Stuart Robertson Stephen Dent

CONWAY

Frontispiece The ~ bi.~ Rdleloev. on ~Sige to the Far ~ on Md'I 19+t

In memory of J. E. Horwood and D. G. Robenson OBE

A Conway Maritime book Copyright C StU:lrl Robcrtson and Stcphcn Dcnt 2007 First pubhshed III Grcat Briuin ill 2007 by Conway an imprint ofAnov:l Books. The Old Magistr;nes Court. 10 Southcombe Street. London W 14 ORA www.ano..:lbooks.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication m:l.Y be reproduced. stored in a retriev:al s)"litem. or tn.nsmiued in any form or by :lny means, electronic, mechanical. photocopying. recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British libn.l) Cataloguing in Publicltion DaD
A record of this title is :I\':rilable on request from Ihe British libn.I).

ISBN 13: 9 781 44 86().456 Edited by: Alison Moss and John Jordan Designed by ichola Smuh. Stephen Dent and Georgina Hewin Printed and bound by CT Prmnng ltd. Chma

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDG EMENTS INTRODUCTION
7

1939-1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

PICTURE CREDITS BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

22

56

88

156

184

216

236 236 239

Acknowledgements

he authors wish to express their gr:lteful thanks to the following people and institutions for their assistance: Ian Proctor, Man Lee, Tham Eaton, Yvonne Oliver, and the rest of the staff at the Imperial War Museum photographic and film archives; Laun W33yers, Ed Finney, Charles E. Brocline Jr and William Dildo of the US N:J.val Historical Center: Debbie Corner, Keeper of Photographs at the ROy;Il Navy Submarine Muscum:Jo Lawler, Director of Explosion! Museum of Naval Firepower: Brian Williams, Mark Frost and John [\,erson of Dover Muscum: Kevin McLaren, Kristina Watson and Lydia Fisher at the ROy.Il COlllmission Oil the Ancient and Historical Monuments ofScothnd; Leon M. A. Homburg, curator. MarincllIuseum, den Helder; Gerry Rendle and Paul Burkhalter of Dcvonport Dockyard and Museum; Commander Erminio Bagnasco, director, Storin Mi/illlre; Volkmar Konig; Terry McGovern: Dave Bassel!;Jcan Hood: Bert Purches: DK Brown; Stephen Johnson; Geoffrey Hudson: William J. Crawford; Dee Dent; Al Fox; Leo van Ginderen: Hans Lengcrer: Waldemar Trojca; Charles Blackwood; David Evans; Martin Le Poidevin of Flyer magazine; Andy Field; Katy Goodwin; Geoff Dennison; Ian Hancock; Tony at ColorWorks, Bath; Steve Mclaughlin. Bill Schleihauf: the staff of Bath Central Library; and John Lee and Alison Moss at Conway. The authors would like to thank their families. friends and publisher for their forbearance. In particular. this book could not have been compiled withoul the aid of a number of people who generously provided images and caption

information from their own collections, as well as their tillle and knowledge. Principal alllong these are several contributors to Conway's naval annual Wars/up. First and foremost our thanks go to John Jordan. John Jordan is the editor of H--arship and also the author of two books on the Soviet Navy, and is at present working on a book on the navies of the inter-war period. Enrico Cernuschi is the author of aero Jimi iI Loro DoverI' (Rome: Rivista Marittima, 2006), now a standard text on the history of the Italian Navy COlllmissioned by the Italian Naval Academy. Vince O'Hara is the author of German Fleet al H--ar 1939-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004) and TIle US j\,lavy Agaill5t the Axis: Surfa{t Combat 194/-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007). Henk Visser is a retired officer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, and works at the Marinemuseum, den Helder. He is the author of De Konil1k/ijkI'Marille, 1922-/964. Conrad Waters is a member of the group working to return the \Vorld W3TTwo frigate HMS W/limbrel to the UK as a permanent memorial to the Rude of the Atlantic. Chris Savill is an aviation and social historian who works at The National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) in Kew, London, and has written a number of books on aviation history. Itichard Worth and Vladimir Yakubov are the authors of Rnising tht Red Balmer: TIll' Pirtoria/ History of Sill/in's Flett 1920-1945 (Spellmoullt, 2oo7).This book has benefited greatly from all their inpul; ally errors of fact or interpretation remain the sole responsibility of the authors.

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The saying goes that 'the first casualty of war is truth'. A proportion of all wartime photographs - particularly colour shots - were staged, either to give false impressions for propaganda purp05t.""!i or in an effort to capture the vimal t.""!isence of situations for which genuine images did not exist. And many photographs in IOday's private collection~ were 'illegally' shot for sailors as souvenirs by official photOgraphers while aboard ship - known to the British photOgraphers as 'rabbit work' - to supplement their wages. The British attitude to official photography was less comprehensive than that of the Germans and Americans. Generally the three British service film and photographic unit~ used colour far 1t:'SS than their oPP05ite numbers. The Royal Naval Photographic Unit had been set up III 1919 and was designed to support the fleet's rt:Connaissance and publicity activitit.-s; by 1939 it had expanded to provide coverage to all the theatres where British naval forces found themsdws. Uy 1945 it employed 200 women. As the \var progressed, 1Illtially small photographic units grew into complex bodies within each armed service, employing men equipped and u"amed by them. TIllS also lIlduded cine film. By the invasion of Normandy In June 1944, the Allies were lughly organized; pre-battle preparations were dear and efficient, and the priority - the rapId dispatch of photographs bade from the landing beacht.-S - was aided by the setting up of mobile vetting centres through which film could be channelled to the rear before being released to the public. Havlllg already covered the Salerno and Anzio Iandillb"S for Life, Robert Capa's surVIVing 'slightly out of focus' shots of the American landinb~ at Omaha beach are worldfamous; notable British photOgT:lphers lIldude George Rodger and Sergeant Jimmy Mapham. operating further east on Gold and Sword beaches. As with many areas of the war, it is the endurlllg work of these eyewitness photographers - operating despite great peT'\onal danger which has heavily IIlflUellCed our emotional fascination with the evenLs of 6 June 1944, subsequently expanded upon III cinema. Nevertheless. photography of the war has itS limitS. H;lVlIlg won a battle, the victors naturally found it fundamentally easier to record the progress of their victory than the defeated theIr defeat. Consequently. by natural process, many photographs reflect a State of access peculiar to the fortunate eye-witness. The Germans produced the best Images of the first two ye:m of the war. The eV3cuation of British troops from Dunkirk is an exception that proves the rule - Operation Dynamo \V3S recorded not by official photographers (long since departed). but only amateurishly by a few British and German participants. The transfer of films to be developed \V3S also problematic at sea in a way it was not on land or in the air. Until dark-rooms were established aboard large warships, or unless special contingencies had been put in place. photographs taken at sea (whether for official war-fighting purposes or for reportage) could take days or evell weeks to arrive at the developing stage. Thus, up-to-date photography of the war at sea was at a premium fOf contemporary media and naval authorities. and remains so today. There W3S. of course, no such thing as 3n immediately 3V3ilable electronic image file in World War Two. Mally private photographic collections only saw the light of day after the \var, and continue to do so. The work of Japanese and Soviet naval photographers is particularly elusive. It IS recorded that Robert DiamelH 3cwd as the official Soviet N3vy photographcr. working Illoscly with the Northern Fleet. coveril1g Arctic oper;nions and focu~sing frequently upon the heroic aspects of the individual sailors involved. In the case of Japan, lTlany of the official record.. were destroyed at the end of the conflict. both by the deV3stating

Allied bombing c3111paign and then at the hands of the Japanese themselves. During the war Japanese propaganda photography was exhibited on the home front. even displayed in Tokyo department storts, In December 1943, by law, Japanese photographic manufacturers and photographers were forced to focus on the war effort. Photographs taken by German and Soviet civilians remain the most elu~i\'C due to the wartime and post-war conditions of those countrit.""!i. Furthermore. while sea war was one of three overlapping and competing areas of fighting, it was usually the least immediate in terms of its effect on populaces and on the services themselves. Steady pressure, patient stalking. and monotonous voyages across wide ocean routes these were the underlying hallmarks of the sea war. And just as most of the maritime war was fought out of sight of the land. the images of it can feci similarly detached and subject to the same barrier of impersonality. Of all the wars. the one fought at sea was perhaps the least human in scale. Yet paradoxically. to prosecute the sea war. each of its basic units the ships - b':lthered more men together cheek-by-jowl in one place to fight this 1I1lpersonal war than either the land or air w;ar necessitated. Visually, the war at sea reflt:cts this potent and varied mixture of the size, scale and faces of banIe, The photographic record presented here includes stills from many theatres of war - the Pacific. Arctic,Atlantic, Mediterranean. Indian - from shore to ship, beneath. upon and above the sea. Characteristic of photographs of sea \vaf is the open sea-space and the natural frame provided by the lens upon a ship or Olher object ab'3iust the ocean. The Impersonal nature of a war fought at gn'at distances contrasts with the often claustrophobic human conditions of life aboard ship, aeroplane or submarine. And yet naval war is no k'ss vivid and dynamic on celluloid than other methods of fightlllg. Few scenes from World War Two can rival the ~heer fiery terror of a massed kllmikll::U attack, the panic ofan 'abandon shIp' or the adrenaline ofan amphibious landing Oil an etlt'llly-heid shon'. Each photograph has a different story to tell, and by placing them III a broad narratl\'e context we can go some way to catching a glimpse uno remarkably diverse. fascinating. and III many cas('s largely forgonen areas of the war at sea between 1939 and 1945.

World War Two: The Naval Background

War at sea can be waged III many forms. each with a SIX'cific pur~ but all with one fundament.1l aim - the injuring ofan OPPOIll;'nt's capability to use the same sea to IllS own cnds, For hundred:> of years, sea power has been created and deployed to defend and extend interests, and deny the ability of others to use the sea as a hIghway for tT:lde, COlllmunicatlon, influence and lllilitary power. As a result, few a~pects of the recent past have been unaffected by the ability of natious to me the sea for political ends. World War Two saw the greatest deployment of sea power in the history of mankind. Iluge resources were spent around the globe on creating and maintaining the tools to fight at sea. In many ways the conflict \vas primarily a maritime war. Without the posscs~ion and exercise of sea power in its wide variety of guises, Japan could not have over-run the Pacific and then been driven back, and the United States could never have projected its power across the Adantic to defeat Nazi Germany- Britain could not have reinforced the home i~land by way of Edward Steichen
In convnand of the US Navy's Photographic lnstJMe. Commander Edward J- Steoehef'l was a

leadIng figure ,n the photography of the war at sea In an or-garuzabOl1aJ as well as creatrve
capacity. Hen! he pen:hes on a platform overIooIang the RIght deck of an Amencan <llfCraft c~ mxtyIng his wrmund'ng5. Photograph by lH!utenantVICtOC Jorgensen.

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COntlnUN conununic.uion with the ruoons of the ConUllOllwealth and th... USA. nor held its positions around the Meduerraneall. Sea power

formed the launch pad of nuny of the gre.1t bnd offenSl\~. or dell\'cred the materlel for others to 6ght on bnd and in the 'Uf. Alhed Victory on
the high "Cas enabled the R"inforcemem of the $o\"iet Umon Olnd the projection of American power into W~ern Europe. contribullllg to the ulmn"tc defc.1( of German)' ;md Italy", while Ja.pan \,~ alm~t es:c1usl\~ly defeated by the applicnion of~.. power. And the punUlt of a nunumc war on e'I'lenrial trade became the sole me<tns by which Germany could bring Britain ro defeat. Through theo applic.uion of M:J power, Urit:ull did not succumb. And in sum,sea power W;lS the only way t1lJt Allied victory could be brought about through the delivery, application and sustenance of military power on land. At the close of the 19305, seven nations possessed IJrgc navit'S and Ill,my others maintained SOlllt: kind of maritime force. E3ch was a serious investment for the nation in qUe1tion, perh3ps the 1ll000t complex. rcsource-he3vy org;miution a SUtt: could pursue. Cerwinly It W3~ one of the h3rdest national entt:rprisn to get right. And e3ch navy was the mult of myriad competing str.ltegic. ~o-pohucal, ideologicJl 3nd econonuc conSlder.ltions. None of them could make precise 3nd exat:t predictions about the opportunitie1 3nd threats the'Y would encounter. TheIr pre<hetions were ~luckJed not JUSt by their not kUO\\lng \\ hat the future would brmg but also by their famili3my with the present. Four of the world's bi~t n3\;C1 wl:re Europe-3n - belongmg to BnulII. Fr.lnce. Gernuny 3nd luly. Tht: Soviet Union's fleet W;lS Jlso ~ largely in Europe3n w3ten. Outsidt: Europe- the tWO laCb~t manumc powers we~ Jap;a.n 3nd the USA. eyeing (,3ch other 3C~ the enormous expanses of the 1'3ciflc Oce3n.

offensi\'e str.ltcgy th3t It hoped would preserve Fren~h securil) in the Mediternnean and Atlantic regions. Thb stntc:gy W:IIS b:llSt'd 3round the &t:t~,.t cb\s banlC'Shlps and DUqUtsM and S'!ffrrn c:I.a Crul~rs to counter lati;ln dC'ligns upon North Africa. while relcasmg the mod('fll l3-inch gunned hybrid banlC1hlp fbanl~cruisers Smubou'K and Dtl/lkrrqur for usc ;against tht: likdihood of G~fllun surf3C~ nld~rs III the Atbnnc. Tr.lditional ~nemiC'S. th(' French alld BnllSh n3V1CS were lIlcreasmgly forced to look upon ~ach oth~r as partial ~uaranton of each others' M~diterranean strat~gy; \\;th British in\'OI",elllellt. Anglo-French lla'':II1 power could dominate th~ region 3nd keep the powerful German ~url";ace fleet III check e1sewh('re. While the French Navy had boood \hips especially its large (<)"trl'-torpillfur fleet destroyers - it lacked ct:ruill elements of an illtt'gratt'd muitime system: II did not enter the W3r with rad3r. its naval aviation was weak and ItS mbmarines. while technologically sound, suffered problems with oper:ltional doctrint'. On a fundamenullt'vel, the French Navy' strength was divided by h3ving 10 look south to the Medit~rran~an and north 3nd west to Its norlhern 3nd Atlantic lbnks.

The Italian Navy

The RL:l!j~ ,\faritl~, though cultiv:ating a repuU[lon for ~bn and daili \\;th spdy r:ather than WI:U-3rmoured \hips (for msunce the 'Condottit'ri' type light crulSCn). Wa'> esscntwly 3 flcct in bemg which could f()C'lli .ill Its pow'er III one the3tre. uk.(' few unncceo;,s,;ary T1\k~ .and suy in lurbour. \'entunng out only \\ ht'n the Supmnarilla high comnund decided the od<b f3\'Oured dlret:t action. laI}' held cololllcs m Llb)~ and the Red ~3 ~ion. which threatened British control of E8}lIt. the Sudan and Suez. A Signatory [0 the 1922 Washinb'ton a\":II1 TreJ.ty (where she accepted the 1.75 r.ltio equl\'3lellt [0 Fr.mce), but deciding not to rant the foUowup 1931"1 London proceedings, Italy ignored the displJc~ment limits on heavy cruiscl"S when building the Zam d.ass crui~rs and the BolzlIuo durmg tbe I93l"ls, Though haly was more succe'isful than her allies and riv.l.ls m upgradlllg older capital ~hips during the pre- and war years (the four battleships of the Car'Vur and Dlljfj<) classes were by far the most radical modernizatiollS of older b3ttleships of any of the five treaty navies), nl<l.ny of her wal"Ships that at bunch had been modern and swift \vere nther \\'Orn OUt. k...s potent and consequently Illore vulnerable by the time of her emr)' to the war in 1940 - 3 factor increasingly important ;lS opentiOn3l dellland\ took. their [OU. Nevertheless. luly 310ne dominated the cenml Medit~rraneall,and It was om.'10us to nun)' th<l.t in the l:\'ent of war u;th Briuin. luly would seck to close Ihe route to the east via Suez. and seek to d~f~.at th~ French b3n1e fleet_ The lulian ill\;l.sion ofAbysslllu III 1935-6 h.ad n ked 3 \'":IIr \\ilh Briuin in th~ M~dlt~rran~an, but Bnush fe3rs of Iulian ;ur power (Mussolini described th~ Italian penlllsula as 'a n.atur.ll ;J.ircr:afi: urner) nud(' it prud~nt for th~m to avoid W:IIT .and rellUUl :lit base III Ale.:undri:ll in EIDlIt instead of Malta. M(,3nwhlle th~ lulian a..y, desplt~ 3W":IIrenN of Brilish n3\'31 short3gcs. f('ared a defeJ.t to a Bnmh b3n1e fleet ~hould it force the issue. Th~ mull of the criSIS, <l.nd of th~ bter lIl\"ol\'ement of the lulian Navy in submarin~ 'pirate' patrols III the Spanish Civil War III 1936-7. was th31 mort' bases were built III th~ south ofluly. and numbers of destroyers. torpedo-boats and submarinC'S wt're lllcreased as lulian n3\"31 expenditure l'O'ie by O\'er 40 per cent III 1938. A less th3n fully motivated Itali<l.n populact', and opportunistic dccbr:ltions of war on France and Brit3in in June 1940. tended to take the shine off Italian na\"al prestige. and her st3nding among her Axis putnen w:n nt'wr high Ihroughout the war. I(31)' was not rich m r:IW

The French Navy

The French Navy - the .\faril/r ,,'atiolla/r - \vas principally design('d to COOlest the Medllerranean ab'3inst the Italians, using a fl('('t of modern. fast. and wellarmed capiul ships, crui~ers and destroyers to prolect French security but also defend imperial interests in NOTlh Africa, the Middle East and further afield in French Indochin.a. Its principal bases were at Brest and Toulon in Fr:lnce. and ships and squ3drons were sometimes deployed to North African ports and ;mchor.agC'S. which included Dakar and CMabbnc3, In the a~reements reached at tht: 1922 Washington Nav<l.1 Tre.ny, the French accepted p;lrity \\;th It.aly With 3 ntio of 1.75 each for eapiul ~hip\, henc3th J;lp3n's 3 3nd Bnum's .and Am~rica's 5 each. Dunng the I934'k, 3~ tensions grew on th~ Europe-.an continent. French IU\-a) planners worked to crcat~ a f1cct to eqUJ,1 It.a.1)" plus Gernuny. In response to Gernull re~arnu.ment,the French 3ccepted <l. drlmt~ with luly, but the It;Wan-Ab)...~illian crisis of 1935-6 53W Fr.lnce choose to rdy on BnulII, wuh all lIlcreasmgi}' exp3nsionisr Iuly nJrnlllg towanb a 'Pact ofStccr with 321 Germany. In 1939 the French N3VY possessed olle dow, com'ened 3lrcnfi: c3rrier (the &<lTPI) wlIh two under construction but never to be completed, two modern and fi\'e older b3n1eshlps, eighteen cruiser.>, fifty--eight desnoyers, thirteen torpedo bo3t5, se\'Cnl).six sublll3rincs, and over thITI)' smaller warslups, Three b;lttleshlps, one cruiser, twelve dcstfO}'efS and thirty escOrt vcsst:ls were ;llso under comtruction. with one new bJnl(:<;hlp ready III 1940. Many ocher Vt:ssc!s were authorized, but construction had not begun and;lll were cancelled on the outbreak ofwar. Alone. this fleet. under the leadership of Adlllir:ll Fr.llwois Darlan. Chief of the NavJI Staff. was Just about superior to the Italian Navy in the Mediterr.tne:m. In the laSt year before the outbreak of war, the French h3d developed an

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materials and suppli~ (she lacked large rocrves of oil III particub.r), and her nJval build-up (or war. despite big budgcury increases, was slow as a result. The country was also not blessed with all abundance of skilled crews to man the newer ships. particularly the brger capital ships. Deficiencies ill realistic training would be exposed ag:ainsl the British. In January 1939 the ItJ.li:m Navy IlJd no aircraft carriers, two reconstructed bJtdedlips (the Drlilios were not fuUy worked up until aflcr June 1940). twenty-one cruisers. forty-eight destroyers,sixty-ninc lorpedo-boats. 104 submarines and thlrty-fouf smaller escort and patrol vessels. With the first

of the excellent Ilew UIIQriQ class battleships due 10 complete in 1940. Ihis would almost constitute a IlIJtch for th~ French N:avy. Org:lllic n:av:al air po\ver \vas weak. the sole It:alian aircraft carrier Aqrli/II remaining uncompleted. Insccad. the navy had to rely on the Itali:an air force. The Rl'.~;a At'T(I/lQIl/;(a. inhu::nced by General Guilio l)ouhcl's doclrines of an independelH (and cheap) strategic bombing arm. \vas aVt'rse co torpedoand dive-bombing and preferred level bombing where possible. The mainslay of the torpedo-bomber force \vas the modified tri-motor S.79 Sparrowhawk. Though Italian air-launched torpedo technolob'Y \vas quite advanced. 115 bombs were nac very effective against ships. The Regia Aefllltall/ild was found to be an indecisive tool. which never functioned well when used 111 support of the navy; reconnaissance \vas poor. and a lack of organic fighter aircraft would also hamming the navy's abiliry to exploit opportunities against the British battle 1eel during the \var.

The Imperial Japanese Navy

In japan. the doctrines derived from the work of American naval Alfred T. Mahan - that Ihe apogee of sea power was the battle fleet - were so prevalent among na\-al planners that the 1\,';/1011 Kai,Rml was almost exclusively focused on offen~i\'e big shIps. the design of which \vas Il1formed by a technological-determinist approach to war at sea. This impressively narrow focus came at the ex-pense of proviSIOn in more defensive areas of maritime operations. Consequently forces for the protection of sea lines of communication - a vital consideration given japans island position and reliance on Imponed resources - were rdatively neglected. Meanwhile the symbolically powerful and aggressive battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers. naval aviation and patrol submarincs were inrended co achieve vicwry in decisive batrle. From 1902, as an ally of Britain to counter Franco-Russian pretensions, and with a modern navy modelled in many ways on the Royal Na\)',japan had steadily grown in military. economic and trained manpower throughout the first three decades of the cemury. Undefeated in battle against German forces in Asia in the World War One, the conflict had shown that japanese tactics and equipmellt were advanced. largely due to British input. These Anglo-japanese tics were severed in 1921 under American and Commonwealth pn..--ssure. The end of the Anglojapanese Allianct' and the cooling of relations after 1922 were a real problem for the japanese. They \vere thrown back on their own resourc~. and this led the japan~c military - ill particular the navy - to St"tk new resourc~ in order to ITltroduce new technolobry, including intensive efforl5 to acquire German submarine know-how. In some areas this process ltd to important innovations but in others - noubly undeT\vater protection and anti-subm:nine warfare - the j:apancse fell behmd. Meanwhile, japanese naval policy. fuelled by IlIternal dissension and upheaval over the Washington Treaty, veered between co-operation with [he west and endemic xenophobia, panially coloured by the many examples in japan's history when she had been forced to bow to western
hi~corian

pressure on matters of international prcstig~. The 1922 treaty pn..'Sented opportunities to japan as well as curtailment; sh~ \va,<; allowed to build unlimited numbers of cruisers, d~troycrs and submannes, and agr~e\llent had b~en reached that prevented th~ fortification of US bases III the w~t~rn Pacific. Yet III 1930. at the london Naval Conference, limitations \.,.ere called for by Britain and Amenca that t.1Tgeted the size of japan's cruiser fleet. Obsessed with their lllferJor numerical position, the japanese devdoped weapons and tactics to giv~ them a qualitative superiority. Expertise in torpedOC'S produced a 24-mch oxygen-fudk-d torpedo. the Type 93 'Long Lance', c3pable of running for 12 mik'S at nearly 50 knots. :almost twice the range of nvalnavil-'S' torpedol-'S. By 1927 the Imperial japan~ Navy possessed almost four times as many aircraft 3S the R0)'31 Navy, and by the Iare 1930s japanese Industry \vas turning out new carrier-borne 3ircrafl that were at least as good as the best land-based foreign aircraft, while new-bilild and converted aircraft carriers had begun appearing from 1922. Until 1932 an JUitudt: of uneasy international co-operation predominated, but the economic effects of Ihe Great Depression reversed Ihis, and japan began to pursue an expansionist policy at the expense of her neighbours in East Asia, beginning with an advancc into Chinese Manchuria in 1931, which some historians trace as the true beginning of the World War Two. Intt:rnal dissent inside the armed forces created conditions enabling the 'fleet faction' to become the mainstream of Ihe japanese Navy, atl3ining fUrther populariry among the younger, radical anti-Western nav:ll officers. Increasingly, japan acted antagonistically tmvards both the United States and the USSR, but it was Ihe 1937 invasion of mainland China (with large-scale naval. air and amphibious support) which really increased the tension. At the same time, naval expenditure was doubled. A desire to achieve economic self-sufficiency, military security and economic leadership of Asia, and a nced to aCI before the United Sl3tes' naval re-armament programme reached its scheduled maturity in 1944, informed all increasingly militaristic and fatalistic outlook. japan \\-as. like Britain, dependent on many imported raw materials and the embargo placed upon these. in particular on oil, by Ihe US began to bring matters to a head in the WL'Stern Pacific. With France and Holland defeated by Germany by mid-1940, and with the US oil embargo biting hard throughout 1941, japan's moment seemed to have arrived and the advance imo South East Asia began at the end of the year. Both the japanese and the Americans had planned on the basis of a japanese attack and capture of the Philippincs at the outset of any \var in the region. The japancse expected an American counter-drive west from il5 base at Pearl Harbor m Ha\vaii. as outlined in the longstanding American Plan Orange, which would be met by japancsc submarine and aerial atrack in the central Pacific prior to a general fleet action III the Sea ofjapan.l3utjapane~e plans changed during 1941.The US oil embargo f.1iled to bringjapan back 'into line' and japan pre-empted Plan Orange, taking a huge gamble on its fate. In December 1941 th~ japanese Navy had ten battleships, ten aircraft carriers. eighteen heavy and twenty light cruisers, 112 destroyers and sixty-eight long-range subm:nincs. the lauer dt:signed ro intercept the US battle fl~t:t and soften it up for a meeting with tht: japanese baule fleet. Until the 1930s. her naval air power consisted of only around three hundred aircraft. which allowed the British to rem:ain calm about the thr~at to their battle fleet should it be called to the East. But by the time japan entered the war. that air power. including shore-based strength. had increased to around a thousand machines. Its carrier aircraft - the NakaJlllla B5N 'Kate' torpedo-bomber. the Aichi D3 'V:al'

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divcbombcr and its fighter, the Mitsubishi A6 'Zckc' (better known as the 'Zero') - were all potent leading-edge designs at the outbreak orchc Pacific war. The remainder of the Japanese naval air arm comprised lancl-ba$cd twin-engine bombers such as the 'Betty', intended for fonvard deployment to Japanese-held islands, and flying boats such as rho;: 'Mavis', which were used for long-range reconnaissance. Considering thal one ofthe principalmcans ofachieving an expansion oflerritory would be amphibiously,)ap3ncse landing craft were relatively unsophisticated umil defensive imperatives prompted a need for better amphibious craft later in the war. And perhaps most importantly, despite an emphasis 011 their own technological superiority, the japanese Navy failed to appreciate lhe extent to which it might need to defend itself against similar weapons: it wem to war without radar and with only putially efTecti\'e anti-submarine sensors, pan of the COSt of the loss of the Anglo-japanese alliance.

agreed to a policy of 'Lend-Lease' to Britain and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the oil embargo imposed on japan pu~hed the japanese Navy into final preparations for \var in Asia. American strategists were convinced that the margin of fifteen US Navy battleships to nine for japan, established by the Washington Treaty, ,vas sufficient to defeat the japane~e fleet in a decisive battle. By December 19~ 1 the US Navy po~sesscd sevcn fleet carriers and one aviation tranSpOrt. sevemeen battle~hips, eighteen heavy and nineteen light cruisers, 214 destroyers and 114 submarines.Three 16-inch gunned battleships were operational compared with the Imperial japanese Navy's tWO, and twO further newly completed ships had already been working up for several months. The US Navy was unequally split between the Pacific and the Adantic oceans, with the focus ofAmerican power having been placed in the Pacific since 1922.

The Royal Navy The United States Navy

The United States was bk'5SCd with the greatest industrial capacity of all the lcadmg powers, and geographical security. America had no far-flung empire to defend, though this also meant it had a deanh offorward bases. Congress consistently refused to grant enough money to the US Navy such that it did not build up to its 1922 Washington treaty allocation umil the late 1930s. Nonetheless, it posst:'Ssed a burgeomng tWQ-oce,an n,avy that surpassed the Royal N,avy in numbers and quality of capit,al shIps if not in 1939 then certainly by 1945. Planning and preparation for,a war with jap,an donllnated thinking III the 1920s and 19305. Admira.l Moffett, Chief of the Navy's l3ure,au of Aeronautics, argued cogently for aircraft carriers and a greatly expanded aviation corps to forlll the linchpin of America's strateb'Y against japan, reOlsoning that they were essential to any lightning strikes across the Pacific west of Haw:.ii, and could take on the wk of mopping up island-by-island rt.-osistance by aerial bombing rather than risking valuable banleships ag:.inSt coastal fonificOltions :md landbased enemy aircraft. American aviation outclassed all except the japanese. and her submarme force was powerful though rather hidebound by its tactical docume. But on babnce the US Navy was still a traditional big gun navy. The new battleships of the Soulh Dukola and Norlh CuroHIla classes were armed with 16-inch guns mounted III triple turrets. surpassing anything building III Europe. Without worldwide bases. American cruisers had to be large. long-ranged and well armed. with the Brookly" class epitomizing the style. By the late 1930s, the US Navy enjoyed control ofa large and growll1g organic air power with rugged types of radial-engined fighters, torpedobombers and dive-bombers (such as the Grumman Wildcat, Douglas Devasrator and Douglas D:lUntless), but still did not wholly think that air power had supplanted the place of the battleship. While President Roose,'elt had much sympathy (or Britain fighting alone from june 1940 against Germany in Europe, much of his electorate felt differently. There were significant pro-German and antiBritish lobbies in the USA. American isolationism had characterized much of the inter-war period and despite American financial aid and a 'Destroyers-for-Bases' agreement in favour of13ritain in 19~0, this view would not see a wholesale change until early 1941 when German submarine operations increasingly affected American merchant shipping III the Adantic. The US Naval hierarchy \vas understandably preoccupied with the japanese threat 111 the Pacific but could also see that German domination of Europe was unacceptable to American intercsts. By the spring of 1941 the US Navy joined its Canadian neighbours in the western Atlantic convoying of AJlied shipping to Britain, and had For the Royal Navy. World War One had been a disappointment. The battle ofjutland had not broken the deadlock let alone won the W3r. and the German U-boat had come close to exhausting Britain. In 1922 the Washington Naval Conference reflected the widespread hope and conviction that such a war should never happen again. For the first time. the Bmish accepted parity with another naval power. the USA. The Conference cstablished a ten-year 'buildlllg holiday' for capital ships: it also t:stablished qualitam'e limits for 'auxiliary vessels' - all other surface ships - but no quamiratlvc limits were agreed on thcse. The London Conference in 1930 focused for the first tlllle on cruisers. dt:'Stroycrs and subrnarmcs, and brought forth an extenSIon of the capital stll!, 'bUlldlllg holiday' to December 1936, at which pomt the japanese stated theIr Intention to withdraw from the Treaty system. The British. dl.'Spite ownmg a merchant fleet far larger than the Americans'. were forced to accept parity 111 CHuser tonnage: the US Navy \vanted a fleet of big 8-mch cruisers to scout for the battle flect across the Pacific in a future war with japan. Meanwhile, Germany, Italy and japan began to produce overweight shIps. At the same time, the parsimony of the Treasury deprived British yards and factOTll.'S of any ft"l.'Sh orders. forcing c1osun.. 'S and a failure to keep fully abreast of the latcst shipbuilding tcchnologics, which by 1939 trandated into a substantial capacity shortage. A major problem of block obsolescence m Bnti~h warships and equipment - created by the buildlllg boom of 1917 and exacerbated by mternational agreements and a frugal Exchequer - adversely affected the srate of the Royal Navy III 1939, when many of its lll~or warships were rather long 11l the tooth. The belated rcblllld1llg of the 1930s had modernized only about half of the fleet by 1939; the rest consi$ted of uTlmodified 1918 designs. This delay Illanifested itself in a number of worrying ways, nOt least the inadequate ~tate of anti-aircraft provision. Tht: Royal Navy had becn the first navy to adopt comTllonality of AA b'lUlS across the fleet, but thi~ had been in the 19205 so by 1939 her ships were fitted with eighteen-year-old technology in an arena of war which developed the mOSt quickly. Effectively. in 1939 thc British suflered from being first in the field nvellty years prior. though most other navies also struggled to produce reliable tachymetric fire comro!. Nevertheless. as w:Jr broke out in September 1939 the British still possessed the largeSt and mOSt formidable navy of the combat,ams. with
Devastalor lorpedo-bombers on USS Enterprise. 194 I Crewmen on the A/neri(.an aircraft. camer Emerpnse (01-6) r.ervice Doug\a5 TBD-I Devil5tator torpedo-bombers on the deck. at 5e<l off the Hawiuian ba5e of Pearl Harbor.

14

nine aircraft carriers and six building, fifteen capital ships with fi....e building, sixty-four cruisers with nineteen building, 216 destroyers and escon vessels with many more planned, and thirty-eight submarines with eleven building, A large fleet was necessary since her duties were manifold and onerous. The RO)'<lI Navy's tasklist still included the local defence of colonies and the protection of the veins of mde on the high seas. Half of Britain's food supplies and two thirds of her raw materials were bought abroad. The Royal Navy had a large presence in the Mediterranean, with Malta the centre of the British nav:ll world there. Om the main facror in 1930s \v:lr planning was defence of the eastern empire.The British planned ro send their main battle fleet ro the East and expected that their next major battle was likely to be fought fmm the incomplete base at Singapore against the Japanese battle fleet, and not in the North Sea against the Germans or in the Mediterranean against the Italians. The Naval Staff planned on a return to the traditional "vo-power standard to counter the growing German and Japanese threat. intending to achie....e this strength by the mid-194-0s, meanwhile ignoring the US Navy as the 'next biggest' fleet. A major building programme was commenced in 1936-7. funded by an increase in the defence budget of .(,20 million to .(,8 I million (and later to .(,105 million), consisting of a projected nine new battl~hips, six aircraft carriers, twenty-four cruisers, twenty~four destroyers (including powerful 'Tribal' class dl'Stroyers 16

mounting eight 4.7-inch guns) and " ....elve submarines. None of the major warships would be ready for another four years. By the end of the 19305 Britain faced an acute strategic dilemma should war break out with " ....0 or all three of the A.xis powers. The British merchant marine was huge and, while a source of strength. required protection around the globe. The need to defend long imperial shipping routes determined the necessary number of trade-protection cruisers. Surface raiders and aircraft were seen as the most serious threat to sea communications, whereas it was believed that the threat of the Uboat, successfully (bur only just) defeated in 1917, would be controlled by Asdic/sonar (recent experience of which had been gained by participation in neutrality patrols against Nationalist, Italian and German submarines during the Spanish Civil War) and by Germany not having direct access to the open Atlantic - an incorrect set of aSSl"SSments, as it turned out. but ones that the KrirgslUlIrine high command also subscribed to. In fact, the U-boat threat \v:lS not underestimated by the Admiralty. bur realistically seen as only one facet of the expected German campaign against British trade. While most British cruisers and destroyers were of reasonably modern design and construction, the battle fleet was old and but partially updated (only two new battleships built since the end ofWorid War One, and only one modern aircraft carrier - compared to three Japanese and four American). Aviation, a growing science in which the Royal Naval Air

The China Sution Hong Kong in the early 1930s: a typIcaIll1tef"-war scene with ~ of the BrrtJsh and US Navies. awnings spread. at anchor out in the harbour: 'Thrtt of the five 8ntISh threeRwlneIIed 0"\l1Sef"S of the Kern claSs. which made up the 5th Crutser Squadron. are present. that at the left belng berthed alongside at the ~ dockyard. The small single funnelled vessel just beyond is the Royal ~ AuxilIary oolef" Ft'Ofl(CIl, v.tlile at the extreme nght is the iIlrCl<lft carner Hermes, In the cen~ of the ~ are two Amencan warshIpS. the cruiser Houston. il/'Id the gunboat /sobel. Beyond and to thelI' right IS the Large subrnanne depot ship ~. with three boats of the 4th Sobmanne Aotifta alongside. (Used courtesy of ExpIoslon! MuseuY'l of Naval FtrepOWer)

Service had enjoyed a lead after 1914, had only in 1937 been recovered [rom the Royal Air Force and mO"t operntional and projected typl"'; of aircraft were obsolescent compared to their japane'iC and American naval counterparts. The Fleet Air Arm used the monoplane Blackburn Skua and Fairey Fulmar as fighter-bombel' and the vintage Fairey Swordfish biplane as a torpedo-bomber, the latter remaining SO dependable that it outlasted its planned succcssor. the Fairey Albacore. But the Royal Navy had plenty of ~trinb"'l to its bow New fire control gear, based on the Dreyer system in service during World War One, had bccn installed. Night fighting became the special competency of the British - particularly within the Mediterranean fleet. often the cradle of leading British tactical performance and innovation. In 1939, alliance with Frnnce 'iCemed to bring added security to the Mediterranean and, combined, Anglo-French naval strength dwarfed tim of Germany. with twO battlccruisers, twenty-rwo battleships and eighty-three cruisers between them as against three 'pocket bank-ships' and eight ctuisers. And the Royal Navy still ret;;ained a priceless ;;asset in its fighting skills, confidence and reput;;atioll, which counted for much.

The German Navy

Much younger and with a lor to prove, the Gernlan Kril"g5I1u"jlJl~ was almost wholly offensive III composition. The surrender of 1918 and the imposition of the VersaiUes Treaty - when the German Navy, limited to

an establishment of only 15,(H)() men, was forbidden to possess 'lubmarilles or an air arm, 3.nd was confined to a coastal pre-dteadnought c:lpability - was a source of great rancour in post-war Germany. The rebirth of thc German N3.vy under the Nazi party ~ including the clandestine growth of the U-boat arm under Admirnl Karl Donitz, and a building prograTllme of sunace warships once Hitler had openly renounced the Treaty ofVersailles in March 1935 ~ formed the bedrock of the World War Two Krirgmrarillt. Adolf Hitler's confident rejection of illlernational opinion while simultaneously expanding Germany's ;trilled forces enabled Nazi forces to look overseas for opportunities ro practise and propagandize. As with the uifill'afft's Condor Legion, the navy rook an active role in the Spanish Civil War, in concert with Italian vessels in the western Mediterranean. The 'pocket battleships' Dfil/5(lIIalld and Admiral Scheer were deployed to Spain along with a core of U-boats and rmne-Iaying Sdlllell/.Jootr, operating against Republican shipping and bases and, at times, coming into contact with neutral warships including British and French. In 1935 an Anglo-German Naval Agreemem - :l. formal bilateral agreeTllent - allowed Germany considerable freedom to incre:l.se its Uboat Strcnb>th while pursuing the construction of a surface navy up to 35 per cem of I3ritish overall strenl:,>th (a size which German naval staff calculated could not be achilved until 1942 an}'\vay). With a view to m3xIIllizing the number of hulls while staying within the overall tonnage

17

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limits agreed with Britain. Donia opted for the 650-ton Type VI [ rather than the 1,000-con Type IX U~boat as the mainstay design. In the V-boat, Donitz had a pOlcmially \var-winning weapon. But few prC-W:lf Kritgsmari"e planners relied on the bold prediction that Norwegian, Dutch or Fn'tlch coastlines might cOllle uncler their control - and in gencnl, few staff officers shared the zealous optimism that Donia held in the 19305 about the importallce of the V-boat in ally future war against Britain. Not Intended to confront tht' British flect in any large-scale surface battles, nonetheless Germany's well-designed, over-displaced and powerful capital ships were a threat (0 British supremacy on all individual basis, and their very existence v"Ould divert significant British naV<lI resources. The Kri(j!sl1IariJ/( suffered from confilsion at a strategic level about the fundamental principles of its existence, and, furthermore, Hitler, despite consistently making the navy his last priority of the three arllled forces of the Nazi sute, ~s renowned for his almost schizophrenic and negligently ill-informed personal meddling in military and naval affairs. Labouring under a less aristocratic class structure than the German Army, the political vie\\'S of its servicemen \\'ere quite diverse though not often attracted by the more extreme flavours of Nazism. By 1939 the German Navy was still slllal!. having not been given the time it needed to prepare properly for the war that Hitler precipitated by annexing the Sudetenland in October 1938. The Kn'e'RSIIldriIJi high command were deeply disappointed when hostilities commenced only eight months after the es13blishment of their Z-Plan in January 1939 (planning eight aircrafi: carriers, ten battleships, fifi:een pocket bartleships, five heavy cruisers, sixty light cruisers and 249 U-boats). The Z-Plan \V<lS formulated on the assumption that general \V<lr would not brcak until 1945 at the earliest, and \V<lS also dependent 011 the unrealistic assumption that Britain would not 13ke competitive remedial action in the meantime. In the event Germany \vent to \V<lr with two battlecruisen, three 'pocket battleships', eight cruisers, twenty-twO destroyers, twenty smaller esCOrts and fifty-nine U-boats. The Z-Plan was necessarily abandoned and the German Navy, ostensibly committed to sur6ce raiding with its 'pocket battleships' and heavy cruisers, \V<lS forced to concentrate on increasing its numbers of submarines and finishing the construction of ships already well adV<lnced. While snlall in number. German ships \vere modern, built since at least the late 1920s, with efficient main and anti-aircraft armament, excellent fire-comro!. optics. damage control and manned by well-trained crews. While one of the first navies to grasp the potential of radar in firecomrol. the KritgsmarilJi was unable to equip itself with efficient and reliable radar setS. Trade protection \'r.lS not an issue, and on the eve of w:lr she had only twenty-two destroyers. mainly for offensive fleet work. and thirty torpedo boats. With one aircraft carrier. the Gmf Zeppe/iu, never completcd. ItS naval aviation was shore-based and under the control of the LJlfiwa.ffr. This mainly tactical air force run by Hermann Goering was not wdl-nllled lIltO thc needs of its maritime counterpartS. and never developed an effectivc au-dropped torpedo. Nevertheless. the British expected air pO\ver to bc used to deliver a knockout blow to British infusrrucrure - ports. roach and rail\'r.lYs - as well as shipping. As a predominantly land-based power. German amphibious needs were primarily defensive, in order to conduct opt'rations on the fringes of its campaib'llS on the European continent.

ocean-going trade wnnage, and ItS navy was primarily designed for the offensive application of coastal defence. It remained a relatively minor force despite ambitious building programmes instigated in the 19205 and 1930s unhampered by the Washington and London naval treaties. It was reliant on foreign technical aid, much of which was unsuited to the peculiarities ofSovie[ design requirementS. Soviet shipbuilding \vas in a bachV<lrd state during much of the inter-\var period. It had retained several large ships of World War One vintage - and even some smaller vessels dating from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Soviet naval officers were sent to instruct and command Republican forces fighting NationalistS in the Spanish Civil War. and weapons, troops and aircraft were also dispatched. Officer purges between 1935 and 1938 served to dumnish the leadership quality. while the core of seamen resident in the Baltic states \vas not recovered until 1940. A naV<lI programme was undertaken after 1926 but its effect was limited. and folded into the larger Five-Year Plan of 1929-33. The fruits of this were largely confined to unsatisfactory designs of four Kir011 class cruisers and fortysix 'Gordy' and 'Lemngrad' class destroyer leaders and 'Uragan' patrol boats. In 1938, the USSR commenced a major capital ship building programme, the flagships of which were four 6O,000-ton SOl'itlSkiy Soyuz battleships and twO 35,OOO-ton baulecruisers of the Krol1sll/adl class. mounting nine 16-inch and nme 12-inch guns respectively. Construction progress was good considering the parlous state of Soviet shipbuilding capacity and skills, and with American. Italian and German assistance the ships \vere well advanced by the nme the decision was taken in 1941 to scrap thelU. By 1929 a modest submarine building programme had been launched, consisting of small 2oo-wn 'Maliutka' class coastal boats and 6OO-ton medium boats of the 'Shchuka' class. developed with German assistance. The Soviet Navy also operated large '5' and 'K' class oceanic submarines of 900 and 1,500 tons displacement respectively, from the mid-1930s. Various designs of motor torpedo boatS were employed m large numbers with all four fleets; the G5 type was reported w make a terrifying 50--60 knotS unladen. Naval air po\ver was non-existent III an organic sense. and amphibious capability \vas neglected despite the importance of the Soviet littoral regions to itS communications and security. The Baltic fleet fought some actions against Finland Il\ 1939-40. Against the Germans from June 1941 onwards. a significant proportion of the Soviet Navy would be occupied not at sea but fighting in marine bat13lions in defence of Soviet bases and pon cities. Meanwhile, Soviet destroyers and submarine-chasen \"''Quld make brave effortS in Arctic waten assisting Allied convoys. In the Baltic and Black Seas, the Soviet Navy was less able to operate successfully in a true maritime war agalllst the KriegsltJarille, mainly due to the dominance of the uifill'affe and the need to act in support of the army.

Other Navies
The British Dominions of Canad.a, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India contributed trained manpower to the Royal Navy in 1939 and when Canada came to organize itS own naval force for war it had to build almost from scratch as a result. Starting OUt with a handful of destroyers and minesweepers, and only 5,000 men, but concentrating on the production of corvettes, the RCN would prove a vital adjunct to the Royal Navy, particularly in the twenty-seven months of fighting and convoying before full American co-belligerency. Right until the end of the \V<lr - by which time it had expanded to over 90,000 men - the Canadian Navy would take a disproportionately keen interest in fighting U~boats. 18

The Soviet Navy

The USSR. with ports and fleets in the Baltic, Arctic, Black Sea and Pacific theatres, had no overseas colonies to defend or supply and little

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Th~ launch of the Admiral Gra( Spee. 193-4 The launch ofthe'pod:et battIeWp" AdTwoI Gm(~ was a strong Slgrl of the ~~ence of German

""'" p""".

Adolf Hi-ler atWilhelmshaven, 1936

Hitler attends the launch of the pov.oerful Gerrnan

banlf!(T\J'ser S<;hornhoro on 3 October 1936.AI5o present WiIS Grand Mn'r.ill Erich Rilede!"-. Commanderin-Chief of the Knegsmonne.

19

Grand Harbour. ~Ita

(oppclte) Swordfish droppona a torpedo

Ie &n~ ~ and Hc:lrr;e ~1 tJed

.IP ~ tt-"~ ~ f Mtlol..- In ~ ~Vidlett", rod FlclnanA.WII:h"1lOl' xteenIl't- and ~"-l"ItLry ~ ..... to the left IS ~ :)f Itw: :nhance Oepol. The ~ the cc:nw d ~ phol~ In the d;ari;er wet t~ Horne the ~NeIscn.'oM'Iile ~ her. n trle paler,-ey of tt'e """"-"...., let': ;we ~Md:m and twO Lcmot! das1 ~ The Sb'1JeS Itle ~ wei. t:.e 1c'"..terS Nt O'l Net5l:rl... C ~ nome ~_ :lI.mi: tt'e tme CI the Spard> CM w:. W>en shop$ d tI'>e I!oUh Frwd'I8eeu :Jme<I ~ 1'IIr'blp In 1'"dbOnaI colou"';; to bc:iIltJ.'l!'

pI'Io'~ ~ U'Vl$ 0(

"It'rn
\t _.

>';'

O..,tm!!"d ~ l"'\edft...

0(...... lfoI!ol Ax ArrtI~ ~ fon:~. tn@- ~ Fifty S....ordish ' .~, WI MlUid ~ ster1ng ~~ to tr>e &-rorStll"l the
~ ~

a Swonjj,sh /'11<

I.

fi1xn tr>e Tcrpedo .....

at J05IXlr iq:Is..

e orpedo <UY1g trvq ... p.e 938.

20

The:' RovJ.1 Amm.liJ.n NJ.\)'. J.nd its neighbour the ROy.11 New Ze.1bnd Navy. preferred to buy and nun Oriti~h-built cruisers. Austr.1hJ. ordered tWO 'County' cb~~ crui\('~ .-lUS/F<lf", .1nd Cwbfrr<l in the 11lld-I<J211s J.nd pun:hm~d three modified Lf,wdrr elm cruis\'rs in the I930s. They J.I~ ordered twO OWr\eJ.~ PJ.trol Subllurincs - Otll'tly .1nd Oxley - III the 192IK and built .1 ~eJ.pbnc CJ.rrier. the Alb<ltrMS. at the Cockatoo NJ.vJ.1 Docky:u\j TIll' ~l1bl1lJ.riJlc~ were later ~old back to Britain. and the AII"llrO-'.( wa~ [ransterrcd in 1938 a~ parr-payment for the Lf,mder Cflllscrs. The~e ~hip~ - to lx: Joined by d('moye~ and escort cr.1ft - were to be med to protect Au~tnlian waters and the Royal Nol\')O had no direct Juri~!ictioll owr their deploymcnt, Australia and New Zealand .1150 sent pilot~ to the Flect Air Arlll in Britain.The RAN would expand to neJrly 40.(1)() lll\'l1 operating o\'er three hundred \'cssels by 1945. including four crui\er\. dev\'n dettro\X'r\. eight fTiga.tCi and sloops Jnd thn.'e landing ~hip\. The RNZN expanded to roughly 1O.ono men by the wu's end. For politicJI Jnd recruitment rt"atOn~. South African .1nd Indian contributiont renuin<.'<! tmall for their populace size. but between them they provided o\'er ninety tmall ~ort and mineswecping \.csse6 and SCJl[ thouund. of officert and mcn to the Royal Navy. Other cOlltidenble navi exittcd.oll the periphery of the naval world yet illlluentiJ.! in th ir own spheres. Th... Netherhntb. historically a n.-ry 1I11poTUIIt na\-aI PQ\\ r. ttill lllailllailled all ell\-iable fl~t of modern. wcllequlpp..d \\arthip<. led by forw.1ro-thinking comnundert. Pioneer; in 'e\cr.d fidtb, but p.1J"ticuJ...rly In tubnlarilles (they im-cntcd the St,,," bn:.1thlllg tube. bt'tter known as the s..-Im"rkd in Gernun U'le) ;lIld dfct:tl\'c .1nu-.1lrcr.llt ddem:e. the Dutch .ItO had colonial re<;pomibilirie<; throughout South Eol\[ Ati;} and pbnned on ddending them III the ~"t'm ofhO\ullti...... III the region, ul.ing.1 forre ofrhree cruin. SC\"t'n de<;U'o~"t'rs ,lnd fifteen tuhmJrm~. The ",xlled Dutt"h b'O\'ernmem exercised control O'er the na\).-. though lIldi\"ldual warthipo; would be imegn.tC'd into

Untl~h comnlJnd. LikewI~. Po!Jlld po;.~e'\"ed J \lIIJII nJvy of four destroyen. Jlld tin' ~ubillarin\"j, in 1939, Jnd would bter \end llIt'n 10 llUll ROyJI NJ\'y cruisen. and d~troyers, lIlduding the Poh\h rt'lIIll.lI1t. th.lt hJd ...)oped to UritJin ill Septelll~r. Much the ).lllle h.lppelll.'d wllh the nJVY of Greece after that country WJS O\errull in 1941. Till: Swedl\h Navy, while not !Jrge by global )t.ll1dJrd~, WJ\ modern .lIld wellequipped, Jnd its l.'xistcnce \\:lS.1 llIJJor fJctor in Sweden" pre\CrutlOll of lb ncutrJ.!lty Jnd territoriJI integrity Jlllid\t W,lr-(omU1l1c{! Eumpe. The nJvy ofSpalll. of simiiJr ~il.e to thJt of the NetherlJnd\. WJ\, hke the rest of the country. left reeling by the terribl{' COI1\'UI\IOII\ of the ('Inl War. Therefore. while the ~YlllpJthiC) ofSpJllI~ llew It'Jdel> wert' dc.uly WIth the AXIS pow...rs, the nJv)"s role was n:strined to the polll:mg of the country~ stJt\'d neutrality.

The Merchant Marine

While not eqUIpped with reckonable oceall-golllg 1lJ.\al lorcC'>, other neutn.ls - orw.1y. for IIISUllCC - still lllJIIlUlIled SIZable merchJnt tleet. whose' sunlval would become bound up by the \ICl"ltuJC'> of Alh...d and A.xlS domuunce. Some merch.1nt vessels (hJ.nged o\\llcrthlp J. number of tllllC'>. In 1939, Ontam sull held .. clear supenont) III hcr merch.1nt nurine. In percentage of world\\ Idt' IOlllla!--,,-', \he held nedrh' tv.icc Ih.1t of her ne.1re<;t competitor. the Umteu SUIC'>. \\ IIh 264 per cent to 13.6 per cent. J.1pan hJ.d 7,5 per cent, '\Jon\J.~ 6.9 per cent. GeTlllJny 6,3 per cent. Iuly 4.9 per cent. France and the: l"'c,th\'rldnd. eJ.ch ".J per cent of global tOnnage. The world\ I11c'rfhJ.llt tl\...t \\ould b<' one of the 1110"'[ un~ung fOlcto~ in the \\at at 'i("Ol, tutferlllg Ghu.1h~. (;ltC'S n('\'('r low...r than their nJ.\'J1 counterpam and fn'quemly l11uch higher. As Ol ttrJtCb>ic dement of the WOlr. [he aruck and defence of trJ.de \hlpping would. on babnc.... occupy the energlC\ of Ihe \\urld\ na\"1\'" on .1 hllherto unptl."Cedented scale.

21

19) 9 - 4 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

narrowing to focus on a few towns nill in Allied hands. ;another BritISh wilhdn1\\'31 across the sea becallle mcviuble by the end of May. As C;l!ais made Its US! sund 3g::linSI the panzers. co\'t"red by the last vesti~ of th~ French First Army. the amphibious evacuation of 338.000 Alli('d men from Dunkirk and other Ch:lIlllei seaports was begun by the Rap.! Jvy and Allied ....'ar;hlps. aided by a motley collection of tenders. tugs. s:ailing barges. fishing 00;1.[5, Cn5U) ~tealllers. private mOlor oo...t'!o. plellu~ cnlt OlnJ Slllmg pchts - the so-allt.-d 'Little Ships'. Another 200.000 men wen:: ~'acwlcd from Awntlc French ports such as SI n:ure. With Fl'3llce and lklglUlll out of the fight and Norway ;lIId Dellln;ark O\1::rukclI by C ....CIlb., and with Germany's eastern ;lIId southern borders ,>un::. Hitler could turn to the proposed m\~ion of Briuin. Opt-r.mon SC':lhon had been cOnlcmpbtcd for 5Cveral months, ;;md wllh Ihe Ch;;lnnel pora. now m Gernun control, ;m m\";lSion force t'Stlln;lIed ;II neul)' 4.000 ulldmg eralt. unk transpor~. b;lrges. rugs, Siebel femes. fWlIng cnft ;Iud motorbo;l~ \\~ usembled ;lnd kept ;II ten wys' re;ldllleiS throughout Seplember. ThIS force could h;l\'e bnded 70.000 men on the firsl cby. BUI bOld weOllher ;ldded to Gemu.n dlfficultlt'S: comnund of the ;llr \\~ not ....on &om RAF Fighter Comnund how~"t"r much Goering II10lde bo,lSIful pn:dicrions; BriUIll h;ld rescued the core of liS professlonOlI Olnny &om Dunkirk; ;lnd IIlOSI of ;III. the Royal N;Jvy wu ;JlillOSI ceruin to wre;Jk complete de\~UUOIl should ;JllY Ch;Jnlld crosslllg be ;Jttempted. no m:atter what forces Ihe Germans could throw 11110 supporung the prl:'cuious :amphibiom Cr.lft. In October the opentlon w:as suspended indefinitely.

sensibly chosen (Q relllaJn ;r, nOll-belhgerent. U\'lllg Itself from any Anglo-French n;r,v:r.1 offensive. But wuh the French knocked out by June. the British Mediterranean Fleet could no longer count on the .\filM/lt , ....;;wolwlt. With fleets :and b;r,ses sml.tegically loc;r,ted ;r,t Glbulur :at the \\~tern entrance and Alexandri;r, in the east (O''er 1.800 nnles :apart). the Dnush under Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham were ;r,t OIlCt:' dJvided ;r,nd t:'xposed. It w:as illlp<KS:iblt:' for the two British fleets to be COlllbined Without losing dominance;r,t one or other end of the Medlterr:mcan.The kq' 10 Ihis ;lnd otht:'r Mediterr:me:an str.Itegic funwmenuls w:as the isl.and base of Malu. Sitwted ;IS :a mging pao;t on the b.teral con\'O)' route belween the two lIuin British b~ :and :astride the north-south luli:an routes from Sicily to her colonies in liby;r,. It wu also close to Ihe narrow. 3O-nule ch;Jnnd between C:ape Bon in French-held TUIlISI:a :and the luli;J1l island lnse of P;/,ntelleria. south of Sicily. It \\~ thus the fly in the omunent of Axil. operations in Nonh Afric:a. ;lnd the Axis would spend much time ;r,nd effort :attempting to neutnlize it. Thl'O\\ n IIlcreas.ingly OntO the Inck fOOl :as it \\~. the French Na\'Y h.d pl.tyed little p;r,rt before the Armistice on 22 June. Its offensi\'e succ~ were confined to;r,n initial rash ofsubnunne :and nnne ;/,[Ucks on luli;r,n merch;r,m ~hlps. operatiolb 111 the Dodecanese isbncls and bomb:ardment by Its he;J\'Y crulo;ers ofthe \\~tern lulian COUto Free of this thre.t by the summer. the lulians rail COIl\'O)"'S to lib)-;a and built up ground .nd air forces there in order to O"er-run British :lIld Ftt'nch North Afric:an termory. The overall Axis plan was to roll east :alld then 10 swing northwards LIItO Ihe oil-rich lamb of the Middle East.

Outbreak of War in the Mediterranean

Me:anwhlle. Germ:an :attempt!, to intl:'rfere in the Mediterrane:an by sendlllg three U-bo:a1S p:aSI Gibralur ended III f:ailure. luly, bidlllg LIS time. h:ad not been keen to support Gernun :activity aga.lIlst the British on its own doorstep. llowever. with the rapid fill of France, on 10 June 1940 Mussolini decided th:at Germ:any had won. and declarl:'d war on Fr;lIlce :and Driuin huuself. The key to Dritish strategy w:as the :ability to leave the Italians alld the Mediterranean to the French Navy. The Royal N:avy could - Just about - fight Germ:any and Japan. This whole str.J.tegy would coll:apse like a p:ack of c:ards with the dt:'ft:'at of France :and the near-simuluneous l:'nlry of hOlly mto the w:u. A hOSlile fleel - including more than a hundred modern subm;lrLllC'S - now sat :aSlride the shortest British imperial route. But It;lly. almost :a muilime economy wedded to the continenl. also suffered from some of the problems alre:ady f:aced by the Bntlsh. She w:as deficient in uw nuteri:als and supplies :and relit:'d upon seaborne tnde to bring much of these necessilies ill. Thus Iuly was suscepliblt:' to contrary Bmish pressure in Ihe Mediterrane:rn. The supply lines to her E:ast African colonies adjoining Ihe Red Se.:l were controUt:'d by British warships :and AngJo-Egypti:an contrOl of the Suez Canal. But there \\~ no denying Ihe vulnerability of the British position: Admiralty pb.nners knew that m order to gel y,-;;arshlps and convoys Ihrough the MeditcrranC2n to M:alu :and onwards 10 British ground forces in North Afric:a. gi\'en Julian hostility. would require :a comprehensi\'e fleet in support. Should Ihc Gcrnuns become lIl\olved. Briti~h difficulties would mull1ply. In pre-w;r,r ulks. the \\'eSlern Meduerr:me.:ln w:a.s ;r,greffi to be Iht:' ~ponsibility of the French. With the c:aslern portion the cha~ of Iht:' Royal :avy. As long :as the French fleet renuined :acti\"l~ m the western the2m. the lulian N:avy w:as mferior 10 the Allies' O\'enU combination, The luli:ans knew thIS. From Seplember 1939 until June 194H luly h:ad

North Mrica and me Mediterranean

Uoth the Uruish and the Italians had great difficulty supplying their :armies in North Africa. Uritish convoys to Eh'Ypt were sellt 011 the long ~ea route around th" Cape of Good Hope.This entailed a much longt:'r transit and in effect used more shipping. Italian convoys to Tripoli were h:lI,lSSed by Untish surface and submarine forces. Emergency supplies were sent by submarine to Italian positions in Libya. while the British used their own submarines to bolster fud supplies to Malta and go 100klllg for Italian shipping: to attack. Uut large British submarines of the '0'. 'p'and 'R' classes. designed and built in the 1920s and 19305 to fight the Japallt'Se III the open waters of the Pacific. prov~d unwieldy and vulnerable to lulian ami-submarine destroyt:'r and air attJcks.Three were lost wlthlll a lllollth of hostilitit:'s with haly. Fivt:' hundred British crew would be killed before the smaller and more handy 'U' cI:ass coasul boats were put imo service with the First. Eighth and Tenth Submarine Flotilbs. Itali:an subm:arines had numbered O'OC'r I to III June 1940. :about lulf of which \\'ere co:asul types and the rest 10nger-r:l.Ilge oce~illC \cssels. comp;r,red to a British forc~ of around ten. Comp:ared to U-boats.luli~n submarines \\"t"re of inferior design. nunned by older crews ;Jnd generally performed much less successfully. In September 1940 the Italians invaded Egypt ~nd. e;r,ger to IllllO.te Hitler's successes. pushed illlo Greece in October. Th~y wt:'re ejected from Greece and seen off by Wa\"t"ll's British army III Ego/pt. \"'lth n:a\:a.! bom~rdmenh proving useful in dislodging luI.i.:an C;lmps. While both sides suffered from the distances of operations from their I1UiIl bues :at Tripoli :and Alexandria. signals intellig~nc~ helped Ihe OrJllsh ;lmelionte Ihis with :adnnugeous planning. Perpetually convlIlced of the impenetrability of their naval H:agelin codes. the 1ulims we're \'ulnerable 10 British code-reading in Ihe Mediterranean. Meanwhile. ;ltter the

1939-40

sign:Hure of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and ltaly.J3p3n started its southward move into northern Indochina. a French colony. Thrown off the European mainland and acting alone, the Uritish looked to the Mediterranean as the only theatre they could operate in successfully for tht: time: being. This relied upon seizing the initiative away &om the: It3li:ms, depending all Gibraltar and AlexJndria instead of Malu and exploiting their valuable aircraft curiers and weU-holled ability to fight at night. After Oper.uion Sealion had been abandoned. the German Navy was forced to re-eVJ.luatc: its pbns. The Kn"egsmarilll: continued to set: the North Atlantic as its prilll3fY theatre and tht' Mediterr:mean as a distractioil. Hut the failures of the Italians led first the Gernun Army to be dragged in to support operatiom in North Africa. then the uifill'affe (X HirgerkorpJ) to support the Italian Navy, and finally the German Navy, which was ordered to redirect U-boat~ from the key North Atlamic theatre. All of these moves \vt're opposed by the respecti\'e anm of the German forces, but they were over-ruled by Hitler who saw the Mediterranean war a~ an opportunity to damage British power more quickly with le~s elTort.

The Question of the French Fleet

The fate of the Marine i\'mimrale after the armistice with Germany had remained a vexatious question to the British. in particular to Prime Minister Churchill. A modern. powerful fleet. equipped with a number of battleships in some cases superior to their German coumerpans, lay dispersed - and virtually intact - at three main bases around the Mediterr.lllean:Toulon, on the southern French coast; British Alexandria, in Egypt; and at Mers el-Kebir on the coast of French Algeria. The incomplete battleship Ri(!lelieu was at Dakar in Senegal, and theJt<l1l &lrt was berthed in Casablanca in French Morocco. There was also a squadron of cruisers and (t/Illre.wrpillelw at Bizefte in Tunisia. A small number of French destroyers, sloops and submarines were already lying in British naval bases, and these units were easily taken under British comrol though not without bloodshed. But it \vas one of British naval str.ltegy's anxieties that the major French forces still at large should fall imo German or Italian hands, as to do so would tip the balance firmly in favour of the Axis navies nOl only in the Mediterr.lnean but III nearly all European seas, and by extension thence into the Atlamic. Article 8 of the Franco-German armistice stated that the French fleet 'shall be collected in pons to be specified and there demobilized and disarmed under German or italian COntrol'. The British high command resolved that, however difficult and rancorous the task, the remainder of the French fleet had to be taken under control or. if necessary, incapacitated. Orders were issued [0 Admiral Cunningham in command of a powerful British squadron off Alexandria. and to Admiral Sir James Somerville at Gibraltar with Force H, to offer the French commanders the choices of sailing into intemment III Britain. or to the West Indies and American controL to continue the fight against Germany; to dimilitarize their ships immediately; or to scuttle them. Cunningham negotiated successfully with the French ships at AlexJ.ndria and found :a solution which did not require violence. Somerville was unable to :achieve :a simil:ar outcome at Men d-Kebir. and on 3 July was prodded by a nervous and expectant Admiralty to carry out 'one of the most disagreeable :and difficult tasks that a British Admiral has ever been faced with'. The British squadron opened a heavy and mostly accurate fire on the French \varships desperately trying to raise steam to escape

the harbour: the battleship Brelagllt was blown up; the new banlecruiser DI/IIkrrql/f and the battleship Prol't'II(f ran aground. damaged, the former to be further damaged a few days later by a Swordfish torpedo attack. Further assaults likewise aimed at picking 01T the remallling French heavy units at places like Dakar. The deed \vas done with customary decisi....eness. The French were outraged: 1.299 French sailors were killed and the rest had witnessed their ships being violated by an erstwhile ally. The Slfflsbt'urg managed to escape to Vichy-held Toulon. chased by the British battlecruiser HI'od. Stunned by this act, Vichy France \vas pushed ideologically closer to the Axis. With ItS North African empire still loyal. Vichy was sti\l a factor in the Mediterranean bal:ance of power, But for the British. the danger of the Axis taking comrol of one of the most potent fleets in Europe had been a....erred. and British political and military resolve was plain to see around the world, most importantly visible to America but also impressh'e [0 the wa....erlllg Spanish. Encouraged, the United States signed a crucial 'Ships for l3ases' agreement with Britain. handing o....er fifty elderly destroyers. Already cogmsam of the fact that the survival of Great Britain was central to the security of the United States. in [he face of a largely isolationist public attitude Roosevelt authorized the Two-Navy Ocean Expansion Act in July, ordering 1,300.000 tons of \....arships and 15.000 na....al aircr.lft to be built.

The Beginning of (he V-Boat War

As in World W;,r One, to access the open seas of the world the German Navy had to negotiate the physical barrier posed by the British Isles. The Royal Navy sought to block the exits: the Channel and the North Sea, and further Out. the UK-Iceland-Greenland gaps. The Home Fleet at Scapa Flow resumed its focus on the northern exits. but it could not cover everywhere and already there were a number of German raiders at large. British cruisers were stretched thinly. Fifty-six fast passenger ships were thus requisitioned by the Admiralty, equipped with 6-inch guns and a rudimentary AA outfit and sent around the world, operating out of Commonwealth or Allied ports. In the first few months of the war in 1939, thirreen of these armed merchant cruisers (AMes) were used to patrol the Norrh Atlantic gaps. suffering heavy losses to surface and submarine arrack: the sinking of the 6-inch gunned Rall'tllpiudi by the Sclltlmht/rst and GUeiSt1ltl11 II-inch-gunned battlecruisers in No....ember is a famous case in point. But the biggest threat posed to all British ships came not from the surface units but from the Lifill'llffr and the U-boats. Germany entered the war with fifty-seven U-boats. of which twentysix were of an ocean-going type. Of these, only eighteen U-boats were operationally available to the Germans for Atlantic operations on the outbreak of war. Their initial impact as a gllrrrl' dr (ourse weapon was limited: by the end of 1939, surface raiders and mines had accounted for roughly twice as many merchant sinkings as had U-boats. Af;ainst warships in this period. the U-boats performed more impressively: the British carrier Courogrous and the battleship Royal Oak both fell prey to skiUed U-bo:at attacks. the lauer's loss particularly disturbing to the Royal N:avy because it was perpetrated inside the Home Fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow.

French Capitulation and the V-Boat War

From Christmas 1939. average illollthly losses of Allied and neutral shipping ran at a steady 80,000 tons. Pre-\\f3r British estimation of the Uboat threat - and of British ability to shmg it off-had so far been provcn largely accurate. But the Brirish anti-submarine situation in 1939 bccame

25

1939-40

with the conquest ofDennurk and Norway in April 1940. and wu \"ery much the gr.Iver in M2)' and June with the' f111 of Fnncc. AlmOSt at <II saoke Germany gained unfetter!. access to mnch Atlantic portS. In particular Bmt. u Rochdlc.loricnr. SI N2l.aU'e and BordeauX"_ AgalllSI this new disposition. a secure British ann-submarine blockade ....';\5 [orally 1I1lpossiblc. With thdr effective range increae<!. ill ;I qualllum leap. takmg them OUI beyond the endurance ofDnnsh convoy (:scam. Uboats' scom M-gan to riSC' accordmgly: up to nearly HO,OOO tOIl~ per
"'One'

nude

month from July to bcc October 1940. The Royal Navy lacked the
rnc:ms to securdy shepherd Its own tnde- let alone IlTlpose a COUTlu:rblockade. Air power had long made dose blockade nnposslhlc. Most of the Royal Navy's pre-war destroyers wen: designed to opcl'3tc with the fleet rather than in ami-submarine and convoying work, though a lllJJOr conversion programme had been surted pre-war.With German forces on England's doorstep, provision also had to be made to prevent any attempted invasion, and this meant keeping destroyers in home w;tters. Also, half the modern fleet de!itroyers were stationed 1I1 the Mediterranean - and many ships had been damaged III euly operations, from Norway to Gibraltar. Organizing the asscmbly, dlsposlUon and unungs of w;lrshlps ;Iud con\'Oy1 and the issuing of sailmg mnructions relied on all unmense volume of information being B.shed around the airW:l\~.Ttut thlS radio traffic could be intercepted was lugdy un:lvoidJ.ble. The key was to make it u Stture and encrypted as f(:.lSon:lbly pos5lbk Without cre:lnng gross Illefficiencies. At the outbreak of war the Gernuns had qUickly begun to read British merchant signals, giving them mile to posItion Uboats to Illterdict not only une5Cofted singletons but also the early convoys out in the Atlantic. Facing only a small number of U-boats. mostly actmg alone but beginning to use novel RJldtftaklik ('wolf-pack' tactics), British mercantile losses WCft' growing incf(:asingly worrisome but were not yet disastrous. However. the Submarine Tl'3cking R.oom set up at the Adnuralty had little to go on except reports from foreign-based agents, radioed contacts from vessels at sea and lllarginally discernible patterns of losses. Existing hard-pressed escorts could not be everywhere at once, and the defence of convoys against U-boat attaek - usually at night, and incft'asingly from moft' than one assailant - was weak and cssentially negative. Unable to take the fight to the lurking U-boot until it had shown itself. British COl1\'Oy1 had to rely primarily on evasion. Compared to the volume of shipping which needed con\'oying, the Royal Navy possessed fM too few dedicated escorts, and so lustily built corveues to supplement its dderly 1918-\'intage d~troyers and a fe\\ sloops already labouring under tht: smin of convoy duties. Based on a CbsslC cOOllnt:rcial whaler df:Sign. these 'Rower' class corvettes did not boast much superiority O\'Cr their qwrry; with a tOp speed of 16 knots and a "'-inch gun. they \\'CfC inferior to a surfaced Typ: VII U-bo-lt by one knot and therefoft' uruble to catch a fleeing opponent. They WCTt: cramped and had a tendency to roll in any kind of seaway. Bur they were cheap and quick to build, and seaworthy enough to operate out III the AtlantIC, two-thirds of which was now accessible to U-boats that could be refuelled at sea by replenishment vessels. In time, bl'3nd new escorts would have to be built. quickly and in large numbers, and more sophIsticated tactics had to b~ d~vclop~d to counter the growing confidence and skill of Gcrmany's submarine arm. But as a banclagc to stanch the steady ble~ding of British merchantmen, the corvette was II1dlspensable 111 British and Canadian us~.

The German U-bo-lt Arm was the proud donUIll of AdmlT~1 Karl Donia. a leading light of the Kritgsmantle and a loyal Nui. The Iynchpm ofthe Gernun U-boat forct: was the Typ: VII U-bo-lt. Over fi\"C hundred boatS \\"Cre commissioned during the war. Of75O tons displacement aud armed with founet:n tOrpl:does, thev could transit at 17 knots on the surface, easily fut enough to reposition and overhaul most convoys at night. The Type VII was joined by a larger des;ign. the ocem-gomg double-hulled T}1}e IX. Two hundred and fifty-two feet long, displacing o\'Cr 1.100 tOilS. and with a capacity for twenty-two torpedoes with four tubes forward and two aft ;lnd fined with a 105 mill gun, the newer class was also a capable sublll;lrine design, conceived to extend the range ofUboat influenc~ across the Atlantic, despite thc Type VII possessing adequatc capabilities in this are;l, as the British merch.1rlt marine would find out 10 its almost ruinous cOSt in the coming months. The Type IX was able to menace shipping in the South Atlamic and Indian oceans 100. Both types were equipped with the standard G7e electrical torpedo, cap;lble of 5.500 yards at 30 knots. To combat the threat posed by modern torpedo-armed submannes, Asdic (the name taken from the initials of the Anti Submarine Detection Invcsuganon Comlluuee), or sonar u it later became known. had been further developed III Britain in the t920s to augment passive hydrophonf:S and take the offensive in active detection of submarines. A major breakthrough had come in the mid-1930s \\;th the de'ooclopment of the AsdIC Range Recorder. which b)' means of an echo memory and a visual display could show a rudimemary fire-<onrrol solution. Too much faith was placed III this technology (by Briuin bur also by Gemun submarine theonm) such that even by 1939 modern submarines \\"Cre largely lllvulnerabic to II. for the simple re;l5On that most submarine attacks were dell\'Cred on the surface at night or from well outside the range of early Asdlc (SUO yards). Eseort \'essels could fift' star shell, which illuminated the scelle for a few seconds. but only once the escort had been nude aware of thc presence of the U-boat - and by definition an atuck had usually becn made by thell. Assuming an escort could locate the souro.: of tile attack atllighl,and could catch up with the perpetrator, only then would Asdlc be of usc in a d~pth-charge attack.

The Diverse Threat to British Shipping

Other weapons threatened British coastal and oceanic shipping lancs. By March 1940 Q\ocr 400,000 tons of British shipping had been sunk by magnellc nunes. Sown by ships. aircraft and subnurines around Britain, they caused a ~Ignlficant amount of dISlocation of coostal shipping in the North $e.ll and especl.lllly III the approaches to the Ttumes, prompting Churchill to denund tighter precautions. In N()\~mber 1939. two destl'O\o'n'! out of Harwich and a dozen merchantmen had all been lost to magnetic mines.AII uaffic our of the Thame-s was Slopped. md Admiralty pressurt' on the R.AF led to the raising of the 6rst barrage balloons for the protection of harbours. In a war at sea which would incre:lSlIlgly be dominated by the application of rival technologICal lIlgenult1cs. one of the 6rst steps would be to make impl'O\"Cments in lluncs\\"Ceplllg gear and the fitting of ships \vith degaussing coils. These mull countermeasures went a long way to neutering the threat over the winter of 1939-40. by which time the insufficiency of German stocks had prevented their having a decisi\'c cffect; though by the war's end a staggering 10 per cent of ovcl'3l1 IlIcrcha11l losses would be attributed to mines. German motor torpedo boats - Sclllltliboo/f to the Germans, 'E-boats' to the British - caused h;lvoc in the same waters, raiding coastal convoys

26

1939-40

and inshore tr.lffic almost 3.t will Ol.S British defences found their feet. These heavily :l.rmed, high-speed dicsc:l boats would remain unmatched until the appe:l.n.ncc of the later British Fairmile MTB designs. ~rt of Donitz's combined strategy for prosecuting the submarine waf on trade: involved maritime patrol aircr.J.ft. Four-engined Uifilllt!lJe FockeWulf200 Condors began to oper.l.te west of Ireland, attacking ships and spotting for V-boats. Though never as co-ordinated with V-boats as Donitz had intended, they remained a threat into 1941 when they were largely chased from the skies by Allied shipborne fighter aircr.lft. By the end of the first fifteen months of the w:ar, nearly 3.5 miUion tons of trade-carrying shipping had been lost to bombs, torpedoes and mines. Sixty per cenl of these losses were of unescorted vessels to V-boat attack. the Royal Navy having decided it would not convoy merchant ships whose speed feU outside the limits of 9-13 knots. Germany also atracked the shipping of neutral countries and these merchant fleets volunteered to be run under British control. Such appropriation~ mealll that the nominal total tonnage under the British 'red duster' increased by an extra 2.5 miUion tons to 20 miUion between 1939 and 1941. And by the end of 1940, Canadian efforts had resulted in an extra fifty corvettes built for Atlantic service. Added to thi~ much-needed boosl from Canadian shipyards, twenty-four minesweepers and six destroyers were also acquired /Tom the USA via Canada; aU were signed o\'C:r 10 Royal Naval COntrol. With only six deslroyers, acquired from the Royal Navy for battle fleet and coasul defence roles and unsuited to anti~submarinework, the Royal Canadian Navy was under-trained in Asclic. Furthermore, in the early months il was wedded to a premature concept of offensive antisubmarine work which differed from the British policy of'the safe and limely arrival of the convoy'. But through force of necessity, the slow lransatlanric convoys would become a Canadian speciality.

convoy carrying tanks for intended use against the British in Libya and Egypt \vas intercepted off Punta Stilo (Calabria) in July 1940 by a heavy British force under Cunningham, itself ostensibly covering a staged withdr.l.w;11 of non-essential personnel from Malta to Alexandria. During the contact, co-ordination between the Rrgia Marilla and the Rrgia Arrorrall/ica was appalling: 2,000 bombs were dropped from medium level on friend and foe alike as the two fleets diverged. with lIlany near-misses but few hits. Both British and Italian convoys reached their destinations unmolested. But all British heavy ships except the Warrpiff had been outran~;ed by their Italian counterp:arts :md the chaotic air attacks had ranled the British crews. Meanwhile the Italians had worn out many of their ships' engines while pu~hing for higher speeds, had proved unable to COllcentrale their fire to any effect despile numerical advantage, and overall felt relieved that it had not bccn worse. The probable U5cfulness of a f~w squadrons of capable dive-bombers wa~ also nOled. Four months later, November would ~ee twO further acrion~ betv.'een the Italian and Briti~h fleets: one at Tarallto would demo!lStrate the decisive use to which air power could be put by an aggressor equipped with aircraft carriers; and the second off Cape Spartivellto would reinforce the Italian battle fleet's growing feeling of frustration at being unable 10 seriously challenge the British battle fleel for command of Mediterranean waters.

The Readjustment of the British Naval Approach

By the end of 1940 the first tentative British steps had been taken towards measures which would achieve the eventual containment of the U-boat. The first surface-search radar in an escort destroyer was fitted to HMS Verify in June 1940. Laboratory refinements to Asdic equipment were fed back to the ships on anti-submarine duty. Operational experience ,vas quickly analyzed and lessons promulgated. By the end of the year, RAF Coastal Command had adopted depth charges in place of useless anrisubmarine bombs, had trialled Leigh searchlights mounted on Wellington bombers, and tested early forms of airborne radar. British shipyards were gearing up to provide replacement tonnage, and new warships, laid down before the war, were commissioning. Britain was surviving alone against Germany and Italy. In the South Atlantic and in the Mediterranean, battle honours were firmly in the Royal Navy's favour; but it ,vas increasingly clear to the Admiralty (though not yet the Krii!Rsmarille) that it ,vas under the sea where Germany would be hardest to beat.

The Italian and British Batde Fleets

Meanwhile, in the confined waters of the almost tideless 'middle sea'. small convoys \Vith light escorts crossing south from lraly and crawling along the Libyan coast constituted the main type of Italian operations. Occasionally, powerful battleship and cruiser forces ventured Out to flex their muscles and to deter illterference from the British. The first contact between the Italian and British battle fleets \vas the result of operations around JUSt such an Italian convoy bound for North Africa. An lulian force of twO battleships and heavy cruisers covering a

27

--------------------------

1939

The sinking of HMS Royal Oak

The most dramatic Gennan success of the first few months of the war came in mid-October 1939 when U.f7 penetrated the British base at $capa Flow and sank the battleship Royal Oak.

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MeBstab "we l; l3ZOO

, .".t" II".,. , "'~ 3 G..<.....,,~. (II.' " l "u""",.".b.,.,;... 0'... '1150 ,... 3 u.,." 0 ... "'"'..0..... "" B<r" _.,,".,.~m!!,--, b."""'. ".to...... U ~'"
Scapa Flow; Lamb Holm and Kirk Sound A Luftwaffe aenal ~onna,s~nce photograph of Lamb Holm and K"t Sound. one of the ef1trances to Scapa Flaw. taken ,n early 19" I. jUst over a year after U47. commanded by lieutenant Gunthef" Pnen. had slipped between the bIotkshlPS in Knit Sound to torpedo HMS Ro~ Oak. whICh was lying at anchor: The photograph shews several key elements of the defences developed after the attack. including t\YO antJ-au'craft banenes
west ofSt Mary'S; a milrtary camp to the east and coastal gun oonenes on Burra)' and Lamb Holm Also evident are tile blocksh,ps.,ncludong addlllonal ones that were sunk. after the attack.. SubseqlJe!1t to thIS photograph beIng taken ~ of concrete bIocIr.s (refemed to as causeways" because they were burlt uSIng Italian POW labour. wtlICh was not pennltted on molrtary Lnstallatoons under the Geneva Convention) were buolt across K,,1: Sound and othef" entrances to Scapa Flow,

I . "$(11. 1I~$l

b'".''' "'" , ,,"(~"Ll.' rll.',?)

2B

lJ-47 returns to ~se from Scapa Flow U'" returns to a hertfS welcome after her successfUl rT""SOOO to Scarpa Flow The TypeVll8 Ublt had a~
....... Uv'ee men::hanl ~ Ilder lartenant PrIen. and went on to MlOther lwent)'~ bef<n being rammed ..-.d SU'lI: wrtrl all I'Iard!. by HMS Wi:l/Yeme '" MMdlI941

"'*

Renderina safe a mine on the eut (OUt of Britain

~ t/'Ie war. Otle of t/'Ie most ~ od "'Sl.O"I of td;s r.c.... ......... peoorroeI was t/'Ie drsposal of fTWleS. Some were l70pped by ~ft .... shakMr (oastal ~ Ot~ brc:ll<e '"ee 01 ttoer l'I'lOOOY'IgS od dnf'..ed
~. AI /\ad to be fNde ~ eother by ~ the fuse or. Ifthrs was ~_ by blowing them "4l Mone disposal was a JOb that had a hi&" fatailty tr~

0-

.-,...

--

- .... ...
_0

-.
,

. .

~.,

<

.,.
"'"

-.

1939

Navies in exile: Poland

When
Ge~ny attacked

Poland many uniU of the small Polish Nny esaped

to Britain.Among them were three of the navy's four destroyers: Buna ('SquaJl'),

Slyska-:o rUchtninc') ;and Grom ('Thunder'). The fourth. Wiehe, tHunicanel. was sunk in action with Ge~n fon:es off the southern Baltic pon of Gdynia. 8Iy$kcrwico 100 Grcm wen brand new ~ voongn the most powerful lhips of their type in service anywt1ere. and they were .. sitylifiaru addition to the stren(th of die RopI Nwy. Gram was bombed and sunk with hNvy lou of life off Norway in ~ 1940. but the other twO foueht on thf'Ouch the WM, ~ other $hips and submarines duot Ivod esaped and rT'IC)n !Nt ~ ~ from the R~ N~.llI,skawico
~

now ~ u .. musftlm ship at Gdynia.

Gun deaninz on ORP a.yskowico Gun crew it work dewJa the U1&Ic 120 rm'l AA JU'l on boa"d ~ on 13 September while the: Oestroyer was n port. The ~ ~ Me to preo.oern the JU'l acodenaly betn& hd IntO /'f part of the ship whole being ~ 10WJrds ho5tJIe ~ft. Note the he/rr'w:u h.wle "p <If'OU'W:l the ,..., posrtlOl\ and the twon 40rrm Bofors I\'lOUlUlC on the ~ Both ~ and Grom ~ been built n~e's ~ at

eo....es.kle

ofWlf/lt. ld on ~ 1942 ~ WiS ~ to \M her p"IS to help de'erld the yM"d when It wu 5Ub,ected to a heavy . . 00 whole the ship was ~ lOr II relit.

S31ilors on the quarterdeck ofORP Grom ae.ty 1T'U$t~ lOr the Cl'let'I'S beneit. the re*y ~ tNt the Sibs' W:e5 betr3y the snn and ~ of their 0'0'eJiI S/tJJiUOl'l and thlit of tiler hor'neIMld

1939 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Battle of the River Plate

Before the outbre<llk of W3f, the German 'pocket battleship' AdmitoI Gm( Spee ......., lXdered to proceed to the So!.lth Amntic. Her mission as a commerce raider was to sink merclu.nt ships and draw A11~ naval units off melr asSIgned sations in other paru of the world. In this bon ~rd she was highly succeuliJl with ~nty twO Bnush and Frel"lCh lhips dispatched to seircll for her. After aklns nine merchant shiPs" she was tncked down by a Britidl 'Squadron comprblna HMS (retet. HMS A,ox MId HMNZS AchiIes under Commodore Henry HJrwood on I) December. Durina the Battle of the River Pbte that ensued. Gra(Spee's I;apQin, Hans lJ,nrdorlf. detided to concentnte his ship's fire on the ~ttr. which. after suffering heavy cbm3r. was forced to brw,k off and retire to the Falkbnds. R.ather ltw1 pursue the ~w or continue to ~ the twO omer Crulsen. the Gtof Spee made fOf' the neutnl U ~ port of Montevideo in the mouth of the River f'bte to effect repairs. In<lecisive and incruslogty irl fur of a British ~rcn.ft arrier and other nu.y units reporu<Ily in the offlfll, on 17 December" Unpdorlf ~iled Gm( Spee ll"lto irlteml.tionlIl waters. took off the crew, and blew up the $hip. The following eotening in Montevideo !'Ie shot hifmltlf. T'hi$ epCsode - welcomed in Brmin as perleed)' in keeping with me Royal N~s tnodltioN.l succ~s in the south Athnlic ~nn Gennan n.iden w.lS an early example of the influence dut mislnf~tion and perceiYed British fi&htine superiority could have on otherwise weJ.pbnned. successful Gennan naval opentions.

The end of the Admlrol

GrofS,...
View from Achilles A photograph of p<X:I( quallt)l but much hiruri:: 1Ilteren. taken by a Royal Mannes sergt'ant on board i\d1illes.. It

The Gro( Spee bumn& after belna KVttIed In

the ~" miles off Montevdeo. The waler was

shows. 'Ajax linng I'\er foremost tvrrets at 07-40 as Gro( Spee was on a beanng of approx. Green 35 degrees.1yox IS malong n.gh speed, and IS approxuna~ f:IX) yards 1lWay.'
Note the anl/sphnta- protecoon In the foreground

~ " fithoms deep, ind so as the $hop ~ on the bottom much of the wreck rernamed alx:r.ie the sunKe

1939
HMNZS Achillts ~nives ~t Buenos Aires 5aIled Il'ItO Bueno5 Ans after the battle. and was ~ a ereat recepuon by the cl"OWd5 0<'1 the quays>de Note the: ftars b-n at n,H" mast - four of her ~ ~ been kJl,ed In Montevideo oIf-dvty men &om the 80WI 5/'Iop5 ~ ended up ~ WIth men &om the: 5WtIled

Gmf....

HMS E.re~r ~t Port Stanley Ths photoaraph :shoN5 the dIl'N&e !iU5laII'led by ERlB. u..:en wtWe 5he wu ... Ide p"c temporar'y repan ., Fbrt Stney., the ~ blind5..1n the ir5I: ten I'I'WIUIeS of the biltue both her forward ~ were hi; and puI out of
iCtIOI'l. w!'We splrItet"5
~ 0<'1

kiIed wounded most the the bndge.1n 4 0Jer 50rty men were bIIed and t20wounded - OJeraquarteroftheshp'sO"eW.

or

or

The captall'l thl!n conned the 5hop &om aft. the one ~ tuTet, also aft. cOl'lbl"lued '" ae:tJOO'\ controled by an officer 5tdn& 0<'1 the roof ~ IOW\ICtIOfl$ to the ~ crew lrl5Ide,

""*'

32

.'.

(left) Churchill addresses the crew on Extler Exerer was wekomed bade. to Bl'nam by the First Lord of the AdmU"3lty, WlIlSton OlurchJlL He ,omed her III the Harnoaxe before docIcing. and later add-essed the assembled ~lIP'~ company on the qw.n.erded:. Note haw the wartllTle censor has indicated that the battlea1.Jiser Repulse. tied up alongside io the badquourld. be removed from the photograph before publicatIOn

""""JJ

(above) HMS &e!er returns home Devonport dockyard ~ crowd every vantage potnt along the qvayside, as well as on harbour craft. as Ueltr arrives bad: home on 15 FebnJary 1940. Devonport was &e1er'S home port She had been built there a decade previous/)t and would roN go into dock to repair the extef1~ damage suffered in the Battle of the River Plate. as well 35 to re<:eive modi!ica1.lOOS to her armament. Note. compared to the photograph opposrte. how the dreadful damage done 10 her fOl'W'ard gun lum'rt.S has been repaired. albert temporarily.The CfC1W'S nest on the foremast has also been ~ but the splinter damage to the front of the bndge has SImply been painted over; while that on the bndge WIngs and funnels has been left. presumably so as to still g....e the ship an appropnate 'battle

L 1

..,

(above).HMS Kmf Geotre v The youngest members or the crew of the new Royal Na--y battleshIp I<Irlg Geotge V, all aged SIXteen. are perched
on
iU1 eno<Tl'lOU5

anchor chaIn while receMr1g instructioo

from iU1 'old Iw1d' pen)' offocer, likely a veteran ofWorid War One, Boys, could enter the service at fifteen.

(right) The rum issue on HMS Rodney The custom of ISSUII'lg a ratIOn of IUT1 to !ii.lIon; In the Royal Navy dates bid: to the century, Here. men crowd roo.nd the IUT1 barrel for the noorJ-tJI'ne ISSUe Ivl egtnh of a pint of ~ IUT1 was doled out to each ratng. to be d,luted WIth two pu water: petty offic~

.eeoth

aIowed to O'ri: thews

~t.

(opposite) HHS Rodnq Royal /"Iirroes II"l u- vnar1 ISIlforrns are lined up b mptOJOn after DMsoons on boar'd the battIeshp ~_

1940

The struggle for Norway

In a European maritime war. Norway is st",cegically 1000ilced with access to the Atlantic and in the early months of the war it was iI conduit through which iron ore could be transported to fuel the German war efforL In April 194() the Germans launched Operation Weseru/HJng - the sea. land ilnd air invasion of

Noovay - with the intention of capturing key Norwegian porn ilnd ore fields under the auspices of an armed protection of Norway's neutrality. Opposing them were partially mobili~ed Norwegian land and naval forces along with British and French troops, transported to Norway by ships of the Royal Navy. So began the first clash between Allied and German combined force$.

The v"lage of Bjet1<:vlk. at the head of Her)3ngen F,ord. oppostte NaNlk, bumtng after naval gun bombardment 'n support of the Allied landing. whl(h took place here In the earty hours of 9 May 1940. The appatl!<lt bnghtness of the flames indicates that the photograph was taken at a WIde aper1ure, corrmensurate wrt.h the low light levels of early mornmg. The landing. by French troops wpported by the 8ntJsh battlesh,p ResoIulJO(!. the Cf\llsers Etfinghom and Vlrdo::twe and etght destroyer5. re!oUlted in Allied troops reach.ng Romba\<$ Fp11 and eventually capturing Narvik. Vv'hile the operation wa!O taking place Hitler" wa!O I~unc;t-.ong hrs 81,tzI<neg in the west, and Ownber1ain's goyerrvnent wa!O falling: wnh~ a fortmght the dec~ w~s w.en to WIthdraw from Nooway. (The previous month. during the Se<:ond Battle of NafVlk. ~ the ovI.<ome of the N~1<lI1 <ampd,&" wa!O mud1 rTlOIl!! ,n the balanc::e, ~ Swordfish fIoatplane G1tapulted from HMS Worsp.te had bombed and sunk U-64 111 th,s IocatJon.)

l6

1940
British ships at Harstad All AA gLjI) manned by troops from Exeter. Devon. Ir'l a makestuft emplacement. covenog sh,pp,ng out ,n the fjord at Harstad. 14 May 1940

British arrival in Norway

A de<:epwely peaceful
VIeW of the town and harbour of Harnad. 14 May 1940. H~. the warship out in the harbour is not a unit of the Norwegian Navy. but the BnlJsh crVlsel" Effmghom. covenng the landIng of part of the NorweglClfl ExpedIbQnary Force to reuJ.:e the port

of NarVlk.

Her hull WiI~ npped open 'like a giant tin opener according to one of Ilet- offic~ CilSualtJe'i woere nil. but the ship Wa:i. declared a total lois and had to be ~nk by the British to prevent capture by the Gennans. Note the Bren

HMS Effinghom Two views of HM5 Effinghcm at anchor tn a Norweglan fJord on 16 May 1940, two days before she hit a rock at O".'el" 22 knotli while tran~ng British troops to Bodo.

gun earners stowed on the Crulser'S upper de<::k - most of the army eqUipment was lost WIth the $l"1lP. Atthough Effnghom was fifteen years old. she had beerl completely modernized only a few years pre'v"OUsIy to bnng her Into lil'l!': WIth ttw! nI!We" Crul~ Coming Into set'Vlce She pla)'ed a very actIVe part In the Norwegian campa'gn, and would doub~s have been eql.lally tmy for the rest of the war had IT. root been fO<' tillS acc1del'lt

(opposite) The torpedoing of HMS f$kimo Dunng the Se<:.ond Battle of Narvik. the 'Tribal' class destroyer E.5kimo had her bow blown off by a torpedo. She hmped back to Skeff,ord in the Lofoten Islands for temporary repaIrs. Surviving aenal bomb attaelG. she was finally made ready for ~a on 27 May 194Q arod made It back. to Vd:ers-Armstrong Yard ,n Bam::lw on northern England on " June for a rebuIld.

38

1940 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BriO$h $hlp$ belnC bombed. Norway BnW1 emerged from the NOl'weg.an camp.1lgn taet.ally Vlctonous 01'\ the surf.c:e. theor ""*'erabolrty to detel'l1'W'led ~ attack I\id been exposed. German landbased . , power the RayaI Navy a I'1Jde shock. s/loNmg the BntISh th.n tne-" ~n mox wa5 I'lQt as effe<tNe as hoped. 4.7JI'lC'" V"S WIth a rn.txm..m eleva.oon of -40 degrees were krIown to possess orly a Im<ted capaoty aa.ln5t t~.,w;I none .1 ~I ~ ~..oomt:wliJu 87 $tiJfas. But thl! Bnmh Iud opeaed
Wh,~ the

e-

tneorb.rhi.~2pdr~-todo

II'ISlIffioent r.-oee ind there were never enough of them More 2<nvn Oeriikon MOmOI AA guns were fined on
were 0'0ppec:I there were no hits. The shop on the centre of me pICtiR: Ii HMS V#lCloc:the. once,) srster~ of ~nr-om but by u.s tme seJWlI as .. n:par shop.
~ ~ ..Iter NQN.<l~ 0r1 this OCY$lOl'l ~ eoght borrbs

betterThese (OlJd . . . . . ~

taets but tud

j:

--

(abcM!) Dunkir1t on fire ..her GemIilll bomlw'dment ThI!; -.1OOIO:JrC $OU\h-'#lIe$l shows the rroer I\irtQ.r on the ..ftemoon of 31 ~ The!ie. filriy open ea of ~ to the ngtrt " the Q.Al Fekx F~. m:m wt'lere rnxh of the frW. desperilte mges of the AILed evacuallOn were to take p.ce oYer the ~ 10 come. wtule the flJTlOUS bead'le$ at M~Ies-Ball1, La Paone ilnd Bray he
to the east ~llnd the photogr<LPhef: The photograph was taken by F/Sgl Lloyd Bennett finm lod:tleed Hudson N nJO. pilrt 220 GR (Gener"ilJ Recommsance) Squadron l\own by P/O Pedersen ~ opet'abog 61:lm RAF 8on:tIatn Newton .... NorfoI<. on 'Sds Piitrol' cO\IeI'I"II the evacuation of the BEF (BntM Expeditx;Jny Force) i'om Belzu"n olIld France The foIowIng d.1y they hMl to retu'Tl to ~ Newton on ~ their port etIple ..ll:er Iowlg the 5lafbod one: to ~ tom .. ~ Henkel.. TIIIoO dar' IN:r the same Nippened ilgilII'l. this tme d.oe to M f t oflTexe. but ilp'Ilhey got home.

or

(baow) HMS ~ oK Dunkirtr. The destro)oer.JewefII'l poctJ.nd off Dl.ri<n on )() ~ I ~ with the port tuTwlg In the bKkground Pnor to the onset of the BlItdcnq III weste'n Etrope.Jewefll'l No:! been IfIYOIo.oed .... cOl'l\Of escort. but she then pned the Fim Destro)e" AotilL1. engagecIlIl cabIe<unong operat>ons off the Netherlands. On 27 May. together with he!'" SISler-shop )aguor olIld ilJ'IOther destn:Jyer.~. she JOined the evacuatIOn operatIOns., picking up SUf"Vivon from SS AbukK

ld

reaJIIlg

some

.400 ~ &1:lm Iny beKh. On

ilJ'IOtrIe' half dozen

been sur*. ilnd Jar.Ia ~ il!TIOI'lg

~MninI

29 ~ with <nnadI one of ttne ~ ~

FWnsily W;lS on:Iered to wMchw .._ the modem IIeet de'l~ &1:lm the evacuatJOn A tOlJito declSlOt\ II ~ Riimsily of tus ben stupl. but 1\ ~
them for future opet'atoons, ~ their viilue W;lS to be pr'OIIed agam and agaIn. Of the e.gt1t ships of the Tc~ javeIon was one of only two to survive the war

40

1940 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Chaos at Dunkirk and deliverance in Dover

:It Dover, ~mspte ~nd the other portS in south-east England as dcstrOyel"5. passenler $hips .. oct other venels rewmed loaded wIth troops from the Dunkirk evacunion between 26 M",y and -4 June 19,"" Of the 338.000 men rescued, over 100,000 were brought back by the Royal Navy's destroyers. The retrieval of ten times the initial estimate of men during OpentiQn

Thue were repeilted Sl;ene'5 like d1ese

Adminlty Pier, Dover Troops crvwd the ~ PIer al Dover after d~barbng from the dest.ro)'ers that /\ad brought them bk from o....l<ri:. All nfles were collected before they ~ traInS at Ckwer I"\aIYle ra'.......y SUlo()l"l. Today the SIte V10wn on thls photognph IS a lemlon.Jl for

Dynamo

w.l$

deemed

ill

mlncle by those in power desperate to put

ill

bnve face

on a diusU"ously untenable position on the continent.A victory in no sense other than a well-brought-off slnote&lC withdr.lW3l. this point prob;Jbly rmrked the nadir of British power on the ,ontinent until 1944.

~-

Disembarking from the deSll'Oyers IrI this photograph. feu- ~ are !ned up 6brelst
~ansl:

the

to albN the troops to prl KCess

""..."1"",,

HMS CodrinttOfl Troops ~ to ~ ~ IJo.oer from the

"ow the ship 15 ~ to por1l:S tile men crcmd to one side .-- the ~ be)Qnd the ~ feTy and saoiIng ~ 15 Do.er- ~.l.W'der ....tIcI\, -uwl the NapoIeonoc-era. tJ.n"oeIs. ~ ~ ~ the evKul!:0()t\ CodTgtDn _ bombed 'od
destroyeo-~on Note

Sl.ric

tl

the

lying on the beach 1Il111 tt _

two months later: the ~ ~ broken up tl 1947

1940

Dunkirk. 4 June 1940

In striking c:ontrut. these views show the su front at Dunkirk immedllltely after the completion of the British evacuation urlier In the day. They were t:lken by He~nn Weper. a trOOp con'ltl'llnder, WIreless operator and olfll;~1 photog:~ with Motorotsunm 13.MS2 (S2nd bitulion. 13th Mobile Assault Unit). 0dM:r'5 he took at about the same time $how F~ prnonen already employed in shiftina abandoned equIpment. being lnterropted. or bell" rTIlln::hed off Into aptmty. I.lI well as nuotly more of the YICtOnOUS Wehnnocht. later he photographed occupied Paris, and RUSSWl front during 1941 MId the winter of 19041-2.

me

Arrinl of German troopS The br1Wr1t weather fJSl serves to ne.gnten the II( d

-~

utter ~ as GerTnan soldiers of ~ ) stand <lI"OU'V:l n me ~ next to ~ and ~ star>g out to o;e.l zt the ~ of ~ of the AIled 5hps that fMed to ~. TJ1en!, oS iItUe CltMol6 elwo1 at \IOctOry ,( ry'ttw'Ig ~ looks

n-

Stn.nMd French submarine chner '3 soldiers exafTlIfIe the beached French 5l.Jbmanle cha5er CH-9 at low tide zt Dlnor1<. The shop had been cOfl"4)leted only I few months prevoousty. and had been beached aftO'" being bombed on 21 May. The ~ that led to tt'rs stranding l$ dearly VISible l'Ia/fway aJona the port side. In the foregrou"ld a Bntrsh l.JrwersaI carner and a bicycle he abandoned. half boned III the OIl-streaked satId.

,
'

..

,
~ ."

"

Wreck of;a French destrOyer Cyclists attached to Mocorensll."1Yl /3 rest on the ~ at DunkIl1<. Other lrOOp$ W:e advantage of the ic.v tide to W1Yestrgate the wreck of the French destro)'ef lM'ott whICh had been struck by a sttek of three bombs (rom a Hetnkel. wInch came t:Ner at tOO-metre altitude just befOl"e modnoght on 21 MayTwo of the bombs Iarlded alongside. but the third penetr<lted between the first two funnels. The $hip was beached at M.alo Ies &lOS and the C1'eW evaaJilled, but a senous fire started on a fuel bunker and touched off the forward rruguines ott 5 ;un. the f'oIIowm& rnornIlg. More wred:ed ~ C6Il be seen further out

"'~
Makeshifr pier
Although not part of the same ~ this phot~ !5hoIoY5 arlOthl!r 5Cene ~ wotAd ~ me1 the ~ troops. In an effort to faoktate the evacuabOl\ the Bntl$h cremd two iW"tIioaJ ~ ~ nto the ~ by p.v1ang ther Iomes down l..i Parne beWl at low tide Under sporadoc shellrlg. these ~ topped W'lh dec""& lashed tlghtly ~ the ~ W~ to pnJY1l:le .. footway. and from them smiIl boats -..e bided 'N'th men beb'e roNII'lll bn out to the larJer ~

43

1940

The fate of the French fleets

At Alexandria, a mixture of diplomacy. de\/iousness. and the implicit threat of force - no doubt helped by the good relations reSulting from the British and French fleets sharing the same harbour and operating as one on a regular basis until jun days previously - resulted in the peaceful demili~rization of the French warships then:. But at Men el-Kebir in french North Africa things did not work out nearly so well. On a blisteringly hot summer's day an appalling catalogue of missed chances. mistakes. misunderstandings. poor (or non-exinenl) communic;auons,
stubbornness. and simple bad luck eventually resulted in the ships of Admiral Sir

James Somerville's just-created Force H opening fire on Britain's erstwhile ally. with tragi<: cOflsequem::es. Gunfire. bombs and torpedoes left the 8relogne blown up and sunk and the flagship Dunkl!rque and the Provence run aground. seriously damaged. For the Nazis it was a stunning and completely unexpetted propaganda coupthe greatest act of scoundrelism in world history' as one newspaper put itwhich they quite understandably exploited to the full. Recruitment to d@ Gaull@'s Free French fon::es was dealt a severe blow. Reaction within Fran<:e itself was one of horror and outrage. although. as time passed under Nazi domination. attitudes bame more mixed. In the Royal Navy. and in particular among the officers and men of Force H. there was utter dismay. although those who expressed this were firmly pUt in their place. Churthill gOt what he wanted - if he couldn't have the French fleet continuing to fight alongside the British. or at least out of enemy hands. then he needed the mon dramatic demonstration possible to the rest of the world. and to the USA in particular. that Britain was determined to fight on. In tnIth. with the exception of Captain Collinet of the Slrosbourg and his comrades who extracted their ships from the maelstrom with such skill. none of the major players in the delnete tame out of it particularly well.As a result of their actions, 1.297 French sailors lost their lives.

French sailors under fire A scene on one of the Frerl(h "'arshps at Mer> elKeblr. Sailors stand. apparent!)' stunned and bern<Jsed. on the smokefilled deck while the Bnush Mediterranean Reefs shells land in the harbour and among the French targets..

Mers el-Kebir. 3 July 194() The French fleet, awrungs spread. at their moonngs at Mer> el-Keblr near Ora... bef~ the bombardment by Force H OIl 3 July 1940. From left to right are Cornmondonl Tes/e. Bn!lagne. SIJ'OSbowg. Prwence. and Dunker"Ql.lf!. O!her ships were anc:hored out of shot, to the right. Note the smoke rising from the funnel of the Dunkerque. The photogldph may ~ been taken from one of the reconnaissance aln:ri!ft sent up from Force H to keep an eye OIl the French ships whrle negotia1.JOl1S were underway. an aCbOll whiCh unfortunately 1\lSt helped to increase French Indignation.

Slrosbourg escapes The Soosbowg getllng ur'>derw.l.y as Brrtrsh shells fall be)")l"ld the bre.l.k'w.l.terTo the left. Provence. whiCh did I'IOt escape. tIM her forward main t~ trained to return the Bnush fire. Srrosboutg made It to W VIChy-held port ofToulon-

Ope~oon uapulr, Pornmooth Operiltoon Cauputt. to ~ the Freod

bep'l

~e.Il:IIy erooo.ch As the b~. F~ ~ .., the Botlih ports d Porurnoum and f'I)'moutl'> ~ boarded

e-'l
La

La Rore.lrl u.s phol:OVIJlh ~ MeIpr;ir'Mne. the frerw:h tntolore IS st,. Ily.-rc; l:a.:l no fT'C>"T"Oet's of t/'Ie frerw:h ~ Me visible. ~ thn. pnotovaPh was .cwaIy taken on 3 Jury Both ...esseII were returned to ffaoce'" I'H5.
~ and

3 /lilt At Portsmoutr> ~ r'rlded the torpedo boats

french contre-torpilJeurs it Porumouth

Other shtps 5eIzed it Portsmouth ird.ded the conve~ Llopord. the colcnil sloop ~ de Bi=a, MId i ......-ber d 5INII ~ d the CH.5 iIld CH" I disses.

45

A convoy at sea Often proven ~nce the seventeenth century to be the best way of protecting I'Tlef'Chatlt sh'ppong. cO!'f'lO')'S were qulCldy rentroduced "4lO" the outbreak of war, but Ihei-

were able to use F~

OV\nuITIbered escorts found It dlflicult. to protect thell" d'Iarges. espooaIly after the U boal$ bases. ThIs cOl'M:l'f is lin the process of executing a tum, probably on exercise as pracuce for YAlen It might be reqored lin response to U-boat attack.

Another British merchant ship is sunk The fldt,o Oemps'let' lJIe's Apapa. on M. her back broken. 'd steMn 1'1WI&"; c~ ~ CO'lUCt Wltn her boo~ sris n tne AtlintJc, November 1940.

witler

46

1940
A Briti1h escort vessel ~t Se.I

It wW\"llust C".emwl U~ts, Slrlace ~ and Ion&-range uuaft that merchant ~ ld ovtno.ombefed e5Ulf1 ~ and ther ~ had to cope WIth The Atlantoe oce.u> W~ <It le~ ~ ~ foe.

... I

1940

Shipbuilding on the River Clyde All RAF aenal photograph taken on II July 1940. fohowing the filtTlOUS John Brown Yard at Clydebank. DunbartQflv,,~, viewed from the KlUth east The yard ,s a bustle of activJ\y. clearly illustratmg how the 6ntJsh shlpbulld,ng ,nd\JStry rose to meet the demands of the wartime Royal Navy. In the firong-out bas"n can be seen the maSSIVe form of the re<ently launched battlesh,p Duke arrat*. her

superstructUrl! just startmg to take ~, Next to her are two destroyef"S. probably Nensso (shortly to become the f'oi'91 PIotJrun) and Nizom. and the depot shIp Hedo. Other vessels of various types are under conSV\lCtlOn on the building sl,ps to either !.Ide. including the aircraft CarOefInde(CIlJg<Jbk!. To the bottom right a tramp steamer and coa~ters he alongside the quays of the coovnen:ial

-"""

(opposite) US destroyers arrive in Britain The first of the exUS flush-deckers after amval at a BI1tlsh port. The censor has blocked out the hull number of the ship ,n the foreground. Note the CIGrTlpeO and clun~ layout of the shIps. and that her starooaro !.>de propeller gvard has been ~

Desrroyen for bases In exchan8@ for the 8ntJsh naval bases at Newfo..ndland (not th@n part of Canada) and throughout the Caribbean. ~fty old 1918VIl1tage WICkes and CSern$on dass flush-<leck.ed American destroyers W'ef'e supphed to the Ro)r.II Navy to help ease the grtl'Mn& strain

upon Bnt,sh cO<l\lO)' escort

n:s<>urces. These
an!

the US

destroyer$ Tw'gg:'!i (DOl 27). PhIbp

(D076), E\oIJm (0078) and YomeR (DD 143). awartmg transfer to the
Royal N.il\IY. Yomo~ went on to serve undef- three flags - the Royal N.il\IY. the Royal Norwegian N.il\IY. and the SoYJet NilV)'_

48

1940

-~-----------------

49

1940------------------

Operation See/owe (Sealion): the invasion that never was

Prep<l~tion$

ThIS senes of photograph$. believed to have never been published before. were taken dunng September and October of 1940 by Volkmar KC\rug. then a nll'leteefl-}'eM-ok! F~ (modVlIpman) in the Knegsmatlne, who had just firushed his training near KleI.l.Jk:~ others In his class he had then found hlm5elf placed In nominal command of the cMhan CTe'NS of assorted Inland and coa~ craft - In KOn'g's case a barge and two fishing vessels - wht<;h proc:eeded to make their way from Germany by rivers and canals across northern Europe as far as Dunkirl<. From then!: they ~[Ied along the coast to the ports of the Pas-deCaIM. to prepare for the inv.uion of southeast England. Komg had the misfortune to injun! ms ankle landing on a coil of rope while Jumping aboard ~ of his fishing vessels. and so was tr.lnsferred to the staff ashore at BouIogr.e.There his duties consisted p<imarity of keeping a re<:Ofd of the numbef's of d;1'ferent vessels ,n the harbour Some 20C1J barges. tugs. fishing vessels. femes. motor boilts and other craft. together WTlh a small number of ~l,)lized as.sault craft. were gather'ed together in the harbours. from where they sailed to praetrse Iand.ngs on the r.earby coast of occupied France.~ largest concentrat>on was al Boulogne; other ports ~ Wl!11! Calais. DunI:1l1o:,le H~, ~, Ron~ and Ostffid While the ba~ were In harbour the soldJen ~ happy to lounge around on deck (mage 4). ~ many of them got :lUnbuml whole al sea on exe<1:'5eS they tended to get sea-sick even Ifl the calmest condItIOnS. The preparatIOnS rOt' the ,rovasion were rvshe<:I. with 'o1::ry few spe<ialired mault craft available. and the (0l'M:l"'$i0n of exJStlng vessels was to a large degree extemponzed. Parts of the barges' bows were (ut olf to enable embarkatIOn and disembarkatIOn, wooden planks being installed to prevent them lloochng wrth water (images 1-3). Image 5 shows a tug toWIng two barges. one motorized. one unmotorized. towards an 'ilYasion beach' 50Uth of BouIogne.When they amved olf the beac:h the two motorized vessels S'NUng olf to enher SIde and (ontJnved to the beath on the<r """"" me.mwh,1e two other. vnaller. motonzed (l'1l.ft such as (lSh,ng boalS would (ome alongs.de the urmotorized

so

1940
b.ge m prop8ll bwW to the bNch. ~ the me.lntn>e. would n- ~ l'rom the tug IntO

stoml trooper'>

specqI high-speed rrootortloW; (propelled U5IOlI ., 0U!b0d motor W'th the propeller on the end of '" Iare shaft and steered by sn'PY tl.WTWl8 Ihts entn ~ ) to ~ the irn ~ on the ~ (..,..e 6). ~ the ~ of the dlsembbtJOn ~ p1K~ I.l5lrli t3fTll'S ~ ~ the open b<::rNs of the birge5. a slow and rnl)$! preunous oper1ItlOO e-oeo cbrog exeroses. h>ages 7-10 !ihow tl"6, complete wrt/'I the tneky ~ of~ a gu"I cama&e KllnIa ~ that though the troops rolled ~ ther tn:ll/SeI"'l., the sea came CNer the tops of ther boots. $0 they stII got ~ cold and wet. All thts KOnl& captUred on his lela camer.l. ~ at the trne, Ioolong at how pntT\M'e it all was. he shared the mlsgMngS of many of 1'11$ fellow ollicers about the feas'bollty of the plan. Years after. espe<wly tompanng It to the AJIIl!' preparabOnS to If'Wade Normandy four ~ later. he c()lJ\(Wl't help boJt wondel'" If I\Ml ever reaJy planoed to lIlVild@ Brnam at aI.

H'*"

..

5 1

-------------------------------------------

--~

Th@ ~avily

Death of an Italian destroyer damaged ltalaan destrnyer ArtIgI.ere lies drsabled undef" the gun5 of the Royal Navy5 ainch gunned (f1Jiser Yori; following the night action between an Italian torpedoboat fOl"Ce and the BntiVl 6-inch light cru;ser fJx off Cape Passero (aboYe).The BntiVl CruISer fini~ her off WIth a 2 I-inch torpedo (nght).

52

1940----------------The British MediternllNn FI~t at Se~ In the early montr\S of war between Italy Id ElntarrI.
battle IIeeu wen! keen to br'na .oovt l Roy;iI Navy '" ~ WOl1<ed Nrd to ~ il barue. of:.en inng on tuliM'I c~ rort.ialoOl'lS tel t-es ....-rth the ~ not oriy of IIlIloctJna ~ but ~ of <hwIng out the ~ b.liwe!leet. Here.'-"1IU of the ~., Aeet ~ on me.- w.y to bon'trd Fen Capuzzo M1d BOi. 22 October 1940.
both
~.

engagement; the

force H from HMS ~ Shops of Force H (pn::babIy 8e<wd:. 8arfloTl M1d~) dlnlg OJ. sweep ttv'ou&'" the ~ on No.oerrber' 1910. ~ ~ the 21-tnd'l torpeOo bbes of the cn.oloeI" SMffrit as a ~ of the crul5e....s a-Ioob on.

53

,
1940

The British attack on Taranto

While the lealian fleet emerged from port quitl! frequently in the early months of the Mediterranean war. seeking a decisive victory. it suffered from over-restrictive control by the Supermorino command ashore. and from poor co-ordination with the Regia Aeronoutico. The frequent result was that the Italians at sea rarely knew exactly where the British battle Reet was, or how it was composed. British admirals were keen to get to grips with the Italian battle fleet, and therein lay a problem for the British - how to inflict some decisive dall'lilge on their opponents and remove the threat from an Italian f1eet-in-being.Air power provided the solution. Despite being outnumbered three to one in che Medittrr.lnean, the balance of power was swung towards the British in November 19-40 when torpedo-armed Swordfish biplanes launched from the recently ilrTived lIIU1trious flew at wave-top height into heavily-defended Taranto harbour and knocked OUt three Italian battleships, the Conte di Cavour, Littorio and Coio Duilio at anchor. The attatk. delivered at night, showed precisely how air power had begun to eclipse the big gun, This was British naval air power in full flow: integrated with the battle fleet (instead of separate, as in the later incarnations of Ameritan and Jap;lOese doctrines), aircl"llft could reath OUt and take the battle to a reluctant or fleeing enemy. This methodology would later be repeated in the action to sink the Bismarck and at Matapan. The immediate effect of the attack was the withdrawal of the Italian fleet to Naples. giving the British greater freedom and even allowing two battleships to be released to other campaigns.Thousands of miles ;rway, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto took a keen interest in the lesson the Fleet Air Arm had taught the Italians. Original war plans - for a Japanese fleet to drive south to Taiwan to meet US naval intervention expected from the direction of Pearl Harbor - were comuntly evolving during 19-40-41 but the action atTaranto played iu part in informing Japanese intentions of knocking out the Pacific Fleet at base rather than at sea. While British and Allied morale received a huge boost, Muuolini becvne even more ClUtiOUS about committing his ships to battle - and already a lack of fuel was beginning to have a limiting effect on Italian naval operations.

Conti di Cavour in Taranto harbour The most heavily o:langed of the ltalran battlesh,ps. the Come di CaIoor. lies settled on the harbour bonom

Conti di Cavour is raised

was ra,sed the followmg year, but she was never put bad: ,nto 5I!l'VlCe. Capture<:! by the Germans after Italy's a.rrrustKe, she 'Was 5Unk for a second time by AJ~ bombers at Tneste 10 February 1945. and the wreck was broken up after the war ThIS ",ew shovvs her ,n Roallng dry dodc in ! 94 I. WIth her maIO armament ~.
The

c:a..wr

54

1940 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Colo Dl.Iilio and Litlorio The other two battlWlIps, Ct3IO Duho (left) and uttlloo (below left) were less badly damaged. but were still out of acbOrl for SOfYle time. Pnme caprtal VlIps had been battened into submission by a small N.Jmber of archaIC: and ~ biplane alluafl

The Battle off Cape Spartivento

The same month as Taranto. the llmlts of acttons based

around slow battle$l'lIp forces were I'lIghhghted as Bntrsh .1I'ld Italian fleets met off Cape Spartrvento. south of Sardinia. Of the Bntish heavy unItS. only !he Reno-Ml. a battlecruiser. was able to reach a favourable position to attack the speedier Italian battlesrups. But once again. the ttahans turned ~y and as 1940 gave way to 19'\ I the Royal Navy n=ga,ne(l temporary command of the Mediterrar.ean. ThIS photograph shows the (]''1,11~ Tfl('${t'. BoIzono and Polo making headway ago1lnst a steep sea on N~be'" 1940. HavIng escaped damage on 'Taranto Nlght'they fought a high-speed running battll! WIth Bnush

cruisers off Cape SpartJvento.

1941

th.u spnng, R~-elt .lIuthonzed the tr.Ulsferr.d of.ll quuter of the US Ilxlfic Flet"t to the AWlltlc .lIS his 1l.ll1l0n moved from neutralJ(y through th(: non-~Ulge~ncy of 1940 lOW,lr~ ~'t'ntu.;;d co-bdlige~ncy. c.llreful to pbce th(: onus of the outb~.lIk of h<XtIhties on Gernuny. !Is (:.lIrly as CKlOher 1939, Grand Aduural Erich R.lIeder. Comnunder-lIl-Chief of the Kri~'IIfJn"t, rn.d pmsed for unhllllted subnurine wJrfaft .lIg;J.mst all tr.lde inbound to Briuin - Illdudlllg Amerinll ships - but Hitler had demurred, aware that a knockout blow against the US could nOt be delivered ~fore Americ.lln naval power joined the British. At the end of March, Roosevelt had ordered that all Italian and German shipping in American harbours be seized, and US Navy participation in the area~ south of Iceland and Greenland - both islands having been occupied by American forces. relieving earlier Bmish garrisons - w:as stepped up, to the chagrin of Raeder. At first the con\'Oys outward-bound from Britain had been given Ropl Navy escorts to about 150 We5t longitude. This was then extended by another 10 westward. and ext(:nded ag:un until by the middle of the year con\'O)"5 were shepherded right :lcrms the ocean by reb)'s of C$Corts oper.lUng from Britain, Iceland :lnd Newfoundland. This extension of the policy of con\'O)' escon ~mtched the RO)'31 Navy C\-en more thlllly, and Im:reasingly invoked the un"di:ln N:I\')', which had to be U'.lIlIled .lit the RO)"'.lIl Navy's working-up biISCS. Thus Canadian corvettes ~Jme incre-asingly \'3lu:lble to British lOn\'O)' planners. In the bte ~pring of 1941, Canada took O\-er the dUl)' of cOIl\'O),ng merch.llnmlen C;bt OUt of C\\foundbnd to the MidO,call Meeting Point south of Ice\a.nd. whereupon the RO)'31 Navy would mume responsibility for the escOrt. Forming the Ne.....f oundbnd E!.Cort Force with their slO\\' cor"'ettes, the C.an.adi.a1lS we~ Jomed by ~\\ lfier American destl'oyers in the western Acla.mic. They Jgreed to dwide slow alld fast convo,),s between them accordingly. Hard to Ill:anocuvre round waiting wolf-packs, slow COIl\'O)"5 and thelT nuxedexperience Can:adi:an escorts we~ particularly vulnerable to concerted rnght :mack!>, In M:arch, tho: U-bo:at arlll had suffered its first bad month. Three of the leadlllg U-boat act:S - Sho:pke, Kretschmer and Prien - were sunk by Ufllish escorts, But the success of the Allies' strategy of Adamic convOYlllg was measured 1I0t by battles won or U-boats sunk, but by the ~fe :arrival of merchant vessels at their destinations. In the first four 1ll011th~ of 1941. ne:arly twO million roIlS of shipping had been lost, eXJccrhau:d by a lack of air cO\'er and sufficiem numbers of tramed C'Kort~ d~plte the introduction of n~ver types such as the bigger, more ca.pable 'Castle' class corvettes. Shipprds in Gernuny, Fr.mce and the Low COllntrit'$ were assembling U-bo.llts at .lin mCTeasmg r;lle. Wolf-pack tacti" were ~oming hener understood by the Allies but they ha.d no breathin~ ~pace to implemo:-m .lI counter-offensi\'e. By nud-1941, the British and Allied merchJm nurllle .lind Its crews were steadily being bled whIte in the Atla.ntic durlllg whJt the U-OO.llt cmH would come to nlltheir'HappyTime' ,The :l\'Olwnce ofloolllmg dcfeJt m the l)JUle of the Atlamic became the most cntlc.;;d priority of the British n.llVY .lind merchant marinc_

were detect:lble by High-Frequency Direction-Finding (HFI DF) equipment which could prm-;de approxinute tria.ngula.tion fixes to build up .lI plot of U-boat positions .across the Atlantic. It MC:lme possible to 6tlight HF/DF s}~tenu aboard escort vessels for tactial use, helping to locate \\'Olf-packs as soon as they signalled an atuck 011 a coo\'oy. The policy of using signals intelligence to steer COI1\'O')'5 a\\'3Y &om conuct with U-bbats was :lCtuall)' \"ery successful, particularly so when the convoys were fast-moving troop cOllvoys .lind high-speed tran.s:n!antlc passenger Imers such :IS the Quun .\fary .lind QUl'm Eli.zalKrh, whose cruising speed W.llS .liS high as 27 knots and troop C.lIp;lClty a staggermg 16,000 men. But sigll3ls II1tdJigence could play only J. slllJ.ll p:art. To aid defence, merchant ships were fitted with more AA guns .lind in some C;lSI."S catapults to bunch single-shot modified Hawker HurriC;lnes for :lntireconnai5SJnce ;Iir defence, These C.lItapult-Armed Merch;lntmen (CAM ships) we~ quite successful. though laul1chll1g .lI1l ;Iircraft destined to be: ditched \\';15 de;lrly a desperate measure designed [0 prevem mo~ powerful forces descending on a coo\'oy. L.lIter the concept w~s uken funher. resulting in the Mercrn.nt Aircnft Carrier (MAC ship), usu:ally J fb.t-decked unker or cargo vessel coO\'C'ned to bunch :and teCO\'t'r J snull number of .aircraft. All these helped aIIevi..l1te the dire need for cn-riers (which in .lIny cue could hardly be sp.ued from fleet duties), ~"Cn if ~uipped only \\;th J few IO\\'-perfornunce S\\'Ordfuh. Indeed, this '\';15 the only type th.at could ha\'C' comfortably operated off such vessels. Continuous neu .all-\\'C'a.ther air cover pfC\'C'nted subnurines from oper.lting on the sllrfJCe with impunity. The Brmsh :also mtroduced the 'River' class frigate, J significant improvement on the 'Rower' WIth double the endurance, more \\'C'apons .lind 4 knots more speed. Behind the frontline, industrial c.llpacity was being expJnded by Brit:ain and CanJdJ, but particularly in the Umted States. By mid-1941. six months before the United States entered the \var .liS a full belligerent, Allied shipping losses were being outstripped by new vessels joining the available active tonnJge. British n;l\T:ll dockyards almost stopped new construction in f.wour of repair and maintenance: meanwhile, the systematic clearing of congestion and the repair of tempor.JoTily laid-up hulls in British west-COJst and Scottish ports helped reintroduce more ships. Looking .lit this war of attrition, some historiJIlS comend that Germany could only hJ\'e \\-"On the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941; having missed the chJnce to strike a decisive blow to BriulII's Achilles heel, Germ.any had no hope once the C'\-'C'nts of December 1941 CJme to pass. But while new ships might be on the $toeb. the immedia.te effects of the loss of cugoes ....';15 another nutter. Concentrating III the mid-Atlantic \\'Ould help the GernullS to maximize their forces :md increase their stranglehold on the free mO\'C'ment of es.sential supplies across the Atlantic sufficient to seriously affect Bnuin's Jbility to suy in the fight. If the British public were feeling the pinch, the sailors aboard some mcrchant vessels experienced something nOt seen since the introduction of antiscorbutics to victuals in the nllleteenth century ~ an outbreak of seUtv)'.

Allied Countermeasures

In

the V-Boat War

The Bismarck Action and Progress North Atlantic

10

the

Allicd ingenuity w:u cJlled upon and resulted in a number of new lI1eJsure~ to counter the ill1mediate U-boat and LlIftll'affi threat. GreJter qu:mtitic~ of snull seJborne rJ.dar sets were developed for me aboard cscort ~hips, making subnlJrines theoretic.lllly do:-tecuble on the surface from beyond \;sual range. EquJ.lIv import.mtly. German VHF Slb'llJls

Even without the burdcllS of the Mediterr:meJn, the constant grind of Adamic convoying, and devoting resources to the training of the eager Canadians, the spring of 1941 was a difficult period for the Royal Navy. stretched to its tolerable limits. The Bismarck chue and engagement is a case in point: Force H (Ark Royal, Sheffitld and Rt"Olvn) h;ld to come

58

1941

from Gibralw, while big con\"O)"$ :Ilhng from the CI)'de and L1\'~rpool w~re denuded ofescorts to free up hea"y shl~ such as the RoJ,1r)' to join the hum from me C'\oer~pressed Home A~t. With me German battlecruise~ Sthamhonr and CIIl'isnwU perched at Bn:st. me British lu.d plenty to won)" about In May 1941 even before tht' pride of their fleet, me fllt. pcmoerful and unmodernlzed oouJecruiser Hood. was blown up on 24 May III rhe onh Adannc by a salvo from the Bismarck. AU but three of Hooas crew of 1.419 were losr III \'Cry deep Waler. Sunk after only eight IUlllutes of action. her desrruction was a massive shock to the Ropl Navy and the British public: but II sounded the death~kndl on the first and only sortie for the bl'3nd-new IS-inch b'Unned German battleship. The British battleship Priu(t oj IHllrs - new and not yet properly ,....o rked up - had scored a 14-lIlch hit Oil the BIsmarck and as she steamed 011 1Il company with the heavy cflliseT P,i"z Eu~" she was down at the bow and leaktng fucl. Worse was that a thouund tom of oil could lJot be pumped from the bow. The psychology of confidence and the expectation of sucCt.'SS - or tht' opposite - were very Ill1portant to a fighting 5er\'ice's psyche and could mfluence opentional performance to a degree. Just mmutes after tht' BISmarck had sunk the Hood .lIIld seen off the PrincC' ojll:dt'S. Bis",arrk's Adnural Liitjens brwdast a messagco exhorting his crew to prep,ne ro go down galhntl}~ mdicatlng an underlymg conviction of mC'\'irable demise. (Sumlar sentiments were expressed. pcrh"ps more undefSUm:lably. \\ lthin the U-boot ann; poetry "nd lerten wnuen by crewmen rewal rhat C'\~ntual de"th "t the tuum of the enemy \\<IS expected and C'\'Cn 5C'ntlmenuhzed m adonnce.) Galva.mzed by the sure behef that the &marck h"d to be sunk at all COSts. th~ Royal Navy set to Its wk. employing cruiser screem JOliled by carner forces from Force H "nd the Home Reet to h"rry lhe 1eelllg BISmarck. B.m.1eships Rodllry and Ki/{l: Crorgt V finally caught up with the cnppled German battleshIp on 27 May and sank her In a hail of hea,'Y sheUfire and torpedoes. The destruction of the Bismurck had dIverted a huge amount of Royal Naval resources but the Ileutr.ahzatlon of the threat to BritISh convoys was more than adequate recompense to the Adnunlty. To the shocked German high command. it \~S anOlh{"r example of the folly or bUlldlllg prestige battleshi~ which could apparently be hamstrung by a couple of torpedoes dropped from archaic biplanes. From June 1941. only Gernun armed merchant raiden eontlJlued operanons III ~\'ery sea except the Arctic. Three weeks prior 10 the destruction of the Bismurck. a far sm"lIcrsc"le and totally unpubhcized opention h"d taken place that would help to bUIld a picture whOS(' rnolutlon would ha\oe n-en greater stntegic eo~uencn. Durmg rhe 6nt half of the )oear. the Bntlsh nude delibente efforts to capture Gernun shIps out :at sea. And on 9 May. the Dritish destroyer Buffdog had captured U- J 10 and. with It. "n Emgm" cipher machine along wllh code books. rotor ~ttlngs and supplementary documentation. With thu; key to Germ"n n"val slgn"ls. particularly the complex 'Hydn' U-003t codes. now in the h"nds of British cryptognphers at l)Ietchley Ilark. U-boat movement1 could to some degree be untll\'elled in ad\'2l1c~. Teamed with HF/DF, this combination of near real-time knowledge of German imenrions almost immediately reduced losses. and despite fmure code changes and the imroduction of more sophisticated encodmg methods and eqillplllent by the Germans later in the \\':IT. the quiet intelligence contribution to victory was significant. A further step-ehange in Allied anti-submarine defence at sea came in June with the launch ofHMS Arld,ldty, the prototype escort carrier. Built

on merchant hulls. CiCOrt carners \\-ere onguully concel\'cd as aircnfi: tr.Insports. bm rhey soon adopted more warM.e roles. mcluding mtisubmarine, <Inti-au and amphlblOU5 support functions. In the autumn. Audtrity was the first vnsd to down" Focke-Wulf Condor "t sea. mmg her US-built Grumman Manlet (Waldcat) fighten.

The Soviet Union Enters the World War

On 22 June:. having failed to act on the plan to 1Il\-"de BriUIn t\\oelve momhs before, and with the: Balkan and Greek fbnk "ecured. HItler broke the: non;aggression pact signed with Stalul In 1939 by m\,;ading the USSR. llitler calculated that by securing a qUIck Illliitary victory over the USSR. he could force an agreement on GreJt Bnum. whose hopes he saw pinned on the USSR and a Ulllled State~ which would be distracted by an unencumbered Japan. Uut by embarking on Operation Barbarossa. Hitler starred on the long road to defeat on the steppes of the Soviet himerland. By this time the Soviet Baltic Fleet. based at the Kronsudt. had grown to two battleships. two cmisers. nineteen destroye~. sixl)'-five submarines and larg.. numbcn of torpedo boats. In those confined waters. wanhlps were especially \'ulnenble to air attack and minefields. On the outbre"k of hostilities between Hitler and Su.lin. Gernun mine barnges III the centr.ll ;and eastern Baltic immediately pUt paid to a SO....iet destroyer and dam"gt"d a second along with a cruiser. Indiscriminate SQwlllg by both navies led to casualties from their own mines. E-OOats "nd U-boats added to the efforts of dedic"ted German minel"yen. and also had success against SO"let patrol boats and subm"rines. Within three weeks the Germ"n army had secured a bridgehead across the sea on Finnl~h soil and h;ad cut off Russi.lOS fighting to the norrh. The relief and evenrual evacuation of this trappc'd corps occupied the Soviet Baltic fleet umil the end of the year. during which opentions nearly eighty SO\'iet ships were dispatched by mines and Liflll'dffe bomben and many thousands or men were killed. A similar scene unfolded hundreds of miles a\\'2Y to the south-cast in the Black St'a.There. the Soviet fleet, based on the yards at Nikolayev and Se"astopol. found itself trying to relieve and eventually evacuate besieged Odessa. Dy the autumn. Sevastopol itself was IIwested: l1a\'21 gunfire and na\'21 brigades were thrown ashore in a despetllte camp<lign to dislodge the German and Romanian armies encircling the fortreSS-port. Forced 10 flee its main bases. the Black Sea Aeet had to rep"lr <lnd rearm Itself much further to the east while German aitcrafi: bomb:lrded Soviet ~hl~ unable to escape the inferno at St-\OIStopoL sinking a crui5C'r ;/ond tWO desttO)'C~ and sewnl tnmports. Back III me Baltic the siege of Lemngnd dragged on. ",th Sm-,et wa.rsrups hea\'i!)' t'ng:ab'ed m the defence of the city. Ships' crews \\oere formed uuo n,,\'a.! infantry brigades much like rhe British of the nineteenth century. whale men renuimng aboord the fleon manned the big gum ofthe e1derl)' battlesrups Okr)"lbnl:Y<l Rn'llfllfSi}'d and .\faw. E\oen the old. protected cruiser Auror<I - which fired the first shots of the October RC'\'Olunon of 1917 - was pressed lIltO the defence. as a headquarten ship for tf:l.wlen, while her dlsmouIl(ed ~;uns were used ashore as artillery. The .\ll/uk - a 2.()(X)...ton destroyer leader of the 'Leningr.ad class. the first luge ships bUilt III Russia ;after that revolution - was sunk in KronU<ldt harbour by di\-'C-bombers. though later :Ilvaged. Reliant Oil widespread defensive mining. subject to the icing sea and tied 10 the land in I't'~isting German occupation ;along the Baltic coast. the Soviet Baltic fleet was stuck in the waters between the Kronsudt and Leningrad and firmly on the back foot.

59

1941

The Arctic Convoys

Waking the sleeping Soviet giam would ensure that Germany would evemu:illy be defeated on land. Bm the elltry of the USSR had already Il1creased [he British burden at sea, as Churchill agreed [0 lnstinne convoys to Russia via the Arctic route as a subsrirme for rhe S..:cond Front' requested by Moscow. As German offensives on rhe Eastern Front destroyed more and more materiel. captured oilfields and absorbed precious raw matC'rial sources. the Soviet Union gn:w ever more III need of essential supplies and equipment if it was to regroup and fight back. Over the course of the war the lllajority of supplies to the SOViet Union would flow rhrough the Persian Gulf or across the Pacific, bllt from a political standpOlllt a northern route from Britain was a necessity. Arctic convoys from Bntish POrtS thus began in the SUlllmer of 1941. Summer and winter convoys (Ook different routt'S according to the extent of the polar ice edge. In the summer. the \Vhite Sea pOrt of Archangel was the destination, reached by going north about Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. keeping (0 the extreme limit of uifiu/(/ffi range but threatened by Uboats in the perperual daylight conditions. In the dark Arctic wimer. with the sea ice much further south and the White Sea frozen. fewer U-bom operated but the morc risky POrt ofMurmansk had (0 be used.This roUle was much more vulnerable to German air attack from occupied Norwegian and Finnish air bases. All the while. German caplt3l ships. holed up in Norwegian fjords to derer any Alhed flanking movements. were deemed a significant threar to the convoys. Thus, just as the British were becoming better armed and on a surer economic footing with unfettered American aid, large-scale diversions of weapons, equipment and supplies had to be sailed (0 the northern Russian ports, through the worst weather condirions in the world and with German submarines and aircraft lying in wait. What made the strain of the Arctic convoys harder to bear was the suspicion that it was cOlllpat:ltively a waste of effort. resources and lives - indeed, It is still a matter of debate whether the USSR was a burden rather than a help to the Allies for the first year of her fight against Nazi Germany. Certainly from a British perspective their sacrifices '...ere met JUSt as often with complaint and unhdpful silence in Moscow than with the gratitude they felt they was due. In time, of course. the intractable Soviet winter and the scale of Soviet manpower would defeat Hitler's armies and divert enormous German resources away from the west. which provided inestimable help to the western Allies' efforts in esrablishlllg a permanent bridgehead on contim'ntal Europe in 1944. Despite the dangers. by the end of 194 I. fifry-three ships had made it without loss to Russia in seven convoys, delivering 750 ranks. 800 fighters. 1,400 vehicles and over 100,CK>O tons of supplies. The Germans. hampered by a lack of reconnaiS5.111Ce, were unable to deliver coordinated anacks. \Vith American entry to rhe war, the supply of materials to Russia would go up a gear - but so would German illterest 111 interdicting it.As the ice closed in on Archangel in the darkening winter of 1941, the Bismarck's sister battleship Tirpirz and the 'pocket battkoship' Admiral Stllur were moved to Trondheim, ready to be unleashed. In response to a failed U-boat attack on an American convoy escOrt. Oil 11 September Roosevelt b';lW permission for rhe US Navy to sink Oil sight any Axis submanncs operating in proscribed American shipping lanes. The autumn saw the first fourteen of hundreds of Liberry ships launched fiom US shipyards, as American mat",rial assistance to Orit:ull burgeoned. German pbnners accepled that war with America was unavoidable. and urged the Japanese to stJ)' out of the war with the USSR ~o a~ to focus efforts against the western coloniJI powers in the cast.

But while negoliations with the US continued through diplomatic c1unllcls, Ihe Japanese Combined Fleet under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto quietly prepared it!. ships for Ihe IllOS1 audaciom operation C\'cr mounted by the Japanese Navy.

The Snuggle for DORlinance in the Mediterranean

Pn..'SSCd back from the Balkans and in reverse gear in North Africa, Ihe British situation got steadily worse over the autumn of 1941. But so long as Malta could be kept in the fight. the A..xis would not enjoy unfettered usc of the sea. In November the Italian Navy Jtlemplcd to run a convoy from Greece 10 North Africa to supply Rommel's siege ofTobruk. Sl'ven lranspOrtS, escorted by six destroyers. were intercepted off Cape Spartivento by a Strong British cruiser force OUI of Malta and all bar one luliJn destroyer were sunk. Controversially, the llritish 'U' class sublllarllle Up/wldf'f, commanded by Lieutenant-COllllnander Wanklyn VC (awarded for sinking the 18,0<XI-ton pa~enger shIp COlliI' Rosso III May). then moved in and s'-lIlk the last rcmainlllg Italian destroyer as she stopped to rescue survivors. lulian timidity and British fighting confidence were again evident at the First Battle of Sirte III December, when the lllallJ Italian battle fleet was driven Jway from a British convoy by its t"Scort, consisting of Just three cruisers and a hJndful of destroyers. But Italian nuncs took a roll of two British cruisers and a destroyer attemptlng to harry coastal shipplllg upon arrival offTripoli. Meanwhile, German submarines had made their way to the Mediterranean in Ihe autumn and, u~ing a form of the Emgma code as yet unreadJble 10 the British, they had a significant effect on the balance of power, sinking the British carner Ark R"J"II. More U-boat5 were sent but Illany were sunk by Allied submarines and aircraft operating out of Gibralur. However, the battleship &rham and the cruiser Glllatl'll also fell prey to U-boats towards the close of 1941. The Mediterranean was never a 'target-rich environmem' for Axis submarintos; ceruinly not 111 comparison to Ihe Adamic, where largets were more numerous and proportionately less heavily defended. For the British submarllle the opposite was Irue. Despilt: a gradual improvement in Italian amisubmarine countermeJsures such as active sonar, extremely farrgued yet increasingly deadly flotillas of SillJ]] Jnd elusive British craft found their lllark along the lulian convoy romes. British submarine U~e torpedoed the repaired Italian battleship Villori" 11-lIcto on 14 December, forclllg her out of action for another four momhs. But later that same month, luhan hUlllan torpedoes returned lhe deed with intert."St by sinking the old battlesillps QUI'1'11 ElizI1Mlh and IMia"t at anchor in Alexandria harbour, dealing a serious blow to Ihe Brilish Mediterranean fleet.

The 'Day of Infamy' and the Effects of American Entry

It is often unwise to highlight turning points in history to the exclusion of more subtle yet pervasive ttends, bur everything changed on 7 December, when the American Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was atucked by Japanese cJrrier-laullched bombers and torpedoplanes. By crippling the bulk of the American battleship fleet at anchor, the Japantose gained time and space to conquer South East Asia before again rurning east to fJce the slunned Americans_ Though taken completely by surprise by the Japanese aClion. Hitlerinitially encouraged by the speed of his Jdv:lllce into the USSR and latterly mindful of Raeder's desire to apply naval pressure in Ihe Atlantic before It was tOO late -Joined the Japanese ill declaring \var on the USA.

60

1941

It is from this point that most historians agree that the Allied cause was saved, Indeed, Churchill later wrote ofhow he 'slept the sleep of the saved and the thankful' - privately, for a man and a service accustomcd to Royal Navy pre-eminence, this tacit acknowledgcmcnt of reliance on Amcrican maritime capaciry (and the power it could project) to guarantee British survival must have becn a biner pill to swallow. It has been argued that without Pearl Harbor, and Hitlers declaration of \var, the USA would havc continued to stay out of the World WatTwo. It had been augmeming British and Canadian convoy escorts to the midAtlantic position for some 111011[hs, but it is perhaps Winston Churchill's greatest comribution to the British war efforl that he succecded in sccuring American ~Yl1lpathy and supporl. Thc British Prime Ministcr had IllCt the Amcrican Presidem in Pbccmia Bay in Newfoundbnd in August 1941, aboard the Ptilue rif II'<lIN, and a clmrcb service with fraternal hymns was conducted undeTlleath tile big guns. The main point of busim:ss \\";IS the drafting of tile Atlamic Charter, the firmc:st commitment by the USA to elltering the war to defeat Nazism to have appeared thus (u. But this was by no means a likelihood, f.u k"Ss the ccrt.1inty Churchill prayed for. In the event, the US commitmcnt to the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe as its primary war aim, with Japan a dose second (and 1t.1ly a distant third), \v;JS a great boost to bele:lbTUered IJritain. In the autumn of 1941 American llaval po\ver had stood tall: fifteen battk-ships, five carriers, eighteen heavy cruisers, nineteen light cruisers, 200 dl."Stroyers and 111 submarlllCS. More ships - roughly l.'<]ulv;Jlcnt to 50 per CCnt of the built fleet - \vere ullder constructioil. With American entry to the \v;Jr, the British also gained access to crucial "SourCt':$ III the US portS on both COJsts. repair and rebuilding fl... Thus in 19-11 the European war turned IIlto a world war. The Soviet Union and now America were thrown lIUO battle. Churchill apprcciated Japan's attack on the USA even more than Germany's attack on Russia. dl.-spite this adding Japan to the Axis war effort and leading. m short order, to a series of appalling losses to the British Empire and the Royal Navy in the Far East.

(and the grounding of the carrier ftldomirablr while working up in the Caribbean), allied with a tendency to underestimate the striking power ofJapanese aircraft. contributed to the dramatic loss of the battlecruiser Repulse and battk'Ship PriUlr of Iiirlrs on 10 December 1941 while they attempted to intercept a Japanese invasion force heading for Malaya. The gamble had failed spectacularly. During what the Japanese call the 'Batde ofT Malaya', these two prime capital ships were sunk during a sustained torpedo and bomb attack by land-based planl.'S. The losses dealt a huge blow to British naval prestige in the Far East. It \vas another tragic lesson in the increasingly unavoidable realiry that naval unitS without strong air cover were vulnerable as never before to skilled aerial attack. a tendency already demonstrated by British losses off Crete and which should have been obvious to the commanding officer Admiral Phillips. Despite violent mJIIOeuvres and all AA guns thrown IIHO defence. these twO symbols of traditional naval power were sent to the bottom in just over two hours by WeJpOnS vastly cheaper and more numerous. The Prime Minister \vas grievously upset by the news.

The Allied Outlook

In the wide expanses of the Atlantic. in the second half of 1941,Allied losses to U-boats dropped to around 100.000 tons per month. However. U-boat construction programmes were producing a growing fleet and ])onitz was lllcreasingly able to establish patrol lines right across the Atlantic. aided by almost cominuous German codebreaking of low-level British convoy signals. By the end of the year. nearly 1.300 Allied merchant ships had been sunk. Only thirryfive U-boats had been sunk in return. Bntain was ostensibly losing the (httle of the Atlantic. However. there were small signs of hope for the Allies. American carriers had escaped the disaster at Pearl Harbor; so had US submarine facilities and fuel supplies. The massi\'e mdusrrial capaciry of the American economy was now on an official \var footing. A promising glimpsc of the future of integrated aIr-sea convoy protection was afforded in December when a Britain-bound convoy, HG 76, ofthirrytwo ships from Gibraltar. made it home with only tWO merchantlllen lost. Uy contnst the Germans had lost five U-boats over four days at the hands of the COn\-oys twelve escortS. Air cover - provided by AlldacilY's MardetS - had seen off the circling Condors, given advance warning of lurking U-boatS and served to guide the escorting destroyers to their work until AudacilY \vas herself sunk by torpedo. But the template had been successful. And as a taste of how the Allies would eventually re-enter the continental European fray, throughout 1941 Britain had conducted small-scale amphibious raids to damage installations and divert German resources. Combined operations became an important part of Allied strategy, as the British were forced to revert to their time-honoured expedients when faced by a dominant foc on the continent. The idands off Nonvay bore witness to no fewer than three such sea-launched British raids that year. These operations showed that well-executed amphibious assaults - delivered with strategic and taerical surprise against enemy shores - could reap substantial rc\\";Irrls. If the western Allies were to achieve their stated primary aim of defeating Nazi Germany on European soil. their first steps would have to be from the ramp of a landing craft.

British Disasters

IU

the Far East

For so long to her adv;Jmage whilc her enemies \vere European. and alrcady mitib"Jtcd to a large degree by the mobility of the submarine and acroplanc, [he facts of geography turned al:,"Jinst Britain when Japan joined the war. The fact that all three of the Axis navil.'S werc hostile at the same time sm:tchl.-d British sea power to its limit. Despite thc withdra\val of many British \'cssels from [he Asiatic stations to bolstcr the Mediterranean Jnd Atlantic in 1940. and dcsplte the knowledge that by 1941 only the US Navy could effectively oppo~ the Japanese III the western Pacific. throughout the year Churchill had prcssed for the sending of two capital ships and an aircraft carrier to the Far East as a deterrellt ab"Jinst Japan. NJval staff at the time, and historians subsequently. questioncd whether this small force (a far cry from the main battle fleet of 1930s \var plans) would ha\'e carricd any political deterrellt value.Those in favour considered it a sound plan, reasoning that most of the Japancsc Navy would be occupicd against the US Navy, with their remaining forces being inferior to the powerful British units. In any case, 'Force Z'. as it was known, arrived after the outbreak of hostilitit'S in the east, and whatevcr peacetime deterrent value it had was swiftly negated by e\'ellts. A lack of friendly air cover on the Malay peninsula

61

1941

War in the North Atlantic

During 1941 the Batde of the Atlantic reached unprecedented intensity with the U-boats making full use of the bases on the French coast. While merchanunen and escorts battled the inclement
conditions, the most dramatic episode involved a German surface wanohip, me banleship Bismarck.

(right) Facing the elements 0fIicet"i dres5ed for the AtlantIC bndge of an escort

~aWr

on W op6l

(below) A British denroyer battles on The ded:. awash. HMSM.oIne ploughs through heavy $!las, If) company with other destroyer>. Note the tanered
White Ens.gn.

Western Approaches Command Headquarters, Derby House. UVtrpool. The Operatoons Room beneath Deroy House,l.Nerj>ooI. the Headquarters of Westem Approaches Command. The maln AtlantIC plot IS to the left. WIth the home waters plot '" the lmkgrou:ld. On these were shown the ~ts or every COf'fJaf ifld escort, ~ well as (as m..och as possible) every str1ggler: ifld every U-boat. AcrniraI Horton's office CM:fiooked the Operatoons Room.

The Lofoten Imn<!s raid In Mch the Lobten Islands 011" Norway were ,..;ded by the Bnbsh. the IoaI flsh.ol pIri destn:rted ifld eIe-<en shps ar"d 200 GenNn ~ ~ In~ Ige c~ ar"d 001 ~ on the Spotzbege. ard'opeIago were ~ to preo.ent the ~ ~ use of
thml. Lon:llouts Mountbanen became
~

of

Combned Operauons ancIlau"lctltd a r'aId on Vaasgo

on Norway on the Dectn"Oel: ~ ~ and bctonts. ap\l.I"I'lI the pnson ar"d therWt nftatrq

HnJer's II'1JWOI"lI ~ WIth Norway Thts is at! ofioal BntISh photoeraph taken cUYIg the Lofoten ope abOi IS, Voowrog a wei ~ CU"""'t'" rTIWWlg the ~ of one of HM ~ (possilIy

HHS ltgltlrl). sotJouetted ~ the

i"I'lCiU'UOI"lS ~ l(iri;e Fjord

snow-<:~

6S

1941
' ~ J'ul and HII'l<ttet"of~ lord abo.w'd the PrtIce 01 wo/es w+We W wAli anctlorM ",

Churchill on the deck of HMS Prince o(Woks

Tlvspho',,&,

Our

the CCJl.I'W
~~l()I'

w.

. Pt III the
b.lttle';h;p

~ ~

f" . .. . took Brit st'l Prrr.e ~~ W S1an aao.;s tr>e At ~ lOr "lIS hostonc ~ ng WIth US ~t F1'rilr. 0 ~es.:)1'1_~ a ((lfflOy to ~ and ~ _ the bcshP the ftted f-<JIn Z ~ to ~ III a fn..Clea, II'ld ~ d:sa$troIA ~ to irr cider: and ther'I CCU'lte!: Japanese the E.ts..: roes.
'Ie
WI$

"1

conferences en the

'llc:ert a Bay ~.., August 1941 kl a ~ of ~ the prYlCipIeS of the AtlIrrt.c Charter" ~
14)

o-av.

Augl,$ll1

..-e

I'M) Ie.lders CUTog the vat:. and mport.1l'lt to tne Br lh Ifl tl'la.t rt pnered the firmest a.wo"1 so far tor US p.nap,>'0'1 ~ NaZI Germ.1n)':

n.s was the lint SU'm'1t 01 many ~ me

WItI'1 Roose-.dl: a'ld "IS rtIlI'. ber'tned

the 0'1.I:$el'" USS

68

1941
Mantlme p,atrol
ajn;~ft

The Shc:w"t ~ ftylng boat. brought IntO RAF ~ tust before ~ outbre.tk of war. t..-ned out to be of
~
v,)jut

to

MId ant,-U-boat patrM. Thts partJClMr ~ IS

Coastal Corrmand for cOt'M:ly escort a

GRS of 20 I Sql...ron.

69

1941

HMS Suffolk in the Denmark Strait Gunners man one of the quadnJple O.S-inch lewis antiaircraft guns SItuated armdsl'lIps aboard HMS 5lJffoIk, on a patrol of the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland in 194 I Ice flows can be seen In the background. The northern part of the Denmarl<. Stran hes W!th'n the Art:uc Circle. though the dnft l<e extends

a go& deal further south.

Suffolk and her $OSlersh,p NOt'(oIlc. spotted B.smarck and Pn1ll Euzen. and shadowed them for nearly I,(XX} miles through ICe. f~uent mist and heavy squalls of snow and
5leet pnor to the Battle of the Dlo:nmar1<: Strait dunng whICh the Blsmard<: sc::0Rd a hit on HMS Hood and the

battlecru,ser exploded,

Naval aircraft on HMS Suffolk

A $upennanne Walrus aU''Craft ofSuf(oJk IS hoisted aboard while on patrol m the Denmarlc Strait. May 1941

70

1941

The pursuit of Bismarck following the loss of Hood

Shadowed on her journey south by the radar-equipped cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, the German battleship Bismarck was struck and partially slowed by torpedoes launched by Swordfish flying from V"lCtorious. forcing Admiral Liitjens to tum back

tOw;lrd$ St Nauire. Ark Rayol. making full speed in company with Renown in a

pincer movement up from Gibraltar. launched her own Swordfish in response

[0

a sighting of the German flagship by an RAF C:u.alina on 26 May. and the torpedo anack jammed Bisrmlrck's rudder. She w;,u narrowly aught only a day away from
land-based friendly air cover. and eventually dispatc.hed on the morning of 27 May by the guns and torpedoes of King George V. Rodney and company. There were just 110 survivors from a complement of over 2.300 men.

(left) The last photograph of HMS Hood

Taken from HMS Pnnt;e o(WoIe$, $hortIy before they went lI1to actIOn against the German ships. Note the spray covers over the ends of the gun barrels; the t1Jrrets are stili traIned aft so as to reduce the ingress of water while the ships tr.Nel at high speed in heavy seas,

(above) The 'mighty Hood' HMS Hood VIeWed between two Ill-inch guns belonging to HMS Rodney after the forme!" had retul'T1l!d from the Mediterranean. HMS Repulse can be seen to the left.

Bismorck attacks the

Prince ofWoles
.A.n konH: !hoI of the
battleship &mcm:k taken

from the heavy cruise..Pnnz Eugen shortly after the ~nl<mg of the Hood.

71

---------------------------------------------_.
1941

HMS Furious in the Mediternnean Rough seas brealong (;Mer the decks of HM$ F",I'l(lO,J$ dunng 1941 (photograph taken from the Cruiser HMS Sheffield). At feast one of FlNlOUS'S crew seems completely unconcerned. Originally built as a battfecruiser during World War One. FIJfIOU5 was one of two stllPS - Atgus being the other - to serve as an 31n;r.1ft o;amer ,n both conflicts. These two were also the only Bnbsh camers in service in 1939 to see ovt the war: the other five, completed or converted between the wan, had all been sunk by the late ~of 1942

- - - - - - - - 1941 - - - - - - -

194 I

HMS Sheffield and German supply ship Friedrich Breme On 12 June I'M I ", the North AtlanlJC. HMS Sheffield ontercepted the German !.Upp/y ~IP Fnednch Bteme-. full of fvel and pr'OIfisIons for Uboats. ar.d sank her with gun~re_ The German c~ abandoned ~IP and were ~n pr;so.ne.r In thiS photograph. empty mell cases litter the deck arour.d the aft 6-wxh tu~ts of HMS She~ld after the encounter.

Burial service

The burial service reng read on board HMS Sheffield for two of the crew of FnedricJl Bteme v.t.o were lOlled by shell splinters dunng the shelling of the tanket:The service was anended by the ~IP'S company of both ~Ips.

1941
The sinkina of HMS 8amom

Of all the 8ntJSh mages of the war.lt sea. 1939-15, some of the best known n the drarna:.< and homfyw'la ~ mome"1ts of the 8ntJSh b.1nJe5hIP !lartort A ~eran of World War One. when she had pIared a ma,<Y part II'l
the 8.lttle of Jvtl-ld by No.oember 19<11 the old (though rnodernzed) shop had chaJl<ed up a not lOtonsoder.lble
correat record II'l Wor1d WarTINO,IOtludo-li: the ~ d ~ the 8.lttJe of Matapl and the ~u.at.oon of CJete She had been torpedoed by a U-ooat, and cIo.iged by borT'tIs.lt'd by P1eIfre,I\ad ~oc:Ienufy ~ and the destn:l'fel" Dt.d-. and towed the cnpped batties/llp ~ to Slofety after the ~ debicIe. But on the .lftemoon d25 ~ 19i1

son.

w+1IIe the Me6't~ FIeet ....,lS operiItI'lg elf the COi$l of Lby;I. she _ hit on the port Jode by three or b.r (~\Iaf)'}~ lired by lJ.33/. Even.l modem shop IM)lJI(I h.l'ooe been ~ to SUI"IIOYe such ~ and lloN7n. moruIy WOU"Ided. mrnedIatety bepl to heel Ole( and sn. Fo.r rrnJtel: .ner the lim M. as the ship ~ a ~ . she blew t4l The ~ Bon d Enq...-y concklded Nt It _ prob.lbIy .l secondiry maaazne that had expoded. .grortII'l&.., tum the.fter fl'IUl magan-oe:, 'Y'oA1en the appaIlO'lg doud ~ clean:d. the boltt!eshlp _ gone. together WIth 862 of !'let" crew. Upt.on G C, Cool<.e ~gr..-en the speed with ~ ~ ~ c:wer: and !'let" u.~ end. some 396 mer'\, Voc::e-AO"rw'aI SIr t-i@nry Pnchm-~ .-nona them. so.r."T...ed to be ~ by acc~ shops. ()ne SU"VlYOI' realled checb'l& tNt d hos Wnbs wet't stoI II'l place as he was IU'lg Wough the ar. after Ivtbns: the water he was then boY.1ed Ole( and Ole( by the shock ~ of the expIoslon. AdmnI Ctn'qham. on board the I\acshlp Q!.ftn ~lh. descnbed It as '.l homble and .l_~ spectacle'

rouona

(lJ.33/ was sunk. logether with thll'tytwo members or her crew, by an Albacore aircraft from HMS Fomlldoble rust.

under a year later)

Corrung at posSlbly Bn!aln's, and the Royal Navy's, lowest pomt In the war, Bomom's loss was II"IltIally kept secret But on board HMS Vo/Ionc. the next b.1ttleshlp II'l

line, was John Turner. a Gaumont Bnttsh New'S camerman.

He had joined the organization In 19]6. ar'ld had fllme<! many or the notable events of the !.as!. years or the deude roo- the news that was shown in the cinemas of the day, At the outbreak or the war he had be<ome a naval war

...
77

correspondent At the tome Ilorhom was 101 pedoedTI.Jl'Tle<" had just two monutes' worth or film left. II'l hiS camera. so what he liImed was a senes of moments from the ship's loss. r.lther than the ~ ~ The film was so.bsequently otnpOISICIed urltJI the war's end even after the ~ had ari'Mted the b.1tt\esh1p had been Sl-*. CunrlongNm S.l)'Il'lg that It was 'not .., the If'Iterests of the war effort or of the RoyaJ Navy' for It to be shown. Tl.WTleI'" went on to COle( the ll'I'VaSIOI'I:$ of SIOIy and NomIldy. and the Japanese surrender .It Slnppore. and enpyed .I long and successflA career .lfter the _ becomrIg a news edrtor for P:a~ .lfter the aen- of trIeI"!\.l news reels and of Gao.6nont Bntl$I'l Ne-Ns.. HIS 6m of the destn..ocbon of Boofnn. and the rw..merous st.oIIs that h.l'ooe been madI!: from It.. have ~ on to prlMde 50me of the best known lfTla&e5 of the w.-. even tnougn the lim seqJe!>Ce5 lI'l piI'1JC\W ~ frtquently used to .~. other events such as the loss d Hood. and even the ttw-ee EIntrsh brnlecrursers Sl.ri: It )JtIInd. twenty

_-

aone

1941

The Soviet Navy on the defensive

When Germany in.....ded the Soviet Union the Soviet Navy became heavily inYQlved in the desperate suuggle to stem the advance, sUP'POrting the Red Army ashore and anisting in evacuations of troops and civilians alike.At Leningrad the ships and their crews played their full part in what became one of the great siege!> of history.

(above left) The battleship Okt)'Obrskoyo Revoliursya

Antl(Uro;raft guns on board the ~ ~. which rem3'oe<! at LenWJgl"3d thrt.>ughovt the 5Iege. he!pII'g to defend the city against land and air attack She was """~by artillery on 16 September" 1941, and by

~on4Ap011942

(above) The cruiser Kirl)

On board the cn..llsel" Kitw dumg the WInter of 1941-2 The first ~ warship to be built SII"lCI! the Re\A::)lution. the handsome KJrrN was completed in September 1938. and had partICipated in the opening attacks of the RlmoFinnish War. In 1941. after evacuating Riga and Tallim, I<iroY was caught ~ shoals and German m'nefiekts. Her Cf'eN desper'ately trie<l to hghten the ship and the KNVv wccessfulty made a hair-raising passage back to LenWlgrad. and took up pom.on to nMt the German besiegers..

(left) The battleship Morcrt

In the alilunYl of 1941 German armoo.r advanced on leningnld. Battleships and OU$efS, many of elderly design yet mounting ~I guns. ~ \IffY ~ agaInSt

German field artillery. lu~ iltl" stnkes ~ called up and on 17 Septembe<' the battlesh'P Abat was hit by eWe bombers. her forward magazines exploded. and she sank 10 the $hallow I'Iatbour floor. her main guns unatreaed. This photograph shows the wreck of MaroIS fOlWMd
~""""","".

78

1941

The icebreaker MoIow, under ~ ;It Lenin&~d The SovIet f'Qvy ~ only" few IC~ of ItS OM'\ 1M 'Nlth the outbr'Nk of ~ ~ iCebreakel's were taken under n.w.II control and were wned. With the Gulf Fnmd normally freezing for four to five month5 each WII'ltet: IC~ were ~ but no fewer than tefI were ~ in the BaIbc 6.TtrIg 194.

or

The desU'O)"tr Storo~ heavily camoufb:gflI The Type 7-U destro>,e" was Ol'le of the most modem So..et destro)oers of the penod. TOfl)edoed by a German MT8 in the ~ Strarts ... p,e 1941, she was towed to l ~ for ~Il': Thts l'eSlJted 11'1 a ~ 00w and 1.Ip(IMed armarTll!flt. She re-entef'ed servICe'" 1943.

The submarine Mol 72 ~ LFisarlcMch abod

5l.bname. the 5l'Nl

~

200-ton(~voesseIM-171.From)Jy 194

u-boats m Sow:!. ~ bqan to opeme n the same deep water"5 of the ~ ~ fpds m Bare1ts Sea. On 21 I\l9ISt. Moll2 sneaIozcll'ltO ~ Fjord lndetected by the German guwd:loat and

fKt her torpedoes I'Iad tnI5SeCI the ship and strudc the poer: nst9i n ~Septerrbet" she b.nd her I't\aI1( ~ the hA of" ~ stener; and agan in ~ 19'41 ~ '" hip 'NI1lch the apwn d.l.med was of 8.000 tOl'l$.In fact she was the Vesco of only 3)1 tons. Soviet submarw'les da.med thIrtytwo ships of a total of nearly 96,(0) tons sunk in northem Witer5 in 1941. Accordone to German ~ only tweIYe ~ of 28.000 tons were lost. iIrld only three of the5e ihp of 6,<400 tons ~ a ~ to Sow:t St.b'narYles. The rest ..-.e sunk by a pu' of 8ntJ5h ~ oper11Uli 1n;m ~ \.O'ltll 0ecent:Jer 1941.

M-' 71 ~ her escape I\M"c he.lrd ~

~ torpedoes IntO a merchintrnl tied ~ " poet:

IS.

but

In

The Josi( Sto'" The passenger ship josI( Sfo/ln, ~ rno servKe as a transport is shown here SII'Ikrlg In De<ember 1941 after being damage<! by mines ~ the evacuatIOn of HanaO. Some 7JXXJ men were ~ 1.850 were taken off by ScMet ...essels. t::M:T 2CXX) were taken pmoner by the Germans. and nety ).(XX) per1Shed

-.

1941

Free French submarines

(below and opposite) Surcou( Two VIeWS of the mighty French submanne Sun::ou(. ,n Dry Do<:k No. 2 at Portsmouth.
New HarTlJMlre. 00 I September 1941. gMng an Im~~ of thIS remarkable ~$I1l's II1VTleflse SIZe.At 360 feet long and some 4,200 tons submerged dLsplacement she was the workfs largest submanne: her d,rnenSlOllS were not exceeded until the com~tioo of the first of the gaanl japanese a,rcrafHarrying submarines of the /-400 class in 1944. XIIl:w(s appearaI'Ce in 1931 not surpO$.ingly uuse<J comtematJon in other 1laVIeS; equipped with a p,ur of a-inch guns. ten torpedo ~ and even her own scouting ilJrcraft she was a lour' de (otl:e of 5Ubmanne technology. Yet she was far from an unqu.ll;fied triumph. the sheer

ambotton of the design being beyond what French industry and teehnoIogy of the tUlle could really deliver; she alw represented somethLflg of a tactICal dead end. and as a result remawoed unique. In July 1940 Surcouf was one of the vessels t.lken CNef" by the Royal Navy at f'Iyrrlouth. and was one of the few """"ere there was resistance. with the ne5Ult that two ElntJ!J1 and one Frenchman lost ther lIlIeS. It then proved diflicult to find a proper JOb fo!" her. and ,n the end (,ronolly ,n the light of the faa that w had ~n desJgned as a cOI'T\ITIef'Ce ralde<') Svtcou( spent much of the ~ eighteen months escorting convoys across the Atl3f1l>C- She proved awkward to crew. requ,nng a larger number of highly skilled pe.-sonnel than were easily ilVallable to the nascent Free French Navy. There were also problems of disl:iphne Flnally,ln February 1942 she was lost WIth all hands in!iOlTleWhiil mysterious Circumstances, apparently rammed by an Americ:an merchantman off Parwna..

80

1941

(below) Rubis In contrast to Surr:;oufs less than gIoOous wartime career. that of the little Rubis (pictured afte.- the war at Toulon) was one of outstanding success. Less than a quarter of the SIZe of het" goant SISter. Rubos served throughout the war. first wrth the Monne Nal/l:lflOlf:. and then after July 1940 with the Fon:;e N(lII(I~ FfOflI;/W: !.fus, OperatJng maInly from Clur'dee and Gosport. she earned out twenty-etgtrt patrols and m,ne!ayv-og sortIeS, lay;ng 683 milles and being responsible for the 5ritJng of twenty-two enemy vessels and damag'ng two fl'\OI"e. This one small 5Ubmanrw! was creditKl wrth doing more damage to the enemy than any other French warship dunng the 51)( ~an of wa~ In 1941 Rubts WI"Vive<:I a nerve-shredchng

episode when attading a German convoy off NOfWay. V1e tof;:>edoed a freighter at wch close rdl'lge that the V.ock of he..- torpedoes e>q>loding damaged the submanne,s batt~ preventing her from diving and ne<:essitating a tIlree-day returrI passage acro5S the North Sea on the surface, Fortunatdy rt was h.gh SlO:TlITler. the ~ather was cam and &bs made It I\ome. although one man was wa!J>ed overboard Her dedlCaled. tJgtltIy I<.nrt (only fr..e out of forty-fQo had elected not to p" the Free French forces) and extrovert crew amassed an IInpressive collection of decoratIOnS (both BntIsh and French) between them. peri1aps none more popular or <:leser"vM than those awarded to Bacchus. the $loot, endlessly cheeriul. short-hall-eel mongn-I dog that was her mascot.

194 I

The attack on Pearl Harbor

Pearl Harbor was hit by Japanese carrier-launched bombers and torpedo-planes in

a startling coop de main reminiscent of the British aerial attack on the Italian fleet at anchor in Tar;J.nto. but far more devastating in its power and consequence. Five US banleships were sunk and three destroyers lost; and three other battleships and twO cr1JisellO were damaged, with over two thousand American deaths. The primary purpose of the atcu;k was to prevent the USA (rom executing Plan Onnge once the Japanese 'moved south' by sending the US Pacific Fleet at Peu'l Harbor against its 'open flank',

M aenal View of the Naval Ope1ltlng Base. I'l!arl Hartor, IooIang southwest on 30 Octobet' 1941 Foro Island. \NJlh Its Naval Alr Statton. IS ,n the Cerltr"@.WIth the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard just beyond It. across the channetThe airfield ,n the upper ~-c:entr"@ ts the Army's Hickam FIeId.The st'ups moored in 'BattleshiP Row' are to the left of the ~nd. WIth an aircraft. carner occupying the !iOUthem-most berth It was the fact that the carriers were all away at sea on 7 December that was one of the reasons why the japanese attack was fundamentally a r~'ure Cruisers aOO ~ are moored out ,n the hart>ovr tC1Wilrds the bottom of the pOotogldph.

84

1941

The Ji.p<l.nee U:I<I.ult c;ommem:el A ~ ~ Type 97 Ymer oituck pWne ('K.iu.) t.l~ off from ~ ener" to a~ Pe.ui Htx>r- ~ tne $hlp'!. CJYN cheer'~' The stlIp IS erther Z... "-ul<u or sno....-. Note tI'>e .... t t"POd m$ at the I'e of the CTIl:I"'$ isl.rod. w tn oi japanese n.r.al ~

Ioob'lg along '&ttIestop RoN" on 7 Decetl"ber 19-4 1.,J.fter the Jiplesc a~ USS Anzono (88-39) 1$ .., the Centre. tJurr.1g 1\n::lusly.dteJ" her bwd ~ e><pIoded 10 the left of her 'e the cWrr,.el USS ~ (88-4]) and the Slden USS West (fl8..48) A_

us ~ttleships

on lire

V.......,

---85

---------------------------------------------------------....
1941
View from Ford Island Thos IS oftM dalmed to be the moment of the ~ on boan:llhe USS!.nlona, In fact the photograph has been taken from the other end of the osland Ii'om where the lw;~ wu moored, ld the huge firebd en.JPMg be)'ond the ~ ConsoIId;r,ted PBY-S UWN. IS ITlO5lI1kety that &om the ~ USS Shaw.1vt by bombs .-.d ~ ~ while IywIg in ~ dod:. The masts and funnel of a battl5wp that ~ VISble beneath the cloud of smoke Id ftnes belong to the USS ~......tloch II"l an ~ p.e of ~ was got \JOderw.Iy MId attefl'llted to esape: out to sea. crit to be on:Iere<I to be beached rather than nsk belng 5lri: on the INrI entr.wlte to

....

86

1941

The sinking of HMS Prince

of Wales
alongside the I.nteship's starboard quarter. Such a manoeuvre required skilled seamanship to minimize the risk of damage from collision. as well as to give every chance to those who were attempting to cron from one ship to the other - any who fell into the gap in between the venels would have little chance of survival. Of the 1.612 on board Prin!e o(Woles. 1.285 were saved. The less robust ReplJlse. which sank more quickly. lost 513 OlJt of 1.309.Admiral Phillips. and Captain Leach of the Prin!e o(Woles. were not among those rescued by Expreu and two other destroyers. Electra and the Australian Vompire.

Not surprisingly very few photographs were taken during the destruction of Force Z at the hands of Japanese aircraft. and this is by far the best known. giving an idea
of the pandemonium as the Princ.e ofWoles began to sink on 10 December 1941. Smoke is rising from midships. evidence of damage below decks: while members of the crew, some still dressed for battle in anti-flash clothing and tin helmets. others now in life jackets or even stripped down to their underwear in anticipation of having to make a swim for it. are lining the ship's side and beginning to make the

perilous crossing to the destroyer &pnm (from which this photograph was taken)

87

1942-----------------

ntaterializaoon of the expected major thrust aimed at Midway using almost the enore Japanese fleet. Intelligence also indicated a simultaneous feint north-east towards the Aleutians. On the morning of 4 June, a land-based PBY Cat:l.lina fiying-bo:lt from Midway sighted the Japanese invasion support force but misreported it as Admiral Nagumo's carriers. But thorough enough \vas the US intelligence picture that the commanders of the American carrier force, assembled and lying in ambush. knew to disregard the incorrect sighting. The Japanese, still confident that no American force was there to oppose them, flew off a hundred bombers to attack the Mid\vay arehipelago. Information gained from a second aerial sighting \vas relayed to Emerprist! and HOnln. \vaiting in ambush to the north east of Mid\vay. and they turned in towanls Nab'tuno's carriers; 150 miles away from the Jap:mese, US task force cOlllmander Admiral Spruance decided to launch his attack. hoping to catch the Japanese carriers recovering their strike aircraft, when they would be at their IllOSt vulnerable. Admiral Fletcher on the }'tlrkIOUI71, recalling the relativt::ly \vasteful attack on the Shoho at Coral Sea. launched his dive-bombers and torpedo plan~ sixty minutes later, hoping to get a clearer picture first of the exact location of the most important Japanese tarb-ets. Meanwhile, as it re-aTlned its planes for a second attack on Midway, Nabrumo'~ force received intelligence from a SCOUt plane indicating the presence of AllIerican ships to the north. The Japanese had no idea that the US carriers were at sea and in the area umil a Iootplane found 'what appears to be a carrier' later that morning. Adminl Yamaguchi, in command of Carrier Division 2 (Hjryu and Soryll), signalled Nagtllllo to suggest they attack the American carriers immediately, but Nagumo. hcsitating, preferred to retire slightly to the north east to re-arm and re-fuel. as his plancs were still armed with weapons designed to attack land targets and not ships, and he would need to re-arm them with torpedocs. At this crucial poim the first American carrier-based attacks began, but aircraft hunched separ:llely from the York/OJ"', Homn and Ell/rrprisr fared badly; all three torpedo squadrons found the Japancse and attacked but they had become separated from the dive-bombers and the majority of thelr escorting fighters. Homer's squadron of torpedo-bombers were entirely shot down by fighters and AA fire. EllIrrprisr's squadron lost ten of its fourteen aircraft in the attack. Twelve torpedo aircraft from the Yorkwu'1l were lost, with no hits scored (though their fighter escort from VT-6 brought down SIX Zerot-'S for one loss). But crucially, the Japanese fighter patrol. its attemion focust-'<i on the low-level fight with the EllIerprise's torpedo and fighter plancs, f.1iled to notice the arrival of Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers from YorktowII and Elltl'rprisr at high altitude. Unmolested by Japanese fighters, the dive-bombers swooped down on the Japanese carriers and scored between eight and ten devastating hits on the Alo.'aJ?i, Kil:o?il and Soryu, which were s\viftly engulfed in explosions and flames. Dcspite being harassed by American fighters, retaliatory strikes by plancs from Hiryu managed to deliver two torpedo and three bomb hits to the YorktowlI, causing heavy damage and necessitating her being towed to Pearl Harbor for repair, though she never arrived there. During the voyage horne she \vas sunk by a Japanese submarine - bllt not before dive-bombers from both her and Ellterprisl' completed the rout of the Japanese carriers by sending the Hir'j'11 ro the bottom with four bomb hits late on 4 June. At rhe COSt of one carrier, the US fleet had sunk at a stroke four Japanese carriers, destroyed 270 enemy aircraft, defended Mid\vay and their rearward lines of communication. and secured their fiNt major victory of the war.

The Strategic Effects of Coral Sea and Midway

Was Midway a decisive victory which decided the outcome ofIhe Pacific \var? In the sense that an American victory in the Pacific was almost incvit:l.ble given hcr vastly superior shipbuilding, munitioning and manpower capacity vis-ii-vis Japan (six timcs more capacity in 1941), Midway was by definition not a decisive victory. But in a contemporary banlc-by-battle mindsct, Mid\vay proved to be a major signpost in the direction of US triumph. Japanese offensive power. so far largely unstoppable, had becn stretched and then bcaten. The Imperial Japan~e Navy was still a force to be reckoned with. but Mid\vay denuded it of enough of its experienced air component to allow the process of American counter-atrack to begin. By the spring of 1942. the Alli~, 011 the back foot everywhere. had needed a sib'l1al strategic victory. The Americans, at Midway, provided it. The tacticallessolls of Coral Sea and Midway in the late spring of 1942 seemed obvious: that gun power no longer decided the fate of fleets, but that the aircraft carrier could deliver crushing blows across hundreds of mib of sea space far beyond the range of conventional battleship influence. But in reality these battles also reminded naval stafE. of the vulnerability of carriers to exactly the style and \veight of attack that they could deliver; thus a crushing knockout strike \vas the essential objective. At Coral Sea, the Americans had lost half their carrier force and none of the remaining carriers on either side were fit to stay in the baule; but at Midway, the Japanese lost three quarters of their force to the first overwhelming strike launched from the American carriers. Furthermore, at the Battle of Mid\vay, over 60 per cellt of the participating American aviators had completed their training in 1941 or later - evidence of the first fruition of an enormous training programme which produced thirty thousand navy and marine aviators a year in seventeen new training centres across the USA. Two years before. flying men made up only 16 per cent of all American line officers. but by Mid\vay there were two-and-a-half times as many aviation officers than all other specialities combined. In marked contrast, Midway sewrely damaged Japan's ,elite carrier Ieet and permanently removed perhaps one third of its very experienced pilot strength. Furthermore,Japanese naval aviation \vas also deeply harmed by the loss of large numbers of trained mechanics, armourers and other support personnel. killed when the carriers were lost. A nt-'w Japancse Third Fleet \vas brought into being, based around the surviving carriers and escort vt-"SScls, but the lost squadrons and cre\\!S were harder to replace. UnlIke the Americans. the jJpancse did not establish carrier replacement air groups, which brought subSt:l.ntial benefits to the efficiency of American combat-ready carriers and the standards of thcir trained aviator force. The Japanese did not rot:l.te their experienced combat pilots awa.y from front-line duties, but preferred to keep thcm in their squadrons aboard ship where they could provide training for newer pilots. This left them exposed to defeats like Midway which could seriously weaken the experienced core of aviators and diminish aggregate combat effectivcness. And as thc Japanese corps of cxperienced naval aviators crumbled a\vay,Arnerican strength grew.

America on the 'Offensive-Defensive' in the Solomons

The US Navy could take the 'offensive-defensive' to the JJpanese diaspora after Mid\vay. By the middle ofJuly, the Americans could call on four fleet carriers - EIl/(rpris(, Honrl'/, Saril/ogil and llilsp - while Japan could field two flect carriers and three light carriers of which JUI/YO and

90

1942------------------

Hi"" - :lv:libbl~ :It th~ end of th~ month - were virtually fleet carriers in terms of cap:lcity. First the Americ;ms unded muines at Gu;adtlcJ.n.:ll in the Solomon blJnds on 7 August. O~rarions lIuellsified :IS both sides sought to g:ain the upper h:lnd.The Solomon Isbnds would be the scene orthe PJ.eifics lengthi~t and mon bitterly fought na"':I1 c;amp:lign. Mutual attempb O'o~r the course offifteen months W Interfere wuh ~ach others' reinforcements led to :I series of;a dozen luge .:Iir :lnd ~;a b2ules. indudlllg the c.unp:lign in the vicimty of Gu;acU!c:ln:l1 Itsdr. Within tWO weeks of the US 1Il"':ISion. a carrier bJ.ttle WM fought in the ~tern Solomons, the J;ap:ln~ losing the carrier Ryujo :lnd the Americ:llli suffering SC'o~~ cUnuge to the EnrnpriY. In October. while :luempting to :lttack the American-hdd :miicld on Guadakaml. the J:lp.1nese won ;a uCllol newry J.t the B.:Ittle of $;anta Cruz by delivering :I well co-ordmated dwe-bomber .:Ind torpedo .:Ittack agatnst US carriers. III putlcubr the Homrt. which \"':IS knocked out .:Ind e'\"C"ntuall)" sunk (though by US and J:lp;anese torpedoa fired from destroyers). OncC' :Igatn. fighter defence. ;along with better tbnuge control ;and Imprm-.:d AA gunfire..... ~ cTltlcal III hllllung the tbnugc suStallled from a wdl:lUlled C:lrner stnke. But this time. Americ:ln fighters were un:lble to stem the J.1p.1nese ude..... hlle theIr own bombers were shot down often many Ilules aW:lY from theIr urgets. While rawr existed ;aboard American carners. It w~ not ;alw;ays utlhzed properly. Escorting the Elltnprisr. the b<luleshlp SoUlil Dal'OI(l had used her modern ootterics of AA guns to destroy menty-slx alrcran. The mIghty ooulcslup W:lS playing second fiddle to the flat-top and Ib rillY ;urcmn. J:lp:lnese n.:wal :llrcran were of supenor quality to all other combatJ.nlS III 1942. The MIlSUblshl A6M2 Type 00. or 'Zero'. WJ.S a fJ.st :lnd very malloeuvnble fighter ;aIrcraft and the first carner-borne plane to OUlclass Its land-based counterpJrts. In the hands of wcll-tmllled Japancsc pilots. Illany of whom had acqum~d hundreds of hours of flying and battle experience over Chill3, It W:lS a formidable challenge to American and BntlSh types III the Pacific theatre and provided the Japanese with thc leadlllg edge to its air superiority. The Japant:se also produced wotldleading torpedo and dive-bombers, including the NakajllTla lJ5N2 Type 97 'Kate' and Alchi D3AI Type 99 Val. American aIrcraft - the Grumman Wildcat fighter, the Douglas Dauntless dive-bomber and Grumman Avenger torpedo-bomber - were usually slower, less manoeuvrable and oflower range', but were more rugged and capable of curYlIlg hea\'ler payloads. New American aircraft - for enmple the Ch:mce-Vought CotSalT. Grumman De;lTCat and Curtiss Helldiver - would later Tt:mO'o'e Japanese quahtatl..'C' su~riom)'. but in 1942 what the US Navy really needed to Impl'()\,'C' 'A':IS Its fighter direction :md air-combat tactics to counteract Japanese tC'ChmCJ.1 su~rioflty. LeJ.ding American fighter aces had begun to formulate nc'W fornutJon-ba.sed tactics (such as the 'ThJ.ch \"'ea..~) which had a.!ready been pl"O\-'C'n to cut aw<l.)' much of the Zero's superionty at Midway and $;anta Cruz. While thelT plane losses roughly equalled those of the Japanese. American ;llrcrew losses ....'ere only one-si."th of the JapJ.n~ at the Battle of $;anta Cruz. More US pilots survi..-ed being shot do'o'o'll. So while the Zero might be .:I su~rior 2eroplane. there weT'C inCTeJ.Singl} fewer expeTienced pilots to fly It as the w':lr of attrition over the Solomon Islands ground <lW;I)' much of the remalmng e"..p erienced J:I~nCSC' ;a..i<lrion force. Pt-riodic American :Itucks on R.a.baul demorntr.ued that while an airborne strike force was away fTom its carrier. this dId not J.UtonuticaUy mean thJ.t thC' urrier ....':IS itself vulnerablC' to attack,

providing it retainC'd suffiCient fighter aircmft to defend agamst bndbased aerial countemttack. ThiS was something the BntlSh. with f("" . . er carriers and no dedicated high-performance carner-borne fighter aircnft, had been unable to achieve III the comparam'dy Il;lrrow seas of the Mediterranean. With the impetus ofcontinua.! ad"':Ince stTiPped awa}~ the Jap:mese h;ad Imt the abilit), to follow up their victories III a meanlllgful ....':Iy. ;and during 1942 Japanese carrier aircran lossn were double the numben constructed as replacements. Howe'\'C'r. With the loss of liMp to a Japanese subnurine in September the US avy ....':IS down to twO fleet carnen until the new EsYX clas1: and the converted hght fleet cUTlers entered ~rvice in mid-1943. There ....':IS C'~n talk ofborrmnng:l Unllsh cUTler at one St::l.ge. With the commissioning of HI)'lJ III the autumn the JapanCSC' av)' had four fleet carriers and one light carrier. o..'C'r the next thrtt months. the Americans.....ith control ofthe ;airfield on GUJ.da.lcana.!. held 5'0'0":1)' during wylight hours. but WIth ,"credible dC'termilution the JapJ.nese nunaged to delin~r troops and supplies to their position on Guada.lcana.! during night hours. opcralloTl.ll the Americans nicknamed the 'Tok)'O Exp~'. By ovember 1942. both sides' exhausted carrier forces ....'ere ....ithdrawn to ~up. 1C'J.ving the Solomons ~truggle to their battleship groups and bnd-based aIrcraft. On the night of 12-13 Nm-ember. a JapJ.nesc force ofm'Q baulcshlps. a cruiser and e!e..-en de:stlU)'C'rs ....':IS spotted approachmg GuawlcJ.nJ.1. An AmeriC;ln force of r.\'O heavy and thrtt light cruisers and eight dcstTO}-ers was handed the task of meeting and driving them off. as no US battleships \..'C're on hand to interfere. The r."'O forces met unexpectedly and suddenly in the pitch black. and in the pell-mell battle that followed, the US cruiser At/all/a and four AmericJ.n dcstTO}-ers were lost. with several other ships badly damaged. In return, the KOIl.l?O-ciass J<lpancse battl~hip Hiri had been disabled; eighty-fi..'C hits from crUlscr shells, foUow~d by air-dropped torpedoes and bombs dispatched her later. on the night of the 14th. Also that night, her sister battleship Kirishima with four cruisers and nine destroyers steamed illlo the area where they met the banl~ships II-aslriugl<Jfl and SoIll1l Dakola and four destroyers. Slugging it out, th~ Soli/II llik<.l/a sustained 14-inch shell hib in her superstructure but h~r armour remained intact; however. the Kirishima W:lS battered IIUO a wTCck by the Americans' 16-inch fire. and W:lS eventually scuttled. Apart from the serious damage to the Soil/II Dakota. three US de:stTO}'en were sunk.Japanese losses III these and other November battles offGuadalc:lnal also included three desu'Oyen, while the American Navy lost three cruIsers and six dt-stroyers, sunk by sUpt'riorJapanese night-fighting skills. Nonetheless. "'ppJ.lled at thcir losses on land - where the war of :mrltion. II became IIlcreaslllgly clear. could not be won - the Japanese began to plan for their withdra....":Il from the ~tern Solomons b)' the end of December. The first of a string of US re-conqueslS had been .:Ichie..~d.

The Battle of the Atlantic and Signals InteUigence

Unlike the Pacific. the "\':Ir in the Atbnric was one of no lluJor set-piece engagements. Inste;ad it \"':IS ehJ.raC1eri.zed by the ebb :lnd flO'... of steady. grindlllg p~ure ;applied through blockade imd counter-bloclude~ a tC'Chnological advanta~ here soon crossed OUt there: an unscathed convo)" followed by ;a dis;astrous re-<:rossing: and so on. By far the nUJofll)" of worldwide merchant losses continued to occur III the Atlantic. where the number of U-boat losses (thlfteen) was f.:IT outstrlp~d by ne.... U-b<t bunehn (108). Figures show that III the 6nt SIX months of 1942, 5 5 Allied ships ....~re lost. totalllllg 3 nullion tom an unsu uinable casua.!ty r.ue for the Allies, and one which led Admin.1

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Raeder and Hider to believe, as Dorlltz always had. that the U-boat would be the decisi\'C weapon in this theatre of the war. Increasingly, the ilHerception and analysis of German radio communications becamc essential to the defeat of the U-boat. All German V-boat operations were co-ordinatcd from a shorc headquarteN known as the &:fclr/shllbl'T dl'T L'utersUbm1tt' (Bdl), and it "'<1S standard operating procedure for a U-boat to put to sea and there to receivc its orders by ndio signals. Likewise U-bo:lts reported back to the fide' by radio transmiS1>ions. The Germ:ms. committing ont" of the biggest failurl"S of intelligt"nce of the WJr. never :Ieeepted the logical possibility that their Enigma codes could be intercepted. broken and put to Allied usc quickly enough to have an effect on their operations. Yet it was this <:onst3nt flow of radio messages that gave the Allit'd oper:ltion31 mtelligence commanders (but not the main Operations Rooms, who were kept unaware of the existence of Allied decryption for security reasons) the Iluelligence needed to defeat the U-boat threat during the U:mle of the Atlantic, and the Germans never worked this out. German messages between submarines. patrol aircraft (such as the Focke-Wulf Condor) and shore were lIlterccpted and used in twO crucial W'ilys. First. to the eontrary of German scientists' belief. German VHF signals were detectable by High-Frequency Direction.Finding (HF/DF) equipment. HF/DF remained unknown to the Germans throughout the war. Secondly. the uuercepted encoded mes~ges were sem to the Governmel1t Code and Cypher School at Dletchley Park. where a small team of talented mathematicians. programmers and intelligence experts broke the encryptions and scm the decoded messages to the Submarine Tracking Room at the Admiralry III London. The US Navy initially shared this illtdlig~'nce and other HF/DF information. and later in the war assumed the lion's ~harc of decoding a range of other German codes. Howl'Ver. the Allied abiliry to read German codes, at great effort. sccrecy and patience. and despitc a multitude of unavoidable ddays and disappointmcnts, did not at all makc U-boat operations transparem. For long periods the U-boat codes could not be decrypted. The British were unable to read any U-boat messages until January 1941.They then began to read, to January 1942, the 'Dolphin' cncoded traffic, but on I February 1942 the Gnrnans added an l'xtra, fourth, wheel to rhe standard threewheel Enigma cncoding machine. This new Atlantic code, 'Triton' (called 'Shark' by the British), n:mained unbreakable through the 'Great Blackout' until Deeember 1942. But like other weapons, decryption W'aS double-edged. The Germans wen~ also active in their own signals intelligcnce war. From February 1942 to June 1943. when the Battle of the Atlantic \vould be at its height, a German staff team led by Heinz Bonatz had reached such efficiency that it was deciphering low-b'd British operntional codes and the Admiralry's daily U-boat disposition signal within a few houN of disp3teh. By this the Germans were able to forecast altcrntions in convoy routl"S, 3nd to reposition thl'ir wolf-packs accordingly. As a 1946 British special report into wartime cryptographic activities ruefully reported: 'The patient and c3reful work of the submarine trackers was in (.lct being used agalllst our own ships.' British high-Ievcl codl"S \vere generally secure for long enough until scT:lpped and replaced, but weaknc<;s lay in the f.let that the Illl'ssages were recoded to ships and stations using less secuTC wirek"Sl. tdegrnphy. which could be broken and used [Q work back on the origmal transmissions. Howewr, e....en the best lIltdligence has its limits; it can be misused, ignored. misinterpreted and is subject to processing and analysis delays

before it is even acted upon. 'correctly' or not. The physical realities of warfare - the men and ll1achinl"S tasked with the lighting - 3re always more imporum than any intelligence. Intelligence could, rC3listically, do little more than comribute to a war of attrition.

'The Second Happy Time': V-Boat Successes Reach Their Peak

It was at this time that Atlantic shipPlllg losses were at their heIght; withlll the first four months of 1942, as Illuch Allied tonnage was sent to the bottom as Ilad been lost 1Il the whole of the previous year. Some longerrange Type IX U-boats operated 1Il the Indian and Southern Adamic oCt"aIlS. but the prlllciplt" was obVIOUS: mOSt U-boats would conccntrnle in the 3re3 of grt:att:l;t Allied shipping - and the Nonh Atlantic becallle an even richer hunting ground whell AIIlt."rican coaStal and cr.ms,lt!antic ~hipping becallle fully legitimate tJrgets III 1942. Upon the GeTltlJn declantion of war J6rJinst tht" USA III December 1941. J hrgt." number of U-bo:lts SJiled west to aUJck comparacively unprott"cted and fTt."Sh urgets off the t"ast COJst of Alllt."rica. Type XIV .Hi/ehllllh supply submarines enabled the Typt" VII to opt."r.lte this far away from home. The Gulf of Mexico WJS a particuhr hot-spot of OpeT:ltion Hwkf"se1l/a_~ ('Rolling Drums'); over fifty tankers and freighters were sunk in its waters III a six-month pcriod bt"twecn March and St:ptember 1942. Italian submarines also operated III AlIleriC:1Il waters and furtht:r south in the CaribbeJIl. Focusing on tht: conveying of fast troopships in the Pacific, and believing a weak escort to be a wa~te of warships. Adminl King did not IIlStitute convoying :Ilong the American East Coast until May 1942. The effect of the delay was massively ad\t."rse: 1.2 million tOilS of Amt"rican slupping - unescorted. sailing singly. openly radioing and with navigation lights undimmed - were sent to the bottom in tht" four months nicknamed 'The Second t-IappyTime' by U-boat crews.The US Navy was so shon of anti-submarine craft that it was givell :I numbt"r of 'Flower' class corvcttes by the Royal Canadian Navy and the British. Later It built dedic3ted cO'astJl patrol craft, but by then. Donitz's submarmes had exacted their highest Six-monthly toll sinct" the war had begun. By August. when the most deadly phase of the Battle of the Adamic was JUSt begmning. over 3 million tOllS of Allied shipping had already been lost in American waters. Uritish stocks of essentials were edging close to collapse. Tht." BJU had recalled most of its U-boats to the mid-Adamic which was swamped by wolf-packs sometimes numbering over thirry boats. But despite the U-boatS' g:lthering denSity, statistically only 40 per cent of all Allied convoys were ever sightcd. Ict alone att'ilcked successfully. A third of these sighted convoys subsequently eluded U-boJt attack entirely. And only 9 per CCIlt of all convoys lost morc than four ships. Several Illlportant factors influenced the U-hoats' variable strike rate: efficiency of cOlllmunications; thc weather conditions, including visibiliry: the skill of the U-hoat crew's attack; and the abilities of the defen~ive forces - human and technological - arr.lyed against them. Brilliam Allied llllllds wcre put to work fine-tuning Anti-Surface Vessel search radar. removing early glitches. Radar. particuhrly lightweight sets moumed 111 patrol aircraft but also increasingly aboard ship, could detect a sllrf.,ced submarine at a rangc of five mik"S. and sometimes pick lip a periscope at half a mde. The significam night-time surf:1ce advantage enjoyed by the U-boat was negated by this electromagnetic advance. J n April. new escOrt-llloullted cemilllctric Type 271 radar scored its first U-boat kill in concert with portable HF/DF - a

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sign ofthinb'S to come, and not a 1Il0lllem tOO soon, as U-boat numbeT5 reached 300 by late spring, with one third operational. The key was either to attack and sink the submarine or to force it underwater. Here a U-boat's speed was much reduced co, at best, 7 knots (compared to a convoy speed of perhaps 10 knors, aud escort sprint speeds of over 20 knors), and the submaTlne became detectable by Asdic sers mounH:-d aboard .."'Scorrs whIch could in turn be given precise directiom by air cover. The efficacy of British Type 271 ~hipboard radar was partially demonstrated by thl;: fact that dow convoy~, run by Canadian warsblps carrYlllg the less efficient SW IC Canadiandl;:vcloped radar, suffered 10ss.."'S III excess of their share of convoy duties. Then ab'alll, while providing 35 per Cl;:nt of Adamic .."'ScorfS, the Canadians were III charge 111 over half of all convoy combats with UboatS. With more than eighty corvettes ill commission by 1942 but still only a handful of effeerive destroyers, th..'Y fought a di~proponionate alllount of battles with U-boats, all the while under-resourced and under-trained. By the middle of the year, it was clear (ro the British at least) that the Canadian cornponelltS of the Mid-Ocean E~cOTf Forces were unable 10 compete effectively against the U-boat taerics, and the Canadian kJTCe was requested to withdraw 10 re-train and re-equip with Type 271 radar and new HF/DF gear.

trans,ltlantic convoys. U-boatS would lurk in it. r~upplring from '.\li/rllimllt", reliant on Metox and largely safe from land-baSed air cover. But over the course of 1942,Ihe U-boat's growing d..'StruCliwuess was chech-d. Between the spring and the autul11n. the average number of Uboars per opemtion had increased from five to twelve. Statistics ~how that a greater number of U-boats were accounting for fewer merchant sinkinb"i among them. Thus while the tallk'S for the second half of the year showed the highl"'St overoll toLll ofAllied tonnage sunk, each U-boat was sinking less and less during this period - from 16,000 toilS per Uboat per momh dowll to 7,000 tons. And while this did not alter the fact that more mercham ships than ever were being lost, it meant that Allied measures were havlllg an underlying effect. At the same Hllll', more UboatS were sunk than ever before. From 1942 onwards, the majority of U-boat losses were administered by aircraft flying from new escort carriers, MACs and from land bases. The complexion of the Battk' of thc Adamic was dowly changing_

The Tragic Risks of Arctic Convoying

Meanwhile. convoys had also to be Ttlll up in the Arctic, drawillg heavily British llaval reSOUTCeS, morale and endurance. Convoy requirements were expensive for navil"'S to continually attempt to meet. denuding other theatres and specific oper.ltiolls of much-needed na\f3l support. Despite shipyards on both sides of the Atlantic churning om ever-increasing nUll1b~rs of'Castl~ class corwttl"'S, Blark SlI'aJl class sloops. 'Jtiwr' class frib':lteS and American 'Destroyer Escorrs', the workllOrses of the Allied navil"'S could not be ~verywhere at once. ExperimentS of sending merchant ships off unescorted and scattered met with higher losses, and w~re curtailed. The tr.lgedy of convoy I'Q 17 in July - when twemythr~e out of thirty-three m~rchant ships were lost - dt:monstr.lted the difficult decisions facing thos~ in command. The catastrophic d~cision to scatter the convoy, taken by the First Sea Lord in fear of the German battleship Tj'l'itz in the offing, resulted not only in significant loss of life, ships and war materiel to maT:luding Uboats and dive-bombers, but also a lelllp0r.lry decline in the confid~nce of the Red Ensign in the White. N~arly 100,000 tons of supplies, and hundrt'd of tanks and aircraft, and thousands of \'~hicil'S were lost to the Bartl1t~ Sea. Two months later, PQ 18 lost 33 per cent of its ships. Hard as thcse losses were for the British to bear, the investment would cventually pay dividends.
011

The Tide Begins to Turn

Amumn saw the U-bo:lt attack intensifY filrther. Convoy ON 127 lost six ships totalling 44.000 tons and the Can3dian destroyer Ollmm to att:lcks by over a dozen U-boats. Sinkillgs of independent S3ilers ill the C3ribbean and off South America remained troublesome. Large-scale Rmlelf,Jklik oper.ltiolls were mounted in Octobl'r. Com'OY SC 104 lost nine ships of Ilearly 50,000 toIlS; SL 125 suffered twelve losses, of 80,000 tOilS; SC 107 lost fifteen ships of83,OOO tons. Aud by Septelllocr, German scientists had developed till' Metox T:ldar \\f3TTling receiver which ail'rted a U-boat 10 the presence of ASV I and ASV II r.ldar. The technological pendulum h3d swung ab':lin. But while T:ldar \\f3TJling receivers fitted to U-bo3ts enabled them to dive before an altack could be launched, to a COllVoy escort this \\f3S a very acceptable second best to an actual 'kill' as it threw the U-boat off track and could pin it underwater for hours on end, by which time the convoy wa~ long gone and :mti-submarinc reinforcements c311ed up if availablt'. A new i3ritish weapon, hurriedly introduced al the end of 1941. began to mature and prove ilS worth ill 1942.The fonvard-fiTlllg mortar bomb thrower called 'Hedgehog' began to equip i3rimh escorrs and was also adoptcd by the US Navy. Ib twemy-four small projectilt..-s detonated only on contact, and therefoTC did nO[ require bst-second fiddling with depth settings before firing, which unproved strike efficiency and no doubt Sowed a few finger<: too. For a variety of reasons It took time to be accepted 1Il the Royal Navy, but was very popular with the Arllerican~, and was a lethal submarine killer, Maritime patrol :nrCr.lft would eventually prove to be key ill combinlllg reach, pn..'Sence and offensive power. Not only could they force a transiting U-boat to dive and thereby lme its position vis-a-vis a convoy, but anlll..,d with depth charyl"'S and machine guns thl;: patrol aircraft could take the offensive to the U-boars by attacking them Upoll and belle:llh the surfJCc. Large land-based V"'ry LOllg Range (VLR) aircraft, by extcnsion, could providl' an umbrella over a convoy for much longer. As VLR IlIJritilllc patrol aircT:lft cquipped only one squadron III RAF Coastal COlllmand and nOlle at all in the US Atlamic command. the Mid-Atlalllic 'air !PI" was still a major problem for the Allied

The Baltic and Black Sea: Ice and Mines

Anxious to 1'111 dowlJ Soviet SUblllarill.. 'S operating in the Baltic, once the winter ice had retrealed the Krit'j!5ma,i,,1' found itself unable to prewnt a Soviet breakout in the spring, and suffered losses from mines laid by the Royal Air Force. More German and commandeered Swedish ships \wre sunk by Soviet submarlllt-'S and IIHuefields III the Gulf of Finland. Conversely, in the Black Sea. Galllall llIinefields successfully ward~d off Soviet submarint-'S and minesweepers attempting to 1l1terfcrc with supply shipping off the Bulbrarian and Romanian coasrs. And as the sit:ge ofSevastopol ellt~red its eighth mollth at the end ofJune, Hitler's summer offensive in Russia and Ukroine began. In the CTllllea, the cTtlis~r ,\lolo/or', six destroycrs and two transportS landed thouS.1nds of fresh Sovlel troops into Sevastopol ;md fought at great cost to bring away wounded evacue..' S. By the first week ofJuly. all four destroyers and both tramports had been sunk from the air while the port of Novorossiysk was 3ttacked by the Germans but saved by Soviet amphibious counterattacks. As the German offensive rolled east around

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the northern Black Sea shore and into the Caucasus, German air superiority made Soviet surface units very vulnerable and confined thelll to the eastern Black Sea ports ofTuapse, Pot! and Batum as a consequence. Hitler's plan to seize the oilfic1ds ofthc Caucasus - which could provide four times the quantity of oil that had becn available to Germany in 19-1-1 - came ever dOSl:r to fruition. Dy AUb'Ust onl: of history's mOSt intense sil:ges was under way somc four hundred miles to the north east at Sralingrad_ But on 19 NO\'ember the Soviets launched their scything counterattack, leading to enormous blood-letting on both sides and a flattened city_ Thc precarious Soviet situation was bolstered and the Germans were thcmselves surrounded, resulting in the surrcnder of von Paulus's decimated armies early in the new year. The Battle of Stalingrad hung over all other cvents of that winter simply by dim of the scale of the slaughter it involved. German and Soviet casualties numbered almost one and a half million - quite unlike anything the other belligercnts ever encountered. This was the strategic pivot of the year - Soviet Russia, at enormous cost, had stemmed the German tide on land and. buo)"l'd by reinforcements sent via the sea. could now gather itself to the long rask ofejecting the Nazi invaders and eventually deciding the outcome of W3r in Europe. It was [he anvil upon which Hitler's u'MtlSf<lllllr dream \vas hammered into pieces. The Caucasian oilfields and the oil artery up the River Volga were preserved. Hitler's armies. unable to conquer the oil supplies they needed. would never make further such advances into the Soviet interior. Instead, Soviet doctrincs of encirclement and deep battle would come to shatter over-stretched German armies,

The Fight for the Mediterranean Intensifies

In the Mediterranean and North African theatres, the Italians had been sidelined by the Germans, as a rt."Sult of which the British army under Montgomery \vas firmly on the defensive. And at sea, the Italian battle fleet was able to show initiative 011 a par with its British opponems at the Second Battle of Sirte in March 19-1-2. That momh, BritISh 'u' class submarines sank three lralian submarines. The Italians revised their convoying policy in early 19-1-2 and decided to provide each convoy with a battleship in close escOrt. This enabled a more secure transport of supplies to ROlllmel's force fighting the British Eighth Army, which would Tt."'Sult in the German recapture of Benghazi and the fall ofTobruk, and the subsequent Axis re-invasion of Egypt. Simultaneously, an increase in uiftll'l1../f1! strength ill the arrival of If F/irgerkorps brought the fight over Malta to crisis poilU for the British. The R0}'31 Navy was forccd to leave the island base in April. the Illolllh of heaviest losses (four dt."Stroyers and four submarint."S bombed 111 the harbour, in dock or trying to leave), followed shortly by the submarilH,"S which redeployed to Alexandria. RAF forct."S on Malta comprised mainly outdated illedium bombers and a few tired fighters. Forty-st.'Ven Spitfires had been flown off" from the American carrier 1a.lJ} on 20 April, but within tell days only seven werc left operational in the face of unrelenting aerial attack from ju 87s, ju 88s and Me 109Es. Axis supply lines were no longer hindered by Malta, and in the face of overwhehmng Germ:m air superiority large British naval forct."S became compelled to turn back when nearing Sicily on eastbound t."Scort duty.

assistance in the early planning suges). But Hitler felt unable to trust the capabilities of the Rtgia Marilla. which would have to be relied upon to ke('p a British attack a\vay from the invasion transports, and \vas unwilling to diwrt rtsources a\vay from the massively urgent priority of the Russian frolll. and secondarily from Rorlllller~ call1pai~;lling in North Africa. Resistance on Malta \vas likely to be stubborn, he also calculated. ThiS hCSIt.lnCY W:lS key. A small number of British convoys \vere pushed through with mixed success. In August, the biggest Allied relief opcration so far - Operation Pedl-stal - W:IS launched from Gibraltar, augmcntcd by naval units released after the PQ 17 disaster and by a reduced thrcat to the Indian Ocean after the Amcrican ~uccess at Mid\vay. At the cost of a British carrier, eight other \\"JNhips and nine merchant ships, a convoy of fivc ren13ining merchantmen was pushed through to Malta. Some revisionist historians have subsequently questioned whether this operation to sustain Malta - and the wider Mediterranean strategy - conducted at such cost to the ROy.I1 N:lVy, \vas worth it to the overall Allied \\"Jr effort. But to the people Oil Malta and to Churchill, it \\"JS viraL And corning after the traumatic surrenders at Singapore and Tobruk, the lo's of Malra would likely have had dire consequcnces to Briti~h morale, not to mention the Medilerr:l.Ilean military situation_ [n any case, the supplies Pedestal delivered enabled lhe island to hold out until the end of the year, by which time two Illore convoys had successfully arrived. With the rdurn of offensivc British naval and air forces to Malta, pressure was renewed on Axis supply lincs crossing on the north-south route from North Africa to Italian ports. Simultancous!y, Axis air attacks began to decrease in numbers, ferocity and cffect, with the It.llians resuming the burden oCthe bombing and preferring to revert to higherlevel tactics despite being supplied with Stubs. Never again would Malta be in such peril.

The Axis on the Retreat

The success of the Italian armies and RomTlld'~ Afrika Karps were significantly affected by the aggressive patrolling of British submarinl"S, though the British found the submarine \\"Jr tough in the Mediterranean despite the Italian lack of radar; ta'l:,'l':ts often hU.!,'b'l':d enemy-held shorelincs and attacks in shallow, clear \\"Jters were difficult to pull off, especially in the face of local enemy air and submarine cover. But j"TJ.lided by Ultra intercepts, smaller 'U' and 'T' class boats and motor tOrpcdo boats had a decisive effect upon Axis supply convoys to North AfTica_ Nearly five hundred merchant ships - a quartcr of all Axis shipping sunk in the Meditcrrane3n - and 169 \varships would fall PRj' to British submarillt:s. In 1942 these British craft hdpt'd create conditions by which the Germ:In position in North AfTica \\'3S eventually rolled up and decisively defeated during 1943. The consequent loss of file! supplies (estimated :It two-thirds of its oil requiremellts) destined for R.ollllllel'~ army helped Montgomery keep him at bay in c3rly September 1942. Meanwhile, British supplies of tanks, lIltlllitioliS and troops continued to [reI. [he long \\'3y round the Cape of Good Hope to reach Montb"Olllery, giving him a growing 1Il3terial advanrage ovcr the increasingly cut-off Gt'rm:lll and Italian opposition. The Eighth Army s('curcd victory over ROlllmel at the second banle of EI Alamein at the beginning of NO\'l'lllbl'r. Freed momemarily from its COtWoy-covering duties, Force H went ovcr to the offensive and look('d south from its base in Gibraltar wits next cmploymelll. Coinciding with Momgomery's signal vicwry over ROlllmel at EI Alalllcin and Just as the Sovi('t armil'S b('b'3n the biner figill-back at Stalingrad. Operndon Torch - the invasion of French North

The Relief of Malta

The British position in the Mediterrallt::1Il was now tenuous at bt."St, and for Malta to survive seemed an Impossibility in thc face of AXIS preparations for amphibious and parachute IIlvaSiOll (involving japant."Se

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Afrin - ....'as bunched in Morocco by US :and British fore" comprising the biggest amphibious opcn.non of the war to due. When German troOps entered Toulon in ovcmbcr 1942. the French nunaged to scuttle S('\~nty-seven of the eighty ships W1thlll the base. F~nch n,;1I\<l1 power. tr:unpled on by friend and foe. may ha\~ been at its 10we'51 ebb bot American and British srrcngth \\<1$ what mattered if Fn.nce \\<lS ('\~r to recO'o~r 11'5 bases and much else bc$ldes. Unable to interfere with Torch. the Kritj?sttlQrill~ did nOt ha\~ it allm own way in the Arctic. On New Years E\e. the escorts of convoy'S JW 51A andJW 51B - two British 6-inch cruisers. Sll4frtld 1ndJamdl(Q and six dL"Stroyers respectively - were cOllfronled by a powerful Ger11l1n T:Iiding force of the 'pocket battleship' UlnolV and the heavy cruiser HipJNr accompanied by six destroyers. Unaware of the presence of the Brmsh CHlIsen;. the L!itzow peeled ofT 10 investigate the incoming convoy JW SIB. willie the Hipper :lIld dL'Stroyt'rs :macked the hopelessly outgunned British destroyers. which laid a smokescreen between the GC'rmans :lIld the convoy. The 4.7~1l1ch armed Onslou' was diSJbled and thC' A(I/alts sunk while they hulled to cO'oer the retreating convoy JW 51 B. MC.lIll\\hile the Brllish crulSCrs appt'ared on the scene and opt"nC'd fire. holmg the HiPI'" below the waterlllle and slllking one destroyer.The GC'fllUlllo brole off the .lICtlOll .lind the convoy was sawd. Hening n('\\"5 ofhllo ships f.llilmg to .lIct dceisl\'c1y .lind being seen otrby inferior forces. thC' lIlC1.ndescent Hitler f.lllllously ordered the scrapping of thC' Kn~~n1aml~ surface fleet. an order he bter rewrsed but not before Grand Adnllr-.ll] Rolleder had been repbced by l)Qnltz as Conull.ander~m-Chief of the Kritgsmilnllt.

End of the Beginning

In the ~pnllg of 1942 Hitler had been on the cusp of major victories.The BntlSh Commonwealth army fightlllg out ofTobruk had capllulaled [0 ROlllmel; the Malta convoys were barely getting through; and Alh~d col1vo)'s to Russi.ll suffered IllaJor losst.'S. exemplified by the disaster of PQ 17. The Jap.ant"Se had walked II1tO most of East Asia and d~feated AIIIl'rican. British and Dutch naval fOfCl'S along the way. Out within six Illomhs of the Allied lIadir 111 late sprll1g. the picture now looked very

different for the Axis. With Alarllein. Midway and Sullllgrad on the plus side of the babnce sh~t. the Allies 1ll00'cd O\'l:r to the offel15i...~. Hlder's Stratcogy for 1942 - the conquest of thC' oil-filled Persian Gulf and TransCaucasus spc'C16cally; the qUick defeat of the SO\'let Umon III genera.l I\"nullled fom~r unfulfilled. Hider .admitted that he did not know how to defeat thC' UnHed States. Strategic mlti.lltIVe had passed from the Axis to the Allie'S. For thC' $ovIC[S. thC' first lluJor victory o\'('r a IlUSSI\'(' Gernun army sh()',...~d the way to\"'70ros a wider coulller-ofTellSlvc which would not stop until it reached the R.ti(/ukauz/ti. The Jap.anese lIlay ha\'C felt satisfaction in their swift and violelU acquIsItion of an enormous new empire but had been shown to be m:ncrially and strategically at a growlllg disadvantage fighting against the USA. For the Americans. the carner-based fight~back through the Pacific islands would be facilitated by the victorie'S .lit Mid\vay and Guad,lcana1. Throughout the yen. American production had skyrocketed. Extravagant urge1'5 - 60.000 aircraft III 1942. 125.000 in 19-13; 25.000 tanks in 1942. 75.000 III 1943; 20.000 AA guns up to 35,000 the following }~ar; .lind most 1Il1portalllly. Illereham shipping [Onnagc up from 1.1 million tom in 1941, to 6 nllUlon ton III 1942. 10 million tons in 19-13 - ....~re not only met bot exceeded as the hu~..c mdustrial capacity of the conrinenul United States \\<lS h.arnessecl and expa.nded. For the Bnmh Common.....e.llith. which had been fighting alone for at least C'ightC'en months by the turn of 1942. the ,'ictory at Alamein and thC' North A#Tic.lln Iandmgs m.arked an Important lurning point in the war; \I w.IIJ, .liS Churchill put II. 'the end of the beginning'. AIIIC'ric.lln forces and strategic Will IIlcreaslllgly became more involved in the European conniC[; III the hushed bolick-rooms and offices. codebreakers were back in business with 'Trlton'; and thanks largely 10 the efforts of US shipyards, Allied escort numbers climbed to'ovards Ihe 500-mark. If Britain could be sust.lined through the c1nllax of the U-boat onslaught then the planned Allied victory 1ll Europe would be possible; without that, for the Allies the war would be AllIerica's burden in the oceans of the world and the Soviet Union's 011 land.

95

fI-

I 942

The US Navy in the Atlantic

Upon entry to the war, American warships assumed responsibility for antisubmarine convoying and patrolling in the western North Atlantic, joining the growing R.oyal Canadian Navy, which had been performing sterling service on behalf of Britain since 19~O. (opposite) USS Memphis in the South AtJantic A superb VIew IookJng aft from the bow of the tight Cruise Memphls (CL-13) underway. 1941-2.Thos photograph gooes a very good ,m~SI()(l of the ship's fine lines, and the unorthodox arrangement of her 6-inch guns wrth two in the forward turret and four more in r.lngle Gl>emate mountlngs either side of the forward superW1Jdure. This arrangement was originally duplicated aft. but two of the casemate guns were rerTlOYed because the ships turned out to be ~ght.Also VIsible here is the forward 3Inch antJ-auuaft gun. behind the turret. and the rangefinder5 and other fire-cootrol eqUipment on the tnpod foremast The crewmen are wearing the short Whites' popular in the tropICS. MempM was one of the ten Omoho class. and like her SlSter-shlps ~ mainly in the AtlantIC dvnng the war (t'NO that ~ In the PadIC, Morb'~ and Rclergt>. both survrved senous damage from japanese air attack. suggestlng that those who cntlOzed the onglnal des'gn as too ligh1'M:!lght were not altogether correct). In January 1943 she hosted President Roosevelt during the Casablanca conference - the ship's 5&ond brush wrth VIPs: back in 1927 Memphis had brought home Charles A undbergh after his ptaneering trans Atlantic fhght.

Landing Signal Officer on Wasp

On board the Glrner USS Wasp (CV-7) 111 early 1942 ~ unchng Slgnal Officer and enSIgn assistants guide planes .... to land. Wasp served in the Atlantic and Mediterranean <k.o:1ng the first half of 1942 before being transferred to the PaCific.

Scout-bombers on USS Ranger

Douglas sao 'Dauntless' scout-bombers on USS Ranger circa June 19'!l Ranger was the only large US carner to serve in the AtlantIC throughoot the war

97

North Adantic patrol The .....et and ~ZJI'l& cold at I'lIgh latstudes attacked every exposed surf~e_

Hen: USS Tnppe (00-103)

--"'" "'"
"""""

is cClYer"ed with ICe in February 1941after an"Mn& at Ponland. Maine. The ICe had to be

by $hips' ~ ot/'lerINlse

con5icIerabIy and stal*y _ thrutened.

Crewmen

loadi"i; pn:Msions loadn& the USS PC-556 for a ~ ofI"the AtlantIC coast, a Octobel" 1941 Tlws ~vesseI ~ aNt fi...e ~ old wtlen this photogr'ap/'l_ uken. and ~ wd ' - t-n prepamg for' I\er" malden operatoonal YCI"pge,~ wnalI. IHfeet. 2as-ton patrol craft were c.pable of 20 kroots and earned ~ )onch gun and twO depth-charge tIYowers and rack$ for coastal antJSlJbmarv',e WQI1c. They were unable to counter the U-Boat Arm's Operat>On'Paukt:n1dlIog' in the fi~ SD< months of 1942

(oppo$lte) FMh-deck destroy'er The US N.r.;y ~ ~ 01 ~-one 01 tt>e' old flWI.. ded< ~ I...oke ~ tM<en <Ner by tt>e' Royal ~ they were e.-e'ltuaty re-med and ~ ~to-<l.l.te r1Miir. Id laler IT'Ily were c~ for ottler wb 5UCh as fm transports. ~ and seaplane camers.

98

1942 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

99

1942

Life on board a British minesweeper,

HMS Sandown
The 684-tofl padc:lle sturner Sondown w:u Ml Isle dWight krry btlllt in 1934. She wu just one oilNfl)' such ~ips requisitioned by the Admiralty in 1939 ~ converted Into I piddle minesweeper.As such Sandown was typiaJ of the thout.V'Mh of SlNIl civilian vessels taken ~ for the counoos ufllbmorous but essentuJ dl:uc!5 oIa navy at war. Bned u Dovet'" durinJ: 1940-2.w was !hen converted ~ chrs t.-ne into VI <luxilW'y anti.airc~ ~. before being retUlTled to her owners In 19+4.

'In S~" stOWll'li the Otter. the Iate-Ioke device U5ed to hold the sv.ftP the correct d$tMIce from the Wp's 5Ide

1942 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Sunbathing on deck.

Cleaning lewis goos

III

Dover harbour.

The corrmaod is given to haul in the ~

Lener wntmg on the Mess Deck.

101

1942

Operation Zerberus: the 'Channel Dash'

Three days pnor to the loss of their ~r Asiilll ~e ill Sinppore. the British ~d wat.e;t!ed u the German biltt1e<:n.tisen Gneisenou and SchomllOfSl ",nd the I\Nvy
cruiser Pmz Wren escaped from Bn!u and l.ucbciou5ly ue~ in ~d ~ight up the En&ltSh Channel and back to Cuxtuven. Three lItD,Cks wen! mounted, by NTBs. Swontfi$h ~ by four elderly destrOyers to within 3.000 y.an:ts. but to Itttle effect. H~, both butlecru'lers hit mines as they neared their destination. Uld while under ~Ir Gnttsenou was hit by RAF bombers and was so badly c:brnqed that she - . - rewmed to service. (Some of her maIn gUM wen! subsequently mounted for coasal dl*nc.e in Norwq. when! they SUrYM! to dlis <by.) The 'Owlnel [)uh' was a senous ~rnss~t to the R~ N~ ;lOd RAF. rod a d~tk ~ success for GerTTgny: I'1owoeYer It was ~so a con~ble stntqk own-pl removina; at a stroke the dlreat of the big UMps euily bre:3kJna Out: Into the AdalltIC. IIUl"d IeIvlnt them boaJed..up in the Bmic.

The ~ -:l ~ accompane:l by a ScmeI-boOI' (nctrt). seen &om Pnnz~. steMnlng 14) a typoaIIy arer Id m.sty EngWI Q.annel on
I) Febrwry 1941

102

1942

The Kriegsmarine at war

\.

A1lhoogh the Kritgsmonnc', sumce fOf'tes were never able to re<over from the lones susuined durina the NOrwegWl c:ampalZn,;and the majority of resources were increuingly put Into the U-boat campa'&J". it svll hold to Cilrry out the nme nufl'lerous rovtioe tub of a -.artime rIZ'i)' is its bigger opponent across the North Sea.A number ofw;r,ntllps!:Nt Nod beblrd to the ruvies of uptured countries wef'e put into sefVk:e to help accomplish lhis..

(top left) ~,fonner ~ rnin&yoer The tnII"leIa.,er Olav T~ was ~ CUY1I the German II"Wa:5lOI"I of Norwq ., ApnI 1910. n:I was ~ by the K.ltp'llO'o-e l.I"der the ~ AIJocros
(1940-1) and tl"el 8nIrvner (19'41-5. ~ the pte'o'IOUS 5hIp of that ~ had ~ Ulk) She IS - - . here ... the \mel- ~ lnierw3y drJng ~ ope:m.oons aff a SflCM'..oo..nd Norwegr;In coast., 1942. On 18 I'el:Jrwry 1942. 6ovn-net was enpced In laying mIneS otr Pon.angen F,ord n ~ ...+w:n she sTtted. througtll:!'lldr; fog. a So.oet Slb'Nnne on the sa.mce ~ Il'lISSlOg her whie tr'yt'lg to ram. the GenNn crew heard the Slbnanrle crew stlOYt 'Russkl. the So.neu ~ ~ they had been attad<ed by a BntISh
veMe"fvl ac;tompa~~ then ~ the

Sl.b'nan'le. whoch ~ and made lU escape but not before her aptan, his bot UlJiht .... the rapdy sh.lt tu.tdl, WAS left behnd and rescued by the ~ The Bnxnmer and her II: were trequenu,. the ~ of 50YIet ~ though were I"MeIy hit.

Depth-charge thrower
A sequence of Wee photographs ~ depth

charges. berlg fired from .. ttYowet" on a GemI&n escort vessel. The KnegsrnoIlne h.1d an ~ record on 4Iltto submame warfare. achtevIng just one confinne<l $lflIang dl.nng the war

103

The Prime Minister and Lord Privy Seal visit the Home Reet
Ivl offic;i;JI phot~ of BntaIns le.tder for most of the WM. Pnme ~Wnston Ouchi I, with the \.ofd Prr.y

Seal. Stalbrd Cnpps. 'od the Comrnder.jo..Choef Home Aec1. AdmoI )om c. T~ on the q.wterdecl< ofToooey:s ~ HM5 K6lg GeorJl'!' V It Sap.I fbw on II October 1941_ AdmoI Toooey. v.b:l had a ~ rKoni on aetoO'l fmm'Nol1dWar~_---..eel IS ~ of the Home Fleet ~ the nornensety stres6J ~ of 1940 ~I 1941 He then went on to seNe IS Comrnder~Nore.1S wellS Fim 'od PnnopaI ~ Aide de ~ to the Kn& rom J-wy 1945 He was not ~ to ~ \4l to 0vctII (Oltoer 00fTYTlInden 1eMroed to deal WIth twn t\"OOI"e Oplom,l.~) ..-.d IS " result thetr reW.tJClt1Sh,p W~ ~I '" Ked Crws ~ been Solocnl:r~"tt>e loKond Ubou' ~ b u t sat ~ I ~ MPon ttoe ""'\me (oaIooor\ serw'lg1S ~ to ttoe Scw>et t.non ~ t 9040-2 As Lord Pnvy Seal Ill! _ Lrader of ttoe ~ of CorTvnons and at. the ~ tIl5 phOIO&nph """ taozn had pst had " map- dlsci&'ee ,,,,,"It ~ 0w..rcnI o.oer the CIIoe<IIl pIanv>g of the _ efli:rt Ind had ., ~ offered I'IIs ~ Wl\twl "few WCll:b he moYed 10 become MnsIcr lOr Arcn!'l. ProO.Jct,c:n

s.-

s.-

Anti'lJrtran IUns on bo3rd a battleship Ivl ogtttlwreIled 2pdr pom-pom anu-anraft &U1

mountJn& on a battJesl'op. powbty KIlg George V_The &U1 layer on the further (right /wld) enclosed posrt>on IS lo<:lUlg through the fore- aod bad-SIghts. Such enclo$ed po$ItIOIl5 were not fitted as standard. aod ITlOI'e often than oot the entire craY mountlng would be ., the open. aItt'oough a I'1U!T'Iber of suc!'I rnod,katlons seem to have been used ., vanous ,f'ldlV1dual tnStanCes. The boxes to eMer SIde of the e'gllt gun barrels are for the atTVn.lnrtJon. whde belo'w the barrels can be seen the eKlt chutes (or empty cylinders. The funnel~ object w-ble Jl the middle of the mounting IS for coolina .....dter for the gun b.urels. In the backgrould ve two Wlile 20rrvn OerIikon mountings. igdlll used rmmIy for anb-u-er..l'I. defence. Only one ~ualIy has the gun mounted.

106

1942

The Wrens
Women's RO)"II
N~

Servoce (WFlNS) un,u were

eosClblishmenu in

OIwched to most

~ ~

Briain. During Worid War Two the Women's RopJ Naval Servio::e wa.s exJWlded rapidty - fn)m HOO to ~rly 7-4.000 by the wu', end. The mUl objective wu fOf" women to n:pb.ce certain personnel in order to releue men for <lctlYl! lervice in the f\eet. A brae number of women <lIsa served ;abroad in bom the Middle East and the East. Some members of the service wen!! employed In secret ru.~1 communiu.tiom ;r,nd tnnsport ftylnc duties.

nr

Wren inspection Ve~ Laugt1ton Mathews ~ Wren duef~ and petty oAken at W Royal Naval &rncks at Devonport in 1941 Daught~ of ~ 8nmh naval MtOlWl Sr JoIv1 Kr1o>I Laughton Ver.iII WilS the o.recto.- of the VoJomen's Roy,! Naval Set-w:e &om 1940 to 19-46.

W~

""""""'" ""'-

Western Approaches WOl't.Ing 011 .. plott.tlg

... \'Vestem WOIChes

107

.
1942

Arctic convoys
The sea voyage to the north Russian poru of Murmansk and Archangel was the shortest route for sending Allied supplies to Runia. But it was also the man
dangerous owing to the large concentration of German forces in northern Norway. The last convoy to reach Murmansk without loss. PQ 12. had arrived in early March.After this. convoys grew in size and urgency. as did German efforu to destroy them.

Convoy 17 In June. the Admiralty received word thaI the next convoy to sail for SovIet ArctIc ports would recerJe an all-out German assault. De~tte this. on 27 June convoy PQ 17 set sall from Re}oiqavik. conSIsting of th,rtythrtt merchantmen with a close escort and a battleshIp covenng fon:e gMng an vnprecedented ~Iy-o;even wri1ps ,n total.The covenng force turned back on I Ju~ On '" July. two merchantmen wet"e lost to air attacK. and news of the German caprtal shIPS r,'P'U', Sdleer and Hipper sorhe1fl8 from Altenfjord near Trom$O in NoJWay led to an AdmIralty order to satter the convoy. The rlf!'Xl day. a tlJnm tw@1\I@ m@f'Chantmen Wl!n! loS! to U-boats and air attMk. The ~at of the GernIan heavy unltS dl5traetl!d t:hf! attentlOO of the covenng and ~ort forces. despite the German shIpS never becoming Invo~ III the action and mumlng to port '11 the evenIng of 5 Ju~ Only ten merchant vessels eventually reached Archangel. guided in by Scv!et ~ Th,s Image shows escorts and merchant shIPS at Hvalfjord in Mol)' !942 before the wihng of convoy PQ 17. Beh,nd the destroyer karus is the Russlan tanker AzetbatJon.

po

108

1942

Men """I)Ii(Nrd to

(below) Clearinl snow from the night deck of HMS V"ldoriol4 ~ the 500W <liter i norm on 24-27 Marth 1942 while the awualt camero _ Pt of lo l'orce cOYerJng ConYO')' to northern Rus~ Be)(lOd is the .-ropressrve bulk of the fla.gsIvp. KIng Geofge V Note the puff of steam it the 1'orwird ~ of the fl,grn. deck - ~ _ to II"ldoate the dorecbon of the WII'ld.

(above) Wjtn~ses to a" explo$lon

!vi amn'UWbOn ship expIodtng, ~ fn:m on bOiIrd an ~ort carner on 19 October 1942. Of aI the rner'Chant cargoes most IethaJ to ~ In the even1 of a torpedo Ot bomb nri:e, ilI'IVTlUI'lI't I4Ilks wrth petroleum ~ the v.orst. The possblrty of escaplI'll a strICken ~ip _ dJfficult enough in Il"lOSt On;~es. but the detonalJ()n of orboard tl"O'VtJOnS rmde the likelihood of W"'VivaJ tenibly!Jim, If not ~ . Crews bndonIn& ship In the ArctIc also ~ to contend with !ieilS !iO cold that their suvivaI _ a m.1tter of JUST.
l'T\IIlUtes at most.

1942

U-boats at Kiel Type V1ID U-boat V-118, together WIth tJ-126 and tJ-127. on 17 Augtm 1942, at Krupp's Germama Werlt shIpyard, KJel, where all three '-"'ere built. The latter t'No boats had only been launched In June and July respectNely and '-"'ere stili fitbng out. Both were lost the folio'wlng year. WIth all hands. tJ-118. on the other hand. having been commiSSIoned at the start of 1942. survrved the war. although she didn't have a partICularly wccessful u.reer. laying mll'leS that were nespons;ble for the smlung of just three small ~sels while being damaged three t1n'leS herself. Hawever. she dod have one unoque claim to fame: one of her viaJms, the flShlllg vessel Kneel. sunk on I0 July 1945 by a rrune laid off the Lizard. was the last 8ntlsh sfllp to be lost to enemy action dunng the war Uke many of the U-boats at the end of the war: tJ-118 was to be sunk as part of Operatlon Deadhght". but Instead she foundered under tow to her deslgnated s-nklng area.

The huge steel and glass hang over the building slip$. wh.ch dominates this photograph. had been part of Krupp's investment in the yard at the beginning of the twentleth century. allowing work to continue If! all weathers. a precUf"SO( to the cO\lel'ed shipbuilding facilities of the modem era.AIlIed bombing during the war removed most of the glass. but by that tlme the need for U-boats was such that they '-"'ere being built In the open arl)Way GerTTlilnla werf! built over a hundred U-boats between 19)5 and 1945. yet was one of the '>ITlalier burlders of these vessels. Along!.lde the quay In the background is the Cruiser pnnz Eugen, whICh !\ad been forced to return to Ktel in May for repairs after havlng her stem nearly severed by a torpedo from the 8ntlsh subrnanne Tndent off Trondhelm on 22 February

."

=-:::~- ~

--' - ._---->-- ~ ~

--]t"

."
....

.....

N'

~~

~-

:-

-.

I I l

----------------------------

1942

On board a Royal Navy destroyer in northern waters M oflic:ial photograph. dated 15 March 1942. captJOne<l:'A destroyer recel'i'eS the SIgnal saying an enemy air attack can be expected. Gun cnews are stanchng by theIr guns watching and warung.The sh,p IS probably a 'Tnbar class destroyer. but beyond that the <aloent impress>on. from the manner of dress of the men around the guns
well wrapped up but with f\Ot a tin helmet In sight IS that they are rather JTlO<"e concerned about the cold than being atUlcked, This suggests that the St'IIP IS servlflg somewhere II"l northern wate~

I 14

1942

Survivon; of the loconoo s.r..-rs of the totpedoed Iner' ~ ct.ng 10 an ~ I~ flIU poor to beon& rescued In an II"IOdent that was Ioog kept ~ the I.oano. 5eI"W'IC IS , tr'OOpShIp but ~ ~ ItMin ~ of w.,;_ too pedoed by U-156 on 12 September 1942 off west
~ tt.l. the Ubt;w.ts cOl'l'Wl'\il'lde Wernet" Hartensten SlgI'IolIIed n pLwl ~ lOr hdp .... ~ as tNny as he coUd. resdbng II'l omer u-boats as wei as VIChy ffeoc:h.....-arst.ps 00fl'WlI to his MI. T~ an Amencan aruaft ~ m'ed 'd ~ V-/56. ~ .... the breablg oIf of the rescue A/ttooo..Iah ~ IIXYJ rrves ~ saved. . ,600 more ~ not.

Ah:.i.

Ships of me Home Fleet aw.rdin& the northem

tr.lde routes

Taken *urn the ~ HMS ~ n lcet.Oc water;" cn-route to ~ Flow. 26--29 Mf 1942, the p/'lotogr.tph ~ the 1-!t.nt" da$$ ~ M4:llffln ~ and 8Icn<ney ... Woe ahexI ~ tIw'oui:h dloppy seas. for most of the partICJpatlU .... the w .1 se4 tM II v.tlat It was hkl! rnJdl of the tme.

I I 6

The Second Battle of Sirte

The IwiMl ~tt1e fleet wu ~bIe to show initiiltive on ... PM with its Britbh opponents at the Se<:ood Battle of Sine on 22 March 19-42.The battleihip Uuono. supponed by three Crulsen, inflictl!d cbmage to a Bnvsh force of four D.do class cruisers Utd'Tribar dtitroyen: protecting a snull convoy hNdifla f Malta from Akxvldria. Press'"' Mrne the atuck despite BntW! ~ ~s and eYUIYe Ie:tion,;md ~ from excessive salvo-spread the Liuono's ~in a~rneflt lOund ItI ~rit ~ the Bnush denroyen. Debyed by the b<ittle. upon firglly reachu"C Mala the Bnush transpOf"t d'ups ~ sunk by iIIr IttKk Utd one desuoyer wn Io$t to a mine.

~v.,s ~'JI'I ~ ~ aetIO<1 agan5l:

W italian

fleet .. "1S ~ t~ 0Vt ~ (dri lT1:lm 'wr own bo~ ~e fi-om J SI"I'IOIte Bo.at cklpped ;mem) to shield U'of' Ccr'i'o'OY.u HMS ~ eoev.nes r.er for'w..-d 5~ lIU'5 to i/'e he lub111eet.

bt~

I r7

1942
Salvaging 6reconsllire
Three photographs taken in August 1942. showing sa~ge work taking place on ~ wreO: of the Bnxonshrre. one of the Bnbsh supply shIPS sunk by bambmg after the BanJe of $,rte, The diver is salvag'ng cases of goods from the sunken shIP. which is /ylng on its !iide.The men supporting the drver are in fad pen::hed on an AA gun. now lying parallel with the SUlface of the sea. The salvage parties wori:.ed on the SIde of the hull. the ,tems re~ being taken ashore ,'I small boats. 01 was alo;o pvrnped from the shIp ''Ito drums .mel then taken ashore in tIarbour craft.

1 18

1942

Italian operations in the Mediterranean

In contrast to the Royal Navy's tr.avails in attempting to c;ontinue running supplies into Malta, in the early months of 1942 the Italian Navy wou able to escort subSLlntial convoys to North Africa. reinforcing Rommel for his next offensive. Rommel was able. by the end of the month. to occupy Benghazi.

The cruiser MontKuccoli

uke all Italian Cn.Jrsers the Momec:uc:coo Wil5 voef)' fast. but unlike most of the others. she survived the war: In 1952 she ..,;sited London. the ~rst Italian warship to ",sit Btiuin SU1(e before the war She is photographed here from on board the Dvco d'AoSIQ In Apnl 19'12.
Firing practice
Anutorpedo-bofrbe..- finng ~ctice onboiird the cruise<" MOfllecuccol,. 1942. Note the fingers in ears!

Launching a new anti-submarine motor launch launch of the VAS-225 at the Celli yard,VenlCe. 5 March 1942. Note the bless"'g.

lulian torpedo boat Unce. at Piraeus. Greece Budt as a result of a clause in the Wasl'lingtoo Naval Treaty whICh permitted uolimrt.ed bulkl,ng of shiPS below 600 tons dlspiacemenll.Jnce was one of the 'SpICQ' class of warstups closer in size and role to destroyer escorts.: their prinopal prey were submannes. The same month as this photograph was taken in AugoJst 1942. the Bntlsh submanne Ptlrpoise was attacked and damaged by the Lonce off Dema.LJbya.A year later. Lonce was sunk by the Bntlsh 'U' class submanne VllOf In the Gulf ofTaranto.

I 19

1942

Pearl Harbor, March 1942

If any evidence was needed of the a.eticJ.1 blunder of not bunching:l second :ltUck on Pearl Hubor ;and of concentnlting on the pan bc:iHties n.ther dun the ships. U1ese photocnPhs aken at the bue less man four mond'ls later ....ould have amply provided it.AJrudy most of the ~ stllP! ~d been sufficiently patched up to nuke dlflr Wlf'( bick to the ITUinbnd United Sates for NU ~irs. and eYen the lint of those wnk were afloat apn. But what nukes these Kene5 part>cubrly teIing is tNt they not onty show major wor1c being arried out on .. $hip mat _ not one of the YlCtIms of the japanese attaCk. but major WOf"k that had ~rudy

I
.l

as USI.W

been pbnned ;and was belfll dc:Iroe as IW't of a routine prognrrme. It was business lot Peart Hubot". ;and America was already fIutrlg the vast mdustnal muscle Wt would soon bqin to crud! pPul.

uss ,""""'" The ~~ on thew ptootop-apl'l$ IS the -eraft c.vner ~one of the ~ ~ had the P>d b"t...ne to be m _ tNt fa-..eful December Su"lday. The WCll't. beIt'c urned out ~ ~ 01 her e9lt fl.-n;tl pIS on t'NlrIlTlOU"'tS. These ~ been pMt of ~ ! ~ llI"ICe she W-st enl~ ~ like other ~ the Unr'..ed States ~ I\ad 00'l&""'I'Y ~ ots ~ umtI'1; PQ$$ltWy """"" to de'end ~ ~ ~e.mdd<.As ~ doctme ~ dn1g tne 1930s trvs _ ~ be<:ome less ~ leu ~ l~ Roy.1l ~ bene the Wst to effew.oeIy re:~ this. ~ HMS~, ~ So..rlac:e ~ WIth ~ gu"IS on 1939)

MId l7y the rr.dlSe

of 19-41 the deosIon had been taken to ~e Le on', ll-Wl(h fA5 (Od those of her SISter ScJootogro) WTtn new S-fldl ~ ~ Botto phc~ were taI<en on 30 Mcn 1941They st'ON ll-Wl(h mou"!t No. 3 hM'C be"'C ~ b" reTWMI from It$ po$IWl to the rur of me fi..n>eI belr1: lowct'ed II'ItO a ~ barJe aIor'pde, W<th fear of ~ of the Haw.... !5Iind5 ~ hop. tI'Ie i'T'S were ,,'tI1aed as coast defence battene5..1n the e.e'll le~ryon ~ eat her t'OeN ~ bertg St.O< ... the Battle of the CoriII 5N .. i:tie
0\Ief",l

month ~~The fl.-nch gu"IS ~ ~ c*d on to repel tM-.erl out of W!l'vc:e M'Id ~ after the war:

~ ~ and were

120

1942

The Battle of the Coral Sea

H~rd ~ernJ reconm'l$:lnce and over'lUlous reporting led to confusJOl'l and mis-targeting. and both fleets bo,led to locate Nch omen' m;un forces for almost an t!ntin! day on 6 May 1942: the Amelians thought they Igd hit one or the main Japanese fleet amen but hold instead sunk a light carrier from the Covenng Group. the Sholto. The main Japanese stnke was mistakenly launched against the American oiler Neosho and her escorting destroyer, both of which were sunk: a second strike was attempted in the late evenIng apinst the US carriers. only to be repulsed WIth heavy losses by Ameriun fighten supported by ~dar aboOlrd

the leJlington. Confusion reigned: some J<lp;ane5e aviators mistook US Clrrien for their own VId AmericJ,n anti-aircn.ft fire was accld~tally ai~ ;at US pb.rlC$.

us N""'f torpedo ~ ImCI< tt'1e japanese light carner Shoho 0Jwlg the &ttIe of the Coroil Sea O'l 6 May 1941At ~ Waro'ilft un be ~ In 1M phoI:~

I 21

--------------------------------------------------------...
194 2

Death of the USS Lexington

C~rted from the hulls of unfinished battle<:Nisers and penniue<! by clauses in the 1'122 WilShinrton Tre.Jty to exceed the tonnage limitations applied on new carriers. the ltri'Ifton (CV-2) and hel" sister Sorotogo (CV.3) wen! the 'supercarrien' of their cby.At the 8l.nIe of the COQI Se.a,lhe lWtlfloo.less able tN." the accom~ yorlttown to take evuive ac;tion and having mis-<o-oI'"diluted her Comb.llt Air Plitrol. suffered hiu by three bombs and two torpedoes. Fires were not entirety brought under control and two Iioflt' intenul explosions in the foIlowi"l houn prompted her crew to abal'ldon srup. whereupon W was sunk by an escortJ"l destroyer.

(bmw) USS Io1otrif JOeS to l.e.l.inpn's aid 'vn on bod.., -=cOOT'P7""i~~ U5S~) Moms ld ~ dest~ on loe'ef'I ~. ub1g off the came"'s crew
~

(~) ~odoni"I

5hip
~oon

(jew pt/lerYlg on Lexngton's ftoght ded< ... to ~ shop on 8 May 19'12.

(above) Climbing to safety Survivors elm!> aboard anothe<' ....euel The rescue effort was superbly came<! 0I.It. and although 216 men lost thetr I~ aboard W lex.ngton.1,73S ~ ~ved

_-...

(left) Smoke and debris as the carrier explodes

Lemgton explodes as the fires reach the aYlatlOn gasolne storage She was the first large camet" to be sunk H'l the Pacr1ic. but eN W ~ ~ )'l!MS ~u hke thIS would
be seen tJIT1e and time agaJn by men
~ ll'l

the US and

123

..
1942

The Battle of Midway

The ~nes. N~ expected iu picket line of subrmnl"leS outside Pearl H~rbor to 1M: Admiral NOlgUmo plenty of advan<:ed WlImlllZ of an Amencan $OI"tie.Adherence to nodio silence mant dut Admi~ YamamotO - at se<l in me b;,tdeship Yomato - was umble to IJW' instruCtlOl'lS to Nagumo of what to do in the event of encounterina American amen. The ~ tud to walt ;In hour for the confirmiition that at leut one of the $hips was a carrier. Durini this time. N1&'J"'O's omen ame ul\der atude from Midway.~ 3ircn.ft. bin. susamed no hits ~ oot off much of the alack usltll the Zero fizhter cover. US N;IV)' dive-bombers bred better. Slnklnz four
jaj)ilne1t arrien.

Soryu takes evasIVe action Soryu. of Carner- 0Ms00n l c,~1es >Nt1Ile uoclef' high-level borntwlg amel< by l.JSAAf B- 17 bornbef"S from the
M~ ba~.

iltUCk produced near

shortly after 8 vn on "June 1941TM ml!.~ but no hots.

ene of the oconoc;

phot~
IoU The ~
Ct'\.II~M~

DenrucOon from the air

or the w at
he""Y

sao~"t cbYIg me afternoon ol'6)r.e 1~2. V!et" Yle n.d beefl

phclt~~l/Il

bon'Oe<i by pI1a fi'nrn

fn.-rpra ((V-lo) .and Homtt (CV-.a Note ter

tNtt~ modsl'\Ips

S'.ruct..r'e. the ~
~.....-..-.
Qrl

he<' $tern. Id

wrecI<J&e

....... """""

~op "Ier rw..mber bur

I 942

~nese prisoners of war under guard on Midway The ~ of the ~ arr(ro!ft CT eo' ~ ~
~ fivn an open Ifebo.n by USS lb -'-" (AVOon 19 ju1e 1911Aftet" beIIlg held bra lew days on ~r they ~ transferred to Pearl I-brbor on 23 JI.O'le Iboan:l USSSn.$ (AK.I 5). 0Il'Tl'\'Ill& thet'e 0"1 I iJy 1~ me rnatYle guard WI the ~ ~ med wrlh a M 190) 'Sp tgf.eld' nile

~ lsbnd pier, Midw3y The IleIoIy cruser USS A!n5oaJlo (CA2") ilclnpde the S>d IsJld poer:~ M.-ne ~ br !he ~ on 25 ~ 1912 n the ~ un be see'! the damaged ~ of aTBf-1 A~ (a.-.u ii 00380). the oNy ~ of $I)< Torpedo SquUon Et&ht (VT..fl) TBk that attad:ed Nago.zno"s CTleI"; on ")..ne 19'12 "b hItl ~ scored ., ItI6, t/le A...~nge.."s irst combat mouoon 01 ~ w not .... aosp<JOUS Stt 1Or' .. ~ tNt_ to end up v.r.t1J O outstarOng rec:.on:I n ~ The shop n the nght dts1lce is probably USS ~ (A'JO.IO)

HMS MQllntNS and RMS Queen Mary A vrtffl W_e"l on bod HMS ~f.vs. a 'Colony' class cruser, at ~a Ifl August 19"12 escortrt the fMnous ClI\d WI'wte Star lroef" RMS ~ Iob'y, by then beIflI ~ as a troop shp. On 28 August the cn.orser VISIted the !5LYld after-.....n.:n she was f\IIT\l!d

The May "-l been ~ &-om her- ~ Ifl f"Wd'I 191(1 ld ~ the coo.ne 01 the !ileMned some 650.000 mles. c:arr')'I'li dose to one mIoon ~ On one ~ Ifl 19"13 she umed, Ifl ~ to her- 9-43~. some 15.7) troops. malt.o'wa toUI of 16.683 souls on bo.d, a record """"'d1 ~ InIo:e/y to be br'oIr.en. ~ two ~ after tt.s ~ wzs t.lken a ~ e'SC0I"ll/'li Cl'\IISe': HMS Ct.ltJCOa .... as ~ rarrmed ~ 5l.ri: by ~ May oIf the ~ coast of Scotland. ~ """'" troops. !he ....,. could not iIfb"d to stop, od so tine ~ 01 the ~s ~ wer-e ci'owned.

"''''' .....,. QJten

~ bts. I\~ tNt ~ been Ifl U5e WItn the FfotaI Nao.y sroce 1915 vd.,.,tllCh, the ~ of wtme ~. cOilople,el!S became laryely tboquotous.A"> 1 eq..opnent thr Ur1ey bt was ~ Ifl tNt rNrJY cooid be ened. stOWed rnon: or less ~ on a shop. b.lf. ~ trlIS It po:MCled oriy the most ba$Ic means to t'lrect Its ~ II lrI!c>t men alloat. but not rn..och mere Note how the stop's AdrTn.'ty ~Me p.'ll: ~ IS c:WI'erent eadl5llZ - ew:Ient rom the ~ 'bre.Jk' on the (~ lone
t'ooO

v.p's bo.its. with the ~ of one of the ..--inch twin motnts tNt composed the cruser's ~orocs.y ~ Ilf'OIedng be)ond tt1IS. The boats an be 5eM Ifl ~ the UlneI ~ ~ ...t1oIe Ifl the bottom -1\ancI corroer the ~ JrId port wrc t..,s of one 01 the Vwp's ~WilnA ~ e vistlIe.At the ~ 01 the fu:'W'lel e

In the ~ fon:&n:xm IS one of the cranes used for ~ ,",,1CUlWs"J ~apiInes od

nam

WIU'I

fe.sa..na

w.

1942

On board HM Submarine Tribune

of $Qme seventy which were aI taken by Jilek Bryson, ill! officl3l1 pho~,. for d1e Mlmstry of InfonmbOn. dUntlI the filmi"l of Close Quorten In 19-42. Their purpose wu u publicity $lilh. for the felorure film. whK:h detailed a routine Brtmh SYbfTwioe p;ltrol in the North Sm. and off the C~st of NOl"W"Y. "nd wu made uSlIll'officeo and men of HIS ~ty's subrNnnes'.WhiIe many of the photognphs are clearly posed. all give iI good impression of the cbvstrophoblc condItIOnS on boMd d wbmarioe:l. u -'I as the sornewh&t anfomW manner of dress adopted (even thouan all pr-esent IJrI"I!f"e doubdess tidied up for filmin&). These ue
pv-t
photol~

of il

~rie's

(right) HMS Tnbune!llt Holy loch

tNo SLb'NrY'le ~ shop HMS Fo-th .at I-Ioly Lod\ S>tJancl

(below) Stowma a torpedo A r~ er r'ld a T~

.,.. ......
It:>I' ~ ~ ,"II! M'len

~e-" ~ !he ~ of a torpedo. The c< me<! 16 Mk.1/IlI 21-tneh torpedoes. arlCl ......M trle5e ~ .tloul:

h<ed

I'l

on patrOL l4) to a dozen rnerT'Oers of \toe subman"oe"s C"the same ~t.

hz..o"... ~ t'iCI' explowe wartoead. correct st~ was

The enflne room Ger1er'il-..ew of tne oMenor of ~ ~ room

HMST~.

0I'l

board

The Second c.o.:s-r. of HMS TrO.no A!uy 0fI\cer Hedey 0'IIl'tes Woocky at tws drwlg sunon on tf, bwd ~ The 6epth ~ on tf, ~ 9>cJr"y tNt ~ sutltNrYIe a on the s..rl:e ,) CIe ondociJbon tNt ttvs ~ W~ posed <bq shoot", of the 6m.

(""") Chedon& "'" _

.."'"

(I@ft) For-w:ard

""' ......

l.JaMnanl: R. ~ at tne forw3rd ~ of .. V!, wrth a stoker worb1g the ~ ~ ~""i hin<Ie. .1II'Id .1Il'I Engroe Room Arbficer ~ for'

J!@riKopI!

HMS Tribune running on the 5urbce in Scottish ~ters This is a wonderfully atrnospOeric view IoOOng ;1ft from the (OIVlong t~ of T,rb!.one, The promlOeflt tswlgI.lIu object is the submanoe's H.gh Frequency Dlrectton FlI'lder (HFIDf. nocknamed 'Huff-Dull) for' IIltet'CeptJng radio s~

'0' dus subtmrine

The other photographs on these ~ ...-e Pt of the ll'le ~ try ~ llo)wn $hQwIng od1er ~ In Holy Lcxh.This IS poss1bty HMS ()ry,oy,1umg the depot
",<>HMSFMh.

130

194 2

LOlldm& 5ton:$

TtYec submannes load stores alongWe the depot ship HMS Forth. Sol' IS the inboat'd boat with P614 alongside, Krtbags and hammocks on the casrog india!e that s.t had probably come from anothef" port in 8ntaJn since krt~ bags were not canied on patrOl.
Transferring
i

torpedo

TransfoTrog i practJc:e torpedo from HMS Fotth to the ~ PJ, I HMS SbtI (P2/7) is seen aIongsKIe and
another submarvle
IS

seen on the

I J I

-----------------~,'"'

1942

Operation Harpoon
A$

spring 19'12 gave way to summer, and as shipping losses mounted simultaneously in the Adantic. the British supply siwation to Malta be<;;ame criticill.lf M,lIta could not be sustained. with the Royal Navy cha5ed away from the Island. its garrison would be easy prey for a German invasion and North Africa would fall to the Axls.A series of crucial relief convoys was put in motion. In June, Opention Harpoon saw six merchant ships. escorted by fiye destroyers and covered by two carrien; and a battleship, sail from Gibraltar to Malt:!.. Four merchant

ships and two destroyers were sunk by Italian cruisers and air attack. Simultaneously. a British eleven-ship

convoy from the Middle East. escorted by light cruisers and codenamed Operation Vigorous. was beaten back by an Italian battle fleet and by inteme Axis air llruCk.. E-boau and a V-boat. Two merchantmen. a cruiser and three destroyen were lost and nothing at all reached Malta except more Id news,

...

1942

A deceptively peaceful scene ., Gr.lnd Harbour; Malta. Nrty on the ~ of 16).ne 1942, the aftermath of OpentJOn ~A motor t.n:n ~ dc:mn the twbotr. Yot1lIe a dIrNeed destJ'orer: down l7y the bows, IS bent helped into Dockyd Creek try iI tJ.Ii. ThIs is most ceru.iy 8odswotth. whch ~ nn.dc a nwoe off the 5bnd d\n'lg the ~ ho.rs i$ the cCIl'NO'/ ~ In the ~ lIe$ /r:tJ.nei, WfIh BIcnkney cOfTW'II ilowIy up to pert the destrqoer lI'l the cftstlce IS ~ Mane.

"""*

~ latter One. pkJs Mldr;kcon. WI':l'e the only dewo)'ers left seaworthy out of the COI'M)y'S ~ort The crews of aI ~ ... the last sta&eS of eJ<NUSbOn. Of the SO)( merchintmen Nt set out &-om GtnIw: only two ~ II. into ~ - a plllfuI quanuty of $UppIIes (~ to the Iow!s suffe-ed 10 deIrver them. ThIs _ the trne of the iYMd's ~ tniI.(':'Ilo ~ ~ of the ~ COI"lStIUy ~ aerr..nds pIKed on the Voip$ of the Ro)Ql NI'/)' and theI'" crews. leu tNn .iI month

earWl" Bkriney and Modctecon ~ beerI on drne!; that could hartly be more ~ plougt'lo"Ia ttw'ough the mountaInOus North AtWtbC.)The b'b'n Ioolani wreck I'fWli off the borrO-darnaged whf O"l the ~ IS ill Nt ~ of another ~ HMSGaIorll. whch n.d ~ her bows ~ off by l r'rWle off PantelIenIlI'l J-Irf 1941, _ towed stem tnt mo ~ but then fi.rther ~ n a borrbn& raod in ApnI 1912. Be)'QOd ~ W WiI5 t.ter" Slri: OilS .lI blodr:stMp.

1942

(right) Benito Mussolini on the cruiser MOnle<uccoli Mvssolon' goes onboard the CI'\J'ser' .....m,en docked at Naples follOWIng the aet.oon off Panlellena In June 1942 that svccessfully attacJ<ed the ships of Opet"ation Harpoon.

(left) Battle honours Mussolini pins the Medagloa d'ArgenlO to the umform of Lt Cdr Fabto Tani in a ceremony ashore Behind the ,/ Duce IS AdlTlII'al RIccardi.

(below) Naples The destroyers (from left to nght) MoIocello. Oncni. Ascon and Eugeruo d Sovooc. which also took part ,n the aetton. at the quayslde oonng the c~_

.,

194 2

HMS Phoebe
HMS ~ was typIal of the Nird-~ cn.ris~ of the R~ ~.I.nd ~ exten$ive service in the Arb-ntic ;and Medit~ Complete<! in September 19-40. she w;u rwke torpedoe<I. in August 19-41 .and Octobel- 19-42. both tllMS &0'"& to the BrooIdyn ~ Yard foo- repaIr. "'-be wu sold for K~& in

(above) A mess deck on HMS Phoebe PI'Io1t was typocaI of the hard-~ cn..osers of the Royal ~. and QW e>ttenv.oe set'VOCe on the ~ and Allannc. Compieted on ~ 1940. she was twICe totpedoed, I'l August 1911 and Octobe" 1912. both tIrl'rl PlJI: to the Brooid'tn Navy Yard b- ~ She was 50id lOr 5Cnp on 1956.

1956.

135

1942

Operation Pedestal
Two b3ttleships, three carriers. seven trui5e~ thirty-two destroyen ;and eight wbtNrines wen rrKluereO to proteCt JUst foorteen merdwlUnen and &\eir 85.000 tons of despenotely crucw arps 'J,Iiling from the Clyde to M~. The convoy met with submarine. ;air ;and rnotor-torpedo-bou OltClCk.$ ~i illmost the entire length of its route. Of the carriers invotved in Open.tion Pedestal. one. ogle. wu sunk by ~1J on II Auaust. along With "ioe of the mixed escort of crui5en and destroyers and mne of the convoy. Just five surviving merch:mtrnen. indudi"ldle uraendy needed Amencan-owned and Bntish-crewed tanker Ohio. hersetf hit by an IQliin torpedo and two Gern'Wl diYe:-bombers. ~mped ,"to Grand t-brbour. Yalletu. with 32.000 tons of wpplies intKt. This wu a hugely mky and expensIV'I ,...supply optiOItion which could e;uily ~ 5een the convoy wiped out. and II"Idicates how Important I fig.una presence in the Mediternnean wu to die Royal NIY.

(l'i&ht) HMS Phoebe

The fofeastJe of the ~ !'tube 0Jn'lc OperatJOl'l Pedestal.

(bebw)HMS&Igle The ~ ume'" ~ escorted by I destrO)oel'" do..nlg the SlS of ()penbon fledenlII

~tory

1942

,,

" ,.

L1

..,

HMS Indomitable Crewmen dl5pef>lng on the Rtght deck In relaxed mocxl early on ... Operatoon PedestaL Quite apart from the ~

nurnber's of sadors milhng about. Induding member's of a band. there are a runbel'" of other indicators that flying operations hir...e not been taking place, nor are II'I'UT\Itlel1t The radio masts along the sides of the deck are in the raised posrtton for ftytng ope!'atIOI1S they were lowered

to the honzontal (as shawn 111 later photographs),There are no arrester WII'eS rigged, though the 'bowspnngs' that held them dear of the Right deck for an ain;ralt's arrester hooks to engage can be seen just outboard of the hatched lines on the deck. Near the stem are half a dozen spare wing ~s. presumably detached for maJntellanCe, v.tIiIe in the f~nd are two of the starboard crash barnef" starclIons. lying on top of whid'l are the heavy WU'l:

bar'ners. 'NhIch cOlJd be ngged dunng Iandll1g to ~ aJl'cl'1l1t from ~ng and rvnmng on rno any parked
on the forward part of the <:led:. This photograph was probably taken on 10 August 1941 the convoy having passed through the Straits of Gibraltar during the night. for by the next day it was being shadowed by Axis auuaft

137

Sea Huniaoes on board HMS V"ICtOl'ious during

Operation Pedestal Thos phol~ 15 dated 22 August 1941 wtoch must be n;~ b"!he smple reo1:SO'llhal HMS L~ IS on the
IS ITlOt'e l,i<eIy tNl tT. was taken at aroo.nd the the o!l'ltr phot~ on this sec!lOI\ IQ-ll A.t.y.ISl The Mtr.Ift itted to l oo..r!ngil'el'" on the Iingmo.n:l 15 56 ~ 1BV1506 (7T) of 885 Sq.adn:n (Ths ~ left VI(fOn:;lu$ (lIl 21 August. conimwlg the rTIIScI.w'l& of!he pont) UrtyOll tI'le.ftemoon of II ~ lJ.73.hMlg slipped ~ the co.....o,,.~ ~ put lOur ~ lntD ~s pori side. W"b1g!he !hp on f.IST. eogtrt rTW1lIte5. forb.on.i,tety. ~ leu- 'ft'lS of Ihe ~ ~ ~ Foo.r of her ~ ~ on the".t the vroe. ~ to
WIlle IJme .IS
~ It

Wd OIl other

Bntosn (MTlen.

138

139

P~r;ltions on HM$ Indomitoble HMS Eagle seen from the fl.ght declc. of HMS /ndomJrDbie. $3lling through a bnllwn $UI1-ht western Mediterranean. The scene IS stilt fa,rIy rel::ed. but 5lg!'lS of the battle to come are clear; with a,reran naw on the de<k of both carnen. arrestor WIres ngged and radoo masts ~ On boan:l .hdomt!obIe IS an ontnguw"og moe of atn:rafi.: there IS a Sea H...-ncane IB of 880 Squadron on the foteground. with Abacores beIonn to 831 or 796 or pos.5Ibly 827 Squadron. wn.t appc'S to be a t1artIet (pos5Ibty 806 Squadron) on the .. fl:er bit. and a slTrt'Y OOf-of-plac@ Swordfish at. the sUIboard side of the ftWtt deck. TM photograph WiS Ukerl on erther 10 or II August. The H,y,W,er Sea HI.nicIe IB WiS the Fl@etArArm's fir'sl. I!nb5h ~seat ighter fTlClflOPIine. and _ basiatt a sfancWd HI.rncane but fitted WIth a V-hme: ~e hook: l.rike ~ amer MUaff It. did not tYYe

...........

hirey AJbKOI"a
Fu-ey Abcores.e on
~ ~ thestruud~~bM'" .-otl-~ patrol, proteW1g

the cOl'Ml')llo-I2 ~ 1912.

140

1942

Indomitoble is stnlck On 12 August ,ndomItabIe was hn three times by dMlbombers, and althovgh her armoured flight deck saved her from fatal damage, she was pvt out of action until March the following year:

(below) Ohio reaches Mala. One of the epic sea stones of the war read1e5 rlli concluWn as the I.lst ship of Pedestal. the crippled tanker Ohto. ~ approaches Valletta. Malta. on I5 August 19"'2 The destroyer flrorr\IIcm lte'$ alongside to port Dnoo's stT\lCt~ hawtg been so weakened by repealed bomb and tOflledo macks that she 1$ Incapable of steammg on he!"

own and ~ a destroyer lashed on either side to support her - to RaIboard. ~ hidden by the tanker's

superstructure. IS Pem. Fender> hung between the r.hips prevented them from cavsong too much additional damage to one another u they moved sJowty fOIW;lI1Hwo more
destroyers. other tugs and motor lauoches are ,n attendance. Only when OhIo was safely WIth," Grand

Harbour dod the two ~ hand her over to the lugs. This photograph was taken from another ship of the l!5Cort. possibty the destroyer Ltd:lury. whICh played a majOr part In OhIo's survival. The exhaustlOll of the men in the foreground is evident (and undemandable), most having been in actioo contlllUOO.hly for three days or rnore.

141

194 2

(opposite) H,lIu convoy A pe.x:eful _ of a l'1.l/ta.bo!nd cClrNOy and e5Cort at sunset.lS seen from HMSEIX)'CJUs. one of the escortJng warVIops. later ., the ~ on <t December:
~ltese

wuching Ohio and the denroyel"$ arriving in the harbour

With the TMI of 10.000 tons of IVeI OIl to Malta. ~UOC'l PedesuI w.lS il ~ WiltqIC $U(Cess,lhe I!nusI'l U<Iass SlbrnarYIes of the 10th Submarne Flow retlTled to M.W; the ~ month, and more 'ghle'" ~ <Jr'T'IIIed. ~ on AxIs wpp/)I1Ines. ~ tM:lu&h Aaoe<I5Ub-rwrne and D" "tuck on unken MId wWIps (~ Ios:ses tM It.iIy (0.':;1 Nrdy ~ to ~e). coukl be rNlrlUIrled tlTough....mt w.lS !he deoWe pn,se d the struggle for North Aha.

Sul'VJYOO from
""""" MoJu.

O~n.oon ~aJ ~

5t.rvM::w's drserriwic from the

lMuy at Grand

142

1942

143

194 2

---------------~=

144

1942

America goes on the offensive

Victory ;at Midway paYed the WIY for the first American coun[~attaek qlinn Japanae-oupied isbnck. meeting stiff around ~d ~ resistanCe. The Americans Imded ~ I.t Guadalca.ul in the Solomon Isbnds on 7 AUIlJSt. The next niJt!1, disaster struek <IS a joint AmeriQllAustnlQn cruiser fot'te wu Vlnihilated by ~nese cn..oisenI near ~ lsbnd, with four 'Wok Mld one ~ .

the of ~ at I'IoumeI. New CaIedon.i. QMxr (CA.39) was cne of the ~ Slri: the Bmle of
~ ~ Isbnd. Note Q.-'lcy's ~

uss """'" &urn USS v.mp (OJ..7} on the eve d ~

""""'" """"""" -....

"""'*

bcs ilI'ld ~ 12.

o.rna

(bdow) HMAS Conbernr The /(en(~ ~ t-.y 0'\IISeI'" 15 photogr"Iphed on ire near TulagIlslanclll'l the southern So:*:wnons dl.rro&
OperabOn W~An U'lIdentJf,ed ~ ~ poAed aIongsode to re'l'lO\Ie the 0"e'W". Ou-Ina the earty hotn of9 ~ on pwol oIf ~!he Md ~ bady damaged n comt:m WIth a ~e of ~ ~ CaJbmD was lCUttIed ~ hol.o I;tter Photograph UIcen frcm USS ChaJgo (CA.29).

(opposite) Ship's band Members of a ship's band play on deck aboard a US Navy CNrSer dln'Ig 19<4l Note the runber of pegs Oeemed necessary to keep the sheet musK 11'1 pla(:e

145

1942

146

1942
(oppoSite) The Battle of the unem Solomons
Wrttwl t'M:l ~ of ~ IS Amencan .and ~ .4l

ti"

a.,( the
.If

U$tem 5olomc:lnl.. Th", ,rxreu _

~194l

e>q:llodng japinese bomb ~ USS Enterpnse IofIed "oe ptlotograpI'ler...no tool< rt. Robert ~k ~ 4

USS fnlerpnse: the ~ ~ to the ~ Ix>d ~ JiIery of USS frutpnse. '1!C~ tal" .. oomb <L ..., L~ &ttIe 01 the E.oI$te-i SoiormnI.
-n

(left)

cn~ to

p'ot~ ~

(below) Wreck of ~ QI'JO stllP ThIs. phot~"'P" of UlC: M1 1V'.v:neeI CW'I tNGwdalcaNI shore. was Ui<l:n .., P\boeTl" 194) Sht~ been SIrlk l7y US a.rcraft (If'l 15 ~ 1942. Yot.Ie .r.tenv'-""'i to deWer I'r'le'l .Yld ~ to )ip.wIete b1::es hold '"Ii the roorthem P1 of t/'Ie 1$1'(1 SIIIo blind IS ., the <:lJSUnCt

1942

The Soviet Navy

during 1942
Throughout 1912 the Soviet i'bvy continued to provide s~ for the army.;and in partiC\lbr for the defenders of leninzrad UId Sevuwpol But with the Gemun advance suJli"l ~t these stoVdy Oriended CItIeS, they were also able to CO onto the ofrensIve.... parncubr apinn coasaJ shippin not only in the lbItic ;md Bbdt SRs. but in the Arctic too.

The cnliser KitOt' after ... bomb hit at Leoiognd On 04 Apr- 1942 ~ was M by a borrb 'Id suffered no ~ tNn ten ~ ~....tlOie twenty ~ IID:r w_ stn.d by l'M) more bombs. tle(:~ ~ wt.ch ~ 1hl! 5I'wp ellA. d 6CtIOn IIItJI 19H ntem'wttentt): the ~ !'lid I senous efIect on ScMet Sl.Jl'Uce operMlOllS.

The destrOyer lacier Toshkent

~ ju'lf!

efltel'$ Sevuwpol 1942 the iNI Ger'min-~mon ~ W1S ~ 'Id the ScMet BId: Se.iI Aeet was k.ept My QrT)YIlI rerLt"on;emenu IIltO the fortress

port ~ Uking the ~ out. MI the provdog ~ wpport. It lost ~ destro,oers 'Id IlWIy smaller vessels to ." Imdr. A.>m modget subm'nes 'Id HTBs

""'*

cOl"llpOl..nded the dlflicuIbes f"'"l the ScMet.s III SevastopoI haftlolr On 27 }l.ne the last large ScMet warshop to errter the ~ port. the destro)'er IeadeI" TosI*ent brtlught 9," men ... to the fortress and evacuated 2,300 wounded and cMlaans, &II the while under ont~ all'" attacX Shlppong nearly 2,000 tons of water ttv"ough bomb damage and nelMTllSSeS. she had to be lcrwed to ~ where she $ettJed on the shallow bottom. She was destro)oed by bombs five days later,

Submanne ().-'f aJonpde Tas/lk.eIIl The old Slb'Nme D-4 ~ To:sI*ent dl.rng ~ of~ .... 1942, Booh a1\el" ~ Will' One. [).4 was the ~ SoYiet Sl.brn1ne built ~ lOr the BlIdc Se4 but the desT1 sulfer"ed from many GUts and was tltSUCcessfiA. She was 5lri: by ~ fon:es olfYevpatona the foIowong ~

1942

Submvine: Shcft..2' 2 ;at Poti The .....tJnwne 1$ shown hen: h9citIg out OIl ~ CCIII"Wt sortie- n the bkpn:lrs the WttIeshop ~ Ka'rm.ncl. By autl.ftV'I 1942 the t:..A of the 5cMet BLO S& F~ _ fon:ed to concentrate at ~ and Bab.mo ~ more and more of ots b.- wert CMrTUI'I by the Getm.rl '""'I- F\:ll:l beciwne CJ\.IOal In the resupply or ~ ~ T~ ~ tQmed ~ coastal shipping fi1:lm the Bosporus ~ to the and ~ and ~ earned 4S.lXX> men to the defence ofIwpsc by mod-October. T..apse was g.,oed

en-ne..

(l'i&ht) Submarine ShetH2' 5mI'lg dowrl (If"I the far ntn IS the cornrnandel'" of the Slbrnne. ~ A.. F. Vdyaev Wher\.,.. AI\Ied c~ passed the North Cape. b.r ~ We ScMet Sl..Ibrnan'les v.OIAd ret nto po5'bOIl between the IflboI.n:I cQ1i?<IOY and the ~ coast. ~ for the cOl'NO'f to pm befc:n u.nq ntO the COolSl to harry AlOS ~ AftH PQ 13 and QP 9 tad "... lI'l the ~ week or Md'l 1942, S/ldHll was ~ II'l tns WI:( when she ~ lntD ~ fresh C".emIio I'I"lI"lefiellild., T_ Fjord. Sew!reIy ~ her U'P:N tnosIerred to 5Ubm'ne 1(-22 lCI she _ KVttled.

(left) Soviet minesweeper

On board a ScMet tntl'leSWeeper o( the Trar class. IooIOng aft. in wet weather:

149

1942

HMS Formidable during Operation Torch

OrigilQ!ly conceived U iI joint Anglo-US operation of 90.000 troops from each anny to &0 ahead in 'P'ina 1942..n bet the opentlOn wet"lt ahead In NOYetnber wid'! mostly Amerian forces, de1.pite 5tron1 dilsent In the US high comrTWld about the ~ of the 'soft undetbetly' S~tqy.Je*led by $~ British usaun md supply cOflYO)'5 from 8ntISh WJter'S, an Amenan anny in 0Yef" a hundred sh~ ~ the Atbntic from NOIfoik. Virginia. ne.ading for ~ In MotOCco. The wtIOle force Jrnved WIthout loss - a sq:n of the growong effic:ac:y of antJ-$lJbfru,nne tlcucs. teehnoIoo' Vld "~e.Thrs wu the most ~ Vld ~ amphibious Iandil'la of the war thus br.The ~ also broutflt with lhem a ~ publiaty machine Wheto the .Alneriam bnded in North Atria. there were rwenty-rwo fomgn correspondents ~ ~ 1Il~.Within nIrM!: months there were ISO. A French sqwodron in CnabIana. harbour, ndudi"l the powerful but immobile b.atdestllp jeotI &rt. and the cruiser Prirnofvd al'ld Ioal ~ b,atterie$, put up I"Ulsance but _rt evenwdy SIlenced and a cuse-lire was qreed. ~rs wn capwred. though Onn proved more nubbom.
Throughout.Axis submarine atQcks on sl.lPJlfy convoys _no: SUICllned but ~ WIth I r'lUmber

of counter-sinkings informed by 'Ultra' Intelligence.

Observing opf!ntions , the5e photogr,JPhs. Royal N<r.oal offic~ ondvchng CaptaIn A G. Tollbot of Fctmtdoble. ld men obset've oper.Itooos through bl"OCul~

150

Preparing for t<lke-off Gr\.nvnan MartIet lIs or lVs of 888 Squadrotl and Supemlanne Sea~res (elthef" lbs or lies) 01885 Squadron ranged ~d>' for take-off OIl the fl.gt>l de<k 01 HMS Formidable dunng operatIOnS ll'I support of OperaIJ(Yl Torch. The Mart~t (the BntJSh name (or the Amencan Wildcat) had a habOt o( beh.rv,ng rather ~ on uke-off and landIng. resulting In plenty 01 $peCt<llors. such as those 111 the foreground o( the photogr<JPh. whenever there were lligtrt deck-operauoos 1l'r1)l1'l!'lg the:.e aIrcraft. Note also the WdY tNt the arr.et's ~ ~t scheme has been c.amed <M':r the l'I~ c!e'<:"-

BombirJg up

;II

n.irey Albacore
I.e( ~ ,. ~ t ~

I ,-erd;a""S

00

a F~

ore d 810 SquiO"on 0 'le

~ ~

"'It"- cleek

'.-.e AIlracore
~ ;and

'Mi15

942 :alyatorpedo used to proo.>de lOse a.wort

to lx:wTb IrieIdI

I 5 I

------1942

Severe bomb damage to the stem of HMS Delhi

The antIaircraft cruiser suffered bomb damage in A1glet'S Bay dunng mopping-Up operations in Decembe.- 1942 dunng the aftermath of OperatIOn Torch. Note the men standIng on the Iowef deck of the cruiser.

The cruiser 0upIeiIt _ ... G<nNno

~togettheie.il

codes dosed to preo.e!'It

her sriJn&, the ~

-""-"""
etC.

~-~

WCl'n 1.4). theshpiC~~

The e>:pIosoor6 were $0 VIOlent there were lo I"UTlber of CA5UiIt.oes on tne qMy$Ide. and the ship bosned Sor twenty dIys..

--

rendenrot

Toulon
In World War Two the (l'eltest number of ships to be de:!itroye:d in one sinp actIOn occulTed in the early momi"l of 27 November 1942 at the French IUVllI base and a~J of Toulon. when the french Navy fulfilled the promise rmde two and a IWf yurs previously "Ot to let iu ships btl into GerTT'Qn or IuJ~n Iwlds. Th,s dramatJC event h.lId been prompted by the Allied invasion of A1ltf"Q and MQrocco e;J,rlier in the month. The Gemun high cOffirmnd. fc;uful that this could lead in rum to a !andinl in the VKhy-controtled southern half of france:, resolved to occupy the area. Wh,le this ~s f;1.kinS place, unopposed by the Vithy regime. which recognizl'd that to do so would have been futile. there w<u much deliberation 15 to whether or not to attempt to seize the powerful French f!l?('t
(which Included most of the ships which escaped from Mel"$ el-Kebir) at Toulon. By the: time the de<:i$ion had been made to carry this OUt the French had aken

matters into their own hands, and preJnred alt the ships for scuttlinl. At soon as the German forces bepn to advance on the port the order was
given to scuttll!, and In the space of just a few hours over eighty ships were sunk

it their moonngs or b'own up by their crews. TIM!: Gl!:rman oper.lltion was an almon complete bilure. wid! jUst 1I twldful of vessels left lIfioat and .r.lltiolul. Five submannes rmn:a,ged to e:sape from the narbour: of these one wu then scuttled by its crew just outside; one was interned in ~in: and th~, Cosoboonco. Gloneull, and Morsouin, ~tu:ally rmde it to North Africa to be lreeled by a rapturous ~eption lind to join the Allies. In all three battleships. SeYefl cruisers, 1I se:apl:ane amer. thirty-four destroyers lind escorts, twel~ submarines and fiftyseven other vessels were destroyed or put out of action. In Rnuin inital reports SUtN! mat me French comrmnding officers al'ld sabotage pllrties hlld gone down wim their ships-In bct, despite the colossal destnJction. 1I bir lIrTlO1Jnt of fighting In and around the dockyOlrd, and rmny men - both Frem;h crews and German would-be captors - only lellving ships liS they were sinking, fatal casualties amouotN! to just twelve French. lind one unfortunate Germlln. Some 27.888 French seameo were temporarily rmde PoWs.A oumber of the ships were n.ised over the following eighteen months.ofteo to be sunk again in Amed air raids, but Yllry few were ever put back into service.

The cruiser MorseJlIoise The cOl'l'VTWldon& officer of the MarseillaIse debber.nely SCUttled the shop II"l such a manner to make salvage rnor'e difficult.

I 5)

-1942

The day after the sc:uttling !vi RAF reconnaissance photograph shows the ships at the maio rettIe5 at Quai M,lhovd, With smoke obscunng mudl of the so::ene It Wil5 impossible to tell precisely what damage had been done. in partICular lIltemally and below the waterlone. but It was dear thaI a lot of the shIps were either bottomed or c3j)Sl~.k. usual the RAFs photo

Interpreters were able to woO: out a lot from small details;

for example they deduced that the apparently intact Strosboorg (ngtlt) was In fact low in the water, and therefo.-e quite badly damaged. Next to her al Jetty No. S. the Cruiser Cofbert was burning funoosly: the smoke atmost entirely h'dlng the equally aflame A/gene at jetty No 4 and Motse.101Se at No. 3

154

1942

(..Dove) The burnt-out remains of the c.ruiser Colbert Note how- thoroughly the sc.uttI"'1g was earned out with the ship flO! only sunk but the m.1Jn gun turrets blown apart with 70 kg demolItIOn charges- The four small rectangular antennae on the yards are for her F~-desrgne<!Dereaeur ~puque (OEM): radar deve~ and manufactured by tho!! Sad,r Company, which could det~ aln:raft at a range of SO km.~ ~ loImlW Installations frtted on board Srmsbourg and A/gbJe_

The seaplane carrier Commandolll Teste and the lttleship Prowmce Both shiPS had been at Hers el.l<etHr where the latter was severely damaged. and I'l()\fII both were scvttJed at Toulon. next 10 the 116tVaub.an.The t\MO ships had been part of the DMSIOfl des f,oIes. and both went down with the Germans actually on board. Just \Ilsl~ next to Commonoom Teste are the masts of a small 5Upply 5h1p, th@ HO~!ln, a150 5CVtlIed. In front of the stHPS can bl': sef':n w ftoats supporting arlU-torpedo netting. whldl had.
ironically.
~rwd

to Impede the five 5Ubmannes whICh attempted to escape.

Another view of DupleiJl

A hautlng ..;ew seen between the funnels of a conlft-fOlprJkur. almost certll1n1y Ger(aut. scuttled on the oppos<tt r.>de of the D~ de M,SS1essy

155

....
194 3

aircraft and l.."SCort vl.."S$Cls employing the fruitful bough of Allied technological R"SOUrcCS. By the end of the year. 237 U-boats had been los!. And as American industrial capacity ddiven::d sufficiellt weaponry to take the offensive simultancously in the Atlantic and the Pacific. the KrirgslII<lrillr would be forced to turn 100vards its own lI1dustrial relllvlgorJtion to try and redress the imbalance. During 1943 German IIldustry under the guidlllce of Albert Speer Jdopted American-style mass-production for the first tUlle to deli\'er the lltlll1\x>r of tanks :llld Uboats requIred. Simultaneously, increasingly radical technological solutions wen.: sought III its struggk to overc01lle AllIed tactical and material dominance. Bm cOlHral of the Atlamic had been lost to the Allies and would not be regained.

The Italian Navy Runs Out of Steam

Likewise, by 1943 rhe offemive capabilities of Italian submarines had largely becn neurralized by the ad\<lncing state of Allied ami-submar1l1e warf.ue. Simultaneomly, the process of interdicring Italian trade tonnage. already seriously damaged, \\-<lS speeded up. British coastal forces, including [he new Fairlllile D MTB/MGB type, grew in strength. Equipped with hydrophones, mines and shallow-running torpedoes to counter flat-bottomed Axis transports, eighty such cmfc operated in Ihe sometimL'S-stormy Mediterr:lI1can in January 1943, increasing to 171 a year later. As the Allied ground forces moved west across Norrh Africa toward. Tunis. so the MTB forces moved with it. Thc convoy routes bt'tween Sicily and Tunisia - nicknamed the 'Death Routc' by demomlized Italian sailors - became dominated by the Royal Navy and Allied air forces acting out of Malta and from bases along the captured North African coast. Axis troops more frequelllly arrivcd in Norrh Africa by tmnsporr aeroplane than by sea. flying into a desperate situation. Attrition of the Italian merchant navy far outstripped the launching of new tonnage. American bombing attacks further reduced the Italian warship fleet and many harbour facilities were mzed. The last Italian air raid on Malta occurred in February t 9--l3. By the ~pring. the Axis position along the southern Mediterranean littoral was hopeless. and in May the Germans and Italian army corps, numbering close to a quarter of a million men, surrendered at Tunis. haly'$ capability and will to wage war was crumbling to picces. And in June the Germans lost the momentous tank battle of Kursk, effectively Nazi~I1l's last major offensive on the Eastern Front. From then until the end of the war their land forces were in general retreat. Coo('nal1led Operation I lusky, and supported by a powerful escort and bombardment force of a monitor. six battl~hips, two carriers, seventeen cr\li~" and nearly fifty d~troyers, the Allies Jllade crossings from Bizerte in Tuni~ia and Malta to pUt eight divisions - 180,()(H) men - ashore in Iargl' amphibious landings in Sicily 1ll July. German beach-head counterattJck~ weTC beaten offby inshore gunfire support from cruisers and destroyers. though Gernun dive-bombers succeeded in sinking some American ships_ Smaller-scale amphibious hops. b'Uarded by British MTB~ from Malta. attcmpted to outlbnk Axis positions around the north east of the island, but could not prevent almost 110.000 German and Italian tTOOPS and 10,000 \--chidcs escaping across the Straits of Messina [0 the mainland (in some cases. using craft built for the :abandoned invasion of Britain in 1940). Meanwhile, with the exception of the X .\ lAS force which switched to the German ~ide. the attitude of the It:alian Navy to Allied incursion into Italy \va~ ambivalem. At the insistence of DOnitz. forces wert" sent south but they were light and offered only token resistance. The ~till-pOlelll Italian battleships remained in port. Half of the

dozen Italian submarmcs sent to interfere with the Husky landmgs were lost within ten days. On 25 Septcmber, Mus~olini was dismissed 111 Romc by Italian king Victor Ellll11allue!, and Marshal Badoglio appointed III hiS stead. With Sicily III Alllt~d hands, increased secrct llcgotiations hastencd the Italian armistice of 8 September, which resuln:d in an 1Il1l1lcdiate Gcrman offensive occupation of chaotic Italy and action :against her na\)'.Tllc new battleship ROlfIll was sunk with FX-1400 (Fritz-X) radio-controlled bombs on 9 September as the bulk of the Italian fleet made its way to Bone :and M:alta to surrender to the British Mediterranean fleet. Backed up by five carriers, Allied amphibiolls landinb"S went in against liglll German defences at Tamtllo and stiff rt'sistance at Salerno between 8-12 September. A second FX-1400 severely damaged the American light cruiser Slll'llllllllh off Salerno harbour, and the British cruiser Ugllndll and battleship IJiuspitt' would soon receive similar punishmetll while comributing to the massive shore bombardment. Despite the porI!. of l3ari and Brindisi falling (and to the west, Corsica and Sardinia being captured), the Allied advance became heavily bogged down by November and was locked in terrible stalemate at Monte Ca$sino by the end of the year. At the Allied tripartite conference in Tcllcmn in Novem\x>r, it was agreed to give part of the surrendered Italian fleet to the Soviet Navy (pnncipal1y the battleship Giulio C/,$llrt', to be renamed the I\'owrossiysk), and that the USSR would receive Konigsberg. a permanent warm-water pOri in the Baltic, later to be renamed Kalinll1grad, Meanwhile, stubborn German resistance funher to the east meant that the Ukrainian Black Sea pon of Odessa remallled in German hands. supplied by COIWayS from Romania (whose oil the German war effon now largely depended upon). Squadrons of swift Soviet motor boats harried them. Among a range of ex-US warships to be donated. many patrol torpedo boats of different types were handed over to the USSR 111 1943, in whose service they would pro\'e of great worth.

The Japanese Retreat from the Southern Frontier

From the end of 1942 and 11110 1943, Japanese forces began to be dislodged from a number of their mosl far-flung locations. SpIll imo three groups under Geneml Douglas MacArthur (South-West Pacific Area), Admiral William Halsey (South Pacific Art"a) and Admiral Chester Nimit2 (Central and North Pacific Areas), vast American forces of men. ships and aircmfc fought their way from atoll to aloll. defeating or leapfrogging the Japanese force~ around the perimeter of conquered territories. Capture of enemy-held airfields was a top pnoril)'. In February 1943 the JapanL'Se force of 12,000 remallllng men were withdrawn from Guad,lcanal by dL'Stroycr, ceding a vital VICtory to the US Mannes. For the first timc, the Japancse had becn handed a decI~ive defeat in the air,at sea alld on tbe ground. And III the first week of March . the Japanese were taught that thL')' could nOt run slow convoys of tmllsports dunng the day with llladcquate aIr cover without great risk. Eight tr:msports en roule betweell Rabaul and New Gumea, l.."Scorred by eight destroyers, were atucked by American bombers using new skipbombing tactics. Over the course of twO days, the battle of the Bismarck Sea sawall eight transporlS alld half the destroyers sunk by bombing and stmfing. On 18 April, US P-3R fighters. acting on llnelligence Intercepts, shot down Admiral Yamamoto's aeroplallc as he flew from Rabaul to 130ugainville. killing him. Meanwhile, Japanese reinforcements were being sent using fast destroyer forces down Thl' Slot' in :an effort to

158

1 94 J

relic\"(: Ihe bl..lea~..uered land ~rrisons. Over [he next few month~. the centrnl Solomon~ became [he scene of sever.ll hJrd~fough[ ~urface act!om, For Ihe Al1llrlCan~. on babnce the \1ClO~ of Ihese b.lUIC"'i. the purely otfen~'\'e pha!>e of Ihe Pacific war had begun and [he}" pl"e"sed [0 Ihe nOrlh \\~I IOwards Boug;unville and Rabaul. Fear of American urner ;,urcr.llt and a lJ(k of friendly bnd-b~ air cO\~r kepi Ihe japalll"\C frolll approachmg American fleets without their own carner baule fleel 111 a[lellJance. Uy [hl~ [llIIe, lila: '-prodUl'cd liberty ships wt:re pouring OUI of Amenc;m ~h'J"'!o';lrtb al a r.ue of about 1"11 per month. By [he middle of IIJ43,AmerIC2n h,pyartb \wn: (hurnmg out Esso,' c~ fleet carne" c:\'cr)' elghl wn'h, a \wll 2.\ IIgh[ cJrm:r. en:ry ~i.,>; wt:eks. Furthermore. ~urerior Ilc:\\ alrO'3n ~1"C"'i - m particular Ihe Grumnun F6F Hellcat fighteT and Impl'O\'l:d rawr .tnd fi!th[l'r connol wcre lIuroducerl to the tlcc:t With a growing fleet of large and hght fast carriers baded up ~ all dficil:nt fll:l:t train - conferring [he: ablh~' to condu(t ,u\ulIled .lIld \\1de-r.mging opcunom a[ an unprecedented pace and lI1[ell\uy unitt III Ihl: centr.ll PaCific pu~hed soulh \\est from Mld\\JY. The j.lr;ln~ ';I\"Y, incre;l~lIlgly composed of forces thT"O\\ n together n be:-<.I a~ 10\'\("\ .md I['; f;lr-flung comlllUlllenb could pronde. \\;1\ ~[lll attempting to COntl:~1 thl: Sololllons well illlo No\'C'mber 19..3. H;I\ IIlg failed to pre\'ent ;In American im'asion fleel from bndmg on l30ugalllville on I November - Ihrcatelllng Ihelr hllherlo-unmole-.ted major tlel:t b;l\C at RJbaul - the j;lp;lnese- Io<:t a hght UUI\er ;lnd a demoyer ;lnd tWO other wJ.rships dJ.maged at [he UJllle of Empre\\ Au~..u~u BJy Three d;l\"\ bIer Ihe)' sutfered a further senou) se:lbad. when J fleet of IlIne powerful ~-lIlch gunned crUisers under VICe Admiral Kuril;l" de~pJtched from Truk 10 StOP Ihe con~hdatlon of the American b.ndinh~ on Bougainville, was caughl and badly bmered III crowded RJbJul harbour by a ~urprise air raid by a hundred US carner :Jircrafi.japanc~e air group~ ~erlt to imerfere were largely Wiped out, and the Jtpan(:~c lo~t all hope of collte~lil1g Ihe 130ugainville IJl1dlllb"" A~ a re~ull, it WJ~ only a lI1;mer oflimc before RabJul became i~olJted and neutralized a~ a forward naval ba~e for Ihe japanl'iC, With 1ll0~t oflhe sotomon~ now in American hJnd~, US Iand-basl'd airpower would 110\\ k"cp RahJ\,1 under con~tJIlt Jir alt:Jck, wcaring aWJ)' local JJpJnese air grouP\ ~lruAA!ing 10 ddend the base.As the AJlleriCJ.ns pre~~ed Oil, Ihe hd W,I~ kept on RabJul .lIld it hecame increa~ingly suffocJled as Ihl' fronllme mov"d north .ll1d \\'l~t, 5upportl'd by heJvy bJule~hip~, .1 US fleer illvaded Ihe Gilbert Idalld~, whith were cJptun:d in November a.fter a suiciwl lasl stand by the jJpJnl~ g:arri\On on tht' i~lJnd ofTuawa. Onl\- one hundred pri~ners \\ere ukl'n out of the lQrri~n un:ngrh of 4,7110 defelldef'l. The o\'l'rwhdming ~tn'n~'1:h of American cJ.rrier power wa~ deuly deIllOlhtn.t"d durin),' thi~ campJign. Eighteen carrie" were almmt unoppmc:d by the J.lp.ln~ who hJ.d lou most of [heir own carner group" in the 1\o101l10n~_ The irr\"wr;ible attrition of jap.llle5C a\1aoon. cruiser ,md dc:<itlOyer forec:<i 1Il term~ of nUll1be~ and of fighting efficiency. J.nd the 10<;\ of the SoIOlllon, basc..... tOb't:ther served 10 weJken the log1~t1CJI and comb.n IQundmom upon \\' hKh jJpall's south-eastern expan~lon had been built. The jJp.1Ilc:<iC .1\"'" could not field enough light forces to act both \\1th the fleel and III dell-lice of jJpanese: sluppmg. leI Jlone use [hem to remforee precanou\ OUlf'O"~ III the ground \\';lr. It was Io<:ing aircr.ln and p,l~ alld lc:<i\ and Ie<- did II enj~- frlendh local air superiori~. Then"J.tier. wllhom Ihl" meam 10 end the \\';lr II h:Jd bt'b'Un. \UOltq,.>ic mobility \\;1\ worn a\\;ly .:h japJ.n i"ulld Itself fighting defi:n Iwly on

hugely \Cp.lrJted lfontS a~inst a n.nge of t'lwllli~; Chine!>e. AmencJn, Bnmh ,1I1d Conunonwealth_ Of these. the US a\'Y \\,1\ .llol\l: able 10 suualll tive nl.ljor clTortS ag:ainn the JapJne<><:: J long-r,mg!;' ~ubnunn!;' .!!lll'm' dt' ("rme Jg:JIIl~ jJpant'St: mCT('J.ntlle ~llIprlllg: fleet J(tiOll\ .;Ig'Jill\t COIlCcntr.lIlOIlS of llJ\';l! shipping:; an i.dJ.nd-hopPIll~ trJtt.'~'y uSlllg enormoU'i amphlblOll\ foret'S to learfrog nUjor pod,el of jJpJnt.'\e fl:";!\unce; a dC".';l"-tating arrier air otfen~i\~ that \\J.~ e\~lltll.llI~ lble to CJrry the war to Ihe jJpanl'SC.' homeland: Jnd the fJClhu[lolI of;l 'Ir,lll'~1C bombmg call1pJlf,'Il bunched tfom iilimb that the 114\"\ ,md lIunne<Iud c.;lpturcd.

The Ongoing Menace of German Capital Ships

Incn"J lIlY 1\Q!alOO .;l.lId contnbuting: I~ 2nd IN to the Axi~ wn etfort. nonl'1hdC'\\ the remallllng Kri~s",.:ril/t capital \lu~ could nOI IX' ignored b~ the R~11 a\1; Smer-~hlp 10 thl' BisnlJrrk and likewl\(' one of Ihe mo\t ro'\ertul \\earon~ .;Ifloat. the 1;'I'r/::; had .;I chequt:red open.tioll.;l.1 hl\to~. Hiller \\a\ nlT\1)U\ of hl'T loss 10 Uriti~h J:ireran. carriers polellllJlly opcratlllg with [he Arrtic convo".~ and would not authorize her u\c until the \\ hereJ.bou" of the Unti~h nrrieI"'i could bt: esubli\hed. Uut C'\l:n III harbour \he poo;cd a thn:.;It thJt the Uriti~h paid .;I dl~proportlonate amoulll of J.ttentlon to Ioumering. A number of wrmg torpcdo--bomblllg ral(b, by At:et Air Arm UJrn.cuw\ d.lllla~'Cd her, llukll1g her a \UtlC U'b'l'I. Uut dC'\pite repeated .lltem!,t" IIldudmg aborllvc tril.., wllh Urimh human torped0t'5 <:odClIJllled 'ChJriots', \he could not be- knockl'd OUI, Mlrronng uetiQ, "\C. JIl JudJtiou~ plan had beel! pIoneered ~' the lulian\ and japallt.. halched by the Urltlsh 10 J.tuck the German bJult",lup J.lld her 11-111ch b'Unned comon $r/"mrll'l1'S/ Jt Jnchor III Altellijord in Norway using nudgel subman'll.'" called X-craft. eJch carrYlllg two 2-lon expIO"i\'C' \.Jddle dl.lrge~. In Septelllber, \IX 5uch craft. !Owed by SUbIllJrl!ll:s. Sl.'t OU! for Ihe fjord, Two were losl on the pJ5<;Jg<' to NOI'\\J)'. Jnotlll'r \.Jnk (Iunng the approach to Ihe Ti,p;/~ and one fJlled Jt thl' last llllllUtl' 10 ,m,lek the Sdwmlr,.m,Thi~ left two 10 gel through 10 the 'J'irpi,:::.I'IJl:ing Ihelr durge5 underne;lIh the hugc battll"ihlps hull, Ihe midgl,t ~lIb news bJlled OUI .Ind watched J'i Ihe Gcrlllam lrled 1Il \'a1l1 10 ,hife thl' ship out of the \\ .I)'; Ihe ch.lr~<."S went up, putting Ihc bJ[[k~hlp OUI of (Ollll11is~lOn for a further ~IX 1II0nth~ - .l vJluablc ~tr:lle~u: n'iult and ,mother blow 10 GerlllJ.Jl lI.1VJI pride. A yt:Jr Jfler their failure at (he BJule of the UJrcm~ Sea Jl:3l1l~1 (OliVO)' jW 51 U. GermJIl \urface unitS ag:ull fell pn.'i~ure 10 demOIl\lra[e theIr ~tr-Jteglt worth III tht' Arctic. In December 19..3 Alhed wll\'oy jW 55U. l'obtbound to RUS$IJ. WJ.S urgeted by the Gt'rlllan b;lttlecrul~cr SdlJmlr"N sortlclI1g from NOI'\\"J); but ;In lIl{ercepung force of Br1U~h (rUI'eI"'i mpportl'd by tht': b.lttlC\hip Dllkt <?,{\'ork broughl hcr 10 ;lnioll a[ long range. where the 14-lIlch b'Ulli of {he I3nu~h bauk...hlp bam'red Ihe GlrlllJ.n 5hlp II1tO J. hulL The BJttle of thl: North CJ.pc delllOlNl'Jll'd Brltl~h expertise: III tlCl't h.mdling. use of I'Jwr ,md low-hglu fightlllg \k,lk f',;0\\ jU,t the WtllJgc.-d >lirpi/::: remained alone .lI~ the 1:I\t vt.',rige of German c.lIplul \hlp p(m.:r, Meanwhile. [he neuterlllg of the threJt of m.ll\.....d U-boJt .lItuch in the Atlanric h.lld removed the linJl IllJojor obool.llde 10 .;I lIlJ\\I\'e Iran~fernl to Bnum of American and Canadian lI11'n. un],;,\. \\eJ.pom. supp1i~. lranspom, undlllg ~hlps. hosplul \hlp' and .lI million aud Olle other thill!,.'\ needed for the commencement of Ihe l1l\J\lon of !\inloccupied Europe. And ~imuluneoudy. [he tltuJtlOI1 III Ihe PaCIfic \hO\v..-d thJt an American \1clOry WJ.~. for .lIll pr;l;ctlC.;I1 purpo\('\. ineviuble - but .;II wh.;ll cmt?

159

194 J

Navies in exile: Greece

Some of a series of photograph of the Greek uuiser. HHMS ~.4f!roIf. Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. Sakellariou. Commander-In-Chief of the Royal Hellenic Navy.The 10.2oo.(on cruiser had been bought by Greece while under construction at Uvomo in Italy in 1909. Despite a major ref,t in France dUring 1925-7, by 1941 the ship's speed had dropped to 16 knou and so. rather than stay in Greek waten; to be sunk by the ~ffe. on 22 April she left for Alexandria where twO days later she was placed under the orders of Admiral Cunningham. During 1941-4 IIM!roIf operated with the Allied navies in the Middle east and Indian Ocean theatres where her lack of speed was of little imporunce and her powerful main battery would be more than adequate to deal with any German raiders. In April 1944 tile ship was onl! of a number of Greek warships which were
briefly the scene of mutinies, but on 17 O<tober of that year the old warrior led the Greek fleet that dropped anchor in Faliron Bay.Athen~. at the end of the Nazi occupation. On 15 May 19'15 she arrived at Rhodes to mark the actession of the Dodecanese from ltaly_ After the end of the World War Two the old warrior became first a naval headquarters ~hip. and then from 1957 a training ship at the Greek naval academy at Paros. before finally returning to Faliron in 1985 to become a museum ship. where she remains to this day.

.,

'I \'

(right) HHMS Gorg;osAuoff Seen from the quarterdeck. anti-aIrcraft gul'Vlel"Y exercises are taking place after the conclusion of DM$lons. T""O of Averoffs 3-inch anti-aircraft guns can be seen. prom'nent on

erther side of the after

superstruct~

WIth anlJ-sphl1ler protedJon around them. while the

maetme guns on the roof of the after mam tUrT'e1 and on the platform between the legs
of the tripod mainmast are also in use. In the foreground is a large-base (possibly 9-foot) portable rangefinder:

(left) Independence Day

Morning divisions on board Averoff. and preparatJons

for celebrating Greek Independenc;e Day (25 Man:h). a rn.1jor OWISIOn for the sailors of the Greek ships in the Allied navies.

Adm,raJ Sakellanou is in
the centre of the quarter deck. facing fOf'Nal""d. Note the naval band playing beneath the main guns. and the AA machlOe guns on the turret roof The pale obteet In the foreground IS by

the aft rangetlnder. ccwere<! a tarpauhn.

194 3

Navies in exile: Netherlands

The rmjority of the Netherlands' warships based in European waters l!~ when the country wu invaded by Gemuny in 1940. ilIld <it once bepn to serve ..Ionride the Royal Navy.An ouutanding Combilt record ensued. Ships sunk were n:pb.ced by new ones built in Britkh lhipyan:b. H~r. when J~n invaded the Netherbnds East Indies (WO yeu~ biter there were far heavier losses before the sul"YlVlng vusels escaped to AU$tnlg and Ceylon.

HNIMS TttnJI in Austnllia

The C1\IlSe!" Tromp at SyO'ley b- YISIt and repars, 1942....04. Before the w the ship ~ been desl&Nted ~ .. flo,., Iexler, 6.n'lg the w she took part In the dl!fence of the I\Iether'bnds E.ut noes , .....d dirNge by japarll5e ~ clu1ng AJbed a~ to thwt the 'fw<I$IOIl of &Ii bt:oo her to retn to ~ b ~ Th5 ~ ~ her from ~ the f<ltt of moo of the ~ of the AIied ships.. ~ 6.nlg !he foIowr1g week$. Ute!" she ser"l!d with the BntJSh East n:Jies Fleet and with the US 7th Fleet.
Subrmrlnekillers TYo<I famous Netherianck '~IoIIen': OIl the left 15 Z'I>OOf'dvrsdl (T <1m) whoch sank lJ./68 on the ~ Sea l!'\ October 1944. and on the nght IS 0-21 whoch $lk lJ.9S III the T ~ SeA In NoYembet 1941,Of lJ.-I68s crew. twenty-three lost their lives and twenty-two were rescued. /J.95 Iud only jun entered the Mediterranean and ~ sunk WIth ~rtyfive of her Cre'N. ~ wrvMng and being taken prisoner. These were not the only Wl'5WoCes of a NetherWnds wbmanoe sinking aoother~: OoIflJfl ('$'-<:1,)$5) W1k the tu.IWl Mab:hrle near Sardll11<l ()(l 9 February I'M3, This photograph was t3l<en at Armterdam on 2 September 1948

The 'terrible twUlS' The be fIboiU HNIMS Sottrbo (iboYe). In the ~ E.st roes. pre-_ t:oA post.1932.~ ~ 'NIlh ~ ~ 'Cl 'Oco..tJIe Prn::e J-;k". 'Cl ~ (""').II'I.a North Afrrar, h.arboo.r. pn::OIbIy AlgIers, (VIe W3S ~ to the ~ 11'I 19'13. her ~ ofIicer IoslI'lg I'lIS fe off Il.lty). ~ Io"oNn as the 'terTillc twns HcMy arrne<l b' thelr sae. WIth three ! 5CIlvn i"'S plus proper ~ conud. as wei as poss.esslI'lI .If'l .lI"T'I"lOU"e deck. they n.rned out to be Ide.aI ~ for ~ ~ 'Cl both ~ ~ engaged III operauons off ~ 'Cl du"lIlc the 0"N.l:SI0n of Nomwldy

I 6 I

194 3

The balance of power changes in the Atlantic

At the SOrt of t 90. the U-bct ~d succude<l in denying Britain so RUn)' essential carps that Bntish NtIOrnIJ reserves held only mrff months' worth of oil. Over 300 Uboilts were at the com~nd of Admir.lll DOnia, ~ Allied cO!'IVO)'$ in the elIrty months of the year suffered great losses. Yet durint the course of the yur. the Battle of the Adanoc tume<l in f.noour of lhe Allies. as a cOfllb;ned ~ su~ oI'fetUive by skilled eKortS and patrol ~rcr.lft increasingty took effect. By the middle of the year. as fewer and fewer of his bm.u returned l'rom their rniuiom, Donitr. ordered the tetTlpClnfy withdrawal of his force from the Atbntic.

The 1alJ&hina; swordfish ThIs boat IS belIe-:l to be ().7"'.c~",.IIne 1943.The ~ ~ the nu:h I\appler tmes of the U-Boit ""'1h the 'Uugtq SwatIish' ~ tNt adorned boats of the N.nth LJ.&at ~ ~ ~ ~ By 19+1. lJ..bc.t openuons n the AtIInuc hMj a-'ded amost to ~ ~ ~ A6ed ilItltl-subINnle tneaSU'eS c:bTw1atrd the se.J ~

Under siese from the air Arcnft beame the t.J..Ooa.u~ tnerTl)'Armed WIth -m ~HFJDF_ ~ depth ~ 1'ido" ~0l./$lJ( hon'wlg torpedoes. nWwoe pl5 m L.egn
~ lOr nVtt attaeb, ~ and ~ patrol ~Ii. could keep watch for ~u <II'OU"Id cOI"I\IO'fS. and Wrtel'"-nnged mediun bornbe<-s 'Id fighlC'f"S 1IyIng 6-om '-:I ~ could aM ~ a ~ on the 5U"f.lce, In 1943. U-boats ~er.oed . . ~ radar and ~ anu-H"O"aft <lt11\aITIef\t '" in attempt to beat olf the attentions of Akd anb-~ illI'"mlfi: bt.tl to bttIe ava.l.

1943
Liberator factory The Importance of the mantJme VLR ai~raft to the closure of the mid-Atlantic 'a,r gap'. leading to the defeat of the Uboats. is d,ff,o.,rt 10 exaggerate. One of the most effectM!VLR types was the B-24 LJberator; AO'Ml by RAF Coanal Command. the Royal Canad,an AIr Force and the US Navy.lntroduc:ed In 1941. the liberatOI'" hold~ the record as the most nurnerooAy built Allied aircr.lft of the war. with fJoIef" ! 8.0CXl examples produced. The Ford Motor Company boasted of tumlf18 one out per day at the peak of their produetrvity. But the ma,n claimant to the ranl<s of new a,rcraft Coming off American production lmes was the US Army An" Force. who used the LJberator as a Strillegoc bomber ~ Germany and In the PacIfIC As a result of the,r wanglehok! OIl produc;tooo. rt was nol untll the $p!1flg of 1943 that even one mantJme liberator squadron began to operate over the western half of the Atlantoe.ln concert ........m squadrons fIyong earlier models from keland and the Bntlsh Isles, ItS effect was onvnedlilte and Iastlng.

163

1943

The Arctic. 1943

Arctk; convoys continu~ throuJhout 19'43. the most dramatic occurrifll in ~;llling c.onditions 3t the very end of December when JW SSA MId JW SSB were set to converxe on oppo$ite tncks between loch Ewe in Scotland. lo~ Russia.. The Briti1.h expected MI nuck by the Sclwmor. lond desuoyen; s.ailing north OUt of Altenljord. To C~ the incoming lotld outgOing convoys and brina die battlecruiser to b.J.tde. the

British ~ their 8-inch crui5e~ 8ehsc. Sheffield and f\bfr:JA with the unbound JW 55B while Admin! Bruc. Fruer in the lay GeorJe: \lcbn batdWiip Qh olY:ri. lo"ompanied by PnWa. numed eI$(W,In:ls from Icebnd to prc.wide Iupport.. TIllny miles un of the cOfI\lJO)'. det~ the ~ llIina: the Berut's radar set.VICe-Admiral Burneu "WIcked u~g /Itri*- hittint: and forcing the Get'l"l'Wl batdecruilier to tum ~ and work round to i1ttempt MI i1ttllck on the tofWOy. Antic~tirla this n'lO't. Burnett heloded to..the toI'lIIOy and repined COI'ItlIct with the Sclvnnont. Re--openin, fire. the British cruiwrt. scored hiu but Nafdc wu badly da~ by the I I-inch shells of the S c ~Admiral Bey in the GeI'1TWl baaJecruiser OJmed south -ar from the 1!1lpg1ffllMt; meanwhile Fraser's fon;e was closing from me south wen. pided by radar reportS from Burnett's truisers. By .. p.rn. the CVce d'&k made n.dar contact at 22 miles and moved in for the kHl. The whole scene iIIuminned by star shell. lond bilttl!n!d on one side by Burnea's trollers and the I"inch shells of the British b.J.ttleshlp on the odler. the ScharMorst was oY'trwhelmed, lInd sunk by torpedo with larz:e lou of lif. MNnwhlle the convoy reached safety
in Munmnsk.

The icy North

Looking forwanj on the

port

We of the

bn<J'ie

supemructvre of HMS Norossus. 23

January 19-1), posItIOn approximate sooN, SI"VI/. The build-up of ICe on board ships ~ in the Arctic. may hlve looked spectacul3r but was potentially very dangen;lus. Desprte the dleerfuI
~lor, I~

expresSlOl1 on the face of 1M condrtJons ~ appaIl~

and woriung

Soviet destroyers in echelon ScMet TypeVIIU <lestro)'ers '" 19-13.The ~ these shlps ~ a /T1oOdffIcatoon of the II"lltIaI senes to enable them to operate," the ~ condrtJons of the Atctlc.They could ~ ~ ~ the Atctlc and 8a!tJc seas VIol the

or

~eSeaUnaL

Pushin! through the ice

Seen from the DIdo dass 0"UISet" HMS Sc)fa. merd'lant ~IPS and an esl:Qft destro)er of cOt'fol':T1 fW S3 pass through p.ack ice during their voya.ge on 15-27 Febr1Jary 19'13.There is a seal on the ICe II"l the foreground.JW 53 left ~ on 15 February 1943 and arnYed at Kola Inlet. Russia, on 27 February 19"3. Of the twentynll"le merchant vessels whICh left BI1tJSh waters. twenty'eliht amved safely; one was wok 111 port by uuaf\ atuek. One escort ves.seI was also lost The escortw'lil atrmfl. eat'T1I!f. HMS Dosher, had to orvert to kelind followin& ICe dirnige during a norm.
HMS t:lk dYt:Ifc The battlestop. o.k o(York. ~ Btuce Fmer's Ibplip at the Battle of the North Cape. opens We with her r-ns.

165

..
1943

The Allies invade Italy

When it became clur tN.t w propo5ed Allied Irrtnion d western Europe could not be mounted before: 19+4. ~t was ruched Wld"n the Allied c~ chat $u~te plans to Il'Nlde IaIy could be put in motion.lhint forces plucked from the successful cam~ in North Africa. Iandll'lp wert INde first .u Sicily. then ;rcross the StralU of Henllla and Into lNinQnd ItiIIy in ~lemo and TOIr.lntO-

6ntJsh troops of Mcw1tpnery's fi&hth Ivmy emerae from the: boN ~ of lSr-J8J. .. US ~ ldng Vop. on the bYch ~ SMmo on the: ~ rnM1lind Ths plJCUW lM16ng Shp Tn _ kilter used to <Itw'l budWINd 'It A1lZJO ...0 then ... the
~

~ I:>rvlYons. NvIng kught a b1g ~ oiIIpI1$1. Rommel ... the Nonh Amcan ~ ~ needessIy added to fi'esh AmencI troops d the US Fifth

........

od poorly

~BntISh tr'OOpS

from the 50lh (TyneTees).-l Sist

Ivmy ... the: assautl. on Salerno. But. after t'l.Mn& been deceNed Dlul mer OestI'QbOn ld p.rpose. nety 200 men refused to ~ Ifl the: ~ and were <urested l'or ~ on:lln W/ttwl SIX weells. after a tnaI for whoch d'letr defence had no tll1'le to ~ evidence. aU but one had been found iU'1ty of ~ their sentences ~ from fr.oe ~. penal se<VItude to death.

1943

Pack animals uhore

\NIlde cOflW'lI ashor'e from land<ng end!. on 5lc,ty on early August '9'13.Amencan sold.ers Ie.1d rather reluctant mulM through the surf towards the beach. Beam of burden were use<! to help transport AllIN supphes O'o'ef' Italy's ~ terrain,

Opention AYlobnc:he

Toochdown In the $Uff. September' 1~ 3: US mIJWy ~ of the 817th ~ AVIIbOn Battalion I'd all" an lST nmp lbrl& landn& oper;IbOnS III Sa\@mo on I'J'IariInd Italy Troops sund on the deck of the ship. A lJS.oper;Ited 5IJperTNnne Sprtfn lies nose-down on the surf. mcsUkerly shot doY.Tl by A.menc.l 'lb-.craft ~ AccCll'dlng to the US Ar force. the ~ sutrered
oriy'a senten on the bidt of t. Nnd'.

I 94J

Surrender of the Italian fleet

After the
ltalj~n

Government had agreed the Allied

terms for an armiuiee the main body of the lulian fleet sailed for Malta to paH under British control. Air attacks by their former ally resulted in the destruction of the batdeship Rorm with heavy loss of life, but the remainder of the fleet made it to Malta. On II September Admin! Cunningham was able to signal to London: 'Be pleased to inform Their Lordships that the lulian battle fleet now lies under the guns of the fortress of Malta', These photographs are part of a series taken by Ueutenant Cotter at Kalafrana Bay on 14 September and St Paul's Bay on 22 September 194] and show uniu of Admir.lI Da Zara's fleet at anchor with members of their crews on deck.AII are taken
from small boaLS, photographers not being allowed on bo.1rd the ships.

#,r

fx'

i.1
I'

~ .1-:, "'., .... ""'..

,
,~

"J.

(below) ItilJi.il at am:hor Battleship 1Li/i.il (ex-l.Jm:n in Kalafr<lllil Bay.

(above) Keeping watch A Maltese $/ffitry stands watch r:Ner Italian battleships. Kalafrana Bay.

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Line-up in 5t Paul's Bay From left to right: Ital<an submannes Go MenoI.rJ.jalea and Zoea then the escort-lorpe<Io-OOat 00::ne. the seaplane carrier Giuseppe Mr.Jg/ia. the requ,~lIOned liner LUdfliI and the submarine on the other side of her is probabty the
A>un and then the Gatarea

The crew of the Ga/area Sem from a different ang"". Galatea is frl the (oreground
wrth A>un behind her and then the Luana and ~ Mr.igllil.

./

Worse fates Ba~IP Wtta"D ~ In Kalafrana Bay. In the fon!ground. with salvage WO<"k clearly stllI,n progress. is the /3rtoca~. sunk in Augvst 1942 after the Battle of s,rte.

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The expansion of US output President Roosevelt stops at KaIser- Shipyard ,n Rdrnond. California. during an 8.OCQ..miJe tour of the United Stales. VISItIng industnes and the armed forces. In the car with him Me Harry HoplOns (left) arid Henry Kaiser; known to ~ as the 'father of modem American s/'lIpbuild'ng' - to others. simpty as 'Sir Launchalot' By 1943 the 'ndustnal ovtp<Jt of the Uruted States was far ovtstnppina that of its allIeS and enemIeS combmed, and Kaiser'S beame f<l/TlOU$ foc- prodUCing a Liberty ship in four days.. one of CM!.r 2}50 ships built to the same ~ Bntif.h design Il!qUJreI'Tleflt. Hopkins was a pro-6ntJsh diplomat and a~ to ~Jt. popular with Olurthill and Instrumental 10 arTangJng Lend-Lea5e In 19"11

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,.

--.

-.
'

..

-,
/

--,

I ,

, -t

The J;apanese Emperor ablrd Musuhi Empertlr HoroMo (front centre) 'NIth naval offic~ ~th the powerful antiall"Craft and se<ondary armament of the supef'battleshJp MUSilshl. at YoI<.osI.b naval ~se on June 1941 loyalty to the Emperor was the central tenet of the japanese "rmed forces In World WarTwo. and led to a psychology that demanded a Wllhngness to pay the uftomale pnce In battle 00 land. at sea and in the a.r.japanese forces - led by fanatICal officers pr'O'o'e<l extreme!)' tough for the A1lres to beal even resorting to suicide tactICS when the ncreaSlflily d~ operatIOnal mu.1t1On dernarlded
~

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-I

The Southern Pacific fight-back

Vic.tory at Guadalcanal in February 1943 gave the US
a base which enabled their forces to accelerate the process of counteradvance, pushing the Japanese
;, ;

frontier back through the Solomons. The Japanese Navy was forced to adopt a perpetually reactive stance as its carrier air power wn ground away in
support of beleaguered land garrisons.

HMNZS /...e;;Jnder
The light Crulsel" Le3!der at arl(:hor ,n $oIomon Islands waters, 25 July 1943. photographed from USS Nichotts (DO-449). Le.n:lerwas on loan from the Royal N<Nf
to the Royal Ne'N Zealand Na'V)(
Croiser survivof"$
$UlTlmet" and 1I110 the autumn. the Americans and japanese fought hard for the central Solomons at the cnJiser~ battles of Kula Gulf, Vella Gulf. Hor-amu and Vella l...M!11a. the Americans, despite Ios!e5 emerg~g ~ ,n the firn week of October. Oily ~ of USS HeIetw (eL-SO) clamber abo.mj LtS5 f'..Jich:bs (DO-449) after- the battle of Kula

Throughovt the

Gulf. s-6 MY 1943.

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Amphibious linding A.mencan iIIld Aus~ ddiers look at the camera as tiler Lando'1i craft he<Jds J'l1.0 ~ somewhere in New Guilla podJly the Huon ~ neM Lae:. dn'l& Operatoon Postern '" eiy ~ C>.ri'lg the ~\JOn,~'Betty'."I/~iIl'ld'Zero' ~ bMed at ~ ., New Brruon a~ the ~ g.,jppng offshore. "*'e i hI..rO'ed AIled perwnneL ThIs ~ ~ by GoeneriiI DougIi:l. ~ _ a $l.ICC~ ~ a dIstWlC'llllck oIlV41 support

175

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Replenishment at sea

The Amelicans. operating across vast distances for weeks at a time. pte>neered the efliaent use of replenishment al sea (PAS) using specially~u'pped naval tankers. a masSIVe force-multlpller: Also crvoal was !he van support fleet of ~Ir ship$. ~ (~ghlers and floating doc\<$, which ~ steadily IT'oCMI'lg closer to japan ~ng andlorages provided by suitable aloHs a!O Kwajaleln in the Marshails. Maros in the Admiralty I~ and Ulith, in the Western Carolioes. The American fleet had to provtde nol only a strikilg force but ItS own base of ope!"attOflS - as ~I as CMryIIlg an air force and an army along WIth It This photograph shows USS ~ (CA-36) reWllng at sea from a niNy oiler during the Mmhalll!Jands operation In December: The ~ler is one of the few that were fined WIth a Mark 37 gun director. visible atop her bndge. Note the red navigatIOn light on the oller's port bndge wmg.

wen

Shooting practice US5 Bb>a firing her guns while steaming ~ a tum. dunng shal<.ed<:N.rn. October- 1943.

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Plotting the baclle

A photograph by Edward Steichen shows busy crewmen working on charts and communications systems aboard the Essex class aIrcraft carner l.c><ngton (01-16) nICknamed 'The Blue Ghost" due to her all-over dark blue 'camouflage' en route to sml<Jng agaJost japanese targets In the G,lberts and Marshall Islands ,n late November 1943.

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Soviet and Axis operations in 1943

During 1913 the Soviet advance began in urnest. with the large warships, suc.h as battleships and

cruisers. being used to bombard Gennan and Romanian positions ashore, while smaller ones operated in coastal waters and rivers.

(riaht) MAS craft in the BlilCk Sell The Italian Navy contributed a squadron of these f1o\S craft. four midget submarines and some uashboats. all sent to the BlaO: Sea by contlnenUl rail. ThougtJ !.IYIalL this forc::e ~ the Axis to use the sea for supply and transport. and offensNe operations. This photograph shows elements of the f'1AS-I'1amtro 5ezJc;ne MAS at Sevastopol. january 1943. They sank a SovIet crvlSef".

rv

Flo.

loading a torpedo
Romanian l!$COrt
lJnrts of the

Romaruan Navy escort iI Romanll cClI'1YO)' 00 the way to its dest.on.utOn

loadmg torpedoes 01110 a SovIet K<las.s submanne. SovIet torpedoes ~ not terribly effeewe - the depth~ and finng I'TleChanI5mS ~ oorellable and many torpedoes passed under their targets; some detonated after ITlISwog. others just 5al1k. Those that made a hit did not always detonate ~ aIthougn this was a problem not ~ed 10 Soviet submanoes. Soviet doctnne was to ciNe invned.ately after releasing tOl'pedoes. and OetonatJOns were often freely translated as 'hits',

180

Ofluoyer

On oo.-d the NJWr: ~ ~ Stl. These older g,jps bmed the INckbone of the XMet ~ strelgth at the Slt of the W. being dlstnbuted nOOg ~ b.r I\eeu.. 5L*l wu one of the l7ew to SIn'Ne the WilT

The littonl One of the most mporunt f\.ncbons of the ScMet Navy was l"l'ICM"lll troops ., nver ~ tQjst<l! enwtlfVT'leIlts. ~ he ScMet Navy eM root tonstruc;t spetiaI,ze<j Iand'"i ships Of' craft. and ., delr.oemg men amp/'ubIousIy I'Iad to rely on warshlps. transport torrversions. tMkan ferry barges ar.d other smaK craft.

Budeship fire support The battleshp ~ Konn.ni bor'rbl:in& etlIITIy poWor6. CUing 19-43 he rewrted to her 0f"'iI,....-ne,

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The Roy;al NayY's intricate work Although the German Navy dKl not have eoougtl stocks or mll'le,> to cause decisive d3mage to shipping in BritIsh coastal wat~ minesweeper> still had a VItal role to play '" safeguarding sea lanes. Thi5 photograph shows offic~ aboard Moto!" Minesweeper 136
@flJOyinga cup of ship's cocoa. very wekome
,1"1

cold weather:

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'Chariots' of fire Royal Navy officers conduct trials of the 'Charlot' human toI"pedo IJOder.Nater craft. whICh was designed to carry explosives to attack enemy ships. On<:e in r.mge. the two crew members WOIJld bail out and wi\lt to be rescued. Seven were lost In attacks off ltal.an ports and two off L.bya on jaroary 194): two were also lost on late December attempllng to attack the battleshIp r'P'fZ ,n OftofjOrd. Norway She had already ~ damaged by 8ntIsh X-eraft midget submannes ~ months pre'o1OU5ly although three X-craft were Ion lfl thlo: oper<lbOn. For the CI'l!W'i It was a peculiarly dangerous way to go to war

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a mere feint - almost complete strategic and mctical surprise was achieved by the Allit.-s. From headquarters ill Portsmouth, Admiral Sir Bertram Rams,1Y as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief of Operation Neptune, the maritime facet of Overlord, co-ordinated an enormous number and range of vessels in the asuult phase and the build-up of supplies. The forces comprised 1,213 \varships, -l-, t 26 landing crali: of all sizes and cargoes, 736 support ships and 864 merchanr v<.'Sscls - a total of almost seven thousand vessds, of which 79 per cent were British and Canadian, 16 per cent American and 4 per cent from other allies. The equipmcllt U'';llhported across the Channd also included a range of ingenious wssds and Mulberry/Gooseberry :mificial harbours crt'ated specifically for the establishlll(nt and subsequem maintenance of the Normandy beach-head. Meanwhile a complex, deep-layered dcfence comprising Uritish and American destroyers, frig.m.'s and MTUs patrolled apportioned sectors of the wt.'SteTll and eastern Channel on the lookom for any German attempts to reach the ilwasion shipping lanes. Sc/l/wrkt'l-equippt'd Uboats, infiltrating narrow tidal coastal waters being plyed cOllStantly by large volumes of shipping on predictable rouu.'s, would present a difficult challenge to Allied anti-submarine air and surface forces. UUt with Allied superioTlty assured and with Vltra intercepts continuing to inform the Alht.'S of German counter-attack plans. no major German naval units could hope to make a decisive intervention. Through pre-emptive Allied s,1turation of the skit.'S around the V-boat bases in the Uay of Uiscay, and constant local patrolling, V-boat and E-boat im("rfercnce was kept to a minltllUm as the crucial toehold \vas gained. By the end of D-Day, over sixty thousand shells had been fired at German defences by naval cr:tft, and over 175,000 troops of many nafionahties had been put ashore on an established beach-head that strctcht.-U for 56 miles. Hitler's much-vaunted Atlantic Wall, which had ~kcn the Germans four years to construct and absorbed a large percell~gc of materiel and labour, fell in Just one day. Still, Allied warships had to be a.lert to tip-and-run raids by powerful German torpedo-boat flon[[as based to the cast at Le Havre and to the west at Cherbourg. Once convinced that the Allied landin6'S were the genUllle arricle, scvcmeell V-boats were mustered by the Krirgsmarill/.' for opcr;JtiOlls III the Channel; those without SclllJorkels were dcstroyed first and all boats of the first wave were accounted for by 15 Junt.'. Seven had bet'll sunk and three damaged by Uritish escorts. Uy mid-Junt.' almost all the E-boats had been sunk by air attack in Le Havre. In the days after 6 June, blockships. Goos("berry breakwaters and the Mulberry harbours were manoeuvr~'d into position off Gold and Omaha beach~'S. Uy the end of Opcr:ttion Overlord, on 5 July, one million Allied mel1 and thou.sands of \"Chides, weapons and tons of stores had been pUt ashore 111 Normandy. O""Cr 80,000 vehides were landed for the Americans alone in JUSt cleven days. In return for their heavy losses, the U-boats ha.d ma.naged to sink a. meagre five transports and one landing craft; only one esCOrt was sunk and three knocked out. Withdrawn from the Channel and forced to flee their French bases during AU6'\IS! as the Allied ground offensive split and the Americans swung tow~lf(ls the we~tern coast, the V-boats headed (or Nonvay.

bea.ches between Cannes and Toulon on 15 August. An American and a French corps went ashore and wcre quickly successful in forcing the German occupiers to retrea.t to the north ("ast. These were rhe last major amphibious actions in the European war. Ma.rseilles was sciZ('d, and through this port Allied troops were also gathered for the final push on Germany. The British opposed Anvil, preferring to maintain the pressure that Gener;J1 Alexander \vas applying in Imly a~ a means of getting to Vienna before the Soviets. Here. Churchill's arguments failed to be heeded by his allies. as Britain rapidly became the junior partner in the Big Three. As a result. support for the Italian campaign was diverted to the AIlIt'rican forces intended for Anvil. But control of the sea in the western Mediterranean. won by the Royal Navy, had created the conditions to complete the liberation of France (rom the south. Mt'anwhile. in the Baltic, the long bitter fight for Leningrad continued. Soviet naval forces acting in support of their comrades under arms ashore. Moored with their 6'Uns covering the city, the battleships and cruisers of the Soviet Navy acted as static batteries. Their fire, however. while terrifying in volume. was not particularly accurate or decisive. Uy April 1944 in the Black Sea the German garrison in Odessa was threatened with encirclement. Oven\hdming Soviet power generated a breakthrough and despite furious orders from Hitler not to evacuate, the German and Romanian armies of the Crimea - some t 50,000 men were brought away by air and sea as Sovi~t naval brigades stormed through th~ ravaged city. Abandoned Axis casualties numbered more than half the quantity successfully evacuated.

The US Fast Carrier Task Forces in the Pacific

With the frontline fleet of brand new carriers, mod~rn aircraft and powerful escorts expanding evt'r more. the relentless American lIlarch tow~rdsJapan went on. During February and March 1944 the Marshall Islands were captured, with no survivors from a garrison of 2,000 defenders on the final atoll to be taken. Eniwetok. With ten Japanese troops killed for every American casualty, the Admiralty Islands and New Uritain also fdl and the Japanese fleet bas~ at Rabaul became increasingly untenable. Finally. Rabaul was snuffed OuI and the Japanese base at Truk was pummelled by US carrier air groups. Nine days after Operation Overlord went ashore from the grey waters of the English Challnel. nearly 130,000 troops were landed by over 500 ships a6'3inst fierce resistauce 011 the island of Saipan in the Marianas, in what \vas to be the largest amphibious oper;Jtion of the Pacific \var. Having expected the Marianas to be attacked next. the Japanese attempted to deploy a force to prevelll any landings. A very potent Japanese fleet - consisting of five battleships. five fleet carriers, four light carriers. thirteen cruisers and twenty-eight destroyers - was assembled. But even this was outweighed by the naval firepower and suying power assembled by the Americans III Task Force 58: seven fleet carriers, eight light carriers, seven battleships, twenty-one cruisers and sixty-nine destroyers. Naval history had never seen the like of it. Instituted in August 1943 under Admiral Sherman. the Fast Carrier Task Forces were the main striking force of the US Navy in the latter stages of rhe war, operaring under the guises of Task Force 38 and 58 dep("nding on whether the same ships were operationally assigned to Admiral Halsey's Third or Admiral Spruance's Fifth Pacific Fleets. The core of rhe Fast Carrier Force consisted of the fleet carriers of the Essex class. supported by th(" Elllfrprise and Samt("g'1 and the 1I1dtpt'lldtll(e class light carriers capable of 32 knots. Operationally divided uno carrier task groups, each group included bct\wen three and five JO-knot carriers and

Further Allied Amphibious Landings

While Oper:ttion Cobr:t - the elimination of resistance in Brittany and the capture of its ports III particular - and rhe swing towards Paris took place to the north, Operation Anvil went in TO the Mediterr:tnean

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a powerful escort of ncw fast battleships, cruisers and d<'''5troyers. Each 8Sfo\" class carrier could carry thirty-six F6F Ilelleat fighters, thirty-six SB2C-1 llelldivcr dive bombers and eighteen Avenger torpedo aircraft. Of Admiral Mitscher's force asscmbled for the Marianas operation, six large carrieT'\ were of the Em'x class - the se\"Cllth, the older EII/('rl',isf. Able to Tllake proper me of air warning radar,Adllliral Mitscher's force \v.l.S warned of an incomingJapaliese carrier-launched attack and Illet it 50 miles out in the Philippine Sea; in aerial combat, Illore than two hundred Japanese aircraft Ollt of JUSt one raid were shot down for only twenty-three US fighter;. Judging - unmually, for a carrier-based force that the best form of offence was defence if the enemy \v.l.S likely to attack from a large number of bases, Mitscheis tactics were <'''5senrially reactive and greatly successful. Meanwhile. American submarinl"5. acting as pickets. sank the carriers TaillO and Shokilim. Next day. Mitscher launched an air strike and sank the J-/iyo and some tJnkers. and the Japanese fleet. seriously knockt:d, withdrew to Okinawa. At 'The GreJt Marianas Turkey Shoot'. as the Batth: of the Philippine SeJ became known to the American fliers. a total of between 300 Jnd 400 Japanese aircraft were destroyed by HelleJts /Tom Task Force 58. JapJncse carrier aviation \v.l.S almost annihilated and the safety of the American lJndings on the Marianas was ensured. Three weeks of nighunJrish ground fighting followed. resulting in the slaughter of almOSt the emire Japanese gJrrison of 27.000 men. The Japanese cabinet resigned. At the end of July the Americans landed on Tinian and cleared it of resistance within a week. Meanwhile, 10.000 Japanese Tllen were killed trying without success to dislodge an AmericJn invasion of Guam. ending on 10 August. The capture of the Marianas provided yet more bases from which na\"JI and air forces could imenlict Japan's lines of communication, cut her empire in half. isolate the Philippines. apply even more pressure to her suffering merchant marine and take the fight direct to the home islands through long~ range bombing.

defeat for the Japanese. l3y the end of NO\t'lllbl'r. when the US carrier force withdrew. It had bl'ell in contmual action Jt sea for almost elghtyfom days. With the main strength of the Japall<.'se fleet all but dt'stroyed. 200,(MJ() US troops were pm ashore on Leyte and for the next eight weeks a series of difficult overland and amphIbious operations followed umil the Island was carried on Christmas Day. The largest battle of the PJcific war was the new-year prospect wdcoming the battle-weary US troops as they looked across the San l3ernadino Strait towards Luzon, and the Fihpmo capital, Manila.

The Unsung Hero of the Pacific

l3y the end of 1944. in the hands of the largest and mmt powerful navy ever built. one weapon achieved all that the Krit.~Slllllrillt' had failed to. Steadily accounting for an increasing quantity ofJapallcsc merchant ships plying between the home islands and the newly-acqll1red. disparate empire, the US submarine force was perhaps the lynchpin of the American victory over the Japan<'''5e civilian population, and certainly thl' most unsung factor in a post-war US Navy keen to emphasize the role its expensive surfJce units had played. At the ombreak of \v.l.r only forty submarines had been available for operations in the Pacific. from Manila in the Philippines, and Pearl Ilarbor. The most modern fleet boats of 1.500 tons \\"Cre of the Po'pl'isf'. Salmoll, Sargo/Se"d'<l,~o" and "7<lIl1bor classes, based at Pearl Harbor. US fleet submarinl'5 were nearly half as big again as German submarines such as the Type IX. reflecting the need to cover much larger diSL1nces. The shorter-ranged 'S' class medium boats of 800 tons were intended for coastal defence and many were consequently based at Manila. Also av.l.ilable were the nine older 'V' boats of varying classes and ~izt."5, the largest of2.800 tons. By the first week ofJanuary 1942 the Philippines had fallen to Japan and the Asiatic submarine base there withdrew to Java, and after the battle of the Jav.l. Sea at the end ofJanuary, Fremantle in Australia became the thinl home for the Asiatic fleet in a momh.A month later, the command structure became yet more complex when these two fleets were joined by a thinl operating out of Brisbane.

The Crucible of Leyte Gulf

On 25 October 1944. the US Navy returned to the Philippines. from whence they had been expelled in early 1942. Still Jble to field powerfill ballieship (orces, the Imperial Japanese Navy attempted to interfere with the invasion by throwing Admiral Kurita's force including the 18-inch gunned Yamllto and ,\ll/slI1Ii and other battleships round the north of Leyte while a slower group of battleships includillg the FI/so and YllllllIhiro ulld~r Admiral Nishimura passed to the south through the Smigao Strait. Amcrican submarines had already struck Kurita's force as it passed through the Palaw:m Passage, sinking or seriously damaging duee cruisers, including his flagship Alago. Rounding the far side of Leytc. both Kurita and Nishimura's forces ran into the tceth of the escort carriers and oldcr battk'ships providing cover for the landings. J/I/sashi was sunk by carrk'r planes in thc Sibu)'Jn SCJ. Nishimura's fleet was hammered by American surface forces. FI/So was sunk by a torpedo attack launched by destroyers in the Smigao Strait while US battleships and cruisers of Admiral Oldt'ndons Task Group 77 stood off and with their main armamelll inflicted a defeat in detJilupon the rest of Nishimura's fleet, the admiral going down \vith his blazing battleship Yam<lshiro.Three out of the four carriers in Admiral Oza\v.l.S main body of the Japanese fleet were al~o ~unk by Mitscher off Cape Engaiio. [n total. the Japanese lo~t three battleships, four carriers, ten cruisers and devcn destroyers. The bTf,'"Cst battle (or, more correctly, series of battles) in modern naval history, and the last major nav.l.l ~Jlgagclllent of the war. had cnded in serious

Cautious Early Days

Trained primarily in the role of long-range scouts for the battle fleet which was now dislocated, and hitherto less concerned with targeting the Japanese merchant fleet. the US submarine force was given free rein to enb'Jgc in unrestricted submarine \v.l.rfare ab'Jinst any ships sailing under the Japanese flag. A cautious start ensued. Combat readiness \vas uniformly poor; US submarines were accustomed to attJcking from depth using sonar bearings Jild not on the surface; Japanese antisubmarine capabilities were littlc known; and doctrine dictated that much of lhe tillle spent on patrol would be submerged and out of the sight of land-based enemy aircraft. These factors accounted for few succ<'''5ses, and it was not umil August 1942 that the first major Japanese waT'\hip, the heavy cruiser Kllko, was sunk by a US submarine. the 544 (later to be lost to enemy action off the Kurile Islands III October 1943). At first, American submariners \vere taught to prioritize attacks on warships over merchantmen. and centralized command and wolf-pack gatherings were di~liked in the US Na\}', which preferred its submarint's to operate alone and in radio silence. SJ SUrf.1Cl' and SD air-search radar began to be fitted to US submarines, particularly in the new ColO class (1.525 tons and 20 knots on the surface) which emered service in the

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summer of 1941 and of which type seventy-seven would be built, making them one of the more numerous classes, American submarllles. like their German counterparts. experienced difficulties with their torpcdot.'S. p:anicularly III the case of arming and detonating on impact. The quality of lhe Mark XIV steam torpedo's secret magnetic detonator and the weapon's v:ariable depth of running remained serious issut."S. 'Duds' meant attacks frequently did not produce the resultS a skIlful approach had merited. Refusing to counten:lIlce a possibility of technical failure. an investigation of the firing pin was not ordered by the Bureau of Ordnance high cOlllmand until the summer of 1943, when tests revealed that it was 1I0t sturdy enough to withstand impact without a risk of distorting: the fitting of a new type of stronger pin eventually solved the imle. But the supply of torpedoes was severely limited after stockpiles in Manila had been bombed in December 1941, exacerbated by manufacturing difficulties. Submarine 'kills' remained very low. After just six weeks of oper.uiom, despite plentiful targets, only six Japanese tramports had been sunk, for the loss of twO US submarines. In truth, the American submarine force and its British and Dutch allies had failed to prevent the Japancsc expansion which had proceeded, after all, along reasonably predictable lines. With over seventy boats available in the western and mid-Pacific theatres - more than the Kricgsman"Ill operated in the emire Atlantic after twO years of war - by April 1942 the Americans had sunk 300,000 tons, constituting less than 25 per celli of the German total in the S<1111e four-moneh period. But the KrirgslIlarim"s submarines had been practislllg theIr art III war conditions rather longer. As the US submarine service \Vl:nt over to the offensive as best it could given the strain upon men and materiel, patrol records of claimed sinkings were often wildly optimistic and led to confusion about the true damage being done to thejapancse merchant tonnage total which stood at around seven million tons in December 1941. For the whole of 1942, 275 ships of 1,6 million tons were c1aullcd by Amcrican submarine commanders. In fact. post-\var analysis shows that only 180 ships of 725,000 tons had been sunk. constlUlting 10.8 per cem of the available tonnage. After one year of war, nine US submarines had been lost.

submarine loss(,"S due to enemy action and unserviceability were being outstripped by new cOlllmissioning: over the same period the Japanese lost over one and a half million tons of trade vl'Sscls and the effects were stagger1l1g, Japan \v:as as reliant on a large and efficient merchant marine as Brit:lin, But in contf3st to her AXIS partner Germany,Japan did not obtain a single useful and productive industrial centre 111 aU Its territorial conquests since Dccember 1941. largc capacity shipyards did not exist outside Japan or America (Singapore was JUSt a maintenance base) and no factory or armamcnt complexes existed with which the japanese could hav(' augmented thcir native capacity. But Japan, planning for a short war with a ncgotiated end, was singularly ill-prepared for the long-haul defence of its existing trade tonlla!:,'"C_ And unlike Britain, Japan could not turn to external sources of shipping production to shore up her haemorrhaging merchant marine. Neither did japan dedicate enough resources to signals intelligence and those advances it did make were hardly applied to thc protection of trade nor the interdiction of US mercham vessel traffic. Japanese pre-war planning had set too much store on the international agreements in place which had declared unrestricted submarine war illeb"a1. As a result, the Japanese discounted the idea that their merchant tonnage would be in such a vulnerable situation. Assuming that its \v:a~hips and not its tradc would be the preferred target, merchant convoying was not adopted from the outset and when it was - not until November 1943, when monthly losses ran at 100,000 tons - it \vas run in an unco-ordinated and unscientific manner. In all effort to reduce disruption and time \v:astagc, only small groups were convoyed, which failed to appreciate the merits of a concentration of escorts shepherding one large convoy, and also served to spread the small number of dedicated anti-submarine \varships tOO thinly. Meanwhile, American Ultra intelligence - aided by a Japanl"Se propensity to 'radio chatter' - enabled precise information on encmy dispositions and intentions to be exploited.

A Faulty Doctrine
japanese ships, desib'lled for the offensive application of power and cOlllmanded by men who subscribed to that ethos, were much less effective in the escort role :IS Allied destroyers, frigate~ and corvettes had been. The most highly trained men were employed in ships enb"aged in the tleet and not on anti-submarine operations. Only the largest and IllOSt offensive tleet ships \vere equipped with radar and certainly not for the detection of American submarines. Meanwhile, maritime antisubmarine patrols and air cover, proven decisive against the U-boat in the Atlantic theatre, were not a priority for the Japanese air force. Despite developing some excellent flying boat desib'llS, the Japanese air force had no cemimetric radar, no Leigh light equivalent, and no cffective anti-submarine doctrine. Compounding this parlous state of officially sanctioned ib'llorance. new merchant tonnage launchings were pitifuUy insufficient to keep tt3ck of lossei, which by Allied (principally British) standards were mild. In 1942 japan constructed a quarter of a million tons of shipping, which was trebled the following year and doubled in 1944. but by then it made no diff('rence, Naval demands for materials and access to shipyards ahv:ays took absolute precedence over the construction of mercantile hulls. At all times Japanese shipyards were dogged with a growing pile of hulls awaiting repair. Japanese anti-submarine measures were unsuccessful in the main even when ramped up in the face of mounting and irreplaceable

Japan's AchiUes Heel

During 1943 and early 1944 the Amencan submarine tleet rccei\'ed upgf3ded weapons including the new wakeless Mark XVIII electric torpedo (based on the German G7e, several having been \vashed up Oil US beaches during Operation Paukt'f1Sfhlag). employed increasingly wdlhoned wolf-pack tactics (but f3rely ul\'olving more than three boats), and had the advantJge ofa growing range offonvard bascs located around the edge of the shnnking JapanC5e frontier, From tht.'Se bases, such as Milne Bay in New Guinea. supported by tenders and protectcd by local patrol boats and detached destroyers. US submarint.'S had k'Ss distance to tt:lIlSit to their patrol areas. Adv;mtageously placed, they could more efficiently venCllrc imo ever-collcelltric Japanese shipping lant."S and pick off merchant ships, in particular the oil tankers with their cargoes vital to sustaining the Japaneie war effort. Powerful and large submarines such as the Ba/ao (119 built) and the refined "Truc" (80 built) classei. in the hands of Illcrcasingiy able and daring skippers such as O'Kane, Grider and 'Mush' Morton, look till' best lessons of the German U-boat campaign. hont.-d them and applied great pressure to the Japanese war machine already at a significant disadvallt:lge vis-a.-vis the US llldustrial basc_ As sinkings rose, the Japallt.'Se began to pay more attemion to anti-submarine operatiOns, introducing new destroyer escorts and patrol craft. By the end of 1943, AmCrlcan

188

1944

shlpplllg losses. Amcncan submannes were good-depth boats and. unaware of theIr quarry's attnbutl'S III the early months of the ""'ar. the japanest' often set theIr depth charges to explode at too shallow a depth. A conuQ\'erslal Informatlon slip-up In Congress In 1943 helped the Japanese to rccogmze theIr error and It W,IS soon rcetified. to the COSt of a number of Amencan ~ubmarllles. Local fishlllg boatS and tramp v~Is, IlIcklumed 'umpans' by US submanners. ga\OC radIO reports to shorc bases If they ~potted American lxnt5. and would be fir!. upon errauedly uSmg deck-mounted gullS. Amencan subuunne losses I'OSC' III corrcbtlon to the growmg sIze and boldncs.s of the sub fleet and the margmal IIIcrease III dfectl\ocness of japanese defences. Seventeen boats wen: lost III 1943. It was not unnl autumn 194-1 th:lt the fint radar set5 w~rt' fined to Jaranese C\Corts. Concurrently. in a desperate and unworkable edict. Jaranese merchant shIrK wen: ordered to sail only by day to r!.uce losses. Already suffenng aCUle shorta~ of oil. the Japanese avy h.ad rc-based Itself nearer Its fucl supplies at Singotpore in early 194-1

The Stranglehold Intensifies

By early 1944 all Japan~ tanker and fleet train routes had been discovered and werc being plundered by bold youn~ American commander" using rchahle torpedoes. Monthly losses ripped 200,()OO tons. The growlllg weakn("'SS of the JapanC'SC econolllY - by 19-1-1 the blockade \\'as really bltlng hard. with civilian consumption of oil at Just -I per cent of 1941 k...'('ls ;md the Japanese fleet's mobility SC'\'t'rcly hampered - and the continual imerdiction of lines ofsupply by American naval and air forc<.."'S made " impossible to stem the splr.lliing rate of attrition. All the while. American production in all areas - fi.lcI oil. naV3l and merchant dllpplllg, aircraft, men and munitions - \\':IS comtantly cxpandlng. Major Japanese war'ihip~ were also picked off. Big Japanesc task forces. centred around fleet and e~ort carriers, \\'ere t.lrgcted by Amcrican submarinc force~ actin!; in ~lI1all packs. On 19 June 1944 the 5110/.:'&'1 and the flah'Shlp 'Iai/,o were ~ullk during the Battle of the Philippinc Sca.Thc '1I1i)'<' \V3S dIspatched by USS RIlS/,er in Au~,.ust off the Phihppinl'S. The USS Barb sank the UIlYO off Hong Kong in September. The 5/u/llmo W,IS sent to the bottom on 29 November. torpedoed by USS Arrlttifish whIle on a worklllg-up vopgc. The JunfV and C/mfV \\"ert: torpedoed offJap:m III Dcrember. the latter by USS Sni!fish. The l. 'm}'l1 was ~unk by USS Rtdfisll offShanghai that same month.The rebuilt battlenuiscr KlllljlO and nine crUlscrs also fell prt-y to the silent service. Japancsc subnurlllcs comprisc-d a divcrst' force of technically advanced lxnrs, mduding large cruiser types and onc-off ~cial dt."'Sigm lllduding the Sm Toku (1-400) seaplane-carrying behemoth-. of 19-14. de<iigned to bomb the Panama Canal. Oper.lting a fleet of easily the lugC"it :md

101lgt"St-ranged submarlOt."'S in thc world. and wuh the best subnurille torpedoes of any navy, the Japancsc submarine force Wll; ;dmO'it excluSl\'Cly designed for olfensiw fleet or speCl..ll 1l1lSSlom. 1Ild oper.lt.:d under a 'warship first' policy. Howt"\'er. it made only .l snull contnbuuon to the attack on Allied \\':Irships or merchantmell. and suffered SC\'Cn" losses in the process. Figures show that Just o\"t"'r IBn American lllerchanUllen w~rc sunk by Japant"'SC subnunnes. toulhng 9nU,non tons. This compares to 5.200 ships mulling O\'er 22 n"lIlon tons sunk by Gernun submarine'S. In broad terms there was no JOl.panC'SC 'U,mle of the Pacific' equivalent of a \\':Ir on American trade and l:\'C'r-lengthenlllg supply lines. Very quickly many Japanese submarines. whate\'er their origmal purpose'. became burdened \nth the Job of runmng ~upphcs to island gotrrisons cut off and h.ard-p~~d by swift American counter-advanccs. American aIr groups flew anti-submarine p.atrols from a large force of dedicated escort earners such as the CssDbWnclJ cms curymg nearly thirty aIrcraft. bad.ed up by land-based patrol Ol.Ircr.;r.ft oper.ltlng from a growlllg array of Wand bases. Uy the end of 1944 the Japanese. like the Allies. had made Stndes III the de\'C'lopment of Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) b"Car but It was tOO little and tOO late to mfluence the \\':Ir. Untish 10ng-n.nb"C 'T' and'S' class subnurlllcs JOlll.:d the fight. eqUIpped with aIr and surfacesearch radar. Dy the end of the war. fifty-two us avy submJrincs had been lost to enemy .actlon. aCCIdent or malfunction. At least two US boab - the 1il/lIbtt and 'Iill',! (commanded by Ridurd O'Kane), and possIbly the Grou4rr - were sunk III 19-1-1 by their own torpedoes returlllng on a circular run. Nmety per cent of the toul Japanese: merchant tonnage was lost. Men III submarmt'S made up less dun 2 per cent of thc enure toul of nlen mobIlized wlthlll the US Navy 111 the I)acific. yet thl')' accounted for approxlIlI:ltely five million tons of toulJapallt."'Se tonnage sunk dunng thc WJr. US carner-bJSt"'d aIr power. tradltiollally highlighted :IS Ihe 'lcltlllotif' of the Pacific War. accounted for approximately -10 per cent of the Japanese merchant tonnage sunk. Submarines sank 55 per cem (thouPJ carrier aIrcraft sank slightly more japanL'Se warshIps th:lIl the US Navy's ulldel'\\'atcr arm). US sub1lluine aces would not sink 3S mJlIY sillps or so much aggrcg:lte tonnJ~ as leadlllg German commanders because urgets werc generally smaller and fewer o\'('r.;r.ll III the Pacific, and these werc sprcad across :II wider nexus of roUtes. But as a service. It WIped out the J,lpanesc: merchant manne, halted the Impe-ri;d Japanese NJVY's rcnlolllllllg Ulllts for the Wilnt offuel, and brought the Japanese economy to Its knees. In short. it achic\"cd 1Jl the Pacific what the U-Boot Arm had set out and faIled to do to the British in the Adantic. The \\Tltlllg was on the w.all by the turn of 19-15:Japant"'SC defeat was ceruin if not y'et Jccolllphshed.

189

1944

The Normandy invasion

In the eYeIling of 5 June. minuwupers set to work off the NOnNncty cout, while IUrty in me moming of 6 June. BritiJh m~t 5u~rines bid marl(ers off the intended bodin& buchu. As lin enormous aet'QJ OlrTIUcU ConslStlng of tnn~ pb.nu. ~ g1idet"s. bombers and ter MeOfU rumbled overt1eild ilt OSlO hours the bi& guns of the Allied fleet opened up an .lIccunote and paralyzing fire. several miles off~. befot'e bein& .llutmented by CruIsers and eventually the rockets and ,hellfire from ~qlly-t'Qujpped WIding craft as the bndinp fon:es. escorted by MGB and desuoyer Roollas. closed In to the buCMs on Ill'\U$iYe front. NI'Ill durance tnrm went uhon! with the troops to cleM buth obstldes.

(below) Piping the innsion The p.o:Ie st~ HMS~ ~ lOr Arror'nIches

lb'on& the Norr'rwdy ~ 6 ju'le

19+4

0fIicer. Sub-LoeutetWlt A MltCheII. of Glasgow. Scotland. plays HMS ~ _'-'/ on the bagpipes as she leaves her depot sl'up HMS ~d1 to $3<' kw" Normandy. HMS
A<::t.-enft'e and
vat'OOU!;

(above) A busy Devon port

In preparabOn for the lI"IYaSIOI\ artdIery eq.llpmerlt IS loaded aboard LCTs at 8rOOlam 01"1 the south coast of Eng\and on I JIJI'le 194'1

trarIspOr'ts be

~_

-------

--- -_ ...- ....

--->"~-

-=

1944

--,,- - --

-~-Ol.~

.--

landing craft and barnge balloons Undng SNps andTank I..andong Craft seen from the cruser HM$ Frob<sher off the south coast of England twe/'.oe hours before D-Day. The brd of one of the cruser's 75...-.:h guns can be seen lI'I the foreground. AboYe the armada Me barrage balloons. s.lhouetted apll'\$t the ~ sky.

Bmish ccwcaJ fon::es on

~uol

BnU5h 71r.-l'oot motor ~ts ~ from a pw1:ll 011" ~ on the lookout kit iI"f E-bolts and R-boats .lItterrng to Iflterier'e wM the AIled ~ a.... at H)1:he by the BnU5h ~t ~ these: craft: ~ speed of "" to -.0 knoU 1d ~ .med 'NIth ol 2pcr.
two ~

and b.r ~ guM.

19 1

t'"

Omaha 8och, D.DJ:)' 'foIhde Robert Capa's famous 1lIurTed' mages ilf'e prtlbabty the bestknown photographs of the DDay landings. thIS picture. taken (rom on board an Amencan landing craft off Omaha Beach. is wreIy just as powerful It graphou.lly conveys the reality of assault>ng the exposed beach through the surf while unde!" heavy fire from the entrenChed defenders on the dllfs a/,x:we,

Encuation of casualties
Beach clwalbes being brought on board the Cf\IIser HM$ Frobt5her, one of the crursers which took part on the ~ t before and cbvlg the landongs.

192

1944
Landine ships be~dled By the end of D-Day. 0'M'ef 175.000 troops had bem put ~, I'1eanwIWe adcIrtIoNl troops, ~ and 5lJPPIy COIlYCl)'S were bmed up across the ChameI on readirw:s:s b- ben& landed on the days IObYIng 6 jl.ne. The success of the Wldings depended on the protectIOn of the crossOwv1el Wles of c ~ because as Ion& as Germo fon:es coukl be bfoo&ht to the b.ttIefield by ~ and ro.Jd (under heavy AIied ar prew.n:). aI AIled resoI.I"l:e5 ~ to be brought ~ by ~ MId ~fegwrded In thls photogfaph. USS uJ.ns (left) lCI uss LSJ.388 ~ while strtded ~ low tide cirne r=.lppIy oper.JbOllS on 12 ~ 19+t

,. ,

"

19 J

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1944

'Mulberry' Harbours
The 'Mulberry' hu'bours were an ingenious solution to the lack of accessible harbour facilities on the French COast. An outer floating breakwater made up of 'bombardons' contained an inner fixed breakwuer consisting of'Phoenixes' and scuttled blockships; together these were known as 'Gooseberries'. After constnJction, the finished 'Phoenix caissons were flooded and sunk to the sea floor to hide them from German reconnaissance flights. On 0-1. they were refloated and towed across the Channel. Gerlefal aenal W!!W of the 'Mulberry' off AJTomanches. The outer nng of vessels IS the breakwater fonned from partially sun~n bIockshlps and concnete Phoerllx' caiSsons. Ooser to shore IS the long Jetty formed of Lobnlt2 pfel"head unrts, connected to the ~ by floaung pontoons known as "Nhales. Around and between these elements of the ilrtJficaal harbour. ships and smaller craft come and go In la~ numbers in an area of approximately two square miles, equal to that of the harbour of Gibraltar.

- ..'

-.
194

1944

'Phoenixes' off Arromanches

BIockshlps. 'Gooseberry' breakw"~lers and the 'Mulberry' harbours were manoewred intO posrtJon off Gold and Omaha beaches. Hen:. concrete 'Phoenix' eatSSOnS are IaKl in line oft' Gold Beach at Arromanches. whde a soldoer makes a hiIlardous .......re-rope CJ'OSSlOil.

La 608 ~ her" argo and, after a tel'T1f)vlg &fteenhour~. ~ It ~

Torpedoed LCT

to Portsmouth desprte hawlg beong tor peOoed on the ~ to France. ~ f t 5bI ~ 10 be SC11Ipped

(Oftrleal) low tide The scene on 0I"le of the Nonn.lndy beaches after the IItdngs. 'NIth Sl.IpI:lie$ beln& ~ ashore iom ~
out it

sea..-d the dtbns ofWI' ~

195

Toulon: the French fleet returns home

-(aboYe) french CruIsers rewm

The ceremonial ~try of the french fleet into Toulon took pbc:e on 13 Ncnwnber 19+t.Alter the AnvIl Qodings in the south of moce it !'lad been e>tpeCted due Toulon would ulce about three weeb to apwre; in bu such wu the ~ of the defending Gemwl forces that the CItY fell In less
duna~

French ~ Gfooges ~ (Ttl .and frnII@ Be-r" enter the n.tJour George L~!'a1 bq!I the w oIlo Pt of fnnte'~ el<tr Fota cR Raid b.Jt ~ the "T'IStJ(C: s.pent mou of the nelrt two .and a h#' ~ at 0-. At the end of 1942 the ship ~ t'le Allies. 6rst heI6o'" ~ to the USA for 011 tT'toIp" re't to $Ort out the ~ ~ from her ~ ~ onaCoroflty and ~ to br'ini her "'" to dat~ EmOt BfflJn rneat'I'M\a~ spent the lI"@ ~ at MartJ~ on the french ~ lndoes, ~ ako goong to Anv:na for reM: In the ~ 011913. 0'1 the ont"""J P"Ylt the cemor ha5 asked for the USmodel SA a.. seven and SF $lrliICe ~ (both also used for ~ fire tOl'ltrol) on the crv~' forem.t5,($. and other eIect/'Ol'lICS 01"1 the y.vds. to be touched out.

Tnc~ ~ the

(above) Scnpping the Strosbou"f

AA aIIorther SCln'leI" s.gt.t: the battIesI'op Stn:lst:Joui. ~ ~ ComrncJ1cblt fe'lte. C1\JISel" La GoIos!o" ~. wtw:h had been ~ twenty months prevoousIy All ~ VIops had ~ been ral5ed. and then ~ to the 8aoe ~ Laun:t opposrte the dockyan:I. ~ a bMIn WiI5 ~ to acc~ them By the tme ttvs phoI:~ WiI5 taken the 0'U5ef" had capsized ~ the Swsbcug had deirty UI db 10' Ie a CtrW'l MTIOU'It cl scrippI'l note how the to9 of her toNer br'odgl! and the tMrTek oIl'ler 1Orw.w foWlS are ~ WhIle Wl'I'le Itloujtot was,...en to ret\.I'lVIi the ~ ~ Cor lIOlWlI: Teste to 5e1'V1(e after the war: '" the end aI ttv'ee ships were I:Irol<:en up.

and

On ~de in Toulon Af.r:rthe (~re-etltl')'of the 5hps.~ mcM:d ~.~M-aI ~ of the Royal N.Jvy (<:ommoder.1I'l-O>oe( ~l Aee1. Actnir~ Hewrtt (US Navy). ld Re.Ac1r..-3 Lemonr"lIef: (~of the ftM frerv3'lships. took the ~e. nspected the guII'd. and Iiod v.rre.uhs .at the Toulon w ~ n. _ stw::Mts some of the French Navy o.nts ~ the c ~ ~

197

194 4

Reinforcing the Soviet Navy

In lieu of Italian ships allocated co the Soviet Union

following the Italian armiuice. various Allied vessels were transferred instead.

(left) Submarine and submarine chasel"$ SovIet submanne il 7 at a Northern Fleet base In 194'1. and LendLease Submanne Chasers (SCs) with 80.2/6 in the foreground. Under LendLease tenT\$, the USA supplied
len m;neWI'el!pE!n, fifty torpedo OOatli and ~ty-elght IIO-foot submarine chasers to the SovIet Navy between 1943 and 1945. 5lowty these Wl!t'l! returned to America after the war: or scrapped or scuttled Built of wood. capable of 22 knots and armed with a ]-Inch Vl and 20mm (or laler a 40mm Bof.;o gun) and small rnlar sets. these SCs were versatile coastal antI-submanne boats capable of a wide range of inshore patrol and escort wori<..

(right) 03 motor boat at speed Motal" boat D3 type n::A 116 In J944.~ were a more conventional type of motor torpedo boat than the G-S. with a less extreme performance but better crew aw::mmodatlOn and mone able to cope with sea conditions. Some were adapted as patrol boats with depth charges aod addfbOoal guns In place of torpedoe$. as shown her'e.

-... -

-=

_=-=----c
(left) U~ula changes ownership Du!log 1944 a number of BritIsh war'itlips wef"e transferred 10 the 50Yiet Union, amongst which were the submarines St.ri(ISh. lIrsuIo. Unison. and Unb<oken. Wn~sh was unfortunately the VICtIm of'fnendly fire" before she armed.

bemg sunk by RAf aircraft off ~ Norway on 27 July:

(opposite) A well-tl"3velled 'flush-decker' Another ship transferred was the destrorer' Bnghlon, She had been USS Cowell (DO, 167), one of the 'Aush-ded<ers' transferred to the RcYyaI ~ four years previously. In SovIet !.ervice she became Znaoo. and was returned to Bntain in 1949.

198

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1944

The Marianas
The fight for the Marianas was a crucial step
in the American adv;Jnce on Japan's home islands.

In June 19+4. when the Americans invaded the

Marianas, the Japanese main fleet met them

in battle.The resulting enwemem.. known either as the Battle of the Philippine Sea or the Battle
of the Marianas. ended in complete defeat for Japan. CarTier Task Force 58's Hellcat fighter squadrons destroyed large numbers of Japanese aircr1lft. ensuring the safety of the amphibious landings on the Marianas. Meanwhile. battleships performed fire support and AA

escort for the carriers and US Marines. Japan lost

three aircraft carriers sunk and hundreds of aircraft shot down.

(right) Junyo damaged

On board the japanese a"uaft camer junyo after the battle. HI!!" funnel. usoally so distinctrve on account of ItS
r.Dosh angle. IS mJS~ng. having ~n b1astM by a bomb hit. Her SIster ship. Htyo. was sunk dunng the ba~. as Wl':re two other earners, the Tolilo and S/lokoIw.

(left) Bomber shoot-down A ~ tWJI"-eng,ned bornbe<' shot down in an attack on TF-52 escort
cam~ 18/uno! 1944,

dunng the Mananas oper.rtIon. taken from on aboard USS I<Jtkun Boy

(evE-71 ). Sornetllnes tlus image is captIOned as a SUICide attack. but these were not introduced formally until the autumn.

204

1944

The asuult at Saipan US IvTrrt reinforcements disembarking from lSTs form a i!"ceful curve as they proceed across a (oral reef towards the beach at SaIpan.17 Jur.e 1944.

Bombarding Japanese positions The battlesl'op USS New Me.ouco (BB-'!O) prepares to lire dlnrla the bombardment ofSaJpan. IS ~ 19+t. Note b'l'le-fuze setters on the left SIde of each gull 1T'I()(.rlt. uch hoIdini: thrtt~ rounds of amrnJI'UtIOn: ~ of 20mm rnad1ne Il\Il$ at the ~ nght; and
tnpIe I"..-.ch ~
lr'l

the ~

Leyte Gulf and the Philippines

When Leyte in the Philippines was invaded in October 1944 the JaJnnese fleet, despite the mauling it had received three months earlier, arne out to do

battle with the Americans once

~in.

Outnumbered

and out-classed, it was unable to take advantage of some serious mistakes made by the American command. and by the end of a series of actions which together go to make up the greatest naval battle in history - Leyte Gulf - it had ceased to be a fighting
force in any reOlI sense.

(above) The Americans under attack at Leyte Carner DMSIOIl 25 o..onder attack by Japanese aIrcraft: two De5troyer Escorts and USS Gombier Bay (c.vE-73) lay a smoke screen durmg the iwasIon of the Philippmes. 25 O<:tober 1944, The escort camel" Gambler Bay. sunk off Samar later that day by Admiral Kuntil"s he<YJ cnJlsers. was one of only two camet"> ever sunk entJ~ by gunfire from wrface warships - the other bell'lg HM5 Glorious. wnk by the Sdlarmorsl off Norway in 1940. interestingly. Gambfer Bay's 5-inch gun ~ believed to haw; scored at least three hItS 00 he!- atta~.

Japanese attempts to fight back The Japanese fleet. headir.g for the American larxlir.g forces off Leyte. fell upon the es(ortmg eanief's.ln the ens.umg engagement. the Amencans lost two earners and three ~ and es<:o<1S, but the Japar.ese were dnven off WIth heavy 1osS6 He~ the carner Gambier Bay (CVE7J) IS seen on fire after being hit Yl~ from on board her S1stel'ship KJI1cun Boy (CVE-71).

206

1944

Readying fQr 01 torpedo nnke US Navy ~ armng 01 TBM Avenger WItM , torpedo aboard USS Sat }oCJnrtl. probably for a strike on AdrroIraI Ozawa:s.laPanese camer fOfCC off Upe EngaiIo on 25 Octobef: Sat}aonto was one of ~ II&ht CJ1el"S III Jl..ltnr.JI Ha~'s enormously powerliA Thn:l FIf:et. whose main nnlon& edge was pn:Mded by no fe'wt:r' than
SIX

Reet ~

ZurIwbl .l!ute as the rYVolI enYgn 15 lowered ckJnn& the eng~t off Upe EngaOO. 25 October 1944.

The Zuikoku goes down Crew rnerrtler's of the SII'bl& ~ U"Cnft camer

207

1944

--

... _..-~-

...... : -

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1944

The demise of the Tirpitz

The battleship Tirpitz was attacked and damaged many times. by aeroplane and

by minisubmarine. but was not desuoyed until RAF Lancaster heavy bombers dropped 12,OOOpound Tallboy bombs on her in November 19"".

Bombing-up a Barracuda

Fleet AJr Arm persooneI preparing and fuzing bombs on the flight deck of an aircraft carner. The bombs were then loaded onto Fairey Barracuda aircraft (visible in the background. probably from 827 or 830 Squadrons). Yvtlkh a~ the German battlwup ,n A1ten(jOfd. Norway ,n April 1944, but did not sink her.

(oppoSite) The nrpnz capSited ~kJng up the German battleYllp Tup.tz. Pnde of the German Na-.y. the 35.COO-ton battleship r,rp.lZ was finally sunk in a Norwegian fjord off the little island of Hakoya by RAF l..ancasters in November 1944 whereupon she ~ offTromw. taIQng the German caprtall\eet strategy to its death Here the Norwegoans are busy ~aking up the battleshiP.

2 11

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1944

The Yomokoze $inkl; below the waves Dramatic pero:::ope $hot of the Japanese dertroyer Yorrl(lkcze S1nl<mg ,n japanese waters alter ~ng torpedoed by U55 Nou1lkJs on 25 June 1942. By 1944. the Amencan $Ubmanne stranglehold CNef japanese sh,pp'ng lanes had 'ntens'fied to the potnt whell!: the Japanesl! fleet's operatlCM'lal radius was ~Iy (unaded fO<" want of fuel oil. Merchant sh'ps SImply

could not get through to the home ~nds. and as the submanne conSIderable prnatlon was expenenced In japan.

blocka~

bit hard.

212

1944
Hauling ~urvivon aboard a US submarine Bnush and Australian pn~-of-war s.u~ ~Ing l"e'iCued by men on the deck. of USS Seollon. after the Japanese ship RoIwyo Moru was sunk In the Ouna Sea ,n September 1944. She was UrTyIng a cargo of l\lbber and. untJel<nov"m to the (feW of the attacking submarine. 1,]00 Allied pnsooers of war. Hit by two torpedoes. she fortur.ately took twelve hours to sink. gIVing the PeWs time to make rafts and organize themsel\les Wlth food and water. The Japanese crew had Immedaately abandoned ship In the only avaltable lifeboat$.

(overleaf) A quiet moment

An Amencan sailor relaxes ,n his bunk aboard a submanne. In addlbOrl to tus a!Testlng collectlOll of pm-ups. he is

reading The SIroy lamb by Thome Smith. an Amencan 'Miter of comically bawdy fantasy fICtion. 00 a cramped submarine with sixty-live other men. opportUflJtJes for recreatton were few and far bet'Neen.

21 J

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The J~p~nese, ignoring me terms of the Allies' Potsdam Declarauon of 26 July. whIch promised 'prompt ~nd Ullt"r desrruction. lud dung on to ~ bst.-dllch defence of the hOlTle i.sbnds as the only rem~lIl1ng opnon. While Inf~nrr}' forces w~rt.' garnered and PR'"p~red. J~p~nC'\e shlp)<lrds m;ade one bst effon ~nd built large numbers of Koryll Type I) mldgC't subnunnes to be sem ~galll5t Allied bndlllg forces. Emermg serVIce In sm;allnumbers in May. 115 \\crt.' constructed by August WIth nearly' 500 funher hulls ;at various suges of completion ;at the war', end. AdvancL-d electric submarines of the /-20 1 ~nd Ila-20 J typn wert.' built in Illuch sllialler numbers but failed to be re;ady in rime for service. Over the first half of 1945, the noose had been tightening around Japan. But despite the overwhelming sign~ of inevitable defeat, Japan could not be forced into an attitUde ofdefeatism. And with unconditional surrender the starcd goal of Allied policy. thc St3gt" had been sct (or a vicious denouement. American bndings were madc at Luzon III the Pluhppmes in January 1945. A month IJter.lwo Jima bec.ame the focus of the Americ.an push, witnessing ont" of the most legC'nwry ground struggles of the w;ar. Iwo JlI1U by within 650 mik'S oITokyo: in American posscs5lon by the nuddle of MHCh, the smteg;c bombing of the Japanese home natton was ~.-doubled ~ fighter c(J\"t:r could be mort.' efficiently pl'O\'ided to longrange bombcn. Me:mwhile, the Ropl N~vy. umble to disguise' Its srnm after more th~n fi\"t: ~nd ;a hllf }"t:ars of unrelenting service, WH able to send ~ P~ci.6c Rat - focu'>Cd on aircn.M: carriers Ilying brgely American llrCraft types - to join Admiral Sprwnce's US Filth Fleet only m March 1945. US commanders h~d mixed feelings ;about the putiClp~tion of the Bnmh on what was, by lny uanwrds. an American suge III the fin~l aca of the Pacific war. On I April the island of Okinawa was il1\':Ided. US leri~l qu~lu.m\"t' superiority - backcd up with O\"t:r-bpping air-warning rawr cO\"t:r and huge nUlTlerical advantage in modern fighter types - was allied with a mature and experienced pilot foree to shoot down whole squadrons of Japanese aireraft. [n trelllelldollS battles over the island and alit to sea, Japanese aerial losses numbered over five hundred plancs:Amcrican losses were onlY:l fifth of that. At S<:l, the giant JapanL"'Se ~uper-battlcshlp YalllalO, witham aIr cover on a futile one-\\':IY mission to reliC\'e the b.attered Jap;ancse g:arrisan on Okinawa. \\':IS sunk by bomb- and torpedo-armed carrier ;aircraft on 7 April. She h:ld nC\"er fired her ma1l1 armament at an eqUIValent enemy v~S<:1. The :lircr.tM:. :md by exlension the alrcraM: carrier. had finally ~nd unl:'qul\"()(";J.lly supplanted the battleshIp when this M,OO()-ton. l6-inch armoured. l8-inch gunned symbol ofJap;an mdmon:ll b:lttle fleet blew up specucululy with the loss of some 4.000 of her crew. Kamrkx:r ~ttaCks reached thl:'u clmux off Okin~\\<I. US arrlers were me nuin urget but wsseb of all size and power were exposed to the 'divine wind'. In one ~pan of eight)' terrij),ng mmutC'. the Amerian destroyer USS lAffq was subjected to one of the most Intense SUicidal aeri:tl assaults C\'t"r reconkd. Arl1lt.-d \\ Ilh SIX 5-mch. tweh"t: 4{) nun ~nd c1ewn 20 nlln guns, she pm up an IIlcrcdlble amount oflUk ag:ullst ~ force of fifty suicidl" aircraft. shooting dO\\ n c1evcn. l3ut ~galllSt such saturation. ~he could not avoid the Impact of six aircraft and four bombs. Yet Ihe l.Affty survIVed to be towed to Okinawa. In the three weeks of bitter fightlllg o\'cr Okinawa. ov('r 25Cl Alhed shIps were hit by kalllikllzt' attacks. mostly frolll deliberate crnshL"i. Ullt after somc of [hc fiercest ground.:ur and sea lighting of the entire war. the isbnd was captured on 21 June. AllIeric.an submarines. h.avlllg taken [he lions share of Japans trade o\'er the polSt thirty-six months. continued to punish the dWllldhng

Jap:mese merc.mule and n~\"" shipplllg until the end ofthe \\<lr. One ~t - USS &iflSh - una.. mt' J.ap.tnese subnurines in a renurlr:~ble four wys in Febrw~' 1945. In June, three US wolf-p~clts took up posirion in the Se~ of J~p~n. Thc renuinmg w;arships of the J~p.,nC1C flttl, paralyzed by a lad. of fud lnd toully dominated by Allied ~ir po\\"t:r, \\"t:re umble to counter thLS move, ~mong m~ny othen dcsigned to accderate and exploit J;apanese \\'t".amess. By thIS poilU, the ve'itigi~1 Japanese empirt.' could in no \'<ly sust:lin the \\';"Ir effon that had conquered it. Of the oil extraCll"d from the territories conquered III 1942.42 per cent had reaehed the home islands that year; only 15 per cent had arrived in 1943. and 5 pcr cent by 1944. In 1945 no oil reached Japan itself at all. as oil-trallSponing ships were Slink in large numbers by well co-ordinJtcd American submarines. Concurrently, tJctic.a1 air strikes destroyed fud dumps and oil bases wherever they were in range, .and the US Na\'y's blockade took Ib toll. Where pOSSIble, marines seized any local oil supplies and turned them over to the Allied \\<lr effon. In July, Admirall111sey-'s Third Fleet. in concert wllh the BntlSh c~rr1er force, rook up position 170 miles offTokyo and launched bombing r;aids on c<sul f~cilities. danuging airfields and IllduSln~1 IIlsulbtions ~nd sinking shipping in Yokosu~ naval b;ase. Me;anwhLle, I3ritish and Americ~n battleships fired 2.000 tons of shells 1Il10 the Tokyo mdustrl:al disrricr. Allied lir pD\\"er ranb.w. over southern Japan ~lm05t unopposed, ~uch was me crippled state ofJapanCSt' defences. All the \\hile. Amcrican f;actories. &Il1py-.uds. depots ~nd milling faciliries renuined ulltouche-d and invulner:able, and exp:lnded their c~p~city and rate of production. As the strat('glc bombmg of J:lp.an conrinucd apace. rt.'Sulting in hundreds of thousands of civili~n de:l.ths and the shauering of the relluining Japanese \\<lr lI1frastructure, US and I3ritish sublTlarint"S performed lifeguard duty on watch for downed 13-29 bomber aircrt.'ws. Litcrally dwarfed by the scale of the combat in [he Pacific, two British X-craft mini submarines sull managed to contribute. sinking the Japanesl" hl"avy cruiser '/ilkao at Sinb':lpOrc III July. [he crews winning two Victoria Crosses in the process. Just as the European naval war had been s1.,rtcd by thc actions of a World War One-era Gl"rman battleship. til(' Pacific war at sea was brought almost to a dose by' the knock.ing OUt oftwo modcrniZL-d World W.ar Oncera J.ap:lnese battleships. the Hyl4ga and l~. HavlIlg csc:lped dcsrrucrion at leyte Gulfthey wert" sunk in sha:llO\\' water at Kurc by cuner ancraM:.The Hanma. a modified 1915-built K",JgO class battlecrUiscr. also senled on the bottom aftcr ft'("ei\'ing bomb d:u1l3b'e ;at Kure. The S<n'iet Umon declared w;ar on J~p;an on 8 August ~nd im'Jdcd M~nchuril me ncxt day. racing agaillSt nme to gain new land in Ent Asi;a before the end of hosnhties. The spero and scale of this new &ont destroyed lny J~p;rnese hope thar their large army could hold back its enemies' cOI1\'entlon~1 forces. And while Soviet marines made outflanking ~ttacks soum west from Vbdivo~tock down into the Korean pcmllSula. AllleriClIl preparations began for the amphibious inv:lsion of the southJap~nCSC' home isl.and ofKyushu. Codename-d Operanon Olympic .,nd scheduled for November. this was to be foUowcd up by Opt'ration Corner - an air-sca assaul[ on the Ia~t island. Honshu. in Man:-h 1946.l3ur in a contt'O\'Crsialll1O\1' calculated to shorten the war .,nd a\JOid the grim prospect of:J. lengthy and costly llwaSlon outIllled III these operations, the US Air Force was authorized to use .atomic weapons. The first bomb over Hiroshima on 6 August elicited no fornul response from the J.apanesc high command. Uut when the second exploded O\1'r N.,gasaki three days later, the Jap.,nese ~urrendered

2I 8

1945

unconditionallr Though a general cease-fire order was issued on 15 August, the Allied fighting forces were by no means certain that the Japanese would lay down their arms (or refrain from launching fresh kamikaze attacks) so abruptly after nearly four years of total war.Therefore, the large Allied fleet off Japan's southern coastline remained at a high degree of readiness, In the evem. such was their shattered morale and evaporated w:nfighting capability. the Japanese put up no further mass resisunce. Three and a half years of \var in the Pacific were at an end.

The Final Reckoning

The US Navy had lost tWO battleships. five fleet carriers. SIX escort carriers. ten cruiSt:'rs. sevemy-one destroyers and fifty-two submarines. Against these 10sSt:'s, the prodigious Output and efficient management of American industry had assembled, by the Japanese surrender, eight battleships. twenty-six fleet carriers, 110 escort carriers, fifty-two cruisers, 349 destroyers, 298 esCOrt vessels. 181 submarines and thousands of landing craft. transports and small vessels. These were supported by an unprecedented array of mobile logistical forces including 152 floating dry-docks, Aware of the implications of fighting the Imperial Japanese Navy in its home \vaters, and at a great distance from its own bases, the US Navy had begull experimenting with undenV3Y refuelling in the mid-1930s. The perfection of these techniques had made a high tempo of sustained operations possible. By the war's end, the US Navy had expanded to employ 3,408,347 people in all capacities, including ninety thousand women. Over the course of the next twelve months, 3 million of thest: would need to be demobilized. Fifty-six thousand had died in the service of the US Navy, and 80,000 had been wounded. ByV) Day, the Royal Navy had expanded to around 900,000 men and women. Fifty thousand had been killed 111 service. British Commonwealth naval losses had been heavy, comprising four battleships, two battlecruisers, five fleet carriers, five escOrt carriers, thirty-three cruisers, 154 destroyers, ninety submarines, and 138 light warships and armed merchant cruisers, as well as 1,307 auxiliary and minor warships and 1,326 landing ships and craft of all types. The Royal Navy fought well in World War Two, but the price for its vindication was high. Britain and America alone emerged from the W:::Ir as the major naval powers. The US Navy ended the \var with 1,672 major naval vessels, the Royal Navy with 1,065. At the end ofWorld War One, the US Navy had supplied a battle squadron to supplement the British Grand Fleet; at the end ofWorld War Two, in the Pacific, the positions had been reversed.The Royal Navy had been relegated to a supportive rather than pre-eminem position which, rebtive to the new superpower, continued to decline in the years after the war. Showing sib'1lS of exhaustion, the swollen wartime navy \vas swiftly demobilized. Within four years it was at but one sixth of its \V3rtime peak.

The US Navy was meanwhile reduced from four nullion to a Strt"nb'th of 484,000, the Marine Corps to 92,000, as the Deet dropped from 1.200 to fewer than 250 major warships within four years. The US Navy had unquestionably become the greatt.'5t maritime fon;e.After the \var, despite the expansion of the Soviet Navy, it would continue as the prcnuer navy in the world. a position it maintains today - its capit.11 ships now solely large aircraft carriers. The Japanese Navy had started the war at roughly 70 per cent size of the US Navy. But elcvcn out of twelve battleships, twenty out of twenty-six carriers, thIrty-eight out of forty-thrce cruisers, 115 destroyers and 120 submarincs had been sunk.The battleship Naga/IJ was left as the sole surviving - though heavily battered - c:lpital ship. Most of the remaining ships were snnilarly so heavily damaged as to be of no military value by August 1945.Japans bst few carriers, including some only recently completed, were of equally little use due to the almost total absence of aircraft or pilots to fly them. In the course of the war, the Japanese Navy had employed 2,100,000 people, of whom 415,000 were killed or wounded. The Italian Navy suffered 22,000 casualties and lost eleven cruisers, forty-four destroyers, forty-one escorts, thirty-three torpedo-boats, eighty-six submarines and 178 minor vessels_ A number of n13jor units were passed to foreign coumries, in particubr the Soviet Union, as war reparations. The French Navy, tOrn 3sunder in the first half of the \var, had by VJ Day been reborn as a modern fighting force. Nevertheless, its losscs were still heavy, including five battleships, ten cruisers, forty-nine destroyers, fifty-five submarines and well over a hundred smaller vessels, sunk ill the service of various regimes or causes. Soviet Navy losses \vcre 155,000 men - still only 3 Slllall proportion of the millions lost on land. Emerging 3S a superpower, the Soviet Union would subscribe to an uncharacteristic naval exp3nsion which would eventually be a major contributory factor in the bankruptcy of Soviet communism by the late 19805. For the defeated Axis navies, their immcdiate problems were generally subsumed within the catastrophic illlcrnal collapse of their home nations. Later, the process of post-war reconstruction of the Japancse Maritime Self-Defence Force, the Italian Navy and the German BUlldesUlari,le would occur within a new Cold War political framework donunated by the requirements of NATO, SEATO and the closure of painful \var memories. Today, those few warships of World War Two vintage still remaining mtact are the focus of increasing efforts to presen'e them as touchstones to the past. For those vessels no longer in existence - and for the scenes which confronted the participants aboard them - the phocogr<lphic record is perhaps the most immediate medium through which the war at sea - and the parts played by men and machines in fighting it - can be remembered.

219

_--- -

--------,

1945
Survivor of Leningrad

The Soviet battleship Mon:lt in 1945. shovvJng how- her destrored fone part had been patched up so that she was
able to contlr.ue ,n set"VlCe as a powerful floatmg battery '0 t:tHo: d@~e of lerungrad

~---

Romanian monitor

A Romanl31l monitor of the Monupol class ,n 1945, 10 August 1944 Romania had SWItched sH:Ies, and the small Royal Romanian Navy found itself fighting alongside ItS former foe. the Sovieu, against rts former allies. the
G<nn~.

The battleship Se'o'OStDPOl heading we5t. ~ar the coast of the Cnmea. as the war ,n

""'""""

Europe comes to a dose.

220

The battered Italian fleet As the AIbes ac!van(ed up Italy, the temaIIV'IIlM"\lt$ of the IYb.m Navy whoch had not sadeQ fur Ma/u. III 1943 (J( been ~ $I.nI<., feU onto Albed I'wm These nduded (\eli) the ~ &tffoAAo. ~ scuttied In the Pnm.iI D~ it La $peN III the $pl'lI'J& of 1945.The rnushn:xlm on the l'unnl!I was ~ coolln& deY.c.e me<! to ~ spl<.s. ~ the dlIp _ uwdy i.Md ~ rogtn. More ~e _ the ..-cnft CMner ~ (below). saved &om SMtlIng by ~ photogrIphed het'e III ~ n 1945.The ~ had ntended It ro.~ as a bIoc:Io:5hIp.

, /

1945

Third Fleet warships Amencan land"lgs """ere made at Luzon In the new year 1945. En route to the F'hihppll'>eS. USS Stephen Polter (DD.538) is in the right centre. closest to the camera. The ,J,1rua,ft carrier at left is USS Emerpnse (CV6).

us

222

1945
Sea of lapa.n
Task Force 58 ra.d on Jap.1n. USS Horntr's (01.12) 4ClrT'wTl i\TIS ~ 6nrl& on 16 February 1945. as the amer's planes taJdTokyo. Note the expended shells and read)' set'VlCe ~ to the nght.

223

--------------- -

-----.,.

194 5

Iwo Jima
The isl3nd of lwo Jima - now a by,wQrd for the stereotypically fanatial Japanese reargl,lard - was inqded on 19 Februilry. By the middle of March. when the island surrendered. over 20,000 Japanese lay dead. American casualties. at ~.305. were light in comparison. though still horrifying.

Streaming imo battle One of a ~ of Jl!mar1<:able photographs taken dunng ~ two Jlma lflVao;K)fl by lieutenant Howard W. Whalen. a Boat Group Commander on the attack transport Sonbom (APA_193). who use<! a lbca 35mrn camera to take
several rolls of Kodachrome colour transparencIeS shawl'lg various a$peCtS of the operatIOn. Most show the viaMy of the 'Blue' Beaches. northerTvnost of two Jrna's eastern larld,ng beaches, where Sanborn's boats and amphibious traetQ('S (lVTs) put marines and supplies ashon: dvnng the 19 February amphlbfOVS aso;ault In thiS rrnage lVTs head for landing beaches on two J.ma. Note the explosions, with much smoke and dust. ashore. Mount Suribadli is at left..

DestnJction on lwo Jima A noghtmansh 1IisIon. Smashed by .Japanese mortar and sheltfire. trappM by two's treachet"om black-ash sands. illTltriIC5 and other 'otiucles of war he knocked out on the black sands of the volcanic fortress.

224

1945

Burial at sea Guard (,res the salute dunng a bunal at sea for a casualty of the battle for ~ Jima. taken on board USS Ham(ord (APA-I 06) while $he was evacuatmg v.QUnded men to Saipan 25-28 February 1945.
Aro Honor

Kamikaze attack on USS Sarotora Crewmen at>oaro USS Sorotoga (CV-3) fight fires resulting from the attack. by a japanese suicide ilIn:r.1ft on 21
February 1945.

225

1945

Okinawa
As I final pre:limirwy to the complete isobtion of the Japmese home islancb. on April Fools' my I'HS the illmd of Okimwa W1IS inviIded. The prime diffic;l,lltin in Qkina Oki~ by l"lOt only in the 120.000 men cIefendi", it to the lut rmn ;and bullet. but also its rel.ative proximity to the remNnu of the ~ e :air force and IUYy in Japan and Ta~.

The invasion
The
>oes~

beJins
lI"NHIl)n

of th!

fteet heM:! ~ the shot'e-

AmtraCS and bit: JUftS Ivrtenatl batUeshp VSS ~ (86-1]). a ~ of the ~ aNd:. on ~ Hbor. takes her ~ n~ I ApnlI~5_

Japanese aircnft aRame A Japanese Judy a,,"craft. bums after betng

ml down by anba,rcrilft fire from the aircraft carner USS Wasp (01-18) off the Ryukus. 18

Man:h 1945.

Point blank USS ldt::tlo (86-42) fires the JU"l5 ofTlXm. Tlv'ee at nearly pom-bLri.~.cbYaa the bombardrne1t of ClIarvwa. WI these "'aI m,es of the Paaic w. AtwenaIl Id Bnbsh ~ were largely rdeg.1led to ~ ~ duties and 10 prow:ing iCante ~-c:ontroledAA tOWl'" for QI'rier ~ttIe groups. both roles of whch the ~~ c<Uc! ft6I suteeSSfiAy but whch .....,-e a r.- uy from being the nd<tJoNI .twter 01 sea power:

227


1945

The end of the Kriegsmarine

M~, by sitnaJ from the 8dU, loU ope:ntioNJ U-bous were ordered to surface. radio their position. jettison their ammunition <rond pnxefll to Allied poru. ftyinc a bQck fbg of surrender or a White Ensign. Aside from U-~ts. the nu;or uniu of the GenTWl surface fteet had ceued

On 8

Inspectin& the Uitzow Thls 15 the wred:e:l pod<.et battJdolp I.iItzDw

(ex~
In

SoYtet hinds

postwar"

d the GerrNn c:n.-r kkrwd Hppet: ct"y Oodc n ICoel ....nen the 1\Irtlotr_ ~ by the AIle. 80th the GerrNn ~ to ~ her and the darNee ao.J5ed by AIled Ixlrrtler"s an be seen. HIJ:lget' t\Id spetIt the !Au )'eM and a half 01 the ..".. U5ed prm..-Iy b trwwJ& new saion. and ~ troops ~ on the &!be &ont.lJnWo:e some other GerrNn shps. she _ too bdy ~ to be reunw:ct to ser"o'ICe. m _ broken ~ b" Kr.Ip the
A stnl::Jng __
WI

The

at KioeI

....t-ocn _

""""'" ,-

194 5

)
f

"

Ubo:u $l,Irrender Two ~TypeV1IC U-tmts. U-826 ld U-236 post. ~ Onty about ISO ~ ever deI~ onlo Alloed contrnl: most made for 8rrtJsh ports. although a few ~ the USA. In loch Enboll ~ other- northern and western 6rrWl ~ the U-boau were dlSalTT'led and their' ~ sent to pnson camps WI ~uon for thH" repatnabOrl The ~ of the U-boats were 5UI1k by the ~ Nally off lIsahIIIy Il'l Northern k'eI&nd CNer the ~ of the )'e I'l ()pentJon Dedght. But ~ tMn 220 U-boats were K'Vttled by ther (J'eW$ r.rther than suffer the ~ of a repeat of 1918.

Procusi"l the U-boJIt Cf'eW$ The Royal ~ ~ ~ taIang over the GermM'I ~ port n:I dockyW Jt KIet. The ~ lJ...bcwt crews ~ tt.. l'\jl\'lft d r'U'Jbtrs to C".emw't perwmeI l.nder the ~ of BnbSh ~ olicers.

23 I

1945
The
HatsuzokureJ

deSU'O)'er

officer; ~ the cIeWo)'er Hatsuzalwn:l on 27 August 1945 to ~ JOr the errtI')' of the AIled fteet.-ltO Tok)oo &y.t trle end dlNortdWT"'O. Note the extremety nut A'ld elioent ~e of the ~ on rNlizd UlnlnSt to the ~ conckuon 01 tile ~ lIeet

The fomul ceremony of the Jap,aneu surrender The japanese SlITender look pIKe 01'1 bo..-cI USS ~ on Tok)oo Baron 2 Septerrber- I'HS.The ~ delegatIOn was headed by Mamon.l Stugenmu of the Foreign Office and ~ Yosh'f"'O Umezu. Army Quef of Staff, The AIlled delegatIOn was made up of MntraI Nmrtt of the USA; Ounese General Hsu YUf1g-ehang: Adrnoral of the Fleet Sor 8nKe Frasei'": General Derevyanko of tho! USSR; Field Marshal Sir Thomas B1amey for AU5U<Iha: Colonel Cosgroye for Canada; Gene<-aI Leclerc for France: Admoral Heffrich (01'" the Netherlands and AJr Corrvnodore Su" Leonard Ism for New Zealand.

232

----

-------- --.-.

......... ..................

.........

----

--

-~...........

- ~------

. _. -

..

Japan Surrenders
Japanese sUlTl!!nder followed soon after the second atomic bomb eJqlloded
N~auki. The
abo~

tapiwlation documenu were signed aboard the new Iowa class battleship VSS MIssouri - the 'Mighty Mo' - on 2 ~p[ember. While the surrender ceremony took place. another se~n Aml':rian, two British battleships and s_nl crtJtsers stood on lliard out in Tokyo Bay.

(abolle) The Allies in Tokyo Bay

Navy camet" ."ruan piss oYer USS Mssoun (BB-63). USS Detroit (CL6) and other Alhed warvuP5 mTolcyo Bay dunnl the surrender cet"emornes. 2 September 19'15.
MiuOllrl and Mount fUll A close-up v.eN of the bow of USS Mssoun (88-63) WIth Mount n..JI hmed by her stem and anchoI" chail\ Il'l Sagan'll Wan O(ToIo::)'o Bay. japan. on;a 30 August 1915. ElnW1 battleVl,ps and US CI'Utsen are VISIble WI the bacJqrrt::lund

194 5

The aftermath
The survivinC ships of th. Im~ri..1J~nelie Navy Iyina Il'lOSdy hUiiIy damqed. In dlelr porn. were joined by those of the vlctoriOlJs Allies. Of the former, rmony of tho5e whic;h (ould be rmde seaworthy were convened for duties u repaU'Qtion tnnsporu. joining Allied vessels as the complex a.sk of collecting. Identifying. U'Nting and uansporting demobilized ComNtvlu' prisoners of war and inMntllm bbour bepn in earnat.

(rilht) CnlBar Aoba in Kure Bnush ~ oIIic.en a'l bNrd the ~ cruser Aoba, some trne ifter the Ces.sitlOrl d ~ SeYeriy dirNged by Arner'an bon"br1c n)lAy 19'45. Aobo ~ ~ on the Ioor c;( KI.n hbo.r. .....toere she 1.,.,;1 been sefWlI ~ 10 bOOS ~ bitter)' Lh .. ),Jpin", crusers. AJ:bo ~ seen J ve<)' busy _ tabnt; pvt ... the ColIpO.n 01 e.u.n olnd the 8.mIes 01 the CorJI Sea.
~e. d.Jnl& the Inte'" of wtw:h she was ~ daf'roa&ed t1t US aunIft1owlg ~ of !hose on board, nd.IdIrla ~ Goto Antomo. ~ she was dimqed ~ by both .. atuck. and ta pedoed by <II US ~ before hstwlg "4l n K...re

SaIIO kIancI MId c.pe

w_.

British shippinl: in Kure Elements of the 8rMh ~ Aeet n K.ure ~ rd.lde the 5lJtrn1ne depot ship ~ pocnnd here WIth ~~Amon&the ~ In the ~ iii the Jijwle$e U'Cnft Ul'l'leI" ~ . whId'l was used kr the ~tru.uon of ~ personnel Between Octobel" 19-15 ~ the following ~ she ~ home $OII'Ie l2.lXXl people. The japanese f\I\Iil ilCidemy ~I Eu. Jlmi wa:;.
used as the headquarters of the 1!ntJ~ Commonwealth occupatIOn forte

(opposite) The junyo and

twO

Ha-201 submarines

The mpn:w..e bulk of one or the few- ~ Japar.ese

~fI earners, the jJnyo (launched 1942). at Sasebo. japan after-!he TI'lISbCe, on 26 September 1945, Two Ho-201 diu ~ed electril:: RbNnnes ~ alonpde. AJong WIth the ~ SenKkl 1-201. these ~ the ~ J;tpinee ~ dmes of the Gernw'o Type XXI d XXII dm oo.ts. They reKhed ~ I:ister speec:b of 19 b'lOtS ~ but )Ip.ao could not ~ e INI1'f or Oeplo'f them n b'I'le to ~ If etrect.

Cricket on cleek The fi&ht ded< of flnWo umer roo mdcll:IIe n.utu'm 1945 v.tIIle she ~ I JOO PoW, d ontemees from Ja!>'n to ~ The It.." s ~ 'Nef"e ngged as domwtones.Thrs IS dearly l no-bal.

Pic

ure

ere d

t S ----------------------

Picture Credits
Aldo Fncuroh: 119 bonom righl: COUrle:sy of Al Fox: 40 lOp (Squadron Le~dcr Lloyd Iknn..n. DFC & bn. PilolS Flr,ng tog Book. 1930-57):Andre~T.ni: 13~ ,,,,<idle &: botlum:Amonr PresIon Colltion: 231 OClllom; Con",d W~t"l"I ColInon: 48 bonom. 52 lOp &: bonom. 73. 135 leli & right. 136 top &: bonol1l. 1-11 tOp. 15~: Conw,y Picture Libnry: 6. 19 101', 20. 29 tOP &: bonom. JO bonom. 31 101' &: bollom. 32 '01' &: bonom. 33 lOp &: bonom. 36. 40 bonom. 43 bonom. H bonom right. 45 bottOm. -16 all lIn'g~. 47. 49. 6~ lop &: bonom. 65 bonom. 69. 70 101'. 71 bonom left ~nd right. 77 '01' &: bollom.81 bonom.82 bonom. 8~. 99. 102. 113, 11-1. 115 lOp. 12J 101' &: bollOm. 145 bonom. 162 '0p. 164 '01'. 165 101' & bonom. 168. 173. 174 bollom. 180 '01' &: bonom lefl. 190 101'. 191 bonom. 192 101'. 19-1. 196. 199. 203. 205 101'.206 '01' &: bollO"', 207 101' &: bollom. 210. 212. 221 (01' &- bouom. 223. 225. 226 101' &: bonom, 227 lop. 213 lUP. 232101' &: bonom; Dover Mu>eum: 41 '01' (D060~). -II right (1)13366). -II bonom (00615-1). 100-101 ~II Im~g"S: Enr,co C ..rnuschL: II? bollom leli. 13-1 lOP: coum'Sy of Ernllnio l3agnasco: 5~ lOp &: bollom. 55 101' &: mlddl..; E1;plosion! Museum of Na,.,.1 F""power: 16-17 V998.3.1-I3): Gcny linages: II (Time &: life PicIUTI.'S). IS (Time &: L.lfe l'lCNm). 19 botlOm, H (top). 66. 83 (Time &: L,fe l'lClUres). 144. H6 (Tm, .. &- L,fe Picrum). 162 bollom (Tnnc & L,f.. 1',etuI'M). 163. 169 lOp (Tim<, &: Llf<, PicNT<'S). 169 bollom. 172. 177 (Time &: life PiClurn). 178 (Tim.. & lif.. Picl"fC'S). 179 (Time & L,fe PlCNm). 183.213 (Tn"e &: Life J'lCIUT\'S). 21-1-215. 228 (Time &: life I'iclurn). 229 (Tune &: Life plCNr~): COUrt~}' ofHal15 Len~rer and W.>!demnTroJC~: 204 '01'. 234 top; Imperl'>! War Mu.... um: 21 (MH23).30 101' (A672). 3~ (AI43). 35 lOp (AI787). 35 bollOm (Al03).37 lOp (NI79). 37 bollom (NI85). 38 l0P (N246). 38 bonom (N24-1). 39 lOp (N148). 39 bonom (N233). 42 lOp (C0L288). 42 bollom (COL295). -13 lOp (HU83522). 4-1 bonom HI (HU68018). -15 101' (lLN70046). 53 bonom (A2295). 62-63 (A2309), 65 top (A28350).67 (A3881).68 (A-I862). 70 botlom (A-iJOO). 71 l0P (A I I I). 72 lOp (M352),72 bonom (A-l3-18), 7-1-75 (A4382).76 lOp (A4401). 76 bollOm {AHI5).87 (HU2675). 10~ (TR92). 105 101' (TR94), 105 bonom (TR9l),I06 lOp (TR21O).I06 bonom (TR318).107 lop (Al0288).107 bonom (07288).108 (A8953). 109 lOp (A 11273). 109 bollom (A81 ~9). 115 bonom {A8926). 116-117 (A8166). 118 lOp lefl (GM 1509), 118 lOp righl (GM 151-1). 118 bollO'" (GM 1513). 126-127 (A 11322). 128 101' (TR579). 128 bonom (TR580). 129 101' (TR510). 129 middle {TR50l). 129 bollom (TR49S). 130 lOp (TR582). lJO bollom (TR533). 131 101' (TR585), 131 bollom (TR:'26). 1)2 (A10402). 133 (A 10403). 137 (A 11161). 138-139 (A 11285), 140 101' (All 159). 140 bon0111 (AII152). 141 bonom (AI1260). 142 101' (GMI5O-I). 1-12 bonom (GMI485). 1-13 (AI3679). 150 '01' (TR281). 150 bollO'" (TR282). 151 lOp (TR285). 151 bonom (TR287). 152 101' (AI3658).152 bollom (AI3656).15310p (HU45840).153 botlOm (HU45806), 155 lOp (HU45805), 1.55 Imddl~ (HU45830). 155 bonom (HU45810). 160 lOp (AI5182). 160 bollom (AI5185), 166 lOp (TRI418). 166 bollOm (Til.. 1282). 167 101' (Til.. 1005). 170 lOp (GM3827). 170 bollom (GM3825). 171 lOp (GM3835).171 bonom I~" (GM3836), 171 bollom righl (GMJ828), 182 (AI4433). 190 bollOm (A2-1059). 191 101' (A24095).I92 bollom (A24106). 195 (01' (A24083). 195 bollOm (A24005). 197 101' (A25669). 197 ,,,,ddl~ (A25666), 197 bollOm (A25671). 200 lOp (TR2618). 200 bollO'" (A23891). 201 {A23-186). 208 (CLlI93). 209 lOp (CL11 91). 209 bollom (A2:'65-1). 211 (Til... 1812). 230 bonom (TR2882). 235 101' (FE618). 235 bollom (AJO<X)3); Marmemuleurn. IXn Helder: 161 all "nag~: NARA Sull Pictun:s: 12Q top &: oollom: RIChard Wonh &: VbdmllrY~kubov. "~lh lh~nks 10 lh~ Bor,s Lem~chko ColleClion.lemachko@mlUIICI.ru:78 all ima8~. 79 all imag~. 148;ill inug~. 149 all ,m~ges. 1M bonom. 180 bonom r,ghl. 181 .>!llm~ges. 198 ~lll1n~ges. 220~]] 1I11ag<:s: Royal ComnlLllion On th<, Ancient and HlSloric.>! Monuntentl ofScodand: 28 (C47656). 48 lOp (H87:'6. CAM/G296): Royal Navy Submmne Mu..curn:80. 81 top. 110_112 all im.ages: SI...,hen Dent Colleclion: 53 10p;Tani Collec(ion: 55 bollonl. 119 lop leli &: rlghl: US M~rll1e Corps: 234 bonom (USMC 136995): US N~uonal ArchIVes: 82 tOp {80-G-K-I6-i72}. 85 bollom (8o-G-32732), 86 (80-G-I9948), 97 lOp (80-G-K-687). 97 bottom (80-G_K_740). 98 bonom (K-878). 121 (80-G-17009). 122 lOp (80-G-I681 1). 122 bouom (80-G-7403}.12-1 bonom (80-G--I14422). 1-15 101' (80-G-K-S63). L4710p {80-G-K-41 I). 175 (77-510). 176 lOp (80-G-K-I08). 176 bollom (80-G-K+2858). 202 (80-G-5931-1). 204 bonom (80-G-238363). 205 bonom (80-G_K_14 162).224 bonom (26-G-4474), 225101' (80-G-K-3170), 233 top (80-G-421130); US N~,.,.I H'llorical Center: 2-3 (NH85665), 85 lOp (NH50603), 96 (80-G-I0535). 98 lOp (80-G-405270). 103 lOp (NH71378). 124 101' (USAF [0 4845). 125 lOp (80-G-79984-28). 125 bonom {80-G-121-17).147 bollom (80-G-K-1467-A).167 bouom (80-G-K-3%5). 174 lOp (80G-56728). 193 (80-G-2527(7). 222 (80-G-470275). 22~ lOp (NHI04317-KN). 227 bollom (80-G-K-384-1). 233 boUOlll (80-G-700862); counO'Sy ofVolkm>r Konig: 50-51 allllnagcs:WGAZ MmneiChulc Mii,wlk: 103 bonom 3 ,mages. 230 101'.

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Maunie. hor. I\;md II;', II (ClU PubllShmg. Godallnlllg. SUIR"j. 1989) MeDoulPll.l'lullp. CI,.uh~," &dlllanh,1'" .i..... /860 (Mumme Books.llSknrd. Corn",.,,1l.1982) MeLut"l1. K...."'.Sanu...Jr- w .... i, 19J~-49, 1<>1..- I' c..r'" <fr. l..MjtN..-ffr ''''''I~.JPIu '" w .""Ii<>fI.l/ .\I.".WmtllU R.lWfJ <If Scofu... (RO)..J ComnuUlOll on I~ Ancl~nl ~nd HlStorKai Monumena orScotbnd. 1999) MelC".ul. RlUTl. H..J( -Sl"oU I'N/ln (fhonus Rec-d PublKJllOm. B....trord on A..on. WIlMIR'.

2IWl1;
\k",cr.JIU1I- S..",l Il:..s/l,,..- '" w Sm>ni II;"/d II;" (Mxdoll~kl & jams. london, 1977) \lc-hon, Con"nodoR' P J.. C8E Ilinr,. E.u~. R.rd DroJf<'lt (Edinburgh Fm~ocW PubWung (,.\s,Q) ll Hong Kong. 1997) IIolnrrt. N~II, e-rr.a <II SrI'. 1JIt HJ>UW)' r( W IWywl .,-.-wI 1'IIItf~ &....n. 1919. 1998 IAuUf... lonJon. 1999) Mldd1cbroolt. f\.bmn. CMI",. (MomY\Oo~ Londoo. 1978) Mor_. Snnud EboI. HIjlOr( II{ liauJ ~ \..... ~,It Il;,n'J II:' II (M"" >duma,AtbnnC".llltk Ul'O""n & Co.. Bcmon. M-.19-47-60) I'.nbll. RO)' Con)Yn. R.A F. .-tlf I~ H..-y (Su110ll PubllSh",g. Suoud. GloucnleMIR'. '" ~ ""Ih the R/l.F MUSC"Um. 1998) Nic:hofton.AnhlU. HlIJ~ /Q Frrm.... OrotriiQ """ dw I..- " . Pn_ "1I:.la _ ~ (Sunon Publrshmg lid. Suood. GloucnlerWR'. 200) Ch"t"1)'. Rxlwd. 1I11y wAtha II;'" ('II. W. Norton. london. 2nd rein. 21M"') I'x-k. S. W. 11 Aftorol. /9-41 (bn AlUn. ShC"ppc-non. Surrn. 1978) I'>dfi<old. l'ft...., 7ltr &n/aJIII' Eu (P;an Boob. lid. london. 1975) l'a,Ln. Q.ar. DUE. SJr'I"''' tIw R.JIl'II ..........oia IINl BniUlI 0--""'/111 r( .,._ (lllPMHl lCI"'~ MaftIOfI & Co.. lui. london. 1937) PanluD. Jon & Tu1l); Anlholl1'; SM,~ s,,'olfd' ~ l'"UIU Slory oj,Itt" 80IIilt oj .\f,lM., (PoIocnx- Books. Washington DC. 20(5) Palmon. Ln.rtne~. l'.J-II1;zr Polltol.. rIIt HuM.... Pltowgt..,Jw I -564 (G~nh,U 8ook~ London. 2(04) 1'~.... I~.GcT.uJ. n..Smrrll:.r.19J9_4j(H~mp& Co.. london. 19.(6) I'olllla'. Norman ..... 'm'!Ji HISI)' '" Camn ...... anolt lind 'IS 1'!fI1It7ttt "" II;"Id E,...,rs, I <>I. I. 1909/~45 (Polonuc 8oo1ts.lJuIics. Virglma. 2(06) !'nnl;!', Gordon W. with Goldst~m. Donild M. &: 1>..11011. KalhtnneV...... r J),n,l'l II .. SUpr' IItt t'llroJd Story oj IT,," H.nbor (I~ngurn Books. Ne..... York. 1982) I'1Yslon.Amony; G.rd",.... Robt"rt: Hunt. Gffllf (rd. Gt_ III Ma. 19)945 (Co"",.,,)' Manllrn~ l'rt-<s. G~n""lCh. 1978) l'!'C">u..>n.Anlo"y. 1lrt' Rp)"l S/III)' s"bm.l"'~ Sm'l;A ern'm",,11 HlSIi'T)' (Con"~ M~nlln" .. PtnS, Londoll, 2QOl) - , Tht JI;mds It~r 1I;'Nhips (Con"~ Manu"'.... Prns. london. 20(2) Ranllq'. Wi"slon G. (f'd.). D.D.ry. Thm and (rn.., ,..,hlln",. Aftcr rhe Ibnl<:. london. 1995) R~urr.IJn>". 7hl""cal O,au.1{<' a,,,lllrilish ,\'a",II>"liq /86Q./9J9 (loudon. 1977) R~.yn. AI~n. KUIJI GtpWt V O.m /J.Jnlnh,ps (DlVouae Books lId. london. 1972) - . T",,,, CloISJ Cn,um (Ul\"ouae Books ltd. london, 1975) - . 1I~. 8",/r f)l'!Ir"Y"J, 0 1<1 Z d<lSSf'1 (B,\..,uac Uoob ltd. london. 1976) - . GtOlllly CIIW C""sm (RSV Pubi,sh",g. Brook1)'''. New York. 1978) &. lelllon.11 Tn:o...,r. Drd" Cl.w Cnl'sm (U1\"OUJe UooJb ltd. london. 1973) '" Robt"rlS.John. Qw...." Eli~..Mr}, Oass &l/Ikship' (1J,,'Ouae UooJks lid. london. 1975) R~k.rll. S1eph..n. 1M II;'" '" Sra (four ,...lulI1<5. HMSQ london. 195~-61) - . nils 1I~"ri't (Collins. london. 1957) - . TM Solii)' ",II~. I~J~1945 (CoUlIlS.london. 1960. and w!>5equelll edlUOIU) Roh"'Yr.JUrgC"ll. 1I;zr ~f SrI'. 19J9_45 (Chatlum.london. 1996. OTl8nully publtshnf ,n C...nruny In 1992 by U.tws V<'rUg H.ms Jurgtn Hamotn. MtinchC"n, ~ l)n K~ :w, 5. 19)94J) &. HumrnC"k~11 G.. Or~ 11;' a, Sr" (!:In t\Ihn.london. 1972) R~, N.A. M, (nf.),......, PooI.... '1I w TwomlWlIl c.r..1lI'Y (Palgm~ MxnufLm. london. 1996) Roussdot. VIC~.Arhrural d'~ Hmn L. G.. DSO DSC. R....... hrt Mnri ~ (Protik PublKauons. Wtndsor. fkrb!lH'~. 1972) Ru~. FOC'drKh. Orr Stdrntr1JIt er- . . . oIII)'S SIr I~J~194J (N","" lmalUlc Pn:sl. Anll2pohs.MO, 1951) - . 1JIt .'i<>o'lft1" .........wI o",.....r.us 1~4/194j {Na>"" 1"","U1" Pn;,s.Annapobs. Mil.

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SNnUand. ~rt. & Humn".Anthom: .\I.tlw e-.". (Collm,_ London. 1961) S!urpc-. finn". l......., 1--... FiJI" "MJdUnd Pubbslung LId.1.ftc~n". 1998) 5mWSlOM, PJul H . l' S.U:..tnp$ ojllMd II;" IJ (l;an AIbn lId. Sh~on.Surlq'. 1965) Snuth. Gordon. ~ II;"., Ma, RJJfI1I & 0 - _ .\"'7 Amo:!Iu ,1I11<>rlJ 11.... 1 (J;an AIbn. London. 1989)

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Web sites
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Articles
B~nm.~Jdfn:y G. 'World

War II: AllIed and Gn"UI! Na>':lI Slr:lICl>U:1. III Cohn G""y A

R~r lJ.lrnflt (~),

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