GROUP PROJECT #1

Voting Methods
Determine guest speaker for MATH3041
By Goh Ghit Hong, Javid Karimi, Tony Yiu, Jackson Lin

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 3 4 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Details of Calculations .................................................................................................................................................. 4 4.1 Voting Methods ..................................................................................................................................................... 4 Borda Count Method ................................................................................................................................. 4 Condorcet Method ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Elimination Method ................................................................................................................................... 5 Tally Method ................................................................................................................................................. 6

4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.1.4 4.2

Application .............................................................................................................................................................. 7 Dataset 1......................................................................................................................................................... 7 Dataset 2......................................................................................................................................................... 9 Dataset 3....................................................................................................................................................... 10

4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 5

Summary and Discussion ......................................................................................................................................... 12 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Dataset 1 ................................................................................................................................................................ 12 Dataset 2 ................................................................................................................................................................ 13 Dataset 3 ................................................................................................................................................................ 14 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................ 15

Appendix.......................................................................................................................................................................... 16

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2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report investigates how different voting methods affects the result of determining which guest should be invited to deliver a speech for MATH3041 in 2014. Three datasets were given, all with different amount of votes and are independent from one another. Of four voting methods: the Borda count method, Condorcet method, Elimination method and Tally method, two are then chosen to be applied to the datasets. Whereas the Borda count method and Condorcet method are currently used in various elections, the Elimination method and Tally method are devised by us. It is ensured that all methods are pareto efficient and dictators are identified in every result. The relation of Arrows impossibility theorem to the analysis will be touched upon wherever possible. All voting method explanation and results can be found below in the details of calculation. Results show that a different winner for dataset 1 and 3 can be obtained using different voting methods. However, even with different voting methods, dataset2 results in the same winner and order of preference. The report finds that result of the Borda count method and Condorcet methods normally gives similar winner and frequently the same order of preference. It is only when using the unconventional voting methods that we devised, that the winner changes. This shows that some voting methods do alter the outcome of an election and thus it is important to ensure that the voting method used in any election is transparent and made known to every candidate and voters. 2

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3 INTRODUCTION
For every year, the school of Mathematics in the University of New South Wales invites a guest speaker to deliver a speech for the students doing MATH3041.In 2014, four candidates have been shortlisted: Barack Obama, who will speak about How to make a million dollars: analytical solutions of the Navier-Stokes equation. Mitt Romney, who will deliver a speech on How to make a billion dollars: lesson from the Black-Scholes equation. Ron Paul, who will discuss about The use and abuse of the Hodgkin-Huxley equations. Rick Santorum, who will explain What does Schrodinger equation say about his cat? The objective of this report is to study the mathematics of election by exploring different voting methods to elect the speaker for 2014. Three different datasets on the order of preference of the candidates will be given and analyzed. For each dataset, two methods will be applied, resulting in a different winner for each method. In the event that the same winners are elected regardless of the voting methods, the ranking of the winners will be examined. These voting method used should be pareto efficient and dictators will be identified and discussed.

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4 DETAILS OF CALCULATIONS
4.1 VOTING METHODS
Four methods are adopted to analyze the datasets. The Borda Count Method and

Condorcet Method are commonly used in parliamentary elections. The Elimination method and Tally method are devised by us to observe if there will be a change in the winner of the election using unconventional means. We will also examine the extent that Arrows impossibility theorem applies; the dictatorship will be discussed below in the Discussion section. 4.1.1 Borda Count Method The Borda count is named for the French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda, who devised the system in the 18th century. Easy to use, it is currently used by different organizations and competitions throughout the world In the Borda count method, the candidates are then given scores according to the frequency of the different rankings they received. For instance, the candidate receives 4 points if he is the first preference, 3 points for the second preference, and so on. Typically, the candidate receives x points for a first preference, x-1 for a second, till 1 point for the last preference. When all votes have been counted, and the points added up, the candidate with most points wins. 4

GROUP PROJECT #1 | Voting Methods

May 17, 2013 4.1.2 Condorcet Method The Condorcet method comes from the 18th-century French mathematician Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, whom is also known as the Marquis de Condorcet. It is an election method that counts the number of wins of a candidate when paired against the other candidates. For each possible pair of candidates, one pairwise count indicates how many voters prefer one of the paired candidates over the other candidate, and another pairwise count indicates how many voters have the opposite preference. The counts for all possible pairs of candidates summarize all the preferences of all the voters. Pairwise counts are then displayed in a matrix. In the matrix, each row represents each candidate as a 'runner', while each column represents each candidate as an 'opponent'. The cells at the intersection of rows and columns each show the result of a particular pairwise comparison. Cells comparing a candidate with themselves are left blank. When the sum matrix is found, the contest between each pair of candidates is considered. The number of votes for runner over opponent is compared with the number of votes for opponent over runner to find the Condorcet winner. In the event that there is a tie for the winner, the worst defeat of the runner will be examined and the margin of the worst defeat will be calculated. The runner with the lowest margin of defeat will be the Condorcet winner. 4.1.3 Elimination Method In this method the number of first preferences for each candidate will be counted. If any candidate has more than 50% of the voters for his first preference then the candidate will win the election. Otherwisethe candidate with the least amount of first preference will be GROUP PROJECT #1 | Voting Methods 5

May 17, 2013 eliminated. The second preference will be examined next andif any candidate has more than 50% of the voters for the second preference, the candidate wins the election. Otherwise, like the first step, the candidate with the least amount of second preference will be eliminated. This process will be carried on until a winner is found or everyone else has been eliminated. 4.1.4 Tally Method In the tally method, all the numbers of first preferences for each candidates are tallied and added to the number of second choices. Next, the number of third and fourth preferences are added together as well. The difference of the total sum of the first and second preference between the total sum of the third and fourth preference are then calculated. The winner is the one with the most positive result. This method is designed under the logic that the candidates wants to be in the first and second preferences to win the election and they do not want to be in the third and fourth preferences. In the case where there is a tie,the winner will be the one with most number of one. If that is equal as well, then the one with most number of two will be the winner and so on.

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4.2 APPLICATION
4.2.1 Dataset 1 The Borda count method and Elimination method are used to analyze dataset 1. Borda count method: Dataset 1 Candidates Barack Obama Mitt Romney Ron Paul Rick Santorum

Score 54 42 68 36

Table 1: Tabulation of Borda count method results for dataset 1

4 points are given to the candidate for every first preference, 3 points are given for every second preference, 2 points for third preference and 1 point for the last preference. In this dataset, with 68 points, Ron Paul is the winner. The order of preference is Ron Paul, Barack Obama, Mitt Romney and lastly, Rick Santorum.

GROUP PROJECT #1 | Voting Methods

May 17, 2013 Method of elimination: DATASET 1 Barack Obama 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice Mitt Romney 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice Ron Paul 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice Rick Santorum 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice 0 4 8 8 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Round 1 6 6 4 4 4 2 6 8 1 0 8 2 0 6 6 4 4 4 2 6 8 Round 2 6 6 4 4 NA NA NA NA Round 3 6 6 4 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

10 8 2 0

10 8 2 0

Table 2: Procedure of Elimination method for dataset 1 In the Elimination method, Rick Santorum gets eliminated first,followed by Mitt Romney,then Ron Paul, and finally Barack Obama is the only candidate left. Therefore the winner is Barack Obama. The order of preference is Barack Obama, Ron Paul, Mitt Romney and lastly, Rick Santorum.

GROUP PROJECT #1 | Voting Methods

May 17, 2013 4.2.2 Dataset 2 The Borda count method and Condorcet method are used to analyze dataset2. Borda count method: Dataset 2 Candidates Barack Obama Mitt Romney Ron Paul Rick Santorum Score 127 129 123 121

Table 3: Tabulation of Borda count method results for dataset 2 4 points are given to the candidate for every first preference, 3 points are given for every second preference, 2 points for third preference and 1 point for the last preference. In this dataset, with 129 points, Mitt Romney is the winner. The order of preference is Mitt Romney, Barack Obama, Ron Paul and lastly, Rick Santorum. Condorcet method: A Barack Obama Barack Obama B Mitt Romney Ron Paul [A]= 23 [B]= 27 [A]= 26 [B]= 24 [A]= 28 [B]= 22 Mitt Romney [A]= 27 [B]= 23 Ron Paul [A]= 24 [B]= 26 [A]= 24 [B]= 26 Rick Santorum [A]= 22 [B]= 28 [A]= 24 [B]= 26 [A]= 25 [B]= 25

[A]= 25 Rick Santorum [B]= 25 Pairwise election results 2-0-1 3-0-0 0-2-1 0-2-1 (won-tied-lost): worst pairwise defeat 27 24 26 28 (winning votes): worst pairwise defeat 4 Nil 2 6 (margins): Table 4: Matrix of Condorcet method results for dataset 2 GROUP PROJECT #1 | Voting Methods

[A]= 26 [B]= 24 [A]= 26 [B]= 24

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In the Condorcet method, Mitt Romney is the clear winner, with 3 pairwise election won. Using the pairwise election results and the worst pairwise defeat margin, the order of preference is Mitt Romney, Barack Obama, Ron Paul and lastly, Rick Santorum. 4.2.3 Dataset 3 The Condorcet method and Tally method are used to analyze dataset 3. Condorcet method: A Barack Obama Barack Obama B Mitt Romney Ron Paul Rick Santorum Pairwise election results (won-tied-lost): worst pairwise defeat (winning votes): [A]= 8 [B]= 17 [A]= 16 [B]= 9 [A]= 15 [B]= 10 2-0-1 17 Mitt Romney [A]= 17 [B]= 8 Ron Paul [A]= 9 [B]= 16 [A]= 8 [B]= 17 Rick Santorum [A]= 10 [B]= 15 [A]= 7 [B]= 18 [A]= 11 [B]= 14

[A]= 17 [B]= 8 [A]= 18 [B]= 7 3-0-0 8

[A]= 14 [B]= 11 1-0-2 17 0-0-3 18 9

worst pairwise defeat 9 nil 9 (margins): Table 5: Matrix of Condorcet method results for dataset 3

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May 17, 2013 In the Condorcet method, Mitt Romney is the clear winner, with 3 pairwise election won. Using the pairwise election results and the worst pairwise defeat, the order of preference is Mitt Romney, Barack Obama, Ron Paul and lastly, Rick Santorum. Tally Method: Tally number 6 12 3 4 10 6 6 3 2 4 11 8 7 3 5 10

DATASET 3 Barack Obama 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice Mitt Romney 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice Ron Paul 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice Rick Santorum 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice

11

-13

-5

Table 6: Tabulation of Tally method results for dataset 3

In the Tally method, Barack Obama is the winner, with the highest positive score. The order of preference, by highest positive score, is Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Rick Santorum and lastly, Ron Paul. GROUP PROJECT #1 | Voting Methods 11

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5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

5.1 DATASET 1
In this dataset, by applying two different voting methods, two different winners are found. When using the Borda count method, Ron Paul is the winner. With the Elimination method, Barack Obama is the winner. Borda count method: The result shows that using this method Ron Paul recieves 68 points, Barack Obama with 54 points, Mitt Romney 42 points and Rick Santorum has 36 points. Clearly the winner is Ron Paul, since the difference between these points are greater than 3 for any two pairs then there are no dictators. This method is Pareto efficient because if everyone prefers one person over the rest then he will get the most points, therefore he wins. Elimination method: The result shows that Rick Santorum gets eliminated first and then Mitt Romney and then Ron Paul, and finally the one that will be left is Barack Obama, therefore the winner is Barack Obama. This method has no dictators for this dataset because the difference for each elimination step is at least two, there would be dictators if and only if there was a difference of one in any of the elimination step. This method is Pareto efficient because if everyone prefers a particular person over others then the person is the winner because he would have more than 50% of the vote for the first choice. GROUP PROJECT #1 | Voting Methods 12

May 17, 2013 Arrows impossibility theorem applies as we obtained two winners, in which the theorem suggests that if every voter prefers Ron over Obama, then the group Ron over Obama.

5.2 DATASET 2
In this dataset, after applying the two voting methods, the results remain identical, with both winners being Mitt Romney. Even the order of preference, Mitt Romney, Barack Obama, Ron Paul and lastly, Rick Santorum, is the same. Borda count method: The result of this method being applied to dataset 2 is Mitt Romney 129, Barack Obama 127, Ron Paul 123, and Rick Santorum 121. The winner is Mitt Romney, however this method clearly has dictators because there are differences of less than three. To minimize the dictators we can allocate different number of points. For example, the score give to a first preference vote can be 5 points instead of 4 points. This will emphasize the higher priority of the first preference over the other preference. Condorcet method: The result of this method being applied to dataset 2 is that Mitt Romney wins the pairwise election against all three other candidates. There are no dictators when this method is applied because Barack Obama, who is the closest to Mitt Romney with two pairwise election won, has a margin of 4 in the pairwise defeat against Mitt Romney. This means that 4 change in votes are needed to cause a change in winner. GROUP PROJECT #1 | Voting Methods 13

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5.3 DATASET 3
In this dataset, by applying two different voting methods, two different winners are found. When using the Condorcet method, Mitt Romney is the winner. With the Elimination method, Barack Obama is the winner. Condorcet method: The result of this method being applied to dataset 3 is that Mitt Romney wins the pairwise election against all three other candidates. There are no dictators when this method is applied because Barack Obama, who is the closest to Mitt Romney with two pairwise election won, has a margin of 9 in the pairwise defeat against Mitt Romney. This means that 9 change in votes are needed to cause a change in winner. Tally method: Applying the Tally method for the dataset 3, results in Barack Obama with 11 points, Mitt Romney with 7 points, Ron Paul with -13 points, and Rick Santorum with -5 points, therefore the candidate with highest positive score is Barack Obama therefore Barack Obama wins. This method is Pareto efficient because if the group prefers a particular person over other, then that person should have the most number of ones and twos, and in the case that if everyone chooses one person as the first choice and another person as the second choice, then they will both have the same Jackson number, but according to the method the person with the most number of ones will win, therefore Pareto efficiency is satisfied. 14

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5.4 SUMMARY
In conclusion the report finds that all the voting methods are Pareto efficient, and logical. However there are some methods that are weaker than others for different datasets, this is based on the existence of dictators that might appear in some dataset using the same method, therefore there is a need to modify the method or use a different method. It is often difficult to come up with two different methods that produce two different winner. In the calculation, it is found out that the Borda count method and Condorcet methods normally gives similar winner and frequently the same order of preference. It is only when using the unconventional voting methods that we devised, that the winner changes. This shows that some voting methods do alter the outcome of an election and thus it is important to ensure that the voting method used in any election is transparent and made known to every candidate and voters.

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6 APPENDIX
Appendix A dataset1.m

3 1 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 3

4 3 4 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 4 3 4 3 3 1 1 2 3 1

1 2 2 1 4 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 2 1 4 3 4 4 4 2

2 4 1 4 2 4 2 1 2 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 2 1 2 4

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May 17, 2013 Appendix B dataset2.m

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May 17, 2013 Appendix C dataset3.m

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May 17, 2013 Appendix D bordacount.m

bordacountscore = fopen('bordacountscore.m','w') load dataset1.m load dataset2.m load dataset3.m rowcount = length(dataset1(:,1)); colcount = length(dataset1(1,:)); choicescore = colcount:-1:1; data1score(4) = 0; for k = 1:colcount for i = 1:rowcount for j = 1:colcount if (dataset1(i,k) == j) data1score(j) = data1score(j)+choicescore(k); end end end end fprintf(bordacountscore,'testing') fclose(bordacountscore)

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