) (1) The CA regarded the Grant of Right of Way executed by Jesus Cabahug in favor of NPC as a valid and binding contract between the parties, a fact affirmed by the OSG in its 8 October 2009 Comment to the petition at bench. Given that the parties have already agreed on the easement fee for the portions of the subject parcels traversed

by NPCs transmissions lines, the CA ruled that the Spouses Cabahugs attempt to collect further sums by way of additional easement fee and/or just compensation is violative of said contract and tantamount to unjust enrichment at the expense of NPC. As correctly pointed out by the Spouses Cabahug, however, the CAs ruling totally disregards the fourth paragraph of the Grant executed by Jesus Cabahug which expressly states as follows: That I hereby reserve the option to seek additional compensation for Easement Fee, based on the Supreme Court Decision in G.R. No. 60077, promulgated on January 18, 1991, which jurisprudence is designated as NPC vs. Gutierrez case. From the foregoing reservation, it is evident that the Spouses Cabahugs receipt of the easement fee did not bar them from seeking further compensation from NPC. Even by the basic rules in the interpretation of contracts, we find that the CA erred in holding that the payment of additional sums to the Spouses Cabahug would be violative of the parties contract and amount to unjust enrichment. Indeed, the rule is settled that a contract constitutes the law between the parties who are bound by its stipulations which, when couched in clear and plain language, should be applied according to their literal tenor. Courts cannot supply material stipulations, read into the contract words it does not contain or, for that matter, read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. Neither can they rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not. (2) CA erred in finding that the ruling in said case does not apply in the case at bench. Even without the reservation made by Jesus Cabahug in the Grant of Right of Way, the application of Gutierrez to this case is not improper as NPC represents it to be. Where the right of way easement, as in this case, similarly involves transmission lines which not only endangers life and limb but restricts as well the owner's use of the land traversed thereby, the ruling in Gutierrez remains doctrinal and should be applied. It has been ruled that the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land if, as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary. Measured not by the takers gain but the owners loss, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.

G.R. No. 182457. January 30, 2013 Facts In an Information dated October 25, 1995 filed before Branch 32, RTC of Agoo, La Union, accused-appellant was charged with Rape, thus: That on or about the 8 day of May, 1995, in the Municipality of Agoo, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design, did then and there, by means of force and intimidation and against the will and consent of the offended woman, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the latter, to her damage and prejudice. Despite the issuance of a warrant of arrest on February 22, 1996, it was returned unserved as appellant could no longer be found at his given address and he appeared to have gone into hiding purportedly in Cavite. Subsequently, the trial court ordered the archival of the case and issued an Alias Warrant of Arrest dated November 27, 1997 against appellant. Appellant remained at large until his arrest by the elements of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, CAR Criminal Investigation and Detection Office on August 15, 1998, more than two years after the original issuance of a warrant of arrest against him. Appellants arraignment was deferred upon his own motion pending reinvestigation of his case. After the dismissal of appellants appeal with the Department of Justice, he was finally arraigned on November 15, 1999 and he entered a plea of not guilty. Upon completion of pre-trial, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order wherein the parties entered into the following stipulations: 1. That during the time of [sic] the alleged act [was] committed, the victim was under the employ of the accused as his housekeeper; 2. The identity of the complainant; [and] 3. The identity of the accused. Issues The issue is whether or not appellants guilt was indeed established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Held/Ratio Yes. The incident of rape at issue happened prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353, the applicable law is the previous definition of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

According to the foregoing provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age.17 In the case at bar, the prosecution insists that the elements of carnal knowledge and force or intimidation are present. The Court has held that, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. On the matter of the credibility of witnesses, recently in People v. Padigos, the Court has reiterated a long held principle that the Court gives great weight to the trial courts assessment. They held that the trial courts finding of facts is even conclusive and binding if it is not shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The wisdom behind this rule is that the trial court had the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, thus, it is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. From a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no fault on the part of the lower courts in relying on the trustworthiness of the victims testimony. They agree with the assessment of the Court of Appeals that the following portion of ABCs direct testimony was delivered in a clear and straightforward manner.