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Griswold v. Connecticut

381 U.S. 479

ll

June 7, 1965

ll Douglas, J.

Petitioners:

Estelle T. Griswold, C. Lee Buxton

 

Respondent:

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

FACTS:

HELD:

Appellants Griswold, an Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Buxton, a licensed physician were arrested tried, convicted and fined $100 for violating provisions of the General Statutes

Yes. Appellants have standing, in so far as that they assert that the crimes for which they were charged is, constitutionally, not a crime.

of Connecticut sections 53-32 and 54-196. They

Yes.

While

the

right

to

privacy

is

not

provided medical advice to a married couple

explicitly included in the Bill of Rights, the right

that wanted to be informed on contraception

of married couples to decide on reproductive

methods and subsequently prescribed

choices and to

be

assisted

in

doing

so

is

contraceptive devices and materials for the

protected by peripheral rights

or

the

wife's use. Section 53-32 provides that the use of any

"penumbra" of other rights provided by the First Amendment (right to teach, as in Pierce v.

drug, medicinal article or instrument to prevent

Society of Sisters, supra;

 

and

Meyer

v.

conception is punishable by fine or mandatory

Nebraska;

right

to

association,

NAACP

v.

jail time. Section 54-196 provides that any accessory to such crime is punished as if they

Alabama), the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Ninth amendment.

were the principal offender. Intermediate appellate court and the State's highest court affirmed the judgment. 151 Connecticut 544, 200 A.2d 479 Appellants asserted that their conviction pursuant to the statute is in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus they believe that Connecticut is unconstitutional.

Court reversed Connecticut

ISSUES:

Whether appellants have standing to assert right of married couples to privacy? Whether their conviction as accessories due to enforcement of said Connecticut statute violated appellants’ Fourteenth Amendment rights?

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332

Eisenstadt v. Baird

405 U.S. 438

ll March 22, 1972

ll Brennan, J.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS:

 

William

Baird

[Appellee]

was

convicted

at

a

bench

trial

in

the

Massachusetts Superior Court under the Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c.272, §§21 and 21A for (1) exhibiting contraceptive articles in the course of delivering a lecture on contraception and (2) giving a woman Emko vaginal foam (contraceptive foam) at the end of the lecture.

(Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746) The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: (1) unanimously decided to set aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives but (2) by a 4-3 vote, sustained the conviction for giving away the contraceptive foam. Baird filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court dismissed the petition.

The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal and remanded the actions to remand the action with directions to grant the writ to Baird.

ISSUES AND RATIO:

1. Whether

Baird has standing

to

assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to

 

contraceptives:

 

Appellant: Eisenstadt

 

Response

 

Baird’s conviction rests on the

Court of Appeals: Statute in which

restriction

that

he

is

not

a

Baird was convicted is not a health measure; it does

doctor

or a physician.

Baird is

not follow how Baird should be prevented from

also

not

a

single

 

person

Attacking the statute.

The

point

of giving away

denied

access

 

to

c o n t r a c e p t i v e s is t o challenge the statute.

Contraceptives.

 

Thus,

Baird

Supreme Court: Unmarried persons denied access to

should

have

no

standing

in

contraceptives… are not themselves subject

court.

to Prosecution, and are denied a forum in which to assert their rights.

HELD: Baird is now in a position to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives

2.

Whether

the

Massachusetts

statute

Fourteenth Amendment:

violates

the

Equal

Protection

Clause

of

the

a. The deterrence of fornication cannot be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution of contraceptives. b. The Massachusetts statute on restricting access to non-married persons does not serve any health purpose. If that were the case, then the restriction should also apply to married persons. c. “If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”

HELD: The Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

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332

Geluz v. CA

G.R. No. L-16439 ll Jul. 20, 1961

ll

Reyes, J.

PETITIONER:

Antonio Geluz

 

RESPONDENTS:

Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo

FACTS:

accrue to

its

parents or

heir, by

virtue of his

Nita Villanueva aborted her pregnancy by her husband, Oscar Lazo, on three occasions:

once before their marriage and twice during its course. On all three instances, she sought the services of Antonio Geluz, a doctor. Oscar Lazo claimed that he did not know of, nor gave his consent to, the abortion, and thus, citing the last abortion as his basis, he filed a complaint with the trial court, asking the court to compel Geluz to indemnify him. His complaint and plea for indemnity was granted by the trial court and further affirmed by the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the provisions on the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Hence, Antonio Geluz came to the Supreme Court to appeal his case.

ISSUES:

Can

the

husband

of

a

woman,

who

voluntarily

procured

her

abortion,

recover

damages

from

a

physician

who

caused

the

same?

HELD:

No. The court ruled that indemnity cannot be had as an unborn fetus has no juridical personality, and thus, no action can be brought before the court on its behalf, and nor can any right that may arise from an injury caused to it

juridical personality being extinguished, or in fact, not having at all been realized, the moment it was aborted. Neither can provisional personality of a conceived child, as provided by Article 40, be invoked in this case since it does not satisfy the requisite of birth. Hence, the court explained that both the trial court and CA erred in awarding the damages to Lazo since

Article 2206 does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality.

Only

moral damages

can

be

claimed by

parents on the basis of the illegal arrest of the normal development of their unborn child, which results to parents’ distress and anguish on the loss, and disappointment of their parental expectations. However, since the case at bar involves voluntary abortion on the part of the mother, coupled by the fact that the husband was indifferent to the other two abortions, the court was unable to find any

ground to award moral damages. This is

exacerbated by the fact that Lazo didn’t even

sue on administrative or criminal grounds, but

only seemed to be after the doctor’s money.

Hence, the court reversed the decision and dismissed Lazo’s complaint.

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332

Joaquin v. Navarro

G.R. No. L-5426

ll

May 29, 1953

ll Tuason, J.

PETITIONER:

Ramon Joaquin

RESPONDENT:

Antonio Navarro

FACTS:

ISSUES:

During the Japanese invasion, the Navarro family, consisted of Joaquin Navarro Sr., 70; Angela Joaquin de Navarro, ~67; Joaquin

Between the mother and son, first?

who

died

Navarro Jr., ~30; and sisters Pilar, ~33;

In answering

this

question,

 

must

the

Concepcion, ~23; and Natividad, ~25, were

presumption

of

survivorship

in

Rule

131,

killed in various orders. The established fact is

Section

3

(jj)

of

the

Rules

of

Court

or

that the three sisters, Pilar, Concepcion and

simultaneous death in Section 43 of the Civil

Natividad, were the first ones to get killed,

Code be applied?

 

while their father, Joaquin Navarro Sr., was the last. The disputed order of death however concerns that of Angela Joaquin de Navarro and

HELD:

Joaquin Navarro Jr., because no clear evidence

Based on the preponderance of evidence

shows that at the time when Joaquin Navarro

provided by Francisco Lopez’s testimony, the

Jr. got shot on the head, Angela Joaquin had already been dead or was still alive. It is important to solve the mystery because it has a bearing on the rights to succession of Ramon Joaquin, herein referred to as Petitioner, who is the biological son of Angela Joaquin to a previous relationship, as well as the legally adopted child of Joaquin Navarro Sr., and Antonio Navarro, herein referred to as Respondent, who is the biological son of

court ruled that it is most probable that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before her mother. The contrary position is merely speculative, and is thus trumped by the former’s circumstantial FACTS. Thus, there is no need to use the presumption of survivorship in Rule 131, Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court, or the presumption of simultaneity of death in Section 43. These two provisions only apply when the

Joaquin Navarro Sr. to a previous marriage.

FACTS are unknown and unknowable, which is not true for the case at hand.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that

Angela

outlived

her

son.

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332

Mercado v. Espiritu

FACTS:

Petitioners Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit against Luis Espiritu (but now directed against the administrator, Jose Espiritu, since Luis died), alleging that they and their sisters are the sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, their mother and the sister of the defendant. Petitioners claim that in 1910, Luis, by means of cajolery, induced and fraudulently succeeded in getting the petitioners to sign a deed of the land left by their mother for P400, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795. They therefore ask that the sale be

rendered null & void and that defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to petitioners the shares of the land, together with its products. The defendant answers this by saying that Margarita, with due authorization of her

husband and petitioners’ father Wenceslao,

sold to Luis a portion of the land (15 cavanes of

seed) for P2,000. To cover his children’s needs,

Wenceslao subsequently pledged or mortgaged to Luis the remainder of said land (6 cavanes of seed) at P375. With this amount being insufficient, he additionally borrowed other sums of money aggregating a total of P600.

After their father’s death, the petitioners then

declared themselves to be of legal age and executed, together with their sisters, the notarial instrument ratifying the previous

contracts and selling absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400

“as an increase” of the previous purchase price,

the property that had belonged to their mother.

ISSUE:

WON

the

sale

can

be

annulled

on the

grounds that petitioners were minors without

legal capacity to

contract on the

date of

its

execution, and that the defendant

availed

himself of deceit

and

fraud

in

obtaining

petitioners’ consent.

HELD:

No, the sale cannot be annulled.

First, the evidence adduced at the trial

Persons and Family Relations

doesn’t show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence or intimidation in order to effect the sale. Second, no evidence appears in the records that petitioners were minors when they executed and signed the document. No certified copies of their baptismal certificates were presented, nor did they produce any supplemental evidence to prove that Domingo was 19 and Josefa 18 when they signed the document. The statement made by one of the adult parties of said deed, in reference to certain notes made in a book or copybook of a private nature, which she said their father kept during his lifetime and until his death, is not

sufficient to prove the plaintiff’s minority on the

date of the execution of the deed. Even in the doubt whether they were of legal age on the date referred to, the courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minors who pretend to be of legal age, is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or to seek their annulment. (Law 6, title 19, 6 th partida. 1 ) The judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and

absolves the purchase from the complaint filed

against him doesn’t violate the law relative to the sale of minors’ property nor the rules laid

down in consonance therewith.

1 “If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five

years of age, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that was not of said age when he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived

and not the deceivers.”

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332

Braganza v. Villa Abrille

FACTS:

Rosario, with her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo, received from respondent, as a loan, on October 30 1944, P70,000 in Japanese notes and in consideRATIOn, promised to pay him P10,000 in the legal currency of the Philippine Islands 2 years after the cessation of hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines Since the petitioners didn't pay, Villa Abrille sued them on March 1949 Braganzas claim as defense that they only received P40,000 and that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the

promissory note

ISSUE:

Is the mom liable? How about Rodolfo and Guillermo?

HELD:

Mom is liable. Children are liable in as much

as they benefited from the loan

RATIO:

No question on mom's liability. She can't use minority as a defense since it's personal to the minors. However, such defense will benefit

her to the extent of the shares for which minors were responsible At time of the signing of the loan agreement, Guillermo was 16 and Rodolfo 18.

Failure

to

disclose

their

minority

in

promissory note does not mean that they'll not be permitted to assent it. THERE WAS NO JURIDICAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE INABILITY How is this different from Mercado? In Mercado, there was an active misrepresentation in that the siblings Mercado wrote in the document that they were of age. Here, no such thing. = Guillermo and Rodolfo are not legally bound

Article 1301 of the old Civil Code states that "an action to annul a contract by reason of minority must be filed within 4 years". Since Rodolfo turned 1947, action will expire October 1951. Action was filed June 1951, so within the period BUT the brothers are not entirely absolved. Article 1340 "states that the minor party must make restitution to extent that they may have profited by money they received" Another thing is, the funds were used for their support While the promise to pay P10,000 can't be enforced, 1340 states that they should be liable

for

P1000

Persons and Family Relations

Hermosisima

6

332

Bambalan v. Maramba

G.R. No. L-27710 ll Jan. 30, 1928

ll Romualdez, J.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:

Isidro Bambalan German Maramba and Genoveva Muerong

FACTS:

ISSUES:

Isidro Bambalan, the plaintiff, executed a

 

Whether or not the sale was invalid because the

deed

of

sale

involving

a

piece

of

land

to

plaintiff who executed the same was a minor

Genoveva Muerong, one of the defendants. At

 

the time

he

signed and executed said deed,

 

RULING:

Isidro was a minor, and made no misrepresentation that he was of legal age. In fact, Genoneva was aware that Isidro was still a minor, as she was the one who purchased his first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document. The plaintiff now wishes to

invalidate said sale.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of

the lower court.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu, where the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be of age, is not applicable in this case, since the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age and since his minority was well known to the purchaser.

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332

Braganza v. Villa Abrille

G.R. No. L-12471 ll Apr. 13, 1959

ll Bengzon, J.

PETITIONERS:

Rosario de Braganza, et al.

RESPONDENT:

Fernando de Villa Abrille

FACTS:

RULING:

Rosario and her sons loaned Japanese war notes in the amount of P70,000 from Fernando

F. de Villa Abrille, promising to pay him with interest in Philippine currency two years after the cessation of the war as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines. Upon their failure to pay, Villa Abrille sued them, to which the defendants

asserted the sons’ minority during the time they

signed the promissory note as an excuse for their liability. Further, Villa Abrille, when the defendants signed said promissory note, was

not aware that the sons were still minors, since none of the defendants made any

representation as to the two’s ages at the time.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the minors were liable to pay since they failed to disclose their being minors

The Court held Rosario’s liability but only

made the sons liable to the extent that they

benefitted from the loan.

RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. Mere failure to disclose minor’s age

does not constitute fraud, hence the minors cannot be held liable. There is no juridical duty on their part to disclose their incapacity on the basis of their minority. Misrepresentation of age, for it to be fraudulent, must be active and not passive; that is, the minors actually have to lie about their age and not just fail to disclose it. Meanwhile, the minors are nonetheless required to make restitution insofar as they have benefited from the money they received.

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332

Martinez v. Martinez

G.R. No. 445

ll

Mar. 31, 1902

ll

Cooper, J.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:

Pedro Martinez

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Francisco Martinez

FACTS:

Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the

RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. This is based on the Court’s own

compulsory

legal

heir

of

Francisco

Martinez

understanding of prodigality as acts that must

Garcia, brought

a

suit

to

declare his father

show a morbid state of mind and a disposition

prodigal. He accused his father of squandering his estate by making donations to his second

to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to

wife and her family. On the other hand,

want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs

Francisco

stated that gave

his

son

a

general

of their undisposable part of the estate. Pedro’s

power of attorney to administer his estate, but

testimony was insufficient to allege prodigality

that the revoked the same due to

ISSUES:

his

son’s

on his father’s part, and neither is there any

mismanagement.

 

evidence that his father has been transferring properties to diminish his estate. The Court found that the father is far from being prodigal

WON Francisco should be declared prodigal

and still exercises his full mental faculties and

RULING:

possesses ability to manage his estate wisely. On the other hand, it was the son who has

The Court affirmed the CA’s decision and

exhibited tendencies to be prodigal.

ruled

in

favor

of

not declaring Francisco

prodigal.

 

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332

Wassmer v. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089 ll Dec. 26, 1964

FACTS:

On August 23, 1954, Francisco Velez and

Beatriz Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage. In preparation for their wedding on Sept. 4, invitations were distributed

and apparel were purchased. On Sept. 2, Velez left a note for Wassmer to the effect that the wedding will have to be postponed due to the opposition thereto of his mother. The day after, he sent a telegram assuring her of his return. Alas, he never did. Velez was declared in default

after failure to answer Wassmer’s suit for

damages, and was ordered to indemnify plaintiff. Velez filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable negligence, as well as a motion for new trial and reconsideration on the ground that there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUES:

(1) WON defendant’s petition for relief on the ground of excusable negligence is valid;

plaintiff was due to fortuitous event is a mere conclusion or opinion.

(2)

Mere breach of a promise to marry is NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG (Estopa v. Biansay). Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

(3) The circumstances surrounding the breach of promise to marry are contrary to good customs for which defendant MUST BE HELD ANSWERABLE in damages. Article 21, CC, provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

No question was raised as to the award of actual damages. As per Article 2219, CC, moral damages are recoverable in

(2) WON

mere

breach

of

a

promise

to

this

case.

As

per

Article

2232,

CC,

marry is an actionable wrong;

 

exemplary damages are also

(3) WON

defendant

must

be

held

recoverable because the circumstances

answerable in damages;

(4) WON

the

damages

awarded

were

a wanton, reckless and oppressive

indicate

that

defendant

acted

in

excessive.

 

manner.

HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:

 

(4) Considering

the

the

SC

particular

 

circumstances,

affirmed

the

(1) Defendant’s petition was NOT VALID because it wasn’t supported by an

affidavit of merits based on FACTS. The

contention that his failure

to

marry

lower court’s judgment but REDUCED

the initial moral and exemplary damages from PHP25000 to PHP15000 as a reasonable award.

Persons and Family Relations

Ordoyo

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332

Tanjanco v. CA

G.R. No. L-18630 ll Dec. 17, 1966

ll

J.B.L Reyes, J.

PETITIONER:

 

RESPONDENTS:

APOLONIO TANJANCO HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS

FACTS:

to

marry

are

not

permissible

in

this

From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent,

jurisdiction.

 

ARACELI

SANTOS,

both

being

of

legal

age.

Tanjanco expressed and professed his

undying love

and affection for Santos

who

eventually

reciprocated

such

feelings.

With

Tanjancos

promise

of

marriage

in

mind,

Santos acceded to

his

pleas

for

carnal

knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For one

year, Tanjanco

had

carnal access to Santos

which eventually

led

to

Santos

getting

pregnant.

As

a

result

of

her

pregnancy,

Santos had to resign from her job as secretar

y

in

IBM

Philippines,

Inc.

In

her

state

of

unemployment Santos became unable to

support

herself and

her baby,

and

because

Tanjanco

did

not

fulfill

his

promise

of

marriage

she

suffered

mental

anguish,

a

besmirched

reputation,

wounded

feelings,

moral shock, and social humiliation.

Santos

prayed to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child she

was

bearing,

and

pay

her

for

support

and

damages.

 

Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of action. Santos appealed the case to the Court

of Appeals

and the latter decided the case,

stating that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of the unborn child nor for

its support, but a cause of action was present

for

damages,

under Article 21 of the Civil

Code.

Tanjanco

appealed such decision

pleading that actions for breach of a promise

ISSUES:

WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry her

HELD:

In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind the idea of seduction.

Decision of Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Complaint of Santos is dismissed for failure to state cause of action

Persons and Family Relations

Pagdanganan

11

332

De Jesus v. Syquia

G.R. No. L-39110 ll Nov. 28, 1933

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL. CESAR SYQUIA

FACTS:

Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as a cashier for a barber shop of which defendant

Cesar Syquia, an unmarried man from a prominent family, was accustomed to get his haircut. The two became acquainted and developed an amorous relationship which resulted to Antonia getting pregnant and giving

birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931.

During the early months of Antonia’s

pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor at her home, and in February 1931, he handed Antonia a letter which was addressed to the priest who was to christen the baby acknowledging that the baby is his and that it be christened in his name. Defendant showed paternal interest in the situation that even when he was abroad, he continued to write to Antonia cautioning her to take care of herself so that “junior” would be strong. After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and the child in his house where they lived together in regular family style with all household expenses paid for by Syquia. When Antonia showed signs of a second pregnancy, Syquia left her and thereafter married another woman. During the christening of the child, the defendant caused the child to be given the name Ismael Loanco instead of the originally planned Cesar Syquia, Jr.

ISSUES:

WON the breach of promise to marry is actionable. WON the letters made by defendant prove sufficiency of acknowledgment of paternity.

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in refusing to give damages to

Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The action has no standing in civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features

necessary

to

maintain

such

an

action.

Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second child, Pacita Loanco. The sufficiency of acknowledgement of paternity is satisfied by the production of one or more documents, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father, as contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The admission of paternity is contained in the note to the priest and the other letters addressed to Antonia during her pregnancy.

Persons and Family Relations

Perez

12

332

Piccininni v. Hajus

FACTS:

The petitioner, Piccininni, claims that the

defendant, Hajus, made him believe that they would get married and live at her house. Because of this, Piccininni spent $40,000 to renovate and improve her house.

Hajus claimed that she can’t be

charged

with fraud and that what she committed was a

breach of promise to marry. Therefore, no action can be brought upon her because of the Heart Balm Act. The Heart Balm Act states “no action shall be brought upon any cause from alienation of affections or from breach of promise to marry.” Trial court ruled that the Heart Balm Act bars Piccininni from charging Hajus. Case brought to SC.

ISSUE:

WON Piccinnini can recover his property in light of the Heart Balm Act

HELD:

Yes.

Piccininni is

not asking for

damages

because of a broken heart or a mortified spirit. He is asking for the return of things which he gave to Hajus because of her fraudulent representations. Picininni does not assert that Hajus wronged him in failing to marry him. He just asserted that she wronged him in fraudulently inducing him to transfer property to her. His complaint is based on what she did, and not on what she refused to do.

Hence, trial court’s judgment was reverse.

Persons and Family Relations

Poblador

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332

Loving v. Virginia

Warren, CJ.

FACTS:

In Virginia, there is a comprehensive statutory scheme prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages. Residents Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. After their marriage, they established their marital abode in Caroline County in Virginia. They were convicted for violating Section 20- ­­58 which states that any white person and colored person shall go out of this State for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be guilty of a felony and imprisoned for not less than one nor more than five years. The central feature of this act is the absolute prohibition of a white person marrying other than another white person. The couple instituted an action to nullify the ruling of the Court as a violation of their 14th amendment.

ISSUE:

WON

the

statutory

scheme

adopted

by

Virginia preventing marriages between two persons solely on the basis of racial

classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses?

HELD:

State argument-­­ no violation of equal protection as whites and colored people are punished with the same degree. Furthermore, there is a rational basis, which is based on scientific evidence, for it to outlaw interracial marriages. The Court could not question the wisdom behind the legislation. Court: The history of the 39th Congress (one who introduced the 14th amendment) and jurisprudence reveal that equal protection is not limited to equal application of penalty in the classification made by legislature. There is no question that Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions according to race. The Court has consistently repudiated these kinds of statutes as inimical to the doctrine of equality. It entails the most rigid scrutiny for the statute to be valid. However, there is no legitimate and overriding purpose independent of racial discrimination which justifies the classification. It is also violative of the due process clause as the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. It is one of the basic civil rights of man. The 14th amendment requires that freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. The freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.

Persons and Family Relations

Tiangco

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332

Zablocki v. Redhail

FACTS:

Wisconsin statute: members of a certain class of Wisconsin residents may not marry, within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry. The class is defined to include any “Wisconsin resident having minor ISSUE not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment.” Court permission cannot be granted unless the marriage applicant submits proof of compliance with the support obligation and, in addition, demonstrates that the children covered by the support order “are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges.” Redhail was denied a marriage license because of his failure to comply with the statute. It was found that Redhail had a paternity action instituted against him, alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock. He was adjudged to pay $109/mo as support for the child until she reached 18 years of age. When Redhail applied for a marriage license, Zablocki did not ISSUE the license for violating the statute on the grounds that: (1) he had not satisfied his support obligations to his illegitimate child and; (2) the child had been a public charge since her birth, receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program.

ISSUE:

WON the Wisconsin statute is constitutional [NO]

On

privacy:

Right

to

marry

is

of

fundamental importance,

and

since

the

classification at ISSUE

here

significantly

interferes with the

exercise

of that

right,

a

“critical examination”

of

the

state

interests

advanced in support of the

classification

is

required. The decision to marry has been placed on

the same level of importance

as decisions

relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. It would make little

sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in [US] society Two interests are asserted: the permission- ­­to-­­marry proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling his prior support obligations; and the welfare of the out-­­of- ­­custody children is protected. However, the State has already numerous other means for exacting compliance with support obligations, means that are as effective as the statute yet do not impinge upon the right to marry: via wage assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties. The statutory classification interferes directly and substantially with the right to marry:

No Wisconsin resident in the affected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a court order. Some of those in the affected class will never be able to obtain the necessary court order, because they either lack the financial means to meet their support obligations or cannot prove that their children will not become public charges. Some will be coerced in foregoing their right to marry. Statute is grossly underinclusive since they do not limit in any way new financial commitments by the applicant other than those arising out of the contemplated marriage. Statutory classification is substantially overinclusive as well: Given the possibility that the new spouse will actually better the applicant’s financial situation, by contributing income from a job or otherwise, the statute in many cases may prevent affected individuals from improving their ability to satisfy their prior support obligations.

Persons and Family Relations

Sevilla

15

332

Graham v. Graham

33 F.Supp. 936 ll Jul. 15, 1940 ll District Judge Tuttle

PLAINTIFF:

Sidney Graham

 

DEFENDANT:

Margrethe Graham

FACTS:

under Michigan law, which states that married

Sidney Graham sues his former wife based on an agreement they had when they were still

woman have no general power to contract, but can contract only in relation to her separate

married.

Said agreement

stipulated

that

property, the contract is VOID because it

Margrethe is to pay Sidney a sum of $300 per

contravenes public policy. Under the law,

month until they no longer want said

marriage is not merely a private contract

agreement to continue. Sidney alleges that the

between the parties, but creates a status in

reason

for

said

agreement

was

Margrethe’s

which the state is vitally interested and under

plea to have him quit his work in a hotel so he

which certain rights and duties incident to the

could accompany

her

in

all

her

travels.

relationship come into being, irrespective of the

Margrethe

denies

Sidney’s

allegations

and

wishes of the parties. As a result of the

asserts, among others, that the contract was not within the power of a married woman under Michigan law to make.

marriage contract, for example, the husband has a duty to support and to live with his wife and the wife must contribute her services and

ISSUES:

society to the husband and follow him in his choice of domicile. Any private agreement

WON the contract is valid and binding

 

between persons married or about to be

RULING:

married which attempts to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract as defined

The judge ruled that the contract is void.

 

by the law is contrary to public policy and

RATIO DECIDENDI:

 

unenforceable, as is the case when the wife releases the husband from his duty to support

Regardless

of

WON

the

woman

is

his wife in a contract between married persons.

competent to enter into the alleged contract

Persons and Family Relations

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332

Bradwell v. Illinois

FACTS:

The statute of Illinois on the subject of admissions to the bar enacts that no person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counsellor-at-law without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from some two of the justices of the Supreme Court. Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied to the judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois for a license to practice law. With this petition are a certificate from an inferior court of her good character, and that on due examination she had been found to possess the requisite qualifications. Pending this application, she also filed an

affidavit, stating that “she was born in the State

of Vermont; that she was (had been) a citizen of

the State; that she is now a citizen of the United States, and has been for many years past a resident of the city of Chicago, in the State of

Illinois.” She also filed a paper asserting that she

was entitled to the license prayed for by virtue of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States, and that of the 14th article of amendment of that instrument. Her application was denied, and it was stated as a sufficient reason that under the

decisions of the SC of Illinois, the applicant—“as a married woman would be bound neither by her express contracts nor by those implied contracts which it is the policy of the law to

create between attorney and client.” The

decision also states that admitting women would mean that the courts would be exercising the authority conferred upon them in a manner that was never contemplated by the legislature. Plus, God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws.

ISSUE:

WON the decision violates a provision of the Federal Constitution.

HELD:

No--the decision of the Illinois court upheld, and Mrs. Bradwell still cannot practice law. There are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. However, the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them. The SC here, referring to the

opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, says that the power of a State to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment, and that they cannot inquire into the reasonableness or propriety of the rules it may prescribe. The Supreme Court also dismissed any claim under the privileges and immunities clause of the unamended ConstitutionArticle IV, Section 2, Clause 1. Bradwell argued that because she had been born in Vermont but later moved to Illinois, Illinois' denial of a law license was inter-state discrimination. But the Court noted that under the recently-enacted Fourteenth Amendment, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Because Bradwell had been a resident of Illinois for several years, she was now a citizen of Illinois, and the interstate provision of Article IV did not apply.

Persons and Family Relations

Falcone

17

332

Dunn v. Palermo

522 S.W.2d 679

ll

Jul. 7, 1975

ll

Henry, J.

APPELLANTS:

Winfield Dunn, et al.

 

APPELLEE:

Rosary Palermo

FACTS:

ISSUES:

Rosary Palermo, a Nashville lawyer, married Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy her maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes. Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo. She was advised that she was required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her

name purged from the registration records. Upon her refusal to so register, her name was purged from the registration list. Thus this action, wherein appellee seeks a declaratory judgment declaring that the defendants' interpretation of Sec. 2-206, is erroneous, or in the alternative that this statute be declared violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

WON it is mandatory for a married woman to assume the name of her husband repute

RULING:

The Court ruled in favour of the appellee.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

There is no constitutional question that needs to be answered as regards the Texas statute as it does not mandate any change of name by a woman upon marriage. It merely recognizes the prevalence of the virtually universal custom under which a woman normally adopts the surname of her husband. We hold that in this jurisdiction a woman, upon marriage, has a freedom of choice; she may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband. So long as a person's name remains constant and consistent, and unless and until changed in the prescribed manner, and absent any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, the State has no legitimate concern.

Persons and Family Relations

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332

In Re: Santiago

A.C. No. 932

ll

Jun. 21, 1940

ll

Laurel, J.

PETITIONER-COMPLAINANT:

OSG

RESPONDENT:

 

Roque Santiago

FACTS:

signed the deed of cancellation of their

ISSUES:

Ernesto Baniquit, then living separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of

contract. Thus, the OSG filed this complaint charging the respondent with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.

Occidental Negros. The respondent, after

WON the contract executed by the spouses

hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the

upon the respondent’s advice validly

latter that he could secure a separation from his

terminated the marital tie between the two

 

wife and marry again. He made Baniquit and his wife sign a document, in which it was

RULING:

stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the

The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party

RATIO DECIDENDI:

so marrying. The respondent assured the spouses that they were single and as such, could contract another and subsequent marriage, hence on June 11, 1939, Ernesto contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. Upon realizing his mistake, which came

The Court held that there is no doubt that the contract executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares, upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public, is

from his idea that seven years’ separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage, respondent immediately sent for the contracting parties

contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. As such, Roque Santiago is guilty of malpractice for having given false advice to the couple due to either his

who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and

recklessness or sheer

ignorance

of

the

law.

Persons and Family Relations

Cadorna

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332

Selanova v. Mendoza

A.M. No. 804-CJ ll May. 19, 1975

ll Aquino, J.

COMPLAINANT:

Saturnino Selanova

 

RESPONDENT:

Judge Alejandro Mendoza

FACTS:

RULING:

Saturnino Selanova charged Judge

ISSUES:

The respondent is severely censured but

Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with

not

disbarred

due

to

the attending

gross ignorance of the law for having prepared

circumstances.

 

and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the

RATIO DECIDENDI:

complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage

The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the Art 221 of the Civil Code which makes void any (1) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

which each had filed against the other and that they waived their "right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit against the other. Judge Mendoza

and (2) every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and

claimed that he was aware of the invalidity of

wife. They also cited that Judge Mendoza’s

the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it on the assurance of the spouses that they would ask the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental to approve the agreement. He said that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of

reliance on Art. 191 Par.4 of the Civil Code was misplaced and that the Court had already ruled in an earlier case that judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage should be secured beforehand before it can be ratified. Meanwhile, in regard

the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code).

to the other main stipulation of the contract in question, which waives the right of either spouse to file a complaint against any adulterous offense the other may commit, was also cited to be "contrary to law, morals and

WON

the

document

of

extrajudicial

public order, and as a consequence not

liquidation of conjugal partnership ratified by the respondent is void.

judicially recognizable" They held that while while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they still remain crimes and a contract legalizing their commission is therefore void.

Persons and Family Relations

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332

Jones v. Hallahan

501 S.W.2d 588 ll Nov. 9, 1973 ll Commissioner Vance

APPELLANTS:

Marjorie Jones, et al.

 

APPELLEE:

James Hallahan

FACTS:

constitutional sanction or protection of the

The appellants, each of whom is a female person, seek review of a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which held that they were not entitled to have ISSUEd to them a license to marry each other. Appellants contend that the failure of the clerk to ISSUE the license deprived them of three basic constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of

right of marriage between persons of the same sex. Using sources that define the word marriage, since Kentucky statutes do not define the term, they found that marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman and that no authority to the contrary has yet been presented. Thus, it appeared to the Court that the appellants were prevented

association; and the right to free exercise of religion. They also contend that the refusal subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment.

from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court Clerk of Jefferson County to ISSUE them a license, but

ISSUES:

rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined. A license to

WON

in

refusing

to

ISSUE

a marriage

enter into a status or a relationship which the

license to the appellants, the appellee violated

parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity. If

the formers’ constitutional rights.

 

the appellants had concealed from the clerk the

RULING:

fact that they were of the same sex and he had ISSUEd a license to them and a ceremony had

The CA affirmed the judgment of the lower

been performed, the resulting relationship

court.

would not constitute a marriage. In substance,

RATIO DECIDENDI:

 

the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage

No.

The Court found that

there

was

no

license because what they propose is not a

constitutional

violation

since

there

is

no

marriage.

Persons and Family Relations

Cadorna

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332

Goodridge v. Department of Public Health

Plaintiffs were denied marriage license by the Department of Public Health, due to same-sex marriage.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs are 14 individuals from five Massachusetts counties. The plaintiffs include business executives, lawyers, an investment banker, educators, therapists, and a computer engineer. Many are active in church, community, and school groups. They have employed such legal means as are available to them for example, joint adoption, powers of attorney, and joint ownership of real property to secure aspects of their relationships. Each plaintiff attests a desire to marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their commitment to each other and to secure the legal protections and benefits afforded to married couples and their children. The plaintiff couples attempted to obtain a marriage license from the city/town clerk’s office and complied all the formalities. The Department of Public Health, charged by the statute, refused to accept the notice of intention to marry and denied a marriage license on the ground that Massachusetts did not recognize same-sex marriage. Plaintiffs filed a suit. The Superior Court ruled for the DPH. Plaintiffs appealed from this decision.

ISSUE:

plaintiff’s claim to construe the statute to permit marriage to same-sex couples. WON prohibiting same-sex marriages was valid under Massachusetts marriage licensing statutes, G.L. c. 207 or was it a violation of Massachusetts constitution?

HELD:

NO. The Superior Court was not correct in its summary of judgment in favor of the

Department of Public Health and by dismissing the plaintiff’s claim.

NO.

Declining

a

license

to

same-sex

marriage was not valid under Massachusetts marriage licensing statutes and thus, was a violation of the constitution. Barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage, solely for the reason that the person would marry a person of the same sex, violated the Massachusetts Constitution. The court construed the civil marriage to

mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses to the exclusion of others. This reformulation redressed the plaintiffs' constitutional injury and furthered the aim of marriage and advanced the legitimate state's interests the department had identified.

WON the Superior Court was correct in its summary judgment in favor of the Department

Judgment

of

the

Superior

Court

was

of Public Health, and thereby dismissed the

reversed

by

the

Massachusetts

Supreme

Judicial Court.

 

Persons and Family Relations

Reyes, G.

22

332

Silverio v. Republic

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. The doctor ISSUEd a medical certificate proving the same. Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. In his birth certificate, it is indicated that his name is “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” and his sex was registered as “male”. He alleges that he is a male transsexual. He seeks to have his name changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from “male” to “female”

PROCEDURAL:

Trial Court: Grant petition in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. CA: Reverse No law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.

ISSUES:

WON a person’s first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment [NO]

The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Art. 376 (NCC) No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. RA 9048 amended the provision. Section 1 of RA 9048 provides Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed… Sec 4: Grounds for Change of First Name (1) the petitioner finds the first name to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) the new first name has been habitually and continuously

Persons and Family Relations

used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community and; (3) the change will avoid confusion. Changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose (to make his name compatible with the sex he transformed himself through surgery) may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. (Rather than filing first in the trial court) A law does not exist which allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the FACTS, as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

WON the entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex can be changed on the ground of equity [NO]

Petitioner wishes to change his name and sex since this is the first step of marrying his fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract between a man and a woman. One of the essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Following will be affected:

Allowing the

union of

a

man with

another man who has undergone sex reassignment. Treatment on provisions of the Labor Code directly applicable to women.

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332

Silverio v. Republic

COURT’S FINAL REMARKS:

Petitioner pleads that “the unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and the realization of their dreams. No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly

recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

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332

Republic v. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676 ll Sep. 12, 2008 ll Quisumbing, J.

PETITIONER:

Republic of the Philippines

RESPONDENT:

Jennifer Cagandahan

FACTS:

ISSUES:

Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. She asserted that she was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is a condition where persons thus afflicted

possess both male and female characteristics. Tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development; she has become a male person. In her petition with the RTC to have her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff, her physician testified on her condition by presenting a medical certificate to back her alleged condition. The RTC granted her petition, recognizing her proven medical condition. Thus (OSG) filed this petition seeking areversal of the abovementioned ruling based on (1) violations

on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding (a)

Cagandahan’s failure to implead the local civil

registrar in her petition with the RTC and (b) her plea to have her gender changed in the birth certificate (OSG believes her condition does not make her male; and (2) a violation on Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, in which Cagandahan failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was

filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing. The court dismissed the two procedural ISSUES on Rules 108 and 103, and decided on the substantive merit regarding the

change of gender in Cagandahan’s records due

to her medical condition.

WON the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her name and gender, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH

RULING:

The Republic’s petition is denied.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

No. The respondent’s condition, CAH, is one

of many conditions involving intersexuality,

which apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. Here, the

rule of determining a person’s gender at birth

cannot apply because the sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. Instead, it is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Thus, the Court is of the view that where the person

is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. In the case of respondent, his having ordered his life to that of a male is backed by preponderant biological bases. Unlike in the case of individuals who underwent sexual reassignment, respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. In the

absence of a law on such an unusual matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning

a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality

and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.

Persons and Family Relations

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People v. Santiago

G.R. No. L-27972 ll Oct. 31, 1927

ll Street, J.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:

The People of the Philippine Islands Felipe Santiago

DOCTRINE:

In relation with the course syllabus topic from which the case is filed under, the marriage between Santiago and Masilang cannot be considered as valid because it lacked the essential (marriage) requisite of ‘consent freely given’

NATURE:

This is an appeal brought to the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija finding the appellant guilty of rape and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment, reclusion temporal; requiring him to endow the offended party; requiring him to recognize and maintain the offspring, if there should be any, as consequence of the rape; and requiring him to pay further costs.

FACTS:

Felicita Masilang (victim), aged 18, was

Felipe Santiago’s (appellant) niece by marriage.

On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked the victim to accompany him to cross the river and from there he led her to a place far from the highway with tall grass hiding them from public view. The appellant manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the girl but she

refused; however, the appellant succeeded by forcing himself on her. The appellant then brought the victim to the nearby house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago. In the afternoon, a protestant minister was brought in to conduct a ceremony that married the appellant and the victim.

ISSUE:

WON the marriage of the appellant and the victim is considered valid to exempt him from criminal liability. NO.

RATIO:

The court found that the offense of rape has indeed been committed, but the marriage

ceremony was only a mere ‘ruse’ of the

appellant to escape from criminal liability. The actions of Santiago before and after the marriage would prove that he really had no intention to marry Masilang other than for the aforementioned reason. Furthermore, because the victim was under duress, the marriage is void for lack of consent. Consequently, the appellant is not exempt from criminal liability.

The judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, and will be affirmed. Costs against the appellant.

Persons and Family Relations

Yumol

26

332

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat

G.R. No. 47101

ll

Apr. 25, 1941

ll

Horilleno, J.

FACTS:

The plaintiff met the defendant in March

  • 1938. After several dates, they were engaged

on 19 September of that year. On 26 November the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in the Catholic Cathedral of the City of Baguio. After living together as husband and wife for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave

birth to a child of nine months, on February 23,

  • 1939. Because of this the plaintiff abandoned

the defendant and did not return to their life as

husband and wife. The plaintiff then requests the annulment of the marriage he had with the defendant on the grounds that he consented to the marriage because the defendant had assured him that she was virgin.

ISSUES:

WON

annulment

can

proceed

given

plaintiff’s claim that he had been defrauded by

his wife whom he thought was a virgin

RULING:

The judgment appealed from is deemed to be in accordance with law, and is thus affirmed.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

NO. The plaintiff's allegation that he had not suspected the pregnancy of the defendant when he married her is highly improbable, given her obvious advanced pregnancy. Therefore it is

unnecessary to consider the appellant’s

allegation of fraud. He also argued that it is not

uncommon to find people with big stomachs, but we find this argument too puerile to even consider, especially since the appellant is a freshman in law school. Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is the cement, the very foundation, on which society rests. For annulment to proceed, it is entirely necessary that the pieces of evidence provided be clear and reliable. No such evidence can be found in this case.

Persons and Family Relations

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332

Eigenmann v. Guerra

FACTS:

HELD:

Eduardo Eigenmann [who represented

No.

He

is

estopped

because

of

his

himself as of legal age] and Maryden Guerra got

misrepresentation of his age [claimed to

be

married before Judge Prudencio Encomienda as

25yrs,8mos] when he

applied

for

marriage

solemnizing officer and 4 witnesses, including

license. With regards to the

consent

of

his

Eduardo’s mother. After living together for

mother, the fact that the mother was a witness

quite a time, Eduardo filed an action for the annulment of his marriage to Maryden Guerra on the grounds of his age and lack of parental consent, his consent not freely given [use of

force, intimidation by Froilan Guerra, wife’s

father], and lack of legal authority of the one who administered the oath [councillor of Quezon City] making the marriage void ab initio.

ISSUES:

WON his lack of statutory age

and

lack of

parental consent may be grounds for

annulment of marriage WON his consent

being not freely given

may render the marriage void

WON the marriage

is

void

ab

ignition

because of the lack of legal authority by the

officer who administered the oath

to the marriage and did not object to the

marriage implies consent. Consent may

be

given

in

any

form

[written,oral or implied] A

written consent under oath is not necessary.

No. There was no factual or legal for the claim.The Court did not see any reasonable or well-grounded fear of an imminent danger and

grave evil upon Eigenmann’s person or property

that would arise from the statement of Froilan Guerra [Balita ko lumiligaw ka sa aking anak. Pag niloko mo iyan, mag-ingat ka.] The statement for the court was only an admonition natural for a father and not a threat.

No. What is declared null and void by the law are marriages solemnized w/o a marriage license. A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained. The local civil registrar and the solemnizing officer are not required to inquire about the authority of the officer administering the oath.

Persons and Family Relations

Bayona

28

332

Navarro v. Domagtoy

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 ll Jul. 19, 1996 ll Romero, J.

COMPLAINANT: Rodolfo Navarro RESPONDENT: Judge Hernando Domagtoy

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodolfo G. Navarro submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law:

1.) Respondent judge solemnized the wedding

between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the

groom is merely separated from his first wife. (In violation of Art. 41 of the FC) 2.) Respondent judge performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario at the

respondent judge’s residence in the

Municipal of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. (In violation of Art. 7 Par. 1 of the FC) 2 In response, Judge Domagtoy claimed that his act of solemnizing the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga was predicated on an affidavit supposedly ISSUEd by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7 Par. 1 of the Family Code, and that he merely worked within the ambit of Art. 8 of the same code, which provides for other possible venues to solemnize a marriage.

2 I believe it’s this issue and its corresponding ruling that would be important for purposes of our discussion in class

Persons and Family Relations

ISSUES:

WON

respondent

exhibited

gross

misconduct and ignorance of the law.

RULING:

Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more

severely.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

YES. Judge Domagtoy’s gross ignorance of

very basic legal principles enshrined in the

Family Code resulted to a bigamous and

therefore void marriage for the first marriage he solemnized, and to the second, a lack of the necessary authority of the solemnizing officer, since he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction.

Judge Domagtoy’s reliance on the said

affidavit of Tagadan’s 7-year separation with his former wife, which said affidavit was proven to

have not been ISSUEd by the MTC Judge of Basey, Samar but only sworn before him, is insufficient justification for his having

solemnized Tagadan’s second marriage on the basis of his wife’s presumptive death.

Regardless of whether Tagadan had a well- founded belief that his wife, who had not been heard of for almost 7 years, was dead, it was

still necessary for him to have undergone a summary proceeding officially declaring his

former wife’s presumptive death. Absent such

mandatory proceeding, the subsequent

marriage is considered bigamous, and therefore, void. Art. 7 Par. 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary

within the court's jurisdiction.” For members of

the Appellate and Supreme courts, this jurisdiction extends throughout the Philippines

Cadorna

29

332

Navarro v. Domagtoy

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 ll Jul. 19, 1996 ll Romero, J.

(ie. CA and SC judges/justices can solemnize marriages regardless of venue, so long as the requisites are met). The same cannot be said, however, for judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions (eg. MTC judges); they may only officiate weddings within their areas; they lack the authority to solemnize weddings in areas beyond their jurisdiction. While this may not affect the validity of the marriage, it nonetheless results to an irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, namely, the authority of the solemnizing officer, which, as a result, may subject the officiating official to

administrative liability. Meanwhile, the

respondent’s defense on the applicability of Art.

8 in the same code cannot stand since a.) the requisites for holding the marriage outside of the official venues listed therein are not satisfied in this case since only one and not both of the parties requested another venue, and the parties are neither at the point of death nor in a remote place; and b.) Art. 8 is only a directory provision and does not alter or qualify the authority of a solemnizing officer.

Persons and Family Relations

Cadorna

30

332

Arañes v. Occiano

Apr. 2, 2002

PETITIONER:

Merceditas Mata Aranes,

RESPONDENT:

Judge Salvador M. Occiano,

FACTS:

Aranes charged respondent

Occiano,

Presiding Judge of the MTC of Batalan, Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing her marriage with late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. Aranes and Orobia lived as husband and wife until the death of Orobia. Then Aranes discovered that she cannot inherit the properties of Orobia, nor get his pension as a retired Navy Commodore because their marriage was a nullity. In his comment, Occiano averred that he was requested to solemnize the wedding in Nabua, due to Orobia’s difficulty in walking. He examined the documents before the ceremony and upon discovering the absence of a marriage license he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, the couple assured him that they will deliver the license to him immediately after.

The petitioner filed an Affidavit of

Desistance attesting that the judge did refuse to solemnize her marriage at first and, upon reading the comment of the judge, realized her own shortcomings.

ISSUE:

WON respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law.

HELD:

YES. Respondent judge was guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued

license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. The Affidavit of Desistance cannot exculpate Occiano because withdrawal of

complaint

does not

necessarily have a legal

effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.

Respondent judge is fined 5,000 pesos with a stern warning that a repetition in the future will be dealt with more severely

Persons and Family Relations

Cristobal

31

332

Republic v. CA and Castro

G.R. No. 103047 ll

Sep. 2, 1994

PETITIONER:

RESPONDENTS:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO

FACTS:

Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, without the knowledge of Castro's parents (thus, a secret marriage). Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license (license no.3196182). The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife, but only did so when Castro was pregnant. However, they only lived together for 4 months and eventually parted ways. Their baby was later adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas, and brought to the US. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro consulted a lawyer regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. They discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. She was issued by the Civil Registry of Pasig a certification of due search and inability to findto back this claim. The trial court denied Castros petition for nullity of marriage, ruling that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non- issuance of a marriage license. Castro then appealed to the appellate court, which reversed the trial courts decision and declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void. Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, then filed for petition for review on certiorari.

search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that the local civil registry office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. Since no marriage license was issued, marriage is rendered void ab initio (under the Family Code, Art.4).

*Also worth noting that

Castro failed to

offer any other witness regarding the celebration of her marriage. This is because of its peculiar circumstance being a secret marriage. Cardenas did not appear during the annulment trial, so he is considered in default.

ISSUE:

WON the certification of due search and inability to findmarriage license presented as evidence is sufficient to render the marriage void.

HELD:

Yes. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 3 , a certificate of "due

3 Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court

Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry

Persons and Family Relations

Cruz

32

332

Alcantara v. Alcantara

Aug. 28, 2007

HUSBAND: Restituto Alcantara WIFE: Rosita Alcantara

FACTS:

Restituto filed a

petition for annulment

against Rosita on the following grounds:

(1) The wedding was performed without first securing a marriage license Even though the couple was

married twice (first at the stairs in

Manila City Hall

before a

certain

Minister Aquilino Navarro through a

fixer” and second at San

Jose de

Tondo),

the

Manuguit Church in ceremonies were

celebrated

without the

parties

securing

a

marriage license. (2) The alleged ML, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license

with the local civil registrar of the said place. (3) The certification of the Municipal Civil

Registrar

of

Carmona

states

the

ML

number of 7054133 but the marriage

contract bears

the

ML

number

7054033.

The couple has 2 children, but on the side, Restituto has a mistress with whom he has 3 children. It appeared that he was filing for an annulment with the intent to evade prosecution for concubinage.

ISSUE:

WON the irregularities relating to the ML are sufficient to render the marriage void.

HELD:

No. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

RATIO:

To

be considered void on

the

ground of

absence of

a

ML,

the law requires that

the

absence of such ML must be apparent on the

marriage contract, or at

the

very

least,

supported by a certification from the local civil

registrar that no such

ML

was issued to

the

Persons and Family Relations

parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a ML number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona. The certification 4 moreover is precise that it specifically identified the parties.

Issuance of a

ML

in a city or municipality,

not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a ML despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage 5 . On the discrepancy in ML numbers, it is not impossible to assume that it is a mere typographical error. It therefore does not distract the Court in its conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said ML to the parties. Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, he cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists to be rendered invalid. He is an educated person (mechanical engr) and he knowingly and voluntarily entered into marriage. The Court ruled, “he cannot benefit from his action and be

allowed to extricate himself from the marriage

bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.”

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.

The

presumption is always in favor of the validity of

the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans towards the validity of the marriage bonds. This presumption is of great weight. Note: The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 1982 thus, prior to the

4 This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. 5 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Dolot

33

332

Alcantara v. Alcantara

Aug. 28, 2007

effectivity of the Family Code, will be assessed on its validity based on the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless ALL these requisites are complied with: (a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

  • (b) Their consent, freely given;

  • (c) Authority of the person performing the

marriage; and (d) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage

license

is

the

States

demonstration

of

its

involvement

and

participation

in

every

marriage,

in

the

maintenance

of

which

the

general public is interested.

Persons and Family Relations

Dolot

34

332

Vda. De Jacob v. CA

Aug. 19, 1999

PETITIONER: TomasaVda.DeJacobasSpecialadministratixoftheIntestateEstateof DeceasedAlfredoEJacob
 
 RESPONDENTS: CA, PedroPilapil,ProvinceofCamSur,JuanTrivino

NATURE:

Petitionforreviewoncertiorariofade cision of CA

RULING:

PetitionisGRANTEDandtheassailedde

cisionoftheCAisRESVERSEDandSETASI

DE.MarriagebetweenpetitionerandAlfred

oJacobisherebyrecognizedanddeclared

VALID

FACTS:

TomasaVda.DeJacobclaimstobethe survivingspouseofDrAlfredoJacob, and wasappointedSpecialAdministratrixofhisestatesbyvirtueofareconstructedmarriag econtractbetweenthemPedroPilapil,thedoctor’sallegedadopt edson,claimsthatthemarriagebetweenT omasaandDrJacobwasvoidforhavingn omarriagelicenseandonlya reconstructedmarriagecontract,plusnoma rriageceremony

ISSUE:

WONTomasa’smarriagetoDr.Jacobw

asvalid

RATIO:

It

hasbeenestablishedthatTomasaandDrJ

acoblivedtogetherashusband

andwifeforatleastfiveyears

(affidavitwasexecuted).Marriage

is

exceptionalincharacteranddidn’trequire

marriagelicense

Secondaryevidence:trialandCAcommi

ttederrorswhentheyexcludedtestimonies

ofAdelaPilapilandMsgrFlorencioYllana.

Also,therewerephotosoftheweddingcer

emony

DueexecutionwasestablishedbyAdela

Pilapilwhowaspresentatmarriagecerem

ony

Subsequentlossofthedocumentwass

hownbytestimonyofYllana

Giventhattheylivedtogetherashusba

ndandwife,presumptionofmarriageisgiv

en

Persons and Family Relations

Hermosisima

35

332

Sevilla v. Cardenas

G.R. No. 167684 ll Jul. 31, 2006

FACTS:

The

petitioner

wishes

to

appeal

the

decision of the CA. Sevilla wishes for the

declaration of nullity

of

his

marriage

to

Cardenas, such that his consent

was given

because of intimidation of the retired Colonel father of Cardenas. Cardenas claims that they

were both married civilly and also had a religious ceremony. The couple has been living as husband and wife for 25 years already, before Sevilla filed the case. Sevilla claims that the marriage license used in their

never applied for a license. The Local Civil Registrar affirmed this that they cannot locate the said logbook containing the record for the marriage license, but it can be inferred that it is due to an overload of problems in their office, and that they belatedly admitted that they couldn’t find the book because the officer in charge of it had already retired.

contract is non-existent because

he

ISSUE:

WON the marriage can be declared null

and void because of the inability to provide proof of the license.

HELD:

No.

It

is

evident

in

the

certifications

provided by and the witnesses from the Local

Civil Registrar that they did not exert all their efforts into finding the said logbook containing

the

record of the marriage

license.Presumption

of

regularity

 

of

official

duty may be rebutted by affirmative evidence

of

irregularity

or

failure

to

perform

duty.

Hence, they cannot ISSUE a certificate for due

search and inability to find’, as seen in Sec. 29,

Rule

131

of the

Rules

of Court.

It

does not

mean that there is really no marriage license,

and with this, one must always remember that

every

intendment of the law

or

fact

leans

toward

the

validity

of

the

marriage,

the

indissolubility

of the marriage bonds.Since

there

is

a

doubt

with Sevilla’s claim that the

marriage license

is fictitious, it

is resolved

in

favor

of

the

validity

of the marriage.

Persons and Family Relations

Macariola

36

332

People v. Mendoza

G.R. No. L-5877

ll

Sep. 28, 1954

ll

Paras, CJ.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANT:

People of the Philippines Arturo Mendoza

FACTS:

The defendant-appellant married Jovita de Asis in 1941. Without said married being annulled or declared void, and no pretense made as to defendant-appellant’s belief that Jovita had been missing and not heard of from seven years which could give rise to the presumption of her death, he entered a second marriage with Olga Lema in 1941. In 1943, his first wife, Jovita de Asis died. Then, in 1949, he contracted a third marriage with Carmencita Panlilio, which said third marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy. The defendant-appellant then contends that his marriage with Olga Lema in 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis was still in effect, while his third marriage with Carmencita Panlilio cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, since there was no previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favour of the People of the Philippines as represented by the OSG, prompting the defendant-appellant to file this petition.

ISSUES:

WON the defendant-appellant could be held liable for bigamy for his third marriage, considering that the second marriage it was predicated on is null and void by virtue of its having been contracted during the subsistence of his first marriage

RULING:

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed

judgment and acquitted the defendant- appellant

RATIO DECIDENDI:

No. There was no judicial decree needed to

declare the invalidity of the defendant- appellant’s second marriage; it was void ab initio. Neither is there any ISSUE of presumptive

death that could have rendered the same valid. Thus, the third marriage, having been contracted after the death of the defendant-

appellant’s first wife, is considered valid.

Persons and Family Relations

Cadorna

37

332

Tolentino v. Paras

G.R. No. L-43905 ll May 30, 1983 ll Melencio-Herrera, J.

PETITIONER:

Serafia Tolentino

RESPONDENTS:

Hon. Edgardo L. Paras, Maria Clemente and the Local Civil

FACTS:

WON petitioner is entitled to have her late

Amado Tolentino, petitioner’s late husband,

contracted a second marriage with private respondent Maria Clemente while his first marriage with the petitioner was still subsisting. Petitioner charged him with Bigamy in a criminal case, where the Court, upon Amado's guilty plea, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente." Thereafter, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in her husband’s death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to her name in a Special Proceeding for Correction of Entry, which the lower Court dismissed "for lack of the proper requisites under the law." Thus, petitioner filed a case against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado, which said case was dismissed by the respondent Court for three reasons: (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the ISSUE involved is marital relationship; (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as there is a lack of the required publication prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code; and (3) the subject matter of the

case has been aptly discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which the Court has already dismissed, for lack of the proper requisites under the law. The petitioner then filed current petition to assail said judgment by the respondent Court.

ISSUES:

Persons and Family Relations

husband’s death certificate corrected to reflect

her name as the rightful surviving spouse

RULING:

The Court

set

aside the decision

of

the

respondent Court and declared petitioner the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino, thereby ordering that the

corresponding correction be made

in

the

latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Yes. First, the suit she filed against private respondents Maria Clemente and the Local Civil Registrar is a proper remedy; it is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. Although her ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. Further, the publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. Second, considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning, and of no force and effect. No

Cadorna

38

332

Tolentino v. Paras

G.R. No. L-43905 ll May 30, 1983 ll Melencio-Herrera, J.

judicial decree is necessary to establish the

deceased Amado,

but

the

petitioner.

invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely

Rectification of

the

erroneous

entry

in

the

concluded, then, without need of further proof

records

of

the

Local

Civil

Registrar

may,

nor remand to the Court below, that the private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the

therefore, be validly made.

 

Persons and Family Relations

Cadorna

39

332

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy

G.R. No. L-53703 ll Aug. 19, 1986

ll

Paras, J.

PETITIONER:

Lilia Oliva Wiegel

RESPONDENTS: Honorable Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Karl Heinz Wiegel

FACTS:

In an action filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion that has been subsisting when she married the respondent. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the ISSUE agreed upon by both parties was whether the first marriage, assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties, was void or merely voidable. Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence showing that (1) the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and (2) the first husband was at the time of the marriage already married to someone else. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon as the set of facts on which judgment will be based. Hence, the petitioner filed this present case.

ISSUES:

WON