Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian Logic Author(s): S. Bhattacharya Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jul.

, 1955), pp. 155-162 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1397435 . Accessed: 03/06/2013 06:29
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy East and West.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and Discussion Comment

DANIEL H. H. INGALLS ON INDIAN LOGIC
S. BHATTACHARYA scholALTHOUGH INDIAN PHILOSOPHY has beenattracting ars forcenturies fromall partsof the world,Indian logic has remained unknown outside India and is so even today.This is due partly practically thatin thenineteenth work to thefact whenmost ofthetranslation century, of the Sanskrit textswas done,the concept of Westernlogic was wholly different fromthe Indian concept, so thatIndian logic was neverreally understood Western There which scholars. was also another by difficulty seemedalmostinsuperable. in a very AdvancedIndian logic is written technical to translate, complexand highly languagewhichis verydifficult and even whena literaltranslation could be made,it did not makesense. is not a literaltranslation but an exSo, whatis neededin the beginning of thetechnique of thelanguage and thebasicconcepts usedin it. planation But thisis notpossiblewithout a thorough of the subtleties understanding of Indianlogic. Happily, thetremendous in thetechnical advance language of logic and its philosophy the last fifty during yearsin the West enables us to translate Indianlogicintelligibly intoother Western languages.Now thatlogic in the West has passedthrough so manyphasesa logic which does not distinguish truth betweenformaland material does not appear so utterly and incomprehensible; nordo we wonder at theinclusion strange of psychological, and other"non-logical" matters in logic. Morelinguistic, whichhave parallelsin over,logic in the West is todayfacingdifficulties Indian logic,thoughthe solutions and even the approaches to suggested the problems are boundto be different now. So, a renewed at attempt a translation of a workon Indianlogic and its explanation, withall the resources of contemporary Western chanceof logic at hand,standsa better success thaneverbefore. This hopeis justified to a considerable extent today of Professor Daniel H. H. Ingallsin his Materials by the achievement for theStudy Indianlogicis notof one type of Navya-Nytya Logic.' Although
1Materials for the Study of Navya-Nydya Logic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press; 1951). See review by Karl H. Porter in Philosophy East and West, IV, No. 3 (October, 1954), 271-273.

155

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

156

S. BHATTACHARYA

and variesfrom to system, the logic of theNavya-Nydya schoolof system has been with as philosophy gradually modifications, adopted, necessary the modelin all the othersystems. The development of thislogic,which extended overseveral was duemainly to theworks ofRaghundtha, centuries, and all of whom commented on the Gadddhara, Jagadi'a, Mathurindtha, workof Gafigeia.Thus,therecould not be a better choicethan original the worksof thesemasters fora first and Ingallshas chosenthe venture, most from them. popular topic intofivesections.Section I deals withthe biogIngalls' book is divided of theauthors in thebook. In Section discussed II Ingallsexplains raphies someconcepts ofNavya-Nydya of language.Section logicand thetechnique textof (it coversbarelyhalf a page), givesthe original III, the shortest on the "Five Definitions withan Englishtranslation of Vyapti," Gafigeba and notes. Section IV contains the textof the commentary of Mathurnditha on the textof Gafigeba, witha translation V gives and notes. Section the textof the commentary on thetextof Gafigeba, of Raghundtha witha translation and notes.It is notclearwhyRaghundtha has beenplacedafter as he is historically earlier. Mathurdndtha, The translation of thetexts is fairly and the noteswhichexplain correct, the translation forthe first timemake systematic and the use of symbols fundamental of can the book be Thus, logic. regarded principles symbolic as a pioneer workon Indianlogic. But justbecauseit is a pioneer workit couldnotbe freefrom which of explanation and interpretation inaccuracies can be avoidedonlywhenthe relation Indian logic and modern between Western understood. away logicis better Ingallsseemsto havebeencarried to use symbols and the concepts of symbolic logic,and by his enthusiasm has failed thetwo. It is notpossible theessential difference between to notice theNydya hereto pointout all theplaceswhereIngallshas deviated from errors. We can discuss theory. onlya fewtypical instance of the error The mostcommon of interpreting Nydyain terms of formal is conceive and hetu as to minor, major,and logic paksa,sadhya, ofSection middle terms The heading 9 is "Terms II, paragraph respectively. "Three of the Inference; s, h, and p." UnderthisheadingIngalls writes, in the full in all inferences form the terms are implicit given .... sadhya abbreviated (hereafter i.e.,themajor 's'), thatwhichone wishesto prove, term;thehetu('h'), thecause,also calledthelingaor sign,i.e.,themiddle s can term;and thepaksa ('p'), thatin whichwhenh is knownto reside, is s, fire to reside, be inferred i.e.,the minorterm.In our stockexample, 28 addedto thison the is p" (p. 35). In footnote smokeis h, mountain he says: "Sincetherelation between s and h is one of samepage,however,

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

COMMENTAND DISCUSSION
pervasion,h may be equal to s....

157
In such cases, it is only by an extensionof

the literalmeanings thatone can speak of 'major,''middle,' and 'minor' Thisis one reason terms. I the to Sanskrit 's,''h,' 'p.' " names, why prefer keep Let us first examinethisnote. If we acceptthisargument, we cannotuse theseterms evenin Aristotelian themajor forevenin syllogisms syllogisms, in the termneed not alwaysbe widerthanthe minor term.For example, "All men are rational all animals are animals; men; syllogism, laughing all laughinganimalsare rationalanimals,"the major termis therefore, and there "rationalanimals"and the minortermis "laughing animals," is no difference in the denotation of the two terms.The majortermcan be equal to the minortermeven if the relation themis not perbetween vasion.Then thetwoterms in Euler's arerepresented as twocircles diagram witheach other.Thus the "one reason"of Ingalls is not very coinciding convincing. Now let us cometo paragraph 9. The veryheading("Termsof theInis no term forin Nyayainference there s, h, and p") is misleading, ference; at all in thesenseof formal in formal as "a logic. A term logicis defined wordor a groupof wordswhichis used as thesubject, or thepredicate, or in a in inference we are not dealboth, Now, Nyiya logicalproposition." but withthe objectsof the real world. And ing withwordsor sentences, if we forget thisdifference and adoptthe formal of Nyiya interpretation it createsseriousconfusion inference and renders the mode of language While it is perfectly nonsensical. is fire to saythatthere on the legitimate it that is nonsensical the "fire" "hill." to word is on the word And hill, say it thismistake, been obvious has almost all. committed is, Thus, though by Th. Stcherbatskoi terme estpresent dans le sujet(paksa "Le moyen writes, surla mona il de la du extreme') 'petit fumee syllogisme. Exemple: y ou
... actually does not occurin the paksa" (footnote the 11). But obviously middleterm in thesubject, cannot be present norcan thehetu(themiddle in thepaksa. Thismodeof language is wholly nonsensical. The term)occur of thisis thatwhileNydya is dealing withtheinferential knowlexplanation refers toobjects, theinfluence are,under edgewhich IngallsandStcherbatskoi of formal it fortheverbalexpression of inference. Modern logic,mistaking formal of knowledge. The very logicdeals onlywiththeverbalexpression first sentence of Quine's Mathematical Logic3makes this clear. "Mathe2As quoted by B. Faddegon, The Vaifesika-System (Amsterdam: Johannes Muller, 1918), pp. 316317. SWillard Van Orman Quine, Mathematical Logic (rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

tagne

."2 On page 30, Ingalls writes,". .. the hetu (the middle term)

1951).

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

158

S. BHATTACHARYA

matical leveldealswith ordeclarative statements, logicat itsmost elementary and with the further sentences." of them into sentences, ways compounding deals with inferential (Italicsin theoriginal.) But Nydya knowledge logic as well as withits verbalexpression. into When an inference is analyzed is whichis analyzed.When an inference s, h, p, etc.,it is the knowledge which into the verbal "members" or is it (three five), analyzed expression is studied.The failure has to distinguish between thesetwokindsof study led Ingallsto commit mistakes.(See below.) This difficulty whichhas passed unapart,thereis anotherdifference noticed so far. The concept is notthesame in the two logics. of predicate is the vahniman" (the hill is fiery), Thus,in thesentence "fiery" "parvato to Westernlogic, whereasaccording to Nydyathe according predicate of is not "fiery" of fact,the concepts but "fire."As a matter predicate are very formal vague in traditional logic,and there subjectand predicate is no uniform themin a sentence.4 rule by whichto determine So, when is p," is s, smokeis h, mountain "In our stockexamplefire Ingalls writes, hisposiand minor after terms, s, h, and p withthemajor, middle, equating of all, he makesthesentence tionis doubly indefensible. First meaningless, "Whatever another error. In the inference, and then commits possesses themountain smoke themountain smoke;therefore, fire; possesses possesses or theword"fire" it is difficult to see howtheword"smoke" fire," possesses as a term at all, forneither of themis thecomplete can be regarded subject "themountain of thesentence or predicate of a proposition. The predicate is thatwhichpossesses "themountain or its logicalform smoke," possesses smoke"is not "smoke"but "thatwhichpossesses smoke";so, also, "fire" fire."Thus, "smoke"and "fire" is not the termbut "thatwhichpossesses but are onlypartsof terms, are not terms, i.e.,theyare not categorematic wordsused words,or, rather, categorematic words,but syncategorematic not the and to But, fire, groupof Nydya, according syncategorematically. is thesJidhya. nor even theword"fire," words"thatwhichpossesses fire," So, also,with"smoke." 7 Next we cometo a morefundamental II, paragraph point.In Section and between Western ascripts logic distinguishes Ingalls writes: "Modern a predicate with a subjector a associates An ascript assertions. merely withits terms, relation beingthe father beingrich'or 'John's e.g.,'John's this or asserts an assertion of William,'whereas (statement proposition) of is rich' or is the father a as or relation fact, 'John e.g.,'John predication the timesalso distinguishes the mostancient William.' Indianlogic from
and Inference(Oxford: The ClarendonPress, 1926), Vol. I, 4See JohnCook Wilson,Statement Part 2, chap. 4.

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

COMMENT AND DISCUSSION

159

of errors. statement and is thesource two." Now, thisis a very misleading a mentalstatenor a real fact. In An ascript of Westernlogic is neither in thisway. beingrich"is notinterpreted "John's Nyayalogicthecomplex real. If in any case we cannot All knowledge triesto state something to ourignorance a complex is realor not,thatis due simply decidewhether in Western or insufficient Thus,whatis knownas ascript logic knowledge. a doubtwhich to Nydyalogic,simply is, according judgment, suspended of theknower.So, cannotbe resolved becauseof theincompetence simply as falseknowledge. all suchknowledge Nydyalogic Nydyalogicclassifies or disis a logic onlyof categorical probable, Hypothetical, propositions. for to all are falsepropositions, according Nydya, there junctive propositions is nothing in reality which can correspond to "if-then," "maybe,"or "eithervalidor or." Every validknowledge, or,rather, knowledge, every complete a is A therefore non-assertive must assert invalid, knowledge something. of the foroneself consists in terms.Ingalls says: "Inferring contradiction of pervasion, namely, knowledge three-stage processwe have described, One of inference. and may conceiveof knowledge knowledge, operative as a non-assertive this three-stage syllogism. Justwhat the value process for or mode of its stagesis, is hardto say. They are not simply ascripts, is a valid formof knowledge, foroneself, even whenproduced inference, to as knowledge and valid knowledge(prama) is defined corresponding fortheNaiydyika is. Theyarecertainly notassertions, whattheworldreally to the five-membered would then have no need of recourse syllogism" As we havealready is hisown creation. mentioned, (p. 34). This difficulty an inference and itsverbalexpresbetween Ingallshas failedto distinguish whichcontains forthe sake of others, herethatinference sion. He thinks foroneself.In thishe to the inference is logically fivemembers, superior to Nydya has misinterpreted theNydya view,for, according logic,theonly in others is to produce thatknowlof thefive-membered syllogism purpose is produced which foroneself.The knowledge edgewhichone has acquired as the has same value this the five-membered logical by syllogism exactly for oneself the three-membered which has one sylgained by knowledge of syllogisms of the two types varies of the members The number logism. one forthe sake of others, reasons.In an inference becauseof non-logical from is the which different has to use languagein a particular way way foroneself to produce an inference without in whichone expresses trying in both in others.The real causeof inferential thatknowledge knowledge of the inference are cases is the operative knowledge.The fivemembers of the verbalexpression of the inference and never alwaysthe members of the processof the inferential knowledge.The processof inferential

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

160

S. BHATTACHARYA

in the inference forthe sake of others is the same three-stage knowledge is therecannotbe process.So faras the inferential knowledge concerned, of an inference foroneself and those anyfive-stage process.The members of one forthesakeof others do notdiffer in kind;and theconclusions also have the same logicalvalue. If we compare the two types, the pointwill becomeclear. In an inference forthe sake of others thereare fivememforoneself thereare onlythreemembers, but bers,whilein an inference there is no ruleas to which ofthethree members willconstitute theinference foroneself.Sometimes thefirst three members of theinference forthesake of othersare taken,sometimes the last three. But in boththe forms of foroneself inference thelogicalvalue remains thesame. This is so because the extratwo members of the inference forthe sake of others do not add to the logicalvalue of the inference at all. The number and orderof the members of an inference in Nydya are not determined by any logicalconsideration but simplyon psychological The first memberof a grounds. for the of others sake not an but an is, therefore, Nyayasyllogism ascript, which from is the of view false; incomplete knowledge, logicalpoint really it does notfunction as a premise of the syllogism at all. It is stated in an inference for the sake of others, to a point only to draw theirattention whichis goingto be proved.The reasonis purely and has psychological with the nature do of the Our inference. knowledge to logical nothing from a doubtful mental where we do notknowwith state, certainty proceeds a complex whether is real or not. Then byfurther we cometo knowledge a complete where thestateof doubtis resolved.In an inference knowledge forthesake of others whichis possible, member states thefirst something but whichhas notyetbeenproved to be true. So there is further effort to member states is self-contradictory which proveit. Butifthefirst something thenthereis no need forany further to provethe matter whichis effort foroneself, one may at once knownto be false. In the case of inference theknowledge statefirst of pervasion and thenmaypass overto theoperafrom a tiveknowledge, and thento the conclusion. Or, one mayproceed and then seek out the the conclusion reason and may probable pervasive relation. of Mill's chargeagainst Here one is reminded theAristotelian syllogism, of inference. His pointwas the actual process thatit does not represent is notpresent in consciousness whenone a'tually thattheuniversal premise to to him, fromparticular infers.All actual inferences are, according is a to this of But false the analysis totally according Nydya particular. of inference. of inference mustcontain Every process process psychological ButMill granted theorder oftheproposia universal that, though premise.

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

COMMENT AND DISCUSSION

161

tionsin the Aristotelian is not the actual orderfollowed in the syllogism of the form of the is to test its process reasoning, yet syllogism necessary of theNydyasyllogism, whether five-membered or validity.The members are ordered to Nyiya logic, for,according three-membered, psychologically, not merely the orderof the members, of the syllogism, but even the form has nothing to do withthevalidity of the inference. Nydyalogicdoes not believethata particular form is necessary to makethe inference valid,or even to testitsvalidity. The validity of theinference, to Nydya, according is determined thatis, by the truth of the criterion, whollyby the material of pervasion, in theinference. and of other involved knowledge knowledge is no distinction there between formal and material and So, in Nydya truth, thustheform ofinference has no logicalimportance. It is determined purely on psychological grounds.This is a fundamental pointin Indianlogic in To that Indian has between and general. say logic distinguished ascripts assertions in theWestern senseis, therefore, nottrue. The failure to appreciate thisdifference is thecauseof further confusions and misconceptions. in on footnote 23 Thus, page 33, Ingallsquoteswith the of that the "'resemapproval interpretationFaddegon Nydya syllogism " bles moreour hypothetical thanour categorical syllogism.' Nothingcan be farther from the truth.The universal in NyIya is alwaysa proposition and can neverbe equatedwitha hypothetical categorical proposition proposition. Hypothetical, are all false, disjunctive, problematic propositions to Nydya, and the difference between themand the categorical according is one of kind.A proposition of one kindcan never be reduced propositions to a proposition of the otherkind. "All men are mortal" to is, according different fromthe hypothetical form"If thereis a Nydya, fundamentally or "If x be a man,thenhe is mortal.''The failure man,thenhe is mortal," to realizethishas put Ingalls on a wrongtrack.Thus, he identifies the absenceof the conjoint withthe alternative denial (p. 64, footnote 118). And he wonders in Nyiya logic. The whyDe Morgan'slaw is unknown reasonis obvious. De Morgan'slaw statessomething whichis impossible to Nydyalogic. A categorical the conjuncaccording proposition stating tion of denials can neverbe equivalentto a denied alternation, for an to is false. We are not to alternation, according Nydya, always trying justify hereone position or theother; thepointis that ifwe forget thisfundamental difference the two logics,and tryto interpret between of Nydyain terms mathematical the Nydyapositioncomlogic, we are bound to misstate of all modes of pletely. From the Nydyapoint of view, the reduction truth-function to three is as unjustified as thereduction of them primitives5
5Quine, op. cit, pp. 42 ff.

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

162

S. BHATTACHARYA

as the and conjunction to one primitive." negation Ny~yalogic recognizes mathematical modes of modes truth-function. The other only recognized by is no possibility ofDe Morgan's logicarenotrecognized byNydya.So, there law inNyiya. So,also,with "anyatara." mistake.On page 34, Ingalls We will conclude out another bypointing to Nydya.But thisis one a representative of attributes theory knowledge differ and epistemology which fundamental on Nyiya psychology point of Indian and schools other from thoseof Siirnkhya, Veddnta, philosYoga, as an image or to Nydya, therecan be no such entity ophy. According the to objectsand not through mentalpicture.Knowledgerefers directly of a tertium mediation quid. the discussion and vitiate These mistakes, thoughtheyare fundamental moreor less unaffected, of thetexts of Section II, yetleave thetranslation on makinga successof an admittedly and Ingalls mustbe congratulated difficult very job.

6Ibid.,pp. 45 ff.

This content downloaded from 151.100.161.185 on Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:29:19 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions