ALFREDO M. DE LEON VS. HON. GOVERNOR BENJAMIN ESGUERRA G.R. NO.

78059 AUGUST 31, 1987

years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforementioned provision of the Provisional Constitution. ISSUES: Whether or not the 1986 provisional constitution may be validly

FACTS: An original action of prohibition was instituted by Alfredo M. De Leon, as Barangay Captain of Dolores Rizal with other baranggay councilmen for the memorandum ordered by Governer Benjamin Esguerra in replacing the petitioners.

recognized? Whether or not the 1987 constitution was already in effect on February 2, 1987 the day of the actual plebiscite or February 8, 1987, its announcement? HELD: The court held that since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution,

On February 9. 1987, Alfredo M. De Leon received a memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 designating new officers barangay captain and barangay councilmen by authority of the Minister of Local Government granted by the 1986 provisional constitution. The Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. However, the respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the following provision: All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. ... and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6)

there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice. But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline, the aforementioned provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: "Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Further, the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission further shows the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the of facial confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite." Therefor, the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on February 2, 1987, the actual date of the voting and not February 8, 1987, the announcement of the resolution. Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary FACTS: Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positionsin addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows: Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution.

According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII. Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional. Decision: No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void. Ratio: In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII. Francisco v. HRET Fact: The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings being held by the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide. The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice, together with other associate justices, is by Joseph Estrada, for the alleged culpable violation of

the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded due to good form but was later on dismissed due to lack of substance. Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a period less than the one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of Representatives. This was initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by many other representatives. This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the constitutionality of such move by Congress. The petitions were consolidated having raised similar issues. The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding was in culpable violation of the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment proceedings against the same individual. The first proceeding was less than a year away from the filing of the second proceeding. Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the impeachment proceedings as it is the former which has the power to facilitate or administer impeachment proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court interrupts and inquires about the proceedings, it will disturb the doctrine of separation of powers as well as the doctrine of checks and balances. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of the Congress and is a political question. Issue: 1. w/n the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional? 2. w/n the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb it? Held: 1. It is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice

is unconstitutional. Under Article XI of our present Constitution, it is provided that with regard to the impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a one-year bar provided. No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a period of one year. The term initiate refers to the filing of the case against the official. It starts when a complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives. It is not initiated during the time when it is verified by the other members of the House or when it is given to Senate for hearing. 2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it will disturb the separation of power, check and balance between the branches of government, and that the SC has vested interest in the issue. The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to settle controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It has been vested the duty to check if there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or office of government. In this petition wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is questioned, no one has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer the issue of constitutionality other than the SC. Given such, even if the legislative that commences and administers impeachment proceedings, it is not a bar for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if constitutionality is involved. Gonzales vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-28196 21 SCRA 774 November 9, 1967 Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913

and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.): 1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member. 2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971. 3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election. Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional. 2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question. HELD: 1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for

ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED. 2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by the Court. Imbong v Comelec Case Digest (consti-1) Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970 RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention Petitioner: Imbong Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members) Petitioner: Gonzales Respondent: Comelec Ponente: Makasiar RELATED LAWS: Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970. RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2 Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates. RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4. Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy Sec 2: apportionment of delegates Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.

Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention. FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8 ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional. HOLDING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional. RATIO: - Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution -Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132: Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4 - Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less

population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population. - Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention. - Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations. Tolentino vs COMELEC 41 SCRA 702 Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO Respondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and the Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F. Ortega and Juan V. Borra

Facts The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose

amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.

Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-34150

Issue Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?

APRIL 2, 1981 FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for

Decision The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing

residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments: ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional? HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following: 1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister

Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence. 2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5

and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529 Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods. Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any

elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v COMELEC FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative? HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. LAMBINO VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]

ISSUE:

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signaturesfor an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed apetition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that thepetition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiativepetitions.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petitioncomplies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative; (2)Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiagodeclaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition. 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply withthe basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735 The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

Petition is dismissed.

Angara vs. Electoral Tribunal Facts: Angara was elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon and was already proclaimed a member of the National Assembly when Ynsua protested to the ELECOM. Angara filed a motion to dismiss the protest but since his motion was denied by the ELECOM, he filed an original action in the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the ELECOM to hear the protest of Ynsua, provided that ELECOM was under the National Assembly which already proclaimed him as its member as the elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon. Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court could take cognizance of the case and has jurisdiction over the ELECOM Held: Yes. When there is an actual case or controversy, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral constituent units thereof. [based on the powers vested by foreign constitutions to the Judiciary] The judiciary has judicial power, and included in this power is judicial review. The Court has the discretion whether or not to exercise this power. Hence, it produced standards for justiciability.

[4] not moot and academic [5] not a political question [6] ripeness Bondoc vs. Pineda G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991

Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for theposition of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, CongressmanCamasura Standards: [1] actual controversy [2] lis mota of the case [3] legal standing of the parties received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in DavaoDel Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election

of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House

Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of theexamination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

YNOT VS. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987] Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit forfarm work or breeding. Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process. Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either. MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]

to the National Government. Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. Issues: On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained

treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor

General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education on December 4, 2011 Political Law Civic Efficiency The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A.) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B.) They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

power. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Petitioners reason out, this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

authority of the legislature to formulate standard . . . Also, the textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.

HELD: Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail neither the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education. No justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 15 2002 election. Its constitutionality not having been assailed in the first place.

Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in Facts: Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for membership in the SK. Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents. Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized theOakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of Held: The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004] maintaining this suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.

place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

constitutional?

(2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the Issues: delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether (1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code,

and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

1.

Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Mariano v. Commission on Elections FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen. 1. 3. 2.

specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD/RULING:

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the

ISSUES:

northwest, by the City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

1.

Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following: This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

1.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded. On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

JOYA VS. PCGG [225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993] Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manilaalleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.

Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. (2) Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation". (3) Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress. (4) Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items.

(5) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court.

Held: This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-ininterest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing thedisbursement of public funds. Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their

acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money. Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition have become moot and academic. The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object

found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. FACTS: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

HELD:

The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially. Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. Case Digest: Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC 05 May 1994 Ponente: Davide, JR., J. FACTS: The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through. G.R. No. 113375

Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. RULING: The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign. The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO cannot exercise it in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise. KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995. FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned

ISSUES: Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and

because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing? HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of st because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST. Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest

Facts: 1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions. 2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest NO. 1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will fund the planned construction of the market building. Chavez v. Pea and Amari Fact: In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a ThaiPhilippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

Issue: w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Held: On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the

public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Case Digest on Bayan v. Zamora (Visiting Forces Agreement) G.R. NO. 138570 (October 10. 2000) The Visiting Forces Agreement, for which Senate concurrence was sought and received on May 27, 1999, is the subject of a number of Constitutional challenges. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA? Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA. As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA. Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases.

The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present action. Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution? Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII reads: [n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that foreign

military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate. It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIIIs requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred. As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers

of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be

no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, petitioner, vs. SIXTO DE LA COSTA, respondent. Villareal, J.: This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent.

the duties thereof. After his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts, some of which consist in the designation of the assistant clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as administrative officer, under the orders of the petitioner, as executive judge of said court, to take charge of all matters pertaining to the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which are handled by said execute judge in Manila (Exhibit 2); in the appointment of attorney Rufo M. San Juan as notary public for the Province of Palawan, said appointment to expire on December 31, 1938 (Exhibit 3); in having authorized justice of the peace Iigo R. Pea to defend a criminal case the hearing of which had begun during the past sessions in Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 5); in having granted a leave of absence of ten days to justice of the peace Abordo (of Puerto Princesa), Palawan (Exhibit 8); and in having granted a leave of absence of thirteen days to the justice of the peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).

Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly on September 8th of the same year.

On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the 20th of said month and year.

On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937, without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging

On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. By virtue of said appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and assumed office. On the same date, August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to said appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District and after confirmation thereof, issued the corresponding final appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa (Exhibit 11).

The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies the rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the necessary oath, entering into the discharge of the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as administrative acts.

he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the former. Hence, there is incompatibility between the two appointments and, consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each of them, resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter. In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same, disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the courts of First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.

The defense of estoppel being procedural, we shall discuss it first to determine whether or not the petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.

As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable Francisco Zandueta was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, by virtue of an appointment issued to him on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the National Assembly on September 8th of the same year, he received, on November 7, 1936, a new ad interim appointment, issued in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 145, which took effect on the same date, to discharge the office of judge of first instance, Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, upon which he immediately took the corresponding oath and entered into the discharge of his office. Under his former appointment of June 2, 1936, the petitioner had authority preside solely over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila but not over the Court of First Instance of Palawan, while, according to his new appointment of November 7, 1936, he had authority to preside not only over said Fifth Branch of said Court of First Instance of Manila but also over the Court of First Instance of Palawan. It should be noted that the territory over which the petitioner could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than that over which

The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124).

In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance of public interest, being one of the means employed by the Government to carry out one of its purposes, which is the administration of justice, considering the organization of the courts of justice in the Philippines and the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or substitutes, the temporary disability of a judge may be immediately remedied without detriment to

the smooth running of the judicial machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He likewise knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission were to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease discharging the office.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by accepting said appointment and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the office conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled doctrine established by both American and Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of constitutional questions, this court deems it unnecessary to decide the questions constitutional law raised in the petition (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234; Walter E. Olsen and Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil. 259; Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner, 36 Phil. 116; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binagonan, 34 Phil. 518; McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil. 563; 12 Corpus Juris, 699, section 40; id., 780, section 212).

It appears from all the foregoing that the petitioner having voluntarily abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and, consequently, the office of judge of first instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, whose Fifth Branch was being presided over by him by virtue thereof, upon accepting the ad interim appointment of November 7, 1936, to the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over said Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila together with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and entering into the discharge of the functions of said office, he can not now claim to be entitled to repossess the office occupied by him under his said appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L., 560, par. 264), or question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he has been appointed judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which appointment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold when a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.

Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner. So ordered.