PLAN TO ASSESS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS LEADING UP TO THE

SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST
ATTACKS

OVERVIEW

The primary objective is to write a chronological narrative of the IC's efforts to analyze
the Al Qaeda threat between 1991 and 2001. The narrative will be followed by a section
discussing the major factors that the determined the effectiveness of these efforts.

To do this, we propose the following approach:

• We will identify, obtain, and review the major analytic products pertaining to Al
Qaeda and related activities that were produced during this period. We will also
review a sample of the day-to-day reporting. We will arrange these products in
chronological order, and identify the conclusions that were reached at different
points in time.
• To understand how these products were developed and put them in context we
will identify and interview personnel who participated in these analyses. We will
also interview intelligence consumers, after coordinating this effort with the
Policy Team.
• To understand how these analyses reflected the state of 1C analysis and its ability
to respond to the terrorist threat, we will collect documentation laying forth the
development of policies, plans, and instructions that guided 1C analytic
operations.
• We will also interview analysis managers who were responsible for the planning,
review, and coordination of these products.
• Using all these data, we will then identify the main factors that shaped 1C analysis
for Al Qaeda and terrorism, and the effectiveness of this analysis. These factors
will be documented, discussed, and used to develop "lessons learned" and
proposals for recommendations.

APPROACH

Establish Background:

1. Identify the players:

A. Consumers: Who tasked and received analysis, and what were the resulting terms
of reference? How did this change over time? (Coordinate this section with Policy Team)

B. Producers: Who were the relevant individuals and organizations in the analytic
community nominally responsible for analyzing the Al Qaeda threat? Responsibilities
aside, who was actually conducting analysis, and what were their skills, specialization,
and functions? How did this change over time?
2. Assess state of understanding of the Al Qaeda threat prior to 9-11

A. Open literature and media reports: What was the state of understanding Al Qaeda
outside the 1C in respect to its size, capabilities, financial support, objectives, and
organization? Identify and review books, monographs; identify the leading experts and
their conclusions. Compile this as a time line to show how it evolved.

B. Intelligence community products: Address above questions in respect to the 1C.

Identify major products in respects to conclusions and evolution of understanding over
time: NIEs, SEIB items, and briefings. Identify and document flow of information — who
produced the products, who received the products. Document response and satisfaction of
recipients with the analysis they received and how this feedback affected later analysis.

Assess Issues:

1. Develop overview of general state of 1C analysis of the terrorist threat during the
period in review

A. Efforts to adapt and focus analysis methods and management to the new threat.
Identify and review efforts by CIA, NSA, DOD and other 1C agencies to update their
analytic organizations for the terrorist threat and other post-Cold War issues.

B. Document analytic production plans. How did Al Qaeda fit into the over analytic
strategy of the CIA, NS A, DOD and other 1C organizations during the period in review?
What was the level of effort?

2. Assess 1C analytic capabilities, methods, and resources

A. Personnel. Assess number and types of analytic personnel assigned to terrorism,

and, in particular, Al Qaeda. Develop time lines, document decision points in allocation
of personnel. Special effort will be made to correlate these allocations to management
decisions. This effort will be coordinated with Commission teams and staff examining
intelligence resources.

B. Data. Identify data gaps revealed and discussed in the analysis. Assess how this
affected collection tasking from analysts and how collectors responded. Assess how
analysts dealt with data gaps (e.g., estimating uncertainty, analytic workarounds)

C. Tools and methodologies. Identify and describe tools and methodologies used in
tracking Al Qaeda (e.g., network analysis; tools for sorting data and identifying linkages;
translation; link analysis; etc.

2. Evaluate 1C management and operation of the analytic process

A. Tasking and Monitoring. Describe procedures for assigning tasks to analysts,

monitoring response, and review of output.
 B. Coordination and Communication. Describe IT and procedures used by analytic
organizations

Required resources for the workplan

1. Publications and documents

The Team 2 workplan identifies the materials that will be required for the analysis.
Special emphasis will be placed on:

• All National Intelligence Council NIEs, SNIEs, and other major products
materials on the terrorist threat
• All CIA Directorate of Intelligence IMs, LAs, typescripts, SEIB and PDB items
pertaining to Al Qaeda and the terrorist threat
• All DCI Counterterrorism Center reports
• Access to all NS A reports and supporting data pertaining to Al Qaeda (these will
be examined selectively because of the volume of material)

In addition to these analytic products, the workplan will also require access to documents
laying forth the policies, plans, and procedures that guided CIA, NIC, and NSA analytic
efforts. These include:

• All major planning and strategy documents by (or directing) the DI, the analytic
components of NSA, and DOD intelligence organizations
• The portions of DCI plans and directives pertaining the intelligence analysis
• The results of commissions and similar groups tasked during this time to examine
the intelligence community's analysis and analytic capabilities

2. Interviews

The Team 2 workplan lists the persons who need to be interviewed to assess the
performance the intelligence community prior to 9-11. This sub-plan requires essentially
the same access, with special emphasis on those persons holding the following positions
during the period in question:

• Director of Central Intelligence

• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
• CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence
• Chairman, National Intelligence Council
• National Intelligence Officer (Warning)
• Heads of the DCI Counterterrorism Center, Information Operations Center, and
UBL Task Force
• Director of the National Security Agency
• Deputy Director of the National Security Agency
 • Director of NSA sub-components responsible for the analysis of SIGINT
pertaining to terrorism

Schedule and Products

The schedule for this effort is highly dependent on when we can begin serious work, and
this depends mainly on the CJA recognizing my clearances. Assuming we can begin by
July 1, we expect to complete the review of existing materials by the end of August. Most
interviews will be conducted from September through November.

We will have a draft of the main product, a monograph suitable for publication and
release to the public as an unclassified document by the end of December.