A2016 - Persons - Digests

Griswold v.
Connecticut
381 U.S. 479 ll June 7, 1965 ll Douglas, J. Petitioners: Respondent: Estelle T. Griswold, C. Lee Buxton Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut HELD: Yes. Appellants have standing, in so far as that they assert that the crimes for which they were charged is, constitutionally, not a crime. Yes. While the right to privacy is not explicitly included in the Bill of Rights, the right of married couples to decide on reproductive choices and to be assisted in doing so is protected by peripheral rights or the "penumbra" of other rights provided by the First Amendment (right to teach, as in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra; and Meyer v. Nebraska; right to association, NAACP v. Alabama), the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Ninth amendment. Court reversed Connecticut
FACTS: Appellants Griswold, an Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Buxton, a licensed physician were arrested tried, convicted and fined $100 for violating provisions of the General Statutes of Connecticut sections 53-32 and 54-196. They provided medical advice to a married couple that wanted to be informed on contraception methods and subsequently prescribed contraceptive devices and materials for the wife's use. Section 53-32 provides that the use of any drug, medicinal article or instrument to prevent conception is punishable by fine or mandatory jail time. Section 54-196 provides that any accessory to such crime is punished as if they were the principal offender. Intermediate appellate court and the State's highest court affirmed the judgment. 151 Connecticut 544, 200 A.2d 479 Appellants asserted that their conviction pursuant to the statute is in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus they believe that Connecticut is unconstitutional. ISSUES: Whether appellants have standing to assert right of married couples to privacy? Whether their conviction as accessories due to enforcement of said Connecticut statute violated appellants Fourteenth Amendment rights?
Persons and Family Relations
Dilag
332
Eisenstadt v. Baird
405 U.S. 438 ll March 22, 1972 ll Brennan, J. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS: William Baird [Appellee] was convicted at a bench trial in the Massachusetts Superior Court under the Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c.272, 21 and 21A for (1) exhibiting contraceptive articles in the course of delivering a lecture on contraception and (2) giving a woman Emko vaginal foam (contraceptive foam) at the end of the lecture. (Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746) The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: (1) unanimously decided to set aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives but (2) by a 4-3 vote, sustained the conviction for giving away the contraceptive foam. Baird filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal and remanded the actions to remand the action with directions to grant the writ to Baird. ISSUES AND RATIO: 1. Whether Baird has standing to contraceptives: Appellant: Eisenstadt Bairds conviction rests on the restriction that he is not a doctor or a physician. Baird is also no t a single person denied access to Contraceptives. Thus, Baird should have no standing in court.
assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to Response Court of Appeals: Statute in which Baird was convicted is not a health measure; it does not follow how Baird should be prevented from Attacking the statute. The point of giving away c o n t r a c e p t i v e s i s t o challenge the statute. Supreme Court: Unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives are not themselves subject to Prosecution, and are denied a forum in which to assert their rights.
HELD: Baird is now in a position to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives 2. Whether the Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: a. The deterrence of fornication cannot be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution of contraceptives. b. The Massachusetts statute on restricting access to non-married persons does not serve any health purpose. If that were the case, then the restriction should also apply to married persons. c. If the r ight to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. HELD: The Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Dilag
332
Geluz v. CA
G.R. No. L-16439 ll Jul. 20, 1961 ll Reyes, J. PETITIONER: Antonio Geluz RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo FACTS: Nita Villanueva aborted her pregnancy by her husband, Oscar Lazo, on three occasions: once before their marriage and twice during its course. On all three instances, she sought the services of Antonio Geluz, a doctor. Oscar Lazo claimed that he did not know of, nor gave his consent to, the abortion, and thus, citing the last abortion as his basis, he filed a complaint with the trial court, asking the court to compel Geluz to indemnify him. His complaint and plea for indemnity was granted by the trial court and further affirmed by the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the provisions on the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Hence, Antonio Geluz came to the Supreme Court to appeal his case. ISSUES: Can the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, recover damages from a physician who caused the same? HELD: No. The court ruled that indemnity cannot be had as an unborn fetus has no juridical personality, and thus, no action can be brought before the court on its behalf, and nor can any right that may arise from an injury caused to it accrue to its parents or heir, by virtue of his juridical personality being extinguished, or in fact, not having at all been realized, the moment it was aborted. Neither can provisional personality of a conceived child, as provided by Article 40, be invoked in this case since it does not satisfy the requisite of birth. Hence, the court explained that both the trial court and CA erred in awarding the damages to Lazo since Article 2206 does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. Only moral damages can be claimed by parents on the basis of the illegal arrest of the normal development of their unborn child, which results to parents distress and anguish on the loss, and disappointment of their parental expectations. However, since the case at bar involves voluntary abortion on the part of the mother, coupled by the fact that the husband was indifferent to the other two abortions, the court was unable to find any ground to award moral damages. This is exacerbated by the fact that Lazo didnt even sue on administrative or criminal grounds, but only seemed to be after the doctors money. Hence, the court reversed the decision and dismissed Lazos complaint.
Cadorna
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Joaquin v. Navarro
G.R. No. L-5426 ll May 29, 1953 ll Tuason, J. PETITIONER: Ramon Joaquin RESPONDENT: Antonio Navarro FACTS: During the Japanese invasion, the Navarro family, consisted of Joaquin Navarro Sr., 70; Angela Joaquin de Navarro, ~67; Joaquin Navarro Jr., ~30; and sisters Pilar, ~33; Concepcion, ~23; and Natividad, ~25, were killed in various orders. The established fact is that the three sisters, Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad, were the first ones to get killed, while their father, Joaquin Navarro Sr., was the last. The disputed order of death however concerns that of Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro Jr., because no clear evidence shows that at the time when Joaquin Navarro Jr. got shot on the head, Angela Joaquin had already been dead or was still alive. It is important to solve the mystery because it has a bearing on the rights to succession of Ramon Joaquin, herein referred to as Petitioner, who is the biological son of Angela Joaquin to a previous relationship, as well as the legally adopted child of Joaquin Navarro Sr., and Antonio Navarro, herein referred to as Respondent, who is the biological son of Joaquin Navarro Sr. to a previous marriage. ISSUES: Between the mother and son, who died first? In answering this question, must the presumption of survivorship in Rule 131, Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court or simultaneous death in Section 43 of the Civil Code be applied?
HELD: Based on the preponderance of evidence provided by Francisco Lopezs testimony, the court ruled that it is most probable that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before her mother. The contrary position is merely speculative, and is thus trumped by the formers circumstantial FACTS. Thus, there is no need to use the presumption of survivorship in Rule 131, Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court, or the presumption of simultaneity of death in Section 43. These two provisions only apply when the FACTS are unknown and unknowable, which is not true for the case at hand. The Court affirmed the trial courts finding that Angela outlived her son.
Cadorna
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Mercado v. Espiritu
FACTS: Petitioners Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit against Luis Espiritu (but now directed against the administrator, Jose Espiritu, since Luis died), alleging that they and their sisters are the sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, their mother and the sister of the defendant. Petitioners claim that in 1910, Luis, by means of cajolery, induced and fraudulently succeeded in getting the petitioners to sign a deed of the land left by their mother for P400, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795. They therefore ask that the sale be rendered null & void and that defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to petitioners the shares of the land, together with its products. The defendant answers this by saying that Margarita, with due authorization of her husband and petitioners father Wenceslao, sold to Luis a portion of the land (15 cavanes of seed) for P2,000. To cover his childrens needs, Wenceslao subsequently pledged or mortgaged to Luis the remainder of said land (6 cavanes of seed) at P375. With this amount being insufficient, he additionally borrowed other sums of money aggregating a total of P600. After their fathers death, the petitioners then declared themselves to be of legal age and executed, together with their sisters, the notarial instrument ratifying the previous contracts and selling absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 as an increase of the previous purchase price, the property that had belonged to their mother. ISSUE: WON the sale can be annulled on the grounds that petitioners were minors without legal capacity to contract on the date of its execution, and that the defendant availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining petitioners consent. HELD: No, the sale cannot be annulled. First, the evidence adduced at the trial doesnt show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence or intimidation in order to effect the sale. Second, no evidence appears in the records that petitioners were minors when they executed and signed the document. No certified copies of their baptismal certificates were presented, nor did they produce any supplemental evidence to prove that Domingo was 19 and Josefa 18 when they signed the document. The statement made by one of the adult parties of said deed, in reference to certain notes made in a book or copybook of a private nature, which she said their father kept during his lifetime and until his death, is not sufficient to prove the plaintiffs minority on the date of the execution of the deed. Even in the doubt whether they were of legal age on the date referred to, the courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minors who pretend to be of legal age, is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or to seek their annulment. (Law 6, title 19, 6th partida.1) The judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchase from the complaint filed against him doesnt violate the law relative to the sale of minors property nor the rules laid down in consonance therewith.
If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five years of age, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that was not of said age when he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and not the deceivers.
Falcone
332
Braganza v. Villa Abrille

FACTS: Rosario, with her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo, received from respondent, as a loan, on October 30 1944, P70,000 in Japanese notes and in consideRATIOn, promised to pay him P10,000 in the legal currency of the Philippine Islands 2 years after the cessation of hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines Since the petitioners didn't pay, Villa Abrille sued them on March 1949 Braganzas claim as defense that they only received P40,000 and that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note ISSUE: Is the mom liable? How about Rodolfo and Guillermo? HELD: Mom is liable. Children are liable in as much as they benefited from the loan RATIO: No question on mom's liability. She can't use minority as a defense since it's personal to the minors. However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which minors were responsible At time of the signing of the loan agreement, Guillermo was 16 and Rodolfo 18. Failure to disclose their minority in promissory note does not mean that they'll not be permitted to assent it. THERE WAS NO JURIDICAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE INABILITY How is this different from Mercado? In Mercado, there was an active misrepresentation in that the siblings Mercado wrote in the document that they were of age. Here, no such thing. = Guillermo and Rodolfo are not legally bound Article 1301 of the old Civil Code states that "an action to annul a contract by reason of minority must be filed within 4 years". Since Rodolfo turned 1947, action will expire October 1951. Action was filed June 1951, so within the period BUT the brothers are not entirely absolved. Article 1340 "states that the minor party must make restitution to extent that they may have profited by money they received" Another thing is, the funds were used for their support While the promise to pay P10,000 can't be enforced, 1340 states that they should be liable for P1000
Hermosisima
332
Bambalan v. Maramba
G.R. No. L-27710 ll Jan. 30, 1928 ll Romualdez, J. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Isidro Bambalan German Maramba and Genoveva Muerong ISSUES: Whether or not the sale was invalid because the plaintiff who executed the same was a minor RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. RATIO DECIDENDI The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu, where the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be of age, is not applicable in this case, since the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age and since his minority was well known to the purchaser.
FACTS: Isidro Bambalan, the plaintiff, executed a deed of sale involving a piece of land to Genoveva Muerong, one of the defendants. At the time he signed and executed said deed, Isidro was a minor, and made no misrepresentation that he was of legal age. In fact, Genoneva was aware that Isidro was still a minor, as she was the one who purchased his first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document. The plaintiff now wishes to invalidate said sale.
Cadorna
332
Braganza v. Villa Abrille

G.R. No. L-12471 ll Apr. 13, 1959 ll Bengzon, J. PETITIONERS: Rosario de Braganza, et al. RESPONDENT: Fernando de Villa Abrille FACTS: Rosario and her sons loaned Japanese war notes in the amount of P70,000 from Fernando F. de Villa Abrille, promising to pay him with interest in Philippine currency two years after the cessation of the war as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines. Upon their failure to pay, Villa Abrille sued them, to which the defendants asserted the sons minority during the time they signed the promissory note as an excuse for their liability. Further, Villa Abrille, when the defendants signed said promissory note, was not aware that the sons were still minors, since none of the defendants made any representation as to the twos ages at the time. ISSUES: Whether or not the minors were liable to pay since they failed to disclose their being minors RULING: The Court held Rosarios liability but only made the sons liable to the extent that they benefitted from the loan. RATIO DECIDENDI NO. Mere failure to disclose minors age does not constitute fraud, hence the minors cannot be held liable. There is no juridical duty on their part to disclose their incapacity on the basis of their minority. Misrepresentation of age, for it to be fraudulent, must be active and not passive; that is, the minors actually have to lie about their age and not just fail to disclose it. Meanwhile, the minors are nonetheless required to make restitution insofar as they have benefited from the money they received.
Cadorna
332
Martinez v. Martinez
G.R. No. 445 ll Mar. 31, 1902 ll Cooper, J. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Pedro Martinez DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Francisco Martinez FACTS: Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir of Francisco Martinez Garcia, brought a suit to declare his father prodigal. He accused his father of squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife and her family. On the other hand, Francisco stated that gave his son a general power of attorney to administer his estate, but that the revoked the same due to his sons mismanagement. ISSUES: WON Francisco should be declared prodigal RULING: The Court affirmed the CAs decision and ruled in favor of not declaring Francisco prodigal. RATIO DECIDENDI NO. This is based on the Courts own understanding of prodigality as acts that must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. Pedros testimony was insufficient to allege prodigality on his fathers part, and neither is there any evidence that his father has been transferring properties to diminish his estate. The Court found that the father is far from being prodigal and still exercises his full mental faculties and possesses ability to manage his estate wisely. On the other hand, it was the son who has exhibited tendencies to be prodigal.
Cadorna
332
Wassmer v. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089 ll Dec. 26, 1964 FACTS: On August 23, 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage. In preparation for their wedding on Sept. 4, invitations were distributed and apparel were purchased. On Sept. 2, Velez left a note for Wassmer to the effect that the wedding will have to be postponed due to the opposition thereto of his mother. The day after, he sent a telegram assuring her of his return. Alas, he never did. Velez was declared in default after failure to answer Wassmers suit for damages, and was ordered to indemnify plaintiff. Velez filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable negligence, as well as a motion for new trial and reconsideration on the ground that there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. ISSUES: (1) WON defendants petition for relief on the ground of excusable negligence is valid; (2) WON mere breach of a promise to marry is an actionable wrong; (3) WON defendant must be held answerable in damages; (4) WON the damages awarded were excessive. HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI: (1) Defendants petition was NOT VALID because it wasnt supported by an affidavit of merits based on FACTS. The contention that his failure to marry plaintiff was due to fortuitous event is a mere conclusion or opinion. (2) Mere breach of a promise to marry is NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG (Estopa v. Biansay). Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so. (3) The circumstances surrounding the breach of promise to marry are contrary to good customs for which defendant MUST BE HELD ANSWERABLE in damages. Article 21, CC, provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." No question was raised as to the award of actual damages. As per Article 2219, CC, moral damages are recoverable in this case. As per Article 2232, CC, exemplary damages are also recoverable because the circumstances indicate that defendant acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. (4) Considering the particular circumstances, the SC affirmed the lower courts judgment but REDUCED the initial moral and exemplary damages from PHP25000 to PHP15000 as a reasonable award.
Ordoyo
10
332
Tanjanco v. CA
G.R. No. L-18630 ll Dec. 17, 1966 ll J.B.L Reyes, J. PETITIONER: APOLONIO TANJANCO RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS FACTS: From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being of legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated such feelings. With Tanjancos promise of marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as secretar y in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her state of unemployment Santos became unable to support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not fulfill his promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child she was bearing, and pay her for support and damages. Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of action. Santos appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the latter decided the case, stating that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but a cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are jurisdiction. not permissible in this
ISSUES: WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry her HELD: In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind the idea of seduction. Decision of Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Complaint of Santos is dismissed for failure to state cause of action
Pagdanganan
11
332
De Jesus v. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110 ll Nov. 28, 1933 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: CESAR SYQUIA FACTS: Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as a cashier for a barber shop of which defendant Cesar Syquia, an unmarried man from a prominent family, was accustomed to get his haircut. The two became acquainted and developed an amorous relationship which resulted to Antonia getting pregnant and giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. During the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor at her home, and in February 1931, he handed Antonia a letter which was addressed to the priest who was to christen the baby acknowledging that the baby is his and that it be christened in his name. Defendant showed paternal interest in the situation that even when he was abroad, he continued to write to Antonia cautioning her to take care of herself so that junior would be strong. After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and the child in his house where they lived together in regular family style with all household expenses paid for by Syquia. When Antonia showed signs of a second pregnancy, Syquia left her and thereafter married another woman. During the christening of the child, the defendant caused the child to be given the name Ismael Loanco instead of the originally planned Cesar Syquia, Jr.
ISSUES: WON the breach of promise to marry is actionable. WON the letters made by defendant prove sufficiency of acknowledgment of paternity. HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in refusing to give damages to Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The action has no standing in civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second child, Pacita Loanco. The sufficiency of acknowledgement of paternity is satisfied by the production of one or more documents, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father, as contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The admission of paternity is contained in the note to the priest and the other letters addressed to Antonia during her pregnancy.
Perez
12
332
Piccininni v. Hajus
FACTS: The petitioner, Piccininni, claims that the defendant, Hajus, made him believe that they would get married and live at her house. Because of this, Piccininni spent $40,000 to renovate and improve her house. Hajus claimed that she cant be charged with fraud and that what she committed was a breach of promise to marry. Therefore, no action can be brought upon her because of the Heart Balm Act. The Heart Balm Act states no action shall be brought upon any cause from alienation of affections or from breach of promise to marry. Trial court ruled that the Heart Balm Act bars Piccininni from charging Hajus. Case brought to SC.
ISSUE: WON Piccinnini can recover his property in light of the Heart Balm Act HELD: Yes. Piccininni is not asking for damages because of a broken heart or a mortified spirit. He is asking for the return of things which he gave to Hajus because of her fraudulent representations. Picininni does not assert that Hajus wronged him in failing to marry him. He just asserted that she wronged him in fraudulently inducing him to transfer property to her. His complaint is based on what she did, and not on what she refused to do. Hence, trial courts judgment was reverse.
Poblador
13
332
Loving v. Virginia
Warren, CJ. FACTS: In Virginia, there is a comprehensive statutory scheme prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages. Residents Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. After their marriage, they established their marital abode in Caroline County in Virginia. They were convicted for violating Section 2058 which states that any white person and colored person shall go out of this State for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be guilty of a felony and imprisoned for not less than one nor more than five years. The central feature of this act is the absolute prohibition of a white person marrying other than another white person. The couple instituted an action to nullify the ruling of the Court as a violation of their 14th amendment. ISSUE: WON the statutory scheme adopted by Virginia preventing marriages between two persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses? HELD: State argument- no violation of equal protection as whites and colored people are punished with the same degree. Furthermore, there is a rational basis, which is based on scientific evidence, for it to outlaw interracial marriages. The Court could not question the wisdom behind the legislation. Court: The history of the 39th Congress (one who introduced the 14th amendment) and jurisprudence reveal that equal protection is not limited to equal application of penalty in the classification made by legislature. There is no question that Virginias miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions according to race. The Court has consistently repudiated these kinds of statutes as inimical to the doctrine of equality. It entails the most rigid scrutiny for the statute to be valid. However, there is no legitimate and overriding purpose independent of racial discrimination which justifies the classification. It is also violative of the due process clause as the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. It is one of the basic civil rights of man. The 14th amendment requires that freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. The freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.
Tiangco
14
332
Zablocki v. Redhail
FACTS: Wisconsin statute: members of a certain class of Wisconsin residents may not marry, within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry. The class is defined to include any Wisconsin resident having minor ISSUE not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment. Court permission cannot be granted unless the marriage applicant submits proof of compliance with the support obligation and, in addition, demonstrates that the children covered by the support order are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges. Redhail was denied a marriage license because of his failure to comply with the statute. It was found that Redhail had a paternity action instituted against him, alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock. He was adjudged to pay $109/mo as support for the child until she reached 18 years of age. When Redhail applied for a marriage license, Zablocki did not ISSUE the license for violating the statute on the grounds that: (1) he had not satisfied his support obligations to his illegitimate child and; (2) the child had been a public charge since her birth, receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program. ISSUE: WON the Wisconsin statute is constitutional [NO] On privacy: Right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at ISSUE here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, a critical examination of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is required. The decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. It would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in [US] society Two interests are asserted: the permissionto-marry proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling his prior support obligations; and the welfare of the out-ofcustody children is protected. However, the State has already numerous other means for exacting compliance with support obligations, means that are as effective as the statute yet do not impinge upon the right to marry: via wage assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties. The statutory classification interferes directly and substantially with the right to marry: No Wisconsin resident in the affected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a court order. Some of those in the affected class will never be able to obtain the necessary court order, because they either lack the financial means to meet their support obligations or cannot prove that their children will not become public charges. Some will be coerced in foregoing their right to marry. Statute is grossly underinclusive since they do not limit in any way new financial commitments by the applicant other than those arising out of the contemplated marriage. Statutory classification is substantially overinclusive as well: Given the possibility that the new spouse will actually better the applicants financial situation, by contributing income from a job or otherwise, the statute in many cases may prevent affected individuals from improving their ability to satisfy their prior support obligations.
Sevilla
15
332
Graham v. Graham
33 F.Supp. 936 ll Jul. 15, 1940 ll District Judge Tuttle PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT: Sidney Graham Margrethe Graham under Michigan law, which states that married woman have no general power to contract, but can contract only in relation to her separate property, the contract is VOID because it contravenes public policy. Under the law, marriage is not merely a private contract between the parties, but creates a status in which the state is vitally interested and under which certain rights and duties incident to the relationship come into being, irrespective of the wishes of the parties. As a result of the marriage contract, for example, the husband has a duty to support and to live with his wife and the wife must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow him in his choice of domicile. Any private agreement between persons married or about to be married which attempts to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract as defined by the law is contrary to public policy and unenforceable, as is the case when the wife releases the husband from his duty to support his wife in a contract between married persons.
FACTS: Sidney Graham sues his former wife based on an agreement they had when they were still married. Said agreement stipulated that Margrethe is to pay Sidney a sum of $300 per month until they no longer want said agreement to continue. Sidney alleges that the reason for said agreement was Margrethes plea to have him quit his work in a hotel so he could accompany her in all her travels. Margrethe denies Sidneys allegations and asserts, among others, that the contract was not within the power of a married woman under Michigan law to make. ISSUES: WON the contract is valid and binding RULING: The judge ruled that the contract is void. RATIO DECIDENDI: Regardless of WON the woman is competent to enter into the alleged contract
Cadorna
16
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Bradwell v. Illinois
FACTS: The statute of Illinois on the subject of admissions to the bar enacts that no person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counsellor-at-law without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from some two of the justices of the Supreme Court. Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied to the judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois for a license to practice law. With this petition are a certificate from an inferior court of her good character, and that on due examination she had been found to possess the requisite qualifications. Pending this application, she also filed an affidavit, stating that she was born in the State of Vermont; that she was (had been) a citizen of the State; that she is now a citizen of the United States, and has been for many years past a resident of the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois. She also filed a paper asserting that she was entitled to the license prayed for by virtue of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States, and that of the 14th article of amendment of that instrument. Her application was denied, and it was stated as a sufficient reason that under the decisions of the SC of Illinois, the applicantas a married woman would be bound neither by her express contracts nor by those implied contracts which it is the policy of the law to create between attorney and client. The decision also states that admitting women would mean that the courts would be exercising the authority conferred upon them in a manner that was never contemplated by the legislature. Plus, God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws.
ISSUE: WON the decision violates a provision of the Federal Constitution. HELD: No--the decision of the Illinois court upheld, and Mrs. Bradwell still cannot practice law. There are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. However, the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them. The SC here, referring to the opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, says that the power of a State to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment, and that they cannot inquire into the reasonableness or propriety of the rules it may prescribe. The Supreme Court also dismissed any claim under the privileges and immunities clause of the unamended ConstitutionArticle IV, Section 2, Clause 1. Bradwell argued that because she had been born in Vermont but later moved to Illinois, Illinois' denial of a law license was inter-state discrimination. But the Court noted that under the recently-enacted Fourteenth Amendment, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Because Bradwell had been a resident of Illinois for several years, she was now a citizen of Illinois, and the interstate provision of Article IV did not apply.
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Dunn v. Palermo
522 S.W.2d 679 ll Jul. 7, 1975 ll Henry, J. APPELLANTS: APPELLEE: Winfield Dunn, et al. Rosary Palermo ISSUES: WON it is mandatory for a married woman to assume the name of her husband repute RULING: The Court ruled in favour of the appellee. RATIO DECIDENDI: There is no constitutional question that needs to be answered as regards the Texas statute as it does not mandate any change of name by a woman upon marriage. It merely recognizes the prevalence of the virtually universal custom under which a woman normally adopts the surname of her husband. We hold that in this jurisdiction a woman, upon marriage, has a freedom of choice; she may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband. So long as a person's name remains constant and consistent, and unless and until changed in the prescribed manner, and absent any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, the State has no legitimate concern.
FACTS: Rosary Palermo, a Nashville lawyer, married Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy her maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes. Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo. She was advised that she was required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her name purged from the registration records. Upon her refusal to so register, her name was purged from the registration list. Thus this action, wherein appellee seeks a declaratory judgment declaring that the defendants' interpretation of Sec. 2-206, is erroneous, or in the alternative that this statute be declared violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
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In Re: Santiago
A.C. No. 932 ll Jun. 21, 1940 ll Laurel, J. PETITIONER-COMPLAINANT: RESPONDENT: OSG Roque Santiago signed the deed of cancellation of their contract. Thus, the OSG filed this complaint charging the respondent with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him. ISSUES: WON the contract executed by the spouses upon the respondents advice validly terminated the marital tie between the two RULING: The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that there is no doubt that the contract executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares, upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public, is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. As such, Roque Santiago is guilty of malpractice for having given false advice to the couple due to either his recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law.
FACTS: Ernesto Baniquit, then living separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again. He made Baniquit and his wife sign a document, in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. The respondent assured the spouses that they were single and as such, could contract another and subsequent marriage, hence on June 11, 1939, Ernesto contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. Upon realizing his mistake, which came from his idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage, respondent immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and
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Selanova v. Mendoza
A.M. No. 804-CJ ll May. 19, 1975 ll Aquino, J. COMPLAINANT: Saturnino Selanova RESPONDENT: Judge Alejandro Mendoza FACTS: Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross ignorance of the law for having prepared and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and that they waived their "right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit against the other. Judge Mendoza claimed that he was aware of the invalidity of the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it on the assurance of the spouses that they would ask the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental to approve the agreement. He said that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code). ISSUES: WON the document of extrajudicial liquidation of conjugal partnership ratified by the respondent is void. RULING: The respondent is severely censured but not disbarred due to the attending circumstances. RATIO DECIDENDI: The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the Art 221 of the Civil Code which makes void any (1) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; and (2) every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife. They also cited that Judge Mendozas reliance on Art. 191 Par.4 of the Civil Code was misplaced and that the Court had already ruled in an earlier case that judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage should be secured beforehand before it can be ratified. Meanwhile, in regard to the other main stipulation of the contract in question, which waives the right of either spouse to file a complaint against any adulterous offense the other may commit, was also cited to be "contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable" They held that while while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they still remain crimes and a contract legalizing their commission is therefore void.
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Jones v. Hallahan
501 S.W.2d 588 ll Nov. 9, 1973 ll Commissioner Vance APPELLANTS: APPELLEE: Marjorie Jones, et al. James Hallahan constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same sex. Using sources that define the word marriage, since Kentucky statutes do not define the term, they found that marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman and that no authority to the contrary has yet been presented. Thus, it appeared to the Court that the appellants were prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court Clerk of Jefferson County to ISSUE them a license, but rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined. A license to enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity. If the appellants had concealed from the clerk the fact that they were of the same sex and he had ISSUEd a license to them and a ceremony had been performed, the resulting relationship would not constitute a marriage. In substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a marriage.
FACTS: The appellants, each of whom is a female person, seek review of a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which held that they were not entitled to have ISSUEd to them a license to marry each other. Appellants contend that the failure of the clerk to ISSUE the license deprived them of three basic constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of association; and the right to free exercise of religion. They also contend that the refusal subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment. ISSUES: WON in refusing to ISSUE a marriage license to the appellants, the appellee violated the formers constitutional rights. RULING: The CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court. RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The Court found that there was no constitutional violation since there is no
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Goodridge v. Department of Public Health

Plaintiffs were denied marriage license by the Department of Public Health, due to same-sex marriage. FACTS: The plaintiffs are 14 individuals from five Massachusetts counties. The plaintiffs include business executives, lawyers, an investment banker, educators, therapists, and a computer engineer. Many are active in church, community, and school groups. They have employed such legal means as are available to them for example, joint adoption, powers of attorney, and joint ownership of real property to secure aspects of their relationships. Each plaintiff attests a desire to marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their commitment to each other and to secure the legal protections and benefits afforded to married couples and their children. The plaintiff couples attempted to obtain a marriage license from the city/town clerks office and complied all the formalities. The Department of Public Health, charged by the statute, refused to accept the notice of intention to marry and denied a marriage license on the ground that Massachusetts did not recognize same-sex marriage. Plaintiffs filed a suit. The Superior Court ruled for the DPH. Plaintiffs appealed from this decision. ISSUE: WON the Superior Court was correct in its summary judgment in favor of the Department of Public Health, and thereby dismissed the plaintiffs claim to construe the statute to permit marriage to same-sex couples. WON prohibiting same-sex marriages was valid under Massachusetts marriage licensing statutes, G.L. c. 207 or was it a violation of Massachusetts constitution? HELD: NO. The Superior Court was not correct in its summary of judgment in favor of the Department of Public Health and by dismissing the plaintiffs claim. NO. Declining a license to same-sex marriage was not valid under Massachusetts marriage licensing statutes and thus, was a violation of the constitution. Barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage, solely for the reason that the person would marry a person of the same sex, violated the Massachusetts Constitution. The court construed the civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses to the exclusion of others. This reformulation redressed the plaintiffs' constitutional injury and furthered the aim of marriage and advanced the legitimate state's interests the department had identified. Judgment of the Superior Court was reversed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Reyes, G.
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Silverio v. Republic
FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. The doctor ISSUEd a medical certificate proving the same. Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. In his birth certificate, it is indicated that his name is Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio and his sex was registered as male. He alleges that he is a male transsexual. He seeks to have his name changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female PROCEDURAL: Trial Court: Grant petition in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. CA: Reverse No law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. ISSUES: WON a persons first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment [NO] The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Art. 376 (NCC) No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. RA 9048 amended the provision. Section 1 of RA 9048 provides Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed Sec 4: Grounds for Change of First Name (1) the petitioner finds the first name to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) the new first name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community and; (3) the change will avoid confusion. Changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose (to make his name compatible with the sex he transformed himself through surgery) may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. (Rather than filing first in the trial court) A law does not exist which allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the FACTS, as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. WON the entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex can be changed on the ground of equity [NO] Petitioner wishes to change his name and sex since this is the first step of marrying his fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract between a man and a woman. One of the essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Following will be affected: Allowing the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment. Treatment on provisions of the Labor Code directly applicable to women.
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Silverio v. Republic
COURTS FINAL REMARKS: Petitioner pleads that the unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and the realization of their dreams. No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
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Republic v. Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676 ll Sep. 12, 2008 ll Quisumbing, J. PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines RESPONDENT: Jennifer Cagandahan FACTS: Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. She asserted that she was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. Tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development; she has become a male person. In her petition with the RTC to have her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff, her physician testified on her condition by presenting a medical certificate to back her alleged condition. The RTC granted her petition, recognizing her proven medical condition. Thus (OSG) filed this petition seeking areversal of the abovementioned ruling based on (1) violations on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding (a) Cagandahans failure to implead the local civil registrar in her petition with the RTC and (b) her plea to have her gender changed in the birth certificate (OSG believes her condition does not make her male; and (2) a violation on Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, in which Cagandahan failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing. The court dismissed the two procedural ISSUES on Rules 108 and 103, and decided on the substantive merit regarding the change of gender in Cagandahans records due to her medical condition. ISSUES: WON the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her name and gender, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH RULING: The Republics petition is denied. RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The respondents condition, CAH, is one of many conditions involving intersexuality, which apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. Here, the rule of determining a persons gender at birth cannot apply because the sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. Instead, it is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Thus, the Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. In the case of respondent, his having ordered his life to that of a male is backed by preponderant biological bases. Unlike in the case of individuals who underwent sexual reassignment, respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. In the absence of a law on such an unusual matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
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People v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-27972 ll Oct. 31, 1927 ll Street, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
The People of the Philippine Islands Felipe Santiago
DOCTRINE: In relation with the course syllabus topic from which the case is filed under, the marriage between Santiago and Masilang cannot be considered as valid because it lacked the essential (marriage) requisite of consent freely given NATURE: This is an appeal brought to the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija finding the appellant guilty of rape and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment, reclusion temporal; requiring him to endow the offended party; requiring him to recognize and maintain the offspring, if there should be any, as consequence of the rape; and requiring him to pay further costs. FACTS: Felicita Masilang (victim), aged 18, was Felipe Santiagos (appellant) niece by marriage. On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked the victim to accompany him to cross the river and from there he led her to a place far from the highway with tall grass hiding them from public view. The appellant manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the girl but she
refused; however, the appellant succeeded by forcing himself on her. The appellant then brought the victim to the nearby house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago. In the afternoon, a protestant minister was brought in to conduct a ceremony that married the appellant and the victim. ISSUE: WON the marriage of the appellant and the victim is considered valid to exempt him from criminal liability. NO. RATIO: The court found that the offense of rape has indeed been committed, but the marriage ceremony was only a mere ruse of the appellant to escape from criminal liability. The actions of Santiago before and after the marriage would prove that he really had no intention to marry Masilang other than for the aforementioned reason. Furthermore, because the victim was under duress, the marriage is void for lack of consent. Consequently, the appellant is not exempt from criminal liability. The judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, and will be affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
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Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat

G.R. No. 47101 ll Apr. 25, 1941 ll Horilleno, J. FACTS: The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several dates, they were engaged on 19 September of that year. On 26 November the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in the Catholic Cathedral of the City of Baguio. After living together as husband and wife for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a child of nine months, on February 23, 1939. Because of this the plaintiff abandoned the defendant and did not return to their life as husband and wife. The plaintiff then requests the annulment of the marriage he had with the defendant on the grounds that he consented to the marriage because the defendant had assured him that she was virgin. ISSUES: WON annulment can proceed given plaintiffs claim that he had been defrauded by his wife whom he thought was a virgin RULING: The judgment appealed from is deemed to be in accordance with law, and is thus affirmed. RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The plaintiff's allegation that he had not suspected the pregnancy of the defendant when he married her is highly improbable, given her obvious advanced pregnancy. Therefore it is unnecessary to consider the appellants allegation of fraud. He also argued that it is not uncommon to find people with big stomachs, but we find this argument too puerile to even consider, especially since the appellant is a freshman in law school. Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is the cement, the very foundation, on which society rests. For annulment to proceed, it is entirely necessary that the pieces of evidence provided be clear and reliable. No such evidence can be found in this case.
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Eigenmann v. Guerra
FACTS: Eduardo Eigenmann [who represented himself as of legal age] and Maryden Guerra got married before Judge Prudencio Encomienda as solemnizing officer and 4 witnesses, including Eduardos mother. After living together for quite a time, Eduardo filed an action for the annulment of his marriage to Maryden Guerra on the grounds of his age and lack of parental consent, his consent not freely given [use of force, intimidation by Froilan Guerra, wifes father], and lack of legal authority of the one who administered the oath [councillor of Quezon City] making the marriage void ab initio. ISSUES: WON his lack of statutory age and lack of parental consent may be grounds for annulment of marriage WON his consent being not freely given may render the marriage void WON the marriage is void ab ignition because of the lack of legal authority by the officer who administered the oath HELD: No. He is estopped because of his misrepresentation of his age [claimed to be 25yrs,8mos] when he applied for marriage license. With regards to the consent of his mother, the fact that the mother was a witness to the marriage and did not object to the marriage implies consent. Consent may be given in any form [written,oral or implied] A written consent under oath is not necessary. No. There was no factual or legal for the claim.The Court did not see any reasonable or well-grounded fear of an imminent danger and grave evil upon Eigenmanns person or property that would arise from the statement of Froilan Guerra [Balita ko lumiligaw ka sa aking anak. Pag niloko mo iyan, mag-ingat ka.] The statement for the court was only an admonition natural for a father and not a threat. No. What is declared null and void by the law are marriages solemnized w/o a marriage license. A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained. The local civil registrar and the solemnizing officer are not required to inquire about the authority of the officer administering the oath.
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Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 ll Jul. 19, 1996 ll Romero, J. COMPLAINANT: Rodolfo Navarro RESPONDENT: Judge Hernando Domagtoy FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo G. Navarro submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law: 1.) Respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. (In violation of Art. 41 of the FC) 2.) Respondent judge performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario at the respondent judges residence in the Municipal of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. (In violation of Art. 7 Par. 1 of the FC)2 In response, Judge Domagtoy claimed that his act of solemnizing the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga was predicated on an affidavit supposedly ISSUEd by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7 Par. 1 of the Family Code, and that he merely worked within the ambit of Art. 8 of the same code, which provides for other possible venues to solemnize a marriage.
ISSUES: WON respondent exhibited misconduct and ignorance of the law.
gross
RULING: Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. RATIO DECIDENDI: YES. Judge Domagtoys gross ignorance of very basic legal principles enshrined in the Family Code resulted to a bigamous and therefore void marriage for the first marriage he solemnized, and to the second, a lack of the necessary authority of the solemnizing officer, since he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Judge Domagtoys reliance on the said affidavit of Tagadans 7-year separation with his former wife, which said affidavit was proven to have not been ISSUEd by the MTC Judge of Basey, Samar but only sworn before him, is insufficient justification for his having solemnized Tagadans second marriage on the basis of his wifes presumptive death. Regardless of whether Tagadan had a wellfounded belief that his wife, who had not been heard of for almost 7 years, was dead, it was still necessary for him to have undergone a summary proceeding officially declaring his former wifes presumptive death. Absent such mandatory proceeding, the subsequent marriage is considered bigamous, and therefore, void. Art. 7 Par. 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction. For members of the Appellate and Supreme courts, this jurisdiction extends throughout the Philippines
I believe its this issue and its corresponding ruling that would be important for purposes of our discussion in class
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Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 ll Jul. 19, 1996 ll Romero, J. (ie. CA and SC judges/justices can solemnize marriages regardless of venue, so long as the requisites are met). The same cannot be said, however, for judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions (eg. MTC judges); they may only officiate weddings within their areas; they lack the authority to solemnize weddings in areas beyond their jurisdiction. While this may not affect the validity of the marriage, it nonetheless results to an irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, namely, the authority of the solemnizing officer, which, as a result, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Meanwhile, the respondents defense on the applicability of Art. 8 in the same code cannot stand since a.) the requisites for holding the marriage outside of the official venues listed therein are not satisfied in this case since only one and not both of the parties requested another venue, and the parties are neither at the point of death nor in a remote place; and b.) Art. 8 is only a directory provision and does not alter or qualify the authority of a solemnizing officer.
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Araes v. Occiano
Apr. 2, 2002
PETITIONER: Merceditas Mata Aranes, RESPONDENT: Judge Salvador M. Occiano,

FACTS: Aranes charged respondent Occiano, Presiding Judge of the MTC of Batalan, Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing her marriage with late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. Aranes and Orobia lived as husband and wife until the death of Orobia. Then Aranes discovered that she cannot inherit the properties of Orobia, nor get his pension as a retired Navy Commodore because their marriage was a nullity. In his comment, Occiano averred that he was requested to solemnize the wedding in Nabua, due to Orobias difficulty in walking. He examined the documents before the ceremony and upon discovering the absence of a marriage license he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, the couple assured him that they will deliver the license to him immediately after. The petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance attesting that the judge did refuse to solemnize her marriage at first and, upon reading the comment of the judge, realized her own shortcomings. ISSUE: WON respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law. HELD: YES. Respondent judge was guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. The Affidavit of Desistance cannot exculpate Occiano because withdrawal of complaint does not necessarily have a legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Respondent judge is fined 5,000 pesos
with a stern warning that a repetition in the future will be dealt with more severely
Cristobal
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Republic v. CA and Castro

G.R. No. 103047 ll Sep. 2, 1994 PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO FACTS: Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, without the knowledge of Castro's parents (thus, a secret marriage). Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license (license no.3196182). The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife, but only did so when Castro was pregnant. However, they only lived together for 4 months and eventually parted ways. Their baby was later adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas, and brought to the US. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro consulted a lawyer regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. They discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. She was issued by the Civil Registry of Pasig a certification of due search and inability to find to back this claim. The trial court denied Castros petition for nullity of marriage, ruling that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license. Castro then appealed to the appellate court, which reversed the trial courts decision and declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void. Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, then filed for petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: WON the certification of due search and inability to find marriage license presented as evidence is sufficient to render the marriage void. HELD: Yes. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court3, a certificate of "due
3
search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that the local civil registry office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. Since no marriage license was issued, marriage is rendered void ab initio (under the Family Code, Art.4). *Also worth noting that Castro failed to offer any other witness regarding the celebration of her marriage. This is because of its peculiar circumstance being a secret marriage. Cardenas did not appear during the annulment trial, so he is considered in default.
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry
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Alcantara v. Alcantara
Aug. 28, 2007 HUSBAND: Restituto Alcantara WIFE: Rosita Alcantara FACTS: Restituto filed a petition for annulment against Rosita on the following grounds: (1) The wedding was performed without first securing a marriage license Even though the couple was married twice (first at the stairs in Manila City Hall before a certain Minister Aquilino Navarro through a fixer and second at San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo), the ceremonies were celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. (2) The alleged ML, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. (3) The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona states the ML number of 7054133 but the marriage contract bears the ML number 7054033. The couple has 2 children, but on the side, Restituto has a mistress with whom he has 3 children. It appeared that he was filing for an annulment with the intent to evade prosecution for concubinage. ISSUE: WON the irregularities relating to the ML are sufficient to render the marriage void. HELD: No. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. RATIO: To be considered void on the ground of absence of a ML, the law requires that the absence of such ML must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such ML was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a ML number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona. The certification4 moreover is precise that it specifically identified the parties. Issuance of a ML in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a ML despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage 5. On the discrepancy in ML numbers, it is not impossible to assume that it is a mere typographical error. It therefore does not distract the Court in its conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said ML to the parties. Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, he cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists to be rendered invalid. He is an educated person (mechanical engr) and he knowingly and voluntarily entered into marriage. The Court ruled, he cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans towards the validity of the marriage bonds. This presumption is of great weight. Note: The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 1982 thus, prior to the
4
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. 5 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Dolot
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Alcantara v. Alcantara
Aug. 28, 2007 effectivity of the Family Code, will be assessed on its validity based on the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless ALL these requisites are complied with: (a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (b) Their consent, freely given; (c) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and (d) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
Dolot
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Vda. De Jacob v. CA
Aug. 19, 1999
TomasaVda.DeJacobasSpecialadministratixoftheIntestateEstateof DeceasedAlfredoEJacob RESPONDENTS: CA, PedroPilapil,ProvinceofCamSur,JuanTrivino PETITIONER:

NATURE: Petitionforreviewoncertiorariofade cision of CA RULING: PetitionisGRANTEDandtheassailedde cisionoftheCAisRESVERSEDandSETASI DE.MarriagebetweenpetitionerandAlfred oJacobisherebyrecognizedanddeclared VALID FACTS: TomasaVda.DeJacobclaimstobethe survivingspouseofDrAlfredoJacob, and wasappointedSpecialAdministratrixofhis estatesbyvirtueofareconstructedmarriag econtractbetweenthem PedroPilapil,thedoctorsallegedadopt edson,claimsthatthemarriagebetweenT omasaandDrJacobwasvoidforhavingn omarriagelicenseandonlya reconstructedmarriagecontract,plusnoma rriageceremony ISSUE: WONTomasasmarriagetoDr.Jacobw asvalid RATIO: It hasbeenestablishedthatTomasaandDrJ acoblivedtogetherashusband andwifeforatleastfiveyears (affidavitwasexecuted).Marriage is exceptionalincharacteranddidntrequire marriagelicense Secondaryevidence:trialandCAcommi ttederrorswhentheyexcludedtestimonies ofAdelaPilapilandMsgrFlorencioYllana. Also,therewerephotosoftheweddingcer emony DueexecutionwasestablishedbyAdela Pilapilwhowaspresentatmarriagecerem ony Subsequentlossofthedocumentwass hownbytestimonyofYllana Giventhattheylivedtogetherashusba ndandwife,presumptionofmarriageisgiv en
Hermosisima
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Sevilla v. Cardenas
G.R. No. 167684 ll Jul. 31, 2006 FACTS: The petitioner wishes to appeal the decision of the CA. Sevilla wishes for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Cardenas, such that his consent was given because of intimidation of the retired Colonel father of Cardenas. Cardenas claims that they were both married civilly and also had a religious ceremony. The couple has been living as husband and wife for 25 years already, before Sevilla filed the case. Sevilla claims that the marriage license used in their contract is non-existent because he never applied for a license. The Local Civil Registrar affirmed this that they cannot locate the said logbook containing the record for the marriage license, but it can be inferred that it is due to an overload of problems in their office, and that they belatedly admitted that they couldnt find the book because the officer in charge of it had already retired. ISSUE: WON the marriage can be declared null and void because of the inability to provide proof of the license. HELD: No. It is evident in the certifications provided by and the witnesses from the Local Civil Registrar that they did not exert all their efforts into finding the said logbook containing the record of the marriage license.Presumption of regularity of official duty may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform duty. Hence, they cannot ISSUE a certificate for due search and inability to find, as seen in Sec. 29, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. It does not mean that there is really no marriage license, and with this, one must always remember that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Since there is a doubt with Sevillas claim that the marriage license is fictitious, it is resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Macariola
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People v. Mendoza
G.R. No. L-5877 ll Sep. 28, 1954 ll Paras, CJ. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines DEFENDANTS-APPELLANT: Arturo Mendoza FACTS: The defendant-appellant married Jovita de Asis in 1941. Without said married being annulled or declared void, and no pretense made as to defendant-appellants belief that Jovita had been missing and not heard of from seven years which could give rise to the presumption of her death, he entered a second marriage with Olga Lema in 1941. In 1943, his first wife, Jovita de Asis died. Then, in 1949, he contracted a third marriage with Carmencita Panlilio, which said third marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy. The defendant-appellant then contends that his marriage with Olga Lema in 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis was still in effect, while his third marriage with Carmencita Panlilio cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, since there was no previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favour of the People of the Philippines as represented by the OSG, prompting the defendant-appellant to file this petition. ISSUES: WON the defendant-appellant could be held liable for bigamy for his third marriage, considering that the second marriage it was predicated on is null and void by virtue of its having been contracted during the subsistence of his first marriage RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the defendantappellant RATIO DECIDENDI: No. There was no judicial decree needed to declare the invalidity of the defendantappellants second marriage; it was void ab initio. Neither is there any ISSUE of presumptive death that could have rendered the same valid. Thus, the third marriage, having been contracted after the death of the defendantappellants first wife, is considered valid.
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Tolentino v. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905 ll May 30, 1983 ll Melencio-Herrera, J. PETITIONER: Serafia Tolentino RESPONDENTS: Hon. Edgardo L. Paras, Maria Clemente and the Local Civil FACTS: Amado Tolentino, petitioners late husband, contracted a second marriage with private respondent Maria Clemente while his first marriage with the petitioner was still subsisting. Petitioner charged him with Bigamy in a criminal case, where the Court, upon Amado's guilty plea, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente." Thereafter, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in her husbands death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to her name in a Special Proceeding for Correction of Entry, which the lower Court dismissed "for lack of the proper requisites under the law." Thus, petitioner filed a case against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado, which said case was dismissed by the respondent Court for three reasons: (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the ISSUE involved is marital relationship; (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as there is a lack of the required publication prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code; and (3) the subject matter of the case has been aptly discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which the Court has already dismissed, for lack of the proper requisites under the law. The petitioner then filed current petition to assail said judgment by the respondent Court. ISSUES: WON petitioner is entitled to have her late husbands death certificate corrected to reflect her name as the rightful surviving spouse RULING: The Court set aside the decision of the respondent Court and declared petitioner the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino, thereby ordering that the corresponding correction be made in the latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. First, the suit she filed against private respondents Maria Clemente and the Local Civil Registrar is a proper remedy; it is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. Although her ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. Further, the publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. Second, considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning, and of no force and effect. No
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Tolentino v. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905 ll May 30, 1983 ll Melencio-Herrera, J. judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that the private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but the petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.
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Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
G.R. No. L-53703 ll Aug. 19, 1986 ll Paras, J. PETITIONER: Lilia Oliva Wiegel RESPONDENTS: Honorable Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Karl Heinz Wiegel FACTS: In an action filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion that has been subsisting when she married the respondent. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the ISSUE agreed upon by both parties was whether the first marriage, assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties, was void or merely voidable. Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence showing that (1) the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and (2) the first husband was at the time of the marriage already married to someone else. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon as the set of facts on which judgment will be based. Hence, the petitioner filed this present case.
ISSUES: WON the marriage between respondent and petitioner was valid based on the respondents first marriage being void. RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the defendantappellant RATIO DECIDENDI: No. Even if the petitioner proves that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against her and her first husband, the marriage would still be valid until annulled since it was merely voidable and not void. Since no annulment was made, it is clear that when she married respondent, she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID. There is likewise no need for evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage, though void, still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact. Hence, she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with the respondent, with such marriage being void ab initio.
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Terre v. Terre
A.M. No. 2349 ll Jul. 3, 1992 ll Paras, J. PETITIONER: Dorothy Terre RESPONDENT: Atty. Jordan Terre FACTS: Dorothy and Jordan Terre met each other while they were in high school, during such time, Dorothy was already married to another man who was allegedly her first cousin, while Jordan was single. Jordan courted her and continued doing so through his pursuance of law studies, to which she decided that it was futile but was nonetheless convinced by the former that they could marry since her first marriage with her first cousin, it being contrary to public policy and morals, was void ab initio. The two eventually got married with Jordan convincing Dorothy that she was single and could marry, and that there was no need for her first marriage to be declared void by the Court. During their relationship as spouses, Dorothy had been supporting him through law school. Ultimately, she conceived his child and it was during this time when Jordan suddenly disappeared for no apparent reason. She soon found out that he had married another woman, prompting her to file a case of abandonment and bigamy, as well as an administrative case, against her husband. In his defense, Jordan contended that he married Dorothy on the belief that she was single; that when he found out about her previous marriage, she drove him out of their home; that the child Dorothy was carrying was not his but her former husbands; and that he contracted a second marriage believing in good faith that his marriage with Dorothy was void ab initio, she having been married already when they contracted their marriage. ISSUES: WON the respondent contracting a second marriage RULING: The Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant. Respondent Jordan Terres defense of having believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null, and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary is spurious, considering that (1) he did not rebut complainant's evidence as to the basic facts underscoring his bad faith; and (2) it was the same argument he used to inveigle complainant into believing that her prior marriage, being incestuous and void ab initio, made her free to contract a second marriage with him. Respondent, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. Furthermore, even if respondents argument about the lack of need for the judicial declaration of marriage nullity were to be accepted, thus rendering his first marriage to complainant valid, it would still result to him being criminally liable for bigamy since he contracted his second marriage with the first one still subsisting. This, and other circumstances showing his flawed moral character, are enough grounds to adjudge him unfit to remain as a member of the Bar, as well as inadequate to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender in support of marriage as a basic social institution.
is
liable
for
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Atienza v. Brillantes
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 ll Mar. 29, 1995 ll Quiason, J. COMPLAINANT: Lupo Almodiel Atienza RESPONDENTS: Judge Francisco Brillantes FACTS: Lupo A. Atienza filed a complaint against Judge Francisco Brillantes for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that the respondent is cohabiting with one Yolanda De Castro, with whom complainant has two children. Further, complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro, and moreover, he denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that the lack of a marriage license in both his first and second marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko made the same void ab initio, and that because of it, he believed in good faith, that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he was single. Finally, respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code, which provides that a judicial declaration of nullity was needed for remarriage, does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines, while the second took place in 1991 and is governed by the Family Code. ISSUES: WON respondents second marriage was valid considering that lack of judicial declaration of absolute nullity on his first marriage that was contracted without a marriage license. RULING: The Court dismissed the respondent from service and forfeited all his leave and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned corporations. RATIO DECIDENDI No. Under Art. 40 of the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second one. Said Article applies to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Art. 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired upon the application of Art. 40 to his case. Neither can he invoke good faith as regards his belief of being single when he married De Castro since he, being a lawyer, should know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. He had a chance to correct the flaw of his marriage with Ongkiko upon their second wedding ceremony. His failure to secure a marriage license on two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. Thus, it is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. As there is no duality of morality, a public figure is also judged by his private life. and controlled
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Borja - Manzano v. Sanchez

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 ll Mar. 8, 2001 ll Davide, Jr., CJ. PETITIONER: Herminia Borja-Manzano RESPONDENTS: Judge Roque R. Sanchez FACTS: Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano filed charges against respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the law for the latters action of solemnizing the marriage between David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao, who were both in existing marriages when they married each other, with the former being complainants late husband. Complainant contends that when respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated." Respondent Judge, on the other hand, initially claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao, he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. However, during his later Manifestation, he presented two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. ISSUES: WON respondent Judge can be held liable for solemnizing the void marriage between Manzano and Payao RULING: The Court adopted the recommendation of the Court Administrator with an increased fine of 20,000 imposed upon the respondent Judge. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. Likewise, respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial, as such does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Further, respondent Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage; it is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
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Apiag v. Cantero
Panganiban., J. COMPLAINANTS/PLAINTIFFS: Maria Apiag, Teresita Securom, Glicerio Cantero DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero ANTECEDENT FACTS: According to Maria Apiag, she and Judge Cantero were married after living together as husband and wife. They had 2 children, Teresita and Glicerio. Judge Cantero then disappeared without any apparent cause and left Maria to raise their children alone. They suffered from his abandonment and didn't hear from him for many years, until they found out that he was in Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. They asked for his support in a letter but were ignored. Afterwards, they found out he was already married to Nieves Ygay and that all the public documents required of the defendant had the latter's name instead of Maria's as his wife. (1993) In a letter complaint, Maria Apiag, along with her children, Teresita and Glicerio, charged Judge Cantero (MTC of Pinamungajan Aloquinsan, Cebu) with Gross Misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents. The Court referred this case for investigation, report, and recommendation. (1994) Teresita, on behalf of her mother, and Judge Cantero had a compromise agreement. In it, the parties settled the case amicably, by letting Teresita and Glicerio receive 1/4 of the retirement money that Judge Cantero would get, and that they would be in included as beneficiaries of the First Party in case of death, inherit properties from the First party, and that Teresita is authorized to receive and collect 4000php monthly out of the 2nd check salary of Judge Cantero. Also in the agreement, it was agreed upon that there would be a voluntary withdrawal of the case, and if this were not done, the agreement would be void. ISSUES: (1) WON the first marriage with Maria Apiag is void. (2) WON the absence of Maria Apiag for more than 7 years raises the presumption that she is dead and there was no need for any judicial declaration. (3) WON the crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed. (4) WON the charge of Grave Misconduct is applicable to him because at the time of the offense he wasn't a member of the judiciary. HELD: The results of the investigation done by Exec. Judge Gualberto Delgado (RTC Toledo City, Cebu) show that the first marriage was valid. Judge Cantero's argument that not having seen his wife for 40 years has no merit because a judicial declaration of death must be filed before one can remarry. He was also found to have committed misrepresentation in his documents and his conduct was also found to have failed in meeting the standard of moral fitness in his profession. HOWEVER: (1) YES, the first marriage is void. Judge Cantero alleged that the marriage was not valid because his consent was not freely given. He was merely forced to marry Maria because he got her pregnant. He also said that they never lived together, and that is was suspicious for the complainants to show up now when he was about to retire. (2/3) YES. The marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the effectivity of the Family Code. The doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante, wherein it was decided by the Court that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages, applies in favor of the respondent. So Judge Cantero's 2nd Quiambao
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Apiag v. Cantero
Panganiban., J. marriage is considered VALID. The Falsification charge also does not prosper because it is based on the Bigamy charge, which Judge Cantero was not found guilty of. (4) NO. Gross misconduct cannot be applicable in this case because the acts pertain to Judge Cantero's personal life, and have no direct relation to his judicial function. Other than this case, the Judge didn't have any wrongdoing in his record. It was found however, that he violated Canon 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. But, he shouldn't be judged solely for a mistake committed in his youth. The Court would have imposed a penalty for neglecting and refusing to support his first family, but in view of his death before this Decision, the case is DISMISSED.
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Antone v. Beronilla
G.R. No. 183824 ll Dec. 8, 2010
FACTS: March, 12 2007: Myrna Antone, executed an affidavit-complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla, alleging that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when Beronilla contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. Beronilla moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense He declared that his marriage with Antone was null and void by the RTC branch 16, Nacal, Biliran on April 26 2007, and it was final and executory. Given that it was null and void from the beginning, there was no first marriage and the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. Prosecution pointed out that the first marriage on Nov 18 78 has not been severed when he contracted the second marriage on Feb 16 91 which means that bigamy has been executed prior to the declaration that the 1st marriage was null and void on April 27 2007 March 26 2008: Petitioner alleged to the CA that the Pasay City Trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdictions or with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her motion for reconsideration July 18 2008: CA denied the respondents motion for reconsideration for the lack of merit
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred to conclude that the first element of bigamy (a valid first marriage) is lacking.
HELD: YES
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was promulgated in 1987 states that: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. This court held that under the FC, a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case, by then, the crime has already been consummated. This court declared that a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy. The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage bet. Petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for bigamy does not constitute an offense. THE ORDERS OF THE RTC AND RESOLUTIONS OF CA IS SET ASIDE. CRIMINAL CASE IS REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
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Llave v. Tamano
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
FACTS:
Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous. HOLDING: The petition is DENIED. Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. REASON: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslim sand non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity. As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow. On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaRATIOn of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rights, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
marriage
between
Ramos
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Santos v. Bedia Santos

FACTS
Leouel and Julia got married on September 1986. The lived with the latter's family. The marriage was strained, however. The couple frequently had quarrels about when they would start living independently from Julia's parents, and days where Leouel was away, spending time with his own parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel's opposition. When she was able to contact him through long distance telephone call, she promised she would return when her contract expired. She never did. Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. There he tried his best to look or contact his wife but to no avail. Leouel then filed to nullify their marriage due to Julia's psychological incapacity. Julia countered that it was Leouel who was incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however, denied by the lower and appellate court.
ISSUE:
WON there is actual psychological incapacity in the case at bar that would nullify the marriage. HELD: No. Although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow
some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
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Santos v. Bedia Santos

marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Reposar
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Republic v. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 ll Feb. 13, 1997 FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separatedin-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

HELD:
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
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The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad
Republic v. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 ll Feb. 13, 1997
(3)
(4) (5) (6)
complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; The incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; Such illness must be grave enough; The essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their
children; (7) Interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) The trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The petition, assailed marriage Molina Supreme Court granted the and reversed and set aside the decision; concluding that the of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
Cadorna
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332
Chi Ming Tsoi v CA & Gina Lao - Tsoi

G.R. No. 119190 ll Jan. 16, 1997 FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi had already been married for a span 10 months. During that period, it is quite unbelievable that the couple has not ever engaged in sexual intercourse even if none of them are impotent. Gina filed a case in order to annul her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Her husband, on the other hand, is against the said petition and is insisting that their marriage should remain valid. Mr. Tsoi submitted his medical report as evidence on the trial. It states that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeterthe defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman. ISSUE: WON the Trial Court and Court of Appeals erred in their decision to render the marriage void due to one of the partys incapacity. HELD: NO. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the lower courts. The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. It must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other; since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
Reyes, N
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Choa v. Choa
G.R. No. 1473376 ll Nov. 26, 2002 FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case. Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The
evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
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Antonio v. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 ll Mar. 10, 2006 ll Tinga., J. Statistics never lie, but lovers often do - Tinga (2006) PETITION: Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA. [Reversing the RTC decision: nullity of marriage of Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes] DECISION: Reverse CA and affirm RTC Antonio and Reyes marriage is null and void. 6. FACTS: Antonio and Reyes met in 1989 and were married in 1990. Upon the unbearable psychological incapacity of Reyes, Antonio left her almost a year after. Antonio filed a petition to declare his marriage null and void alleging Reyes as psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage (Art 36 of FC). Antonio alleges that Reyes persistently lied about her life, her company, her occupation, income and education. The acts undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust, and respect. Both Antonio and Reyes brought in experts to prove their individual claims. Reyes witness used a Comprehensive PsychPathological Rating Scale, showing results that Reyes is not psychologically incapacitated; yet Antonios witness claims that the test is not reliable. TOOL OF ANALYSIS: Molina Guidelines 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by 7. experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. The incapacity must be incurable. The incapacity must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Essential obligations affected: Art 68-71, 220, 221 and 225 in FC. Courts should give great respect to interpretations of National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church.
3. 4. 5.
ISSUE: WON Reyes conditions and actions are bases for psychological incapacity, thus nullifying the marriage HELD: (1) Antonio sufficiently proved that Reyes is psychologically incapacitated through his testimony and two expert witnesses who (2) identified Reyes constant lying as pathological. The court held that pathological jealousy and repeated lying undermines the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. (3) The psychological incapacity was established on or even before the celebration of marriage when Reyes fabricated the existence of friends. (4) The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the Catholic Church (in reference to Molina [7]) already annulled the marriage. (5) The psychological incapacity is indeed incurable. Antonio came back to Reyes as an attempt to make the marriage work. Seeing that Reyes never changed proves the incurability.
Sevilla
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Dimayuga Laurena v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Darlene, filed for annulment due to psychological incapacity of her husband due to the following reasons: Infidelity Physical abuse (for having hit her face) Abandonment of conjugal home Stopped support for children Trial court and CA denied petition on grounds of insufficient evidence to declare husband as psychologically incapacitated. ISSUE: WON husband can be declared as psychologically incapacitated therefore rendering the marriage voidable HELD: NO RATIO: Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: 1. Gravity it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out ordinary duties required in a marriage. (there is no evidence there is incapacity of husband to the assumption of marriage is due to psychological incapacity and not merely because of refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will) 2. Judicial antecedence must be rooted in history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge after the marriage. (Petitioner failed to prove this as she only cited that during their honeymoon they had a 15 year old who slept with them, but respondent explained that they have had sex several times before said honeymoon and the buy was with them to take their pictures and due to money constraints, he had to stay in one room with them) 3. Incurability must be incurable, or the cure would be beyond the means of party involved. (In this case Dr. Lapuz failed to convince the court that husbands psychological incapacity was incurable, e.g. when they reach the age of 50 s or 60 s, they may settle down) The burden proof belongs to the plaintiff to nullify the marriage. Any doubt should be in favor of the marriage. Petitioners reasons for annulment of marriage are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void.
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Te v. Te
Feb. 13, 2009
PETITIONER: Edward Kenneth Te RESPONDENT: Rowena Yu-Te

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married then separated. Petitioner filed for annulment of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity. Clinical psychologist found petitioner to be afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder (insecure, weak, gullible, no direction in life, unable to decide without advice), while respondent has Antisocial Personality Disorder (disregard for others rights, abusive, controlling without remorse, tendency to blame others). Clinical psychologist recommended annulment. ISSUE, HOLDING, RATIO WON personality disorders of both parties are sufficient grounds for declaring marriage void YES. Void ab initio per FC Art 36. Courts must consider expert opinion as decisive evidence. Personality disorders with their respective features incapacitate both parties to fulfil essential marital obligations. HELD: Petition is GRANTED; marriage is declared VOID AB INITIO. During joint meetings, Family Law Committee and Civil Code Revision Committee included additional kind of void marriages under psychological incapacity based on Canon Law (laws adopted by ecclesiastical authority for the government of the Church and its members). The committees thought it was a) an acceptable alternative to divorce; and b) a solution to problem of Church annulments not recognized by civil law. Psychological incapacity has nothing to do with consent (lack of due discretion); it refers to marital obligations, which were the object of the consent (lack of due competence). Intentionally, drafters did not give examples to avoid ejusdem generis and limit applicability of the provision. Standards in Republic v. CA and Molina were set because of the deluge of petitions for nullity. In fact, OSG labelled FC Art 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. Ct, however, need not worry about the abuse of Art 36; there are safeguards such as State intervention against collusion and fabrication of evidence. Ct therefore declares that there should be perspectives other than that in Molina (without disposing of rules set from this case) to govern annulments under Art 36.
NOTES
Ordoyo
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Ting v. Velez-Ting
Mar. 31, 2009 ll Nachura., J. FACTS: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez Ting met in medschool, fell in love, and got married. Ben worked as an anesthesiologist in a hospital owned by Carmen s family. They had 6 kids. After 18 years of marriage, Carmen filed for a petition asking for the nullity of their marriage. According to her, Ben has psychological incapacity because his chronic alcoholism, violence (hurting Carmen and forcing her to have sex), compulsive gambling habit, irresponsibility in the failure to give regular financial support to his family. Dr. Pureza Trinidad Oate (psychiatrist) compulsive gambling, physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that husband is suffering from a personality disorder. Dr. Obra refuting Oate s opinion: (stenographic notes, psychiatric evaluation of interview with Bens brothers) nothing wrong with petitioner s personality, considering the latter s good relationship with his fellow doctors and good record as anesthesiologist. RTC nullified the marriage, saying that his compulsive gambling, habitual alcoholism, violence, etc, are grounds for psychological incapacity. CA reversed the decision. ISSUES: 1. WON CA decision violated stare decisis of Molina and Santos cases 2. WON requirement for declaration of the nullity of marriage has been liberalized 3. WON petitioner is psychologically incapacitated HELD: 1. (Discussion on stare decisis, its definition etc. similar to Legmeth. No need, and is only procedural, not the main issue of the case) Interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. 2. Molina doctrine, not abandoned. In previous cases, the set of rules evaluating the psychological incapacity should not be rigidly applied because no two cases are similar. We must give weight to the authority of the expert opinion, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE IS ENOUGH, to sustain a finding, not only on the factors provided above. 3. Marriage VALID, Reversed CA ruling. Petitioner failed to prove the pre-existing psychological defect prior marriage, there are two conflicting expert opinions but more weight is given to Dr. Obra s findings because of the extent of his evaluation (used a report from a third psychiatrist from South Africa). Semper praesumitur promatrimonio. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Totality of evidence is inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit. Although the Court condones the behavior or the husband for no rational explanation could be made. He owes love, respect and fidelity to his wife, as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Tiangco
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Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010 PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: Jocelyn M. Suazo Angelito Suazo and Republic of the Philippines On July 1987, Jocelyn finally left Angelito. Not long after, Angelito found another woman to live with and they even had their own children. On October 1997, Jocelyn filed in the Regional Trial Court a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The following reasons were included in her complaint: That from the time they were married until they separated, their relationship has been characterized by bitter quarrels that caused severe physical and emotional pains to the petitioner The main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the respondent to work and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations The psychological incapacity of the respondent started from the time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went by and is now showing to be permanent and incurable Angelito did not answer to this complaint nor did he subject himself into the observation of Nedy Tayag, a psychologist hired by the petitioner. The hearings commenced once the RTC has proven that no conspiracy existed between the two conflicting parties. Jocelyn presented three witnesses: herself; her aunt, Maryjane Serrano; and the psychologist, Nedy Tayag. Jocelyns testimony - Repeated allegations in her petition - Described the occurrence of the beatings - Declared that Angelito did not treat her that way before marriage - Described Angelito as quarrelsome with other people also
DOCTRINE: Psychological incapacity as a ground for void marriages (FC, Article 36): The mere testimony of the spouse is not sufficient evidence to prove the psychological incapacity of the other spouse and to render their marriage void ab initio. NATURE OF PETITION: On July 14, 2004, petitioner filed an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 119, Pasay City on January 29, 1999. The reversed RTC decision nullified the petitioners marriage with the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. FACTS: On June 1985, Jocelyn (petitioner) and Angelito (respondent) met for the first time in Bian, Laguna when the both of them were only 16 years of age. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went with Angelito and his friends to their trip to Manila. They stayed there for three days. Upon being gone for three days, their parents went to look for them and when the former found them, they were brought back to Laguna. Not long after that incident, their marriage was arranged. They were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian. The two were forced to stop schooling. And because they had no means to support their new family, the couple lived with Angelitos parents first. Jocelyn was the one who supported the family. She worked as a household helper for the relatives of Angelito. The husband, on the other hand, refused to work and became a drunkard instead. Whenever Jocelyn will urge Angelito to find work, the latter will only be infuriated and their discussion will lead to a violent quarrel.
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Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010 Her aunts testimony - Corroborated testimony parts of Jocelyn's
The psychologists testimony - Claimed that the respondent suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; described it as serious and severe; chronic (incurable) and long- standing even before the marriage - This disorder has been deemed as incurable since the person itself is not aware that he possesses such a disorder - Although no physical examination was done, these findings were based on the report given by Jocelyn (who was found to display no pattern of lying and very responsive and coherent her psychological examination) - Claimed that the disorder has prevented the respondent from interacting normally with his wife and other people and this hindered him from functioning as the husband of the family (they have no children, he lets his wife work as a maid, etc.) - This disorder thus affect the psychological incapacity of to perform marital obligation he is a good for nothing person The SG, representing the Philippines, opposed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage saying that the psychologist did not examine and test Angelito all of her report findings were merely hearsay since they only came from the testimony of the petitioner. RULING OF RTC: annulled the marriage
This could also have stemmed from the fact the two were married young and they never the developed the love and respect that a married couple should have developed.
The respondent could have blamed the family of the girl because he was forced to enter a marriage he did not want at that time. Based on the psychological incapacity requisites enunciated by the Court in Santos v. CA, the RTC concluded that the respondent did suffer from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but incurable and it did render him to be unfit to fulfill his marital obligations. The testimonies given are enough to prove this and to give to the petitioner the relief prayed for. Letting the marriage remain valid (wife will still use the last name of the husband, etc.) will only remind the beaten party of the hardship that she has to go through. RULING OF THE CA: reversed the RTC decision
The courts should have used the totality of evidence approach: If the totality
of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. There is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti - social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation, but it was merely based on the testimony of the wife which is found to be inconclusive. It can only be due to simple causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity. It can also be rebelliousness because of their loveless marriage. The concept of psychological incapacity is
No particular instance in the law to consider a person as psychologically incapacitated yet there are some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation (in this case: refusal to work, habitual alcoholism). Respondent has not shown love and respect; he is irresponsible, immature,
jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all a wife beater.
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Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010 not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce. Jocelyn filed another petition for the reversal of the CA ruling and it included the following arguments: The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term. ISSUE: WON there is a basis to nullify their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. NO. RATIO: The Court finds Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. Expert Opinion Evidence: Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition. The psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only from the testimony of Jocelyn. It is not mandated that a personal examination must be done because there are times when this is not entirely possible; however, there are other measures on how a psychologist can find out about the background of the person in consideration. The Court then concluded that the psychologist, using only the petitioners testimony could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. Jocelyns Testimony: The Court finds this testimony as insufficient. All of the beatings and refusal to work arguments happened after the marriage. She did not clearly specify what was the exact time that all of these alleged arguments happened. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicati ve of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. Moreover, while it may be conceded that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, also does not constitute psychological incapacity. Wherefore, premises considered, we deny the petition for lack of merit. We affirm the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals. Costs against the petitioner.
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Marable v. Marable
PETITIONER: Rosalino Marable RESPONDENT: Myrna Marable FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent met while the Petitioner was still in college, courted (notwithstanding petitioner already having a girlfriend at the time) and eventually eloped and were married in civil rites in Tanay, Rizal, followed by a church wedding. They had five children. However, after a few years, they began to argue incessantly, the frequency of their fights being exacerbated by the petitioners extra-marital affair and failed business ventures. Eventually, the petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo. He gave up all his property to his wife and children and converted to Islam after dating several women. Eventually, Petitioner filed for nullity of marriage on grounds of psychological incapacity to fulfill essential obligations of marriage; he cited his underprivileged background and the influence of a father who was a womanizer and a gambler; he alleged feelings of misery and lonelinss throughout his life from childhood to college. In his petition, he cited the psychological report of Dr. Tayug which stated he had Anti- Social Personality Disorder, rooted in deep feeling of rejection from family to peers, and leading to experiences of selfabsorbed need for attention. Dr. Tayags report concluded that the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Trial Court ruled for the nullity of the marriage, based on Dr. Tayugs report. OSG filed for an appeal, and the Appellate Court reversed the Trial Courts decision based on a lack of legal and factual bases: it ruled that the petitioner failed to establish the existence of psychological incapacity, that the root cause of the disorder and its gravity and permanence were not fully explained, nor was it proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The OSG further contends that the petitioner, contrary to his claim of a disorder, was a good provider and father to his children; further, the burden of proof to establish such an incapacity lies with the petitioner, who was unable to substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to a psychological disorder, and not general dissatisfaction with his marriage. Petitioner filed for an appeal with the Supreme Court. ISSUES: a. WON Petitioner has presented sufficient basis for psychologically incapacity to fulfill essential marriage obligations, and consequently, b. WON his marriage can be deemed void on such grounds. RULING: The Court ruled that the petitioner has no basis for nullity of marriage, given his basis of psychological incapacity was insufficiently proven. The Appellate Court did not err in declaring the petitioner and respondents marriage as valid and subsisting, and the appeal is denied for lack of merit. The findings in Dr. Tayugs psychological report did not sufficiently prove that the Petitioner had psychological incapacity to fulfill essential marital obligations. For psychological incapacity to be sufficient grounds for nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Alampay
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332
Marable v. Marable
Code, there must be a severe psychological illness afflicting a party even before the marriage has been celebrated; a mental incapacity rendering the party incapable of giving meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contractedthe party must be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Among the guidelines laid down by Republic vs. CA for psychological incapacity are the ff.: i. Burden of proof rests on the plaintiff; any doubt is to be resolved in favor of the continuation of marriage and against its dissolution and nullity ii. Root cause of psychological incapacity must be: a) medically/clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage iv. Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable v. Such illness should be grave enough to bring about disability of the party to assume essential obligations of marriage vi. Essential martial obligations must be those embraced by Articles 6871 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the Code as regards parents and their children vii. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while neither controlling nor decisive, should be given great respect viii. Trial Court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state; no decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General ISSUES a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition The Petitioner had relied completely on the psychological examination and findings of Dr. Tayag, but these were insufficient to establish the petitioners psychological capacity, as it merely made general conclusions about the petitioners alleged suffering from Anti-social Personality Disorder without stating factual basis for finding the petitioner to be socially deviant, rebellious, impulsivenessetc. As held in Suazo vs. Suazo, the declaration for nullity must be based on an in-depth assessment of the parties by a psychologist or expert, for conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. However, in Dr. Tayags evaluation: The report did not specify how the Petitioners actions were a result of his psychological incapacity. ii. There was no established link, medical or otherwise, between the petitioners acts and his alleged psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that sexual infidelity by itself is not sufficient proof that the petitioner is suffering from incapacity, as the latter must be more than just difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligationsSantos vs. Court of Appeals ruled that the intention of the law to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage
Alampay
62
332
Ablaza v. Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC a petition for the celebration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. Being the surviving brother of Cresenciano, who had died without any issue, entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. RTC dismissed the petition: (1) petition is filed out of time and (2) the petitioner is not a party to the marriage. CA affirmed* RTC. [no prescription but should be real party: brother is not real party]
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
HELD:
[RTC decision set aside, case remanded to RTC for further proceedings w/ instructions to require petitioner to amend pleading]
Yes. The validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 0211-10-SC [(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: took effect on March 15, 2003] which explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife was not in effect since it extends only to marriages under Family Code (1988). The marriage was solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code w/c contains no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage and when. Court cited Ninal v Bayadog and distinguished between a void and voidable marriage and how they can be impugned.* However, not anyone can file a petition. The only party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in ISSUE to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case. Assuming the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. But this right hinges upon a prior determination of WON Cresenciano had any decendants, ascendants, or children, and of whether the petitioner was the lates Cresencianos surviving heir. Thus, hes a party of interest but needs to implead Leonila and Leila [Cresies wife and daughter] as theyre indispensable party whose substantial right will be affected by any judgment of this action.
Bayona
63 332
Ablaza v. Republic of the Philippines

NOTE: * This case is under period to file action or raise defense, SC tackled it in passing:
" XXX being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the FACTS rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts."
* ISSUE on prescription by CA in passing: while action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe , the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party
Bayona
64
332
Ninal v. Badayog
G.R. No. 133778 ll Mar. 14, 2000 ll Ynares-Santiago., J. PETITIONERS: Engrace Nial for Herself and as Guardian of the minors Babyline Nial, Ingrid Nial, Archie Nial and Pepito Nial, Jr. RESPONDENT: Norma Badayog FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. Instead, they instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years, therefore exempting them from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the charge on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. ISSUES: WON the second marriage of Pepito was void for a lack of a marriage license WON the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death RULING: The petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO DECIDENDI: YES. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they have cohabited for at least 5 years, since their cohabitation was not the type contemplated by law, he having been still married to his first wife when he started cohabiting with Norma. The five-year period of cohabitation that exempts couples from acquiring a marriage license should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In their case, since a legal impediment was existing, they cannot be deemed to have been exempted from the requirement of a marriage license, which lack thereof resulted to the status of the second marriage as void ab initio.
YES. Unlike voidable marriages, void marriages are imprescriptible, and can therefore be the subject of a declaration of nullity even after the death of either of the parties. Art. 47, which was invoked by respondent, cannot apply to this case as said article refers not to void but to voidable marriages. The trial courts conclusion that the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two.
Cadorna
65
332
Domingo v. CA
G.R. No. 104818 ll Sep. 17, 1993 ll Romero., J.
PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS:
Roberto Domingo Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera, represented by her Attorney-inFact Moises R. Avera than remarriage.
HELD:
FACTS:
Delia Soledad Avera and Roberto Domingo were married in 1976. Delia later found out that Roberto was married to one Emerlinda dela Paz since 1969 when the latter sued them for bigamy. Delia filed a petition at the RTC of Pasig for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property against Roberto since their marriage was contracted while Robertos first marriage is still subsisting. Avera is an OFW while Domingo is unemployed and was completely dependent on her. Avera wanted Domingo to turn over the possession and administration of the properties she acquired to her brother but he refused. The RTC and the CA dismissed Domingos motion to dismiss, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
WON a judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary for the division of properties given that the marriage was void ab initio (subsequent marriage while first marriage still subsisting). WON respondent Delia Soledad Avera can file for a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage for purposes other
1) YES. It is necessary in order to protect the subsequent spouse who believed that her spouse was lawfully married to her. The division of properties is only one of the consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage; hence there is no need to file for an ordinary civil action that the petitioner suggests. 2) YES. Art. 40 of the FC states The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Petitioner contends that it means the declaration is required only for purposes of remarriage. The SC held that the term solely pertains to the final judgment and not to for purposes of remarriage meaning solely the final judgment can be invoked to make a previous marriage void to be allowed to remarry, but the final judgment can be invoked for other purposes.
Cristobal
66
332
De Castro v. Assidao De Castro

G.R. No. 160172 ll Feb. 13, 2008 PETITIONER: REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO RESPONDENT: ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO FACTS: Reinel Anthony De Castro and Annabelle Assidao planned to get married and so they obtained a marriage license from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. In order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed a fake affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years, when in fact, there was no cohabitation. They were then married under civil rites, but did not live together after the ceremony. Annabelle later gave birth to their daughter Reinna Tricia De Castro, who she raised and financially supported alone. She then filed a complaint for support under the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, stating that she is married to Reinel and that he failed to do his responsibility to financially support her as his wife and Reinna as his legitimate child with her. The trial court ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared Reinel as the natural father of the child, and was obliged to give her support. Reinel brought case to CA. CA denied the appeal, but modified the previous ruling such that Reinna is declared as a legitimate child and that the marriage is valid until properly annulled by a competent court. It also ruled that since the case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of the parties as null and void in the very same case and ordered that a separate case be filed for it. Case then brought to SC. *Worth noting: Reinel refused to undergo a DNA test for paternity and filiation and to state with certainty the last time he had sex with Annabelle. ISSUE: (1) WON the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support (2) WON the child is the daughter of Reinel RULING: Petition granted in part. CA decision set aside, RTC decision reinstated. RATIO: 1. Yes. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. As it ruled in Nial v. Bayado, for purposes other than remarriage, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In this case, the fact is important to establish the childs status and her entitlement for financial support from the father. As for the couples marriage, it was decided to be void ab initio since they failed to obtain and present a marriage license. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. 2. Reinna is his illegitimate child and therefore entitled to his support. The childs Certificate of Live Birth lists Reinel as the father. In addition, Reinel, in an affidavit waiving his additional tax exemption, admitted that he is the father of the child. During his testimony in the RTC trial, he also conceded that Annabelle was his former girlfriend, that he used to visit her in her house or clinic and that they would go to a motel to have sex, which eventually led to Annabelles pregnancy.
Cruz
67
332
Dio v. Dio
G.R. No. 178044 ll Carpio., J.
DOCTRINE: Void marriages under Art 36 have coownership as their property regime.
FACTS: Alain and Caridad were childhood sweethearts who started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. They decided to live together again and in 98 they got married. Alain filed for the nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Their marriage was declared void ab initio and their properties dissolved. (However, Caridad was in US and filed and granted a divorce even before the filing of the case in CFI. She was already married to another man.) ISSUE: WON there was an error in the order that the absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties under Art 147 HELD: NO. The property regime of void marriages falls under Art 147 and 148. The relationship of the parties can be
characterized as the union of legally capacitated parties not barred by impediment to get married, but whose marriage is nonetheless void. There are 3 elements for Art 147 to apply, all of which are present in this case: 1. Parties capacitated to marry 2. Live exclusively with each other as husband and wife 3. Union is without the benefit of marriage, or marriage is void The Court erred in applying Sec 19 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which states that the decree shall only be issued after compliance with Arts 50 and 51 (dissolution of properties and delivery of presumptive legitimes) These articles apply only to void ab initio or annulled marriages under Arts 40 and 45, NOT 36 (psychological incapacity). Void marriages under Art 36 are governed by rules on co-ownership. Art 496 CC states that partition can be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Dantes
68
332
Moe v. Dinkins
533 F.Supp. 623 (1981), 669 F.2d 67 (1982) FACTS: Raoul (who was 18) wanted to marry Maria (who was 15). They lived together and had a child (Ricardo). However, in order to get a marriage license, they needed parental consent, which Maria's mother would not give. Maria's mother wanted to continue getting welfare benefits from her minor child, and would lose the benefits if Maria married. Raoul, Maria, and Ricardo sued (in Federal Court) to have the New York parental consent requirement declared and unconstitutional violation of due process. In New York, parental consent was required for those under 18. Another underage couple (Pedro (17) and Cristina (15 and pregnant)) intervened to turn this into a class action suit. ISSUE: WON The New York parental consent requirement violates due process. HELD: DISMISSED. RATIO: The Trial Court found that while minors do have constitutional rights, courts have long recognized the government's power to make adjustments to the constitutional rights of minors. For example, children can't get driver's licenses or buy alcohol. The Court found that the right of minors to marry is not a fundamental right, and that the courts do not need to apply strict scrutiny. All that is required is that New York have a rational basis for making the law. The rational basis test only asks whether the governmental action at issue is a rational means to an end that may be legitimately pursued by government. The Court found that New York had a rational basis for the law. The State has the paternalistic power to promote the welfare of children who lack the capacity to act in their own best interest. The State interests in mature decision-making and in preventing unstable marriages are legitimate under its parens patriae power. In addition, the Court found that the State has a legitimate interest in supporting the fundamental privacy right of a parent to act in what the parent perceives to be the best interest of the child free from State court scrutiny. Raoul et. al. argued that the courts were in a better position to determine maturity on a case-by-case basis because they were disinterested parties. But the Court found that in most cases, "the natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their children." The Court found that they weren't denying Raoul and Maria's rights, they were simply delaying those rights. As soon as they turned 18 they'd be allowed to marry anyone they want
De Castro
69
332
Katipunan v. Tenorio
O.G. No. 43442 ll Sep. 29, 1937
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT: Marcos Katipunan, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE: Rita Tenorio, et al FACTS: - Plaintiff brought an action to annul their marriage - Defendant and plaintiff were married on 1919 - Plaintiff alleges that he wasnt aware of the insanity of the defendant at the time of the marriage but it was apparent after the celebration of the marriage (1926)
ISSUE:
1. WON Rita Tenorio was mentally sound at the time of her marriage 2. WON being diagnosed as of unsound mind after marriage can be grounds for annulment
HELD:
1. NO 2. NO - Principles of declaration of insanity o Generally insanity admitted, or once proved, is presumed to continue, the burden to prove the allegation is on the person making it o Once insanity has existed, it is sought to be proved that a subsequent act of its subject was done in a lucid interval - Admittance of plaintiff that during the nuptial ceremony, he did not
have the least suspicion that his bride was suffering from insanity o Coupled with the testimony of Ursula Paz, indubitably show that at the time she wedded the plaintiff, the defendant was mentally sound Declaration of plaintiff o He noticed the insanity only several days after the marriage o He decided to continue living with her, because he believes that one day it would be cured o Waited until 1926 when the defendant, after her 4th delivery of birth, had so severe an attack of madness to warrant hospitalization until declared incurable Husband and wife cohabited continuously for 7 years Presumption of the validity of the marriage Sec. 30 o Annullable Marriages A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (c) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife MARRIAGE VALID
Dilag
70
332
Suntay v. Cojuangco - Suntay

Martinez., J. PETITIONER: Federico Suntay RESPONDENT: Isabel Cojuangco- Suntay Suntay Family Tree: Federico Suntay Cristina Aguinaldo- Suntay Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay Isabel Cojuangco- Suntay (1) Margarita Guadalupe (2)Isabel Aquino (3)Emilio Aguinaldo FACTS: In 1958, Emilio and Isabel got married. They had 3 kids, Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aquino and Emilio Aguinaldo. However, after 4 years, the marriage turned sour and Isabel filed a case against Emilio for parricide. In retaliation, Emilio petitioned for legal separation for his schizophrenia (which has already manifested even before the celebration of the marriage). In 1967, the TC granted said petition with the ff. dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. In 1990, Cristina (grandmother of Isabel Aquino respondent) died without a will. Isabel prayed that she be appointed as administratix of the estate. However, her legitimacy is being contested because of the declaration of nullity between her parents. Federico, on the other hand, is contending that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent. Hence the case. ISSUES: 1. Whether a declaration of nullity or an annulment was indeed granted to Isabel Aquinos parents? 2. WON Isabel Aquino is a legitimate daughter of her parents thus qualified to be an administratix of her grandmothers estate? HELD/ RATIO: 1. ANNULMENT- Apparently, there was a conflict between the dispositive portion and the body. As such, the entire case must be read so as to construe the real intent (like in LegMeth). In the body, it was clearly stated that: The marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Art. 85 (3) allows annulment if either of the parties was of unsound mind. The Civil Code was followed in the case and NOT the family code; and in the Civil Code, only Arts. 80, 81, 82 and 83 were grounds for a void marriage. 2. YES- Having established that the marriage was only annulled, Isabel Aquino is deemed legitimate. A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is legitimate (Art. 89). The terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning.
Dolot
71
332
Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853 ll Jul. 27, 1960 FACTS:
Aquino filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with Delizo, on the grounds of fraud, wherein Delizo concealed from Aquino the fact that she was pregnant by another man during their marriage on December 27, 1954, and sometime in April 1955, gave birth to Catherine Aquino. RTC dismissed complaint due to nonpresentation of evidence, but was excused of his negligence, but still, the complaint was dismissed. Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs ruling, saying that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own (respondents defense), and that it was impossible that Aquino could not have noticed/suspected that Delizo was pregnant when they got married. He filed a motion for a new trial and presented the ff: 1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino, his brother who was living with Delizo at the time they met, admitting he was the father of 3 children with Delizo, and that they hid her pregnancy from the
plaintiff up to the time of the marriage. 2. Affidavit of Conchita Delizo admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino and hiding the pregnancy. 3. Birth certificates of the 3 children. 4. Pictures of Delizos natural plumpness
ISSUE:
WON the marriage can be annulled on the grounds of the concealment of pregnancy by another man at the time of marriage.
HELD:
Yes. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by another man other than her husband constitutes fraud, and is ground for annulment of marriage. Ruling on Buccat cant apply here, because Delizo was then only 4 months pregnant, and it cannot be said that her pregnancy was readily apparent then, since she was naturally plump (kaloka ang euphemism). (6th month pa usually nagiging noticeable)
Enad
72
332
Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L- 27390 ll Nov. 26, 1970
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Aurora A. Anaya DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Fernando O. Palaroan

FACTS: Aurora Anaya appealed the dismissal of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Manila of her complaint for the annulment of her marriage to Fernando Palaroan. Fernando had earlier filed for annulment on the ground that his consent had been obtained through force and intimidation. This complaint was dismissed: the validity of their marriage was upheld, and Auroras counterclaim was granted. While the negotiations for the amount of the counterclaim was underway, Fernando revealed to Aurora that, several months prior to their marriage, he had a premarital relationship (assumption: sex) with a close relative of his. This non-divulgement, Aurora alleged, definitely wrecked their marriage. Furthermore, Aurora alleged that Fernando had pretended to shower her with love and affection when he was courting her, but only intended to marry Aurora so that he could evade marrying his close relative, from whose family he was receiving threats forcing him to marry her. She also alleged that since he had not married her out of love, he had never intended to perform the marital duties and obligations and had even covertly made up his mind against living with her. Finally she alleged that he had courted a third girl with whom he later cohabited and had several children with over a span of nine years. ISSUE Whether or not a husbands non-disclosure to his wife of his premarital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage. RATIO The Court voted to affirm the lower court and uphold the validity of their marriage on the following grounds: A. In marriage, the law prohibits only specific frauds, of which non-divulgement is not part. Art. 85 and 86 of the Civil Code refer to fraud as a vice of consent, which may be grounds for the annulment of marriage. However, only specific frauds misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure as to a previous conviction and concealment of pregnancy constitute grounds for the annulment of marriage. The Court reasoned that it was clear the Congress, in writing these provisions, intended to exclude all other frauds and deceits. To emphasize this intention further, Art. 86 contains the interdiction: No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. The Court also stressed the state interest in the institution of marriage, saying, The law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. B. The cause for the second fraud charge that Fernando had courted her and obtained her hand without intending to comply with his marital duties and obligations had long since lapsed. The Court said, Any secret intention on the husbands part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage. Aurora should have brought her charges based on that fraud within four years after the marriage, which was celebrated in December 1953. However, since this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it was declared barred.
Espaola
73
332
Ruiz v. Atienza
FACTS: Jose Ruiz, the plaintiff, and Pelagia Atienza, the defendant, were sweethearts in 1938. Nine months later, they had a baby outside of marriage which resulted in Pelagias father, cousin-in-law and three other persons visiting Ruiz in his boarding house and convincing him into marrying Pelagia. After some discussion, they including Pelagiasecured a marriage license and solemnized their wedding at an Aglipayan church. Four days later, Ruiz brought suit trying to annul the marriage by saying that he has been forced into wedlock. He said he only went with them that afternoon because he was convinced due to the following reasons: he was threatened by Pelagias father with a balisong; her cousin-in-law told him that if he doesnt marry Pelagia, he would have trouble in the bar exams because many were rejected on the ground of immorality; and he would be physically safe if he goes with them. ISSUE: WON being forced into marriage (due to threats and intimidation) is enough reason to annul their marriage. HELD: No, their marriage cannot be annulled. First, the Court reviewed his arguments: - The threats from the father only came after he said that he cannot marry Pelagia due to the fact that he was already married. This made Mr. Atienza grab him by his necktie, exclaiming So you mean to fool my daughter! Flares of anger are understandable and also, it wasnt sufficiently established that the father displayed any balisong or made any threat against the life of Ruiz. As to the threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar, it is not considered such duress as to constitute an annulment of marriage. (and where a man marries under the threat of, or constraint from, a lawful prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of duress - 38 C.J., sec. 70, p. 1305) Promise of him being safe was only said to make him feel secure since he was afraid of the possible bodily harm he might endure in retaliation for the dishonor he inflicted upon her family.
Ruiz makes it look like he was practically kidnapped until after the marriage ceremony, but he had many occasions to escape. He also had companions in the house whom he couldve asked for help. In fact, there was even a policeman. The evidence doesnt warrant that his consent was obtained through force or intimidation. Court then cites the provision of the Marriage Law (sec 30 Act No. 3613) that refers to force or violence. Force or violence doesnt include mere intimidation, at least where it doesnt in legal effect amount to force or violence. Furthermore, Atienzas attorney has successfully met the issues, upholding the judges conclusion of fact that neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration.
Falcone
74
332
Jimenez v. RP and Canizares

RULING: HELD:
Decree appealed from is set aside. Case remanded to lower court for further proceedings
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez filed for annulment of his marriage w/ Remedios Canizares for impotency. He says that her vagina was too small to allow penetration Respondent, on the other hand, refused to undergo physical exam to determine capacity for copulation (even if ordered by court) Because of this, Zamboanga court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant.
Marriage is an institution in w/c the community is deeply interested. It is surrounded w/ safeguards to maintain purity, continuity and permanence. The law specifically enumerates legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage Husband's testimony isn't sufficient evidence Respondent's refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court must not be presumed as suppression of evidence because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a phys exam unless compelled to. Impotency should not be presumed -> the presumption is in favor of potency
Hermosisima
75
332
Sarao v. Guevara
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE: B. Sarao DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT: Pilar Guevara FACTS: o Plaintiff and defendant were married and on the same day, plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge of defendant. The later showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening. Although he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of pains in her private part later that night. Plaintiff also noticed oozing of some purulent matter offensive to the smell coming from defendants vagina. o Every attempt to have carnal access to his wife proved to be futile because she always complained of pains in her genital organs. o Upon the advice of the physician, defendants uterus and ovaries were, with consent of the plaintiff removed due to the presence of a tumor. The removal of said organs rendered defendant incapable of procreation. o Plaintiff declared that from the time he witnessed the operation, he lost all desire to have access with his wife and thus filed this complaint for annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency. ISSUE: WON their marriage can be annulled on the ground of physical impotency. HELD: No. Judgment of the Court of First Instance affirmed. RD: o Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase physically incapable of entering into the married state as with the capacity to procreate. Impotency is not the ability to procreate but the ability to copulate. Defect must be one of copulation and not of reproduction. Bareness will not invalidate the marriage. o The removal of the organs rendered her sterile but it by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse. It would appear that it was the memory of this first unpleasant experience with her that made him gave up the idea of having carnal knowledge of her. o Defendant was not impotent at the time she married the plaintiff for the existence of tumor did not necessarily render her incapable of copulation. o Plaintiff also contends that his consent of the marriage was procured through fraud in that the defendant did not reveal to him that she was afflicted with a disease in her sex organs. According to the Court, this contention in untenable since fraud is not alleged in the complaint and has not been proved at the trial.
Macariola
76
332
SSS v. De Bailon
Mar. 6, 1937 FACTS: (Im narrating it in a more chronological way than found in the court s description) In December, 1914, Marciana Escano married Arthur W. Jones. Escano would give birth to their only child, Angelita Jones. On the 10th of January, 1918, Jones left the country after obtaining a passport and was never heard of again. Escano initiated proceedings to have her husband judicially declared an absentee in October, 1919. The court obliged her request on the 25 th of the same month pursuant to article 186 of the Civil Code with the condition that the declaration of absence would only take effect 6 months after its publication. The court declared the declaration of absence in effect on April 23, 1921. On May, 1937, Escano married Felix Hortiguela. Upon the death of Escano, Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her estate. Hortiguela then proceeded to split the estate between himself and his stepdaughter Angelita; they were Escanos only heirs. This partitioning of property and final accounting was approved on June 26, 1933. However, on May 1934, Angelita filed a motion alleging that the marriage between Escano and Hortiguela was void ab initio because they failed to meet the seven -year absence requirement of one spouse for the spouse present to be legally able of entering a subsequent marriage. According to her the amount of time between the declaRATIOn of absence (April 21, 1921) and the marriage of Escano to Hortiguela (May 6, 1927) is only 6 years and 14 dayswell below the 7-year requirement. If proven right, substantial changes would have to be made to the partitioning of her mothers estate. ISSUE: WON the marriage between Escano and Hortiguela is void. HELD: The validity of the second marriage was upheld by the court. According to the court, the 7- year requirement should be counted from the last known sighting of the spouse absent, not from the courts official declaration. Therefore, Jones should have counted from the 10 th of January 1918 which was the last sighting of her father. Court pointed out that both Escano and Angelita believed Arthur Jones to be dead as proven by the fact that she grew up recognizing Hortiguela as her stepfather. (There was also a brief discussion regarding the fact that the marriage between Hortiguela and Escano was not present in the civil register. Court held that the marrying parties are not to be held liable, nor the marriage invalidated, for the failure of the solemnizing official to transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary . Just in case maam touches on this issue) ** also note: For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not required to have the former spouse judicially declared absent. Such declaration is only required for the administration of the estate of the absentee.
Marin
77
332
SSS v. De Bailon
FACTS: In 1955, Clemente Bailon contracted marriage with Alice P. Diaz in Barcelona, Sorsogon. After 15 years Bailon filed beofre the Court of First Instance a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. The CFI granted the petition. After 13 years from the granting of the petition Bailon contracted another marriage with Teresita Jarque. Bailon died soon after and since he was a member of the SSS, Teresita filed a claim for funeral benefits and was granted P 12.000. Siblings Cecilia and Norma who claimed to be daughters of Bailon and a certain Elisa Jayona contested the release of funeral benefits, submitting an affidavit stating that Alice was very much alive. A certain Hermes Diaz who was the brother of Alice likewise filed an affidavit claiming the same. The SSS then cancelled the payment of the funeral expenses and death pension, ordering Teresita to return the P 12,000. Their ground was that the granted petition to declare Alice presumptively dead was not final, and that Bailon who deserted his wife in bad faith made the subsequent marriage bigamous and therefore void. Alice herself also reappeared, asserting that she was the lawful wife of Bailon, and that she was not really absent since she just lived with her parents in the same town of Barcelona. The SSC then found Teresita as a common-law wife and therefore not entitled to Bailon's benefits. In a petition brought about by the respondent before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court sided with the respondent, saying that the SSS wrongly declared the marriage null and void since only competent courts can nullify a second marriage and that second marriage contracted by person with absent spouse endures until annulled. Hence the petition ISSUE: Whether or not Bailon and Jarque's marriage was invalid seeing that Alice was not... quite dead yet? HELD: Second marriages in which springs from the first spouse of one of the parties is presumed dead is deemed valid until proven otherwise by a competent court. In this the SSS erred in its judgment. According to law, the recording of the affidavit of reappearance will terminate subsequent marriages. Such absentee's mere reappearance, even if made known to spouses in subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Presumption of the validity of the second marriage continues in spite of the spouse's physical reappearance and by fiction of law must still be regarded as an absentee. If subsequent marriage is not terminated by affidavit of reappearance but by death, the marriage cannot be questioned except by direct action for annulment. Voidable marriages cannot be assailed collaterally, and can only be assailed during the lifetimes of the parties. Upon the death of either party, the marriage is deemed good ab initio. Respondent is rightful spouse beneficiary of Bailon.
Nuez
78
332
Yu v. Yu
G.R. No. 164915 ll Mar. 10, 2006 ll Carpio-Morales., J. PETITIONER: ERIC JONATHAN YU
RESPONDENT: CAROLINE T. YU FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu (petitioner) filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Tanchay-Yu (respondent) unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child Bianca. Subsequently, respondent filed a petition against petitioner before the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The petition included a prayer for the award to her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule of petitioners visiting rights subject only to the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460. Appellate court thereafter awarded petitioner full custody of Bianca during the pendency of the habeas corpus case. Appellate court later on also ordered respondent to amend her petition before the Pasig RTC which she did. However, citing a change in address and constraints on resources, respondent dismissed her petition in the Pasig RTC. Respondent filed her own petition for habeas corpus for the custody of Bianca this time in the Pasay City RTC. ISSUES: WON question of custody over Bianca should be held before the Pasay RTC, if not the Pasig RTC WON writ of habeas corpus is available to determine the custodial right of parents over their children HELD: NO. Pasig RTC has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case. Appellate court erroneously applied the law of the case doctrine when it ruled in its July 5, 2002 resolution that that the pendency of the habeas corpus petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460 prevented the Pasig RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the custody aspect of petitioners petition for declaration of nullity. NO. Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code governed the case at bar. Specifically, Article 49 states that, During the pendency of the action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Article 50 meanwhile mentions that, The final judgment in such cases for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage shall provide for. the custody and support of the common children. unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous proceedings. The issue of the custody of the child is deemed pleaded upon action for the declaration of nullity of the marriage. There was no need for the petitioner to ask for a writ of habeas corpus just to gain custody of his child. By filing before the Pasig RTC the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage, petitioner automatically submitted the issue of custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. Petition granted. August 10, 2004 decision of CA is reversed and set aside; Special Proceedings in Pasay City RTC is dismissed; Pasig City RTC ordered to continue with proceedings.
Pagdanganan
79
332
People v. Zapata and Bondoc

FACTS: Andres Bondoc filed a case againse his wife, Guadalupe Zapata, and Dalmancio Bondoc for cohabiting and having sex from 1946-47. Wife found guilty and was sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor. Husband filed for a second case complaining about the adulterous acts of his wife and Bondoc from 1947-48. Both defendants filed a motion to quash this complaint on the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Trial Court upheld this and quashed the complaint. They stated that both complaints must be deemed one continuous offense because the defendants and offenses in both complaints were the same. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." ISSUE: WON Trial Court erred in quashing the second complaint of adultery because of double jeopardy HELD: YES. Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency. Each time you have sex constitutes a crime of adultery. The two parties may be the same, but this does not argue against the commission of the crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision that bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. Two reasons why there is no double jeopardy in this case: 1) A continuous crime exists if there is unity of criminal intent or purpose. In this case this does not apply. Basically, the times they had sex after the filing of the first complaint are separate and distinct crimes. 2) Another reason why there was no double jeopardy in this case is because after the first complaint, Bondoc does not have the defense that he did know the wife was married anymore. If this were double jeopardy and the second complaint quashed, Bondoc would go unpunished.
Poblador
80
332
Muoz v. Del Barrio

Felix, J. PETITIONER APPELLANT: Felicidad Munoz RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE: Jose Del Barrio FACTS: Felicidad Munoz and Jose del Barrio were married civilly in 1942 and canonically later that same year. They lived together and had two children, Felix Luis Del Barrio(11) and Maria Teresa Del Barrio(9). During their married life, they had frequent quarrels wherein Jose maltreated Felicidad. Felicidad was unable to take the abuse and they ended up separating. Notwithstanding such separation, the wife claimed that her husband maltreated her in several more occasions (Dec. 1950 or Jan. 1951 and September 1951). She filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and alleged that their marriage was governed by the system of conjugal partnership and no property was acquired during the marriage except for one portion of land. She prayed for legal separation, custody of their children, support of respondent for their children, and for the conjugal property to pay for the costs of this case. Respondent denied petitioner's accusations. The court tried to for them to reconcile, pursuant to Art. 98 CC but failed. The Court proceeded to try the case and the plaintiff presented witnesses testify: (1) Jovita Faustino (a tenant of the apartment owned by her father who witnessed their fights) (2) Felix Munoz (her father) (3) Faustino Mallari (patrolman who was called to intervene in a fight and saw evidence of scratches and ecchymosis on the appellant) (4) Atty. Manuel Macias (stopped respondent when he boxed his wife and twisted her neck in a quarrel) The Court however, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Art. 98. In every case the court must take steps, before granting the legal separation, toward the reconciliation of the spouses, and must be fully satisfied that such reconciliation is highly improbable. Petitioner appealed the said judgment. ISSUES: Whether the maltreatments that the appellant suffered at the hands of the respondent after their separation of dwelling, which allegedly occurred in Dec. 1950 or Jan. 1951 and September 1951, furnish ground for legal separation applied for under Art. 97(2) CC. > NO HELD: Decision appealed from is affirmed. RATIO: In the case at hand, we only look at the alleged maltreatments that occurred after the separation as the ones previous couldn't have amounted to attempts on the life of the wife because she didn't institute any action for legal separation then. Art. 97 NCC states that: A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. An attempt on the life of another requires the intention to kill. Without proof of such, a person cannot be convicted of attempted or frustrated murder. According to RPC 2nd Ed. Bk. 2 part 1 of Dean Francisco, "it is absolutely necessary that the homicidal intent be evidenced by adequate acts to produce the death of the victim." We see here that the respondent only used are his bare fists at most and desisted from giving further chastisement after the first blows were given at the spur of the impulse.
**The Court points out that this being a civil case, only preponderance of evidence is necessary, however, the petitioner should have filed a case against her husband for attempted parricide and have him prosecuted
Quiambao
81
332
Muoz v. Del Barrio

Felix, J.
as a means of establishing her right to secure legal separation that she applied for in this case. **note: In the present case, it is the CC that is applied. In relation to this however, I think that the result would've been different had it been tried using the FC Art. 55(1)
Quiambao
82
332
Gandionco v. Pearanda
PETITIONER: Froilan Gandionco RESPONDENT: Hon. Seven Penaranda and Teresita Gandionco This is a special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul the Order of the respondent Judge ordering Froilan to pay support pendente lite to Teresita and their child, and the Order of the same respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the action for legal separation filed against him by private respondent as well as his motion to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing and trying the case. FACTS: 29 May 1986: Teresita filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage. 13 October 1986: Teresita also filed a criminal case to the MTC of General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage. Froilan claims that the civil action for legal separation and the application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent He cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure: - SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed: (a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. ISSUE: WON the criminal case for concubinage should be settled before the civil case for legal separation can proceed HELD: NOPE Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense." - Sec. 1 of Rule 107: Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall he observed: (c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. This action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other Froilan says that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed - Court says that his assumption is erroneous A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for
Quilala
83
332
Gandionco v. Pearanda
legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. DISMISSED
Quilala
84
332
Lapuz v. Eufemio
FACTS: Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio (married civilly and canonically) from 1934 to 1943 until her husband abandoned her. They had no child; however, acquired properties during their marriage. She discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for an issuance for a decree of legal separation. (Also, that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio S. Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial commenced but before it could be completed, Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2) grounds - Petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code - Death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation Counsel for petitioner substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Eufemio opposed the motion. Court dismissed the case. Plaintiffs cause of action did not survive. Eufemio acquiesced with the dismissal of his counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio. ISSUE: MAIN - WON the death of the plaintiff before a final decree in an action for legal separation abates the action SUB(?) - WON it will also apply if the action involved property rights HELD: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. It is recognized in Article 100 of the Civil Code where only the innocent spouse has the right to claim for legal separation. On the other hand, Article 108 provides the spouses to stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered through reconciliation. Since it is personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself - Death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction Further, an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
Ramos
85
332
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz

Castro, J. PLAINTIFF: Estrella de la Cruz DEFENDANT: Severino de la Cruz FACTS The parties were married and had six children. After more or less 20 years of marriage, the plaintiff filed a case alleging that the defendant had abandoned her as well as mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties (in the form of several successful business ventures), praying for 1) separation of property, 2) monthly support of P2500 during the pendency of the action and 3) payment of P20,000 as attorneys fees. Her reasoning was that the defendant stopped residing in their conjugal home in Bacolod City and instead started living in Manila and denied communications with her. Plaintiff was also alleging that based on unsigned notes she found, that the defendant was having illicit liaisons with another woman. She fears that the defendant will squander their conjugal assets on this alleged mistress. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant had abused his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership for his failure to inform the plaintiff the state of their business enterprises. For the defendants part, he vehemently denied the accusation of having a mistress and that the reason he lived separately was because he could not concentrate with work at their conjugal home because of the plaintiffs quarrelsome nature. He asserts that instead of mismanaging their conjugal partnership property, he has successfully expanded through his own hard work and diligence. He also alleges that he had never abandoned the family. In fact, he had been giving the plaintiff P500 monthly support, allowances for their children ranging from P1200- P1500 a month, as well as financing their education. ISSUE WON the defendant abandoned his family and abused his powers of administration, making it grounds for legal separation of the conjugal partnership properties. HELD NO. The Court held that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife nor abuse of his administrative powers. To entitle the plaintiff to any of the remedies she asks for, under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. The Court believes that the defendant did not intend to leave his family permanently. The facts show that he continued to give support in his absence, thus he was not guilty of abandonment as it was held in People v Schelske where abandonment meant an act of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual, since contributing to their support negatived such intent. The Court also believed that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant had married and was living with a concubine. The Court believed that the defendants refusal to inform the plaintiff of the progress and status of their family businesses does not constitute abuse. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter, which is not the case for the defendant. Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation of conjugal properties because the basic policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to preserve the union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation as not in harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the Civil Code (both old and new) requires that separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the
Reposar
86
332

Castro, J. marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code, Article 1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for causes specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code. The judgment of the Court of First Instance is reversed and set aside. Conformably to our observations, however, the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the meantime, be reduced or increased in the discretion of the court a quo as circumstances warrant. The award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without interest.
Reposar
87
332
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong

G.R. No. 153206 ll Oct. 23, 2006 ll Austria-Martinez, J. FACTS: Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13, 1975. They have 3 children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all the age of majority. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for Legal Separation under Art 55 par 1 of the Family Code, alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. RTC granted prayer for legal separation. CA upheld RTCs decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The climax of the couples drama was on December 14, 1995 when the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned into a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondents head asking her to leave the conjugal house. ISSUE: WON CA erred in upholding the RTCs decision granting legal separation to Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family. HELD: No. It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to in the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said provision. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Reyes, G.
88
332
People v. Sensano
G.R. No. 37720 ll Mar. 7, 1933 FACTS:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. After the birth of their only child, Mariano left them to go to Cagayan for 3 years without any letter or support even if his wife is actually poor, illiterate, and without any relatives to contact for help. During that period, Ursula met Marcelo Ramos who took her and her child with him. Mariano returned in 1924 and subsequently charged his wife and Marcelo of adultery. o They were sentenced to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor. Ursula, after completing her sentence, begged his husband for forgiveness. o He refused to pardon her and told her that she could go where she wished. o She then went back to Marcelo and lived with him once more. (still in 1924) o Mariano did not assert his rights as a husband, and even went to Hawaii where he stayed for 7 years completely abandoning his family. Upon Marianos return to PH, he again charged his wife and her paramour of adultery to obtain a divorce under Act No. 2710.
fact that he seemingly consented with his wifes actions.

HELD:
NO. The husband was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the offended spouse. Based on the evidence and his conduct, he CONSENTED to the adulterous relations of his wife and her lover; therefore he is unauthorized to institute the criminal proceeding. o Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows: "Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. "The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders."
ISSUE:
WON Mariano can file charges of adultery for the second time despite the
No merit in the argument which states that it was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the said seven years.
Reyes, N.
89
332
Ocampo v. Florenciano
FACTS: Jose De Ocampo was married to Serafina Florenciano in 1938. After several years of marriage, Jose learned of Serafina s illicit relations with many men, including a Jose Arcalas. He then sent her to Manila as student of Beauty Culture. Until in 1955, after having been abandoned by Serafina, Luis caught her in the act of having illicit relations with one Nelson Orzame. Thereafter, he filed a petition for legal separation on the ground of adultery. Serafina did not answer the suit and when interviewed by the fiscal, (Art. 101 NCC) she admitted to having sexual relations with several men. Believing there was confession of judgment on the part of Serafina, condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription, since it was in 1951 when Luis learned of the illicit relations but only filed the case in 1955, the court of first instance of Nueva Ecija and the Court of Appeals dismissed the case on the grounds of Article 101 of the NCC. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court? HELD: Yes. NOTE: the case deals with the adultery of the wife with Orzame (1955), as the adultery committed by her with Arcalas (1951) has prescribed when this case was filed in 1955, 4 years too late. (Art 102 NCC) Condonation and Consent Plaintiffs failure to actively search for defendant and take her home constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations since it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. Confession of Judgement. The trial court erred in the interpretation of Aritcle 101 of the New Civil Code. As we (SC) understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand what the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. Moreover, when the court learned that the defendant equally desires the separation and admitted the commission of the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. Griffiths v Griffiths, Collusion - the agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defence, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
Roa
90
332
Sargent v. Sargent
COMPLAINT: Donald Sargent is filing for divorce with Frances Sargent because of an allegation of adultery. RULING: No adultery took place. FACTS: Donald and Frances Sargent are married since September 22, 1909. Donald filed a petition charging Frances of committing adultery (1) on various days in November 1917 with an unknown man; (2) at an unknown time and place where she contracted gonorrhea; (3) based on her relationship with Charles Simmons. In order to prove the occurrence of adultery, he did not come home on two occasions and facilitated a scenario framing Frances committing adulterous acts with Charles. Donald gathered the help of servants in his household to provide testimonies of Frances alleged adulterous acts such as: [Ida Lewis] that Frances discussed the issue of the possibility of interracial marriage (which was considered against morals at that time) [Charlotte Lunford] that Charles is always at Frances room, sometimes even going there three times a day. [Viola Jones] that Frances and Charles drink and laugh together from time to time [Mack Jetter] that Frances invited Charles to her room dressed in her nightgown, pulling Charles toward her. Donald also hired detectives Tienken and Wilsdon to listen to the conversations between Frances and Charles through a dictograph which both claim that Frances called Charles as Dearie. (Not surprisingly), Frances and Charles denied the allegation. The court expressed its disbelief of the story presented by Donald and his witnesses because of the sources it came from, specifically, all of the witnesses Donald presented were under his payroll. Furthermore, the court said: To accept such a story would be to say that every woman in her home is at the mercy of servants who, for pay or to satisfy a grudge, might relate a tale which only their mistress and the alleged correspondent could deny. ISSUE: (from the doubt of the judge) WON Donald connived with his employees and hired detectives to set-up Frances alleged adultery HELD: Yes. The court felt that most of the testimonies were inconclusive of the allegations of adultery and even found some contradictions in the stories presented such as whether at the time they allegedly caught Frances and Charles committing to adultery, the door was locked (according to Charlotte) or half-open (according to the detectives). There were also peculiarities that the court cannot resolve such as why the witnesses waited for 2 hours and 20 minutes for adultery to occur and not find any conclusive evidence that such event transpired. Finally, the court posed the question, if there was any doubt as to the fidelity of Frances, why did Donald create a possibility of Frances being in contact with Charles? Donald did not do anything to protect her wife from Charles alleged evil influence. Donald, instead, orchestrated a scenario to make it more likely for Frances to commit adulterous acts; solidifying the fact that Charles did connive with his employees to frame Frances of adultery.
Sevilla
91
332
Brown v. Yambao
FACTS: 1955 Brown filed for legal separation from his wife Yambao due to adultery while he was in the internment camp during the Japanese invasion his wife had a baby with another man, which he learned on 1945 upon his release. The wife failed to answer and was held in default. The City Fiscal conducted an investigation and found that Brown also lived martially with another woman and had a child with her after his release. ISSUE: WON prosecuting officer is limited to finding out if there is collusion HELD: NO RATIO: Court held that according to CC ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made depend upon the parties themselves CC 52. It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. OBITER: Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. In this case, Brown only filed for legal separation after 10 years of knowing about Yambaos infidelity therefore action for legal separation on the basis of her infidelity has prescribed.
Tan de Guzman
92
332
Bugayong v. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033 ll Dec. 28, 1956 PETITION: Petition for appeal of the dismissal of the CA on the legal separation case of the petitioner, on the grounds of adultery FACTS: Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy, married Ginez on 1949 After some time, when husband went back to the US again, he began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, his sisterin-law, and some anonymous writers, alleging acts of infidelity of his wife (1951) A letter from his wife, which he said that he destroyed, said that a certain 'Eliong' kissed her (1952) he went to Pangasinan and stayed with his wife for 2 nights & 1 day He tried to verify from his wife the veracity of the info, but she just packed hear things and left. Despite the answer, he kept on looking for her, and upon failing to do so, went to igloos Norte "to soothe his wounded feelings" (1952) husband filed a case of legal separation at the CFI of Pangasinan, but was dismissed on the issue of condonation of husband of the acts of the wife ISSUE: WON the act of sleeping with his wife constitutes condonation of the act of adultery, thus being a valid defense for legal separation HELD: YES it is an act of condonation Defined as the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation; conditional forgiveness or remission of a matrimonial offense We are assuming that plaintiff's line of conduct that he really believed his wife guilty of adultery, as the issue on the letters are not on question According to American jurisprudence, any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and the knowledge of such by the injured party, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation, but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence. Even a singular voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and if they lived in the same house, it is presumed that they live on matrimonial cohabitation Art. 100 of the civil code states that legal separation may be claimed by the innocent spouse provided that there had been no condonation or consent.
Tiangco
93
332
Matubis v. Praxedes
Oct. 25, 1960 ll Paredes, J. Plaintiff-Appellant: Socorro Matubis Defendant-Appellee: Zoilo Praxedes DOCTRINE: Consent: Under Article 100 of the Civil Code, legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided that there is no condonation of the adultery or concubinage. This condonation may be express or implied; Prescription: Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause. NATURE OF PETITION: Plaintiff-appellant appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dismissing her complaint for legal separation and change of surname based on the alleged abandonment and concubinage of the defendant-appellee. Her reasons for the appeal are: (1) the lower Court erred in having considered that the period to bring action had already elapsed, and (2) that there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage. FACTS: In January 1943, Socorro Matibus (plaintiff) and Zoilo Praxedes (defendant) legally married at Iriga, Camarines Sur. In May 1944, the couple agreed to live from each other because they could not agree on how to live as husband and wife. In April 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, with the significant portion (to the case) provided below: (b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our separation. In January 1955, defendant began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado and they deported themselves as husband and wife. In September of the same year, their common child was born. In April 1956, plaintiff filed for the complaint for legal separation and change of surname against the defendant. After the trial in the lower court, without the defendant presenting any evidence, the latter rendered that the actions of the defendant did constitute concubinage; however, they had to dismiss the petition based on Articles 102 and 100 of the new Civil Code (discussed under nature of petition): (1) The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was, therefore, filed out of time and for that reason action is barred. (2) The plaintiff has consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband. Her consent is clear from the aforementioned portion of the agreement (b). Having consented to the concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation. ISSUE: (1) WON the lower Court erred in having considered that the period to bring action had already elapsed. NO. (2) WON there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage. YES.
RATIO: (1) Based on their interpretation by the Court of Article 102 of the new Civil Code, the complaint was indeed filed outside the periods provided for in the Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the concubinage in January, 1955, but she only instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. (2) Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the quoted
Yumol
94
332
Matubis v. Praxedes
Oct. 25, 1960 ll Paredes, J. paragraph of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. As a matter of fact, the counsel of the plaintiff does agree with the courts decision that the complaint should be dismissed; however, it does not agree that it should be dismissed based on the grounds laid out by the lower Court. They argue that it should be based on the fact that the couple have already been living legally separately from each other long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code. The Court cannot subscribe to this contention because it is contrary to the law. Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the decision appealed from is in accordance with the evidence and the law on the matter. The same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Yumol
95
332
Contreras v. Macaraig
Petitioner: Elena Contreras Respondent: Cesar Macaraig FACTS: Contreras and Macaraig were married in 1952, and had three children. 1958: couple acquired rights, as lessee and purchaser under a conditional sale agreement, to own a house and lot in Philamlife Homes in QC, where they transferred. Installments paid by wifes father. Spouses own no other conjugal property. Shortly before 1961 election: Macaraig, manager of wifes fathers printing establishment MICO offset, met Lily Ann Alcala, who places orders with said company for progpaganda materials for Sergio Osmena, vicepresidential candidate; after elections, husband resigned from MICO offset to be a special agent at Malacanang. He began to be away from home often and to come home very late; when wife asked why, husband explained busy with series of confidential missions. Sept 1962: Avelino Lubos, family driver, told wife that husband was living in singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. Oct 1962: upon husbands return to conjugal home, wife refrained from verifying Lubos report in her desire not to anger/drive husband away. April 1963: wife heard rumors husband was seen with a woman on dasmarinas st May 1963: wife desisted from discussing matter with husband; did not want to precipitate quarrel Husband would come home for a few days; would be gone for about a month After receiving reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her fathers employee, to verify the reports. Family drove Antioquia to the singalong house where she saw husband carrying a baby in his arms. She went to the Singalong parish priest and inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala, and was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig which she gave to wife in Oct, 1963. Wife asked father-in-law to intercede. Mr Macaraig, after talking to his son and seeing him with the new baby, told wife he could not do anything. Nov. 1963: wife asked cooperation of older sister of husband, who obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between wife and Lily Ann. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up husband as she had no desire to be accused criminally but it was husband who refused to break relationship with her Dec 1963: wife filed for legal separation Husband never answered case; fiscal sent and found no collusion; wife allowed to present evidence Lower court dismissed complaint: In respect of concubinage: cognizant may not connote date when proof sufficient to establish cause is possessed, rendering law meaningless as all wife would have to do would be to claim that necessary proof was secured only within a year before filing of complaint. Hard to concede law envisages/encourages filing of complaint within one year after innocent spouse receives information of others infidelity, however baseless the report Lower court believes the correct rule lies between the two extremes At the time wife acquired information which can be reasonably relied upon as true that her husband is living in concubinage with another woman, one-year period deemed to have started even if wife shall not then be in possession of sufficient proof to establish concubinage before court of law; one-year proof: allotted time for securing proof After husband resigned from MICO offset to be special agent in Malacanang, he would seldom come home, claiming confidential missions as an excuse. But Sept 1962, drivers testimony reported him to be living with Lily Ann, and it was driver who brought Antioquia to house in Singalong where she saw husband, Lily Ann and baby
Alampay
96
332
Contreras v. Macaraig
Requirement of law on one-year period after cognizance by plaintiff of cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of essence of the cause of action, based on principle of marriage as an inviolable social institution Lower court has to find wife became cognizant of husbands infidelity in Sept. 1962; wife made attempts to induce husband to amend his erring ways but failed; her desire to bring him back to connubial fold and preserve family solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal action ISSUES: Whether one-year period from timely legal action pursuant to Art. 102 of the Civil Code should be counted from Sept 1962 (drivers report) or from Dec. 1963 (filing for complaint) RULING: SC set aside appealed decision and hold wife entitled to legal separation, remanding case to lower court for appropriate proceedings. five years from after date when such cause occurred is not involved Sept 1962: wife had knowledge of husbands infidelity based solely on family driver; she thought it best not to go deeper into the matter in the hopes, notwithstanding husbands obvious neglect, that he would return; when her husband did return in October, she refrained from bringing up the matter of marital infidelity
1963: failure of wife to act on rumors likewise due to her joy at husbands return, again desisted from discussing matter wife made brave attempts to persuade husband to return (asking help from father-in-law to intercede, and cooperation of defendants older sister) Supreme Court rules that in the eyes of the law, wife really became cognizant of infidelity of her husband in early Dec 1963 when the following happened (as quoted from appealed decision): Wife, in early Dec 1963, accompanied by two children and Mrs Lagronio went to talk to husband at his work place. They repaired to Victoria peak, a nearby restaurant, where wife pleaded husband to give up Lily Ann and return to conjugal home, assuring him she was willing to forgive him. Husband informed wife he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family. From the forgoing, Supreme Court concludes that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family, that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be to have commenced.
Alampay
97
332
Somosa Ramos v. Vamenta

Jul. 29, 1972 ll Paredes, J. FACTS: June 18, 1971 - Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed a civil case for legal separation on grounds of concubinage and an attempt to her life by the respondent Clemente Ramos. She also sought for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property [managed by Clemente]. July 1971 husband countered this by invoking Art. 103 of the Civil Code which prohibits the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from filing of the petition Aug 4, 1971 respondent Judge Cipriano Vamenat, Jr granted the motion of Clemente Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction sought by his wife Lucy. ISSUE: WON Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit HELD: NO. Art 103* is not an absolute bar to the hearing of motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period. SC reversed respondent Judges suspension of petition for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Art. 104* eases the absolute limitation from which the court suffers under Art. 103. The court said that by reading Art 104 in relation to Art 103, there appears to be recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. Thus, the parties may be heard even w/o waiting for the lapse of the six-month period. Citing Araneta v Conception: XXX But this practical expedient [six-month delay period for hearing], necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ...The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." Also, from Aug. 4 1971 to July 29, 1972 [date of SC decision], six months have already lapsed thus no impediment for lower court to act on the motion of the petitioner [moot and academic na ang case?] Rationale behind Art 103: Special nature of suit for legal separation: it is relationship w/c the law attaches the QUALITY OF PERMANENCE Cooling off period: recital of grievances against each other in court may fan their inflamed passions against one another *Art. 103 CC [Art. 58, FC] An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition *Article 104 CC [Art. 61, FC] After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court.
Bayona
98
332
De La Via v. Villareal
G.R. No. L- 13982 ll Jul. 31, 1920 ll Johnson, J. PETITIONER: Diego De La Vina RESPONDENTS: Judge Antonio Villareal and Narcisa Geopano FACTS: Narcissa Geopan filed a complaint of divorce in RTC Iloilo against her husband, Diego de la Vina, on the ground of concubinage. Due to said illicit relationship between her husband and one Ana Calog, she was ejected from the conjugal home in Guijulngan, Negros Occidental, and thereafter forced to establish her habitual residence in the city of Iloilo, with no means to support herself other than through the expense of one of her daughters. Thus, she prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony pendente. After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband, who was the sole administrator of their conjugal property, from alienating or encumbering the same. Respondent Judge Villareal granted the motion, prompting the husband to file this present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that the judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and that exceeded his power and authority in issuing the preliminary injunction. ISSUES: WON the wife validly acquired a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the subsistence of their marriage WON in an action for divorce, where conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary injunction may be ISSUEd to restrain a spouse from alienating/encumbering conjugal property during the pendency of the action RULING: Petition is denied. RATIO DECIDENDI: YES. The general rule that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband is not an absolute rule. Here, De La Vina unlawfully ejected Geopano from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another woman, giving Geopano more than enough justification to establish her domicile elsewhere, lest her continued cohabitation give the impression of condonation to said illicit affairs. It is well established in various jurisprudence that the wife may acquire a separate residence where the husband has given cause for divorce, which in this case, is De La Vinas having committed concubinage. Having established this, it follows that the Geopano could file the case of divorce to the RTC of Iloilo, instead of the RTC that has jurisdiction over De La Vinas residence, which the latter insisted and which the court rejected. Yes. While the law grants the husband the power to solely administer the conjugal property without the consent of the wife, this legal maxim only holds true as long as a harmonious relationship between them exists. When such relation ceases, the husbands powers of administration should be curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests of the wife. The preliminary injunction prayed for by Geopano is well within paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, and thus, the RTC judge didnt commit any breach of jurisdiction in granting the same.
Cadorna
99
332
Reyes v. Ines - Luciano

G.R. No. L- 48219 ll Feb. 28, 1979 ll Johnson, J. PETITIONER: MANUEL J. C. REYES, RESPONDENTS: HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES,. FACTS Celia filed for legal separation against her husband Manuel due to his attempts to her life cited in 2 instances: 1) On Mar. 10, 1976, Manuel pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, then held her head and, with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the cement floor. When she ran upstairs to her father for protection, he pushed her at the stairway of flights and she fell sliding to the ground floor. Determined to finish her off, he again gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which floored her half unconscious. Were it not for plaintiff's father, he would have succeeded killing her; 2) On May 26, 1976, she went to their house to get her overnight bag. Upon seeing her, defendant yelled at her to get out. When she did not mind him, he suddenly doused her with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several times that landed at her back and nape, and was going to hit her with a steel tray as her driver, Ricardo Mancera, came due to her screams for help. For fear of further injury and for life, she rushed to Precinct 5 at United Nations Avenue, Manila Metropolitan Police, for assistance and protection. Celia asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children but Manuel opposed this, alleging adultery on the part of Celia. Respondent judge granted P5,000 which was reduced to P4,000 because the children are in the custody of the husband upon motion for reconsideration of Manuel. Manuel filed for certiorari at the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC. Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE WON alimony pendente lite should be granted to the wife while the legal separation case is pending given that there is an allegation of adultery on her part? HELD & RD YES. The Court denied the petition of the husband and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision with modification granting the support pendente lite at the rate of P4,000 a month. Court held that while adultery is a defense in an action for support, the alleged adultery must be established by competent evidence. During the hearing, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove the allegation. The adultery may still be proved in the hearing of the legal separation. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go to the full merits of the case. It is sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, in view of the provisional character of the resolution. It was also noted that Celia was not asking for support from the husbands personal funds but from the conjugal property of which Manuel is the president, manager and treasurer. It is also cited that the husband can afford the support given that they have various corporations.
Cristobal
100 332
Baez v. Baez
G.R. No. 132592 & 133628 ll Jan. 23, 2002 PETITIONER: AIDA P. BAEZ RESPONDENT: GABRIEL B. BAEZ FACTS: On September 23, 1996, Cebu RTC made the following decisions: The legal separation of Aida Baez and Gabriel Baez on the ground husbands sexual infidelity The dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets The forfeiture of husbands one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children The payment to wifes counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from her share in the net assets The surrender by husband of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to wife and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision Aida then filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision, specifically on the payment attorneys fees, which was granted by the RTC. She also filed a motion for moral and exemplary damages, which was denied by the court, and another motion for execution pending appeal regarding the husbands expulsion from the conjugal residential house and the surrender of the Mazda vehicle, which was granted by the court. Gabriel elevated the case to the CA, which set aside RTCs ruling on the execution of judgment pending appeal of the assets and denied Aidas motion for reconsideration, which gave rise to the instant petitions.
ISSUES: (1) WON execution of judgment pending appeal was justified (2) WON multiple appeals are allowed in an action for legal separation RULING: Petitions denied for lack of merit. Affirmed CAs decision (to set aside execution of judgment pending appeal) RATIO: (1) No. Based on the courts prior ruling in the case Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. In this case, court sees that there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which Gabriel would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house, as Aida has, according to the husband, two houses and lots in the US where she is a permanent resident. (2) No. Legal separation is not subject to multiple appeals. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are mere incidents of legal separation, not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court.
Cruz
101 332
La Rue v. La Rue
May 25, 1983 APPELLANT: APPELLEE: Betty La Rue Walter La Rue consideration Equitable distribution of marital property began when the courts equitable powers are applied to secure equitable rights for one spouse in the property held by the other due to constructive trust impressed on said property. In Patterson v. Patterson, where the wifes interest in property toward which she had made a material economic contribution was secured, constructive trust, particularly on property acquired through joint funds or efforts but in the name of only one spouse, is a redress against unjust enrichment (as it is unfair to permit the possessing spouse to keep the entire interest where the other supposedly has a material contribution to the acquisition of said property). This was used as a special equity doctrine. South Carolina has applied this doctrine, which is, as defined in the Burgess case, the wife is entitled to a special equity in the husband's property acquired during coverture where the wife has made a material contribution to the acquisition of the property. The court cited cases, as well as the situation in other states, to justify that homemaking services may be a consideration in the distribution of assets, while rejecting the part in Patterson which excludes it. Homemaking services posted a problem since, to an extent, it is merely a part of the traditional obligation of the husband to support his wife upon which the theory of alimony is based, but there has been an increasing recognition as of late that homemaking services is no longer viewed as a mere adjunct of the husbands obligation. In assessing the value of homemaking services, the court said that it may not depend on a mechanical formula, but that she has contributed to the economic wellbeing of the family unit through the performance of the myriad of household and childrearing tasks. The length of the marriage, as well as fault on the part of the wife, is factors in determining its value. Its value must be considered in relation
FACTS: The parties were married in 1950. The husband exclusively handled the financial affairs while the appellant wife worked for 7 years, earning $51,000, and then, having been encouraged by the husband, was a homemaker for the rest of the marriage, raising their two children and caring for the house. The trial court granted their divorce in March 1980, stating that the husbands abusive conduct far outweighed the wifes. The divorce order granted her alimony and health allowance, but did not provide for the distribution of marital assets. She petitioned the Ohio circuit court for: interest of all of husbands personal property Undivided interest of all of husbands real property Conveyance to her of all real & personal property in the name of and under husbands control Reservation for dower interest in real property owned by husband The court dismissed her petition for failure to prove the existence of a contract where their marital assets were equally owned, or that any of her earnings were invested in any of her husbands properties. It did not find any ground to establish constructive trust for the wife. Before this said petition, she also filed a separate suit (which she lost) concerning a house originally named to her but signed over to the husband around the time the marriage began to deteriorate. ISSUE: WON trial court erred in ruling that wife was not entitled to equitable distribution of marital assets. HELD: Yes. The Ohio circuit courts judgment was reversed; the case is remanded for further
Dantes
102 332
La Rue v. La Rue
May 25, 1983 to the net assets at the time of the divorce, and also in light of the alimony award. However, there is still a difference between equitable distribution based on homemaking services and those based on economic contributions, since the former still has some correlation to alimony and has the characteristic of a judgment. Thus, equitable distribution based on homemaking services cannot lead to transfers made of legal title to a real estate. That the husband was guilty of abusive conduct exonerates the appellant from fault. As to her contributions, her $51,000 worth of earnings when she worked counts for economic contribution, and her homemaking services also entitle her to another equitable consideration, both counted against the net marital assets. The home wherein a separate suit was filed is also considered part of the net assets, as well as the joint bank accounts of the parties.
Dantes
103 332
Matute v. Macadaeg
FACTS: Rosario Matute was found guilty of adultery in an action for legal separation filed by her husband, Armando Medel, on Nov. 6, 1952. Armando was awarded the custody of their four children, ages 4, 8, 10 and 12. Armando then left for the US, leaving the care of his children to his sister in Davao City. Rosario came to live with them so she could be with her children. Armando came back in 1954, and in Mar 1955 the children joined him in Cebu. With Armando's consent on the condition that they will return in 2 weeks, Rosario brought the children to Manila for her father's funeral in April 1955. She didn't return. She subsequently filed a prayer asking for the court to: (1) Award her the custody of her children because her children, three of whom were already above 10 years old, preferred to be with her and that she was not unfit to take charge of them by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty (in deference to Sec 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court) and (2) For Armando to pay for support for the children's schooling. On June 29, 1955 Judge Macadaeg denied her prayer and ordered he r to return the custody of the children to Armando within 24 hours. She then filed an action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, arguing that Judge Macadaeg had issued the decision with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUES: WON There was grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Judge. WON R o s a r i o Matute is fit to be awarded custody of her children pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court. HELD: Petition DENIED. There was no grave abuse of discretion. Rosario is unfit by reason of her poverty. RATIO: WRT Jurisdiction & Grave Abuse of Discretion A petition for certiorari and prohibition is a question of whether the respondent acted "in excess or without jurisdiction" or "with grave abuse of discretion". There is no question that respondent judge had jurisdiction. If he had made a mistake, and he did not, then it would at best only be an "error in judgement" and not an "error in jurisdiction". Neither did he act with grave abuse of discretion because the June 29, 1955 order merely enforced the award made in the Nov. 6, 1952 which was already final and executory. Unless the Nov. 6, 1952 decision is reviewed and modified, the award of custody must stand. WRT Fitness of Matute Children at least 10 years of age may choose their preferred parent according to Sec. 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court unless the parent is unfit to take charge of them by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty. Rosario Matute is without means of livelihood and depends on her brothers for money and shelter. She is thus unfit by reason of her poverty.
De Castro
104 332
Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18008 ll Oct. 30, 1962 ll Barrera, J. Legal Basis: Art. 372 When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. FACTS: Elisea Santamaria petitioned for the use of her maiden name Elisea Laperal after obtaining legal separation from her husband. She also supported said petition on the fact that she has ceased to live with him for many years. Prior to the decree of legal separation, she has been using her married name, Elisea Santamaria. The lower court used Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, Change of Name, and granted the petition. The rationale of the lower court was that to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets ISSUE: WON the Court may use Rule 103 despite the specific stipulations in Art. 372 of the Civil Code HELD / RATIO: No. Elisea should retain her married name. She is still married and there was no severance of the vinculum. Art. 372 should prevail because it specifically qualified its application to married women legally separated from their husbands thus, this applies to Elisea. Even if the Court were to apply Rule 103, it is the opinion of the Supreme Court that it is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Art. 372. On the lower courts justification above, the Supreme Court held that it was not sufficiently proven that there will be confusion in her finances. Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. **Just in case it will be asked, the previous related case is Dunn v. Palermo- Palermo wants to retain her maiden name even after marriage. This was allowed by the Court. The legal name of any person is the one written in the birth certificate.
Dolot
105 332
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. FACTS: Alice Reyes - Filipina (wife) Richard Upton - American (husband) nd Theodore Van Dorn - American (2 husband) H and W got married in HK in 1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines. In 1975, they obtained a decree of divorce in Nevada on the ground of incompatibility. In 1982, the wife remarried to Theodore Van Dorn also in Nevada. The wife has a business in Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, which the 1st husband claims to be a conjugal property but the wife argued that as of the time that they obtained a divorce, they both expressed that they had no community of property, hence, this case. ISSUES: (1) WON the divorce decreed abroad is binding in the Philippines in cases of mixed marriage (Filipino + Foreigner)? (2) WON the 1st husband may be entitled to the administration of the property subject of the dispute (this one is not the focus of the discussion, though worth mentioning since it s also in the case) HELD / RATIO: 1. Yes. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either; otherwise, it would create a ridiculous situation where the foreigner husband is no longer married to the Filipina wife but the latter is still tied to the marriage. 2. No. He is estopped by his own representation previously that there is no community of property was to be adjudicated by the court in Nevada. Besides, the wife should not discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Karichi note: Philippine laws apply to Filipinos, ergo, foreigners cannot use our laws against our citizens.
Dolot
106 332
Quita v. CA and Dandan

G.R. No. 124862 ll Dec. 22, 1998 ll Bellosillo, J. FACTS: Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, married in the Philippines (1941). They got a divorce (filed 1950) in San Francisco, California, USA, and submitted evidence of their agreement to live separately & a settlement of their conjugal properties. Final judgment of divorce was on 1954, and Quita subsequently contracted 2 marriages, still in the USA, since then. In 1972, Arturo died. Dandan, along with her and Padlans alleged 6 children claimed to be heirs of the intestate of Arturo. The trial court, without a proper hearing, decided in favour of the subsistence of the marriage of Quita and Padlan, stating that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought & decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in Philippine jurisdiction, declaring Quita and Arturos brother as the only heirs. Upon partial reconsideration, the Padlan children, except for one (illegitimate) were recognized as heirs, excluding the brother. Dandan was still not counted because her marriage to Padlan was contracted on 1947, which makes it bigamous, thus void ab initio. Dandan appealed, stating that the court erred in deciding without a hearing, because there was an actual controversy as to the lawful heirs of the deceased. CA affirmed appeal, declared null and void trial courts decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Quita appealed to SC. ISSUE: WON case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. HELD: YES. The provision states: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. There is no controversy as to the children, but the controversy lies as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. In Quitas comment on her entitlement to inherit despite their divorce, she says that Arturo was a Filipino, and so they remained legally married. From this, the SC interpreted that Quita was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing establishing Quita s citizenship. Her citizenship is important to determine, in light of the ruling in Van Dorn v Romillo Jr. Trial court based citizenship solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner s citizenship at the time of divorce. Quita became an American citizen in 1954, the same year final judgment of divorce was obtained. If proven that she was no longer a Filipino citizen, she will lose her right to inherit. SC emphasizes that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of Quita to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse, since Dandans claim has already been resolved (bigamous marriage). Petition denied. CAs direction to remand the case for further proceedings affirmed. Emphasis on question of hereditary rights of petitioner.
Enad
107 332
Llorente v. CA
G.R. No. 124371 ll Nov. 23, 2000 PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS: Paula T. Llorente Court of Appeals and Alicia F. Llorente Philippines, therefore also rendering his marriage to Alicia void. The Court of Appeals affirmed (with modification, to the effect that Alicia is declared co-owner of properties she and Lorenzo acquired during their 25 years together). ISSUES 1) Whether a divorce acquired by a naturalized US citizen is applicable in the Philippines 2) Whether the will executed in favor of the second spouse is valid (minor issue) RATIO The Court reversed the decision of the trial and appellate courts and remanded the case to the court of origin on the following grounds: A. Divorce was applicable under Arts. 15 and 16 of the Civil Code. The CA and RTC used the renvoi doctrine, which refers the case to the law of decedent's domicile - in this case, Philippine law. The Court interpreted Arts. 15 and 16 as applying only to Philippine nationals. Only they are covered by the policy against absolute divorces. Aliens, meanwhile, may obtain absolute divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to law. Thus, they upheld the validity of Lorenzo's divorce. B. The Court did not decide the will's inherent validity and the actual inheritors, since according to his nationality, these are issues best proven by foreign law. However, the question of whether will was executed in accordance with formalities required was resolved based on Philippine law. The Court decided yes, thus leaving to the court of origin the
FACTS: Lorenzo N. Llorente was a serviceman in the United States Navy, who married petitioner Paula in church rites in Camarines Sur in 1937. Lorenzo left for the US before World War II broke out, leaving Paula behind in the conjugal home. In 1943, Lorenzo was granted US citizenship, as well as leave to visit his wife after the Philippine liberation. Upon his return in 1945, he discovered that she was pregnant, and had been having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino. Lorenzo refused to live with Paula, and in 1946 executed with her a written agreement wherein they decided that support from Lorenzo would be suspended, their marital union would be dissolved according to judicial proceedings, and that Paula will not be prosecuted for adultery, given she voluntarily admitted fault and peacefully agreed to separation. Upon returning to the US, Lorenzo filed for and obtained a divorce in San Diego County, California. He traveled back to the Philippines, where he married respondent Alicia F. Llorente. They lived together as husband and wife for 25 years and had three children. During such time, Lorenzo also executed a last will and testament, in which he bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, further designating her as sole executor of said will. Lorenzo died in June 1985. In September of the same year, Paula filed for letters of administration over Lorenzo's estate in her favor, contending that she was the surviving spouse, and the property disposed of in the will were acquired during their marriage. The Regional Trial Court ruled in her favor, holding that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is void and not applicable in the
Espaola
108 332
Garcia v. Recio
responsibility of determining the intrinsic validity of the will and successional rights of the parties.
Falcone
109 332
Garcia v. Recio
FACTS: March 1987 Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon Rizal May 1989 Australian family court decreed a divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage January 1994 He married petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, he declared himself as single and Filipino Starting October 22, 1995 he and petitioner started living separately without prior judicial dissolution of marriage. March 1998 petitioner Grace Garcia filed a petition for a Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, saying that when they got married, Rederick still had a subsisting marriage. She said she only learned of this in 1997. Respondent claims that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia, making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner back in 1994. July 1998 While the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, Rederick secured a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney because the marriage had irretrievably broken down Trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines, NOT due to his alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. ISSUES: (Karichi says its Issue #2) 1. W/N the divorce between Rederick and Editha Samson (first wife) was proven 2. W/N Rederick was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. HELD: 1. YES. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. It is insufficient to just present the divorce decree. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the document isnt kept in the Philippines, the copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in that foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office Divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears authentic. But appearance isnt sufficient. Compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately, when the divorce decree was submitted, it was objected by the petitioners counsel not for its inadmissibility but because it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court then ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence it was admitted in evidence and given weight by the judge as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia because the petitioner failed to object properly. Compliance with articles 11, 13, and 52 of the Family Code that the petitioner quoted isnt necessary as respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws. (He acquired Australian citizenship in 1992)
Note, just in case Maam asks: in civil cases, defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
Falcone
110 332
Garcia v. Recio
2. NO. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, validly admitted in evidence, adequately establishes his legal capacity to marry under Australian Law. BUT there are types of divorces: 1) Absolute (terminates the marriage) and 2) Limited (suspends the marriage and leaves the bond in full force) There is no showing which type of divorce was procured by him The Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy This shows that the divorce he obtained MAY be restricted. This doesnt establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. No proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent as null and void on the ground of bigamy wasnt granted because it may turn out that under Australian Law, he was capacitated to marry to marry as a result of the divorce decree. Hence, the case was remanded to the trial court to receive evidence which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. If theres none, then they may declare nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy, as theres already evidence of two existing marriage certificates.
Falcone
111 332
Republic v Obrecido
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the RTC RULING: Petition by RP GRANTED. Assailed decision set aside FACTS: Orbecido married Lady Villanueva 1981. 1986 wife left for the US. A few years later his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen 2000 Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and married an Innocent Stanley Cipriano filed w/ trial court petition to remarry invoking Par 2 Art 36 of the Family Code--> Court granted OSG says that par 2 article 26 covers marriages between a Filipino and an alien. Proper remedy they say should be annulment or legal separation. A matter of legislation ISSUE: Could Paragraph 2 Article 26 be construed to include Filipinos who have naturalized? HELD: Records of family code deliberations showed that intent of par 2 of art 26 is to avoid absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Does same principle apply to this case? Cites Quita v CA. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Phil law and can thus remarry. Court held that Par 2 Art 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who at time of marriage were Filipinos but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains divorce--> To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice 2 essential elements: 1) Valid marriage celebrated between Filipino citizen and foreigner 2) Valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry reckoning point not citizenship at time of marriage, but citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry For case to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen-> Before a foreign divorce can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.--> such foreign law must be proved also--> must also show that divorce decree allows former wife to remarry No sufficient evidence submitted. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's submission of aforecited evidence
Hermosisima
112 332
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He later married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas (Daisy). Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding because of his work. He returned after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but discovered that she was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada granted his petition for divorce. 2 years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisys marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed him that the marriage between him and Daisy still subsists under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisy did not file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the petition. In fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar case but was prevented by financial constraints. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, Sec 2 of the Family Code. ISSUE: WON Art. 26, Sec. 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE. RD: Art. 26, Sec. 2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse , by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, Art. 26, Sec. 2 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without Art. 26, Sec. 2, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond. An action based on Art. 26, Sec. 2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. Article 26 (par. 2) of the Family Code:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Macariola
113 332
Yasin v. Sharia District Court

Bidin, J. PETITIONER: Hatima Yasin RESPONDENT: Honorable Judge Shari'a District Court Third Shari'a Judicial District, Zamboanga City FACTS: Hatima Yasin was married to Hadji Idris Yasin in accordance with Muslim rites and customs. They were granted a divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc. in accordance with Islamic Law later on. Her exhusband Hadji then contracted another marriage to another woman. Hatima then filed a petition to resume the use of maiden name (Hatima Centi Y. Saul). The respondent court ruled that under Rule 103 Sec. 2(a) and 3 of the Rules of Court (for change of name!) the petition is not sufficient in form as the same did not indicate her residence and the name that she seeks to adopt. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration which the respondent court denied, holding firm their belief that the requirements for Rule 103 should be complied with in order for the name change to be granted. Hence this petition alleging that the respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: WON a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name HELD: Petition is granted and the orders of the respondent court are set aside. The petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and surname. RATIO: No. Although the respondent court claimed that according to Art. 376 CC no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority, and that the same is governed by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the only name that may be changed under this is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. The same is one's name given at birth which for the petitioner, is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. Petitioner in this case doesn't seek to change her registered maiden name but prays to be allowed to resume the use of it. In marrying Hadji, it was only her civil status that changed and not her name. Divorce as defined in PD 1086 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws) severs the marriage bond and allows the spouses to contract another marriage. Art. 370 CC tells us that a married woman may use her maiden name and surname and is not obligated to use her husband's name upon marriage. Art. 371 CC further adds that if the wife is the guilty party in an annulment case, she shall resume her maiden name and surname or, if she is the innocent spouse, she may opt to do the same. The innocent spouse is also allowed to continue using her husband's last name unless either of them marries again. A widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her husband's name is merely an option. **Separate Opinion: Romero, J. points out that the dissolution of matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce/declaration of nullity of marriage/nullity provides a legal ground for the automatic dropping of the use of the husband's family name and the resumption of the use of a woman's maiden name. This is merely a recognition of the change in civil status.
Marin
114 332
Perez v. CA
Petitioner Nerissa wants to reverse an earlier decision by the CA, which awarded custody of her child Ray Perez II to her estranged husband Dr. Ray Perez. FACTS: After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Ray and Nerissa Perez finally had a child they named Ray II. Nerissa was working as a nurse in the US and was able to finance a house in Mandaue City. She was a permanent resident in the US since 1992. Ray was a doctor and worked as a general practitioner. They stayed in the US during her pregnancy. After she gave birth they returned to Cebu but Nerissa went back to the US supposedly to wrap up everything there and return to Cebu to settle down. When she returned she and her hubby were no longer on good terms and eventually became estranged despite efforts to reconcile. She then filed a petition for habeas corpus at the RTC, which it granted citing Art. 213 of the Family Code. The CA reversed the ruling saying that there are compelling reasons to deny Nerissa custody of the child. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WoN Ray II is better off with Mum or Dad considering their circumstances? HELD: When the parents of the child are separated, the applicable law is Article 213 of the Family code. It does not qualify "separation" so it applies to both legal separation and separation in fact. The reason in mandating that a child under seven years be given to the mother is the belief that a child has a basic need for the mother's loving care. However, consideration must be first and foremost the wishes and best interests of the child. The CA, in deciding that Nerissas workload in the US casts doubts in her capability to take care of the child is unreasonable. She can adjust her schedule and manage her time or place the child under the care of someone competent. In fact, this has been the practice in the country where kids are taken care of by yayas. Ray's work schedule was not presented as evidence in the trial and therefore has no bearing. CA's reasoning that Ray was more flexible is not well founded. In fact, he has more work than his wife. The mother's role in the life of her child is irreplaceable. The depth of a mother's love has been immortalized in prose and poetry and finds its justification not in fantasy but in reality. Petition granted and the reversed and set aside. CA decision
Nuez
115 332
Narag v. Narag
A.C. No. 3405 ll Jun. 29, 1998 COMPLAINANT: JULIETA B. NARAG RESPONDENT: ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG FACTS: On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag, complainant, filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, respondent, for having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics of Lawyers. Complainant claims that respondent has abandoned their family to live with his former student. On June 26 1990, complainant sought the dismissal of her administrative complaint stating that she fabricated her allegations and such actions were out of confusion arising from her extreme jealousy. IBP Board of Governors dismissed complaint for failure to prosecute. However, on November 25, 1991, the Supreme Court received another letter of complaint from complainant again appealing for the disbarment of her husband, claiming that she dropped previous complaint because of threats against her by her husband. Respondent prayed for the affirmation of the Boards dismissal of the complaint, and even professed his love for his wife and their family. On August 24, 1992, the Supreme Court issued another resolution referring the comment of the respondent to the IBP, and in the hearing before the IBP, the respondent alleged among others that, 1) He loved his family dearly and gave them sustenance, a comfortable home, companionship and a good name, 2) He was abused physically, mentally, and emotionally by the complainant making their marriage a nightmare (and in the process made him filed a petition for annulment), and that 3) His wife had a propensity to file false charges against him, listing down several complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita (the paramour). On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer recommended the indefinite suspension of the respondent from the practice of law. IBP subsequently approved the adoption of such suspension on August 23, 1997. Complainant sought the disbarment of her husband through a complaint filed on October 20, 1997. IBP granted the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. ISSUES: WON conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment HELD: YES. Respondent was accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita. Complainant was able to prove, through the witnesses she presented, that respondent did abandon his family. The brother in law of the paramour, Charlie Espita, positively identified the respondent as the one living in with his sister, and also confirmed that they had two children. He also admitted that he was the one who handed over to the complainant the love letters that respondent sent to Gina Espita and that the respondent tried to dissuade him from testifying. Bienvenido Eugenio, father in law of Charlie Espita, strengthened the testimony of Charlie by confirming the identity of the respondent as the live in partner of Gina Espita. The handwriting of the love letters to Gina Espita also matched the handwriting on the cards respondent sent to complainant. Respondent, with such allegations, failed to prove to the satisfaction of the investigating body that he was morally fit to have his name on the Roll of Attorneys. He only denied the allegations thrown at him and the witnesses he presented simply impeached the good character of his wife. That he provided well for his family, and was even a successful lawyer and seasoned politician was insufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. The court reminded the respondent that parents not only have rights but also duties to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. As a husband, it was his duty to live with his wife; to observe
Pagdanganan
116 332
Narag v. Narag
A.C. No. 3405 ll Jun. 29, 1998 mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support. Respondent admitted that he was away from home because of work but the evidence showed that he was only away because he spent time with his paramour. The resentful testimony of his two sons showed the impact of his actions on his family. His son Jervis would not bear to forgive him while another son, Dominador, mentioned the trauma he went through which led to the dissolving of his own marriage. Respondent claimed that he adhered to the sanctity of marriage, but ultimately his acts proved otherwise. Complainant was able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. DOMINADOR M. NARAG DISBARRED, His name ORDERED STRICKEN from ROLL of ATTORNEYS
Pagdanganan
117 332
Goitia v. Campos Rueda

FACTS: Luisa (petitioner) and Jose (respondent) married and stayed together for a month before she was forced to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. She stated that a month into their marriage, her husband demanded her to perform lascivious acts on his genital organs and continually demanded similar lewd acts. She refused to do this and husband maltreated her because of this. This gave her no choice but to leave. Luisa then filed a complaint against her husband asking for support. CFI held that husband cannot be compelled to support wife, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation. Hence this case. ISSUE: WON Luisa can compel husband to give her support outside conjugal home HELD: YES. Article 149 of the Civil Code, which states that The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same, is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In this case, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd demands and maltreatment of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home. Wife had a just cause for leaving therefore husband still has to support her. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. A judgment for separate maintenance is not payable as damages or as a penalty, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done to preserve public policy.
Poblador
118 332
Warren v. State
Smith, J. APPELLANT: APPELLEE: Joseph Roblins Lewis Slaton (District Attorney) and Joseph Drolet (Asst. District Attorney) being only one legal being, the husband cannot be convicted of raping himself. d) Other justifications: Prevention of fabricated charges; Preventing wives from using rape charges for revenge; Preventing state intervention into marriage so that possible reconciliation will not be thwarted. The theories were pretty much made during the time when marriage was irrevocable and wives were subservient to their husbands. Her identity was merged into his, her property became his property, and she took his name for her own. There are new laws now that give equal protection to men and women. Besides, N o woman would knowingly include an irrevocable term to her revocable marriage contract that would allow her husband to rape her. Also, the argument of women as chattel doesn't hold water either because even at that time, rape was defined as the carnal knowledge of a female whether free or slave, forcibly and against her will." (2) There is an implicit marital exclusion within the aggravated sodomy statute that makes it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of an offense of aggravated sodomy performed upon his wife. Sodomy was originally defined as "the carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman." One accused of sodomy cannot defend himself by alleging consent because the same is not an element of the offense. (3) If the Court finds no marital exemptions under the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes it would.
FACTS: Daniel Steven Warren was indicted for the rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife but because they are married, he says that he is exempted from being convicted for the same. ISSUE: WON there is an implicit marital exclusion in the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes HELD: No. There is no marital exemption in rape or aggravated sodomy because the same would go against what the Constitution stands for. RATIO: The Defendant argued that: (1) There exists within the rape statute an implicit marital exclusion that makes it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife. Rape is committed when a person has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. a) Lord Hale's contractual theory: "but a husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retreat." b) Medieval time: the wife is the husband's chattel/property and thus, rape was nothing more than a man making use of his own property c) Unity in marriage/Unity of Person theory: A woman's legal existence is suspended or incorporated/consolidated into that of her husband's and therefore, them
Quiambao
119 332
Thurman v. City of Torrington

595 F. Supp. 1521 FACTS: Tracey Thurman was the victim of her husbands, Charles Thurman, repeated harassments and physical abuse. Such instances were on October 1982 when Charles Thurman attacked Tracey Thurman at the home of Judy Bentley and Richard St. Hilaire in the city of Torrington. He took by force their son Charles J. Thurman, Jr. Mr. St.-Hilaire filed a complaint but the police officers of refused to take a complainteven of trespassing. The acts of harassment continued. Even when her husband was finally arrested after attacking her in full view of a policeman and after a judge issued an order prohibiting him to go to his wife's home, the police continued to ignore Thurman's pleas for help. Her husband violated the order and came to her house and threatened her. When she asked the police to arrest her husband for violating his probation and threatening her life, they ignored her. She obtained a restraining order against her husband, which he violated, but again the police failed to take any action. This culminated when Charles Thurman appeared at the BentleySt. Hilaire residence in the early afternoon and demanded to speak to Tracey Thurman. Tracey, remaining indoors, called the police department asking that Charles be picked up for violation of his probation. After about 15 minutes, Tracey went outside to try to persuade him not to take or hurt Charles Jr. Charles suddenly stabbed Tracey repeatedly in the chest, neck, and throat. At the duration of these events, police officers acted ineptly in handling the wifebattering situation. At the time when Tracy was stabbed, Officers DeAngelo, Nukirk, and Columbia arrived on the scene but still permitted Charles Thurman to wander about the crowd and continue to threaten Tracey. Finally, upon approaching Tracey once again, this time while she was lying on a stretcher, Charles Thurman was arrested and taken into custody. It was eventually found out that Charles worked as a counterman and short order cook at Skies Diner. There he served many members of the Torrington Police Department, including some of the officers in this case. While at work, Charles Thurman boasted to the officers that he intended to get his wife and that he intended to kill her. Tracy then filed a complaint in the Federal Court and sued the city for the lack of equal protection in the application of social services, and that this violated the 14thamendment of the U.S. Constitution, particularly the inept police response to a husband beating up a wife. The City brought a motion to dismiss her claims. The Cityargues that the equal protection clause [no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws] only prohibits intentional discrimination that is racially motivated. ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs have properly alleged a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. HELD: Yes, the application of the equal protection clause is not limited to racial classifications or racially motivated discrimination. Classifications on the basis of gender will be held invalid under the equal protection clause unless they are substantially related to strike down classifications which are not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Tracey Thurman alleges that the city uses an administrative classification that manifests itself in discriminatory treatment that violates the equal protection clause. Police protection in the City of Torrington, they argue, is fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim has no domestic relationship. But the Torrington police have consistently afforded lesser protection, plaintiffs allege, when the victim is (1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or (2) a child abused by a father or stepfather. City officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty to preserve law and order, and to protect the personal safety of persons in the community. This duty applies equally to women whose personal safety is threatened by individuals with whom they have or have had a
Quilala
120 332
Thurman v. City of Torrington

595 F. Supp. 1521 domestic relationship as well as to all other persons whose personal safety is threatened, including women not involved in domestic relationships. If officials have notice of the possibility of attacks on women in domestic relationships or other persons, they are under an affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the personal safety of such persons in the community. Failure to perform this duty would constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws. Tracey Thurman alleges there is an administrative classification used to implement the law in a discriminatory fashion. It is well settled that the equal protection clause is applicable not only to discriminatory legislative action, but also to discriminatory governmental action in administration and enforcement of the law. A city may be sued for damages under 1983 when the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the bodys officers or is visited pursuant to governmental custom even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the bodys official decision-making channels. Some degree of specificity is required in pleading a custom or policy. A plaintiff must typically point to the facts outside his own case to support his allegation of a policy on the part of a municipality. In the instant case, however, the plaintiff Tracey Thurman has specifically alleged in her statement of facts a series of acts and omissions on the part of the defendant police officers and police department that took place over the course of eight months. From this particularized pleading a pattern emerges that evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the police department to the complaints of the plaintiff Tracey Thurman and to its duty to protect her. Such an ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference raises an inference of custom or policy on the part of the municipality. Furthermore, this pattern of inaction climaxed on June 10, 1983 in an incident so brutal that under the law of the Second Circuit that single brutal incident may be sufficient to suggest a link between a violation of constitutional rights and a pattern of police misconduct. Finally, a complaint of this sort will survive dismissal if it alleges a policy or custom of condoning police misconduct that violates constitutional rights and alleges that the Citys pattern of inaction caused the plaintiffs any compensable injury.
Quilala
121 332
People v. Liberta
FACTS: Mario and Denise were married in 1978. Shortly after the birth of their son, in October of that year, Mario began to beat Denise. April 30, 1980: the Family Court issued temporary order of protection to her. Mario was ordered to move out and remain away from the family home, and stay away from Denise. Mario could visit his son once each weekend. March 24, 1981: Mario called Denise to ask if he could visit his son, but Denise would not allow him to come to her house. Instead, she agreed to allow him to pick up their son and her and take them both back to his motel provided that a friend of his would be with them at all times. Alone at the Motel room, Mario attacked Denise, threatened to kill her, and forced her to perform fellatio on him and to engage in sexual intercourse with him. Mario forced Denise to tell their son to watch what the defendant was doing to her. Denise went to the police station and swore out a felony complaint against the defendant. On July 15, 1981 the defendant was indicted for rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree Appellate Division Affirmed this. Mario argues that: He was within the marital exemption to rape and sodomy and could not be prosecuted for either crime Both rape and sodomy statutes contravene the Equal Protection Clause by burdening only men and not women ISSUE: 1. WON Mario was falsely charged for 1st degree rape and sodomy in lieu of the marital exemption 2. WON the statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause HELD: 1. NOPE Section 130.35 of the Penal Law states: A male is guilty of rape in the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with a female . . . by forcible compulsion. Female, for purposes of the rape statute, is defined as any female person who is not married to the actor For purposes of the rape and sodomy statutes, a husband and wife are considered to be not married if at the time of the sexual assault they are living apart Legislature expanded the definition of not married to include cases where the H and W were living apart pursuant to a court. Given this, the present case falls within the first definition of these situations Mario was properly found to have been statutorily not married to Denise at the time of the rape. There is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. o Rape is a degrading, violent act, which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm. o A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity o A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman 2. YES the statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause. A statue that treats males differently from females violates the Equal Protection Clause unless the classification is substantially related to the achievement of an important government objective The people bear the burden of showing the objective and the relationship bet. The discrimination in the statute and that objective
Ramos
122 332
People v. Liberta
Arguments advanced by the People for the exemption of females are: o Only females can become pregnant o The rationale of this is that the purpose of this statutory rape is to protect the harm caused by teenage pregnancies. o There is NO EVIDENCE that preventing pregnancies is a primary purpose of the statute. o Instead, the purpose is to protect a woman from unwanted and violent sexual intrusion. Probability of medical, sociological, and psychological problems Rejected by the court Overbroad generalization grounded on stereotypical notions which is not a legitimate rationale A gender-neutral law for forcible rape is unnecessary and therefore the law is constitutional because a woman cannot rape a man or if not, are rare Sexual intercourse occurs upon any penetration, however slight Contact can be achieved without a male being aroused and without consent
Order of the Appellate Division AFFIRMED.
Ramos
123 332
Tenchavez v. Escano
FACTS: Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married. They planned to elope immediately after their marriage but Vicentas mother got wind of what was going on and thus prevented their plans. The Escanos were surprised and disgusted at the clandestine nature of the marriage and the scandal it would bring so they sought priestly advice in the form of a recelebration of marriage but that too, never materialized because of a letter that says Tenchavez was having an amorous relationship with Pacita Noel, their matchmaker. The newlyweds still had contact with each other however the love between them grew colder and they eventually became estranged. When Vicenta went to Misamis Occidental to escape the scandal, she had a lawyer file a petition for the annulment of her marriage. She did not sign it and it was dismissed due to her nonappearance at the hearing. She then left for the United States and filed a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. Her parents, on their part, sought papal dispensation of her marriage. Vicenta then got married to an American, Leo Moran and acquired American Citizenship on Aug 1958. Tenchavez, initiated the proceedings at bar on July 1955. He charged the Escanos with having discouraged their daughter from joining her husband and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. ISSUES: WON The divorce is valid and WON the Court may compel Escano to cohabit with Tenchavez HELD: The Divorce is invalid because a foreign divorce decree cannot be recognized in the Philippines especially if it was granted by a court of the place which was not the parties bona fide domicile and on a ground not recognized by our law, which does not allow absolute divorce. (See Art 15 of NCC) Foreign decrees even in private international law cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. In addition, Vicenta was still a Filipino citizen and covered by Philippine law when the divorce was decreed, hence the divorce is not recognized and is invalid. Her marriage to Tenchavez still subsists and her cohabitation with Leo Moran is adulterous in nature. It is also not within the province of courts to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with and render conjugal rights to the other. However, a spouse who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support. Summing up, the Court rules: (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country; (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law; (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages; (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escano; (2) Sentencing defendantappellee Vicenta Escano to pay plaintiffappellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escano and the estate
Reposar
124 332
Tenchavez v. Escano
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escano, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
See Art 69 of FC and relate it to the case, regarding the exemptions and rules.
Reposar
125 332
Garcia v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-28904 ll Dec. 29, 1928 FACTS: April 8, 1910 - Cipriana married to Isabelo; they lived together as husband and wife February 3, 1925 - continued family dissentions compelled her to leave the conjugal dwelling Alejo (son of Isabelo by his first wife) seduced Prisca Aurelio (daughter of Cipriana by her first husband) and Prisca gave birth to a child Isabelo did not require his son to marry Ciprianas daughter, thus seemingly tolerating their illicit relationship Isabelo has been conveying, and is attempting to convey to his son lands, producing around 4,500 cavanes of palay at P4 per cavan annually, belonging to their conjugal partnership to the prejudice of his wife Isabelo continually refused to provide for her support. Moreover, he just answered Ciprianas allegations by a general denial. ISSUES AND RDS: WON Ciprianas separation from Isabelo is unjustified. NO. The spouses led a rather stormy life subsequent to the dishonor of the plaintiffs daughter; Isabelo ordered her to leave his house and threatened to maltreat her if she returned. Also, keeping the two young people under the same roof with the opportunity to continue their illicit relations would create a very embarrassing situation for the girls mother. To compel the plaintiff to cohabit with her husband can only lead to further quarrels, thus the separation therefore seems necessary. WON the court should restrain Isabelo from conveying properties of the conjugal partnership and WON he is unfit to administer the property of the CP (due to his public illicit relations with Geronima Yap) NO. Cipriana failed to prove that the property conveyed is community property. In fact, it is shown by documentary evidence that the land was acquired by Isabelo before his marriage to Cipriana. There is NO reason to deprive the husband of his right to administer the CP WON the Cipriana is entitled to a monthly pension of P500 YES, but the sum requested is too large, an allowance of P50 per month is enough at present.
Reyes
126 332
McGuire v. McGuire
PLAINTIFF APELLEE: Lydia McGuire DEFENDANT APPELLANT: Charles McGuire As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage relation is being carried out. PETITION: Recover suitable maintenance and support money. Procedural history district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. RULING: Reverse the district courts decision. FACTS: Lydia McGuire married Charles McGuire on August 11, 1919. At the time of marriage, Charles was a bachelor of 46 or 47 years of age and had a reputation of extreme frugality, of which Lydia was aware. Lydia had been previously married and had inherited a onethird interest in 80 acres of land from her previous husband. She brought an action against her husband to recover suitable maintenance and support money. She testified that her husband was a poor companion and that he would give her only small amounts of money on request. She worked the fields and did chores. For several years she had raised chickens and sold poultry and eggs to buy clothing, things she wanted, and groceries. The house was not equipped with a bathroom, bathing facilities, or an inside toilet. She was privileged to use all the rent money she wanted from the 80 acres of land. She used this money to visit her daughters, and her husband provided no funds for such use. She had three abdominal operations for which her husband paid for, but she was no longer able to raise chickens. Her husband had land in the value of $83,960, bank deposits in the sum of $12,786.81, and income of $8,000 or $9,000 a year. Her husband appealed the trial courts ruling in favor of her, alleging that the decree was not supported by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to law. ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to relief HELD: No. To maintain an action such as the one at bar, the parties must be separated or living apart from each other. Parties are not living apart and wife has been supported in the same manner without complaint. As long as home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage is being carried out.
Sevilla
127 332
Pelayo v. Lauron
FACTS: Physician Pelayo was called to Laurons house on the night the defendants daughter in law to help her give birth. The birthing was difficult and fetus was remove by means of forceps wherein Pelayo had done till morning and he visited the patient several times. Pelayo is asking for 500 Php as equitable payment which defendants do not want to pay. Defendants contend that their daughter in law died. Even when she was alive, she lived independently of them and it was only fortuitous circumstance that she gave birth in their house. They held that they are not liable for the complaint. ISSUE: WON the parents are liable for services rendered to Pelayo. NO RATIO: The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) Court held that within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement.
Tejano
128 332
Young v. Hector
FACTS: The parties were married in New Mexico in February 1982 and had two daughters. The father was a successful architect with several business ventures until the stock market crashed. The mother is an attorney whose income sustained the family when the husband failed to find work. When they moved to Miami for the Alices work, Robert stayed in New Mexico to finish his business ventures. He later returned there for a treasure hunting while the wife accepted a shareholder position in one of the largest law firms in Florida. When he returned to his family, they were already separated but lived in the same house. The mother leaves early in the morning and return late at night, working for 12-14 hours a day, and 6-7 days a week. The father was active in school and extra-curricular activities of the children. He was unemployed for six years because he was computer illiterate and failed to meet the demands of the architectural firms. Alice hired a housekeeper to do the cleaning, cooking and taking care of the kids while she was at work. When Alice applied for divorce, the Court awarded her primary residential custody of the children with frequent and continuing contact with the father. ISSUE: WON a parents financial resources should be a determinative factor in child custody? HELD: No, it is only one of the factors balanced with the caretaking roles and other statutory factors. It is the best interest of the children for the preservation and continuation of the caretaking roles that the parties established. According to the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, the court should allocate custody based on the parents past caretaking laws. Financial resources SHOULD NOT be a determinative factor. The separation of the father from his children should not be a factor because he has been the primary caretaker of the children. His alimony should also be increased, distribution of assets and liabilities should be more equitable and award for attorneys fees increased. Reversed and remanded. On Rehearing En Banc: ADDITIONAL FACTS: Both parents are loving and capable parents (gathered from the testimonies of family friends, neighbours, and school personnel). They did not have an agreement to the caretaking roles that the mother be responsible for the support of the family and father for the care of the children. His unemployment is the reason for their disagreements. A live-in housekeeper attended the needs of the children during the day and the mother during the night. Even with the mothers salary increase ($30,000 to $300,000) they were still indebted which later could not sustain the nanny. The father has been away from home for substantial periods of time and Alice has been the dominant influence. HELD: No basis for the court to overturn the decision. The childrens best interest is that they remain with the parent who had continuously been there to care for their needs throughout their lives and not on the parent who had devoted a substantial amount of time with them perhaps only when it was convenient or opportunistic to do so. The mother had been the constant parent throughout the childrens lives. They have personally witnessed an outburst of anger of Robert, who was recommended to have an anger management session. There were three reasons cited by the guardian pendent lite as to why the mother should have custody. (1) The mother has been more economically stable as she has shown proclivity to remain steadily employed unlike the father. (2) the mother has been the constant factor and dominant influence in the childrens lives. (3) She is superior in her ability to control anger around the children. Affirmed lower courts decision but remanded to determine the proper awards.
Tiangco
129 332
Silva v. Peralta
Nov. 29, 1960 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: DEFENDANT-APELLEE: Elenita Ledesma Silva & Saturnino R. Silva Esther Peralta Florence was acquitted from the charges filed against her; however, she was advised to temporarily live in another area of Davao. They decided to stay in the home of the spouses Mr. & Mrs. Camilo Doctolero. Saturnino frequently visited Esther in the house of the Doctoleros, and soon after professed his love for the female. Having believed that there were no impediments to their upcoming union, Esther said yes. On Janury 14, 1945, Saturnino and Esther got married by a certain Father Cote in a house blessing ceremony. TAKE NOTE: There was no documentary ascertaining the existence of their marriage since they alleged that there were no available printed forms for the purpose. The couple lived together as common-law husband and wife and their union had begotten them a son whom they named Saturnino Silva, Jr. In May 1945, Saturnino sustained serious wounds during a battle rendering his transfer from Davao to Leyte, and eventually to the United States. TAKE NOTE: It was only during his return to the US to be treated for his battle wounds, did he finally divorce his Australian wife, Prescilla Isabel. On May 9, 1948, Saturnino contracted a marriage with the plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. Upon Saturninos return to the Philippines, Esther demanded that he give support for their child. His refusal instituted a suit for support filed in the Court of First Instance in Manila. As a counter-attack, Saturnina and Elenita also filed an action (discussed under Nature of Petition) and another suit in Cotabato.
DOCTRINE: Use of surname; Art. 370 of the CC; a married woman is authorized by law to use the surname of her husband; impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise NATURE OF PETITION: This is an appeal on both questions of fact and law from the decision of the Court of First Instance favoring the defendant commenced by the Silva spouses against Esther Peralta, seeking to: (1) enjoin the latter from representing herself as Mrs. Esther Peralta Silva; (2) order defendant to pay Elenita Silva the sum of P250,000.00 as moral, nominal and exemplary damages [allegedly suffered by reason of such misrepresentation]; and (3) pay an additional amount of P10,000.00 byway of the attorney's fees. FACTS: In June 1942, defendant Esther Peralta came to live with her sister, Mrs. Pedro Pia, after abandoning her studies as a student nurse during the outbreak of the war in 1941. During the same time, Saturnino Silva, an American citizen and an officer of the United States Army, was assigned to the Philippines to aid in the countrys fight for freedom. TAKE NOTE: Saturnino was married to a certain Prescilla Isabel of Australia In 1944, Saturnino became the commanding officer of the 130th Regiment, with their headquarters located in Magugpo, Tagum, Davao. During that same year also, Esther accompanied her younger sister Florence in the latters arrest and investigation in Anibongan and later to the general headquarters in Magugpo. This was the time when Saturnino first met Esther.
Yumol
130 332
Silva v. Peralta
Nov. 29, 1960 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J. ISSUES: (1) WoN it is proper for the defendant to represent herself as the wife of Saturnino (Mrs. Silva). NO. (2) WoN plaintiff can claim for moral, nominal and exemplary damages allegedly suffered by reason of such misrepresentation. NO. (3) WoN defendant can claim for actual damages and fees due to harassment and moral damages caused by the deceit of Saturnino, and his consequent refusal to acknowledge their child. YES. RATIO: (1) As mentioned earlier, there was no printed evidence that could ascertain the validity of the marriage between Saturnino and Esther. The only evidence that could be presented was the testimony given by the defendant herself and of her own counsel, Atty. Juan Quijano. Despite having convincing proof that Saturnino and Esther have lived together as common-law husband and wife, the testimonies presented contained many inconsistencies which rendered it unconvincing. Also, there are some documentary requirements presented that prove that Esther has represented herself as single even after her alleged marriage with Saturnino. In the face of the evidence, the presumption of the marriage cannot be upheld and it is safe to conclude that no marriage had really taken place. Aside from the evidence that were discussed in the previous paragraph, another argument that strongly contradicts the validity of their marriage is the fact that at the time of the alleged marriage on, Saturnino was still married to the Australian Priscilla Isabel. In view of the non-existence of appellee's marriage with Saturnino Silva, and the latter's actual marriage to plaintiff Ledesma, it is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino. Article 370 of the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes a married woman to use the surname of her husband; impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise. (2) The court found that Elizas claims of humiliation and distress (upon learning from her lawyer that her husband had a child by the defendant, and was being sued for it) are not satisfactorily proved. In the absence of proof that the suit was reckless or malicious, there is no right to claim damages. (3) The court assumed that the defendant would never have agreed to live maritally with Saturnino nor beget a child by him had not Silva concealed that he was already married. It is well to note in this connection, that Silva's act in hiding from appellee that he could not legally marry her, because, he allegedly have an Australian wife, was not mere negligence, but actual fraud practiced upon the appellee. Also, Esther would not have been compelled to relinquish her employment to attend to the litigation filed to obtain for the child the support that Silva refused. Wherefore, Esther's loss of employment is ultimately a result of Silva's deception and she should be indemnified therefore. Based on these gprunds, he should stand liable for any and all damages which include the expense of maintaining the offspring and the expenses of litigation to protect the child's rights and the loss of the mother's own earnings. Moreover, based on a clear showing of the facts giving rise to such damages Esther had acted in good faith. Saturnino formerly introduced her to other persons as Mrs. Silva, and sent her letters thus addressed, prior to his subsequent marriage to Elenita. Esther Peralta is enjoined from representing herself, directly or indirectly to be the wife of appellant Saturnino R. Silva; and appellant Saturnino R. Silva is in turn ordered to pay Esther Peralta the amount of P30,000.00 by way of pecuniary and moral damages, plus P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. No costs.
Yumol
131 332
Tolentino v. CA
PETITIONER: Constancia Tolentino RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals FACTS: Contancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino; they were married in April 1945 Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo in Feb. 1931, they had children, but the marriage was terminated pursuant to law during the Japanese occupation in September 1943, by decree of absolute divorce granted by Court of First Instance of Manila Divorce on ground of desertion and abandonment by the wife, on finding that Arturo was abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three continuous years Arturo married again: first a Pilar Adorable, who passed, then Constancia in April 1945 Consuelo kept using the surname Tolentino after divorce and up to the time of the complaint Third party defendant (Arturo) admitted that the use of the surname Tolentino by Consuelo was with his familys consent. Constancia Tolentino filed complaint against Consuelo David to enjoin her by injunction from using the surname Tolentino Consuelo file an answer: admitted to using the surname and stated she will continue to use the surname Trial Court granted Constancias action for a writ of preliminary injunction: Consuelo David was enjoined from using/employing/applying in any manner the surname TOLENTINO Consuelo David filed a motion for leave to file a third party complaint against her former husband; it was granted, and Arturo Tolentino, third party defendant, filed his answer Trial Court then confirmed the preliminary injunction in making the same permanent and perpetual-restraining and enjoined Consuelo David from using the surname Tolentino Consuleo appealed to the CA on the following grounds: plaintiff Constancia Tolentinos cause of action had prescribed and the absence of the monopolistic proprietary right of Constancia to the use of the surname Tolentino CA: reversed decision of trial court ISSUES: W/N Constancias cause of action had already prescribed (YES) W/N Constancia can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced (NO) W/N a woman who has been legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined by the latters present wife from using the surname of her former husband (NO) RULING: Constancias cause of action has prescribed. Use by respondent Consuelo David of surname is NOT a continuing actionable wrong The use of a surname by a divorced wife for a purpose not criminal in nature is not a crime Art. 1150 of the Civil Code on prescription: the time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be contained from the day they may be brought All actions, unless an exception is provided, have a prescription period. Unless made imprescriptible by law, an action is subject to bar by prescription with a prescription period of five ears from the time the right cause of action accrues when no other period is prescribed by law (Civil Code, Art. 1149). Civil Code provides for some rights which are not extinguished by prescription, but an action as in this case is not among them; there is no special law providing for imprescriptibility. Even if supposed violation is a continuous one, does not change the principle that the moment the breach of right or duty occurs, the right of action accrues and the action from that moment can be legally instituted
Alampay
132 332
Tolentino v. CA
Whatever the period, the action has long prescribed whether the cause accrued on April 1945, when Constancia and Arturo were married, or August 1959 when the present Civil Code took effect or in 1951 when Constancia came to know of the fact that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino It is the legal possibility of bringing the action, which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription Constancia should have brought legal action immediately against Consuelo David after gaining knowledge of the use of the latter of the surname of her former husband Action was brought only on Nov. 1971, after twenty years CA: where plaintiff fails to go to Court within the prescriptive period, he loses his cause, not because the defendant acquired ownership by adverse possession over his name but because the plaintifs cause of action had lapsed thru the statute of limitations Constancia MAY NOT exclude Consuelo from using the name of her former husband, from whom she was divorced. To sustain Consuelos use of the surname does not contradict Articles. 370 and 371 of the Civil Code. Senator Tolentinos commentary on Art. 370 of the Civil Code: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Arr. 371: not applicable because it speaks of annulment while the case at bar refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce is more akin to the death of the spouse where the deceased woman continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of the husband, even if the latter has remarried rather than to annulment, as if there had been no marriage at all Consuelo David MAY NOT be enjoined by her former husbands present wife from using his surname. WHY: Consuelo has established that granting an injunction would be an act of serious dislocation to her. Presented proof of entering into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Constancia failed to show that she would suffer legal injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husbands surname and be fully protected in case Consuelo David uses the surname for illegal purposes. There is NO USURPATION of Constancias name and surname The mere use by Consuelo of the surname cannot be said to have injured Constancia Usurpation of identity implies injury to the interests of the owner of the name; elements of usurpation of a name i. Possibility of a confusion of identity between owner and usurper ii. Use is unauthorized iii. Use of anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person None of these elements exist in the case at bar; Constancia did not claim that Consuelo had impersonated her It is public knowledge that Constancia is the legal wife of Arturo Tolentino; invitations to public functions are always addressed to her as the wife Consuelo never represented herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturuo Tolentino but simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino Consuelo David has legitimate children who have every right to use the surname Tolentino She cannot be compelled to use the prefix Miss or use the name of Mrs. David different from the surnames of her children; records do not show that she has legally remarried RULING: Use of the surname Tolentino by Consuelo David does not impinge on the rights of Constancia.
Alampay
133 332
Tolentino v. CA
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. CA decision affirmed. Writs of preliminary and mandatory injunction by the trial court, set aside.
Alampay
134 332
Perez v. Tuazon de Perez

FACTS: Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son Benigno Perez, filed a civil case against defendant Angela Tuason de Perez [wife] at the CFI Manila. Plaintiffs three causes of action: Defendant 1. to be declared a prodigal and placed under guardianship for squandering her estate on a young man named Jose Boloix prayed for writ of injunction 2. was spending the conjugal partnership of gain - prayed for writ of injunction 3. defendant has expressed her desire to marry and have children with Jose Boloix, i f only to embarrass her husband prays for 185k by way of damages and attorneys fees Defendant avers that jurisdiction of the case belongs to Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court [RA 1401] not CFI. The CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUES: WON trial court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the causes of action filed by Antonio Perez HELD: NO. All causes of action fall under exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court as provided by Sec 38 A (b)(d) of RA 1401. 1. On declaration of prodigality for squandering of paraphernal estate Falls squarely under Sec 38 A (b) on cases involving guardianship On issue of CPG Material injury in A116 does not refer to patrimonial (economic) economic injury or damage, but to personal (i.e. physical or moral) injury. But since the cause of action is predicated on the grant of guardianship because of prodigality, then exclusive jurisdiction is still with JDRC. On issue of placing plaintiff in an embarrassing situation by wife avowing openly her intention to marry and have a child w/ another man Falls under Sec 38 A (d) on proceeding under A116 when spouse brings dishonour upon the other
3.
PERTINENT PROVISIONS: RA 1401 SEC. 38AProvision of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act: (b) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgment; (d) proceedings brought under the provisions of Articles one hundred sixteen, two hundred twenty-five, two hundred fifty, two and three hundred thirty-one of the Civil Code. Art. 116 When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger, dishonour or material injury upon the other, the injured party may apply to the court for relief. The court may counsel the offended party to comply with his or her duties, and take such measures as may be proper
2.
Bayona
135 332
Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo

G.R. No. L- 17014 ll Aug. 11, 1921 ll Street, J. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Mariano B. Arroyo DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Dolores C. Vasquez De Arroyo FACTS: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were married and have been living as man and wife for 10 years until Dolores left their conjugal home with the intention of living separately from her husband. Thus, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife, to which Dolores filed a cross complaint asking for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance on the basis of cruelty on the part of Mariano. The trial judge ruled against Mariano, concluding that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. Thus, Mariano went to the Supreme Court to appeal. ISSUES: WON Dolores abandonment was with sufficient justification as to render her entitled to her prayers in the cross complaint WON the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife RULING: The Court reversed the judgment appealed from and absolved Mariano from the cross complaint. It also declared the lack of justification on Dolores part for leaving the conjugal home, admonishing her, but not to the extent of giving an unconditional and absolute order to return to the marital domicile and resume her wifely duties. RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The tales of cruelty that Mariano allegedly committed were not sufficiently proven by Dolores. The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and is clearly expressed in Arts. 142 and 143 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorneys fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spousesa state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that Mariano has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him. While cruelty was indeed a ground, it is necessary to prove the extent of said cruelty that would render Dolores entitled to the relief she was seeking. NO. Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, the Court merely admonished Dolores.
Cadorna
136 332
CIR v. Fisher
G.R. No. L-11622 ll Jan. 28, 1961 ll Barrera, J. PETITIONER: THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE RESPONDENTS: DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS FACTS British Walter G. Stevenson and Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson were married in Manila in 1909. Walter died on Feb. 22, 1951 in California where the couple established their permanent residence since 1945. This case is on the determination and settlement of his hereditary estate. In his will, Walter instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to real and personal properties they acquired while residing in the Philippines amounting to P130k. ISSUE RELEVANT TO US WON in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half () of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of the surviving spouse. HELD & RD YES. The SC held that in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, of the net estate should be deducted as the share of the surviving spouse in accordance with our law on CPG. Thus, only the one-half share of Walter in the conjugal partnership property constituted his hereditary estate subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Under the old CC, where one spouse is a foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial agreement, it is the national law of the husband that becomes the dominant law in determining property relations. Since both are British citizens, British laws should apply; however, in the absence of proof of what English law is, court is justified to indulge in processual presumption" in presuming that the law of England is the same as our law.
Cristobal
137 332
Domalagan v. Bolifer
PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT: Jorge Domalagan Carlos Bolifer ISSUE: WoN contract was valid and effective despite being against the provision stated under paragraph 3, Section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action that a contract should be reduced to writing? RULING: Judgment of lower court affirmed. RATIO: Yes. The provision does not render oral contracts invalid. It simply provides the method by which the contract mentioned may be proven. A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in this case and permit the contract to be proved by evidence other than in writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing. In this case, the lower court found that a large preponderance of the evidence showed that the plaintiff had delivered to the defendant the sum of P516 in substantially the manner alleged in the complaint, thus proving the existence and validity of the said contract.
FACTS: In November 1909, Domalagan and Bolifer entered into a verbal contract wherein Domalagan was to pay Bolifer P500 upon the marriage of their children (son Cipriano Domalagan and daughter Bonifacia Bolifer). In August 1910, plaintiff paid P500, together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage." Despite the said agreement, Bonifacia Bolifer married Laureano Sisi and upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded that Bolifer return the P516 he gave earlier, together with the interest and payment for damages which he suffered after being obliged to sell certain real property in order to fulfill the said contract. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendant in the Court of First Instance in Misamis. The defendant presented a general denial and alleged that there was no cause of action. The lower court ruled in favor of Domalagan and ordered Bolifer to return the sum of P516 with an interest of 6% from Dec. 17, 1910. Defendant then appealed to the SC.
Cruz
138 332
Serrano v. Solomon
G.R. No. L- 12093 ll Jun. 29, 1959 FACTS: Melchor Solomon married Alejandria Feliciano on June 21, 1948. On the same day, but before the marriage ceremony, he executed a Deed of Donation where he donated all his exclusive properties as basic capital for their conjugal and family life. The donation further provides in the case that they begot no children that, should he die before his wife, that his brothers and sisters will be heirs to of his property (including those acquired in the conjugal union) and if the wife dies before him, that Estanislao Serrano will be heirs to the same half. Less than nine months after the marriage, the wife died. Then, Serrano commenced the action to enforce the terms of the donation. Solomon filed a motion for dismissal and was granted by the trial court, who ruled that the said donation cannot be counted as donation propter nuptias because it was not made in consideration of the marriage and that the donation was made not to either of the parties but to a third person. Serrano appealed the decision. ISSUE: WON the donation can be validly considered as a donation propter nuptias WON the donation may be held valid and effective as a donation other than donation propter nuptias HELD: No. The court agrees fully with the trial court, citing in support Article 1327 of the Civil Code on donation proper nuptias, which was reproduced for Article 126 of the New Civil Code1. Whether the Old Civil Code (as the marriage was contracted in 1948) or the New Civil Code will apply, the result will be the same. The court questioned whether the donation was made in consideration of their marriage or in consideration of the death of either of them in the absence of children. The court ruled that marriage in itself was not the only consideration or condition; it must be a childless marriage and either spouse must die before for the donation to operate. Even granting that it is in consideration of the marriage, the donation was not in favor of the wife but of Serrano. Citing Manresas commentary, the court said that donations granted to persons other than the spouses even If founded on the marriage are among those excluded from those excluded from Art. 1327. No. It cannot be considered a donation inter vivos because it was never accepted by the donee either in the same instrument or donation or in a separate document as required by law. Neither can it be considered a donation mortis causa because the donor is still alive, and time and occasion have not arrived for considering its operation and implementation, and, as it will be counted equivalent to a last will, it must conform to the strict requisites and provisions for executing wills, which the donation does not.
Dantes
139 332
Solis v. Barroso
G.R. No. L- 27939 ll Avancena, J. DOCTRINE: Donations Propter Nuptias are covered by Title II Book III of CC (Arts618-656). Under Art 633 CC, a donation of real property is valid only if it is made in a public instrument. FACTS: The spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation propter nuptias in favour of their son Alejo and his fiance Fortunata One of the conditions of the donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees, one-half () of the lands donated would revert to the donors. 2 months after the marriage, Alejo died. Juan, the father, died in the same year. Maxima Barroso, the mother, recovered possession of the donated lands, for which Fortunata, Alejos wife, filed an action demanding the execution of the proper deed of donation The lower court ruled in Fortunatas favour, basing the judgement on Art 1279 CC (relating to contracts). Hence this appeal by the Barrosos. ISSUES: WON the donation propter nuptias in this case is valid WON the same is cov ered by A r t 1 2 7 9 CC relating to contracts. HOLDING & RATIO: The donation is NOT VALID and it DOES NOT fall under Art1279 CC. REVERSED on the ff grounds: Donation propter nuptias, according to Art 1328 CC, is governed by Title II, Book III of the Civil Code (Arts 618-656) Art 633 CC provides that a donation of real property is valid only if it is made in a public instrument. o Only exceptions to Art 633 CC: onerous and remuneratory donations Therefore, the donation propter nuptias in this case was NOT VALID and did not create any right since it was not made in a public instrument. The lower court was in error when it considered the donation onerous, which, pursuant to Art 622 CC, would make the donation fall under the rules on contracts. The donation was made only in consideration of marriage and not, as may be inferred in Art 619 CC, for donations for valuable considerations. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not necessary to give b i r t h t o the obligation. Even without marriage, t h e r e may be a valid donation propter nuptias, and such a donation would forever be valid even if no marriage ever took place. This is so because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias is a resolutory condition and not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.
De Castro
140 332
Mateo v. Lagua
G.R. No. L- 26270 ll Oct. 30, 1969 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J. PETITIONERS: RESPONDENTS: Bonifacia Mateo, et. al. Gervasio Lagua, et. al. pending ISSUE: WON inofficious donations can be reduced HELD: YES DPN properties may be reduced for being inofficious DPN are without onerous consideration (no obligation burdening the done), the marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the donation, not its causa. o They are subjection to reduction if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir Steps to consider in determining legal share of compulsory heirs 1) Net estate = Value of properties at the time of death LESS payable obligations and charges 2) Net Estate + all donations subject to collation 3) Determination of legitimes per heir In order to say that a donation is inofficious, it should be proven that it exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the properties of the donor o Pieces of evidence to such are incomplete. They lacked proof that these were the only properties of Cipriano Lagua and that there are only 2 heirs left.
FACTS: Cipriano Lagua = owner of the 3 parcels of land Cipriano Lagua and Alejandro Dumlao are the parents of Alejandro Lagua Alejandro Lagua was to be married to Bonifacia Mateo Cipriano Lagua, in a public instrument, donated 2 out of the 3 lots to his son in consideration of the latters marriage The newlyweds took possession of the properties but the Certificate of Title remained in the donors name o 6 years later, Alejandro Lagua died, his wife and daughter stayed with Cipriano Lagua Cipriano Lagua undertook the farming of the donated lots o At start, he was giving the owners share o After 3 years, he refused to deliver the share o Mateo filed a case for possession and damages = GRANTED Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of the same 2 parcels in favor of his younger son, Gervasio Lagua o Share of the proceeds of the land were still being given to Mateo until 1965 o On the stopping of the share, she found out about the sale o She filed for recovery of possession of the properties = GRANTED Gervasio Lagua filed for annulment of the donation of the 2 lots o ARGUMENT: When Cipriano donated the lots (which were allegedly the only properties he owned), he neglected leaving something for his own support and for Gervasios legitime as forced heir. o Cipriano Lagua died while case was
DISMISSED
Dilag
141 332
Nazareno v. Birog
FACTS: Andrea Rodriguez and Juan Aben were married and had a daughter named Alberta Aben. Their daughter Alberta later got married to Mariano Meleno Nazareno and had a child named Bonifacio Nazareno. When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Cirilo had no offspring. In March 1917, Cirilo executed a deed of donation of land to his then six-year old stepgrandson Bonifacio. The donation was accepted in the same deed by Alberta and Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to possess and enjoy the land. Begin ning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land: 1930 1933 71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for 1, 100 (paid) 2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 (initially with remaining balance of 300, later paid 275, wrote promissory note for 25) 1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600 (balance of 600, promissory note for that sum payable at end of Feb or March 1935) ISSUE: WON Nazareno, may recover title and possession of a parcels of land described? NO HELD/ RATIO: Not only did Nazareno lose ownership of the two portions of the land that the Birogs and Ariolas possess, he signed a deed in favor of Ariola on the third and last portion; therefore, he is estopped from claiming the land. More importantly, appeal must be dismissed since Nazareno has no cause of action under Art.1335 OCC. The donation was made by the husband to a grandchild of his wife by a previous marriage. When the donation was made, the spouses were already married hence it falls under the prohibition provided by law. Donations from the spouse to the children, as well as grandchildren, of the other by a previous marriage are void. Neither has the plaintiff acquired the land by prescription for there is no evidence that he ever possessed it or claimed it against his grandfather (as evident in deed in favor of Ariola, signed by Nazareno as witness). NOTE: This is a wrong decision since the doctrine cannot be applied to all cases. For example, when the grandchildren already have children of their own, the spouse of the original owner can no longer benefit from the donation since he/she will cease to be a compul sory heir of the grandchild.
1934
These two buyers immediately took possession of the land and cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since Ariola had not paid by Feb 1935, plaintiff wrote him a letter demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo) collected balanc e of 25 from Birog in March1935. Hence, the contest for land ownership is between the donee (Nazareno) and buyers of land (Birog and Ariola).
Dolot
142 332
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L- 28771 ll Mar. 31, 1971 ll Fernando, J. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: CORNELIA MATABUENA, PETRONILA CERVANTES defendant asserts her ownership precisely because such donation was made in 1956 & her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962. The lower court agreed with the defendant. ISSUE: WON the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to commonlaw relationships. HELD: YES. The court explained that although Art. 133 of CC considers donations between the spouses during marriage as void, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. The Court cited a 1954 CA decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista1, holding that donations between common-law spouses fall within the prohibition and is null and void as contrary to public policy. The CA decision further states that: assent to such irregular connection for 30 years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased, and also: so long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. The court further stated that even without the precedent, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny, bec. it would be to indict the framers of the CC for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation w/c in its essentials cannot be distinguished. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of StatCon that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. However, the court stated that the lack of
FACTS: Plaintiff seeks to reverse the lower court decision declaring the donation of his deceased brother to defendant as valid, even though it was done when they were in a common-law relationship. She claims that a donation made by her brother while living martially without the benefit of marriage to defendant was void. There was stipulation of FACTS which both sides agreed upon, which are: 1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; 2) That Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favour of defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on Feb. 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by the defendant; 3) That the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common-law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-donee and the now deceased donor, and later they were married on March 28, 1962; 4) That Felix Matabuena died intestate on Sept. 13, 1962; 5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The plaintiff, alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, stated that the donation made by her brother to defendant was null and void under Art. 133 of the Civil Code, which states that: Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
Enad
143 332
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L- 28771 ll Mar. 31, 1971 ll Fernando, J. validity of the donation does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. After all, her brother and the defendant were legally married; w/c makes the defendant her brothers widow. As provided for in the CC, defendant is entitled to of the inheritance, and the plaintiff, as surviving sister, to the other half. Lower court decision reversed. Questioned donation declared void, with the rights of both parties as heirs recognized. Case remanded to the lower court. NOTE: There are annotations in the last part of the case that expounds on donations.
Enad
144 332
Harding v. Commercial Union

G.R. No. L- 12707 ll Aug. 10, 1918 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Mrs. Henry E. Harding and her husband DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Commercial Union Assurance Company - There was no proof that the gift was not a FACTS: moderate one, thus falling under the Mr. Henry E. Harding purchased a exception in the article above. The Court Studebaker automobile, which he then gave to could not rule on whether the gift was his wife. moderate, because such a decision would With his consent, she acquired from depend purely on the couples defendants agent, Smith, Bell & Company, Ltd., circumstances. None of this is in the an insurance policy for the car worth P3,000, records. based on the its present value. - The defendant is not in a position to The car was totally destroyed in a fire, and challenge the validity of the donation. the iron and steel parts that did not burn were Commercial Union bore absolutely no taken by Smith, Bell & Company and sold. The relation to the Hardings during the donation, proceeds of the sale were not tendered to the and thus had no rights or interests in it at the plaintiff before the trial. (During the trial, however, P10 was tendered to the plaintiff as time. proceeds of the sale. The plaintiffs refused this Certain transfers from husband to wife or sum.) vice-versa are prohibited. However, the Thus, the instant petition is for the recovery prohibition can be taken advantage of only by of the P3,000 from the defendant. Commercial persons bearing a relation to the parties who Union argued that because the car was a gift are making the transfer, or to the property from Mrs. Hardings husband, such gift is void itself, where the transfer interferes with their under the Civil Code, Art. 1334 of which states, rights or interests. Unless such relationship is All gifts between spouses during the proven, the validity of the transfer cannot be marriage shall be void. Moderate gifts which the assailed. spouses bestow on each other on festive days of In addition, the Court did not believe Mrs. the family are not included in this rule. Harding was guilty of fraud. An expert mechanic assessed the car, valuing it at P3,000. The cars ISSUES: cost, repairs included, was even proven to be A. Whether the donation from Mr. Harding to greater than the amount of the insurance. Mrs. his wife is valid, Harding had only given the defendant the value B. (Minor issue) Whether Mrs. Harding was of P3,000 based on the assessment of the guilty of fraud in valuing the car at P3,000, mechanicwhich, the Court said, was not proof and therefore, of bad faith. C. Whether she can make a claim for the Thus, because the defendant had agreed to benefits of the insurance policy. the worth of the car, it was bound by this value. Having found both the donation and the RATIO: The Court ruled in the couples favor on valuation valid, the Court concluded that Mrs. both issues. Harding was entitled to the benefits of her cars insurance policy. The donation was valid. The Court ruled so for two reasons:
Espaola
145 332
Sumbad v. CA
FACTS: After the death of his wife Agata B. Tait, George K. Tait, Sr. lived a common-lawrelationship with Maria F. Tait to whom, in 1974, he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. After he passed away in 1977, Maria sold lots including the Sum-at property. She died in 1988. A year after, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait, daughters of George Tait with Agata Tait, brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents (those who bought the land from Maria). Petitioners contend that the Deed of Donation is void because: According to their witness, it is forged by a certain Raquel Tait, their fathers ward It was made in violation of Art 133 of the Civil Code, now Art 87 of the Family Code It was notarized by a person who had no authority to act as a notary public Maria had no authority to sell the Sum-at property, making the sales in favour of the private respondents null and void Since they only learned of the sales in 1988, when Maria became seriously ill, they are not barred from bringing the present action. ISSUES: 1) WON the donation executed by George Tait in favour of Maria Tait is valid and effective 2) WON laches barred the claim of the plaintiffs. HELD: 1) Donation is VALID. The Court ruled that their witnesss testimony of the forgery was incredible, vague, and grossly unconvincing since the statements doesnt ring true and appear to have been rehearsed. Forgery should be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The petitioners shouldve presented handwriting experts to support their claim. They also claim that the deed of donation is invalid under Art 749 of the Civil Code which requires a public instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable property. They contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However, the person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of court who acted For and in the absence of Clerk of Court. In accordance with the presumption that official duty has been performed, its presumed that he was duly authorized to by the clerk of court. Does the deed of donation contravene with Art 133 of the Civil Code that states Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition doesnt apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing?
No. Although it was ruled in Matabuena v Cervantes that Art 133 extends to common-law relations (as can now be seen in Art 87 FC: ...the prohibition shall apply to persons living together as husband and fife without a valid marriage.), the petitioners never invoked this as a ground to invalidate the deed of donation. Their attack on its validity centred solely on the allegation that it was forged and that the notarized by an unauthorized person. Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. o Assuming that they arent prevented by this rule, they were still unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record doesnt show whether George was married to Maria, and if so, where the marriage took place. If Maria was not married to their father, evidence shouldve been presented to show that at the time the deed was executed, they were still
Falcone
146 332
Sumbad v. CA
remaining common-law-relations. The only testimony that they have to that effect is that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother. There was no evidence presented that their father and Maria were still together until 1974, when the donation was made.
**Laches failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which, by exerting due diligence, could or should have done earlier. All in all, petitioners have not sufficiently shown the nullity of private respondents title to the lots. Furthermore, assuming that they never knew of the existence of the Deed of Donation, its impossible for them to not notice that the land had been occupied by the defendants and their families. They waited until Maria had died before assailing the validity of the sales.
2) Petitioners are guilty of laches for waiting 12 years before claiming their inheritance. Their father died in 1977 but they only brought present action in 1989. This precludes them from assailing the donation made by their father in favour of Maria.
Falcone
147 332
Ching v. Goyanko
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA RULING: Petition denied for lack of merit FACTS: Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz married bore Joseph Evely Jerry Imelda etc 1961, parents acquired 661 sqm property in Cebu but as they were chinese citizens, property was registeredin the name of aunt, Sulpicia Vetura May 1993, Sulpicia executed a deed of sale over property in favor of father Goyanko. That same year, October, a deed of sale over the property in favor of his common-law wife Maria Ching was executed After death of father on 1996, respondents discovered that ownership had already been transferred. They had the signature verified and PNP Crime Lab found the signature to be a forgery. Filed for nullification of deed of sale Petitioner claimed that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who provided its purchase price. Presented notary public who testified Goyanko appeared and signed document in his presence RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, finding that the signature was genuine and that the transaction undertaken was only temporary and transitory on the part of Joseph Goyanko. Said court also said that Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack Upon appeal to the CA, Ca ruled in reverse, saying that the property having been acquired during existence of a valid marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership and that no evidence has been shown that there was a judicial decree of dissolution of marriage. CA also ruled that the fact that Joseph Goyangko and Maria Ching were living a common-law relationship, Art 1352 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of sale, for being contrary to morals and public policy produces no effect. ISSUES: A. WON proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships B. WON a judicial relation of trust between Joseph Goyanko and petitioner can validly exist between them HELD: a) Yes Art 1409 Civil Code: contracts whose cause, object or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, pub order and policy are void and inexistent from the beginning Art 1352: Contracts w/o cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. Also, law emphatically prohibits spouses from selling property as well as giving donations to each other. * Law prohibits spouses from selling property to each other because o If allowed, transfers and conveyances would destroy the system of conjugal partnership o Designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other. Also apply to common-law spouses, otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union As conveyance in question was made by Goyanko in favor of his commonlaw wife, it was null and void b) Does not persuade Petitioners testimony that it was she who provided the purchase price is uncorroborated, Even if she was considered the breadwinner of the family does not conclusively clinch her claim
Hermosisima
148 332
Onas v. Javillo
FACTS: Crispulo Javillo contracted two marriages. His first marriage was with Ramona Levis where they had 5 children [petitioners-appellees]. Ater Ramonas death, he married Rosario Onas [oppositor-appellant] where four children were born. During the first marriage, 11 parcels of land were acquired while 20 parcels of land were acquired during the 2nd marriage. Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of May, 1927 and Santiago Andrada was named administrator of his estate. He submitted two projects of partition, the first disapproved by the lower court and second partition is the one now on appeal in this case. Partition was made on the claim that the properties of the 2nd marriage were products of the first marriage. Appellant now alleges that the lower court committed the following errors: 1. All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with the properties of the first marriage. 2. Lower court erred in approving the partition dated Sept. 9, 1931 notwithstanding that the same did not include all of the properties of the deceased, Crispulo Javillo. ISSUES: 1) WON the community partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse. 2) WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the properties of the first marriage. 3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid. HELD: Judgment of the lower court is reversed and case REMANDED for further proceedings. RD: 1. NO. Gutierrez adopting the view of Matienzo states that: When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought about the community ceases, for the principle of an ordinary partnership are not applicable to this community, which is governed by special rules. Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any effect for the community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to the mutual affection between husband and wife, and serve as a recompense for the care of preserving and increasing the property; all of which terminates by the death of one of the partners. Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annuled or when during the marriage an agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership does not exist as long as the spouses are united. 2. NO. Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution if the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share. 3. NO. The project of partition approved the lower court is based on the absurd claim that it does not appear that there was liquidation of the partnership of property of the first marriage nor does it appear that they asked for such liquidation. Partition was based on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second marriage were produced by the properties of the first marriage. Partition is not in conformity with the law.
Macariola
149 332
Vda. De Delizo v. Delizo

Jan. 30, 1976 FACTS: In dispute are the conjugal properties of Nicolas Delizo from his first and second marriages. Delizo was married to Rosa Villasfer from 1981 to 1909 and to Dorotea de Ocampo from 1911 to 1957. The partition for the separation was initiated by the heirs of the first marriage whose claims were refuted by the claims of the second marriage. The main problem was that they could not agree on which properties fell under the property regime of the first marriage and which fell under the second. This was complicated because of the extensive scope of properties Delizo acquired throughout his lifetime17 pieces of property were under consideration. In particular, however, 66-hectares found in Caanawan, Nueva Ecija are being disputed. While the trial court and Court of Appeals found that it was acquired during the first marriage, the division of the fruits of the properties was not clear mainly because majority of the improvement of the 66-hectare property were implemented during the second marriage; only 20 hectares of the 66 were cultivated during the first marriage. This was made more complicated by the fact that although only 20 hectares were cultivated during the first marriage, it was the money made from the 20 hectares that was used to acquire all subsequent property. Taking those facts into consideration, the Court of Appeals held that 20% of all properties acquired during the first marriage should go to the children of the first marriage and 80% to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas and Dorotea. ISSUE: How much were each of the heirs of Nicolas Delizo entitled to given the fact that properties acquired during his first and second marriages could not be divided with mathematical precision? HELD: The Supreme Court held that the lands composing the Caanawan properties could not have been the properties of the first marriage because they were public lands before becoming homesteads. According to the law, it was only after 5 years of cultivation that lands from the public domain would be given to the occupant. The court also held that possession of these lands was not established during the start of the occupation but at the precise time that the occupants were given ownership. However, although the first marriage did not technically own any lands and imparted to its heirs only inchoate rights, the Court held that justice and equity demanded that the rights to the properties by apportioned in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership. Since the capital of either marriage could not be determined with mathematical precision, the Court divided the total mass of the properties in proportion to the duration of each partnership. Thus the second conjugal partnership had 46/64 of the total mass of properties and the first 18/64. Of these Nicolas is entitled to half; 32/64. Dorotea and her heirs are entitled to 23/64 while Rosa Villasfers share would be 9/64. Each of the kids of the first marriage are entitled to 142/1664 of the entire estate while the children of the second marriage are entitled to 64/1664 of the all the properties.
Marin
150 332
Lim v. Garcia
FACTS: Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903. The trial court ruled that the entire estate had been conjugal property except a house and a sum of 10,000 pesos. The children of the deceased filed an appeal against the widow to reverse the decision. ISSUE: WoN the estate was really conjugal property considering that the widow brought nothing to the conjugal partnership as it was alleged?
HELD: Yes, the properties are conjugal. It is presumed that all the estate of the married couple will be considered conjugal partnership property unless proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband and wife. The buildings in question were constructed out of partnership funds - the building erected during the coverture on land belonging to one of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property.
Nuez
151 332
Rodriguez v. De La Cruz
G.R. No. L- 3629 FACTS: Matea Rodriguez (plaintiff) filed a complaint in the CFI Albay against the children of her husband from his first marriage (defendants) for the purpose of recovering certain parcels of lands. Plaintiff claims that: 1. She acquired said lands during her first marriage from her deceased father 2. She had permission from Hilarion to commence this action in her own name against his children 3. Hilarion had been administering said lands during the entire period of his marriage to her. However, CFI Albay dismissed the case in favor Hilarions children through his first marriage and found from evidence during trials, that said lands described were acquired by Hilarion during his marriage to his first wife, one Andrea de Leon and that said lands were not acquired by plaintiff from her father. The lands in question were granted to the children of Hilarion from his first marriage. Rodriguez appealed to the SC. ISSUES AND RULINGS: (1) WON Hilarion was the owner of said lands since he had been administering the lands in question during the entire period of his marriage to Matea. NO. There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from administering the property of his wife. Just because he has been administering it for a long time doesnt mean it is his. The mere fact that she had permitted her husband to administer her property (even without delivering the same to her husband by means of a public document1) does not mean that she has forfeited the same in favor of her husband. (2) WON the CFI Albay err in finding that Hilarion acquired the land in question during his marriage to Andrea de Leon? YES. SC examined the evidence adduced during the lower court trials and found that the lands in question were acquired by Matea from her deceased father through inheritance. Cause remanded to the lower court with direction that a judgment be entered declaring that the said plaintiff is the owner.
Ordoyo
152 332
PBT Co. v. Register of Deeds

May 5, 1934 ll Moran, J. PETITIONER - APPELLANT: Peoples Bank and Trust Co., RESPONDENT-APPELLEE: The Register of Deeds for the City of Manila, DOCTRINE: To the wife belongs the management of the fruits of her paraphernal property, which has not been delivered to her husband under the formalities prescribed by the law, while such fruits remain unliquidated, on the ground that they answer for the necessary and indispensable expenses incurred in the administration and preservation of the property FACTS: Domina Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval from whom she lives separate and apart, executed an instrument in favor of Peoples Bank and Trust Company where she conveyed in trust her paraphernal property consisting of three parcels of land with two buildings thereof. Trust was constituted in order that lots would be subdivided and sold and that trustee would collect the rents to be derived from the property. Registration for the instrument was denied upon presentation at the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila. Petitioner brought the matter in consulta before the Court of First Instance but the registration was still denied. CFI held that instrument was null and void because it lacked the consent of the husband given that such fruits were considered conjugal partnership property, management of which corresponds to the husband. ISSUE: WON wife may authorize in trust the collection of fruits of her paraphernal property HELD: YES. Article 1387 of the Civil Code says that the fruits of the paraphernal property, which are conveyed in trust, belong to the conjugal partnership, management of which belongs to the husband of the grantor. However, according to the deed of trust, the grantor neither parts with nor conveys the rent of her paraphernal property. Trust instrument merely authorized Peoples Bank and Trust Company to collect rent of paraphernal property. Such act was merely an act of administration of the paraphernal property which the wife has yet to deliver to her husband for purpose of conferring management upon him. Applying the doctrine aforementioned, the grantors husband cannot claim the fruits in question for their conjugal partnership until a liquidation thereof has been made by her. Husband only acquires the right to claim the fruits for the conjugal partnership upon the liquidation by the wife. Failure to comply with the requisite prescribed in article 1387 (consent of husband) merely renders the contract voidable, right of action exclusively belonging to husband or his heirs. Decision reversed, Register of Deeds for the city of Manila ordered to register instrument in question
Manresas commentaries were cited, which according to Court, supported their ruling - The management of paraphernal property conferred upon the wife by article 1384 of the CC carries with it the power to enter into contracts regarding the same, subject only to the limitation contained in article 1387, the wife personally defraying the expenses incurred therein as a consequence, without prejudice to the liabilities to which such property is subject, in accordance with the provisions of article 1385 (November, 1898) - Management of the paraphernal property by the wife should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of article 1384 of the CC, which only differs from the former law in that for such acts and contracts executed in connection with said management the wife does not need marital consent (October 1918) - Prohibition in article 1387 must be construed in a restrictive manner; the wife may legally perform every act not intended to alienate, mortgage or otherwise encumber her paraphernal property, she being authorized to execute contracts arising from the administration of an estate, and consequently to
Pagdanganan
153 332
PBT Co. v. Register of Deeds

May 5, 1934 ll Moran, J.
obtain loans, without marital consent, for the benefit of said property (January, 1928)
Pagdanganan
154 332
Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat

FACTS: Poizat was given general power of attorney, which authorized him to enter transactions in the name of his wife. Poizat obtained loan from PSED (plaintiffs). To secure this loan, he mortgaged properties of his wife. However, he failed to pay this loan and the properties he mortgaged were foreclosed and sold to PSED. Wife questioned sale to PSED, contending that her husband executed mortgage illegally and was not authorized. (Poizat signed mortgage in his own name, not in as the attorney-in-fact) Trial court ruled against wife. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON the mortgage executed by Poizat and the subsequent sale of properties to PSED was valid HELD: No. Poizat signed the contract in his own name. Evidence suggested that he executed the contract as a personal act, not as attorney-in-fact of his wife. Properties sold were paraphernal / exclusive to wife before and during the marriage. Hence, it could only be mortgaged if executed in the wifes name, place, or stead. Although Poizat was given general power of attorney, the law specifies how and in what manner he should have executed the mortgage Art. 1713 in the CC provides that: In order to compromise, alienate, mortgage, or to execute any other act of strict ownership, an express power is required. In this case, by signing the mortgage in his own name, Poizat did not exercise the express power granted to him by his wife. Because of this, the mortgage and sale of the properties to PSED were declared NULL and VOID. RTC ruling reversed. Dissenting opinion of Villa-Real: Upon signing and conveying power of attorney, such an act was tantamount to giving husband authority to encumber property.
Poblador
155 332
Castro v. Miat
TOPIC: Exclusive Property HELD: No. The property involved is part of the conjugal properties of the spouses because it was acquired during the marriage. CC provisions apply in this case. FACTS: Moises and Condordia acquired 2 parcels of land during their marriage. Then Concordia died. The balance for the Paco property was paid for after her death, and the property was registered under Moises' name. The 2 properties were promised to their sons, however, Moises asked his sons if he could keep one of the properties, and they agreed. The same was witnessed by other family members. In the end, Moises handed the owner's duplicate of the Paco property title to Romeo. The 2 sons (Romeo and Alexander) shared the Paco property. Alexander sold his half to his brother (who gave him 6k as downpayment). Later, Romeo found out that their father mortgaged the property for 30k to the Castros. ISSUES: 1. WON the Paco property was conjugal or capital 2. WON there was a valid oral partition covering said property 3. WON the Castro spouses were buyers in bad faith HELD: (1) The Paco property is conjugal. The same was acquired during the marriage even though the balance for it was only paid for after the death of Concordia. Since the couple was married before the FC, the CC applies. According to Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code: Art. 153(1) The following property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; Also, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that: all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 1 (2) Yes. The oral partition is valid. The court relied on Moises' letter to Romeo which stated, "ANG BAHAY AY PARA SA INYONG DALAWA, LALO NA NGAYONG MAY ASAWA NA KAYONG PAREHO." and on Moises' Bro's testimony that before Concordia died, there was an agreement that the Paraaque property would go to Moises while the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila for good, the agreement was affirmed in front of the extended Miat family members. Also, Alexander accepted his brother's downpayment for his share of the land. The Court also pointed out that the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code doesn't apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. (3) No, they are not buyers in good faith. Petitioner Virgilio Castro admitted in his testimony that Romeo told him that Moises had given the Paco property to them. Castro knew that Moises had no right to sell the property belonging to his son.
are
conjugal
partnership
Quiambao
156 332
Jocson v. CA
As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. FACTS: Emilio Jocson was married to Alejandra Poblete, who had two surviving children, Moises and Agustina. There are three documents by sale to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez that covers almost all of Emilios properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Moises Jocson assails the documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents. These documents of sale are: Six (6) parcels of land, all located at Naic, Cavite, for the sum of P10,000.00 pesos Two rice mills and a camarin for P5,000 pesos Extrajudicial partition of the unsettled estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the same into three parts, one-third (1/3) each for the heirs of the wife, wherein Emilio sold his share to Agustina for P8,000 pesos. Moises claimed that the properties mentioned, except the extrajudicial partition are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. (This is the main contention of Moises pertinent to our class)
ISSUE: WON conjugal
the
properties
are
considered
HELD: NO Moises invoked Art 160 of the CC which state: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts The certificates of title show that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio.
Quilala
157 332
Francisco v. CA
DOCTRINES: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. > Burden of proving that property is exclusive or conjugal rests upon the party asserting it. > Names in titles or in deeds are just indications do not automatically rebut the above presumption. FACTS: Teresita Francisco alleges that since her marriage on February 10, 1962 with Eusebio, she and her husband have acquired the following: (1) A sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house, (2) A house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. She further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. She also claims that his children his first marriage succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista (daughter) to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal. On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. However, trial court eventually favored the respondents for it found that the Teresita failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer them. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUES: WON said properties were part of their conjugal property HELD: NO, it was not a part of their conjugal property. Petitioner lacks merit. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148 of the New Civil Code. Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation (hence, it is still a separate property even if obtained during marriage).
Ramos
158 332
Francisco v. CA
As regards the house, apartment and sarisari store, private respondents aver that these properties were either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone. However, the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not.
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco. The fact that the land was registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. The phrase married to preceding Teresita Francisco is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco.
Ramos
159 332
Dewara v. Alvero
DOCTRINES: 1. There is a presumption of the conjugal nature of property and thus the burden of proof rests on the party asserting otherwise. (From Art 116 FC) 2. If one of the spouses has no exclusive property incurs fines and indemnities, the responsibilities enumerated in Art 161 of the CC must be first accomplished before fines and indemnities can be charged to the conjugal partnership. (From Art 163 CC) FACTS: Eduardo and Elenita Dewara were married before the enactment of the FC. Ed hit Ronnie Lamela while driving a private jeep. Ed has no property in his name to pay for the civil indemnity he incurred. Lamela asked to levy a certain lot in the name of Elenita to pay for the indemnity. Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of the lot was illegal because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. Respondent spouses contend that the lot was conjugal property of the petitioners. The RTC gave credence to Elenitas account that it was sold to her by her father and aunt in order to help her build capital. RTC ruled that it was in essence, a gratuitous donation and therefore it was paraphernal property that could not be used to pay for Eduardos civil liability. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership of gains and might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities adjudged against Eduardo. Hence this petition. ISSUE: The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo. (The answer to this question will define whether the property may be subject to levy and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in the criminal case for serious physical injuries, which judgment had already attained finality.) HELD: The lot retains its conjugal nature. The Court said that the lot was acquired during their marriage and that their marriage was governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. Elenita was not able to convince the Court that its selling price was so inadequate to consider it as a donation. There is a presumption of the conjugal nature of property and thus the burden of proof rests on the party asserting otherwise. The responsibilities enumerated in Art 161 of the CC must be first accomplished before Ronnie can be compensated, as provided by Art 163. Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both the husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course. Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage
Reposar
160 332
Dewara v. Alvero
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, and that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes abovementioned. Art 116 FC All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Reposar
161 332
Zulueta v. Pan Am
G.R. No. 28589 ll Jan. 8, 1973 ll Concepcion, C.J. FACTS: Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard defendants plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about 30 minutes. Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked 200 yards away. Upon returning he told an employee of the defendant that they almost made him miss the flight because of a defective announcing system. He had a discussion with either the plan captain or the terminal manager. He was told that they would open his bags which here fused and he warned them of the consequences. Just the same they opened his bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and he was able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after two days. This action was to recover damages from the defendant. ISSUE: WON moral damages may be recovered. HELD: The records amply establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral and exemplary damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the ramp (What in the hell do you think you are? Get on that plane); the menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags (open your bag, and when told that a fourth bag was missing, I dont give a damn); the abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one of PAN AMs employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta remarked, will you pull these three monkeys out of here?); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by men in uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with Sitton; the airline officials refusal to allow plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and highhanded decision to leave him in Wake; Mrs. Zuluetas having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of PAN AMs employees; Mrs. Zulueta having suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received by her parents at the airport all these justify an award for moral damages resulting from mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation thereby suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00attorneys fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.
Reyes, G.
162 332
Mendoza v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-31618 ll Aug. 17, 1983 Doctrine: Art 177: CP property - those acquired by onerous title at the expense of common fund Properties acquired during marriage are presumed to be conjugal in character. o This is not destroyed by the fact that the registration of the property is in the name of only one of the spouses. FACTS: Ponciano filed a complaint with CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the deed of sale of two parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife, Julia as vendor and the Mendozas as vendees o He averred that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent The properties in question were bought on an installment basis from Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (representative of J. M. Tuason & Co.). The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the installments due to lack of money so they had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) to pay the balance of the properties in question. In the deed of absolute sale executed by Araneta, the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signature appears over the caption 'vendee' and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent.' o The Transfer Certificates of Title were thus issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in the name of 'JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES.' The mortgage contracts executed by the spouses in favor of the RFC were duly registered and annotated on the back of the said TCTs. As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a house and later a camarin on the two lots which was leased as a school building for 2 years. And when the school was transferred to another place, the camarin was leased on December 10, 1952 to Mr. and Mrs. Mendoza for 10 years. The contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano. o In spite of the good rentals they had been receiving for the building, the spouses failed to pay their obligations to the RFC so they had to ask for an extension of 5 years from DBP, as the successor of the RFC. On March 3, 1961, the Reyes spouses were already living separately and were not in speaking terms; while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question, together with their improvements to the Mendozas without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. By virtue of such sale, TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the Mendozas. o Hence, Ponciano filed a case for the annulment of the deed of sale as mentioned earlier. CFI dismissed the complaint and declared the properties in question as exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia, thus she can validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the Mendozas are innocent purchasers. CA reversed the decision. Thus, the petitioners filed separate petitions for review on certiorari.
ISSUES AND RDs: WON the properties involved are indeed conjugal in character, hence the deed of sale executed by Julia is rightfully voided by the CA with respect to the share of Ponciano o YES. o The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which provides: "ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: "(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
Reyes, N.
163 332
Mendoza v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-31618 ll Aug. 17, 1983 acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;" o The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must be overcome by one who contends that the disputed property is paraphernal. "ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." As stated in a precedent, "it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property." o The disputed properties were acquired by onerous title during the marriage, and the funds used to buy the land and to build the improvements thereon came from the loans obtained by the spouses from RFC. To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal character of the property, the petitioners have only the testimony of Julia de Reyes to offer. But her claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the ITRs where she made it to appear that the properties in question are conjugal assets of the partnership. Also, she made a statement that the rentals paid by her coappellees were income of the conjugal partnership. WON the doctrine of estoppel applies in this case o NO. o It is mentioned that in another case which is filed against Mr. Reyes, he stated defenses that he and his wife never had any kind of fund which could be called conjugal partnership funds, that they acted independently from one another whenever either one engaged in any business. o Estoppel can only be invoked between the person making the misrepresentation and the person to whom it was addressed. It is essential that the latter shall have relied upon the misrepresentation and had been influenced and misled thereby. The alleged misrepresentation was never addressed to the petitioners, much less made with the intention that they would act upon it. WON the petitioners acted in bad faith o YES. o On cross-examination, Mrs. Mendoza admitted that she learned of the RFC mortgage when the lots were about to be purchased. o Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. o The Mendozas demanded the consent of Ponciano on the mere lease of the properties allegedly for their protection, yet on the actual sale where there is a transfer of greater rights they have not required such consent. WON there is an unjust enrichment of Ponciano if the deed of sale is nullified o NO. Mr. Reyes did not receive any part of the proceeds of the sale and his wife has been aligning herself with the Mendoza couple.
Reyes, N.
164 332
Castillo v. Pasco
G.R. No. L-16857 ll May 29, 1964 PROVISION: Art 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer/s if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner/s upon liquidation of the partnership. PETITION: Review and reversal of the decision of CA declaring the fishpond in San Roque as the exclusive paraphernal property of Macaria Pasco. RULING: CA decision revoked and set aside, case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. FACTS: Macaria Pasco is married to Marcelo Castillo, Sr. During the marriage, Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales executed a deed of sale to the spouses for the fishpond in question. The fishpond was payable in three installments: P1000 upon the execution of the deed. This installment was paid from Pascos own account. P2000 paid with the proceeds of the loan from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, who later assigned his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco. P3000 paid from a loan secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in the name of Macaria Pasco. ISSUE: WON the 2nd and 3rd payment came from the CPG HELD: Yes, the loans become obligations of the CPG. Using the ruling in Palanca v. Smith Bell that if money borrowed by the husband alone on the security of his wifes property is conjugal in character, a fortiori should it be conjugal when borrowed by both spouses. The reason obviously is that the loan becomes an obligation of the conjugal partnership which is the one primarily bound for its repayment. Deeds show that the loans indicate that Castillo, Sr. and Pasco are joint borrowers of the Jacinto and Gonzales loans. The loans thus became obligations of the conjugal partnership of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned is logically conjugal property. Since the fishpond is undivided property of Pasco and the conjugal partnership with Castillo, Sr. his heirs are entitled to ask for its partition and liquidation. The ultimate interest of each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into account: a) Pascos 1/6 direct share b) Her half of the community property c) Her successional rights to a part of Castillo, Sr.s share pursuant to the governing law of succession when he died d) Her right to reimbursement for any amount advance by her in paying the mortgage debt.
Sevilla
165 332
Lorenzo v. Nicolas
FACTS: Lorenzo and Clemente got married Lorenzos children (petitioners) v. Clementes grandchildren (respondent) Petitioners claim that the 2 lands are conjugal properties and cannot be sold to the respondents. Lot 6: she paid P169.16 before her marriage to Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable in installment Lot 5: she paid P116.84 before her marriage with Manuel. The P850.32 balance was payable by installment of P52.32 on the 1 and P42 on each succeeding year. ISSUE: WON 2 lots are conjugal properties HELD: NO. The fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the lifetime of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of Magdalena Clemente and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel No. 6 was made in her name in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive shows that the two parcels of land belonged to Magdalena Clemente. But since the installments were paid during the marriage, they are deemed conjugal there being no evidence that they were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to Magdalena, such amounts should be reimbursed to the CPG. Property bought by either spouse installment before the marriage and was fully paid only after the marriage but ownership had vested on the buyer-spouse before the marriage is separate property of the buyerspouse, although the installments paid by the conjugal partnership during the marriage must be reimbursed to it after liquidation. (SempioDiy)
Tan de Guzman
166 332
Calimlim Canulas v. Fortun

G.R. No. L-57499 ll Jun. 22, 1984 NOTE: This case was decided in 1984, under the Civil Code and without the Family Code. FACTS: Respondent husband owned a land by inheritance, on which land the residential house of his family was built. Husband eventually abandoned wife for concubine. Husband sold land and house to concubine. ISSUES, HOLDING, RATIO WON construction of conjugal house on the husbands land made the land conjugal property YES. Both the land and the house become conjugal property upon construction. HOWEVER, the CPG is indebted to the husband, as a creditor, for the value of the land. CC Art 158 par 2 read: Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. (Example: Land was P2,000, house was P10,000. At liquidation of CPG, P2,000 will be returned to the landowner.) Such was also the holding in Padilla v Paterno: The conversion from paraphernal to conjugal property of the land and house shall retroact to the time the conjugal house was built. The conversion cannot happen upon liquidation, because the CPG no longer exists by then. THEREFORE: Husband could not have sold both house and land because both are conjugal property. WON sale of house and land to concubine was valid NO. First, the contract was contrary to morals and public policy. Sale being made by husband in favour of a concubine after the husband abandoned his family, such sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution protected by public policy. CC Arts 1409 and 1352 read: Art 1409. ...contracts whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning. Art 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Further, as in donations inter vivos, sales between persons living as husband and wife are void. WHEREFORE: Sale of house and land is null and void.
Ordoyo
167 332
DBP v. Adil
May 11, 1989 DOCTRINE: (1) Those who have the right to alienate property can be waived or renounced* the right to prescription but not the right to prescribe in the future. (Art. 1112 CC) (2) Under Art 165 CC, the husband is the administrator of CPG. All debts contracted by him for the benefit of the CPG are chargeable to the partnership. FACTS: Defendant spouses Patricio Confessor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan (P2,000) from Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now DBP) to be paid in ten equal yearly amortizations. However, they failed to pay the first time so the husband executed another promissory note to pay the outstanding balance, otherwise, the foreclosure of the mortgage. But the spouses did not pay the obligation so DBP went to CFI Iloilo. ISSUE: 1. WON prescription can be waived or renounced 2. WON Confessor can bind the conjugal partnership HELD: (1) Yes, as stated in Art 1112 CC. Prescription has set in the failure to pay the first promissory note. But upon the second promissory note, he expressly renounced and waived his right to prescription of the action covering the first promissory note. Its condition is the pre-existing obligation under the first note. (2) Yes the conjugal partnership is liable for his obligation. (Art 165 explanation above)
Tiangco
168 332
Luzon Surety v. De Garcia

G.R. No. L-25659 ll Oct. 31, 1969 ll Fernando, J. PETITIONER: Luzon Surety Co., Inc. RESPONDENTS: Josefa Aguirre de Garcia, Vicente Garcia and the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals DOCTRINES: (1) Article 121 of the FC (Art. 161 of the NCC): The conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administratorspouse, by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other, as long as it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There is no there is no showing of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the Garcia spouses from the signing of the husband as guarantor. (2) Article 122 of the FC (Art. 163 of the NCC): The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband (or wife before or) during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redound to the benefit of the family. The husband, in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement, did not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. NATURE OF PETITION: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower court that the conjugal partnership could not be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband since there was no benefits that accrued to the conjugal partnership. FACTS: The husband, Vicente Garcia signed an indemnity agreement, as one of the guarantors in a surety bond of Ladislao Chavez and the petitioner in this case in favor of Philippine National Bank (PNB) to guarantee a crop loan, wherein he bound himself, jointly and severally, to indemnify petitioner charges and expenses of whatsoever kind that the petitioner might incur at any time as guarantor of the said bond. It also included the payment of interest fees and litigation fees. Philippine National Bank filed a complaint against Chavez and herein petitioner with PNB asking to be paid a certain amount. In the decision of the court, siding with the bank, it also ordered the third party defendants, including Garcia, to pay the petitioner the amount it needed to pay PNB. The CFI of Negros Occidental then issued a writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the monetary claim of the petitioner. A writ of garnishment was also issued by the Provincial Sheriff levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcias, from their sugar plantation, registered in the names of both. Respondent-spouses then filed in the CFI against the Provincial Sheriff to enjoin such from selling the sugar allegedly owned by their conjugal partnership. The lower court ruled in their favor, and so did the CA. Petitioner correspondingly filed this present petition. ISSUES: (1) WON a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing benefits received, could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company. NO. RATIO: (1) SC ruled that the CA adjudicated the matter in accordance with law. They affirmed the decision of the CA and of the trial court. Even though the husband was the designated administrator of their properties, the only obligations that he incurred that can be charged upon the conjugal partnership are those that promote the advancement of his profession or career with the belief that it can accrue benefits to the family. This is not true in the case at hand since the act of Vicente in signing as a guarantor was not for the benefit of the family. No proof was shown that he
Yumol
169 332
Luzon Surety v. De Garcia

G.R. No. L-25659 ll Oct. 31, 1969 ll Fernando, J. received compensation of any sort when he agreed to sign as guarantor. It was raised that the act of signing as guarantor gave Vicente the image that he can be trusted, adding to his reputation and esteem, and this could benefit him in such a way that it will be easier for him to secure money which he can use for his family. The SC said that although this claim was not without basis, it lacked conviction. It still held that this obligation incurred by the husband was not for the benefit of the family. As a matter of fact, it was for the benefit of a third party, Ladislao Chavez. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of December 17, 1965, now under review, is affirmed with costs against the petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc. Separate Opinion: In Reyes concurring opinion, he adds that it is not a requirement that the actual charges or obligations must accrue to the conjugal partnership from the husbands transactions; it suffices that the transaction should be one that would normally produce such benefit for the partnership.
Yumol
170 332
Ayala Investment v. CA
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills obtained loan from Ayala Investment, and Husband-Ching, VP of PBM, executed acted as surety for loan. PBM failed to pay loan; AIDC filed case against PBM and Alfredo-Ching to pay loan, with interest. Court of First Instance, Pasig, held that accord. to Art. 121 of the Family Code: Conjugal Partnership shall be liable for (2) all debts and obligations contracted during marriages by administrator spouse for benefit of the family. for benefit of the family does NOT include husband acting as surety for a corporate loan AIDC may NOT enforce payment of loan against spouses-Chings CPG Court of Appeals: upheld CFI ruling AIDC filed for appeal ISSUE: W/N Husband-Ching, acting as surety for PBM, falls under the for the benefit of the family condition that makes CPG liable for the loan/debt to AIDC HELD: NO. Supreme Court upholds decision of the CA and CFI in ruling that the CPG is not liable for the PBM debt. Art. 121 of Family Code: CPG liable for debts and obligations contracted during marriage by administrator spouse for benefit of the family. Payment of personal debts contracted by husband/wife before/during marriage shall NOT be charged to CPG except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. In order for CPG to be liable, the debt incurred by husband as administrator of CPG must be incurred with the husband as the principal obligor (i.e. directly received money/services for his business or professions; no benefits need to be proven, so long as the family may stand to benefit from the loan that husband contracts on behalf of the family business) In case at bar: husband, as VP of PBM, only acts as SURETY OR GUARANTOR, thus contract is not categorized as falling within the category of benefit of the family; the husband did NOT contract obligation for family business; he acted as SURETY for LOAN contracted by a THIRD PARTY of which he was an EMPLOYEE (i.e. PBM is third party, husband, as VP, is employee of PBM) Debt was clearly a corporate debt; CPG should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was for the benefit of a third party (PBM) and not the Ching-Family For the debt to be in benefit of the family and for CPG to be liable, the family must directly benefit from the use of the loan In the case at bar: the corporate loan was extended to PBM and used by PBM, not by Husband-Ching or the Ching-family, whose benefits are only incidental because the husband is an employee of PBM Loan is CORPORATE, NOT personal: it is not an exercise of industry or profession or act of administration for the benefit of the family
Art. 122 of FC:
Alampay
171 332
Carlos v. Abelardo
G.R. No. 146504 ll Apr. 9, 2002 TOPIC: Charges upon the CPG [FC Art. 121 (2)(3)] Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for th e unpaid balance with their separate properties. QUICK GUIDE: Petitioner issued US$25,000 as a loan to his daughter and son-in-law for the spouses conjugal home [house and lot]. The loan is liability of CPG even if the husband denies giving consent by not signing the acknowledgement executed by his wife to such because the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. FACTS: Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. The petitioner tried to collect the money but was met w/ threats so he made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. . Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign. [Spouses separated in fact for more than 1 year] ISSUE: WON the spouses CPG is liable for the said loan HELD: Yes, undisputed is the fact that they used the money to buy a house and lot which served as their conjugal home. Even though it was only the wife who executed the instrument of acknowledgment of accountability which the husband refused to sign, CPG is still liable for the loan since such redounded to the benefit of the family. Defendant-husband and defendantwife are jointly [CPG] and severally [in case of insufficiency of CPG] liable in the payment of the loan. MINOR ISSUE: Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Bayona
172 332
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman

G.R. No. 160347 ll Nov. 29, 2006 ll Chico-Nazario, J. PETITIONERS: Arcadio and Luisa Carandang RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Quirino A. De Guzman MAIN DOCTRINE: An obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors FACTS: Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System. Spouses Carandang subscribed to increases made in MBSs capital stock, which subscriptions, de Guzman claims to have been partially paid by him. Thus, de Guzman sent a demand letter to the spouses for the payment of said total amount. However, the latter refused to pay, contending that a preincorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration of Carandangs technical expertise, newly purchased equipment, and skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment. This led de Guzman to file a complaint against the spouses, seeking recovery of the amount allegedly paid by him. The trial court and the CA both ruled in de Guzmans favour, prompting the spouses to file this petition. In particular, both courts declared that the debt to de Guzman should be paid by the spouses jointly and severally (note: this is the same as a SOLIDARY obligation). ISSUES: WON the liability of the spouses Carandang is joint and solidary RULING: The Court affirmed the RTC and CAs judgment but modified it by saying that the spouses should pay the amounts they owe de Guzman from their conjugal partnership properties RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. It is apparent from the facts of the case that the spouses Carandang were married way before the effectivity of the Family Code; hence, their property regime is conjugal partnership under the Civil Code. It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors. Hence, either of them may be sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary liability, although the amount is chargeable against their conjugal partnership property.
Cadorna
173 332
Ros v. PNB
G.R. No. 170166 ll Apr. 6, 2011 Husband obtained loan from PNB and mortgaged land by forging wifes signature. Contract VALID because H cannot come to court with unclean hands and loan was automatically assumed to have benefited the family because it was obtained for family business. FACTS Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB Laoag on Oct. 14, 1974 and mortgaged a parcel of land as security. PNB foreclosed on the property and bought it in an auction. The land was then registered in the name of PNB in 1978. Aguete claimed that she had no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband without her consent and filed to annul the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property, alleging that her signatures were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. ISSUES 1. WON the wife did not consent to the mortgage executed by the husband, thereby making the contract void. 2. WON the loan from PNB redounded to the conjugal partnership HELD & RD: 1. NO. The Court held that the Civil Code was in effect at the time of the mortgage, thus the property is considered part of the CPG. Art. 173 of the CC (The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property) does not guarantee that Courts will declare annulment of contract, but rather only upon a finding that the wife did not give consent. It was not sufficiently proven that the signature was forged. Also, the documents were notarized, therefore they are public documents that has in their favor presumption of regularity. Ros admitted in the complaint that he had forged his wifes signature. If he were alive at the time of the decision he would have been prosecuted for forgery. By this admission, he cannot bring the action against PNB because he needed to come to court with clean hands. 2. YES. The Court ruled that the benefit to the family was apparent at the signing of the contract, which application included for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & Virginia tobacco. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Petition denied.
Cristobal
174 332
Tinitigan v. Tinitigan
Oct. 30, 1980 FACTS: Teofista Payumo Tinitigan leased a residential house in Pasay to copetitioner Pentel Co. without permission from her husband, Severino Tinitigan Sr., who filed a complaint before Rizal CFI Branch II. He later sought, and was given, court approval to sell the Pasay property to Quintin Lim, general manager of Pentel Co. The wife filed a petition for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership in another court, which appointed her administrator of the conjugal properties subject to conditions (one of them being that the disposition of the Pasay property is subject to the decision of CFI Branch II. Meanwhile, the husband sold the Pasay property not to Lim, but to Chiu Chin Siong. The wife protested but was denied because he supposedly has the right under Art. 171 CC, further justified because it will relieve the conjugal properties from foreclosure due to mortgage obligations. She brought the case to the CA but it affirmed the assailed decision, hence the petition. ISSUES: - WON the husband was the administrator of the conjugal partnership - WON the sale was valid. HELD: Yes. As a general rule, Art. 165 NCC makes the husband the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Exceptions are in Art. 168, where the wife may administer only by the husbands express authority in a public instrument. Other provisions may make the wife administrator by judicial decree. This does not apply since the decree giving her administration was issued after the CFI already authorized the sale, and because the decree was subject to certain conditions, particularly the sale of the Pasay property. Yes. Art. 166 NCC states that, while the husband as administrator cannot alienate or encumber property w/o wifes consent (unless she is declared non compos mentis, a spendthrift, or under civil interdiction), the court may compel her if she unreasonably refuses to give consent, hence the husbands seeking of judicial approval in the sale. Even so, Art. 171 NCC allows the husband to dispose of the conjugal partnership to fulfill the obligations in Art. 1612 pertaining to debts and obligations contracted by either spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. This does not require the wifes consent and it is implied that judicial intervention is not necessary. The wife didnt deny these great conjugal liabilities the danger of foreclosure of many of their conjugal properties.
Dantes
175 332
Guiang v. CA
G.R. No. 125172 ll Panganiban, J. DOCTRINE: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. FACTS: The wife went to Manila. The husband sold half of the conjugal property without her consent. When she came back, she found her children living in separate households, so she gathered them and they lived in the house the husband sold. The buyers sued her for trespassing. They later made an amicable settlement, which is still pending in the RTC. The wife sought for the declaration of the dead of sale as null and void because it was sold without her consent. The buyers contend that the contract was merely voidable, and that it was ratified by the wife when she entered into an amicable settlement. ISSUES: WON the deed of sale is void or voidable given that the Conjugal Property was sold without the wifes consent WON the amicable settlement ratified the contract. HOLDING & RATIO: Deed of sale is VOID. Void contracts cannot be ratified. Art 124 FC was correctly applied by the lower court because wifes consent was absent. Art 1390 CC does not apply because there was no mistake, violence, intimidation or undue influence that vitiated the wifes consent; the consent was completely absent. The amicable settlement cannot ratify a void contract. Citing Art 1422 CC, A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract is also void and inexistent.
De Castro
176 332
Relucio v. Lopez
G.R. No. 138497 ll Jan. 16, 2001 ll Pardo, J. PETITIONER: Imelda Relucio RESPONDENT: Angelina Mejia Lopez DOCTRINE: 3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do not have cause of action when one spouse petitions for appointment as the sole administrator of the properties. FACTS: In 1968, Husband left Wife and 4 legitimate children He arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties Spent and used for sole gain and benefit and excluded the wife and children VALID during that time, as husband was sole admin In 1976, Husband got into an illicit relationship and cohabited with the Petitioner/Paramour Started to build up a fortune consisting of stockholdings in Lopez- owned or controlled corporations, and other properties (buildings, vehicles, lots, jewelry, etc.) o Came from actual contribution of properties and money (which were conjugal) of Husband o Concealed these from the original family, entered into using his name or his paramours name or both o In 1993, Petition of Wife to be sole administratix of properties, forfeiture, etc. against husband and petitioner o A motion to dismiss the petition filed by Petitioner on the ground that wife has no action against her DENIED: as she was impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the properties were registered in her name. ISSUES: 1. WON wifes petition for appointment as sole administratix establish a cause of action against petitioner 2. WON petitioners inclusion as party is essential to the proceedings HELD: 1. NO o A cause of action is an act or omission of one party (defendant) in violation of the legal right of the other (plaintiff). o Elements: A right in favour of the plaintiff An obligation on the part of the defendant An act/omission on the part of defendant that violated the rights of the plaintiff / breach of obligation that gives rise to an action for recovery of damages o The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against the husband Cause of action arises only between the husband and the wife who have rights and obligations to each other. o Petitioner is a complete stranger to the marriage and to the cause of action Administration is between the married couple only o Wifes petition for forfeiture is on the share of the husbands share of the properties co-owned by him and petitioner It does not involve the issue of validity of the co- ownership o Seeking of support by wife is from the husband, also not from the stranger 2. NO o An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action o A real party in interest is an indispensable party, who stands to be benefited/injured by the judgement of the suit Since petitioner would not be affected in any way, she is not a real party in interest, and is not an indispensable party to the suit.
Dilag
177 332
Jader Manalo v. Camaisa

DOCTRINE: Being merely aware of a transaction is NOT tantamount to consent. Court authorization is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who did not give consent is incapacitated. FACTS: Negotiations ensued between the husband and the interested buyer of 4 parcels of land (Makati and Taytay) in the wifes presence but eventually wife refused to sign the contracts of sale. Already drafted a Contract to Sell all that is lacking is the actual contract signing Buyer already paid the downpayment in check subsequently returned by the husband NATURE OF THE CASE: Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages ISSUES: - W/N sale of CPG without wifes written consent is valid? NO - W/N court authorization is warranted? NO RATIO: The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. The wife admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that the wife actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, the buyer herself admits that the wife refused to sign the contracts to sell. The wife may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. The buyer argues that since the wife unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted. In here, the court ruled that the argument is bereft of merit. The buyer is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought. PETITION IS DENIED.
Dolot
178 332
Villanueva v. Chiong
G.R. No. 159889 ll Jun. 5, 2008 ll Quisumbing, J. PETITIONERS: WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA RESPONDENTS: FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG DOCTRINE: Sale of conjugal property without consent of other spouse when marriage governed by CC is only voidable, not void ab initio. FACTS: Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married in 1960, but were already separated in fact in 1975. During their marriage they acquired a lot, which Florentino sold the one-half western portion to the Petitioners for 8,000 Pesos, payable in instalments. When they finally paid in full, they demanded for the deed of sale. Elisera, however, refused to sign the deed. Elisera filed for Quieting of Titles at the RTC, while Florentino executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favour of the petitioners. RTC ruled in favour of Elisera, and declared the sale null and void. ISSUES: 1. WoN the subject lot is part of the exclusive property of Florentino; 2. WoN the sale of land was valid. HELD: No. Petitioners claim that it is exclusive property because the Chiongs were already separated in fact. This cannot be, because the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval does not affect the conjugal partnership. Elisera both showed the certificate of title and a real property tax declaration showing that it was part of their conjugal property, and Florentino also admitted the conjugal nature of the lot. Yes. It is not void ab initio, but only voidable, because they were married before the Family Code and so governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, specifically Articles 1666 and 1737. Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed the civil case on 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. Petitioners finally contend that the transaction should not be entirely voided because Florentino is entitled to one-half share over the lot. This is also untenable, because the court has previously ruled in other cases that the alienation of the sale must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Petition denied, RTC decision affirmed with modificationpayment of interests deleted.
Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife s consent 7 The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Enad
179 332
Flores v. Lindo
G.R. No. 183984 ll Apr. 13, 2011 PETITIONER: Arturo Sarte Flores RESPONDENTS: Spouses Enrico L. Lindo, Jr. and Edna C. Lindo owner-spouses acceptance. The execution of DOCTRINE: the Special Power of Attorney by Enrico in When the power of administration is given Ednas favor perfected the contract as binding, to one spouse, this does not include the power making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage valid. to encumber or dispose of the property without written consent of the owner-spouse. However, if the owner-spouse gives his or her consent after such transaction, it shall be perfected as a binding contract.* FACTS: Edna Lindo borrowed P400,000 from Arturo Flores, and executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to secure the loan. The deed covered property in her name and her husbands, Enrico Lindo, Jr. She signed the deed, as well as a Promissory Note, for herself and her husband, as his attorney-in-fact. When she failed to pay the loan, Flores filed an action to foreclose the property. However, Edna alleged that Enrico had not been a party to the loan, because she had contracted it without his signature. The Regional Trial Court had ruled that petitioner was not entitled to foreclosure, upon finding that the Deed had been executed on 31 Oct. 1995, but the Special Power of Attorney by Enrico in his wifes favor was only dated 4 Nov. 1995. ISSUE: Whether Edna had validly mortgaged their property. RATIO: The Court held that she had. An administrator does not have the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the ownerspouses written consent, and any transaction done without the consent shall be void. However, paragraph 2 of Art. 1248 provides for the perfection of the contract upon the
8
As stated in FC Art. 124, paragraph 2: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization of the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Espaola
180 332
Go v. Go
FACTS: Jesus Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio Go Jr. 23 years later, 1999, he executed an affidavit of renunciation and waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Sr, not h, who had purchased the property On November 1987, Marta Go, wife of Sr and mother of petitioners died On December 1999, Protacio Sr and his son Rito sold a portion of the property to Ester Servacio On March 2001, petitioners demand the return of the property but Servacio refused to heed their demand Petitioners averred that following Protacio Jr's renunciation, property became conjugal property; and sale of property to Servacio w/o prior liquidation of the community property between Sr and Marta was null and void RTC declared property was conjugal property, because there were 3 vendors who were heirs of Marta (also, presumption of conjugal property) BUT affirmed the validity of the sale saying that as long as the portion sold will not be allotted to other heirs in the final partition of the property....as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate of other heirs, it is valid ISSUE: Must the subject property be liquidated first before being sold? HELD: Art 130 Family Code Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void Sr and Marta married prior to effectivity of Family Code= CPG Upon Marta's death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved (Art 175 civil code) and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio Sr and other heirs of Marta w/ respect to her share in the assets before liquidation Sr, although becoming co-owner w/ his children, could not yet assert or claim titile to any specific portion of Marta's share w/o an actual partition of property being done 1st either by judicial decree or agreement. Nonetheless, he had a right to sell his undivided share, but not the interest of his coowners--> the sale of Sr and Rito was not necessarily void, for their rights on the property were necessarily transferred, making Servacio a co- owner of Marta's share. To declare the sale entirely void would prejudice the rights of Servacio. Since no certain allotment for each heir was shown, appropriate course is to commence an action for judicial partition In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the coheirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. Petition denied. Ruling of RTC affirmed
Hermosisima
181 332
Garcia v. Manzano
DOCTRINE: In the system established by the Civil Code, the wife does not administer the CPG unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of court under its supervision. Legally, the wife cannot mismanage the conjugal partnership unless the husband tolerates it. FACTS: Plaintiff and respondent are husband and wife but they have been living separately from each other since 1948, all attempts at reconciliation between them having failed. As a result of their joint efforts, plaintiff and defendant acquired and accumulated real and personal properties. And upon the sepaRATIOn of the spouses, the defendant (wife) assumed the complete management and administRATIOn of the conjugal partnership properties. Husband alleged that his wife has been enjoying said property, as well as its fruits to the exclusion, has fictitiously transferred or alienated majority of said properties, has neglected to file any income tax returns and has failed to turn over his rightful share. As a result, petitioner prayed for 1) complete accounting of CPG and its fruits and that 2) his rightful share be given pursuant to law. Defendant filed to dismiss the petition on the ground of failure to state a cause of action under Article 191 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: 1) WON husband has cause of action under Article 191 of the NCC If none, WON he is entitled to some relief under the allegations of his complaints HELD: DISMISSED. Complaint is not under the provisions of Articles 190 and 191 of NCC and complaint does not establish a case for separation of property. RD: Article 191 cannot be availed by the husband where the administration of the CPG has been forcibly taken from him by his wife and she abuses the management thereof. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation and not in harmony with the unity of the family and mutual affection expected of the spouses, the old and new Civil Codes require that separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in 1) marriage settlements, 2) or by formal judicial decree during the existence of marriage (Art. 190, NCC) Under Article 191, the only grounds for separation of properties are 1) spouse has been sentenced to a penalty which carries civil interdiction 2) spouse has been declared absent or 3) when legal separation has been granted. This enumeration must be regarded as limitative, in view of the Codes restrictive policy. Article 167 of the CC grants cause of action exclusively to the wife in cases of mismanagement and maladministration by the husband (since CC grants administration of CPG to husband). In the system established by the Civil Code, the wife does not administer the CPG unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of court under its supervision. Legally, therefore, the wife cannot mismanage the CPG unless the husband or courts tolerate it. In the event of such maladministration by the wife, the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and assume administration of the community and the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal partnership. The articles above quoted contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife against the abuses of her husband because normally only the latter can commit such abuses.
Macariola
182 332
Partosa-Jo v. CA
Dec. 18, 1992 FACTS: Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo filed two cases against the respondent Jose Jo for judicial separation of property and for support. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. The holding of the lower court addressed the claim for support but did not make any explicit commentary with regard to the request for separation. Jose Jo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dispensation of support made by the lower court but dismissed the claim for judicial separation of property because it interpreted the separation between the petitioner and respondent was something both agreed upon. As a result, it was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code. ISSUES: WON, given the circumstances, the judicial separation of property could be granted WON the Supreme Court may re-interpret the decision of the lower court because of possible inconsistencies between the body and dispositive portion of its decision HELD: YES TO BOTH. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of a decision, it (the Supreme Court) may amend the decision for the sake of clarity even after the judgment has become final. In the case at bar, it was clear that, given the facts and findings, the trial court should have rendered a decision regarding the petition for judicial separation of property. In particular, the petitioner pointed to the penultimate paragraph of the decision as proof that the lower court had ruled in favor of the judicial separation of the property. Indeed, the SC further stated that the Court of Appeals should have modified the decision instead of merely subscribing to the lower courts work. The court overruled the Court of Appeals assertion that the separation of the petitioner and respondent was agreed upon and, thus, not entitled to judicial separation of property. According to the petitioner, their separation was meant to be temporary during the initial stages of her pregnancy. As proof that they never agreed to separate, the petitioner actually attempted to return to the conjugal home. Upon her attempted return, however, she was denied entry by her husband. Under Article 128 of the Family Code (SIDENOTE: although the original case used the Civil Code as legal basis, the decision of the SC used the FC because courts, upon the appeal of a previous decision, will abide by intermediate changes in the law which may render previous decisions erroneous), she could file for judicial separation of property. She was abandoned by the respondent when he refused her entry to the conjugal home. Also, the respondent failed in his obligations to her and the family owing to his admission that he numerous children with other women and refusal to give financial support. Lastly, the respondent did not establish any just cause for his failure to comply with his marital obligations. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to half of the properties of the respondent. **abandonment a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime, providing in the least for ones family although able to do so
Marin
183 332

"To entitle her (plaintiff), to any of these remedies... there must be real abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment must not be only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion." FACTS: Plaintiff Estrella, alleging abandonment and mismanagement of conjugal partnership by her husband Severino, prays for the separation of the conjugal property. Estrella says - Since 1955 the defendant has not slept in the conjugal dwelling, for he had abandoned her for his concubine who lived in Manila. Whenever he returned to Negros he only slept in his office. His failure to inform her about the state of their business enterprises constituted grounds for mismanagement. Severino says - He denied having an illicit affair. He slept in the office because he and his wife always quarreled. He did not abandon his wife and children because he gave his wife support of Php 500, gave them allowances of more than Php 1000 (corroborated by this officemate) and did not mismanage the conjugal partnership because he expanded it with his zeal and industry. In fact, Estrella played mahjong. ISSUE: WoN the separation of the defendant constituted abandonment, a legal ground for judicial separation of property? HELD: NO. Defendant is not guilty of abandonment. To entitle her (plaintiff), to any of these remedies... there must be real abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment must not be only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Record showed that he continued to give support to his family. The wife and kids were not living in want. In fact, the wife seems to have the money to play mahjong. There is no mismanagement because the husband was able to expand the conjugal property. There is no abuse since he has not done acts to prejudice the wife. THE COURT HOWEVER, DOES NOT CONDONE THE HUSBAND BUT MERELY POINTS OUT THE LACK OF THE WIFE'S CAUSE FOR ACTION. The courts must be hesitant in ordering judicial separation because the basic policy is to preserve the unity of spouses in person, in spirit and in property. Judgment where there has been no real abandonment may slam shut the door for possible reconciliation.
Nuez
184 332
In Re: Voluntary Dissolution of CP of Sps. Bernas

FACTS: In May 1962, petitioner-spouses Jose Bermas, Sr. & Pilar Manuel Bermas executed an Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership & Sep of Property, after mutually agreeing to dissolve such. It states that they are and have been legally married since Dec 24, 1932, w/ 2children, both of age and married. During their marriage, they acquired 12 parcels of land and 2 bldgs. The purpose of this Agreement is to prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future, particularly because petitioner H Jose has 2 sets of children: 1 by former marriage, another by his present W. The result of this agreement/contract concerns the income derived from rentals and quitclaim that any property acquired by any or both of the parties shall pertain to him or her exclusively, or to both as co-owners, as the case may be. The petition was filed in June stating the above mentioned facts and that this voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage is allowed, under Art 191 of CC, subject to judicial approval. Moreover, the spouses have no outstanding debts/obligations and the separation of properties would not prejudice any creditor or 3rd persons. Hearing was set in July and notice to that effect was published in a newspaper of gen circulation in Zamboanga City once a week, for 3 consecutive weeks. However, after the hearing, the court denied the petition on the ground that under CC Art 192, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once legal separation has been ordered and exceptions, under Art 191, are civil interdiction, declaration of absence or abandonment. And upon approval of the petition for dissolution, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. ISSUE: WON conjugal partnership may be dissolved w/o notification of children of the parties previous marriages HELD: NO. In a proceeding for dissolution of a conjugal partnership under Art 191 CC, it is essential that children of previous marriages shall be personally notified of said proceeding. In this case, the names and addresses of children by previous marriage of Jose Bermas, Sr. have not been given and it appears that they have not been notified personally of the filing of the petition and of the date of its hearing even though the danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem to be remote. At any rate, the rights of the children by the 1st marriage are still affected in the event that when there is doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between diff conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses. Decision appealed set aside. Case remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
Ordoyo
185 332
Lacson v. Jose - Lacson

Aug. 30, 1968 ll Castro, J. DOCTRINE: The law allows the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between the spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order (Art 190, CC) The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval (Art 191, CC) FACTS: Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married and had four children. On January 9, 1963, Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and went on to reside in Manila. She filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself. However, the spouses were able to reach an amicable settlement with respect to the custody of the children (Two elder children would go to Alfonso, the two younger children to Carmen), separation of property, and support (Alfonso would pay Carmen P300 monthly) which was approved by the Court of First Instance. Carmen later on filed a motion praying for custody of all her children. Alfonso opposed the motion which was sustained by the JDRC. Carmen subsequently raised the validity of the settlement with regard to the custody of their children. ISSUES: WON the settlement/compromise agreement between the two spouses approved by the Court of First Instance is valid and conformable to law HELD: YES. The settlement/compromise agreement between the two spouses is valid with respect to the separation of property and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. (See doctrine aforementioned) Judicial sanction was obtained upon the CFIs approval of the separation of their property as well as the dissolution of the conjugal property. Moreover, the propriety of severing the spouses financial interests is manifest given that they have been separated in fact for at least five years already and at the same time the court had no power to compel the spouses to live together. However, the approval of separation of property and the dissolution of the CPG does not mean the court legalizes/recognizes the separation in fact of the spouses. As to the custody of the children, the Court held that the CFI erred in depriving the mother of the custody of the two older children, citing Art 363 of the CC which commands that no mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. When the settlement was approved by the CFI, the two older children were then 6 and 5 years old respectively and the court did not have any compelling reasons to grant their custody to the father other than to rely on the mutual agreement of the spouses in their settlement. The courts, in determining which parent custody of the child should be granted, should take into account where the child can best be assured of the rights granted to him by law. Decision of the CA declaring null and void the settlement/compromise judgment in so far as it relates to the custody and right of visitation over the two elder children is affirmed.
Pagdanganan
186 332
Maquilan v. Maquilan
TOPIC: Voluntary separation of property DOCTRINE: Art. 134 - The separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. FACTS: Spouses married with one son. However, their relationship soured when husband found out wife was cheating on him. He filed a case of adultery against wife = both wife and her paramour found guilty. Wife then filed for nullity of marriage, dissolution of CPG, and damages on the grounds that husband was psychologically incapacitated. During this case, spouses entered into a Compromise Agreement to partially divide their CPG. However, husband filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the repudiation of the agreement, stating that his lawyer did not inform him of the consequences of it. This was denied so he appealed to the CA >> also denied husband hence this case. The husband argues that: 1. The Compromise Agreement should not have been deemed valid since it is against law and public policy (wife was guilty of adultery hence cant get share of property) 2. That the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor 3. That the respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property. 4. Lawyer did not intelligently inform him of the consequential effects of the agreement. ISSUE: WON the Compromise Agreement is valid given the arguments of the husband HELD: Petition denied. Ruling of CA affirmed. Compromise Agreement is valid. 1. Husbands argument that wife cant get a share and that her share should go to their common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the FC is wrong. The provisions he cited are inapplicable to this case and it is Article 134 of the FC that should be applied. Under Article 134 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. 2. Solicitor Generals participation is not required. The proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the spouses. The settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their marriage. 3. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction, therefore wifes right to manage property is not deprived. 4. Negligence of lawyer binds client. Only reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law. Other notes: The Compromise Agreement stipulated that:
Poblador
187 332
Maquilan v. Maquilan
a. P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint account of the parties. b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall be for the defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in full settlement thereof. c. The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the time the owner of the lot on which it stands shall construct a building thereon; The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant; d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof; e. The house and lot shall be to the common child. Art. 34 of RPC - Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Poblador
188 332
Yaptinchay v. Torres
DOCTRINE: Common law spouses MAY claim coownership of their spouse's properties ONLY IF there is a clear showing that he/she has contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. RELATED ARTICLE: Art. 148 FC (but before, Art 144 CC was used) In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article9, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. FACTS: Teresita Yaptinchay filed a case at the Ct. of First Instance(CFI) of Rizal, Pasay City, wherein she sought to be appointed as both Special and Regular administratix of the estates of Isidro Yaptinchay (who she allegedly cohabited with for 19 years), when the latter passed away without a will. However, the same had been granted to Virginia Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased with his alleged legitimate wife, Josefina Yaptinchay. Virginia then submitted a preliminary inventory of the assets of the estate of her father, including the disputed lot in North Forbes Park. Teresita however, filed another case, this time at the Pasig Branch, praying for an action of replevin, preliminary injunction, and for liquidation of the supposed partnership she had when she cohabited with the deceased (+damages). The judge then issued a TRO to prevent the respondents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from interfering with the rights of the respondent to and possession over the Forbes property. CFI Pasig branch: (June 15, 1966) Upon the defendant's (Virginia and family) filing a bond in the amount of p10k, let a writ of preliminary injunction requiring Teresita to deliver the Forbes property to Virginia and refrain from disturbing the possession of the same. (June 28, 1966) Amended order: Enjoining defendant and their agents from selling, disposing, or otherwise encumbering said properly in any manner pending the termination of this case. (August 8, 1966) Petitioner's motion to reconsider June 15 order overturned: principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession of the said properties which were formerly held by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her appointment and under her authority, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied. ISSUES: (3) WON respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an injunctive writ transferring the Forbes property to Virginia while Teresita was occupying the said property (4) WON Teresita can claim that she was the co-owner of the Forbes property by virtue
Note: cohabitation cases in Article 148: 1. Parties who have no legal capacity to marry or have some legal impediment to marry each other (incestuous, less than 18, against public policy) but without getting married live together as H and W 2. Where one or both parties are validly married to others but live together in an adulterous relationship
Quiambao
189 332
Yaptinchay v. Torres
of her common law relationship with the deceased HELD: Petition for certiorari dismissed, Writ of preliminary injunction set aside. (No errors as to orders of respondent judge.) (1) No. Although the long standing rule is that injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been clearly established, the same rests upon the sound discretion of the Court. Teresita wasn't able to clearly establish that the loans she contracted during the construction of the house were made for the same. On the contrary, it was evident that the loans were made for purposes other than the construction of the Forbes home. Also, the unsupported assertion that the Forbes home is Teresita's exclusive property may not override the prima facie presumption that since the house was constructed on Isidro's lot during his marriage with Josefina, the same is part of the conjugal property of the couple and is thus subject to the control of the special administratix. (2) No. Art. 144 CC which states, "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership," is circumscribed with conditions that must first be shown before rights may accrue. Petitioner was not able to CLEARLY SHOW that she had contributed to the acquisition of the property involved.
Quiambao
190 332
Juaniza v. Jose
DOCTRINE: Co-ownership contemplated in Art 144, requires that the man and woman living together must not be incapacitated to contract marriage FACTS: Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen 16 years in a relationship like husband and wife. Eugenio Jose, an owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted in the death to seven 7 and physical injuries to five 5 of its passengers. The CFI charged damages to Eugenio and Rosalia jointly and severally to pay: Plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,600.00 plus legal interest from date of complaint until fully paid and costs of suit. Pay the respective heirs of the deceased Josefa P. Leus, Fausto Retrita, Nestor del Rosario Aonuevo and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of P12,000.00 for the life of each of said deceased, with legal interest from date of complaint, and costs of suit. Rosalia filed for a motion for consideration to exempt her from paying damages jointly and severally with Eugenio RTC denied the motion pursuant to Art 144 of the CC: When a man and woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. ISSUES: - WON Article 1441 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry - NO - WON Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same. NO HELD: Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Rosalia Arroyo is hereby declared free from any liability for damages and the appealed decision is hereby modified accordingly. No costs.
Quilala
191 332
Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS

FACTS: The late Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman in the province of Surigao del Norte. He contracted two marriages, the first with Rosario Diaz and the second, which was contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with Basilia Berdin. Consuegra died, while the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance were paid to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. They received Php 6,000. Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not designate any beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance benefits. Petitioner Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra. The GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and their seven children, on the other hand, who are entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16. Basilia Berdin didnt agree. She filed a petition declaring her and her children to be the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the retirement insurance. The trial court affirmed stating that: "when two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each family be entitled to one half of the estate. Hence the present appeal by Basilia Berdin and her children. ISSUE: To whom should this retirement insurance benefits of Jose Consuegra be paid, because he did not designate the beneficiary of his retirement insurance? HELD: Berdin averred that because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to designate the beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the appellants who were the beneficiaries named in the life insurance should automatically be considered the beneficiaries to receive the retirement insurance benefits. The GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of benefits to its members one is the life insurance and the other is the retirement insurance. These two distinct systems of benefits are paid out from two distinct and separate funds that are maintained by the GSIS. In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the case of a life insurance provided for in the Insurance Act, the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS may not necessarily be an heir of the insured. The insured in a life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to be so under the provisions of the Civil Code. And in the absence of any beneficiary named in the life insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the insured. Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee, to provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the government for a required number of years. If the employee reaches the age of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement insurance. The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the retirement insurance if the employee dies before retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked to state the
Ramos
192 332
Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS

beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy. GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds should be divided equally between his first living wife and his second. The lower court has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of Lao v Dee. NOTE: Gomez v. Lipana: In construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man, held "that since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute. With respect to the right of the second wife, although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "the only lust and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first.
Ramos
193 332
Maxey v. CA
FACTS: Maxey and Morales lived as common-law spouses from 1903 to 1918. Their first marriage in 1903 was void because it was a military wedding which was not yet recognized during that time. They were also able to acquire parcels of land. They eventually validly married in 1919 however Morales, who was a housewife all those years, died shortly after. Their children filed this case praying for the annulment of sale for their parents properties executed by their father without their knowledge and consent. ISSUE: WON the said properties were exclusive to their father or if they were actually common properties co-owned by their mother because they were acquired from their joint efforts and industry. HELD: The said properties were common properties co-owned by the spouses Maxey and Morales. The rules of co-ownership apply to this case, as stated in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Based on the article, it would be unjust if a woman who is a wife in all aspects except for a valid marriage will be required to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on coownership would apply. Morales ran the household and held the family purse. The Filipino woman traditionally holds the purse and runs the household. The real contribution to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay includes not only the earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business. It also includes her contribution to the familys material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household, conserving scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife. Relevant articles: Art 144 CC: When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Art 147 FC: When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a)
Reposar
194 332
Valdez v. RTC
G.R. No. 122749 ll Jul. 31, 1996 ll Vitug, J. FACTS: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during the marriage were 5 children. June 22, 1992: Valdes sought the declaRATIOn of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Art 36 of the Family Code. RTC held that: 1. Marriage of the spouses are declared null and void under Art 36 on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations. 2. The 3 older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. While Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother: Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. The Petitioner shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the other. 3. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the LIQUIDATION of their COMMON PROPERTIES as defined by Art 47 of the FC, and comply with the provisions of Art 50, 51 and 52, within 30 days from notice of this decision. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. ISSUE: WON the property regime should be based on co-ownership. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
Reyes, G.
195 332
Cario v. Cario
G.R. No. 132529 ll Feb. 2, 2001 DOCTRINE: Art 147 (Live-in partners w/o impediments): wages and salaries shall be owned in equal shares; rules on co-ownership governs the properties they acquired thru their work/industry Art 148 (Property regime of bigamous marriages): properties acquired thru their ACTUAL contributions shall be owned by them in common; do not include wages and salaries Art 40: to contract a subsequent marriage, a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to render the previous marriage void FACTS: June 20, 1969: SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao (had 2 offsprings) Nov 10, 1992: Cario married Susan Yee (cohabited since 1982; didnt have children) 1988: Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. But he passed away on Nov 23, 1992 (13 days after the wedding HAHA) under the care of Susan Yee, who is also the one who spent for his medical and burial expenses Both Susans claimed for benefits and insurance pertaining to Cario from various govt agencies. Nicdao collected: Php 146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM & Pag-ibig. Yee collected: Php 21,000 from GSIS Life, and Burial (GSIS and SSS) Dec 14, 1993: Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against Nicdao praying that she be ordered to return to her at least one-half of Php 146,000.00 death benefits. The trial court, as affirmed in toto by the CA, granted Yees petition since the 1st marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of marriage license (as depicted in the marriage certificate and Local Civil Registrar of San Juans certification which states that they do not have a record of the marriage license) ISSUE + RD: WON Yee is entitled to of the death benefits, thus Nicdao should give her the said amount Under the Civil Code, the law in force in the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio They are not entitled to the said exceptions Nicdao avoided the issue WRT the validity of their marriage Presumption of validity of marriage cannot stand Art 40: for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Marriage is also void. Given that both marriages are void, how should they separate the property of the spouses? Apply Art 148 for Yee: Properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. o The disputed P146,000.00 death benefits, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. o Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. o Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being Reyes, N.
196 332
Cario v. Cario
G.R. No. 132529 ll Feb. 2, 2001 the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. Apply Art 147 for Nicdao: Wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co- ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share 1/2 thereof. of the death benefits under scrutiny shall g o to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
Reyes, N.
197 332
Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva

Jul. 21, 2006 ll Corona, J. MAIN DOCTRINE: Juaniza v. Jose no co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship and Agapay v. Palang it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. PROVISION USED: Art 144 (CC). When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by rules on co-ownership. PETITIONERS: (in relation to Pacita Gonzales) Elino and Dominador as half-brother, Soledad as half-sister-in-law and Teofila and Cecila as children of half-brother. Their interest is for the partition of Gonzales estate. FACTS: Pacita Gonzales cohabited with Romualdo Villanueva in an adulterous relationship from 1927-1980. Villanueva is legally married to Amanda Musngi, who died in 1963. Gonzales died intestate in 1980. Villanueva and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale. Petitioners wanted to stop this and filed a case for partition of Gonzales estate. The properties include 5 lots under the name of both Gonzales and Villanueva, 1 lot under the name of Gonzales only, subdivision lots, stock shares and savings deposit. ISSUE: WON the properties Gonzales and Villanueva has an equal share over acquired property during their cohabitation HELD: Depends on the time. Four properties under the name of Gonzales and Villanueva should NOT go to petitioners. (Refer to main doctrine) The one lot under Gonzales name only is her property because the efficacy of the title was not rebutted. The rest of the property under Gonzales and Villanuevas name after the death of Musngi (1963), according to Art 144 CC, one half should go to Gonzales heirs and the other should go to Villanuevas heirs. They are to share the property equally.
Sevilla
198 332
Saguid v. CA
DOCTRINE: Share in the common property shall be determined by the each of the parties actual contribution in the absence of proof, it is presumed that Gina and Jacintos actual contributions are of equal amount FACTS: 17 old Gina S. Rey was married but separated in fact from her husband. She met Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, in July 1987. Gina and Saguid decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. They separated after 9 years of cohabiting with each other Gina filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership, alleging that from her salary as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. RTC and CA decided in favor or Gina and stated that both Gina and Jacinto contributed to their joint account that was used to acquire said properties. ISSUES: WON the prior courts had basis to grant all alleged properties and contributions to GINA HELD: Given that Gina and Jacinto are not capacitated to marry (Gina having a subsisting marriage) Art. 148 of the Family Code must govern which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man ...only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Even if the marriage commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code (As seen in Sempio-Dy). While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein Stated in Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
Tan de Guzman
199 332
San Luis v. Sagalongos

Feb. 6, 2007 FACTS: Felicisimo contracted three marriages. First wife died with 6 common children. Second wife, with one common son, was an American citizen who was eventually granted divorce in the US from Felicisimo. Third wife was Felicidad whom Felicisimo married in the US (before effectivity of FC) after divorce with 2nd wife. After Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for liquidation of CPG and letters of administration over property to be granted to her. ISSUES, HOLDING, RATIO WON Felicisimos marriage with Felicidad was valid REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER EVIDENCE. Under Van Dorn ruling, which was also the basis of FC Art 26 par 2, it would be absurd and unjust for a Filipino spouse not to be allowed to remarry despite a foreign divorce granted to his/her foreign spouse. If Felicisimos divorce with American wife were true and valid, he should therefore be allowed to remarry with Felicidad. If such remarriage with Felicidad were validly contracted under US law (being contracted in the US), such marriage should also be valid in the Philippines. HOWEVER, evidence is insufficient to prove the validity of both the divorce and the remarriage in light of rules on evidence for foreign divorce and foreign laws. (Refer to case if you want to know more about these rules, but this issue is not of primary importance to the lesson.) WON Felicidad has legal standing/personality to file petition for letters of administration YES. Given the insufficiency of evidence, Felicidads legal standing may fall under three possible situations wherein she is: 1) Felicisimos surviving wife entitled to CPG, should the validity of both divorce and remarriage be proven; 2) Co-owner of common property under CC Art 144, governing property relations between cohabiting persons who have capacity to marry but do not marry, should the validity of the divorce be proven but validity of remarriage be not proven; or 3) Limited co-owner of common property under FC Art 148, governing property relations between cohabiting persons who have no capacity to marry, should the validity of both the divorce and remarriage be not proven. CC Art 144. When a man and a woman live together as H&W, but they are not married, or their marriage is void ab initio, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. *In co-ownership, any property acquired during union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through joint efforts. Hence, shares are presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.* FC Art 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under Art 147, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal... *Ct: Art 148 has been held to have retroactive effect.* WHEREFORE: In all three situations, Felicidad has legal standing to file petition for letters of administration.
Ordoyo
200 332
Penebscot Area Housing v. City of Brewer

438 A. 2d. 14 ll Aug. 14, 1981 ll Nichols, J. PLAINTIFFS: Penobscot Are Housing Development Corporation, et al. DEFENDANTS: City of Brewer, et al. DOCTRINE: Definition of a family; In a family, the domestic bond is important. There Court pointed out three important components of the family: there must be permanent parents that take care of the members; there should be a sense of permanence and cohesiveness among the members; and they should be doing their jobs such as cooking and cleaning to the family. NATURE OF PETITION: This is an appeal from the Superior Court, Kennebec County. FACTS: The Penobscot Area Housing Development Corporation is a private, non-profit organization corporation who recently organized a project to provide housing for retarded citizens. For that purpose, it has negotiated a purchase and sale agreement to acquire a house and lot in a district of the City of Brewer which is zoned for low density single family residential use under the Citys zoning ordinance. In the application submitted to the Brewer Code Enforcement Officer, William L. Wetherbee, the proposed use was for a group home for six adults or older minors, which group home would be licensed as a Boarding Home by the State meaning that six retarded persons were going to live in that house under the supervision of approximately two full-time employees. Wetherbee denied the occupancy permit because the Corporation's proposed use did "not meet the terms of the City of Brewer's zoning ordinance as a single family." He recommended that the Corporation apply for a nursing home use rather than as a single family use. Applying for a nursing home instead meant that the Corporation needed to meet additional requirements as prescribed by the ordinance. Not wanting to do so, the Corporation appealed to the Citys Board of Appeals. The Board affirmed Wetherbees decision that the proposed use could not be classified as a single family use under the ordinance. They then sought review of this by a petition to the Superior Court of Kennebec County. The State of Maine and the Bureau of Mental Retardation joined in this appeal. The appeal was amended by the petitioner to make the Bureau the legal guardian of three retarded persons chosen from Penobscot County live in the housing project of the Corporation. Later on, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Board. Hence this appeal. ISSUE (in relation to the syllabus topics of family): WON the Superior Court erred in affirming the Board's decision that the concept of a single family use in the Brewer ordina nce did not cover the proposed group home. NO. RATIO: Another section in the ordinance gave a definition of the family (Art. 1 Sec. 101): "FAMILY" is a single individual doing his own cooking, and living upon the premises as a separate housekeeping unit, or a collective body of persons doing their own cooking and living together upon the premises as a separate housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship based upon birth, marriage or other domestic bond as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house, club, fraternity or hotel. In reviewing the ordinance, the Court noted that relationships other than those based on blood or law, i.e., founded on birth or marriage, are included in the definition of family. Relatio nships based upon "other domestic bond[s]" satisfy the ordinance as well. Although the main use of the questioned areas were to be used for groups that fall under the definition given above, the ordinance permitted other uses in the low density single family residential districts if special requirements were met. However, the Corporation proposed its group home as a
Yumol
201 332

438 A. 2d. 14 ll Aug. 14, 1981 ll Nichols, J. single family residential use in its application and appeal to the Board and that is where the issue originated from. The plaintiffs' principal argument is that the interpretation of the ordinance by the Board and its affirmance by the Superior Court placed undue emphasis on the role of the staff and ignored the fact that the plain purpose of the group home was to create a family environment for the residents. The requirement of a domestic bond would have been met by the relationship forged among the residents themselves as they lived and worked together. The plaintiffs cited several decisions from other jurisdictions in which similar definitions of family have been construed to include group homes to strengthen their argument. The Court finds no merit in their arguments. The concept of "domestic bond" implies the existence of a traditional family-like structure of household authority. Such a structure would include one or more resident authority figures charged with the responsibility of maintaining a separate housekeeping unit and regulating the activity and duties of the other residents. In so doing, this resident authority figure serves legitimate zoning interests of a community by stabilizing and coordinating household activity in a way that is consistent wit h family values and a family style of life. The Board found that although a staff would be employed by the Corporation for the purposes of maintaining a home for six retarded adults, staff members would not necessarily reside at the home; rather, the Board's findings suggested the staff would serve on a rotating basis. Thus, a central figure of authority residing on the premises similar to a parent or parents in a t raditional family setting was clearly absent. The absence of a resident authority figure in the Corporation's proposal clearly distinguishes this case from cases cited by the plaintiffs in which the definition of family was held to include group homes. Another note pointed out by the Court was in terms of the permanence of the residents in the home. In relationships founded on marriage or birth, the notion of domestic bond also connotes a quality of cohesiveness and permanence in the relationship of residents. The Board of Appeals found that the residents would not control "the choice of who the incoming residents would be nor when other residents would leave." Some residents would ultimately be transferred to foster homes. They further found that the average stay of a resident would be one to one and one-half years. These facts are not consistent with the development of permanent and cohesive relationships among the residents, especially in the absence of a resident authority figure. Finally, the definition of family further specifies that the persons comprising the collective should not only be living together in a relationship founded on a domestic bond but should be "doing their own cooking and living together upon the premises as a sep arate housekeeping unit." The Board found that the Corporation and its rotating staff would plan and manage the activities of the residents. Further, staff members were to be responsible for preparing meals and providing "some cleaning and other services." They concluded that such an arrangement would not comply with the requirement of the ordinance. The Corporation's proposal failed to meet the definitional criteria of a domestic bond and it also failed to satisfy the more concrete specifications of the ordinance as well. While the purpose of such homes is laudable, the scrutiny that is needed to be done under the local zoning ordinances should not be easily abandoned. If the problem of locating group homes is pervasive in this state, legislative, not judicial, action may be most appropriate. Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (that are not related to the topic of family): Venue: The City of Brewer tried to dismiss the petition in the Superior Court based on improper venue, but they were dismissed. Particularly, what was being challenged was whether the State of Maine and the Bureau of Mental Retardation were parties that had standing to bring legal action. A statute was
Yumol
202 332

438 A. 2d. 14 ll Aug. 14, 1981 ll Nichols, J. raised saying that any party was allowed to file an appeal to a decision rendered by a court. But it was clarified that these parties must have a legal standing such that they have obtained particularized injuries. At first, the Court opined that the State and the Bureau did not suffer a particularized injury sufficient for purposes of standing and the status of party which standing confers. Although the State and the Bureau went on to argue that they were injured in such a way that the refusal of the City to approve the occupancy permit was a hindrance to the mandate of state and federal laws to protect the rights of mentally retarded citizens and to promote their welfare, the Court said that these concerns still did not give rise to particularized injuries in the case. However, given that the Bureau was named as the legal guardian of the three retarded persons who were proper parties in this case in the amended petition, any problem of venue was cured. They concluded finally that the venue was properly laid in the Kennebec Court. Zoning exemption for the State: The Corporation raised the point that according to a statue, zoning ordinances are advisory with respect to the State. They contend that this statutory provision exempted its proposed group home from the Brewer ordinance because the Corporation was acting as an agent of the State in furtherance of clearly articulated state obligations and interests by initiating the group home project in the City of Brewer. The Court opined that the statute was not intended to exempt all such corporations from local zoning ordinances. Their decision was based on other ordinances present. For instance, there was a law saying that these exemptions can only be recognized when it is proven that it is reasonably necessary for public welfare and convenience and the like. State involvement is also necessary. The court below concluded that evidence before the Board of Appeals was insufficient to support findings of such. Furthermore, there was no showing that there were no other suitable locations that can be used for that purpose. The Court therefore concluded that the Corporation was not exempt from legitimate local zoning regulations. Constitutional arguments: The Corporation claims that the interpretation of the ordinance violates their rights to due process and equal protection of the law under Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Court opined that it was unclear to them if any rights were indeed violated since the plaintiffs were not able to show any evidence of this violated right upon the imposition of the ordinance. Zoning ordinances are part of the police power of municipalities and they are presumed to comply with due process when they bear a s ubstantial relation to the advancement of public principles. The argument of the Corporation extends as far as confusing the power to control land use with the power to distinguish persons making use of the land, but this is again without merit. In sum, these Plaintiffs have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutional validity of the ordinance which they challenge.
Yumol
203 332
Mendoza v. CA
PETITONER: Ceclio Mendoza (husband) RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, and Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza (wife) DOCTRINE: Art. 222, Civil Code: No suit shall be filed between members of the family (case at bar: between spouses) unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Art. 2035. Art. 2035, Civil Code: NO COMPROMISE upon the following questions shall be valid: (2) validity of a marriage or a legal separation, and (4) future support. FACTS: Spouses-Mendoza were married in 1954, then husband-Mendoza moved to the States for further studies and to practice his profession. Wife-Mendoza filed a complaint, alleging husband-Mendoza had deliberately abandoned her without justifiable cause and refuses to provide maintenance and support for the wife who is allegedly pregnant, and without a source of revenue. Wife-Mendoza wants maintenance and support since husband-Mendoza is employed in a hospital in the U.S., earning an average of 200 USD monthly. Husband-Mendoza moved to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. Motion denied. Husband-Mendozas second motion to dismiss on grounds of Art. 222, Civil Code: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article. 2035. Husband-Mendoza claims Wife-Mendoza failed to state a cause of action, because her complaint contained no allegations that earnest efforts had been made to reconcile prior to her filing a complaint. Thus, pursuant to Art. 222 CC, no suit can be filed before such efforts at compromise have been averred to in the complaint. Court of First Instance: dismissed motion to dismiss complaint. CA: dismissed motion to dismiss complaint. Hence this petition. ISSUE: W/N Wife-Mendozas complaint is invalid for failure to contain allegations that earnest efforts had been made to compromise/reconcile. HELD: NO. Wife-Mendozas complaint is valid. Art. 222 of the Civil Code does not apply, because it is subject to limitations under Art. 2035, which enumerates what are not subjects of a valid compromise. Wife-Mendozas complaint involves a CLAIM for FUTURE SUPPORT. Under Art 2035 of the Civil Code, claim for future support CANNOT be a subject of a VALID COMPROMISE. Thus, Art. 222 does not apply, and Wife-Mendozas complaint is VALID.
Alampay
204 332
Mendez v. Bionson
PETITIONERS: ZOILA MENDEZ, RAFAEL MENDEZ, and MATILDE BIONSON RESPONDENTS: MAXIMO, EUGENIA JUANA, FORTUNATA, PRUDENCIA, ROMAN, ANECITA and MARIA, all surnamed BIONSON and HON. ALFREDO C. LAYA, Judge, Court of First of Cebu, Branch XII, DOCTRINE: Collateral relatives who are not brothers and sisters are not included in the term family relations used in Art. 150 [FC]. FACTS: Three cases involved: 1. 1st case [CFI] Zoila et al filed for action against Maximo et. al for partition of 2 parcels of land; CFI decided in favour of Maximo et. al but failed to include in the dispositive that Zoila et al should vacate the said lands 2. 2nd case [CFI] Maximo et. al filed an action for recovery of possession and ownership for a portion of the land w/c Zoila et. al refuse to deliver to them; CFI in a summary judgement ordered Zoila et. al to vacate the said land - Zoila et. al filed a petition but was dismissed by CFI 3. 3rd case [SC] Zoila et. al assails the summary judgement assigning errors on the interpretation of the decision in the first case ISSUES/RATIO: WON decision in first case denied respondents [Maximo] claim of ownership. - NO It is clear that Maximo et. al were declared owners of the land in question. Documentary evidence [tax declarations & official tax] in support of Maximos testimonial evidence shows that they are owners. Dismissal of counterclaim of respondents cannot affect their rights on 2 parcels of land in question bec it only referred to moral damages, rentals &attorneys fees. Respondents are the owners & thus they have a right to possession of land & right of action against holder & possessor of such in order to recover land. WON CFI erred in not dismissing Maximos case for lack of earnest efforts being exerted by the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement before the action was instituted, the parties being members of the same family. - NO Maximo et al already exerted diligent effort to arrive at an amicable settlement during the first case, thus Zoila et. al cant assign this error on the 2nd case which is just a mere consequence of the first case Zoila et. al are collateral relatives not among the family members enumerated in CC Art. 21710.
10
CC Art. 217 provides that only the ff are family relations: a. bet husband & wife b. bet parent & child c. among other ascendants & their descendants d. among bros & sis
Bayona
205 332
Guerrero v. RTC
G.R. No. 109068 ll Jan. 10, 1994 ll Bellosillo, J. PETITIONER: Gaudencio Guerrero RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr. and Pedro Hernando FACTS: An action was filed by petitioner Guerrero against private respondent Hernando regarding ownership of real property. The two are brothers-in-law, they being married to halfsisters. During the pre-trial conference, respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., noted the relationship between them and on the basis thereof, he gave the petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Guerrero moved to reconsider said order, claiming that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. He also argued that Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer. Said motion was denied by the judge who reiterated the 5-day deadline for Guerrero to amend his complaint. However, the 5-day period expired without Guerrero following the order; thus, the respondent Judge dismissed the case. ISSUES: WON brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards acompromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained
WON the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction RULING: The Court granted the petition and ordered the RTC Judges dismissal of the action to be set aside, directing the latter to continue. RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend "brothers-in-law". Sisters and brothers by affinity not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", the Court found noreason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Thus, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit. NO. Attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action. It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be deemed to have waived the aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the Answer.
Cadorna
206 332
Hontiveros v. RTC
G.R. No. 125465 ll Jun. 29, 1999 PETITIONERS: Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City; Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson DOCTRINE: Members of the same family are the following: husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half blood. FACTS: Respondents Gregorio Hontiveros had filed to register a parcel of land in Capiz, which petitioners Augusto, Gregorios brother, and Maria, Augustos wife, protested. The spouses Hontiveros claimed that they were the owners of the land, and they had been deprived both of its possession and income. Respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson denied that they were married, alleging that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. The respondents also claim that the petitioners had failed to allege that earnest efforts toward compromise had been made pursuant to Art. 15111 since Gregorio and Augusto were brothers. Thus, they prayed that the subject land be reconveyed to them. The trial court dismissed the petitioners case on the ground that, though efforts toward compromise had been alleged, they had not been verified. ISSUES A. Procedural: Whether the lack of verification required by Art. 151 is sufficient ground for dismissal. B. Whether Art. 151 is applicable. RATIO The Court granted the petition, setting aside the assailed decision and remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings, resolving the issues hence: A. Absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the complaint. Verification is merely a formal requirement. If there is doubt as to the veracity of the complaints alleged, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings. B. No. Because of the inclusion of Teodora Ayson as respondent and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner, the case cannot be covered by Art. 151, where members of the same family refers to the following relationships: - Husband and wife - Parents and children - Ascendants and descendants - Brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood Teodora and Maria do not fall within these relationships with respect to the Hontiveros family, and are considered strangers for the purposes of Art. 151.
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ART. 151. No suit between members of the same mily shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code
Espaola
207 332
Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644 ll Aug. 28, 2006 PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS: Edward V. Lacson Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson, represented by their mother and guardian ad litem Lea Daban Lacson support. The RTC ruled in favor of the sisters and their mother and ordered Edward to pay them 18 months worth of support in arrears, amounting to around P2.5 million. Edward appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTCs decision, which led to this petition for review to the SC. He contends that he should not be made to pay for support in arrears from 19761994 since there was no previous extrajudicial or judicial demand from the respondents, citing Art.203 of the Family Code. The computation for support should just start from 1995 as that was the date when the sisters formally asked for support by lodging the complaint. ISSUES: 1. WoN Edward should pay for the support in arrears from 1976-1994 despite the absence of an extrajudicial or judicial demand 3. WoN Noel Daban is subject to reimbursements for loans he provided for the familys sustenance 4. WoN the sale by Lea of half of what Edward claims to be his exclusive or capital property, amounting to P5 million, can be considered as payment for his support in arrears to his daughters RULING: Petition denied. RTC & CAs decision affirmed. RATIO: 1. Yes. Edward overlooked the fact that he abandoned his children at their tender years and as such could not demand for support since he was also difficult to get in touch with. It also appeared that Lea made an extrajudicial demand sometime in 1976 when she came to her mother-in-laws house asking for financial support, as also embodied in Edwards note dated December 10, 1975. Thus, RTC was correct
DOCTRINES: Art.203, FC - The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. Art.207, FC - When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. FACTS: Edward Lacson is married to Lea Daban and they have two daughters, Maowee and Maonaa. Not long after the birth of their second child in 1976, Edward left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek shelter and financial assistance elsewhere. For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. From 1976 to 1994 (18 years), they transferred from one dwelling place to another not their own. Lea did not badger Edward for support, holding on to her husbands promise of doing so on his letter dated December 10, 1975, which he failed to comply with. He, however, occasionally gave meager amounts for the childrens school expenses. Edwards mother also contributed to help in the childrens schooling, but it was Leas brother, Noel Daban, who lent a large sum to the family (between P400,000-600,000). Lea, in behalf of her daughters, then filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Iloilo RTC in 1995. In his answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular
Cruz
208 332
Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644 ll Aug. 28, 2006 in computing arrears from 1976. 2. Yes. Under Art.207, FC, he is entitled to reimbursements as Edward, the person obliged to pay support, failed or refused to do so. It was also worth noting that the setup constitutes as a quasi-contract given the juridical relationship between Edward and Noel (brother-in-law), which is attached with an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another. 3. No. There was no showing that the property was conjugal or exclusive. Lea even claimed that she and Edward separately sold their shares in the property. In addition to this, the daughters were not parties to the sale, thus, it was erroneous to assume that they benefited from the proceeds of the property, more so to consider that the amount offsets his separate obligation for support in arrears.
Cruz
209 332
Modequillo v. Modequillo
G.R. No. 86355 ll May 31, 1990 FACTS: On January 29, 1988, the CA rendered judgment on a civil case regarding a vehicular accident in March 1976 ordering Modequillo and Malubay to pay tens of thousands of pesos worth for compensation and loss of earnings from death, burial expenses, hospitalization, moral damages and attorneys fees, to be taken from their goods and chattels. Hence, on July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land as well as a parcel of agricultural land registered in Modequillos name. He filed a motion to quash the levy on the residential land since it is where the family home was built since 1969 and falls under such category, and under Art. 1523 FC, is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except for liabilities in Art. 155. Modequillo believes that the said judgment debt is not one of those falling under Art. 155. The trial court denied the motion, saying that it was only deemed as a family home upon the Family Codes effectivity on August 4, 1988, hence the petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON the residential house and lot is exempt from the execution of the judgment debt HELD: No. SC agreed with trial court that the residence was deemed as family home only on August 3, 1988 (since 1988 was a leap year) by operation of law under Art. 153 FC. The exception under Art. 155 are effective from the time a family home is constituted as such. However, the vehicular accident occurred on 1976 and the judgment became final and executory on January 1988, both before the effectivity of the Family Code. Art. 1523 have no retroactive effect, not even under Article 162 which states that the same chapter shall govern existing residences. Nor was the house judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home under the Civil Code. Thus, the residential house and lot was not subject to the exception under Art. 155.
Dantes
210 332
Patricio v. Dario III

FACTS Marcelino Dario (grandfather) died intestate in 1987. He was survived by his wife and 2 sons. He left several parcels of land including the land in dispute on which a residential house and a pre-school building is built. Perla (widow - petitioner) and Marcelino Marc (1st son) wanted to partition the property, but Marcelino III (2nd son - respondent) did not. The petitioner argues that the property stopped being the family home in July 5, 1997 when 10 years have passed since the decedent's death. The respondent argues that under Art 154 FC the property cannot be partitioned while his minor son (decedent's grandson) still resides therein. ISSUES WON The property (which was the family home) can be partitioned given that the decedent's minor grandson still resides there 10 years after the decedent's death HELD Petition GRANTED. The grandson is not the decedent's dependent, so therefore he is not entitled to the benefits of Art 159 FC. RATIO: In order for a minor beneficiary to be entitled to Art. 159, three requisites must concur: (1) The relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) They live in the family home, and (3) They are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. The grandson is a descendant of the decedent so he passes the first requisite. He is indeed living in the family home, so he also satisfies the second requisite. However, he cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if his parents are capable of supporting him. The liability for providing support falls squarely on his parents, and only when they are in default will it fall on the grandparents. As such, there is no legal impediment to the partition of the property.
De Castro
211 332
Veneracion v. Mancilla
G.R. No. 158238 ll Jul. 20, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J. PETITIONERS: Mary Grace M. Veneracion, Daisy and Richard Veneracion (minors) RESPONDENTS: Charlie Mancilla (represented by heirs), Giar Cheng Linda, Caitlin, Erica, Tiffany Mancilla, Hon. Judge Adoracion H. Angeles (RTC Caloocan City) Sheriff Jovinal Salayon, Register of Deeds of Paraaque City DOCTRINE: 3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do not have cause of action when one spouse petitions for appointment as the sole administrator of the properties NATURE OF PETITION: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for partial annulment of judgement filed by Petitioner under Rule 47 of Rules of Court FACTS: - 1995 (Feb. 14) o Elizabeth Mendinueta (wife of Geronimo Veneracion) secured a loan from Charlie Mancilla. Php 1.2 M Through a promissory note to pay on August 14, 1995, at 5% monthly interest. This is with a real estate mortgage over the residential lot located at Better Living Subdivision in Paraaque (it was indicated that she was single), including the residential house situated thereon. - 1995 (Oct. 11) o Elizabeth defaulted on the loan, and Charlie filed for judicial foreclosure of mortgage. o Charlie died during the pendency of the case. - 1996 (Oct. 18) o Pre-trial findings: Elizabeth was able to secure a Php 1.2M loan from the Banco Filipino Savings Mortgage Bank, to be used to pay Charlie. Elizabeth asked for reduction of the monthly interest from 5% to 3% Mortgage was foreclosed. A writ of execution was issued on Nov. 7, 2000. Sheriff levied on the property and was sold to the respondents. It turned out that: o Elizabeth had been living with Geronimo Veneracion without the benefit of marriage with 3 children. They have been residing in the said property. o Their father died before the sale of the property. Mary Grace and her siblings filed a petition against the Heirs of Charlie for the partial annulment of the decision of the RTC o Alleged that their father was the one who paid the monthly instalments of the property because their mother didnt have any source of income. o Alleged that it was conjugal property and thus, the need for their fathers signature for the mortgage, which Elizabeth wasnt aware of
ISSUE: WON the family home is exempted from forced sale as it was the family home and conjugal in nature HELD: NO - Petitioners failed to include in their petition copies of the receipts for the instalment payments that their father allegedly made - Also, they were not able to attach any proof that the said property was indeed their family home and part of the conjugal property of their parents. o Not even the records from the RTC was attached - Their mother also never alleged in her petition that the said property was conjugal in nature and was being used as the family home
Dilag
212 332
Veneracion v. Mancilla
G.R. No. 158238 ll Jul. 20, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J. o What she only included in her petition was to reduce the monthly interest. Petitioners annulment petition in the CA has no prima facie or substantive merit PETITION IS DENIED. COSTS AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS.
Dilag
213 332
Arriola v. Arriola
DOCTRINE: Although the house, as accessory to the land, forms part of the estate of the deceased which has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, the family home continues to be as such for a period of 10 years after the death of the head of the family. As such, the house and the land on which it stands cannot be immediately partitioned under Art. 159 of FC. This is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. FACTS: Fidel Arriola had 2 marriages. After his death, his sons from both marriages partitioned his estate through public auction. ISSUE: W/N the house (family home) can be included in the sale HELD: No. RATIO: Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties. More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home. Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the coownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property. To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of coownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
Dolot
214 332
Sps. Kelly v. PPI

G.R. No. 172263 ll Jul. 9, 2008 ll Corona, J. COMPLAINANTS: SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY RESPONDENTS: PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA FACTS: Husband Kelley acquired agricultural chemical products from PPI in 1989, but he failed to pay for it. PPI filed an action for sum of money in the RTC of Makati, and the court ruled in favour of PPI, issued a writ of execution, which then prompted the sheriff respondent to sell the Kelleys real property in Naga City, with PPI as the highest bidder. The Kelleys filed for a motion of nullity of levy and sale, on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution. The RTC of Naga City dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, which the CA upheld. ISSUE: WoN the subject property is exempt from execution. HELD: We dont know that yet. Case remanded to RTC of Naga City, allowing petitioners to present evidence that property is indeed their family home as constituted in accordance with the law. For a family home to be constituted as such there must be proof that: (1) It was constituted jointly by the husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of the family; (2) It is the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated; (3) It is part of the ACP/CPG, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family; (4) The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas. But under FC, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially/extrajudiciallyall family homes constructed after the effectivity of the FC are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of Aug. 3, 1988 are considered family homes. The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually reside therein. Also, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after Aug. 3, 1988. Otherwise, the alleged family home must be shown to be constituted either judicially/extrajudicially pursuant to CC. However, the rule is not absolute. (see: Art 155 and 160 of FC) Case reinstated and remanded to the RTC of Naga City for determination whether or not the property covered is a duly constituted family home and therefore exempt from execution.
Enad
215 332
Josef v. Santos
G.R. No. 165060 ll Nov. 7, 2008 PETITIONER: Albino Josef RESPONDENT: Otelio Santos DOCTRINE: The fact of a property being a family home must be properly determined by the court (according to the procedure below). FACTS: Petitioner Josef had bought shoe materials on credit from respondent Otelio Santos, who, upon Josefs failure to pay, brought a case for collection before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The RTC ruled that Josef was liable to Santos for P404,836.50, with a 12% per annum interest. As a result, some of Josefs personal properties were auctioned off, including a real property in Marikina, for which Santos was the winning bidder. Josef questioned the sale of the personal and real properties, claiming that he was insolvent and had no property to answer for the judgment. He further claimed that the personal properties belonged not to him but to his children, and that the house and lot was his family home, thus exempt from execution. ISSUE: Whether Santos could validly seize the real property claimed to be a family home. RATIO The Court held that the trial court failed to determine the truth to petitioner Josefs allegations. The court must adhere to the following procedure: 1. Determine if petitioners obligation to respondent falls under either of the exceptions under Art. 15512 of the Family
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Code; 2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioners claim that the property was his family home through: - Ocular inspection of the premises - Examination of the title - Interview of members of community where alleged family home is located, to determine whether petitioner actually resided within its premises - Order that photographs of the premises, depositions and/or affidavits of proper individuals / parties be submitted, or conduct a solemn examination of petitioner, his children and other witnesses. The respondent must be given the opportunity to cross-examine and present contrary evidence. 3. If the property is found to be the petitioners family home, the court should determine: a. If the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; b. If the petitioners spouse is still alive, and if there are other beneficiaries of the family home; c. If the petitioner has more than one residence, in order to determine which of them, if any, is his family home; d. Its actual location and value, in order to apply Arts. 15713 and 16014.
service or furnished material for the construction of the building. 13 ART. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation. For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual
ART. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
Espaola
216 332
Josef v. Santos
G.R. No. 165060 ll Nov. 7, 2008 Thus, the writs of execution issued in respondent Santoss favor, as well as the titles obtained through them, were declared void. The trial court was directed to conduct an inquiry into whether the real property was Josefs family home. Santos was ordered to hold the properties and their proceeds in abeyance while waiting for the outcome of the inquiry.
income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. 14 ART. 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Art. 155, obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Art. 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
Espaola
217 332
Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero

DOCTRINE: Exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction FACTS: Parcel of land was registered under Araceli's name. Petitioners jointly purchased subject property on April 17 1984 while merely cohabiting before marriage. House was later constructed on property w/c petitioners occupied as family home after they got married sometime in January 1987 Sometime in September 1988, Petitioner obtained a loan from respondent, w/c was secured by a mortgage over subject property. Check bounced, acquitted but ordered to pay for said debt Writ of execution was issued and sheriff levied upon subject property. Subsequently sold on public auction, respondent being highest bidder. Leased the lands to petitioner and a Juanito. After failure to pay rent, filed an action for detainer Petitioner then claims that the land is theirs ISSUE: WON petitioner can still claim land HELD: For family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied w/ by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege 1) Family residences constructed before effectivity of FC or before Aug 3 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in order to be exempt from execution 2) Family residences constructed after effectivity of FC are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from time it was constituted 3) Family residences w/c were not judicially or extrajudi constituted as a family home prior to effectivity of FC, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to benefits accorded to a family home Subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. No showing of constitution. Still, when family Code took effect, subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution However, the exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction or at the time it was levied or w/in a reasonable time thereafter Honrado v Ca: at no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction Having failed to set up and prove to sheriff the supposed exemption before sale at public auction, petitioners are now barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estops them from later claiming said exemption Right from execution can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove status of property as family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter Petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse before claiming such. One year lapsed from time subject property was sold. It was only time respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer or 4 years from time of auction sale, that petitioners started to file action. --> Negligence or omission to assert right = abandonment, waiver or refusal to assert right
Hermosisima
218 332
Perido v. Perido
PROOF OF FILATION: Marriage of Lucio and his second wife, Marcelina. Since the marriage of Lucio and Marcelina was presumed to be valid in the absence of proof to the contrary, their children were considered legitimate. FACTS: Lucio married twice during his lifetime. He begot three children with his first wife. After his first wife died, Lucio married Marcelina with whom he had five children. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. On August 1960, the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio executed a document denominated as Declaration of Hiership and Extra-Judicial Partition, portioning among themselves certain properties. The children belonging to the first marriage had second thoughts about the partition praying for the annulment of the said document alleging that the five children of Lucio and Marcelina were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to Lucios estate. On the theory that the five children were born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. RTC: Annulled the declaration but the five children of Marcelina were included in the partition in view of the findings that they were legitimate. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON the marriage of Lucio and Marcelina was valid. Which would answer WON their children are legitimate children. HELD: Yes. CA decision affirmed. Five children of Lucio and Marcelina were born during their marriage, and, therefore, legitimate. They acquired successional rights to their fathers estate. RD: CA found that there was evidence to show that Lucios first wife died during the Spanish regime. This finding is conclusive upon the Court and beyond their power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina before the birth of their first child. CA correctly held that the testimony of Leonora (Lucios grandchildren of first marriage) saying that Lucio was not actually married to Marcelina was not conclusive. She was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony. It is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. MINOR ISSUES: WON some lands questioned are part of Lucios exclusive properties. - Lands were all declared in the name of Lucio. Then there is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio from his grandmother. In other words, they were exclusive properties of Lucio which he brought into the first and second marriages. WON some properties questioned are part of the conjugal properties of Lucio and Marcelina. - It is expressly stated in the certificate of title that Lucio, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal, the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else. Legal presumption that said properties belonged to conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary.
Macariola
219 332
Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti Liyao

Mar. 7, 2002 FACTS: William Liyao, Jr. contends that he is entitled to successional rights as a compulsory heir of William Liyao. According to the petitioner, his mother Corazon Yulo and William Liyao cohabited with each other from 1965-1975. During that time, they lived in the same house together with Corazons two children from her subsisting marriage with Ramon Yulo. During this period, he alleges that his father furnished him generously for support by giving him allowance and paying for his education. As evidence of this, the petitioner provided numerous pictures, anecdotes, and witnesses in order to corroborate his claim for successional rights. The respondents (Liyaos children from his marriage) deny his allegations. They argued that their father never had affairs and that their parents never legally separated from each other. Also, they point out the fact that Corazon Yulo never separated from her husband neither. In fact, they claim to have seen the two together during the time in which Liyao and Yulo were supposed to be cohabiting. Lastly, they testified that their father never issued checks in favor of the petitioner and that they never received any formal request for the recognition of Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate child of their father. The trial court granted the petition citing a preponderance of evidence while the Court of Appeals reversed it. ISSUE: WON the petitioner may be recognized as William Liyaos illegitimate child based on the evidence he presented HELD: NO. The presumption is always in favor of the legitimacy of the child. The petitioner may not impugn his possible legitimacy without strong and conclusive pieces of evidence. According to the New Civil Code a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. As Ramon and Corazon Yulo were not legally separated nor was their marriage annulled, then William Liyao Jr. is presumed to be the legitimate fruit of that marriage. The Court held that the fact that the fact that Corazon cohabited with William Liyao for 10 years was immaterial because only the husband or his heirs may impugn the legitimacy of a child. The fact that Corazon Yulo claims his illegitimacy with another man as a result of adulterous relations has no bearing if the Ramon Yulo does not impugn the legitimacy of the child in question. Lastly, the Court held that even if the petition was coursed through the children of Ramon Yulo (note: the legitimacy of a child may only be impugned in a direct action by the proper party) who might be in a position to impugn his legitimacy as his heirs, they could not be certain that Ramon Yulo was already dead. As such, the petition is denied.
Marin
220 332
SSS v. Aguas
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo's signature. A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity. FACTS: Upon the death of Pablo Aguas, the spouse Rosanna wanted to claim SSS benefits for her and her children as beneficiaries and dependents. SSS, upon the submission of evidence by Pablo's sister, denied the claims, stating that the wife Rosanna abandoned the home and therefore was not entitled to support and the children Jeylnn and Janet were not children of Pablo but of Rosanna's paramour. Rosanna submitted birth certificates of the two girls in the SSC hearings but was still denied. She appealed the case to CA, which ruled in her favor stating questions pertaining to the children's legitimacy may only be decided by the courts. SSS now seeks reversal from the SC. ISSUE: WoN Jeylnn and Janet were dependents of Pablo HELD: Jeylnn - Yes, she is. The birth certificate submitted was signed by Pablo Aguas which indicated that she was a legitimate child born before Rosanna left the conjugal home. As for conflicting baptismal certificates of Jeylnn (signed by Pablo Aguas) and a certain Jennelyn (signed by paramour), the Court concluded that they were the same person, corroborated by account of a scandal during the baptismal ceremony. It was impossible for Rosanna to give birth to two consecutive children in 3 months. Janet - No, she isn't. Her birth certificate was merely prima facie evidence, being only a photocopy. Consistent testimonies by neighbors stated that she was only adopted when the couple wasnt lucky in having kids. There being no adoption papers, she was not a legitimate child of Pablo.
Nuez
221 332
In Re: Baby M
109 N.J. 396 FACTS: The Sterns entered into a surrogacy agreement with Mary Beth Whitehead in which she agreed to bear the child of Mr. Stern (through artificial insemination) in exchange for costs plus $10,000 and to terminate her rights as a mother (before the baby was even conceived). Upon the birth of the baby (Melissa) and the subsequent handover to the Sterns as agreed, Mrs. Whitehead "became deeply disturbed, disconsolate, stricken with unbearable sadness." She persuaded the Sterns to give her one last week with the child by telling them that she was suicidal (so they handed their child over to a suicidal woman) and she fled to Florida with her husband and the baby. There, they took evasive maneuvers to avoid detection before being ordered to turn over the child. The Sterns filed suit, seeking ultimate custody of the child and enforcement of the surrogacy contract (in which the child would be placed permanently in their custody and Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights would be permanently terminated). After a lengthy trial, the court ordered that Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights be terminated and that sole custody of the child be granted to Mr. Stern. The court also entered an order allowing the adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern, all in accordance with the surrogacy contract. Mrs. Whitehead appealed. WHITEHEAD ARGUES: Surrogacy contract is invalid because: 1. It conflicts with public policy since it guarantees that the child will not have the nurturing of both natural parents, presumably New Jersey's goal for families. 2. It deprives the mother of her constitutional right to the companionship of her child. 4. It conflicts with statutes concerning termination of parental rights and adoption. She claims primary custody with visitation rights for Mr. Stern, both on a best-interests basis as well as on the policy basis of discouraging surrogacy contracts. The standard for determining best interests is that the child should be placed with the mother absent a showing of unfitness. STERNS ARGUE: Contract is valid and should be enforced. They have a right to privacy, which includes the right of procreation and the right of consenting adults to deal with matters of reproduction as they see fit. Given the circumstances, the child is better off in their custody with no residual parental rights reserved for Mrs. Whitehead. Furthermore, the statute which grants full parental rights to a husband in relation to the child produced, with his consent, by the union of his wife with a sperm donor denied him equal protection of the laws. RULING: Pre-birth contract under which a woman agrees to be impregnated, through artificial insemination, by a man not her husband and to give up, irrevocably, all parental rights upon the birth of the resulting child for the purpose of permitting the natural father and his wife to adopt the child as their own where the woman is to be paid $10,000 and where there is no showing that the woman is an unfit mother or that the natural father and his wife are fit parents runs counter to laws governing adoption and termination of parental rights and the public policies of keeping children with both of their natural parents and of treating the rights of natural parents equally concerning the custody of children and is therefore VOID. Nonetheless, based solely on the best interests of the child, custody was granted to the Sterns, with visitation rights to Mrs. Whitehead.
Ordoyo
222 332
In Re: Baby M
109 N.J. 396 RATIO: Adoption through private placement is "very much disfavored" in New Jersey law. The use of money for the purpose of adoption through private placement is illegal and perhaps criminal. A contract under which the mother, before the baby is born, agrees to surrender all parental rights to the child is coercive. In a case such as this, the best interests of the child become secondary to the market concerns of facilitating an adoption: the child is "sold" without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable parents; the natural mother does not receive the benefit of counseling and guidance; and the monetary incentive to sell may, in some circumstances, make her decision less voluntary. The adoptive parents may not be fully informed of the surrogate's medical history. Statues provide that a surrender of parental rights can only occur where there has been a voluntary surrender of a child to an approved agency or to the state, accompanied by a formal document acknowledging termination of parental rights or where there has been a showing of parental abandonment or unfitness. Under the contract, the rights of the mother are irrevocably termination before she knows the strength of her bond with the child. Therefore, she cannot give informed consent. There is a danger that surrogacy will be a benefit to the rich at the expense of the poor. Mr. Stern was never denied the right to procreate because the custody, care, companionship and nurturing that follow birth are not parts of the right to procreation. To assert that Mr. Stern's right to procreation gives him the right to the custody of Baby M. would be to assert that Mrs. Whitehead's right to procreation does not give her the right to the custody of Baby M.; it would be to assert that said right includes within it a constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy somebody else's right of procreation. EQUAL PROTECTION: The state has a sufficient basis for distinguishing between a sperm donor and a surrogate mother, even if the only difference is between the time it takes to provide sperm for artificial insemination and the time invested in a nine-month pregnancy.
Ordoyo
223 332
Johnson v. Calvert
851 P.2d 776 ll May 20, 1993 DOCTRINE: Under California law, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own is the natural mother. PROOF GIVEN: For the Calverts; Evidence of blood tests showing that Crispina is genetically related to the child FACTS: Mark and Crispina Calvert are married but unable to have a child. Anna Johnson offered to serve as surrogate mother. The two parties enter into a contract where Anna serves as surrogate, while the Calverts pay her $10,000 in installments as well as purchase a life insurance policy for Johnson. The relationship between the two sides soured, with Anna demanding the payment of the balance or else she would refuse to give up the child. The Calverts responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the child. Upon the birth of the child, it was proven through blood tests that Anna was NOT the genetic mother of the child. The trial court ruled that 1) the Calverts were the genetic, biological and natural parents of the child, 2) Anna had no parental rights to the child, and 3) the surrogacy contract was legal and enforceable against Annas claims, all of which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUES: - WON Anna can claim custody of the child - WON the surrogate contract violates public policy HELD: NO. Because undisputed evidence shows that Anna gave birth to the child and that only Crispina is genetically related to such child, and no clear legislative preference is given between blood tests and gestation as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, then the case can only be decided by looking at the intent of both parties as manifested by the surrogacy agreement. Basing it on such agreement, it is clear then that the parties aim was to bring the Calverts child into the world, and not for them to donate the zygote to Anna. From the outset, Crispina intended to be the mother of the child. Annas act of carrying the child may have been indispensible for eventually giving birth to him, but she would not have been able to do so had she manifested her intent to keep the child as her own prior to the implantation of the zygote. Although the Uniform Parentage Act, which bases parent and child rights on the existence of a parent and child relationship, recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child is the natural mother under California law. NO. Gestational surrogacy is completely different from adoption, and as such, should not be subject to adoption statutes. Both parties voluntarily agreed to participate in in vitro fertilization before the child was conceived. Moreover, the financial considerations given to Anna ($10,000 and the purchase of an insurance policy) were NOT for her giving up her parental rights over the child but rather for carrying the child and undergoing labor.
Pagdanganan
224 332
In Re: Adoption of Anonymous

BIOLOGICAL - ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY DOCTRINE: A child born of consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage. The husband in such a relationship is therefore the parent, and his consent is required to the adoption of such child be another. FACTS: Husband and wife had a baby by consensual AID (artificial insemination donor) during their marriage. Husband and wife were registered parents in babys birth certificate. They separated and divorced but child was declared legitimate. Husband was given visitation rights while the wife and child received support. The wife later remarried and her new husband petitioned to adopt the child. The first husband refused to consent, and petitioner suggested that the first husbands consent was not required because he is not the natural parent of the child. ISSUE: WON first husbands consent is needed for the adoption of his child given that he is not the natural father. HELD: Yes. A child born of consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child; therefore the father of such child is the parent whose consent is required to the adoption of such child. The determinative factor is whether the legal relationship of the father and child exists. A child conceived through AID does not have a natural father, but does have a lawful father. In response to claims that AID constitutes adultery of the mother, the court found that in the absence of legislation prohibiting artificial insemination, the child was lawfully begotten and not the product of an illicit or adulterous relationship. Since there is consent by the husband, there is no marital infidelity. OTHER NOTES: New York has a strong policy in favor of legitimacy, so it is absurd to hold illegitimate a child born during a valid marriage, of parents desiring but unable to conceive a child, and both consenting and agreeing to the impregnation of the mother by a medically selected anonymous donor. This policy is for the protection of the child, not the parents.
Poblador
225 332
Andal v. Macaraig
DOCTRINE: Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. The presumption may only be rebutted if there is proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.15 FACTS: Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas were a married couple. Emiliano however, became sick of tuberculosis and his brother, Felix, lived with the couple in order to help out in the farm. Emiliano's illness gradually worsened until it came to the point where he was bedridden. On Sept. 10, 1942, Maria and Felix eloped and went to live with Maria's father. On January 1 1943, Emiliano died w/o the presence of his wife who didn't even turn up at his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to Mariano. Now, Mariano and his mother as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the CFI of Camarines Sur for recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano which had been given to him by his mother, Eduvigis Macaraig, by way of donation propter nuptias in favor of his marriage to Maria. ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas HELD: Yes. Mariano is the legitimate child of the spouses. Art 108 CC provides:
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the child.
Since Mariano was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano died on Jan. 1, 1943, he is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and Maria, he having been born w/in 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. Although Emiliano was suffering from tuberculosis and was bedridden, this doesn't change the fact that he still could have engaged sexual relations with his wife (as he was not impotent). Also, the fact that his wife was engaged in adulterous relations is not enough proof to contradict the presumption of legitimacy. Under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the Rules of Court,
The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of three hundred days following its dissolution.
15
See Art 166 FC: grounds for impugning legitimacy of children: physical impossibility here refers to physical incapacity to have sexual intercourse/ H+W living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible/ serious illness of the husband which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse
Quiambao
226 332
Jao v. CA
DOCTRINE: If it can be proved by blood tests that the child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition. FACTS: Arlene Salgado and Perico Jao lived together as husband and wife Salgado gave birth to Janice Salgado, filed for recognition and support from Jao. Jao denied paternity Blood grouping test of NBI established that Jao was not the father Salgado claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in cases where they tended to establish paternity ISSUE: WON the admissibility and conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests can prove non-paternity HELD: YES If it can be proved by blood tests that the child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the nonpaternity of respondent Jao visavis petitioner Janice. EXTRA FACTS: Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of the child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the father of a particular child, but at least can show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
Quilala
227 332
Macadangdang v. CA
FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. Due to their affair, she and her husband separated. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967. Respondent (Elizabeth Mejias) filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner, which the latter opposed by filing a petition for dismissal. The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. Lower court eventually dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed to the CA. CA reversed the LC's decision, declaring minor Rolando to be the illegitimate child of Rolando Macadangdang. Respondent appealed through a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it. ISSUES: Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw HELD: Crucial Point: Respondent's initial illicit affair with petitioner occurred sometime in March, 1967 which caused her separation with the husband (according to her) BUT! The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were separated in 1965 cannot be considered conclusive and binding on this Court. It is based solely on the testimony of respondent which is self-serving. Nothing in the records shows that her statement was confirmed or corroborated by another witness and the same cannot be treated as borne out by the record or that which is based on substantial evidence. It is not even confirmed by her own husband, who was not impleaded. Bear in mind the Civil Code provisions: Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: (1) By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way that access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband. Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. There was no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From her very revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her four children by her husband in her mother's house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband also lived in her mother's place. Child was born October 30, 1967 which was
Ramos
228 332
Macadangdang v. CA
seven months after their first illicit intercourse and consequently the separation between the husband and the wife (if in fact they did). Note, the couple had been already married years before such date (with 4 children). HENCE: After 180 days following marriage: Check! Before 300 days following (alleged) separation: Check NOTE: Child had no birth certificate of baptism. If indeed March 1967 was the time they had sex and child was born October 1967, then it would be just 7 months. But it was shown that the baby was born normally (full term; it was not premature). Yaya took care of him, which if it was just 7 months he should be in the incubator! How can he be the child of Antonio Macadangdang? *JUST TO NOTE: In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified but not the veracity of the states or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. BACK TO THE TOPIC: The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. (physical impossibility cited above in Art. 257) This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption. To overthrow this, it should be beyond reasonable doubt. Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function, which is different from sterility. The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual access impossible. The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of his having sexual intercourse with his wife.
Ramos
229 332
Chua Keng Giap v. IAC

FACTS: The Court is facing yet another bid by the petitioner insisting that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao and it was an error for the respondent court to reject his claim. He also contests the denial of his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that it had been filed on time. This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao. The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case had long become final and executory. ISSUE: WON petitioner really is Sy Kaos son. HELD: Petition was denied. The Court held that petitioner was, in fact, beating a dead (, decomposing, maggot ridden, fly-infested,) horse. The Court had already ruled in finality the matter of filiations between the petitioner and his alleged mother. It has already passed on in Sy Kao v Court of Appeals where Sy Kao herself flatly denied that he was her son. There is no better person who could say that petitioner was her son other than Sy Kao herself. The Court observed through Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.: Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua Keng Giap is her son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's opposition filed on December 19, 1968, is based principally on the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan Kuy. After hearing on the merits which lasted for ten years, the court dismissed the respondent's petition on March 2, 1979 on a finding that he is not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and the deceased, and therefore, had no lawful interest in the estate of the latter and no right to institute the intestacy proceedings. There is no point in prolonging these proceedings with an examination of the procedural objections to the grant of the motion to dismiss. In the end, assuming denial of the motion, the resolution of the merits would have to be the same anyway as in the aforesaid case. The petitioner's claim of filiation would still have to be rejected. Discussion of the seasonableness of the motion for reconsideration is also unnecessary as the motion would have been validly denied just the same even if filed on time.
Reposar
230 332
Cabatbat Lim v. IAC

G.R. No. L-69679 ll Oct. 18, 1988 ll Grio - Aquino, J. FACTS: Case at hand is a squabble over the estate of late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat. Petitioner is Violeta Cabatbat-Lim who claims to be the only child of Esperanza while the respondents are the sisters and children of a deceased brother. Private respondents (sisters of Esperanza) filed at CFI Pangasinan for partitioning of Esperanzas estate (died intestate on 4/23/77). Part of her estate is the Calasiao Bijon Factory which is in possession of Violeta (alleged child of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat). They were saying that Violeta is only a ward (ampon) through the ff evidences: - Absence of any records that Esperanza was admitted to hospital where Esperanza was supposedly born - Absence of birth certificate in the live birth section of the Provincial Hospital (19471948) - Civil registry certification of 3/9/77 that there is no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat from5/26/48 or 49 - Certification that Esperanza and Proceso were only guardians (from Principal II of the Pilot School) Amparo Resides testimony on 5/21/48 that she was in the Provincial Hospital to watch a cousin give birth and there she met Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC Baby Girl Lastimosa on 5/26/48 (now known as Violeta Cabatbat) Violeta on the other hand tried to adduce evidence that will support her claim. Among which he showed are the following: - Her birth record filed 6/15/48 showing her birth of 5/26/48 and that shes a Legitimate Child of Esperanza and Prospero Procesos testimony that shes his child w/ Esperanza Benita Lastimosas denial that she delivered at Provincial Hospital Marriage Certificate of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao showed that Esperanza is the mother of the bride Deed of Sale 5/14/60 where minor Violeta is assisted by mother Esperanza Deed of Absolute Sale 4/21/61 assisted by father Proceso
TC held that Violeta is NOT natural child of Esperanza and Proceso therefore NOT a legal heir. ISSUE: WON Violeta is a natural child of Esperanza and Proceso HELD: NO. TC and CA findings on filiation is given great accord, conclusive upon the SC. TC then said that the Registry Book of hospital admission doesnt even Esperanza was a patient on 5/26/48 and it doesnt even show that Esperanza was ever admitted from 12/1/47 6/15/48. On 5/26/48, Records only show that there was one birth at that day and that was Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC baby girl Lastimosa. Absence of birth record in the Civil Regitry makes her exhibit doubtable. Moreover, her reliance on NCC 263 is misplaced as such action is not to impugned legitimacy but to claim inheritance as legal heirs from a childless aunt. They do not claim that shes an Illegitimate Child but that shes not a child of their aunt at all.
Reyes, G.
231 332
Republic v. Labrador
G.R. No. 132980 ll Mar. 25, 1999 DOCTRINE: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Art 412 CC: may be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed. FACTS: Sept 26, 1997: Gladys C. Labrador filed a Petition for the correction of entries in the record of birth of Sarah Zita Erasmo (her niece) in RTC-Cebu. Change of name of SARAH ZITA C. ERASMO to SARAH ZITA CAON She alleges that her sister only had a common law relationship with Degoberto Erasmo; hence Sarah Zita is illegitimate and she shall use her mothers surname pursuant to Art. 176 FC. The mother is now living in US with her foreigner husband. Change of the name of petitioners sister which was erroneously written as ROSEMARIE CAON instead of MARIA ROSARIO CAON Gladys reported that she was the one who erroneously gave Rosemarie as the name of the childs mother to the Civil Registrar since she was more familiarly known as such RTC-Cebu granted her petition. SolicitorGeneral files a petition for Review on certiorari. ISSUE + RD: WON Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper action to impugn the legitimacy of a child. NO. It is inapplicable. See the above-mentioned doctrine. The RoC shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, it cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding (a full hearing not merely a summary proceeding). Should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. Thus, Sarah Zita and her parents should have been parties to the proceeding. The change will affect her legitimacy, as well as her successional and other rights. It might also embarrass her due to the social stigma that illegitimacy may bring. There is also no sufficient legal explanation has been given why an aunt, who had no appointment as guardian of the minor, was the party-petitioner.
Reyes, N.
232 332
Tan v. Trocio
A.C. No. 2115 ll Nov. 27, 1990 ll Melencio-Herrera, J. PROOF OF PATERNITY USED: Birth Certificate of Jewel Tan in the name of Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok DOCTRINE: Presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible. NATURE OF COMPLAINT: Disbarment of Trocio for immoral conduct. RULING: Complaint dismissed. FACTS: Tan is an owner and directress of the Harlyn Vocational School. She alleges that sometime in April 1971, the legal counsel of the school, Atty. Trocio, raped her. On February 1972, she begot a son who she named Jewel. Trocio replied by saying that it is true that he is the legal counsel of the vocational school, that he assisted Tan in collecting money from insurance companies. However, he denies that he raped Tan. ISSUE: WON Trocio should be disbarred for immoral conduct. HELD: Trocio should NOT be disbarred. On lack of proof: - The rape allegedly took place in 1971 but no criminal charge was filed and the complaint appeared only in 1979. - Tan continued having dealings and doing business with Trocio as if nothing happened, such as helping Tan, her mother and her sister to prosecute a robbery case. - Her silence and continued relations with Trocio made it appear as condonation. It is strange for an unwanted son to be named Jewel Not proved that the child was his. In the birth certificate, Jewel is the legitimate child of Tan and her husband, Tan Le Pok
Sevilla
233 332
People v. Tumimpad
DOCTRINE: Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child. (Prieto not father) FACTS: Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15 year old Mongoloid child (Sandra). The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a twostorey officers' quarters Four security men were assigned to Salcedo, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad. Sandra complained of constipation, irritability and moodiness. Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." Sandra was brought to the hospital and was confirmed pregnant, 9 months later she gave birth to Jacob Salcedo Result of the blood test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and Tumimpad type "O". ISSUE: WON the accused committed the crime of rape HELD: Accused held that he was always with Col. Salcedo, but this was proven to be untrue, and the mom testified that there were times that Sandra was left alone with accused. Accused simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type "O". Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
Tan de Guzman
234 332
Benitez Badua v. CA
G.R. No. 105625 ll Jan. 24, 1994 FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses. ISSUE: WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy. HELD: The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared that he was the petitioners father.
Tejano
235 332
De Aparicio v. Paraguya
May. 29, 1987 ll Gancayco, J. FACTS: Trinidad Montilde had an affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and conceived a child thereafter. To avoid scandal, she married Anastacio Mamburao in her fourth month of pregnancy. They never lived together as husband and wife. 192 days after the marriage, Consolacion Lumain was born. When her father (Rev. Lumain) died, he executed a will granting her as sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests. ISSUE: (1) WON Consolacion is the child of Fr. Lumain? (2) WON she is entitled to heir? record of birth or by an authentic document or a final judgment > duly probated will of the deceased recognizing her as his natural daughter. (2) Yes because of his duly probated will in Court, designating her as his only heir. Paternity is unnecessary to determine. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
natural be his OTHER ISSUES: Respondent was also arguing that he bought the land from a third person but upon closer look of the court, the land he was talking about was outside the property of the Lumains. The land was left to Felipe and Macario by there parents. Since there is a probated of Felipe, who died before Macario, the latter could not inherit from the former. There is co-ownership between Consolacion and Macario
HELD: (1) Yes. Although there is the presumption that the plaintiff is the daughter of the spouses Anastacio and Trinidad, this was revoked by the account of the plaintiffs mother. Bearing in mind the date of the birth of her child (192 days after the marriage), it is evident that the moher was still single at the time she was conceived. Under Art 265 of the civil code, filiation of a legitimate child is proven by the
Tiangco
236 332
Constantino v. Mendez
G.R. No. 57227 ll May. 14, 1992 ll Bidin, J. DOCTRINE: ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE The evidence presented by the woman was the time that she and the man had sexual intercourse; however, this declaration was not considered as clear and convincing evidence by the Court. The date was very crucial to the determination if Michael was indeed conceived during the time the woman and man were having sexual relations. There was also no proof that the woman did not have any sexual encounter with other men. FACTS: Amelita Constantino was a waitress at Tonys restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and there she met Ivan Mendez sometime in August 1974. The next day, she was invited by Ivan to dine with him at Hotel Enrico and courted her. Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. He later on confessed that he is a married man. Despite this, they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974 and as a result, Amelita got pregnant. She asked for support but Ivan refused to attend to her. Amelita claimed that she had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs. Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's restaurant but denied having carnal knowledge her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. After giving birth to Michael, Amelita filed an amended complaint. The trial court ruled in favor of Amelita and ordered Mendez to pay her the damages and to recognize her son Michael as his own illegitimate child. ISSUE: - WON Michael should be recognized as Ivans illegitimate child. NO. - WON Amelita is entitled to damages. NO. RATIO: The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed. Amelita's testimony on crossexamination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974 is inconsistent with her response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages should only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. More importantly, Constantino admitted that she was attracted to Mendez. The repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not promise of marriage was the reason that she allowed to submit herself to Ivan. Therefore she is not entitled to damages. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Yumol
237 332
Mendoza v. Mella
DOCTRINE: Although a birth certificate is by nature a public document, there must be a CLEAR STATEMENT in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own. Without such, voluntary recognition of filiation has no basis. FACTS: Litigated property was donated by Paciano Pareja to son Gavino in 1939. Gavino disappeared in 1943 (he died that year accord. to CA), leaving common-law wife Mendoza and son Rodolfo (petitioners). 1948: Paciano sold lot to Mella (respondent), who notified petitioners in 1952 to vacate lot. Petitioners ignored notice. Mella commenced action in 1955 on basis of deed of sale by Paciano. Petitioners claim ownership of contested land for Rodolfo on grounds of succession from Gavino and by adverse possession for more than 10 yrs. The issue of adverse possession for more than yearsis not well taken because it was raised for the first time with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/N Rodolfo may be considered acknowledged as natural child, entitled to successional rights, with a birth certificate as proof of filliation. CA: NO, for 2 reasons: i) Only evidence is Rodolfos birth certificate, which is NOT proof of acknowledgment, because the old Civil Code was never established in this country, thus Art. 131 referring to acknowledgement in record of birth never came into effect. ii) NO showing that Rodolfos parents could have married each other when he was conceived SC: NO, but for a different reason than CA; SC chose to resolve only the FIRST issue. Civil Registry Law passed in 1930 contained provisions for registration of births, including those of illegitimate parentage; record of birth under such law, if sufficient in contents for the purpose, would meet requisites for voluntary recognition. Rodolfo was born in 1935. Civil Registry Law applies. HOWEVER: the evidence is a mere certified copy of registry record, and not the actual birth certificate. Such is NOT sufficient proof of filiation because though it contains names of both parents, there is no showing that parents signed the original birth certificate, let alone that they swore to its contents. Even if birth certificate is in nature a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a child may be made, in such a case, there must be a CLEAR STATEMENT in document that parent recognizes the child as his or her own. Without such, voluntary recognition has no basis. HELD: Rodolfos birth certificate is not sufficient proof of filiation to Gavino.
Alampay
238 332
Lim v. CA
DOCTRINE: Marriage certificate does not satisfy the required solemnity of a public document as proof of filiation. FACTS: Felisa Lim and Francisco Uy claimed they inherited, to the exclusion of the other, a house and lot in Sta. Cruz Manila as sole heir of Susana Lim. Felisa Lims pieces of evidence: certificate of baptism [stating that Felisa is natural daughter of Susana] and marriage certificate [stating that Susana gave consent to Felisas marriage] Francisco Uys pieces of evidence: application of alien registration, order cancelling alien reg and identification certificate all issued by Bureau of Immigration [Uys Filipino citizenship by derivation from mom Susana Lim] TC: Felisa Lim sole heir CA: neither is entitled to inheritance because neither of them had been recognized by Susana Lim as her child by any of the means provided for by law; and neither had either of them been declared in a judicial proceeding to be a child of Susana Lim." ISSUES: 1. WON Felisas marriage certificate is enough proof of filiation 2. WON Fransisco is entitled to the property because he purchased it w/ his money before Susana died [not pertinent to class discussion but just in case] HELD: 1. No. Section 131 of the Civil Code of 1889 requires that the recognition of a natural child "be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document." However, article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889 provides that public documents "are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law." The public document referred to in Sec 131 of CC belongs to the 1st class [executed by private individual that is authenticated by a notary]. Marriage contract does not satisfy the requirement of solemnity mentioned above. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. 2. No for two reasons: a) Uy raised the theory of implied trust for the first time in her motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court; b) the evidence regarding the alleged purchase by her late husband is altogether unconvincing.
Bayona
239 332
HEIRS OF R. BAAS v. HEIRS OF BIBIANO BAAS

G.R. No. L-25715 ll Jan. 3, 1985 ll Makasiar, J. PROOFS PRESENTED IN THIS CASE: (1) A note from Bibiano Banas admonishing Raymundo for staying out late and which has been signed by the former with Su Padre at the end; (2) School records of Raymundo including matriculation certificates indicating him as hijo de Bibiano Banas, and a report card bearing Bibianos signature for a parent/guardian; (3) Certified copy of Raymundos marriage certificate indicating his father to be Bibiano; (4) Typewritten letters containing Raymundos autobiography, statement of personal circumstances, and statement of grievances intimated with Atty. Faustino regarding his bitterness on Bibianos heirs unwillingness to have him partake on Bibianos estate FACTS: The late Raymundo Baas was a natural child born out of wedlock of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father. When he went to school, it was Bibiano Baas who shouldered all his school expenses. During one of his frequent visits to Bibianos house, he met Trinidad Vecino, whom he eventually married. In their marriage certificate, Bibiano was named as Raymundos father, while Pedro Baas, Bibianos brother, was indicated as a sponsor therein. Bibiano died in 1955, survived by his wife and children, who are the defendants-appellees in this case. Eight years later, Raymundo also died, survived by his wife and children, who, on the other hand are this cases plaintiffs-appellants. Three years after Raymundos death, his wife and children instituted the present case to partake on the estate of Bibiano, they being the descendants of Raymundo whom they allege to be Bibianos acknowledged natural son and therefore one of his rightful heirs, as well as to collect fruits and damages against the children of Bibiano. Thus, plaintiffs-appellants presented the proofs indicated above to establish their claim, which proofs, as claimed by Trinidad were only discovered after Raymundos death. Meanwhile, Bibianos heirs presented duplicates of sworn statements made by Raymundo and Pedro to the effect that the former had only belatedly known that the latter was his father, that the latter recognizes him as his son, and that they wish to correct the entry made in the formers marriage certificate which indicated Bibiano as his father; and made by Bibiano to the effect that Pedro was Raymundos father. The Court of First Instance ruled in favour of the defendants-appellees, finding plaintiffs-appellants proofs of filiation to be insufficient. ISSUES: A. WON proofs presented by Raymundo Baas are sufficient to prove that Bibiano Baas had voluntarily acknowledged the Raymundo as his natural son B. WON the heirs of Raymundo Baas can assert his personal right to claim filiation on his behalf RULING: The decision appealed from was affirmed by the Court, who held that there was no voluntary recognition. RATIO DECIDENDI: A. NO. The court conceded that Art. 278 of the NCC should be given retroactive effect: Art. 278Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a wilt a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. Applying this provision to the proofs presented by plaintiffs-appellants: (1) The note containing Su Padre was insufficient proof of voluntary recognition considering the context of the entire letter and the Filipino tendency to treat children in their extended families as their own. As such, it was only an indication of paternal solicitude and does not meet the requirement of Art. 278 that recognition of natural children should be precise, express and solemn. Neither can plaintiffs-appellants succeed on their argument of incidental acknowledgment, which only applies when recognition is made in a public document, which naturally, people are
Cadorna
240 332
HEIRS OF R. BAAS v. HEIRS OF BIBIANO BAAS

G.R. No. L-25715 ll Jan. 3, 1985 ll Makasiar, J. more careful with so that any incidental acknowledgment made therein enjoys a presumption of truth. This only applied to Art. 131 of the Old Civil Code, which required filiation to be acknowledged only in a public document. Meanwhile, the private document shown by plaintiffs-appellants could have made a case for compulsory recognition if it has qualified as an indubitable writing under Art. 135 of the Old Civil Code. However, the requisite for this type of recognition, in contrast to the voluntary recognition contemplated in Art. 131, is that acknowledgment be direct and express. As already mentioned Su Padre was insufficient to make the note qualify as an indubitable writing, therefore, Art. 135 also does not apply. (2) and (3) The school records and marriage certificates are likewise insufficient proofs because they were not personally prepared by Bibiano. There are no records of any evidence to show that Bibiano Baas furnished the statements therein or that he had any participation in securing the enrollment and the marriage certificate of Raymundo nor made representations in connection therewith. Meanwhile, as regards Bibianos signature appearing at the back of Raymundos report card, it could either mean parental solicitude, or Bibiano signing it in his capacity as guardian. (4) Nowhere in the letters of Raymundo to Atty. Faustino did he claim his right against the estate of Bibiano. Also, the statement of personal circumstances and autobiography were made at a time after Raymundo aired his grievances over Bibianos heirs treatment to their fathers estate, and thus, the possibility that Raymundo has personal hidden motives other than establishing filiation cannot be discounted. Besides the application of the abovementioned provision, the court also cited that all the documents presented by the plaintiffs-appellants ran contrary to the public documents made by Pedro and Raymundo, acknowledging their relationship as father and son, and by Bibiano, corroborating the same in his own personal statement. The latters statement, if it were to be conceded that Bibiano, at any time, recognized Raymundo as his son, can be taken to be a renunciation of the same, which renunciation is not prohibited by law. These public documents are more reliable, also taking into consideration the fact that Raymundo did not make any claim for compulsory recognition as Bibianos heir during the eight years that passed before Bibianos and his death. Trinidads testimony that all these facts were unknown to her prior to her husbands death is belied by human experience and her inconsistent testimonies during the trial. B. NO. Granting that, after the death of Bibiano Baas, Raymundo could file an action for compulsory recognition against Bibiano's heirs despite his not being under the exceptions set forth by Art. 135 of the Old Civil Code or Art. 283 of the New Civil Code, still plaintiffsappellants cannot invoke Raymundo's right to file such action, because it is not transmissible to the natural child's heirs; the right is purely a personal one to the natural child, and such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him
Cadorna
241 332
Republic v. CA and Vicencio

G.R. No. 88202 ll Quisumbing, J. FACTS Appeal of the decision of the RTC allowing Cynthia Vicencios change of surname to Yu. Cynthias legitimate father Pablo Vicencio left the family before she turned 1. Her mother instituted an action to declare her father an absentee and then subsequently married her step-father Ernesto Yu who acted as her father since. She used Vivencio on official documents such as school records and used Yu when she participated in public functions. The trial court granted the change of name and stated that failure to resort to adoption by the step-father should not be a cause for disallowing the legal change of name. CA affirmed the TC decision, holding that it was in the best interest of the petitioner to change the surname as the discrepancy between the original surname and the surname of the stepfather who has been socially recognized as her father caused her embarrassment and inferiority complex. Sol Gen argued that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant the change of surname and that it might even cause confusion and legal complications because her mother and step-father have children of their own and she might even claim inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter. ISSUE WON petitioners change of surname to that of her stepfathers is allowed. HELD & RD NO. The Court upheld the grave legal consequences that the Sol Gen argued. Also, since she is the legitimate child of her biological parents, she is supposed to bear her legitimate fathers surname. Change of name is a privilege and not a right, and should therefore be carefully considered by the courts and to deny the same unless proper and reasonable causes are shown. Decision is the same regardless of Cynthias age.
Cristobal
242 332
De Asis v. CA
PETITIONER: Manuel De Asis RESPONDENTS: CA, Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy and Glen Camil Andres De Asis, represented by mother/guardian Vircel De Asis Doctrine: The right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301, FC). Furthermore, the right to support cannot be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035, FC). FACTS: In 1988, Vircel De Asis, on behalf of her child Glen Camil, filed an action for maintenance and support from Manual De Asis alleging that he is the father of the child and the he refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the child, despite repeated demands. Manuel denied his paternity of the said minor and that he cannot therefore be required to provide support. Both parties though agreed to dismiss the complaint. In 1995, another complaint for maintenance and support was again filed by same parties against Manuel, which was granted by the Kalookan RTC and ordered Manuel to pay for support and allowance. Manuel moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that present suit is barred by the prior judgment. RTC ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. He then filed a petition for certiorari to CA, which was dismissed under the same grounds and which led to current petition in SC. ISSUE: WoN respondent courts acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata RULING: Petition dismissed, RTC & CA decisions affirmed. RATIO: No. Both courts applied the correct principles regarding right to support. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person under Art.301, FC. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise under Art.2035,FC.The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. Thus, the agreement between the mother and the alleged father regarding the dismissal of the first complaint for support is in the nature of a compromise and as such, violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence, not by the will or agreement of the parties. In this case, lack of filiation was not considerably established. This means that the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of another action, thus second action may still prosper.
Cruz
243 332
Rodriguez v. CA
G.R. No. 85723 ll Jun. 19, 1995 FACTS: On October 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos brought an action for compulsory recognition against Bienvenido Rodriguez. Agbulos brought her mother as first witness. She identified the plaintiffs father, but the opposing counsel objected, on the basisof Art. 280 CC16. The trial court sustained it but CA, which is of the opinion that the testimony may be allowed, reversed the order. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari to the SC. ISSUE: WON the mothers testimony identifying the putative father of Agbulos may be accepted. HELD: Yes. By tracing the counterpart provisions from the Spanish Civil Code, New Civil Code and the Family Code, the Court concluded that Art. 280 referred to voluntary recognition and not to be applied for compulsory recognition. The Court noted that the respondent relied on Art. 283 CC and Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court17 to defend the admissibility of her mothers testimony. Article 172 FC has adopted Art. 283 CC, particularly paragraph 4, where filiation may be proven by any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. Furthermore, the Court also noted that Art. 280 CC was not just repealed; it no longer has a counterpart prohibition in the Family Code, which undoubtedly discloses the intention of the legislative authority to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children.
16
When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal he name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be identified. 17 Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Dantes
244 332
Mariategui v CA
G.R. No. L-57062 ll Bidin, J. DOCTRINE: Filiation can be proven using a Birth Certificate. Without it, the continuous enjoyment of the status as a child is still sufficient proof of filiation. This case is simply an illustration of Art 172 FC. FACTS: Lupo Mariategui had 3 wives (and 3 sets of children) during his lifetime. (1) The first, Eusebia, died in 1904 and left him 4 children. (hereinafter First set) (2) The second, Flaviana, he married in 1910, and with whom they had 1 daughter. (hereinafter Second set) (3) The third, Felipa, he married sometime in 1930, and with whom they had 3 children (Jacinto, Paulina, Julian). Felipa died in 1941. (hereinafter Third set) Lupo died in 1953. In 1973, his descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition wherein they adjudicated for themselves a piece of land in Muntinglupa.18 The third set of children filed a complaint alleging that the extrajudicial partition deprived them of their respective shares. The first set argued that The complaint was one for the recognition of natural children (wherein Art 27819 and 28520 CC shall apply with respect to prescription for the recognition of natural children) Prescription has barred the third set of children from claiming their right to demand their share of the partition. And that they (third set of children) belatedly filed an action for recognition and they werent able to prove their successional rights over the estate TC: Dismissed CA: All descendants, including the third set, are entitled to equal shares of the estate. ISSUES: WON this is a case primarily of recognition of natural children21 WON the third set of children are legitimate WON Prescription bars the third set from claiming their share of the partition. HOLDING & RATIO: Petition (by first set of children) DENIED, CA decision AFFIRMED: This is an action principally of partition (NOT for recognition); the status of the third set of children was raised only collaterally to assert their rights to the estate. The third set of children are legitimate because There is a presumption of marriage between Lupo and Felipa o They deported themselves as husband and wife o They were known in the community as such o Even if there was no marriage certificate, no evidence was offered to controvert the presumption Jacintos (child of the third set of children) birth certificate is sufficient
18
In effect, the first and second set of children tried to defraud the third set of children from their rightful shares. 19 Art. 278 CC. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. 20 Art. 285 CC. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. 21 Because if it is indeed such a case, then the filing of the action for recognition has indeed prescribed as per Art 285 CC.
De Castro
245 332
Mariategui v CA
G.R. No. L-57062 ll Bidin, J. proof of filiation of legitimate children as per Art 172 FC22 Even if Julian and Paulina could not present any evidence, they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo which is still sufficient proof to establish filiation of legitimate children in Art 172. Prescription does not run against the third set of children So long as they have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. In other words, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners without a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. The execution of the extrajudicial partition and registration of the properties in their own names (First set) cannot be considered as repudiation of the co-ownership because it was not duly communicated to the third set of children who were their legitimate coheirs
22
Art. 172 FC. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
De Castro
246 332
Aruego, Jr. v. CA
PETITIONERS: Jose E. Aruego, Jr., Simeona San Juan Aruego, Ma. Immaculada T. Alanon, Roberto A. Torres, Cristina A. Torres, Justo Jose Torres and Agustin Torres RESPONDENTS: The Hon. Court of Appeals, 13th Division and Antonia Aruego DOCTRINE: Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as it prejudices the vested right of persons under the Civil Code FACTS: In 1983 (Mar. 7), a Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed by Private respondent and her sister (Antonia and Evelyn Aruego), represented by their mother (Luz Fabian) The respondents allege that: The late Jose Aruego, a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian Antonia and Evelyn was born out of this relationship They are thus illegitimate children of Jose Aruego BASIS OF ACTION: Open and continuous possession of the status as illegitimate children (Art. 285 CC) Regular support and educational expenses Allowance to use his surname Payment of maternal bills and baptismal expenses Taking them out to restaurants and departments stores on occasions of family rejoicing Attendance to school problems Introducing them as such children to family friends Art. 285 (CC) The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority. Petitioners contend that: With the advent of the Family Code, jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription has shifted from the CC to the FC o From the 4 years after attainment of his majority to during the lifetime of the alleged parent o This is because when the sisters filed the petition, it was almost 1 year after the death of their presumed father
Art. 172 (FC) The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws Art. 175 (FC) Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Art. 173 [during the lifetime of the child] except when the action is based on the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Art. 256 (FC) This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Dilag
247 332
Aruego, Jr. v. CA
Code or other laws. ISSUE: WON the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case WON the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case HELD: NO Vested / Acquired Rights = not defined by the Family Code Left it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to them In the ruling in Tayag v. Court of Appeals: Right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. This right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. The application of Art. 175 of the Family Code will adversely affect the right of the private respondent. In the CC: Prescription will not yet bar the respondent from filing the petition, as they have filed within 1 year after attainment of majority and their father died while they were minors (period of within 4 years after attainment of majority) In the FC: Prescription is barred, as it requires the filing of the petition during the lifetime of the concerned parent PETITION IS DENIED DECISION OF CA AFFIRMED
Dilag
248 332
Jison v. CA
G.R. No. 124853 ll Feb. 4, 1998 DOCTRINE: Testimonial evidence was more than sufficient to establish her open and continuous possession of status as an illegitimate child. However, she cannot rely on her birth and baptismal certificates since it was not shown that the putative father had anything to do with the filing of said certificates. FACTS: Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mothers death and when she was already 39 years of age. Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar (a nanny), Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses. ISSUE: WON the evidence can prove filiation HELD: Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. The following facts were established based on the testimonial evidence offered by Monina: 1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by the former; 2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct. SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous possession. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence. Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
Dolot
249 332
Alberto v. CA
G.R. No. 86639 ll Jun. 2, 1994 PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS: Ma. Theresa R. Alberto Court of Appeals, intestate estate of Juan M. Alberto and Yolanda R. Alberto as a niece by Juans siblings and a cousin by their children. He proudly relayed to his friends the high grades on her report card. Juan would have visited her on her birthday in her school, if not for his death. Theresa and her mother were present in the Philippine General Hospital when Juan died, and Fr. Arcilla, Juans first cousin, held Theresas hand, asking the guard to make way for her and saying she was Juans daughter.
FACTS: Sweethearts Aurora Reniva and Governor Juan M. Alberto had a daughter, Ma. Theresa Alberto. Juan married Yolanda Reyes after Albertos birth. On Theresas 14th birthday, the governor was on his way to visit her. He was assassinated and died intestate. Juans widow Yolanda petitioned for the administration of his estate and was appointed administratrix. Theresa motioned to intervene as oppositor and re-open the proceedings, praying that she be declared as having acquired the status of a natural child, and thus being entitled to share in Juans estate. The trial court decided in her favor and compelled Juans heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. ISSUES May recognition of the child be ordered upon the estate and heirs of the deceased parent, based on evidence that the child has been in continuous possession of natural status? RATIO Yes. The Court granted the petition, which reversed the Court of Appeals ruling and affirmed that of the trial court. The following was established by the trial court, and was deemed to have sufficiently proven that Juan recognized Theresa as his daughter: - Theresa used Alberto as her surname in all her school records, and Juan was known to be her father by the school personnel. - Juan paid for Theresas education. - She was recognized as Juans daughter by his relatives and friends, and was regarded
The acts not only of Juan but also of his relatives demonstrate that the recognition of Theresas status was made not only by Juan but by his relatives as well. Since there were no legal impediments between Juan and Theresas mother Aurora, they could have validly married. As a natural child, Theresa occupies the highest in the hierarchy of illegitimate children. Thus, the present petition was found to be covered by Art. 235 of the Civil Code: Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority. Juan died on Sept. 18, 1967Thereses 14th birthday. </3 Therese would reach 21 on Sept. 18, 1974, and would still have until Sept. 18, 1978 to file the action for recognition. Since the action was filed on Sept. 15, 1978, it was within the deadline.
Espaola
250 332
Guy v. CA
G.R. No. 163707 ll Sep. 15, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J. PETITIONER: MICHAEL C. GUY RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES FACTS: Respondent minors Karen & Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration, claiming that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati in 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10M consisting of real and personal properties. Sima Weis known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy and their children all surnamed Guy. Respondents prayed that Michael Guy (Petitioner) be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Michael, on the other hand, prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei, pursuant to Art. 175 of FC. In a supplement to their (Michael and coheirs) Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioners claim that respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, respondents discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. RTC denied motion to dismiss, because Remedios has not been established as the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters no renunciation of right occurred. (For 1st issue, respondents issued a certificate of non-forum shopping signed by their counsel only, not including their siggies.) ISSUES: (1) WoN Respondents petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; (2) WoN the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes respondents from claiming their successional rights; (3) WoN respondents are barred by prescription from proving filiation. HELD: (1) No. Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of nonforum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, while a petition may be flawed where the certificate of nonforum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. (2) No. the Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar the minor respondents from claiming successional rights. The SC ruled that there was no waiver of hereditary rights waiver was not clear on the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300k and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.did not specifically mention respondents share in the estate of Sima Wei. Also, according to Article 1044 of CC: Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right.
Enad
251 332
Guy v. CA
G.R. No. 163707 ll Sep. 15, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J. (3) No. To rule as such would be premature, because respondents have yet to present evidence. Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. Petition denied. Case remanded for reception of evidence.
Enad
252 332
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz

FACTS: Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky Diaz, filed a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation against Rogelio Ong before RTC of Tarlac. Jinky, who was married to a Hasegawa Katsuo Feb 1993, cohabited and lived together with Rogelio from Jan 1994- Sept 1998 She alleges that from this relationship, Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25 1998 Rogelio paid for all the hospital and baptismal expenses. However, in September 1998, Rogelio abandoned Joanne and Jinky RTC ruled in favor of Jinky and Joanne, recognizing the latter as an illegitimate child since Hasegawa only went home once a year, thus making it impossible to be the father Rogelio appealed to the CA. During pendency of the case though, he died. CA ruled in the reverse and ordered that the case be remanded to trial courts for DNA Testing. Petitioner, estate of Rogelio Ong, challenges this decision alleging that: 1) Joanne is the legitimate heir of Jinky and Japanese man 2) That DNA testing would be not advisable since Rogelio's already dead ISSUES: 1) WON CA erred in not declaring Joanne as the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky 2) WON DNA Analysis is still feasible notwithstanding the death of Rogelio HELD: 1) Though there is a reasonable presumption in favor of legitimacy for a child born in a marriage, this is not conclusive. This can be overthrown by evidence like: - impossibility for the parents to conceive the child on said date - impotence of the husband - record of birth appearing in the civil registrar admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by parent concerned etc 2) New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter of ligitation Sec 4 provides that DNA testing can push through if a biological sample exists - Even if Rogelio already died, any of biological samples (saliva, tissues, hairs, and bones) can be used for DNA Testing. (Any physical residue of the long dead parent can be resorted to) CA ruling affirmed
Hermosisima
253 332
Uyguangco v. CA
DOCTRINE: If the action to establish illegitimate filiation is based on the second paragraph of Article 172 (secondary evidence), the action may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. PROOF OF FILIATION: Open and continuous possession of status as illegitimate children (lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving of support, use of fathers surname, shared profits of a family business, directorship in a family corporation) FACTS: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife and four children (petitioners) and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Uyguangco (respondent) filed a complaint against the petitioners. To prove his filiation, Graciano alleged that at the age of 15, he moved to his fathers hometown, he received support from his father while he was studying and he was assigned by his father as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store. (SEE OTHER PROOF MENTIONED ABOVE). However, he admit that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 (record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record on in any authentic writing) to show that he was the illegitimate son of the deceased. Petitioners: Respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code as the only evidence allowed under Article 278 CC to prove the claim was not available to himself. RTC: Graciano could prove his alleged filiation. CA affirmed. NOTE: Since the case was decided in 1989, the Court already applied the Family Code provisions as the Civil Code provisions the petitioners invoke has been superseded, or modified by the FC. ISSUES: WON Graciano should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claim father, who is already dead, in the absence of documentary (primary) evidence required. HELD: No. His action should be barred under Article 175 of the FC. RD: Under Article 175 of FC, illegitimate children may establish their legitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. In the absence of the primary evidence mentioned in Article 172, respondent is now allowed to establish his claimed of filiation by 1) open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or 2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The problem of the respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph (secondary evidence) of Article 172 of the FC, his action is now barred because of his alleged fathers death in 1975. The second paragraph of Article 175 states that when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his filiation through any means allowed by the ROC or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged sonss illegitimate filiation. Rationale of the rule (Sempio Diy): It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their
Macariola
254 332
Uyguangco v. CA
filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming the illegitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
Macariola
255 332
David v. CA
Nov. 16, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Daisie T. David and respondent Ramon R. Villar had an intimate relationship that resulted in the birth of Christopher J. respondent Villar was married at the time that the said intimate relationship took place. In 1991, Villar took Christopher on a family vacation to Boracay with the consent of the petitioner. After the said trip, Villar refused to return custody of Christopher to David. In response to his refusal to return custody of the child, David filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of her son with the RTC of Angeles City. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the respondent to return custody to David and furnish their children with support. The respondent subsequently raised the issue before the Court of Appeals that ruled in his favor, stating that the petition for habeas corpus was not appropriate because the parental authority of the mother over illegitimate children was express under the provisions of law. As such, questions regarding custody and support could be raised in a single petition. Taking into consideration that the respondent was financially better off compared to the petitioner, the CA awarded custody to Villar. Petitioner then raised the issue to the level of the Supreme Court. ISSUES: - WON the mother of an illegitimate child could petition for habeas corpus in order to regain custody of her child - WON the financial and material superiority of the husband compared with the mother may grant him custody of their illegitimate child HELD: NO. The Court cited Rule 102, sec. 1 of the Rules of Court that provided that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. In correlation with this, the court then referred to Art. 176 of the Family Code that stated that illegitimate children are placed under the parental authority of their mother. Taking those two provisions in conjunction with each other, the Court ruled that petitioner was entitled to relief through habeas corpus because her rightful custody to Christopher J. was being deprived by her husband. NO. Although it was true that the respondents financial status would likely afford the child better opportunities and prospects in life, it was not enough to deprive the mother of custody when she had sufficiently demonstrated that she was likewise capable of providing a sufficient, if less luxurious, lifestyle for her son. Her complete inability to provide for her son would have to be proved in order for the parental authority vested in the mother by the Family Code to be overthrown. This was not the case in this instance. Also, the Court pointed to the fact that any child less than 7 years of age could not be separated from his mother and that, in any case, the child had already categorically stated that he would prefer to be with his mother. The fathers recognition of the child as his own is not enough to claim custody but is sufficient for the claiming of support. The payment of allowance or support need not be conditioned with custody. Custody granted to the petitioner with the respondent obliged to support his children with her.
Marin
256 332
People v. Namayan
The crime of rape committed by the accused carries with it, among others, the obligations to acknowledge the offspring if the character of its origin does not prevent it and to support the same. FACTS: Margie Pagaygay, a mental retardate, was raped three times by defendant Namayan. Her mother noticed that her stomach was bulging and upon medical examination, she was found to be four to five months pregnant. Namayan was convicted for rape, but appealed his decision saying that it was impossible for him to have intercourse since he was jailed during the time of the alleged rapes and that victim's testimony betrays behavior of a girl who was raped. HELD: The record shows that it was possible for the defendant to have raped the girl. The testimony of the jailer could not be conclusive because his task was merely to oversee the records and not check the physical presence of the defendant in jail. On the allegation that victim betrayed the normal behavior of a girl that was sexually threatened, the court reminds us that she was a mental retardate and had no will to resist his advances. There is no doubt that defendant is the father of the child, the acts of sexual intercourse having occurred one month before the start of conception.
Nuez
257 332
Republic v. Abadilla
FACTS: Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They begot two children, Emerson and Rafael, whose respective birth certificates indicated inter alia the following information: Surname: Abadilla Fathers name: Herson (instead of Gerson) Abadilla Date of marriage of parents: June 19, 1987 Place of marriage of parents: Dingras, Ilocos Norte in spite of the fact that no marriage occurred between the parents. In 1997, the parents and their children filed before the RTC of Laoag City an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries, seeking to have the following corrections made in the birth certificates of Emerson and Rafael: 1. Ordering that the date and place of marriage be deleted; 2. Ordering that Herson be corrected as Gerson. During the hearing of the petition, the parents testified to not being married despite bearing two children. The trial court granted the petition and ordered the abovementioned corrections to be made. ISSUE: WON the RTC committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the date and place of marriage, but failed to order the change of the minors surname from Abadilla to Celestino. RULING: YES. The OSG, which brought the petition up for certiorari, was correct in saying that such change should have been made, considering that the minors parents are still not married, ergo Emerson and Rafael are illegitimate children. According to Article 17623, FC, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother, Luzviminda Celestino. The Civil Registrar was thus ordered to change the entry in the amended birth certificates from Abadilla to Celestino.
23
Article 176, FC. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Ordoyo
258 332
Gan v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-145527 ll May. 28, 2002 ll Bellosiollo, J. KEYWORDS: Support pendente lite FACTS: - Bernadette Pondevida instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. - Motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied and the trial court ordered him to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and pay her support every month, among others. - Private respondent moved for execution of judgment of support which trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution. - Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for granting said writ. CA dismissed petition. - Petitioner argues that action for support cannot be granted right away because: 1) judgment for support which is under appeal cannot be executed without a good reason for its immediate execution; 2) writ was invalid because it was done in violation of his right to notice and hearing; and 3) his claim of adultery on the part of private respondent should be heard by the court because such defense would lead to the denial of the claim of support. ISSUE: WON support for the respondent can be immediately executed by the court RULING: Petition denied. CA decision dismissing petition for certiorari by petitioner and the trial courts upholding of validity of writ of execution affirmed. RATIO: - Yes. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. - Petitioners interpretation of the provision cannot be accepted by the court because the plain words of such provision need no further explanation. - Furthermore, the interest and welfare of the child are of paramount concern in all cases involving him. It would be a travesty of justice if support is withheld until the final decision of the trial court is handed out, especially in view of the poverty of the child. - The Court cited an earlier decision (De Leon vs Soriano) where it was said that money and property adjudged for support and education should be given without delay as the time spent waiting for the final judgment of the case may lead to the child suffering due to lack of nutrition or missed payments in school all because he lacked funds. - Even if the accumulated amount were paid after the trial, such payment cannot repair the damage caused while the child was wanting of support. Years of missed classes and long periods of hunger may not be made up. - Adultery could not be alleged because petitioner was not even married to private respondent.
Pagdanganan
259 332
De Guzman v. Perez
G.R. No. 156013 ll Jul. 25, 2006 ll Corona, J. KEYWORDS: Child neglect by wealthy dad FACTS: - Roberto and Shirley were sweethearts while studying law in UST. This led to Shirley getting pregnant, giving birth to Robby. However, Roberto and Shirley never got married. Roberto ended up marrying another woman. - Roberto only sent support Robbys schooling twice, and sent medical support only when Robby fell seriously ill. Other than these, he never provided any financial support for his son. - Shirley got a job as a factory worker in Taiwan, but this was not enough to provide for Robby. Roberto on the other hand, lived a luxurious lifestyle. - This led to Shirley demanding support from Roberto. This was ignored, which forced Shirley to file a criminal case for abandonment and neglect under Art.59 of PD 603. - Shirley presented a notarized copy of the General Information Sheet of the RNCD Development Corporation showing that Roberto owner P750,000 worth of corporate shares. - The City prosecutor ruled in favour of Shirley, stating that her proof constituted circumstantial evidence of his ample financial resources. - Robert argues that his wealth was just his dads and that one can only be charged with neglect if one has the means but fails to provide. Second, he argues that Robby was not a neglected child because Shirley and her family provide for him. He says that neglect only takes place when both parents do not provide for the child. ISSUE: WON Roberto has indeed neglected his son RULING: Petition dismissed. RATIO: - Yes. There is a prima facie evidence showing that petitioner is in fact financially capable of supporting Robbys education. His argument that his wealth is only his dads cannot hold water. - Second, his argument that neglect only takes place if both parents neglect the child under PD 603 is also wrong. The law is clear and shows that neglect can be committed by any parent. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties. - However, he cannot be indicted for violation of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 as the latter covers only those cases of neglect under the former which are not covered by the RPC. Neglect of child under PD 603 is also a crime under Art. 277 of the RPC. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610. - Finally, this does not mean that Roberto is already guilty of neglect. The presumption of innocence still stands and what has only been ascertained is that there is probably cause to charge him for neglect.
Poblador
260 332
Zepeda v. Zepeda
41 Ill. App. 2d 240 ll Apr. 3, 1963 ll Dempsey, J. KEYWORDS: Action for damages to redress wrongful life caused by being a bastard FACTS: - Petitioner alleges that he is the illegitimate child of the defendant and that he was the result of his parents sexual relations that arose from a marriage promise by the defendant. The marriage however, did not follow through. - The plaintiff now seeks damages for deprivation of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his father, to inherit from his paternal ancestors, and for being stigmatized as a bastard. ISSUE: (1) WON the fraudulent act of the defendant is considered to be a tortious act (tort) (2) WON a tort can be inflicted upon a being simultaneously with its conception (3) WON the plaintiff has a cause of action RULING: While the cause for action for wrongful life may qualify as a tort, it is not actionable considering its farreaching legal implications that proscribes the court from engaging in law making. RATIO: Yes. The defendant hid the fact that he was a married man and couldnt actually fulfill his promise to marry the plaintiffs mother. It was not only a moral wrong but was, under the aggravated circumstance of this case, tortious in nature. Yes. The plaintiff is a person now and he was a potential person with full capacity for independent existence at the time of the original wrong. As he developed biologically from potentiality to reality, the wrong developed as well. A legitimate child has the natural right to be wanted, loved, and cared for. However, a legitimate child cannot maintain an action against his parents for lack of affection, failure to provide a pleasant home, etc. - An illegitimate child cannot be given rights superior to those of a legitimate child and therefore, the plaintiff has no cause for action on this account. - Plaintiff also complains of the stigma of being the bastard child of his father. His adulterine birth has placed him under a permanent disability. He protests not only the act which caused him to be born but birth itself. - Although the Court agrees he has suffered a wrong, it is unwilling to allow him the relief which he seeks because such recognition of his claims means the creation of a new tort: a cause of action for wrongful life. If the court were to allow this, the same would extend to other actions for wrongful life (ex. One might seek damages for being born a certain color, race, etc). - The Court believes that a thorough study of the consequences should be made. With the interest of society so involved, the action needed to redress the tort could be so far-reaching that the policy of the State should be declared by the representatives of the people.
Quiambao
261 332
Republic v. Capote
G.R. No. 157043 ll Feb. 2, 2007 ll Corona, J. KEYWORDS: Illegitimate child asking for change of surname from his dads to his moms FACTS: - Minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He used the surname of his natural father despite the absence of marriage between his parents. - His birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte indicates Gallamaso as his surname. - He seeks to change his surname to his moms. - His mother might eventually petition for Giovanni to join her in the US, and continued use of the surname Gallamaso may complicate his status as a natural child. - Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of name on Giovannis birth certificate. - The Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the TCs decision granting the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. ISSUE: WON Giovanni can change his surname RULING: Petition denied. CA affirmed. RATIO: Yes. In accordance with Art. 176 FC and Art. 366 CC. Under Art. 176: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother Meanwhile, Art. 366 provides that a natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. The Republics contention that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties is untenable. Capote complied with the requirement of an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation the notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition, including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition or the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Quilala
262 332
Dolina v. Vallecera
G.R. No. 182367 ll Dec. 15, 2010 ll Abad, J. KEYWORDS: Legal support; woman and child abuse; temporary protection FACTS: - Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262. - In her complaint, she added a handwritten prayer for financial support from Vallecera for their supposed child. She used the child's Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the child's father. - Vallecera opposed, and claims that her petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses and that he was not the child's father given that the signature in the Certificate of Live Birth was not his. - RTC dismissed petition. She filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this case. ISSUE: WON RTC correctly dismissed Dolina's action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child RULING: Petition is denied. RATIO: - Yes. She filed the wrong action to obtain support. RA 9262 is for protection women and children from from abuse. - Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. - Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. She just wanted to get support from him in filing the case. - To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. - Since Dolina's demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera's illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The child's remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. - What she could have done is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.
Ramos
263 332
Ramirez v. Gmur
G.R. No. L-11796 ll Aug. 5, 1918 ll Street, J. KEYWORDS: Legitimacy of 2 sets of children dependent on mothers legitimacy and her 2nd marriages validity FACTS: - Samuel Bischoff died, with a will leaving his widow Ana Ramirez as executrix of his estate. - According to the will, Bischoff bore no children with Ramirez and was therefore devoid of forced heirs. - This fact is being contested by two sets of children from his natural (legitimate) daughter, Leona Castro (deceased already), who he had with Felisa Castro in his first marriage. The entitlement of the 2 sets of children rests on whether Leona was a legitimate child of Bischoff. - Leona Castro married Frederick von Kauffman and had three children (the first set of children). - Kauffman eventually sought a divorce from Castro in Paris which was granted. Leona then married Dr. Ernest Mory and had a daughter before the celebration of their marriage. During the marriage they had 2 additional daughters. ISSUE: 1. WON Leona Castro is a legitimate child of Bischoff. 2. WON the Mory children are legitimate children and therefore entitled to inherit shares from Bischoff's testate. RULING: Judgment affirmed. RATIO: 1. Yes. The Court ruled that Leona Castro is a natural (legitimate) child of Bischoff, whether by Law 11 of Toro (turned Law 1, title 5, book 10 of the Novisima Recopilacion) which was the law at that time or under article 131 of the Civil Code. Tacit recognition was sufficient in either case. - There was sufficient proof that Bischoff recognized her as such, ranging from the memorandum issued by the priest for her record of birth and a document executed by Bischoff recognizing her as his daughter. - Ramirez contests that only children by persons free to marry are considered natural (legitimate). The Court held that there was no proof that Leona's mother was committing adultery when she married Bischoff. - The presumption is that persons are free to marry and the burden of proof rests heavily on the one contesting it. 2. No. The divorce decree obtained by Kauffman in Paris was not recognized by Philippine courts. There was conclusive evidence that shows that neither Kauffman nor Leona was domiciled in Paris. The divorce was apparently their only intent for going there. - Courts of a country where neither spouses are domiciled in have no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status. - Leona's marriage with Mory was therefore void and the children born from it are illegitimate. The Mory children's claim to inheritance must therefore be rejected.
Reposar
264 332
In Re, Julian Wang

G.R. No. 159966 ll Mar. 30, 2005 ll Tinga, J. KEYWORDS: Parents petition for child to drop middle name because of plan to stay in Singapore FACTS: - Julian Lin Carulusan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulusan to Julian Lin Carulusan Wang. - Parents plan to stay in Singapore for a long time to let Julian study there together with his sister, Wang Mei Jasmine (born in Singapore) In Singapore, middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name. They anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. - The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition for they found that the reason given for the change of name did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. They found that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child, however they said that names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. The court further reasoned that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, (Art. 174 of the FC) and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from Julian (a minor). When Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. - Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution explaining that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there (i.e. dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling). The court said that change of name which would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable. - Petitioner then filed this petition. ISSUE: WON dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Art. 174 of the FC RULING: Petition denied. RATIO: - Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. - The only reason for dropping his middle name is convenience. How such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
Reyes
265 332
In Re, Adoption of Edwin Villa

G.R. No. L-22523 ll Sep. 29, 1967 ll Angeles, J. KEYWORDS: Sister na, mother pa! FACTS: - Atty. Luis Santos, Jr. and Edipola Villa Santos would like to adopt the 4-yr old Edwin Villa y Mendoza. - Edipola and Edwin are siblings. (Edipola is already 32 yrs. old, anlayo nung age gap!) - Edwin, being a sickly child since birth, was entrusted by his parents to the petitioners. - His parents testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son. - The Trial Court dismissed the petition and their motion for reconsideration upon the reasoning that there will be an incongruous situation where Edwin, who is her legitimate brother, will also be her son. ISSUE: WON an elder sister may adopt a younger brother RULING: The decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition for the adoption of the subject minor, granted. RATIO: - Yes. A study of American precedents would reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions regarding the matter of adoption of relatives, thus it cannot be stated as a general proposition that the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law. - Art. 335 CC enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners herein are not among those prohibited from adopting. Art 339 CC names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law. - Art. 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article removes all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. - Regarding the dual relationship, it should be noted that relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. - Lastly, we do not have any provision in the law that expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, thus they ought not to be prevented.
Reyes
266 332
Republic v. CA and Bobiles

G.R. No. 92326 ll Jan. 24, 1992 ll Regalado, J. KEYWORDS: Rules governing adoption; joint adoption; retroactivity; vested rights FACTS: - On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat before the RTC of Legaspi City. - The court found the petition sufficient in form and substance; it complied with all jurisdictional requirements and the petition has the positive endorsement of the DSWD. Because of those elements, the trial court granted the adoption. - The petitioner appealed to the CA for the reversal of this judgment but the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The petitioner elevated the case to the SC and argues that the CA should have applied the Family Code retroactively. - The petition for adoption was filed on February 2, 1998, when the law applicable was PD 603, or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. - The complaint of the petitioner is based on the ground that Zenaida Bobiles should have been joined by her husband in the petition for adoption pursuant to the requirement of Art. 185 of FC, requiring that the husband and wife must jointly adopt. ISSUE: WON the requirements of Art. 185 of FC should retroact to Bobiles petition to adopt RULING: Petition denied. RATIO: - No. Art. 256 of FC provides: This code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. - During the time of the petition, Zenaida Bobiles had the right to file the petition on her own without joining her husband therein. The established rule is that the statute in force determines the jurisdiction of the court at the time of the commencement of the action. - Art. 185 of FC is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat the procedural steps completed before their enactment. - Even then, the husband has an affidavit of consent attached to the petition for adoption.
Sevilla
267 332
Republic v. Toledano
G.R. No. 94147 ll Jun. 8, 1994 ll Puno, J. KEYWORDS: American couple adopting brother of naturalized US citizen (wife) FACTS: - Respondent spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. - Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. - His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. - Lower court granted the adoption. - Solgen contended that lower court erred because BECAUSE THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW. ISSUE: WON Solomon can be adopted by the Spouses Clouse RULING: Petition granted. RATIO: - No. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. - Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. - In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. - When private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. - Though it may appear that Evelyn may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209, since she was a former Filipino citizen who sought to adopt her younger brother, unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Art. 185. which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. Art. 185 FC: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. - Alvin is neither of the above.
Tan de Guzman
268 332
Republic v. Miller
G.R. No. 125932 ll Apr. 21, 1999 ll Pardo, J. KEYWORDS: FC retroactivity; foreign couple qualified to adopt before FC; vested right FACTS: - Two American citizens adopted a child. - Natural parents were in poverty and had no visible means of livelihood. - The Family Code, which was effective on August 3, 1988, generally prohibits aliens from adopting Filipino children. - Adoption, in the case at bar, was filed July 29, 1988, when the Child and Youth Welfare Code was still in full effect. Under said Code, aliens in the case at bar were qualified to adopt. ISSUE: WON aliens can adopt a Filipino child before the effectivity of the general prohibition in the FC RULING: RTC decision affirmed. RATIO: - Yes. FC cannot retroact against a vested right. In this case, the vested right is the right to adopt per qualification under the Child and Youth Welfare Code. - A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity, and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.
Tejano
269 332
In Re, Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim

G.R. No. 168992-93 ll May 21, 2009 ll Carpio, J. KEYWORDS: Mother wanted to singly adopt their unofficially adopted children who are already adults FACTS: - Monina and Primo Lim were a childless couple. - Michelle and Michael were entrusted to them by Lucia Ayuban in 1977 and 1983. They were so eager to have children so they made it appear that they were their real parents. They raised them as their own, sent the kids in exclusive schools, and were given the surname, Lim. - Primo died in 1998 and Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen in 2000. - On 2002, Monina filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael, who were 25 (already married) and 18 years old respectively. Michelle, her husband, Michael, and Olario all gave their consent to the adoption. - DSWD issued a certification stating that Michelle and Michael were abandoned children whose natural parents whereabouts are unknown. However, RTC still denied the petition. ISSUE: WON the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt? RULING: Petition denied. RTC affirmed. RATIO: NO. Parental authority is only one of the effects of adoption. Husband and wife must adopt jointly except for instances allowed by law. - Petitioner is contending that she can file for adoption singly because parental authority is no longer required in this case since Michelle is already married and Michael has attained the age of majority. - It is true that upon the age of emancipation, parental authority over the person and property of the child terminates. However, this is only one of the effects of adoption. - The following are the effects of adoption: Sever ties between biological parents except when the spouses of adopter is the biological parent Legitimate child of the adopter (surname, support and succession) Endow them reciprocal rights and obligations from the relationship of parent and child (not limited to) Choose the name of the child Right to be the legal and compulsory heirs of each other - The law is clear. According to Sec. 7 Art. 3 of RA 8552, the husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in certain cases. - Monina is not adopting the legitimate children of Olario. The children were not her illegitimate children. Nor were the spouses separated from each other. The use of the word shall means that the provision is mandatory and that the couple must jointly adopt. - Furthermore, Olario, an American citizen, has additional requirements aside from his affidavit of consent. These cannot be waived by Sec. 7 because the children are not relatives within the fourth civil degree nor the legitimate child of the petitioner. He must show that: His country has diplomatic relations with the Philippines He has been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of petition for adoption He must maintain residency until the adoption decree is entered He has legal capacity in his country Adoptee is allowed to enter in his country as the latters adopted children
Tiangco
270 332
Lazatin v. Campos
G.R. No. L-43955-56 ll Jul. 30, 1979 ll Teehankee, J. KEYWORDS: The will in the safety deposit box; when secondary evidence of adoption admitted FACTS: - January 13, 1974: Dr. Lazatin died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Margarita, and his adopted twin daughters, Nora (de Leon) and Irma (Veloso). - February 1974: Margarita commenced an intestate proceeding. [Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne intervened claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin. One Lily also intervened claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.] - April 11, 1974: Margarita also died, leaving a written will, providing for: a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. - During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust Company that only she and Nora could open. - April (16), 1974: Nora, accompanied by her husband, Bernardo, opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, Irma; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death and so, she removed everything from the box. - June 3, 1974: Private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita, Days after having learned that Nora had opened the safety deposit box: Ramon, son of Renato, filed a motion claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Nora admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will therein. - November 6, 1974: The safety deposit box was opened, at which time it was found to be empty, because prior Nora had already removed all of its contents. - November 22, 1974: Seven months after the death of Margarita, Renato intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of Dr. Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. On this day, Ramon also filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box - August 20, 1975: Renato filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Dr. Lazatin, stating that the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was modified to state that petitioner was adopted by both of the spouses. - Respondent court heard Renatos motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita. During the hearings, he was not able to present any decree of adoption in his favor. He instead resorted to prove his adoption by stating the following evidence: 1) he recognized the deceased spouses as his parents and he had been supported by them until their death; 2) he was formerly known he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; 3) he and his wife used to stay at the residence of the father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to another property owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present; 4) photographs of Irma where she addressed herself as his sister, of deceased Margarita and him when he was a boy; and 5) document showing that his real name is "Renato Lazatin - November 14, 1975: Respondent court discontinued the hearing when Renato could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption.
Yumol
271 332
Lazatin v. Campos
G.R. No. L-43955-56 ll Jul. 30, 1979 ll Teehankee, J. - March 4, 1976: Respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence since they would not prove or tend to prove the fact of their adoption but rather of a recognized natural child. - March 16, 1976: Renato then filed, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora's refusal to comply with the orders of respondent court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita. Private respondents opposed the motion. - March 26, 1976: Respondent court denied Renato's motion. - June 3,1976: Respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for reconsideration, declared that Renato has failed to establish his status as an adopted child. - Hence, the petition at bar. ISSUE: WON Renato was an adopted child (Upon the determination of this issue, it can also be determined if he can intervene in the petitionsNO) RULING: Petition dismissed. RATIO: - The Supreme Court finds the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence. Renato was not able to establish his status as an adopted child. - The evidence presented by Renato does not lead the Court to any link to the existence of a court degree of his judicial adoption. Petitioner merely proceeds from an assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof decreed by a competent court are presented or attempted to be presented. - Furthermore, no witnesses were cited to that adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree. Even though Renato secured a certification from the CFI of Manila which reported that their records have been burned and that the record of Renatos adoption was not one of the salvaged documents, it does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the Court of first Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court. - Moreover, if there was really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the newspaper publication of the adoption as required by law. - The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court cannot be substituted by the claim that the child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. The attempts of Renato to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. However, declarations in regard to pedigree are admissible evidence, but, in proving adoption, there is a better proof available that can be produced. - Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. - Renato failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. His supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the deceased and others who have witnessed that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. - Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it constitute admissible proof of adoption. - As a necessary consequence, Renato cannot intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who
Yumol
272 332
Lazatin v. Campos
G.R. No. L-43955-56 ll Jul. 30, 1979 ll Teehankee, J. would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. Notes: - Nature of adoption proceedings: The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. - Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument.
Yumol
273 332
Santos v. Aranzanso
G.R. No. L-23828 ll Feb. 28, 1966 ll Bengzon, J. KEYWORDS: Adoption collaterally attacked in settlement proceedings of adoptive moms estate FACTS: - Spouses Santos filed a petition in 1949 for the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos (Petitioners), aged 17 and 8 yrs old respectively. - Guardian appointed by the Court gave her written consent to the petition, as did Paulina, who was above 14 yrs old. - Spouses Santos stated in their petition that Paulina and Aurora had lived with them since they were 3 months old and 15 days old, respectively, and although efforts had been made to find their natural parents, the natural parents could not be located. - After due publication of the petition in the National Weekly, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the case was set for trial and the Adoption Court granted the petition of spouses Santos in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines, and Paulina and Aurora were children of the spouses Santos for all legal intents and purposes from Aug. 1949. - Eight years later, wife-Santos passed away intestate. Husband-Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance Mnaila for settlement of intestate estate, stating wifeSantos surviving heirs to be himself and Paulina and Aurora, 27 and 17 yrs old respectively. He also asked to be appointed administratior of the estate. - Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura (Respondents) filed opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, both claiming to be first cousins of deceased-wife-Santos; Gregoria alleged the marriage between the spouses-Santos was bigamous and void, and that adoption of Paulina and Aurora were likewise void for want of written consent of their natural parents, who were alive and had not abandoned them. Demetria added that she is the mother of the child Paulina. - CFI: validity of the adoption could not be assailed collaterally in intestate proceedings. - CA: reversed CFI ruling; said adoption was void due to absence of consent of childrens natural parents and that such was a jurisdictional defect open to collateral attack. - Meanwhile, Petitioners-Santos filed a preliminary injunction against the Respondents to keep them from intervening in the settlement proceedings, alleging in their petition for review with the SC that Respondents (and two other strangers also claiming to be first cousins of deceased-wifeSantos) had been receiving 7k each from the probate court. - SC modified preliminary injunction to enjoin probate court from hearing the settlement case, or from disbursing any more from the estate, disallowing respondents from receiving any funds from intestate estate. ISSUE: 1. WON the adoption decree of the spousesSantos could be collaterally assailed in the settlement proceedings 2. WON the judgment of adoption in this case can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud 3. WON the marriage between the spousesSantos, if void, affects the rights of the adoptees RULING: Motion denied. CA erred in reviewing under collateral attack the determination of the adoption court that parents of adoptees had abandoned them RATIO: 1. No. The validity of an adoption may NOT be assailed collaterally in proceedings for intestate succession. - The CA contends that it can be collaterally attacked because the adoption proceedings did not properly dispense with the consent of the natural parents. Relying on American jurisprudence wherein parental consent is a jurisdictional requisite, the doption decree is void because the adoption court failed to express that abandonment by adoptees natural parents had occurred. - However, under our law: if the natural parents had abandoned the children, consent to adoption by the court-appointed guardian
Alampay
274 332
Santos v. Aranzanso
G.R. No. L-23828 ll Feb. 28, 1966 ll Bengzon, J. suffices. It is not accurate to say that the adoption court had not made a determination of the fact of abandonment, when they had indeed determined that the spouses-Santos were married for 27 yrs., that adoptees had been living with them since the elder was 3 months and the younger 15 days, and that attempts to locate the parents had failed. - ABANDONMENT is any conduct of the parent to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over the child. - While the CFI did not use the term abandonment, its findings contain facts and circumstances which constitute such fact. An ADOPTION ORDER implies a finding of necessary facts; the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; an adoption order can therefore NOT BE VOID merely because fact needed to show compliance is obscure. - Judicial determination of a particular fact (e.g. abandonment of an adoptee by his next of kin) is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter an order of adoption, but it does not make said fact determine the jurisdictional validity of a decree once issued. A mere error of fact cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal; it CANNOT be collaterally attacked. - Rationale: Otherwise, status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since evidence might not be the same at all investigations and be different with each tribunal. - Mere error in the fact does not affect the jurisdiction; if jurisdiction be obtained to determine a fact, its determination of a wrong or insufficient fact based on improper evidence is IMMATERIAL to the question of a legal right to proceed judicially to the next stem. - A judicial determination may be contrary to evidence, or legal evidence, or without any evidence, but it cannot be impeached for want of jurisdiction. 2. No. A judgment can be set aside on ground of fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose, NOT by collateral attack. - The Respondents cannot argue that husbandSantos concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural parents in this case. - Re: the alleged lack of notice of adoption proceedings on the natural parents of the adoptees, ADOPTION is a proceeding IN REM Thus constructive notice, such as publication duly made is enough when the residence of the natural parents were unknown, is sufficient. Furthermore, notice is NOT REQUIRED in cases of abandoning parents. 3. No. Assuming the marriage between the spouses-Santos is void, wife-Santos is deemed to have filed the petition for adoption single; the defect would lie only with husband who was allegedly married to another, could not adopt without joining the wife in petition. - Furthermore, the estate is the wifes, therefore the flaw would not affect consideration of right of adoptees to succeed as her adopted children. - Respondents may NOT intervene, since intestate succession benefits adopted children to the exclusion of first cousins, provided adoption is valid. - Since adoption is for the promotion of the welfare of child and the trend is to encourage adoption, construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain rather than defeat this purpose; thus, where adoption has been fully consummated, the adoption statute must be construed reasonably liberally to the end that an assumed relation and intention of parties to the adoption be upheld, particularly against strangers to proceedings collaterally attacking them.
Alampay
275 332
DSWD v. Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 ll Jul. 18, 1997 ll Regalado, J. KEYWORDS: Admin case against judge who approved petition for adoption without DSWD study report FACTS: - Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. - Judge Belen granted the petition finding the spouses highly qualified to adopt based on the findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents and the adoptee have already developed love and emotional attachment and that parenting rules have been demonstrated the minor. Judge says that the DSWD findings and recommendations are contained in the Adoptive Home Study Report and Child Study Report prepared by the local office of the DSWD through social welfare officer Vedana. - It turned out however that DSWD didnt have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was no order from the judge for the DSWD to conduct a Home and Child Study Report. Neither was there a directive from the judge for the social welfare officer to coordinate w/ DSWD re the minors adoption. -Thus, Admin complaint was filed against Judge Antonio Belen and social welfare officer of lower court ElmaVedana for violating Art. 33 of PD 603 [Child Welfare Code] and SC Circular No. 12. ISSUE: WON approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports (and WON a judge may decide based on such report) RULING: Belen definitely rendered the adoption decree in derogation of the provisions of Art. 33 and Circular No. 12 and Vedaa should have coordinated with the DSWD in connection with the preparation of the home and case study reports. However, only stern warning was given because of good faith. RATIO: - No. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of the Special Proceeding so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department. - DSWD has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. - Belen should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law. - Belen may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child.
Bayona
276 332
Duncan v. CFI
G.R. No. L-30576 ll Feb. 10, 1976 ll Esguerra, J. KEYWORDS: Adoption through consent of Attorney who was given by her client authority to have the latters child adopted FACTS: - Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife who filed for a petition for adoption of minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the Court of First Instance. - Colin, then only 3 days old was given to petitioners for them to adopt by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, who received the infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. - The mother, who never provided for the maintenance and support of her child, instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. Said couple happened to be herein petitioners who later on had the child baptized, with their names appearing in the records of said baptism as the parents of said child. - In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners, Atty. Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written consent in compliance with the consent requirement provided for in Art. 340 of the Civil Code which states that: The written consent of the following to adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over; (2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted. - Learning from the testimony of Atty. Velasquez that the natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the court then pressed her to reveal the identity of said mother, however she refused to do so on the ground that there existed an attorney and client relationship between them, and that she had been instructed by her client not to reveal the latter's identity. - Hence, the CFI dismissed the petition for adoption on the ground that the consent given for the same was improper and falls short of the express requirement of the law. ISSUE: WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give such consent RULING: The decision of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, is annulled by the Court, declaring that the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan is the adopted child and the heir of petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. RATIO: - Yes. Besides the abovementioned Art. 340 of the Civil Code, there also exists another rule regarding consent to adoption found in Rule 99, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, which states that There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption by each of its known living parents who is not an insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child - Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly described by law may be considered here as legally capable of giving the required written consent. They are: (1)under Art. 340 of the Civil Code: parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted, and (2) under Rule 99, Sec.3 of the Rules of Court: each of the known living parents who has not abandoned such child. - The father's consent here is out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized, while the natural and unwedded mother, who from the time she gave her child to Atty. Velasquez up to the time of the adoption proceedings, has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child, much less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same, is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child. - It can indubitably established based on the facts that said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child; thus, her Cadorna
277 332
Duncan v. CFI
G.R. No. L-30576 ll Feb. 10, 1976 ll Esguerra, J. consent to the adoption proceedings is not needed and not the one being required by law. - Meanwhile, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child, since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child is not in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society. This person is no other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant. - Hence, the consent given by her to the adoption proceedings is sufficient for the same to be deemed in compliance with the Civil Code and Rules of Court provisions on consent to adoption. This decision is in greater consonance with just and humane considerations than the CFIs harsh and cruel interpretation of the law.
Cadorna
278 332
Cang v. CA
G.R. No. 105308 ll Sep. 25, 1998 ll Romero, J. KEYWORDS: Consent needed to adopt minor not abandoned FACTS: - Herbert Cang and Anna Marie were married and had 3 children. They judicially separated and Anna Marie was granted the custody of the children. Herbert went to the States and divorced her. - Maria Clara, sister of Anna Marie, and her husband Ronald Clavano petitioned to adopt the three kids because Anna Marie wanted to go abroad and could not take care of the minor children. Keith who was 14 y/o by this time executed consent to be adopted. - Upon learning the about said petition, Herbert immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition. - RTC granted the adoption, citing mainly the financial capability of the adopting parents to provide for the children as opposed to the inconsistent and meager support that the father was able to give. ISSUE: 1. WON the father has abandoned the children 2. WON the minor children may be legally adopted without the consent of the father if the father has already abandoned the children RULING: Petition granted. Adoption denied as it was filed without the consent of the father who, by law and fact, has not abandoned the children. RATIO: 1. No. The Court found that there was no abandonment, because despite the meager amounts that Herbert was able to send and deposit in bank accounts, the main fact is that there were efforts exerted to provide for the family. - The Court also cited the letters as proof of the bond that the father has with the children. - The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. - Keiths consent to be adopted was also taken as a want to continue living in the same economic status that the prospective adopters are providing them. - The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 2. Yes. Abandoned children may be adopted without the consent of the abandoning parent. The consent of the natural parent of the children is needed if there was no abandonment or other impediment. - In this case, there was no abandonment.
Cristobal
279 332
Landingin v. Republic
G.R. No. 164948 ll Jun. 27, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J. KEYWORDS: Aunt wants to adopt minor children of her deceased brother allegedly abandoned by their mom FACTS: - Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen residing in Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of her deceased brothers minor children, Elaine, Elma and Eugene (all Dizon Ramos). - When their father Manuel died in 1990, the minors were left under the care of their paternal grandmother while their mother, Amelia, went to work in Italy where she eventually resided with her live-in partner and their son. - It was alleged that the mother rarely communicates with the children and only sends minimal financial support. It was Diwata, her children and other relatives abroad who financially supported the siblings. Upon the grandmothers death, Diwata decided to adopt the children and bring them to Guam to live with her. - After filing, the trial court ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study and submit a report before the initial hearing. - The minors have given their written consent to the petition, as affirmed by the eldest minor Elaine. Diwata testified on her behalf, stating that she is a qualified adopter since shes a 57 years old widow, lives alone in her own home and is gainfully employed as a part-time restaurant server earning $5.15 per hour and $1,000 per month in tips. She likewise presented as evidence the Affidavit of Consent executed by her children and notarized in Guam. - Elizabeth Pagbilao, a Social Welfare Officer from DSWD, submitted the report to court, recommending the minors adoption by Diwata as the children are considered abandoned by their biological mother, who she happened to personally interview during a chance vacation in the Philippines and who gave her voluntary consent (but not written) to the petition. - The trial court granted the petition, ruling in favor of the adoption. But the OSG appealed to the decision, citing lack of written consent from the childrens biological mother, as well as the petitioners children in Guam, and also failure to establish petitioners position to support the children. CA reversed TCs ruling. Diwata filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos 2. WON the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies with the law 3. WON petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees RULING: Petition denied. RATIO: 1. No. Written consent of the biological parents or legal guardian is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998). - The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. - Though petitioner argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary because the biological mother has abandoned the children, it is necessary to establish that abandonment existed at the time of adoption. - In this case, it was proven that there was no complete abandonment as children still communicates with the mother, though rare it may be, and Elaine even mentioned that she consults serious personal problems with Amelia. Amelia also sends minimal financial support to them. - Court also stated that if Amelia has indeed abandoned the siblings, petitioner should have obtained the consent instead from the legal guardian, the childrens uncle (fathers cousin).
Cruz
280 332
Landingin v. Republic
G.R. No. 164948 ll Jun. 27, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J. 2. No. The joint affidavit of consent by the petitioners children notarized in Guam should have been authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office in order to be acknowledged as duly notarized document in our country in compliance to the Rules of Court, Section 2 of Act No. 2103. - No further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, thus it is inadmissible as evidence. 3. No. It is doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, her home in Guam is still being amortized and she is rather of age. - Petitioner is not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings. - The ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter (should not come from her children and relatives), as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter.
Cruz
281 332
Tamargo v. CA
G.R. No. 85044 ll Jun. 3, 1992 ll Feliciano, J. KEYWORDS: Natural parents wants to pass liability to adoptive parents for sons shooting incident FACTS: - December 10, 1981: Sabas & Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc - October 20, 1982: Adelberto Bundoc, then 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Her parents filed civil and criminal charges2 against Bundoc. - November 18, 1982: Petition for adoption was granted. - Now, Bundocs natural parents argued that it was not they, but the adopting parents, the Rapisuras, who should be the indispensable parties to the case, since parental authority has already shifted from the moment the petition was filed before the shooting occured. They relied on Art. 363 and 39 (2)4 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. - The Tamargos argued that Bundoc was living with his natural parents at that time, and that parental authority was not relinquished due to the filing and granting of petition. - The trial court ruled in favor of the Bundocs and denied the motion for reconsideration. Notice of appeal was then filed at the trial court but was denied as it was filed beyond 15day reglementary period on December 22, 1987. - The Tamargos went to the CA petitioning for mandamus and certiorari to reverse all three trial court orders. CA denied them because they lost the right to appeal. ISSUE: 1. WON Supreme Court may still receive the case, notwithstanding the loss of right to appeal 2. WON adoption may be given retroactive effect, making the adopting parents the indispensable parties even when actual custody was with the natural parents RULING: CA decision REVERSED; Case REMANDED to Trial Court for further proceedings RATIO: 1. Yes. The Court, in the interest of serving substantial justice, invoked its right to suspend the application of technical rules. 2. No. Art. 2180 CC imposes civil liability on the father (or mother if the former is dead / incapacitated) for damages caused by a minor living with them. This stems from the doctrine of imputed negligence, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by him, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Parental liability is a consequence of the duties and responsibilities accompanying parental authority. - At the time of the shooting, parental authority resided with the Bundocs; since they had actual custody at that time, they are indispensable parties to the case. - The Court disagrees with the Bundocs reliance on Art. 36 & 39 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, since Art. 585 of the same code and Art. 221 FC6 points to the parents holding actual custody liable for the minors tortuous acts. - Retroactivity may be given in the granting of the petition when it is essential for some benefit/advantage in favor of the child. However, the Court ruled that it is unfair for parental authority to retroact to the Rapisuras to unduly burden them with liability for a tortuous act that they neither couldve foreseen nor prevented. - Lastly, while Art. 357 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code vests parental authority in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. - In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting.
Dantes
282 332
Sayson v. CA
G.R. No. 89224-25 ll Jan. 23, 1992 ll Cruz, J. KEYWORDS: Status of natural and adoptive children challenged by aunts and uncles in estate proceeding FACTS: - When their parents died, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel were left with the properties of their parents which the latter inherited from the grandparents. - Their fathers siblings (Aunts and Uncles) filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate. - The children resisted the action and filed their own defense alleging that Delia and Edmundo were adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter. As such, they were entitled to inherit their fathers share of his estate by right of representation. - The aunts and uncles contend that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born when the decree of adoption was issued. Under Art. 335 CC, those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction were ineligible to adopt. - They also contend, however, that Doribel is not the legitimate daughter but was in fact born to another woman who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. ISSUE: 1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted 2. WON Doribel is the legitimate daughter 3. WON Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are heirs of the intestate estate of their parents 4. WON they have a right of representation RULING: Petition (by the aunts and uncles) denied. CA decision affirmed. RATIO: 1. Yes. Delia and Edmundo are legally adopted. - The position of the aunts and uncles is inconsistent because they question the legality of Delias and Edmundos adoption on the ground that Doribel had already been born, but in the same breath they also question Doribels legitimacy. - Also, the timeliness of the challenge to the decree of adoption is questionable. They should have brought this with the court even before the adoption was decreed. - The validity of adoption cannot be challenged collaterally. It should be challenged in a direct proceeding. 2. Yes. Doribel is a legitimate child. - The birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Art. 265 CC and Art. 172 FC. - Although it is only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence, no such evidence was presented in the case. - Doribels legitimacy also could not be challenged collaterally. 3. Yes. Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are therefore the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of their parents, conformably with Art. 979 CC, which states: Legitimate Children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. - An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. - The philosophy underlying this article is that a persons love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth. 4. Yes but only Doribel, not Delia or Edmundo, has the right of representation. - Art. 970: Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
De Castro
283 332
Sayson v. CA
G.R. No. 89224-25 ll Jan. 23, 1992 ll Cruz, J. degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. - Art. 971: The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented would have succeeded. - Art. 981: Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation. - Delia and Edmundo do not have the right of representation because the grandparents are considered strangers to the adopted child. The relationship created by adoption exists only between the adopting parents and the adopted child. Thus, while the adopted children have the right to succeed their parents, they do not have the right of representation.
De Castro
284 332
Johnston v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18284 ll Apr. 30, 1963 ll Labrador, J. KEYWORDS: Adoptive mother wants to give adoptee surname of husband who did not adopt her FACTS: - Petitioner (Isabel Valdes Johnston) filed a petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana (2 yrs and 10 mos old) - Both couples are Filipino, childless and SHE already got the consent of the Mother Superior of the orphanage (where the child stays) and the husband. - Petitioner contends that she used her married surname in filing the petition, and that this is the surname she has been using after getting married and is known by it in the community and by her friends/relatives. ISSUE: WON adoptee can use the surname of the father, who did not adopt her RULING: The order of the court below prescribing the use of the surname Valdes by the adopted minor is affirmed. RATIO: - No. Art. 341 (CC) provides that the adoption shall: 1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter; 2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature; 3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter; and 4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname. - Par. 4 refers to the adopters own surname, which is her maiden name, and not her married surname; She entered the adoption not as a married woman. - Adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of the husband to the adoption did not have the effect of making him an adopted father. - To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that she had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case.
Dilag
285 332
Republic v. CA and Wong

G.R. No. 97906 ll May 21, 1992 ll Regalado, J. KEYWORDS: Adoptee of Chinese couple wants to use Filipino surname to get rid of social stigma in Muslim community FACTS: - Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr. and Segundina Alcala. - When he was two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala Jr. and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and order of the court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years if marriage. - Upon reaching the age twenty-two, herein private respondent, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the name suggest a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname. ISSUE: WON the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting of said petition RULING: The reasons given in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting of said petition. RATIO: - Yes. The change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. A change of name does not define or effect a change in ones existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. Neither does it alter ones legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. - The change of name is justifiable because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another justifiable cause is his desire to improve his social and business life. - In granting and denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all best evidence available. - Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; b. when the change results as legal consequence, as in legitimation; c. when change will avoid confusion; d. having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of alien parentage; e. sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; f. when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that change of name would prejudice public interest. - Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose which is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best interest. - Concordantly, the Court held that a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship; what is altered is only the name.
Dolot
286 332
Republic v. CA and Caranto

G.R. No. 103695 ll Mar. 15, 1996 ll Mendoza, J. KEYWORDS: Clerical error in name: Michael to Midael FACTS: - Caranto couple filed for adoption of Midael C. Mazon, fifteen years old, who had been living with Jaime Caranto since he was seven years old, even when the couple got married. They prayed that judgment be rendered: a. declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioner for all intents and purposes; b. dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and c. that the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL. - Sol Gen opposed the petition insofar as the correction of the name involved. He argued that it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption. - RTC dismissed Sol Gens opposition, on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. The RTC further stated that the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners. CA affirmed. ISSUE: 1. WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over respondents petition for adoption because publication did not state the true name of the minor child 2. WON action for correction of entries in the civil registry may be done in the same action for adoption RULING: Decision modified, deleting the correction of the name Midael to Michael. RATIO: 1. Yes. Correction involves merely a clerical errorthe substation of the letters ch for the letter d. Changing the name of the child from Midael Mazon to Michael Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme and tone. - The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. 2. No. Since the case falls under Rule 108 (o. change of name, in Sec 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction), Sec. 3 of said rule requires the local civil registrar to be impleaded in the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. - Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Sec. 4 of the same rule. The notice given by publication in this case was only for adoption (Rule 99, $4). - Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. Thus, decision of the RTC with regard to the correction of the name is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Enad
287 332
Republic v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 117209 ll Feb. 9, 1996 ll Regalado, J. KEYWORDS: Adoptive parents want to change first name of adoptee FACTS: - Van and Regina Munson filed a petition to adopt minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. At the time of the filing, Kevin had been in the Munsons care for almost a year. - In the same petition, they prayed for the change of Kevins name to Aaron Josephthe name he was baptized with, and the name his adoptive family, relatives and friends had called him by since his arrival in the Munsons home. - The petitioner opposed the inclusion of the change of name in the petition for adoption, arguing that change of name should be a separate proceeding from adoption, according to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. - The trial court found that the Munson couple was fit to adopt Kevin. It also held that Kevins name could be changed to Aaron Joseph, saying: The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant over a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said change of name. There is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earls first name. - Thus, petitioner appealed by certiorari. ISSUE: WON an adoption decree entitles the adopted to a change of first name RULING: No. The Court modified the order of Judge Hernandez, affirming the adoption of Kevin and giving him the surname Munson, but maintaining his given name, so that he is known as Kevin Earl Andrade Munson. RATIO: - An adoption decree does not entitle the adoptee to a change of first name, but only to a change of surname. Change of first name can be achieved only through a Rule 103 proceeding. - According to Art. 189 of the Family Code: For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters. - The change of surname was deemed a natural consequence of an adoption. In contrast, the creation of the adoptive relationship does not give the adopter license to change the adoptees registered first name. Such a change is beyond the scope of an adoption proceeding. - The change of first name may only be done by strictly complying with Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. It is an independent and separate proceeding whose result cannot be granted through any other proceeding. - Further, the adoption and the change of name are not actions that warrant a joinder. A joinder of causes of action is the union of two or more civil causes of action in the same complaint, declaration or petition, even if each of them could be made the basis of a separate suit. Joinder is usually left to the discretion of a litigant party, though there are certain requisites: a. It will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and b. The causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money, or are of the same nature and character. - The Court held that there is no relation between the petition for adoption and the petition for a change of name. They are not of the same nature and character, and do not present any common question of fact or law. Thus, they do not warrant a joinder. - Also, there is no legal ground for the change of name. The grounds for change of name recognized by jurisprudence are the following: a. Espaola
288 332
Republic v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 117209 ll Feb. 9, 1996 ll Regalado, J. The name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; b. The change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; c. The change will avoid confusion; d. One has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; e. The change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. - The Court held that Kevins baptism under the new name or the continuous use of it by him, his family and their friends do not constitute proper and reasonable ground for a legal change of name. When a name given in church records or by which one is known by the community is different from that in the civil register, it is unofficial and cannot be recognized as ones real name. - Lastly, the change of name without proper proceeding will be prejudicial to the State. Because the State is naturally interested in the methodical administration of justice and the maintenance of its system of identifying its citizens, it stands to be prejudiced by the wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case.
Espaola
289 332
In Re, Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

G.R. No. 148311 ll Mar. 31, 2005 ll Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. KEYWORDS: Natural father who adopted her illegitimate daughter petitions for her use of her mothers surname as her middle name FACTS: - Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. - Stephanie's mom is Gemma Astorga Garcia and Steph has been using her mother's middle name and surname. - When Hector became a widower, he became qualified to become Stephanie's adopting parent. - With the petition for adoption, he prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and her last name Garcia to Catindig. - RTC granted the adoption. Likewise, it ruled that the name would be Stephanie Nathy Catindig. However, RTC denied Honorato's motion for reconsideration, saying that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his/her biological mother as his/her middle name. ISSUE: WON an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, can use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name RULING: Petition granted. The assailed decision is partly modified in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name. RATIO: - Yes. The Court observed that there was no law, even in the FC that regulated the use of a middle name. - However, as correctly observed by the OSG, members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the FC recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child's mom as middle name. - As adoption's underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child, laws or judgments must be construed in favor of the child. - As one of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all rights provided by law to a legitimate child w/o discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her mother and father. - Lastly, as stated by the OSG, it is necessary to maintain Stephanie's filiation w/ her natural mother. This is in connection with Art. 189 of the Family Code w/c states that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. - Besides, she's living with her mother right now, obtaining support from Honorato.
Hermosisima
290 332
Reyes v. Sotero
G.R. No. 167405 ll Feb. 16, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J. KEYWORDS: Relatives of adopter contest adoptees adoption papers in estate proceedings FACTS: - Respondent Corazon Chichioco, together with the other collateral relatives of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of the estate of Elena Lising before the RTC of Tarlac. - Ana Joyce Reyes filed an opposition to the petition, alleging the she is the only rightful heir as the adopted daughter of the deceased Elena and Serafin Delos Santos, and that there is no need for an administrator as there was no debt to settle. - As proof of adoption, she presented the judicial decree registered in the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac. She also included a copy of the decree of final distribution issued by Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, showing that the benefits of the deceased Serafin was paid to his wife, Elena, and daughter, Ana. - Respondents tried to cast a doubt on the authenticity of the judicial declaration and decree presented by the petitioner, alleging that the natural mother of Ana committed fraud. They filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner but this did not prosper for want of evidence. - However, RTC enjoined Ana from using the property because she allegedly converted the basement as billiards den without the judgment of the administration. The clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod was delegated as administrator of the estate. This was reversed by CA but demanded for more pieces of evidence to overturn the cast of doubt on her adoption.
ISSUE: WON petitioner needed to give additional evidence to prove her adoption RULING: Petition granted. The Court did not remand the issue back to the RTC to avoid the clogging of the courts dockets and ruled that there is no need for further admission of evidence in the lower court. RATIO: - No. A copy of the judicial declaration of adoption and a copy of the clerk of court that the decree was in file in the general docket of the RTC Tarlac, both under the seal of the proper issuing officers. There is the presumption that these have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform. The fact that it is a public document, found in the Civil Registry is a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These are sufficient proof that the petitioner is adopted by the Delos Santos spouses. - Mere imputations of irregularities will not case cloud of doubt on the presumption of validity of these documents, unless proven to the contrary. Furthermore, it cannot be assailed collaterally in a special proceeding for administration and must be raised in a separate proceeding contesting the validity of the documents.
Macariola
291 332
Ex Parte Devine
398 So. 2d 686 ll Mar. 27, 1981 ll Maddox, J. KEYWORDS: Father challenges tender years presumption on equal protection grounds FACTS: - Alice Devine and Christopher Devine were married in 1966 and separated in 1979. As a consequence of their separation, the matter of who would gain custody of their children was decided by the Court. - During the proceedings that would eventually determine who custody of their children would go to, the Court could not find any substantial reason that would render either Alice or Christopher suitably unfit to raise their children. However, owing to the fact that the children still fell within ages covered by the tender years presumption, custody was granted to the mother. This was because in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, custody of children whose ages fell within the scope of the tender years doctrine would always go to the mother. - The father contested the decision and brought the case all the way up to the Supreme Court of Alabama. ISSUE: WON the tender years presumption violates the equal protection RULING: Yes. The tender years presumption is unconstitutional because it violates equal protection. RATIO: - By placing upon fathers who intended to gain custody of their children upon separation from their spouse an additional requirement of proving that their wife was unfit and not placing any similar requirement of the mothers, the law unjustly favored the mothers. - Under the tender years presumption, it would not matter if the father was objectively the parent better suited to raise his children. If he could not prove that his wife was unfit to raise their children who were under the tender years, then custody would automatically be awarded to his wife. - Hence, the tender years presumption not only prejudiced fathers, it also potentially prejudiced children whose best interests the Court must consider when deciding custody hearings.
Marin
292 332
Espiritu v. CA
G.R. No. 115640 ll Mar. 15, 1995 ll Melo, J. KEYWORDS: Mother kissing bad man; custody battle between married couple whose relationship soured FACTS: - Petitioner Reynaldo and private respondent Teresita maintained a common law relationship while working in the states where they had a child named Rosalind. They returned to the Philippines to marry. At the states they had a second child named Reginald. - Soon after, their relationship soured and Teresita left for California from their home in Pittsburgh. - Reynaldo returned to the country and filed a bigamy case against Teresita after learning that a marriage was subsisting when they lived together. Teresita soon filed a habeas corpus suit praying for custody of the two kids below seven years old. - RTC thru Judge Bersamin (future Justice and ponente of De Castro v. JBC) denied the petition and awarded custody to Reynaldo. CA, however, reversed the decision based on Art. 213 of the Family Code. ISSUE: 1. WON CA erred in giving custody based solely on Art 213 of the FC 2. WON the tender years presumption prevails at the time of filing the petition or at the time of decision 3. WON the basis for denying custody was biased and unfair RULING: Petition granted. RATIO: 1. Yes. The CA was swayed by an abstract presumption of law (by none other than Sempio- Diy) rather than an appreciation of relevant facts. Whether a child is over or under seven, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. 2. It prevails at the time of the decision. - The children have already made their choice to be with their father, being over seven years of age. - Teresita contested, saying that the presumption must prevail having filed the petition before the children were 7 yrs. old. - The Court held that considerations involving the choice of the child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody of the child. If parent chosen suffers a character change, the matter of custody can always be reexamined. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate of the parent chosen is unfit. 3. No. The basis noted by Judge Bersamin was not biased and unfair. - The findings of Social Worker Emma Lopez and Psychologist Macabulos were not made for the purpose of litigation but for travel clearance and school purposes, respectively. They found that Rosalind hated her mom after catching her in the act of having an affair with her dad's co- worker and she suffered emotional disturbance. - The contention that Teresita's habit of flirting did not fall under compelling reasons was ruled in the negative, for her illicit and immoral activities had caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts and exposure to conflicting moral values. Reynaldo, however, has proven himself to be a fit parent, being able to attend to the needs of the children unlike Teresita who abandoned the family home (to pursue the affair).
Nuez
293 332
Celis v. Cafuir
G.R. No. L-3352 ll Jun. 12, 1950 ll Montemayor, J. KEYWORDS: Mom executes two documents allegedly renouncing her custody over child FACTS: - Respondents Soledad Cafuir and her husband appealed the decision of the lower court granting the writ of habeas corpus to Ileana (Nenita) Celis and ordering the delivery of the child to petitioner. - Petitioner, after giving birth to Joel (John) Cafuir turned over custody to Soledad, fearing the extreme displeasure and anger of her father over her illicit relations with Joels father, an American soldier to whom she had not been married. - Soledad provided for all the needs and comforts of the child, including a nurse hired to care for the child. - After marrying Agustin Rivera, petitioner filed a suit for habeas corpus. - The CFI of Manila granted said petition, ordering the Sheriff, who then had custody of the boy, to deliver said child to his mother, petitioner Ileana. - Respondents argued that petitioner executed the following documents to the effect that she had renounced her custody of and patria potestas over her child. 1. TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: I hereby entrusted to Mrs. Soledad Cafuir x x x my son named John Cafuir, for the reason that I don't have the means to bring the child up. Anybody who may claim my son for adoption in the future without the consent of the undersigned is hereby ignored. (Sgd.) NENITA CELIS Mother 2. TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: I, Nenita Celis, x x x hereby designate Mrs. Soledad Cafuir x x x to be the real guardian of my son, named Johnny Cafuir. No one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir. (Sgd.) NENITA CELIS Mother
- The trial court found and ruled that under these two exhibits signed by petitioner, there is no basis for finding that she had renounced the custody of her child in favor of respondent Soledad. ISSUE: WON petitioner Ileana Celis, by executing the above documents, renounced custody of and patria potestas over her child RULING: The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the modification that respondent Soledad is ordered to deliver the boy to petitioners. RATIO: - No. In the first document, she merely entrusted her son to Soledad because she did not have the means to bring him up. The word "entrusted" cannot convey the idea of definite and permanent renunciation of the mother's custody of her child. Meanwhile, the second document merely designated respondent Soledad as the "real guardian" of the child. The designation of one as the guardian of another cannot and does not mean that said guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position. Guardianship is always or almost invariably understood to be temporary. - Furthermore, the very last paragraph to the effect that "no one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir," envisages a future act; it means that no one else may adopt the boy except respondent. It does not mean, however, that she has already adopted him. She may or may not adopt him. It is something yet to be done in the future. This the respondent has not done. - This decision is in consonance with Art.210 of the FC: Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law.
Ordoyo
294 332
Sy v. CA
G.R. No. 124518 ll Dec. 27, 2007 ll Tinga, J. KEYWORDS: Mom praying in the rain; custody battle after dad charges mom unfit FACTS: - Respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against petitioner Wilson Sy before the RTC, praying that said writ be issued ordering Sy to produce their two minor children. - Writ was issued in favor of the respondent along with an order for petitioner to pay P50,000 a month for support so petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that the court erred in awarding to the respondent sole custody of the minor children and in ordering petitioner to provide respondent with monthly support of P50, 000. - CA held that petitioner was unable to substantiate his contention that respondent was unfit to have custody and that questions as to care and custody of children may be raised in a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, contrary to his claim, petitioner was properly heard on the matter involving support for the respondent. Motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied. ISSUE: 1. WON CA erred in granting custody of minor children to respondent 2. WON CA erred in ordering petitioner to pay support RULING: CA decision affirmed. Custody of children remains with respondent Mercedes Tan Uy- Sy, and the petitioner Wilson Sy is ordered to pay P50, 000 a month for support, of which is merely provisional as the amount may be modified. RATIO: 1. No. The applicable provisions to the case at hand are Art. 213 of the FC and Sec 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. - In all controversies involving the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. However, the law favors the mother if she is fit enough to have custody over her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mothers love and devotion for which there is no substitute. The love, solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender years than all other things combined. Hence, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. - Trial Court was correct in granting custody to the respondent given that at the time the case was decided, the children were below seven years of age. 2. No. Petitioner contends that matter of support was not included in the prayer for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, hence, court had no reason to order him to provide support for respondent. - However, applying Sec 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of the parties, it should have been treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. Respondent, under direct examination during the trial, expressed the need for support which was to be taken from the petitioner. - Art. 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. It was clear from the respondents testimony that there was a need for support, and such testimony served as the demand for the said support.
Pagdanganan
295 332
Feldman v. Feldman
358 N.Y.S.2D 507 ll Jul. 15, 1974 ll Benjamin, J. KEYWORDS: Screw Magazine, sexually liberated mom, child custody DOCTRINE: Unusual sexual practices of wife do not ipso facto mean she is unfit for custody of their children. FACTS: - Parties were married and had two children. Wife eventually filed for divorce based on cruel treatment, and was awarded custody of their two minor children. Wife subsequently cohabited with another man. - When husband visited former wifes house, he saw a copy of Screw Magazine and letters (some with explicit photos attached) responding to advertisements about having fun and games (sex) with other couples. - Husband then filed for habeas corpus, seeking custody of their children. - Upon presentation of evidence to the court, it was determined that the wifes private sex life in no way affected her children. Her children never saw the offensive material, it was proven that the children were still well provided for emotionally and physically (in fact, both children were class officers in school), and the atmosphere at their home was happy and cheerful. - However, the lower court gave custody to father based on her wild lifestyle and stated: - "The record and exhibits indicate her desire to experiment sexually. It cannot be that the best interests and welfare of the two impressionable children of the marriage will be best served by awarding their custody 'to one who proclaims, and lives by, such extraordinary ideas of right conduct. ISSUE: WON giving custody to the wife is against the best interests of the children given that she is sexually liberated HELD: - No. Amorality, immorality, sexual deviation and what we conveniently consider aberrant sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. By its decision the trial court stated, in effect, that all fathers and mothers who participate in this culture of "free sex" are unfit parents. - Although the contents of Screw Magazine may be offensive to some, the court cannot prohibit individuals from reading in the privacy of their own homes. Also, the private sex life of individuals is within the penumbra of the right to privacy. - Sole concern is for the best interests of the children. In this case, both children have resided with the mother since birth, a change of custody at this late date should not be made unless there is a showing that she is unfit to continue as the custodial parent. The father, to whom the trial court awarded custody, is not presently remarried and lives in a room in his parents' apartment. He is employed on a full-time basis during the day and the record indicates he works on the average of two nights per week as a musician.
Poblador
296 332
Santos Sr. v. CA
G.R.No. 113054 ll Mar. 16, 1995 ll Romero, J. KEYWORDS: Mother v grandparents, child custody DOCTRINE: Only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority. FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by profession, were married and had a son. From the time the boy was released from the hospital, his grandparents (Bedia spouses) were the ones taking care of him. The Santos couple agreed to place their son in the temporary custody of Julia's parents. Julia then left for the US. Respondents were the ones to provide for all of Leouel Jr.'s needs. On one visit, Leouel Sr. along with his brothers, took (abducted) his son from the grandparents. The grandparents filed a "Petition for Care, Custoy, and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos, Jr." RTC and CA granted the petition. Petitioner appealed. ISSUE: WON the RTC and CA erred in granting custody of Leouel Jr. to his grandparents HELD: Yes. The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of authority. Patria potestas is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. When a parents entrusts the custody of a minor to another, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it doesn't constitute a renunciation of parental authority. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds.
Quiambao
297 332
Pablo Gualberto v. Gualberto

G.R. No. 154994 ll Jun. 28, 2005 ll Panganiban, J. KEYWORDS: Lesbian mom, child custody Petition were sent to this Court and to the parties by registered mail at the Bian, Laguna Post Office on October 24, 2002. This is the date clearly stamped on the face of the envelope. Postmaster satisfactorily clarifies that Registry Bill No. 88, which shows the date November 2, 2002, merely discloses when the mail matters received by the Bian Post Office on October 24, 2002, were dispatched or sent to the Central Mail Exchange for distribution to their final destinations. Crisantos motion was mailed on Sept 12, 2002, Jocelyn filed her motion for extension on Sept 17, 2012, and she might still have been unaware that he had moved for partial reconsideration. She should have notified the court as soon as she was notified of the filing of his motion. But her lapse may be excused in the interest of resolving substantive issues. No. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is 1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or 2) executed "whimsically or arbitrarily" in a manner "so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined." A court of competent jurisdiction is vested with the authority to resolve even unassigned issues. Award of temporary custody is subject to change as circumstances may warrant. Even the award of child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not permanent; it may be reexamined and adjusted if and when the parent who was given custody becomes unfit. No. Refers only to decisions and final orders on the merits, not to those resolving incidental matters. Here, the declaration of the nullity of marriage is the subject of the main case, in which the issue of custody pendent lite is an incident. Yes. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of minor children for their
FACTS: - Jocelyn took her 4-year old son with her to Mindoro when she decided to abandon her Crisanto, her husband. - Crisanto commissioned Renato Santos to conduct a surveillance on Jocelyn and found out that she was having lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay, this was corroborated by the house helper of the spouses who stated that Jocelyn was often out and on one occasion slapped the child. ISSUES: 1. WON Petition for Review was filed beyond the deadline (Oct 24, 2002) 2. WON petition was premature 3. WON CA gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the trial court judge to "consider, hear and resolve the motion to lift the award of custody pendent lite" without any proper motion by Jocelyn and after the April 3, 2002 Order of the trial court had become final and executor. 4. WON Section 1 of Rule 36 (for judges to state clearly and distinctly the reasons for their dispositions) violated 5. WON art FC Art 213 which stated that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise should be applied instead of FC Art 211 HELD: 1. No. Husband claims that the petition was sent only on Nov 4, 2002 according to the Registry Bill. Rules of Court Sec 3 states that the date of mailing of motions, pleadings and other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the records of the case. Records reveals that copies of the
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Quilala
298 332
Pablo Gualberto v. Gualberto

G.R. No. 154994 ll Jun. 28, 2005 ll Panganiban, J. mothers loving care. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation. The word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 642 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory character. It is not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
Quilala
299 332
Goldstein v. Goldstein
341 A. 2D 51 ll Jul. 17, 1975 ll Joslin, J. KEYWORDS: Smart child, Israel, child custody FACTS: - Wife filed for a decree of divorce against husband but was denied by the Family Court. Also, the custody of their 9 year old daughter Ann Robin was given to the father (she was still given visitation rights). - Husband and child went to live in Israel. Wife initiated series of proceedings to compel their return and that custody over their daughter be given to her. - After 3 years, Supreme Court of Israel granted her petition. - Trial judge determined to reestablish their mother-daughter relationship. The hearing determined the following: Both parents were fit to have custody of their daughter Their daughter is a smart girl. There was threat of war and terrorist activity in Israel (husband acknowledge such violence) That child cannot be considered to be Jewish until her mother upon the consent of her mother - Ann Robin admitted she loves her father more than her mother and wishes to go with him to Israel - She also said that she had no desire to visit with her mother but agreed, after the trial justice's urgings, that it would be a "fair bargain" if he were to condition her being allowed to live with her father in Israel upon her visiting willingly with her mother for 4 weeks during each summer. - Trial justice gave custody to husband (with the conditions stipulated above) Wife claimed that the trial justice disregarded such factors as the policy favoring the awarding of young children, especially girls, to a fit mother, the preference sometimes given to a resident parent when both are equally fit, and legislative policy that a minor should be allowed to nominate his own guardian only if he is at least 14 years old and, even then, only if his choice receives Probate Court approval.
ISSUE: Was the awarding of the child's custody to the father justified? HELD: YES! Wife's claim answered: Those factors would have simply been placed on the scales together with the other relevant considerations weighed by the trial justice, such as the parties' equal suitability to have the child's custody, the psychiatric evidence of the child's emotional stability and intelligence, the trial justice's opportunity to observe her demeanor, appearance, and attitude, and his obvious conclusion therefrom that her expressed desire to be with her father was not a mere whim and was entitled to substantial weight. (BASTA ANG POINT, EQUAL ANG POSITION NG BOTH PARENTS; HENCE, HINDI NAG ABUSE YUNG JUDGE TO GIVE WEIGHT SA GUSTO NUNG BATA. Note also that the judge gave visitation rights to the mother, so binigyan pa rin niya ng chance si wife to be with the child)
Ramos
300 332
Laxamana v. Laxamana
G.R.No. 144763 ll Sep. 3, 2002 ll Ynares-Santiago, J. KEYWORDS: Lawyer turned drug dependent dad, child custody FACTS: Petitioner Reymond Laxamana was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws while respondent Ma. Lourdes Laxamana held a degree in Banking and Finance. Upon marriage, respondent quit her job in order to become a full time housewife while petitioner managed buy and sell, fishpond and restaurant businesses (he did not pass the bar). The couple had three children. In October 1991 petitioner was confined in Estrellas Home Care Clinic for being a drug dependent. He was again confined in 1996 for rehab. In 1997, petitioner was declared drug free but respondent alleged otherwise stating that petitioner has become irritable since his return and had even maltreated her at one point. Respondent abandoned petitioner in June 1999 taking the children with her. Petitioner filed a writ for habeas corpus for visitation rights which the court granted. The parties were ordered to undergo psychological evaluation which they passed except for the pyschologists opinion that petitioner, in his belief, was not completely drug free. ISSUE: WON the lower courts decision erred when it resolved the issue of custody without trial. HELD: Yes. The paramount interests of the children were not given due consideration. Instead, the court a quo relied on the basis of the psychological report of the spouses conditions to render its decision. This is held to be insufficient to justify awarding custody to the mother. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet "completely cured" may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. It is clear that - every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children. The case was remanded to the lower courts.
Reposar
301 332
Garska v. McCoy
278 S.E. 2D 357 ll May 26, 1981 ll Neely, J. KEYWORDS: Trailer baby, adoption, child custody SUMMARY: Grandparents filed adoption petition to adopt the child. Natural father of the child filed writ of habeas corpus, claiming the custody of child. FACTS: Gwendolyn McCoy, then 15, left her grandparents to live with her mother. She got pregnant by Michael Garska who was sharing the trailer with her mother. McCoy returned to her grandparents home. During pregnancy she did not receive support from Garska. McCoy signed a consent agreeing to the adoption of her son by her grandparents Alitzers. Upon learning of the adoption, Garska visited the baby and started to send weekly money orders. The Alitzers filed a petition for adoption while Garska filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to secure custody of his son. Both proceedings were consolidated. The petition for adoption was dismissed because the baby had not resided with the Alitzers for the requisite 6 months before filing. The circuit court gave custody to Garska saying that he is the natural father, that he is better educated than the mother, that he is more able to support the child. ISSUE: 1. WON custody of the child should go to the father or the mother and 2. WON the primary caretaker doctrine can be used in this case. HELD: The best interests of the child are best served in awarding custody to the primary caretaker parent, regardless of sex. The primary caretaker is a natural or adoptive parent who has been primarily responsible for caring and nurturing the child. However, the absolute presumption in favor of a fit primary caretaker parent applies only to children of tender years. The mother is the primary caretaker parent and there is no finding that she is unfit.
Reyes
302 332
Salientes v. Abanilla
G.R.No. 162734 ll Aug. 29, 2006 ll Quisumbing, J. KEYWORDS: Evil in-laws FACTS: - Loran and Antonette are the parents of the 2-year old Lorenzo Emmanuel. - They lived with the wifes parents. However, due to problems with his in-laws, Loran suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own place but she refused. Thus, he left the house of the Salientes Thereafter, Loran was prevented from seeing his son. He then filed a Petition for habeas corpus and custody in the RTC. RTC: directed Antonette and her parents to bring Lorenzo to the court CA: dismissed their petition. It also held that the RTC was still about to conduct a full inquiry in a summary proceeding regarding the cause of the minors detention and his custody. Hence, they appealed for certiorari in the SC. ISSUE: WON the father may be prevented to visit his son based on the Tender Years Presumption (TYP). RATIO: NO. Art 213 FC (TYP) only deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for Lorans petition for custody, but it cannot serve as a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age. Also Art 211 FC states that the father and the mother have joint parental authority over their children. This parental authority also includes joint custody. Although they are already separated de facto, the issue has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of the child.
Reyes
303 332
Cabanas v. Pilapil
G.R.No. L-25843 ll Jul. 25, 1974 ll Fernando, J. KEYWORDS: Uncle v mother over childs money FACTS: Florentino Pilapil had a child, Milian Pilapil with Melchora Cabanas. Francisco Pilapil is Florentinos brother. Before Florentino died, he insured himself and instituted his child as beneficiary with his brother to act as trustee during the childs minority. Upon his death, proceeds went to Francisco. The mother filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum to the child. The mother filed the bond required by the Civil Code. The uncle contends that he has the right to retention by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. ISSUE: WON the mother has the right to administer the property of the child HELD: The mother has the right - Art 320 CC: The father, or in his absence, the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is more than 2,000 pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. - Art 321 CC: The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. - Besides the law being clear, the court also took into consideration the standard of the best interest of the child. The court found that since the child lives with the mother and there are no signs of a lack of maternal care, all the more should the mother be the administrator.
Sevilla
304 332
Libi v. IAC
G.R.No. 70890 ll Sep. 18, 1992 ll Regalado, J. KEYWORDS: Twisted Romeo and Juliet DOCTRINE: CC 2180 Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. FACTS: - Julie Gotiong (age 18) and Wendell Libi (aged 1819) were sweethearts - Julie broke up with Libi for being sadistic and irresponsible, Wendell persistently tried to reconcile with her Jan 14, 1979 Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi (Wendells father) - There were no eye witnesses - Libis family contends that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification. ISSUE: WON Wendells parents are civilly liable for their sons action (YES) HELD: Amelita Libi (Wendells mom) admitted that her son knew the keys to the deposit box holding the gun was in her bag and that the gun is now missing from the deposit box. This showed a lack of due diligence of a good father of a family Wendells parents never knew that the gun was taken from the deposit box since 1978 as evidenced by a picture (of Wendell holding the gun) given to Julie and Wendell was said to have kept said gun in his car for his supposed role of CANU agent Court Held: It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendantsappellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing, Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides: The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.'
Tan de Guzman
305 332
Lindain v. CA
G.R.No. 95305 ll Aug. 20, 1992 ll Grio Aquino, J. FACTS: Widowed mother of minor petitioners who owned a parcel of land sold the land to defendants- spouses in 1966. Defendants knew that the sale was illegal, the owners being minors, but bought the land anyway. Petitioners therefore sued to declare the sale null and void in 1987. RTC ruled in favour of petitioners. CA reversed RTCs ruling, holding that property under P2,000 may be sold without judicial approval by father/mother acting as legal administrator of minor owners. ISSUE: 1. WON a parent, as legal administrator of property owned by his/her minor children, can sell said property without judicial approval 2. WON defendants purchased the land in good faith 3. WON the action for reconveyance has prescribed RATIO: NO. Parent, as legal administrator, only has powers of possession and management and no powers of disposition or encumbrance. Status as legal administrator of a parent comes from NCC Art 320: Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than P2,000, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. NO. They knew that the sale was illegal, the mother having had no judicial authority to enter into the transaction, yet they bought the property anyway. Therefore, they were purchasers in bad faith. From Gatioan v Gaffud: One who acquires or purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in the title of his vendor cannot claim that he acquired the title thereto in good faith as against the owner of the property or for an interest therein. NO. Real actions for immovables prescribe after 30 years. Sale was made in 1966 and action was filed in 1987 (only 22 years after).
Tejano
306 332
People v. Silvano
G.R.No. 127356 ll Jun. 29, 1999 ll Per Curiam KEYWORDS: Sex as punishment DOCTRINE: It is the duty of the father to give her love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Code recognizes the authority of parents to discipline their children but not to the extent that the father would force her daughter to have sex with him under the mask of punishment. FACTS: The father, David Silvano y Hayag had been sexually abusing her daughter, Sheryl, since she was 13 years old. Three days after she had turned 16, and on the pretense of punishment for coming home late, the father raped his daughter. She went to school the next day and did not come home for two weeks until she reported the incident to the authorities. ISSUE: WON the appellant is guilty of qualified rape punishable by death penalty? YES. HELD: The fundamental presumption of innocence enjoyed by appellant was overcome with the requisite quantum of proof; his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Sec 11 of RA 7659 imposes death penalty to qualified rape committed by the victims parent. The following elements of rape were proven: i. Sexual congress the testimony of the victim and the medical report stating that she is no longer a virgin ii. With a woman his own daughter iii. By force and without consent substituted by the moral ascendancy of the offender over the victim iv. Victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape v. The offender is the parent proven by the certificate of live birth of Sheryl. The father is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is given death penalty with P50,000 as moral damages andP75,000 for civil indemnity. Arguments of the defendant and the answers of the court: (most to least relevant in the discussion) 1. He denied allegation because he provides her financial, material and educational support. nonsequitur, the fact that he supports her does not give him the license to rape her. It is the obligation of parents to support their children (Arts 195 and 220 FC). The ratiocination of the father is a product of a sick mind of a sick parent. The status of being a parents entails the natural right and duty not only of the caring for and rearing of unemancipated children but above all the development of their moral, mental and physical character and wellbeing. The Family Code recognizes the parents rights and duties to impose discipline but it does not authorize them to force their children to copulate with them, or invade their honor and violate their dignity nor does it give them the license to ravish the product of their marital union. The appellant provided her with perversed and distorted moral and spiritual guidance to the extent that brainwashing her that sex with the father is part of sex education. It is the duty of the father to give her love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding, but she got humiliation and destruction of her life, good future and the very essence of her existence. 2. The victim offered only a token of resistance: this cannot be construed as voluntary submission to appellants desires. The law does not impose upon a victim the burden of proving resistance. The latters moral ascendancy over the former substitutes for violence or intimidation. A woman at her age can only cower in fear and into submission. 3. That the mother is using the rape case to further her separation with her husband. Untenable for no mother in her right mind would subject her daughter to humiliation, disgrace and trauma, attendant to the prosecution of rape, if she were not motivated solely to incarcerate the person
Tiangco
307 332
People v. Silvano
G.R.No. 127356 ll Jun. 29, 1999 ll Per Curiam responsible for the defilement of her daughter. 4. The behavior of her daughter after the alleged incident is not consistent with the behavior of a raped victim. Without merit for different people react differently. The failure of the victim to immediately reveal the incestuous acts is not indicative of fabricated charges. Her shame and genuine fear of what the appellant might do to her brothers and mother prevented her from reporting the incident. 5. The testimony of the girl could not convict him (credibility) the presumption that a young and decent Filipina would not humiliate herself unless that is the truth for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. 6. That he could not have raped her in a small room where her other brothers are sleeping. That it is highly improbable that a series of acts constituting the rape lasted for 40 minutes. (And really lame excuse that it is only 10:30 where people are not yet soundly asleep) lacks merit for lust is no respecter of time and place. This is a trivial matter as lust may be consummated in a matter of seconds or it could last hours depending on the parties and circumstances. 7. The irregularity regarding his arrest because of the invitation from the police station he waived any objection when he submitted himself under the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, he was convicted not on the basis of what was illegally obtained by the police, but on the credible testimony of the witness.
Tiangco
308 332
Shields v. Gross
58 N.Y.2D 338 ll Mar. 29, 1983 ll Simons, J. KEYWORDS: Brooke Shields story, child model, Sugar and Spice DOCTRINE: Other rights and duties in exercise of parental authority > Section 50 of Civil Rights Law: A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor" From the Family Code, Article 220 (6): To represent them in all matter affecting their interest From Tolentino, page 620: No person below eighteen years of age may be employed or allowed to work in any place of work or employment without the written consent of his parent, guardian or person having custody over him. NATURE: The parties have filed cross appeals. Defendant requests reinstatement of the trial court's judgment. Plaintiff requests, in the alternative, that the order of the Appellate Division be modified by striking the limitation enjoining use only for purposes of advertising and trade, or that the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed or, failing both of these, that a new t rial be granted. FACTS: Plaintiff, Brooke Shields is a well-known actress who was previously a child model. When she was 10 years old she obtained several modeling jobs with defendant, Garry Gross, through her agent, the Ford Model Agency. In 1975, she got a job involving a series of photographs to be financed by Playboy Press requiring plaintiff to pose nude in a bathtub back in 1975. These photos were known to be used in a publication entitled "Portfolio 8" (later renamed "Sugar and Spice"). Before the photographic sessions, plaintiff's mother and legal guardian, Teri Shields, executed two consents in favor of defendant. After the pictures were taken, they were used not only in the agreed publication but also in other publications and in a display of largerthan-life photo enlargements in the windows of a store on Fifth Avenue in New York City. It must be noted, however, that this was with the knowledge of plaintiff and her mother. As a matter of fact, even the plaintiff used the photos in a book that she published about herself. Her mother had to obtain an authorization from defendant to use them. Over the years defendant has also photographed plaintiff for other advertisements. In 1980 plaintiff learned that several her photographs had appeared in a French magazine called "Photo" and were disturbed by that publication. Upon learning that the defendant intended to give other publications her pictures, she attempted to buy the negatives. In 1981, she commenced this action in tort and contract seeking compensatory and punitive damages and an injunction permanent ly enjoining defendant from any further use of the photographs. Special Term granted plaintiff a preliminary injunction. Although it determined that as a general proposition consents given by a parent pursuant to section 51 barred the infant's action, the plaintiff claimed that the consents were invalid or restricted the use of the photographs. The court ruled that the consents were unrestricted as to time and use and it therefore dismissed plaintiff's complaint. However, it granted plaintiff limited relief by permanently enjoining the defendant from using the photographs in "pornographic magazines or publications whose appeal is of a predominantly prurient nature" and it charged him with the duty of policing their use. The Appellate Division, by a divided court, modified the judgment on the law and granted plaintiff a permanent injunction enj oining defendant from using the pictures for purposes of advertising or trade. Two Justices voted for the res ult believing that plaintiff possessed a
Yumol
309 332
Shields v. Gross
58 N.Y.2D 338 ll Mar. 29, 1983 ll Simons, J. common-law right to disaffirm the consent given defendant by her parent. While another Justice added that the consents were governed by section 3-105 of the General Obligations Law and therefore could be interpreted to have expired after three years. But it accepted the trial court's findings that the consents were valid and unrestricted as to time and use. ISSUE: WON an infant model may disaffirm a prior unrestricted consent executed on her behalf by her parent and maintain an action pursuant to section 51 of the Civil Law Rights against her photographer for republication of photographs of her. NO. RATIO: Historically, New York common law did not recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy. In 1909, however, responding to a previous court decision, the Legislature enacted sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law. Section 50 is penal and makes it a misdemeanor to use a living person's name, portrait or picture for advertising purposes without prior "written consent". Sect ion 51 is remedial and creates a related civil cause of action on behalf of the injured party permitting relief by injunction or damages. Section 51 of the statute further states that the prior "written consent" which will bar the civil action is to be as "above provided", referring to section 50 which in turn provides that: "A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The statute acts to restrict an advertiser's prior unrestrained common-law right to use another's photograph until written consent is obtained. Once written consent is obtained, however, the photograph may be published as permitted by its terms. It may abrogate an infant's common-law right to disaffirm the consent or, conversely, it may confer upon infants the right to make binding. Where a statute expressly permits a certain class of agreements to be made by infants, it settles the question and makes the agreement valid and enforceable. By adopting section 51, a new cause of action was created and it provided in the statute itself the method for obtaining an infant's consent to avoid liability. Construing the statute strictly, the parent's consent is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate the legislative intent. Inasmuch as the consents in this case complied with the statutory requirements, they were valid and may not be disaffirmed. The consents cannot also be considered as void because it failed to comply with the provisions of section 3-105 of the General Obligations Law requiring prior court approval of infants' contracts. This statute applies only to performing artists, such as actors, musicians, dancers and professional athletes. Moreover, the Legislature has purposively differentiated between child performers and child models. Thus, what are referred to in the aforementioned statute are child performers and not child models. Furthermore, section 3105 was not designed to expand the rights of infants to disaffirm their contracts but to provide assurance to those required to deal with infants that the infants would not later disaffirm executory contracts to the adult contracting party's disadvantage. Sections 50 and 51 are interpreted to serve the same purpose. The court, as a parting statement gave the advice that if a parent wished to limit the publicity and exposure of her child then he/she need only limit the use authorized in the consent, for a defendant's immunity from a claim for invasion of privacy is no broader than the consent executed to him. The order of the Appellate Division should be modified that striking the further injunction against the use of the photographs for uses of advertising and trade, and as so modified, the order should be affirmed.
Yumol
310 332
Silva v. CA and Gonzales

G.R.No. 114742 ll Jul. 17, 1997 ll Vitug, J. KEYWORDS: Businessman-actress love child, child custody DOCTRINE: Included in parental authority is the parents right to the company of the children. FACTS: - Silva, a married businessman and Gonzales, an unmarried actress, had an illicit relationship from which two children were born. When the relationship ended, Silva filed for custodial rights of the children, on allegation that Gonzales refused to allow him the company of the children on weekends; Gonzales counter-claim: Silva engaged in gambling and womanizing. - RTC: awarded Silva visitorial rights but deprived him of taking the kids out without written consent from the mother. Pending Gonzales appeal, she married a Dutch national and moved to Holland with the kids. - CA: welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration (PD 603, Art. 8); a system of rotation of custody (mother, weekdays, father, and weekends) might not be conducive to their upbringing, and that Art. 3 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides: every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character. (5) and Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper influences, hazards and other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental, emotional, social and moral development. (8) Best Interest of minor children: deny visitorial/temporary custodial rights to father. A home with one parent is more normal than two separate homes. Art. 176, FC: illegitimate children are under the parental authority and use the surname of their mother. ISSUE: WON the father is entitled to visitorial rights to his children? (The right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child/children) HELD: Inherent and natural rights of parents over their children: Art. 150, FC: family relations include those between parents and children. Art. 209, 220 of FC: the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. 1987 Constitution: natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the youth. Nothing in these provisions limit such rights to legitimate parent-children relationships. Laws on support and successional rights go beyond legitimate family members and encompass illegitimate relationships too. - Declaration of nullity of marriages (Art. 49, FC) provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents not given custody of their children. - The Supreme Court ruled that a few hours spent with their father could not be detrimental to the children. Furthermore, allegations of the mother against the father (re: womanizing and gambling) cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render father as unfit; allegations are a product of the mothers unfounded imagination; no immoral man would take the trouble to spend on legal action to see his illegitimate children. RTC decision reinstated. Fathers visitorial rights restored.
Alampay
311 332
Palisoc v. Brillantes
G.R.No. L-29025 ll Oct. 4, 1971 ll Teehankee, J. KEYWORDS: Daffon 1, fistfight, school liability QUICK READ: Daffon killed Palisoc in a fistfight while at school so the parents of the latter are suing Daffon + member of the Board of Directors, President and Instructor of MTI invo king Art. 2180.TC absolved all co-defendants using doctrine in Mercado requiring a kind of living and boarding arrangement between the student and school for the latter to be liable as suggested by the phrase so long as they remain in custody. Ct reversed TC and said there was nothing in the law that requires that kind of arrangement and that the liability stems from the substitute parental authority that requires them to exercise protective and supervisory custody over the students as long as theyre attending school even during recess time. Mercado dictum was set aside and Ct held that Daffon, President and Instructor were jointly and severally liable for damages [12k] arising from Palisocs death. Brillantes was not being a mere board director [only head of trade school liable]. FACTS: Dominic Palisoc [16] and Virgilio Daffon were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI), a non-academic institution. While Daffon was working on a machine at the schools laboratory, he remarked that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Palisoc slightly slapped Daffon in the face. The latter retaliated with a barrage of blows causing Palisoc to retreat. While retreating, Palisoc stumbled on an engine block and fell unconscious. He died thereafter. The cause of death was internal injuries probably caused by strong fist blows. Parents of Palisoc sued Antonio Brillantes [member of Board of Directors], Teodosio Valenton [President], and SantiagoQuibulue [instructor] along with Daffon. Daffon was of legal age at the time of the incident, hence the parents were not liable under Art 2180.The trial court found Daffon guilty for quasi-delict, but absolved the defendants-officials of MTI, citing the ruling in Mercado v CA. ISSUE: Whether defendants school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors HELD: YES. Valenton (head) and Quibule (teacher) are liable for damages under Art 2180 CC. Brillantes is not liable as being a member of the schools board of directors. School heads and teachers, to a certain extent, stand in loco parentis to students who remain in their custody. Custody, as used in Art 2180, means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over their students for as long as they are in attendance in the school, including recess time. The basis of the presumption of negligence in Art 2180 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc.are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. Where the parent places the child under the custody of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one responsible for the tortuous act of the child. Palisoc. The unfortunate death could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. NOTE: The basis of TC for absolving is a dictum in Mercado v CA which is also based on another dictum in Exconde, both of which are set aside in this case Brillantes was the former owner of the school but during the occurrence of the incident, the school was already incorporated thus hes not liable as being a member of the Board. The school could be held liable but since it wasnt properly impleaded, then Ct cant hold it liable. DISSENT (Makalintal): The size of enrollment of educational institutions makes it highly unrealistic to consider students as in the custody of
Bayona
312 332
Palisoc v. Brillantes
G.R.No. L-29025 ll Oct. 4, 1971 ll Teehankee, J. teachers or school heads merely from the fact of enrollment and class attendance, unless the latter can prove due diligence. The restrictive interpretation of Art 2180 in Mercado should be maintained. Under Art 2180, parents are responsible for the tortious acts of their minor children who live in their company. Since the basis of liability of teachers and school heads is in loco parentis, the said provision should be applied by analogy, i.e. so long as they remain in their custody should be equated with who live in their company; and school heads and teachers should not be responsible for damages caused by children who are no longer minors.
Bayona
313 332
Amadora v. CA
G.R.No. L-47745 ll Apr. 15, 1988 ll Cruz, J. KEYWORDS: Student killer, Daffon 2, school liability FACTS: - April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a high school graduating student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos went to school to submit his Physics experiment. However, while he was in the auditorium, his classmate Pablito Daffon fired a gun that mortally hit him. He died at 17. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. - Amadoras parents filed a civil action for damages under Art. 2180 CC against the school, its rector (HS principal), dean of boys, and the Physics teacher, together with Daffon and 2 other students through their parents. The complaint against students was later dropped. - CFI Cebu: defendants were liable in the sum of P294,984.00 (death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages & attorneys fees) - CA: reversed, all defendants absolved completely. i. As per Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC Art. 2180 is not applicable since the school was an academic institution of learning & not a school of arts & trades. ii. Students were not in custody of the school at the time of the incident since the semester had already ended. iii. No clear identification of the fatal gun. iv. Defendants exercised necessary diligence in preventing injury. - Petitioners claim their son was still under schools custody because he went to school to comply w/a requirement for graduation. While the respondents allege that in submitting the said report, Amadora was no longer in their custody since the semester was over. - A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, the Dean of boys, from Jose Gumban on April 7, 1972. It was an unlicensed pistol which was later returned to Gumban without reporting such to the principal or taking further action. Gumban was one Daffons companions when the incident happened. Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son which respondents rebutted by saying there was no proof that they were one and the same. ISSUES + RDS: WON Art 2180 CC can be applied in this case (WON it can be applied to all schools): YES The Court mentioned 3 cases which were decided in relation to Art 2180 CC. - Exconde v Capuno: Capuno, a student of Balintawak Elementary School and a boy scout attended a Rizal Day parade on city school supervisors instructions. Afterwards, Capuno boarded a jeep and drove it recklessly that it turned turtle killing 2 passengers. SC exculpated school in obiter dictum (it was not party to the case) since it was not a school of arts & trades. Some justices dissented claiming that liability under CC Art. 2180 applied to teachers in general & heads of schools of arts & trades in particular. - Mercado v. CA: a student cut a classmate with a razor blade at the Lourdes Catholic School, QC. Exconde ruling reiterated. Custody requirement was defined as a situation where student lives and boards with the teacher such that control, direction & influences on pupil supersede those of parents - Palisoc v. Brillantes: a 16-yr old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the lab of Manila Technical Institute. Court ruled that even if offender was already of age and not boarding in the school, the head and teacher-in-charge were solidarily liable with him. So long as they remain in their custody means, according to J. Teehankee, that the protective and supervisory custody that school, its heads and teachers exercise over students for as long as they are at the attendance in the school including recess time. No such requirement as actual living and boarding in the school
Reyes
314 332
Amadora v. CA
G.R.No. L-47745 ll Apr. 15, 1988 ll Cruz, J. before such liability is attached, hence setting aside the dicta in the previous cited cases. It should also be noted that even students of age were still covered by provision since they are equally in custody of school and subject to its discipline. CC Art. 2180 applies to all schools whether academic or non-academic. - General Rule: Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. - Exception: In establishments of arts and trades, only the head thereof will be held liable - History of disparity: - Head of school of arts & trades exercised closer tutelage over his students who apprenticed to their master, the school head. He was personally involved in teaching his students who usually boarded w/him & thus he exercised constant control, supervision & influence. - Head of academic school: exercised only administrative duties over teachers who were directly dealing w/students. Thus, teacher is liable. - No reason to differentiate the vigilance expected from teachers from academic institutions and non-academic ones. What is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students? - The laws custody requirement is not limited to boarding with school authorities. It is not co-terminous with the semesters. There is custody for as long as he is under the control and influence of school, and is within its premises regardless of time and is in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, exercise & enjoyment of a legitimate student right/privilege which includes relaxing in the campus. Under similar circumstances, teacherin-charge should be liable for his students torts. He need not be physically present or in a position to prevent the injury. Custody refers more to his influence on the child & the discipline instilled. Teacher is liable regardless of students age. Teacher should be liable & not school itself unless he can prove that he exercised the diligence of a good father. This defense is made available to the teacher considering that his responsibility/influence over the child cannot be equated to that of the parents. WRT liability for kids of the age of majority, leniency should be observed in assessing teachers responsibility considering that parents are no longer liable for the acts of their emancipated children.
HELD: PETITION DENIED. 1. Rector and Dean not liable because they are not teachers-in-charge; only had general authority over students. 2. Teacher-in-charge: not disclosed by evidence. Just because Amadora went to school in connection with a physics report does not necessarily make physics teacher the teacher-in-charge. Besides, theres no showing that the teacher was negligent in any manner. 3. Dean of boys no proof that the gun he released was the same gun that killed Amadora. 4. School only teacher or head is responsible. NOTE: This is just a revised version of a digest that I got from the internet.
Reyes
315 332
St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos

G.R.No. 143363 ll Feb. 6, 2002 ll Pardo, J. KEYWORDS: Reckless minor driver DOCTRINE: Liability for damages caused by acts/omissions of a minor is on those given the authority and responsibility to take charge of them pursuant to Art. 219 FC. However, the proximate cause of the acts/omissions should be proved to be the negligence of the person given authority, otherwise the parents of the minor should be liable. FACTS: - Appeal via certiorari of the school on the decision of the CA granting payment for damages to the parents of a minor who died in a vehicular accident on a schoolsanctioned activity. - St. Marys Academy conducted an enrollment drive where prospective enrollees schools are visited to campaign. Deceased Sherwin Capistranos was part of the group. They rode a jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva and driven by minor James Daniel II. The jeep turned turtle and Sherwin died. - CA ruled that the school has liability pursuant to Art. 218 of the FC which grants them substitute parental authority. The Court also held the parents of the minor driver who was absolved due to his minority liable. ISSUE: WON the school is liable for the death of the student. HELD & RD: NO. The school is liable for the death if the proximate cause was the negligence of the school teachers/ administrators having charge of the student. The Court reversed the CA decision because they found that the Capistranos were unable to prove that the proximate cause of the death was the negligence of the school. The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of the minor driver but the mechanical defect of the jeep. Hence, the liability should be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The case is remanded to the trial court for determination of liability of the parents of James Daniel II and the owner of the jeep.
Cristobal
316 332
Vancil v. Belmes
G.R.No. 132223 ll Jun. 19, 2001 ll Sandoval - Gutierrez, J. KEYWORDS: US citizen grandma v mother, guardianship DOCTRINES: Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. But if either parent is alive, grandparent should prove parents unsuitability in order to claim rights of substitute parental authority. Courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. FACTS: In May 1987, Bonifacia Vancil, a naturalized US citizen, commenced before the RTC of Cebu City guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie (6) and Vincent (2), her grandchildren from his son Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in the US, with his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their fathers death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000. Bonifacia Vancil was eventually appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate the children. Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. She then followed this with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a naturalized American citizen and a resident thereof. RTC rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. Upon appeal in 1988, CA reversed RTCs decision based on legal provisions (Civil Code, PD 603, FC Art.225) and Rules of Court (Sec.7, Rule 93) which vests parental authority and guardianship of minor children to their parents without need of court appointment. In 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with SC petition for review on certiorari. Helen stated in her Manifestation/Motion that at the time of the petition, Valerie was already 18 years old and should no longer be included in the guardianship proceedings, which CA noted and eventually ruled petition as moot with respect to her. ISSUE: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian RULING: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed. RATIO: Helen, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian, as provided under Art. 211, FC which provides: Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Bonifacias claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Art. 214, FC: Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Bonifacia then, as the surviving
Cruz
317 332
Vancil v. Belmes
G.R.No. 132223 ll Jun. 19, 2001 ll Sandoval - Gutierrez, J. grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that the mother is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. She, however, has failed to provide convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. She merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that the latters live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of the guardianship proceeding. Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute guardian as she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado, and as such, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In addition to this, her old age and her conviction of libel will give her a second thought of staying in the Philippines. Generally, courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts, despite not being a statutory requirement for guardianship or administration, for they will find it difficult to protect the wards and their properties. SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Cruz
318 332
Abiera v. Orin
G.R.No. 3236 ll Mar. 27, 1907 ll Mapa, J. KEYWORDS: Sibling war, special administrator FACTS: - Vicenta, Mariano and Petra Cacao were siblings. Petra Cacao married Juan Abiera. Petra Cacao died. - Vicenta married defendant Miguel Orin. They have no children. Vicenta Cacao died. - In 1898, Mariano Cacao, Juan Abiera and Miguel Orin entered into an extrajudicial partition of properties/animals acquired during the marriage of Vicenta Cacao and Miguel Orin. Specifically, Orin was to pay the other two P1,000 each. - Abiera was representing his children by Petra Cacao. Because of the circumstances, the natural nephews became heirs of Vicenta Cacao. - Juan Abiera died. Plaintiff Sebastian Abiera became administrator of his estate. As special administrator, plaintiff demanded the P1,000 from Orin; lower court decided in plaitiffs favor.
ISSUES: WON Sebastian Abiera may demand payment as special administrator to the estate of the father of the heirs? HELD: NO. The obligation was executed in favor of the heirs, not in favor of Juan Abiera, who was merely representing them. Sebastian Abiera could only manage Abieras estate, not those of third persons. Juan Abiera cannot transfer his right to represent his children to Sebastian. The right to represent the children is attached to parental authority or guardianship. This is a personal right. It died with Juan Abiera.
Dantes
319 332
Cortes v. Castillo
G.R.No. L-16903 ll Mar. 18, 1921 ll Malcolm, J. KEYWORDS: Adulterous mom, custody QUICK READ: The mother who was found guilty of adultery was deemed unfit to acquire custody of her children from her mother-in-law. FACTS: - Maria Cortes was found guilty of adultery by the trial court but Col. Alejandro Herrera, her husband, condoned her and came back to live with her. - On the suspicion that she might be committing adultery again, he left, took the kids with him, and stayed with his mother. He filed an action for divorce, but - He died in the line of duty (he was a policeman, apparently) Maria then proceeded to re-obtain custody of her children from her mother-in-law but the latter refused. - The trial court sided with the mother-inlaw. - Hence this appeal. ISSUES: WON A woman found guilty of adultery is unfit for custody of her children - Yes RATIO: (The entire ratio is just one paragraph long, and I might as well copy it verbatim) "Article 171 of the Civil Code, presumably still in force, because of continued judicial construction and enforcement, provides that parents who, by the example set by them, tend to corrupt their offspring, may be deprived by the courts of their parental authority. (There can also be noted sections 770 and 771 of the Code of Civil Procedure.) This provision of the law imposes a discretionary power on the courts, which should be made use of, with a primary regard for the welfare of the minor. (See 2 Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp. 63, et seq.; decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 23, 1905.) Both under the civil law and the common law, the best interests of the child is the paramount consideration"
De Castro
320 332
Chua v. Cabangbang
G.R.No. L-23253 ll Mar. 28, 1969 ll Castro, J. KEYWORDS: Hostess, Betty the adopted child DOCTRINE: Abandonment authority abandonment rather than fitness that divests the mother with parental authority parental Art. 332 of the Civil Code The courts may deprive the parents of their parental authority or suspend the exercise of the same if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or should give them corrupting orders, counsels or examples, or should make them beg or abandon them. Therefore, abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving authority over the parent - Mere acquiescence to the giving by Villareal to the spouses is not sufficient to constitute abandonment - But since she waited for a period of 5 years before she filed the petition for custody, it is more believable that she did abandon the child - More proof that she doesnt really love the child - She admitted under oath that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing the petitioner and the child support which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the child away - Also, she expressed her willingness to drop the case if the spouses paid her in cash and a jeep - Not to mention that she gave her other child to a comadre in Cebu because she couldnt support her
terminates
NATURE OF PETITION: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chuas petition for habeas corpus for the custody of her daughter Betty from respondents. FACTS: Petitioner, when she was still at the prime of youth, worked as a hostess in nightclubs She slept with different men, but she got pregnant with 2 children from a certain Sy Sia Lay and 1 daughter with Victor Tan Villareal She gave her youngest daughter to a comadre in Cebu The custody of the other daughter, Betty, was acquired by Mr. and Mrs. Cabangbang during the formers early years (4 months old) - They christened her Grace Cabangbang Petitioner now wants to get custody of Betty - She contends that Villareal took the child away and gave her to the couple - The couple avers that they found the baby, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of their residence ISSUE: WON the custody of the child can be granted back to the mother HELD: NO, petitioner abandoned the child, thus she has lost her parental authority over the child RATIO: CFI ruled that the mother was unfit to have parental authority, as she is not an upright woman. - But SC ruled that it was more of an
SIDE ISSUE: Petitioner contends that no child under 7 years of age shall be taken away from her mother. - Moot and academic, as she is already 11 years old We therefore affirm the lower courts decision, not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a
Dilag
321 332
Chua v. Cabangbang
G.R.No. L-23253 ll Mar. 28, 1969 ll Castro, J. ground which the court overlooked i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her child
Dilag
322 332
In Re, Edward C
126 Cal.App.3d 193 ll Nov. 30, 1981 ll Barry-Deal, J. KEYWORDS: Divine punishment, child maltreatment DOCTRINE: Maltreatment of a child is not privileged simply because it is imposed in the guise of freedom of religious expression. Whether the discipline is excessive or a lifestyle is harmful to the child must be measured in the light of an objective standard of reasonableness under all circumstances. FACTS: 3 kids: Eric, Marlee and Edward During the maternal grandmas two-week visit in March 1980, she observed the father disciplining the three children by hitting them with a leather strap, looped over. Although the boys were spanked a few times with clothing on, Marlee was beaten at least a dozen times, usually on her bare flesh. The boys witnessed Marlee's whippings, heard her cry, and listened to their father, while administering the beating, explain to the children that he was doing it because God wanted him to and that it was Biblically ordained. There were other forms of discipline and parental control: a. Marlee was made to sleep in her underwear on a plastic sheet on the floor with no bedding in 60 degree weather as punishment for wetting b. One night Marlee was strapped three times during the night for wetting the bed c. The children were made to stand in a corner for long periods and were lectured about God at mealtime. One night, after three hours of dissertation by the father, the dinner was cold and the children fell asleep without eating d. After school the children were not allowed to go outside the home, to visit friends, or to have friends visit them e. When Marlee was unable to recall what she learned in church, she receive a severe beating that there was blood in her underpants When the grandma reported it to the police, the latter looked at the 3 childrens signs of abuse. A visual check of Marlee revealed numerous abrasions, bruises, and lacerations on her buttocks, legs, and arms; she was taken into protective custody. (Apparently, there were no significant bruises on the boys.) Note that Marlee is only 8 years old. The father refuses counselling and said that he does not need one, only a counselling with the Lord.
ISSUE: W/N the maltreatment is justified by the religion? NO
HELD: Sufficiency of Evidence The court reasoned that the "parental preference" and the "child's best interests" standards are usually compatible, but when the rights of the parents conflict with those of the child, "`... the legal system should protect the child's interests. Not only is the child a helpless party but the parents should suffer the consequences of their inadequacy rather than the child. Thus, in any proceeding to remove a child from the parents, either temporarily or permanently, the court must balance the fundamental rights of the parents against the fundamental rights of the child. Mistreatment of a child, however, is not privileged because it is imposed in the guise of freedom of religious expression. Whether discipline is excessive or a lifestyle is harmful to the child must be measured in the light of an objective standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Reunification of the Family Until the father cooperates to counselling program, reunification of the family will be detrimental to the family.
Dolot
323 332
Prince v. Massachusetts
321 U.S. 158 ll Jan. 31, 1944 ll Rutledge, J. KEYWORDS: Jehovas Witness magazine, child labor FACTS: Sarah Prince was the aunt and legal custodian of 9 year old Betty Simmons. One night, the kid and Princes legit children insisted they come with Prince in distributing Jehovahs Witness literature magazines (Watchtower and Consolation) on the streets. The children used to come with her, but she was chastised by the school attendance officer, Mr. Perkins. She was then convicted of violating Massachusetts comprehensive child labor law, which prohibits any boy under twelve or any girl under eighteen to sell, expose, or offer to sell any newspapers, magazines, periodical or any other articles of merchandise of any description, or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any other trade, in any street or public place. Specifically she was found guilty of the complaints: a. Furnishing her (Betty) with magazines, knowing she was to sell them unlawfully, that is, on the street; b. As Betty's custodian, permitting her to work contrary to law. Prince argues that the law violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to exercise her religion and her equal protection rights, in particular because the children themselves were ministers of their religion as well. ISSUE: Does the freedom of religion of the First Amendment, and the parental rights secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit Massachusetts from enforcing the child labor law? HELD: No. The States authority to prevent child labor overrides the constitutional protections in this case. Two liberties are at stake, the parents right to bring up the child in the way he should go, and the childs right to practice his or her religion. The custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents. However, neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. The state as parens patriae may guard the general interest in a youths well being by requiring school attendance, and regulating or prohibiting the childs labor. The appellant urges that the activity in this case in no way harmed the niece. However, the states authority over childrens activities is broader than over like actions of adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of employment. Legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils (like the crippling effects of child employment, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the street) is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action. This case reduces itself to the question of whether the presence of the childs guardian puts a limit on the states power. The parent may martyr themselves, but this does not mean they may martyr the child before the child reaches the age of majority. Massachusetts had determined that an absolute prohibition, though limited to streets and public places and to the incidental uses proscribed, is necessary to accomplish its legitimate objectives. DISSENT: "Religious freedom is too sacred a right to be restricted or prohibited in any degree without convincing proof that a legitimate interest of the state is in grave danger."
Enad
324 332
Strunk v. Strunk
445 S.W.2D 145 ll Sep. 26, 1969 ll Osborne, J. KEYWORDS: Sibling love, organ transplant, substituted judgement FACTS: Arthur and Ava Strunk had two sons: Tommy, 28, married, and suffering from a fatal kidney disease called chronic glomerulus nephritis; and Jerry, 27, handicapped by a speech defect, feeble-minded and committed to a state institution for such individuals. In order to keep Tommy alive, he had an artificial kidney and was undergoing treatment, but this could no longer be sustained. A kidney transplant would better help him survive. The Strunks and other relatives were tested for the compatibility of their blood type or tissue with that of Tommys, but only Jerrys was found to be acceptable. Tommy and Jerrys mother Ava thus petitioned the county court, praying for the authority to proceed with the operation. The county court held that going through with the organ donation would beneficial to both the brothers. First, Tommy would have a new, better-functioning kidney. Second, Jerry would not have to lose his brother, on whom he was emotionally and psychologically dependent. Upon the appeal of the guardian ad litem, Morris E. Burton, the Franklin Circuit Final Court adopted the findings of the country court and also ruled to allow the transplant. ISSUE: Whether a court may permit an organ transplant from an incompetent ward of the state at the petition of his mother and committee. RATIO: YES. The Court AFFIRMED the judgment of the lower courts and PERMITTED THE ORGAN TRANSPLANT, reasoning that: A. Through the doctrine of substituted judgment, the court has jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to a wards well-being. The doctrine of substituted judgment is the right of the court to act in behalf of any person with a legal disability, not only with regard to their property, but also in the interest of their well-being. This power has been delegated by the courts to the incompetents committees. The court stated its belief that such power would not extend so far as to allow a committee to subject his ward to serious surgical techniques [] unless the life of his ward be in jeopardy. Thus, in this case, it was only in exercise of this delegated power that Ava Strunk, the mother and committee of Tommy, sought the approval of the county court, and only in exercise of the power conferred by the doctrine of substituted judgment did the county court give its permission. B. The surgery would be for the benefit of both brothers. The Department of Mental Health was amicus curiae. It recommended that the surgery be permitted not only so that Tommys life may be saved, but also to prevent Jerry from feeling any guilt if his brother were to die. The court also noted that all the members of the immediate family have recommended the transplant, in addition to the Dept. of Mental Health and the county and circuit courts. Based on the lower courts findings that the procedure would be to Jerrys best interest, the judgment was affirmed.
Espaola
325 332
Conservatorship of Valerie N
40 Cal.3d 143 ll Oct. 21, 1985 ll Grodin, J. FACTS: - Valerie N, 29 years old, is inflicted with Down Syndrome and has an IQ of 30. Living w/ mother and stepfather - Mother instituted a court proceeding for appointment as conservators and also requested for additional powers to sterilize Valerie through tubal ligation - Reason? Valerie was sexually aggressive at the sight of men. She would kiss, hug and sit on random men's laps. Though she is not sexually active, she masturbates excessively. - Mother fears when she leaves her daughter and the harm she may suffer if she does get pregnant. - Failed behavior modification. Also rejected contraceptive pills. Other contraceptive devices like intrauterine devices would be harmful. - Lower court granted conservatorship but ruled that it had no jurisdiction to order the sterilization since Subdivision (d) of 2356 prohibits other persons from obtaining sterilization for a conservatee without the latter's consent ISSUE: 1. WON State law is unconstitutional 2. WON Court can grant the parent's request for Valerie's sterilization HELD: 1) Yes, said state law is unconstitutional. It violates the conservatee's privacy and liberty interests protected by the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution - Sterilization is encompassed in the right to privacy to choose an option of procreation. It is also protected by the interest of the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. To say that consent of the conservatee is necessary to get sterilization would be to deny the choice of those who will not be able to understand the consequences. True protection of procreative choice can only be accomplished if state permits court-supervised substitute judgment of the conservator to be exercised on behalf of a conservatee Denying mentally retarded women the choice to be sterilized denies them same rights as would those women who are not mentally retarded enjoy Although the Court found that the state interest is to give mentally retarded women the choice to be able to procreate later, it is overbroad and takes away the rights of those women who could not make the choice for themselves
2) NO - Lack of sufficient evidence from parents about the necessity of sterilization - They didn't provide proof that Valerie can become pregnant - Did not provide proof that besides the pills, they have tried other less-intrusive way of making Valerie take contraceptives Court affirms lower court's decision without prejudice for more factfinding for the parents and to petition again
Hermosisima
326 332
Johnson v. Calvert
5 Cal.4th 84 ll May 20, 1993 ll Panelli, J. KEYWORDS: Surrogate mom DOCTRINE: Under California law, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own is the natural mother. PROOF GIVEN: For the Calverts; Evidence of blood tests showing that Crispina is genetically related to the child FACTS: Mark and Crispina Calvert are married but unable to have a child. Anna Johnson offered to serve as surrogate mother. The two parties enter into a contract where Anna serves as surrogate, while the Calverts pay her $10,000 in installments as well as purchase a life insurance policy for Johnson. The relationship between the two sides soured, with Anna demanding the payment of the balance or else she would refuse to give up the child. The Calverts responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the child. Upon the birth of the child, it was proven through blood tests that Anna was NOT the genetic mother of the child. The trial court ruled that 1) the Calverts were the genetic, biological and natural parents of the child, 2) Anna had no parental rights to the child, and 3) the surrogacy contract was legal and enforceable against Annas claims, all of which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUES: 1. WON Anna can claim custody of the child 2. WON the surrogate contract violates public policy HELD: 1. NO. Because undisputed evidence shows that Anna gave birth to the child and that only Crispina is genetically related to such child, and no clear legislative preference is given between blood tests and gestation as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, then the case can only be decided by looking at the intent of both parties as manifested by the surrogacy agreement. Basing it on such agreement, it is clear then that the parties aim was to bring the Calverts child into the world, and not for them to donate the zygote to Anna. From the outset, Crispina intended to be the mother of the child. Annas act of carrying the child may have been indispensible for eventually giving birth to him, but she would not have been able to do so had she manifested her intent to keep the child as her own prior to the implantation of the zygote. Although the Uniform Parentage Act, which bases parent and child rights on the existence of a parent and child relationship, recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child is the natural mother under California law. 2. NO. Gestational surrogacy is completely different from adoption, and as such, should not be subject to adoption statutes. Both parties voluntarily agreed to participate in in vitro fertilization before the child was conceived. Moreover, the financial considerations given to Anna ($10,000 and the purchase of an insurance policy) were NOT for her giving up her parental rights over the child but rather for carrying the child and undergoing labor.
327 332
Gillick v. West Norwalk

Oct. 17, 1985 ll House of Lords KEYWORDS: Parental consent for contraceptives for under 16 FACTS: The Department of Health and Social Security issued a circular to area health authorities containing, inter alia, advice to the effect that a doctor consulted at a family planning clinic by a girl under 16 would not be acting unlawfully if he prescribed contraceptives for the girl, so long as in doing so he was acting in good faith to protect her against the harmful effects of sexual intercourse. The circular further stated that, although a doctor should proceed on the assumption that advice and treatment on contraception should not be given to a girl under 16 without parental consent and that he should try to persuade the girl to involve her parents in the matter, nevertheless the principle of confidentiality between doctor and patient applied to a girl under 16 seeking contraceptives and therefore in exceptional cases the doctor could prescribe contraceptives without consulting the girl's parents or obtaining their consent if in the doctor's clinical judgment it was desirable to prescribe contraceptives. The plaintiff, Victoria Gillick, who had five daughters under the age of 16, sought an assurance from her local area health authority that her daughters would not be given advice and treatment on contraception without the plaintiff's prior knowledge and consent while they were under 16. When the authority refused to give such an assurance the plaintiff brought an action against the authority and the department seeking: 1. A declaration that the advice contained in the circular was unlawful, because it amounted to advice to doctors to commit the offence of causing or encouraging unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, contrary to section 28(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, or the offence of being an accessory to unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, contrary to section 6(1) of that Act; and 2. a declaration that a doctor could not give advice and treatment on contraception to any child of the plaintiff below the age of 16 without the plaintiff's consent, because to do so would be unlawful as being inconsistent with the plaintiff's parental rights. The judge held i. that a doctor prescribing contraceptives to a girl under 16 in accordance with the advice contained in the department's circular would not thereby be committing an offence of causing or encouraging unlawful sexual intercourse with the girl, contrary to section 28(1) of the 1956 Act; and ii. that a parent's interest in his or her child did not amount to a 'right' but was more accurately described as a responsibility or duty, and accordingly giving advice to a girl under 16 on contraception without her parent's consent was not unlawful interference with parental 'rights'. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's action. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal, which granted the declarations sought, on the grounds that a child under 16 could not validly consent to contraceptive treatment without her parents' consent and that therefore the circular was unlawful. The Department appealed to the House of Lords. ISSUE: WON a doctor can lawfully prescribe contraception for a girl under 16 without the consent of her parent. JUDGMENT: NO (with an exception). Clearly a doctor who gives a girl contraceptive advice or treatment not because in his clinical judgment the treatment is medically indicated for the maintenance or restoration of her health but with the intention of facilitating her having unlawful sexual intercourse may well be guilty of a criminal offence. It would depend upon the doctors intention. The departments guidance avoids the trap of declaring that the decision to
Macariola
328 332
Gillick v. West Norwalk

Oct. 17, 1985 ll House of Lords prescribe the treatment is wholly a matter of the doctors discretion. He may prescribe only if she has the capacity to consent1 or if exceptional circumstances exist which justify him in exercising his clinical judgment without parental consent. The adjective clinical emphasizes that it must be a medical judgment based upon what he honestly believes to be necessary for the physical, mental and emotional health of his patient. The bona fide exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgment must be a complete negation of the guilty mind which is an essential ingredient of the criminal offence of aiding and abetting the commission of unlawful sexual intercourse. *Parental rights were recognized by the law only as long as they were needed for the protection of the child and such rights yielded to the child's right to make his own decisions when he reached a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capa ble of making up his own mind. Accordingly, a girl under 16 did not, merely by reason of her age, lack legal capacity to consent to contraceptive advice and treatment by a doctor. According to Lord Scarman, the parental right to determine whether or not their minor child below the age of sixteen will have medical treatment terminates if and when the child achieves sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand fully what is proposed." (Also known as the Gillick Competence)
Macariola
329 332
Curtis v. School Committee

420 Mass. 749 ll Jul. 17, 1995 ll Liacos, CJ KEYWORDS: Condom vending machine FACTS: On January 2, 1992, the Falmouth School committee voted in favor of executing the condom availability program within the campus. The effects of this would be to make condoms available to students in two ways: 1. upon request, 2. through vending machines located within school premises. Apart from making condoms available to students who might want to avail of such, the program also provided counselling by school officials and printed materials that contained information about STDs and the role of condom of protecting their (the studentss) health in that regard. Additionally, the memorandum that outlined the means of implementing the program also stated the intent of the school districts superintendent to impart the message that only sexual abstinence is the foolproof method of keeping safe from STDs. The condom availability program took effect on January 2, 1992. In reaction to its implementation, several students enrolled in the Falmouth public system assailed the program alleging that it infringed their constitutional rights. They presented two main arguments: 1. The program violates their right to familial privacy and their guaranteed liberties as parents in the control of the education and upbringing of their children (protected by the 14th Amendment) 2. The program violates their right to free exercise of religion (Protected by the 1st Amendment) ISSUE: WON the condom availability program violated the constitutionally-protected rights of the petitioners HELD: NO, petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate to the Court that the condom availability program violated rights guaranteed by the constitution. With Regard to the Claims Regarding Familial Privacy: According to the petitioners the programs in question invaded the constitutionally protected zone of privacy which surrounds the family. While the Court acknowledged the rights of families to privacy as well as the interests that the parents sought to protect, it held that the petitioners did not sufficiently demonstrate the violation of their constitutionally-protected rights by the condom availability program. The Court noted the lack of coercion as the primary ground for ruling that the program in question did not violate the constitutional rights of the parties involved. Coercion was defined as where the governmental action is mandatory and provides no outlet for the parents, such as where refusal to participate in a program results in a sanction or in expulsion. The Court held that since the students were not forced to avail of the condoms nor required to undergo counseling and read the information pamphlets regarding STDs, then there was no coercion present. In essence, the condom availability program affected students on a voluntary, not compulsory, basis. Therefore, there was no supplanting of parental authority by school officials as a result of this program. As a result of such ruling, the inclusion of an opt-out clause or parental notification were deemed unnecessary. With Regard to the Claims Regarding Free Exercise of Religion: The Court ruled that the condom availability program did not place any burden on the ability of the petitioners to exercise their religion. Again, in justifying its ruling, the Court pointed to the fact that student participation in the program was not compulsory. Neither was there penalties prescribed by the program for those who do not wish to participate because it may be contrary to their religious beliefs. Mere exposure to programs that may be offensive or contrary to the religious beliefs of the petitioners does not amount to a constitutional violation of their right to freely exercise their religion. Petitions dismissed. The program in question does not violate any constitutional right of the
Marin
330 332
Curtis v. School Committee

420 Mass. 749 ll Jul. 17, 1995 ll Liacos, CJ petitioners.
Marin
331 332
Roe v. Doe
29 N.Y. 2D 188 ll Jul. 7, 1971 ll Scileppi, J. KEYWORDS: Disobedient daughter FACTS: Jane Roe was the guardian of a 20 year-old student on the University of Louisville (Kentucky) who was supported until 1970 by her wealthy father (John Doe) who was an attorney in New York. She was instructed to take up residence in her college dormitory but, in defiance of her father's orders, she bunked with one of her female classmates. Upon learning of this, Doe instructed her to return to New York. Instead of obeying him, she decided to finish her academic year, paying for tuition and other expenses by selling her car. She then moved back to NY, but lived in the home of a friend. She now instituted the present action wherein she claimed that her father should furnish support from the time he stopped sending her money until the time she returned to NY. Family court ruled in favor of Roe, ordering Doe to pay for the support of his daughter, he willfully disobeyed the order and was thus sentenced to be committed to jail for 30 days. The commitment was stayed on appeal, which in turn ruled for Doe, hence this petition. HELD: The decision of the Appellate Court should be affirmed, only requiring Doe to pay for tuition and health fees. A minor of employable age and in full possession of her faculties, voluntarily and without cause, abandons the parents' home against the will of the parents, and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, she forfeits her right to demand support. Child's right to support and parent's right to custody are reciprocal. The father may establish and impose reasonable regulations for the child. The obligations of parenthood, under natural and civil law, require of the child "`submission to reasonable restraint, and demands habits of propriety, obedience, and conformity to domestic discipline' She cannot enlist the aid of the court in frustrating that authority, reasonably exercised, by requiring that her father accede to her demands and underwrite her chosen lifestyle or as here, run the risk of incarceration.
Nuez
332 332

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