International Studies

http://isq.sagepub.com Whither Social Science?

Om Bakshi International Studies 2006; 43; 137 DOI: 10.1177/002088170504300202 The online version of this article can be found at: http://isq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/43/2/137

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Whither Social Science? / 137

Whither Social Science?

Om Bakshi
The development of new approaches in recent times has brought about major changes in the study of social and political life. They reject almost everything that has been traditionally accepted, for which they have been severely criticized. But focusing on academic issues alone wont help much. We can understand the new approaches, their concerns, their rejection of science as model, their disdain for objectivity, universality, truth, relevance and so on, more adequately by relating them to the social conditions that obtain in the West. There are, however, major differences between these conditions and those that obtain in countries like India. And the kind of problems facing these countries can be addressed meaningfully by the more traditional approach than by the approaches developed recently. This is why, while it does not seem to have much future in the West, where it originated and continued for long, it may survive, even flourish, in countries like India.

Rarely has the discussion on the nature of social and political inquiry been as intense as in our times. The concept of inquiry developed by classical thinkers and adopted by numerous thinkers over the centuries has been rejected and, under the influence of contemporary movements in philosophy, alternative approaches have been developed.1 In spite of the enthusiasm generated by them, however, their usefulness remains doubtful. Those shaped by positivist thinking revealed major weaknesses when employed in the study of social life. The efforts to overcome these from within the positivist framework didnt quite succeed, revealing more than anything else the limitations of this philosophical position. As these approaches began to lose ground, social scientists started turning to alternative approaches. Developed under the influence of different strands in continental philosophy, these approaches have proved very attractive to scholars, including many in India. A careful examination, however, shows that these, too, have serious
The author is Professor of Political Theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Acknowledgement: The author is extremely thankful to Professor Randhir Singh for his comments on this article. For the views expressed in this article, however, the author alone is responsible.
1 For a discussion on the nature of the traditional approach to the study of social and political life, see pp. 14955 of this article and Bakshi, 1987: 111.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 43, 2 (2006) Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009 DOI: 10.1177/002088170504300202

138 / OM BAKSHI limitations. In this article, the changes that have taken place in the study of social and political life in the last few decades will be critically analysed. In the course of this discussion, an attempt will be made to develop an alternative approach. Instead of applying some philosophical insight to the study of social and political life, however, the effort will be to explore how we can meaningfully approach it. Science as Model In the last few decades, there has been a strong urge to develop social sciences on the model of natural science. Those conversant with the history of ideas, however, would not regard this as a new development since efforts to make the study of social and political life scientific have been made from the very beginning. They might refer to Books IV, V and VI of Politics in which Aristotle made a careful analysis of the situation obtaining in the cities in ancient Greece. The truth is that even Plato sought to put the study of social and political life on a scientific basis, although today many would hesitate to regard his approach as scientific. With the success of the natural sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the urge to make the study of social life scientific became stronger. Their continuing success in our times has ensured that the model of scientific inquiry will continue to be emulated by social sciences. This, however, does not mean that there is agreement on what constitutes scientific knowledge. In everyday life people generally equate it with the knowledge of facts. In their thinking, this reliance on facts separates scientific knowledge from prejudice, superstition and ignorance. This view of scientific knowledge might appear nave to many, but we should remember that it dominated social sciences not so long ago. Indeed, in the period following the Second World War, social scientists concentrated their energies on gathering facts on a scale perhaps never seen before. Although this view came under criticism, particularly at the hands of those influenced by anti-positivist trends in philosophy, it brought about significant changes in social sciences. In particular, it played an important role in emancipating the study of social and political life from the influence of metaphysical thinking. The importance of the elimination of a lot of verbiage from social sciences cannot be exaggerated. This is not to deny that there are serious difficulties in developing scientific knowledge by gathering facts. For to study facts as they are may seem unproblematic, but how we should go about studying them is not obvious. Since the facts of social life are very large in number, we must know which facts to select. There is also the difficulty that how we understand a fact depends on its relationship with other facts. We may understand it in one way if we relate it to one set of facts and in another way, if we relate it to another. This is why we must know how to establish relationships among them. There is a feeling that we depend on our ideas to guide our factual inquiries. This was the position taken by Weber, who
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Whither Social Science? / 139 believed that we rely on our values for selecting and ordering facts. This was also the experience of social scientists in the mid-twentieth century. Although they collected facts in the hope of developing reliable knowledge of social life, it was widely observed that they made inquiries in the perspective of liberal democratic values. It is, therefore, not surprising if the feeling has grown that, since we can collect facts in a variety of moral frameworks, there is little possibility of providing an objective account of social reality. Today social scientists are as uncertain of accepting objectivity as a realistic goal as they were certain of it not so long ago. The reason why this view of science seems nave to many is that a pile of facts, however meticulously collected, does not provide adequate knowledge of social and political reality. It helps neither in explaining past or present events, nor in delineating their future course. This was also the experience of social scientists in the mid-twentieth century who collected facts merrily in the hope of developing reliable knowledge, but found themselves lost in the midst of huge piles of facts. They were widely criticized for adopting a crude form of empiricism. This led them to revise their concept of science. The feeling grew that theories, not facts, give us knowledge of social reality. Social scientists were enjoined not to rest content with collecting facts but to make generalizations on the basis of those facts. Although it is widely believed that this is how we develop scientific theories, this view is not without difficulties. To begin with, we can never close the possibility of discovering evidence against our generalizations. This has led thinkers from Hume onwards to wonder whether a collection of facts, however large it may be, provides a secure basis for claiming regularities in nature or social life. It is, however, not possible to discuss here the concept of induction, which has been a subject of considerable philosophical interest. What needs to be noted is that this proposal does not come to grips with the difficulties involved in collecting facts. In other words, if our generalizations depend on the facts at our disposal, then the question remains exactly how we go about collecting them. While this proposal assumes that we develop ideas on the basis of facts at our disposal, the feeling, as we have seen earlier, is widespread that we gather them in the light of our ideas, values, concepts or theories. Thus, there is widespread scepticism regarding the possibility of acquiring objective knowledge of social and political reality, given the possibility of approaching it from a variety of points of view. Weber, for instance, has no doubt that, thanks to the dependence of sociological inquiry on our values, our knowledge is always knowledge from particular points of view. There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of social reality (Weber, 1949: 7285). This does not mean that there are no rules of reasoning to regulate our inquiries. In fact, according to Weber, we are bound by these rules here as elsewhere. What this means is that a critic could examine whether we have taken into account all the relevant facts, whether we have checked them carefully, whether the inferences we have drawn
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140 / OM BAKSHI from them are warranted and so on. But whether this would render our account objective is considered doubtful. This argument has proved very attractive to social scientists. They have increasingly become sceptical of the possibility of providing an objective account of social phenomena. Those who accept the more traditional model of social science, however, continue to have serious objections against such a position. They agree that we rely on our concepts or theories for making sense of what is going on around us, but insist that we can always check them against objective reality. Even if at any given time we have several competing accounts or theories, they deny that this means that these are equally valid. Their position is that we must submit our accounts or theories to critical scrutiny to know which, if any, could be accepted as valid. This position has increasingly come under attack in recent times. It has been argued that our accounts or theories provide different ways of looking at social phenomena. Those who take this position reject the positivist claim that we can check the validity of our theories. The trouble, they argue, is that there are no facts independent of theories. Facts are theory-laden, is how those who espouse this view put it. The assumption regarding the objective existence of social reality accepted for long has been given up. It is widely assumed that everything depends on how we perceive it. The possibility of a variety of theories of the same social phenomena would leave those who accept a more traditional view of social science uneasy, but not the exponents of the new approaches. For them this is not a problem. The view that we must decide which of them is true, they believe, is a relic of positivist thinking. We are advised to accept them all as valid. The reason for the persistence of a sense of uneasiness with this position is that we continue to cling to an antiquated concept of truth. In their opinion, truth is an authoritarian concept which is intolerant of different ways of perceiving social phenomena. The time has come to discard it. In recent times, thus, relativistic tendencies have been on the ascendancy. Although the exponents of the more traditional view of social science continue to attack relativistic thinking, the latter never seemed more convincing to many at any time in the past than today. But this would leave at least people in everyday life perplexed. They would find it hard to comprehend a position which denies the objective existence of social and political reality. They would wonder whether it is a matter of our concepts, theories or frameworks that a bulk of the people in countries like India are living in conditions of abject poverty; that millions of young men and women are unemployed; that countless children are suffering from malnutrition, millions of them are underage workers, toiling in inhuman and hazardous conditions and so on. Indeed it is hard to imagine that anybody, whether a scholar or a person in everyday life, could claim that these are the products of our thinking. These, to use words commonly employed by critics of social science but for exactly the opposite reason, are really out there. If we accept the scholarly trends in contemporary thought, however, we would not regard accounts Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 141 or theories which ignore the vast majority of people as inadequate. This would appear surprising to many, especially to people in everyday life in countries like India, given the number of people facing these problems and the extent of their suffering. They may not have a satisfactory explanation for these problems, nor know how to go about solving them. But they have no difficulty in recognizing these problems, no matter what their beliefs, concepts, theories or frameworks. In any case, major problems give rise to tensions, disruptionseven upheavals in society, affecting a large number of people in a variety of ways. This is why people in everyday life would not regard any social account or theory for which these problems do not even exist as adequate. It is hard to see how we can disagree with them. Methodological Difficulties Even those who accept this argument would not think it prudent to ignore the methodological difficulties which social scientists encounter while making sociological inquiries. For Weber is surely right when he claims that, since social and political life is extremely complex, it is not obvious how we go about analysing it. But instead of embracing a relativistic position, we need to look at the whole issue afresh. This we can do by questioning the way writers like Weber believe that we go about making inquiries. This question has been raised by Popper, who feels that knowledge does not start from the collection of data, facts, observations or perceptions, but from problems (Popper, 1976: 88). According to him, a problem arises when a scientific theory is unable to account for the phenomena to which it purported to apply. We offer a hypothesis for solving the problem and try to test it. If it withstands our efforts to falsify it, we accept it for the time being. Popper argues that social scientists, too, should rely on this method. Although what this means is that they should write in response to the problems of their sociological theories, he enjoins them not to ignore the problems facing society, since these problems also give rise to significant problems of a purely theoretical kind. The importance of writing in response to practical problems cannot be exaggerated, although it is true that in social science, like in natural science, we can write in response to theoretical problems. For example, Weber developed much of his sociological thought in response to social and political theories of Marx. But the trouble is that social reality does not remain static. And when the facts a theory was designed to explain change, it is rendered anachronistic. This is not the sort of situation that arises in natural sciences like physics. Since in the social universe a theory was designed to explain may itself undergo large-scale changes, it may not provide a starting point for inquiry. This is why we must look for another starting point, which is provided by major social problems. The importance of knowing where and how to begin inquiry cannot be exaggerated. Since social life is extremely complex, we do not know which of the myriad aspects of social reality we should study. And whatever we study seems to be related to a variety of social phenomena, leaving us wondering which of these Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

142 / OM BAKSHI would help in explaining it adequately. It will not be surprising if we come to the conclusion that everything is connected with everything else. In recent times, thus, it has been widely argued that, thanks to the complexity of social and political life, we cannot establish a cause-effect relationship. This conclusion might seem inescapable to those who think about social and political life in a vacuum, but not to those who approach it in the context of social problems. For these problems would provide them with criteria to decide which aspects of social life to study and help them to establish cause-effect relationships. Those writing in response to social problems, thus, would be able to separate the relevant from the irrelevant, the necessary from the contingent, and the underlying from surface phenomena. This would save them from getting lost without any clue in the complexities of social life. It might be objected that problems of social life do not exist independently of our thinking, that we recognize them with the help of our values. This is why doubts might be raised as to whether this approach gives us any distinct advantage over those who analyse social reality in the perspective of their values. That this objection is based on a misconception will become clear if we analyse the nature of social problems. At any given time, every society, however well organized it may be, is faced with several problems, some of which raise questions about best means to ends which are widely accepted. For example, it may find its police unable to protect its citizens adequately from criminals or its public health services unable to provide proper medical care to the sick. Such problems can arise in any society whether liberal, socialist or Islamic. However, a problem may be peculiar to a society because it is organized on a certain normative basis. Persecution of religious minorities may be considered a problem in a society which accepts secularism but perhaps not in a theocracy. Development of practices which are intolerant of dissent may be regarded as problems in democratic societies but not in authoritarian regimes. We regard these as problems because they undermine the values which provide the basis on which social and political life is organized in a society. This is why we are often guided by our values in identifying social problems. But civilized societies have also faced problems which could not be identified with the help of values providing the basis of their social and political life. It is, for example, doubtful whether oligarchic principles could help in recognizing problems which arose in Greek cities like Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. For these principles were not concerned with the kind of claims then advanced by the class of merchants, artisans, craftsmen and others. And yet the fact is that Aristotle, who is widely believed to have imbibed oligarchic prejudices, was able to recognize the problems which arose following the emergence of this class and developed his ideas in response to them. To take another example, the early liberal theory, concerned mainly with maximizing utilities, could hardly lead one to notice the kind of problems which unregulated capitalism gave rise to in the nineteenth century. And yet several liberal thinkers were able to take cognizance of such problems as the exploitation of industrial workers and theorized in their Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 143 context. While it is difficult to deny the possibility of dominant values proving a hindrance in recognizing such problems, the question is whether they render us incapable of recognizing human suffering. In any case, as noted earlier, we may be forced to take cognizance of social problems as they, unlike theoretical problems, may create tensions in social life and even cause serious disruption in it. Indeed, the truth is that in such conditions the hold of dominant values is likely to weaken, which would help us in taking notice of social problems. It may be pointed out that thinkers like Plato, Aristotle and Marx wrote in response to problems of this kind.2 Theorizing Meaningfully An additional advantage of writing in response to problems facing society is that this imposes discipline on our speculative impulses. In social sciences particularly there is a danger of developing theories which are not open to critical scrutiny, of lapsing into empty verbalism. Writing in response to social and political problems, on the other hand, helps us to develop theories that can be empirically checked (Bakshi, 1988). The importance of submitting our thinking to standards like testability cannot be exaggerated, although in our times there has been a tendency to ignore this. Take, for example, the plea to develop theories advanced by those dissatisfied with the tendency in social sciences to focus on gathering facts. We have seen earlier that social scientists were enjoined to make generalizations on the basis of facts they had gathered. But there was another scholarly tendency which stressed the need to construct analytical frameworks composed of concepts identifying major variables and their possible relations. The tone of this kind of research was set by scholars like Parsons. Although systems theories as developed by them attracted considerable attention, there was a strong feeling that these theories operated at such a high level of abstraction that it was difficult, if not impossible, even to check them against facts. The exponents of this view in political science like Easton admitted that this criticism was perfectly true, but argued that the demands of empirical verification imposed an unnecessarily severe burden on those engaged in theoretical inquiry (Easton, 1971: 31417). They agreed that the ultimate test of any theory was its correspondence with facts, but did not think it was necessary to formulate ideas in a form which could straightaway be tested by reference to facts. The feeling was that social scientists had to be given latitude to freely develop theories. The translation of their ideas into verifiable form was, thus, a separate task that could be undertaken some day. At a time when social scientists insisted on the need to prove things which every ten-year old child of normal intelligence knew, as Leo Strauss put it in his
2 The very fact that a thinker can recognize problems which raise questions about the moral principles on which social and political life is organized, may lead some to doubt whether they really do so. Now such a question can always arise, and it can be decided only on the basis of concrete evidence in a given case. All one can perhaps say is that we should study the most serious problems confronting society. Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

144 / OM BAKSHI inimitable style, it was not surprising that the exponents of this kind of theorizing emphasized the need to develop theories unhampered by the worries of verification. But the question is whether testing hampers theoretical inquiry. For, as Popper argues, it not only checks theoretical inquiry but it also stimulates us to try again. Far from inhibiting the development of scientific knowledge, testing plays an important role in developing it. In any case, the question is how discipline could be imposed on the speculative impulses of theorists were theoretical enterprise to become autonomous. Since the latitude to theorize could easily become a license to fantasize, the possibility of theoretical speculation losing touch with social reality cannot be ignored. A social scientist may not even know that, caught up in a momentum of its own, his inquiry has degenerated into empty verbalism. We must therefore adopt an approach that helps in developing theories which can be subjected to critical scrutiny. This is precisely the advantage of writing in response to the problems facing society. For we can meaningfully discuss the usefulness of the concepts we develop and the relationships we establish among them in the context of problems. We can find cogent arguments both for and against any concept or any relationship we establish in the abstract, making it difficult to rationally decide which would be more useful in analysing social reality. There have been serious disagreements on the question, for instance, whether it is more profitable to use the concept of social group based on status and prestige or that of class based on its relationship with the system of production. The reason for such disagreements is that we can classify people in a variety of ways. While this has led some to regard all concepts as equally valid, it has led others to think that none could claim validity. It is therefore not surprising that writers like Foucault believe that the possibility of classifying social phenomena in a variety of ways undermines the very possibility of social science. Although this view has been enthusiastically endorsed by many, we must resist the temptation to draw relativistic or sceptical conclusions. For, contrary to what the detractors of social science think, we can critically examine the usefulness of the classifications that we make if we examine them in the context of the problems facing society. Making Research Socially Relevant Writing in response to problems facing society will also help us in developing socially relevant knowledge. The need to take interest in matters which concern society at large cannot be exaggerated. Nor has it escaped the attention of those concerned with the study of social life. Indeed the relevance of research in social science has been one of the major issues in contemporary thought. In the midtwentieth century, for example, social scientists were widely criticized for not taking interest in matters affecting people at large. There was a feeling that their insistence on making inquiries strictly according to the norms of scientific reasoning, whether it helped them in developing reliable knowledge or not, prevented them from doingDownloaded socially relevant work. This might appear puzzling to many; for from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 145 it is not immediately clear how enjoining scholars to write with clarity or precision could result in making their research socially irrelevant. They would regard relevance as one of the more important norms to regulate scientific inquiry. Although they might admit that scholarly work is often done merely to satisfy curiosity or for the sake of acquiring professional competence, they would insist that the task is to work on issues which are socially relevant. Although this view is not without substance, we need to discuss why social science has often been indicted for being irrelevant to the needs of the people at large. For this feeling has been so widely shared that we cannot rest content merely with claiming that, like truth, relevance is a major norm to regulate our scientific inquiries. Among those who share this feeling are the followers of Marx. Their argument is that since social scientists aim at discovering regularities in social life they tend to accept the capitalist system as given, as natural. This does not serve the needs of the people, particularly those belonging to the working classes, who would rather be interested in a radical transformation of society. This view has proved attractive to those who think that the solution to the problems facing people at large requires restructuring social and political life. What has lent credence to it is the proclivity of social scientists in general to acquiesce in the existing conditions. In spite of the wide endorsement this line of thinking has received, however, it is open to question. For a careful analysis of social life alone can provide a basis for any meaningful proposal for social change. It cannot be overemphasized that Marxs plea to restructure the existing society on socialist principles was not the product of a utopian dream, a fantasy or poetic imagery but of a careful analysis of the existing capitalist society.3 There is no reason why those who analyse social reality as it existed are destined to acquiesce in it. The view that the desire to emulate natural science renders research in social science irrelevant to the needs of society, however, has not been confined to the followers of Marx. It is commonly believed that this leads social scientists to insist on precisely measuring the phenomena they are investigating. Hence the tendency in social sciences to concentrate on subjects amenable to precise measurement, whether they are socially relevant or not. There is also a feeling that some crucial aspects of human behaviour like intentions or purposes are not amenable to precise measurement. Although the usefulness of concentrating on such phenomena as intentions is not beyond doubt,4 it is hard to deny that those who insist on precisely measuring social phenomena are likely to focus on subjects they can study with the help of methods at their disposal, thus making their methods the criteria for selecting subjects for investigation. The trouble, however, is that methods cannot guide us in deciding what to study. Indeed this reverses the relationship between methods and subjects for investigation. For we can rationally
3 The close relationship between moral principles and empirical analysis is discussed in Bakshi, 1987: 98110 and Bakshi, 2000: 97113. 4 For a discussion on this question, see below, pp. 16768.

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146 / OM BAKSHI decide what methods to use only in the light of the problems we want to study. Instead of selecting problems amenable to the methods at our disposal, we should first decide what to study. It is possible that we do not even have the methods to study the problems in which we are interested. But, instead of ignoring them, we should try to develop methods for studying them. And the truth is that interesting and difficult methodological questions arise when we face problems which do not yield to the methods at our disposal. This is why we can develop methods meaningfully in the context of concrete problems for investigation. On the other hand, those who place methods at the heart of the study of social and political life would be more interested in applying the methods at their disposal. Instead of addressing issues which concern people at large, they are likely to produce exercises in fashionable methods. This argument might seem far-fetched to some, but not to those conversant with contemporary thought, because in the mid-twentieth century there was a widespread feeling that methods provide the key to a reliable knowledge of social and political life. For social scientists methods became the ultimate criteria for accepting statements about social life (Almond and Verba, 1963: 43). In other words, they regarded only those accounts of social reality reliable that were produced with the help of certain methods, and not because they described social reality adequately. It is therefore not surprising that social scientists took keen interest in refining methods and techniques at their disposal and in looking for those being used successfully elsewhere. Although doubts were often raised about the usefulness of quantitative analysis, they continued to hold that reliable knowledge could be developed only by precisely measuring social phenomena. The result was that they tended to concentrate on subjects like voting behaviour and to ignore those like racialism and social violence. It is therefore not surprising that in our times there has been widespread discussion on how to make research in social science relevant. The proposal which is widely favoured is that social scientists should select topics for investigation because they are significant from a moral point of view, not because they lend themselves to quantitative analysis. This is, however, not a particularly novel idea, for social scientists are often guided by moral considerations in selecting subjects for investigation. Those committed to the principle of equality, for example, have investigated discrimination on the basis of race, caste and sex. The trouble, however, is that there are major differences in defining concepts like equality, liberty and rights. This is why those interested in a rigorous analysis of social and political life would be hesitant to place moral concepts at the heart of their inquiry. In the mid-twentieth century, thus, social scientists were not favourably inclined towards this proposal. The advocates of relevance did not deny that their proposal might result in diluting analytical rigour of research in social science, but felt that it was better to be vague about matters that were important from a moral point of view than to be precise about matters that were not. This view had a strong appeal for all those dissatisfied with the kind of research in which social scientists were then interested. Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 147 There is a great deal of truth in the view that we cannot pursue precision for the sake of it. We should be interested in carefully measuring social phenomena only when it is the demand of the inquiry that we are making. This is why how precise we should be can be decided meaningfully only in the context of our inquiry. To say that we should not have a fetish for precision does not mean, however, that vagueness is a virtue to be inculcated by social scientists. We should remember that vague statements do not lend themselves to critical scrutiny. It is arguable, thus, that champions of relevance have not addressed the genuine concerns of those interested in analysing social life.5 The proposal to rely on our values for selecting subjects for investigation has further difficulties. Since every moral theory defines the needs of the people differently, it is not clear how we could rationally decide about the subjects to be investigated. Few would think that working in fascist, fundamentalist or racialist frameworks would make research socially relevant. It seems that in general those who advocate the desirability of working in moral frameworks have more humane values in mind. This makes the proposal attractive to many, but it also leads them to overlook its weakness. They do not even examine the possibility that working in a framework of humane values may not help. We should remember that notwithstanding their desire to ban values from scientific inquiry in mid-twentieth century, social scientists were actually working in the framework of liberal democratic values, which did not quite help them in addressing issues which affected people at large (Bakshi, 1987: 5561). It is possible to argue, however, that the situation would be different were we to become conscious of the need to work in a framework of humane values. That we may espouse values which help us in becoming socially relevant, cannot be denied. But there is no certainty that those who consciously espouse humane values would care for the interests of those at the receiving end. This can be illustrated by referring to the writings of Feyerabend who has endeared himself to many a social scientist by denying that science provides the model for other intellectual pursuits. He is critical of science on the ground that it regards truth as the highest norm to regulate scientific inquiries. His argument is that we can realize freedom, and hence happiness, by giving up the pursuit of truth. Thus, he agrees with the view that we can pursue our moral concerns only by diluting our commitment to cannons of scientific reasoning (Feyerabend, 1981: 197230 and 1983: 15667).
5 In recent years, however, the feeling has grown that the text should be open, that we should be sufficiently vague about what we want to say. The argument is that this permits the reader, instead of merely being a passive recipient of wisdom or truth that the authors wish to convey, to interpret them in his own way. This might seem an unusual way to make the reader active. But we should remember that the aim of the protagonists of this view is not to provide analysis of social reality but to develop interpretations for the pleasure of the experience. It is not hard to understand the growth of such a view in societies which have succeeded in largely addressing their social problems. But the question is whether it could be adopted by scholars in societies facing major social and economic problems, since they would be Downloaded interested in an analysis of social reality. from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

148 / OM BAKSHI The view that renunciation of the standard of truth would serve the cause of freedom might come as a surprise to many who would imagine that the growth of science liberated mans thinking from the hold of prejudice, superstition and mysticism. In this way, it served the cause of freedom of thought and investigation. According to Feyerabend, however, whatever its role in the past, science inhibits freedom of thought today. For the prestige science has acquired in the last few centuries has led many to expect other disciplines to shape themselves in its image. This has resulted in a tendency to regard disciplines which do not as inferior, if not fake. The dilution of the image of science would, thus, permit us to pursue disciplines which do not conform to the image of science today. While many would doubt the desirability of returning to ancient and rigid forms of thought and pursuing subjects like astrology and witchcraft, Feyerabend feels that freedom is possible only when different forms of thought flourish. This alone permits us to pursue what interests us, develop our potentialities and thus become happy. This is why he would like science to give up severe standards of truth and rely on judgments of taste. We might fear that renunciation of the standard of truth would undermine science, but Feyerabend is not unduly worried. He thinks that a world in which science has no role will be a better place. This would surely leave many perplexed. For, contrary to what Feyerabend thinks, science is not just for contemplation, for providing pleasure to those leading comfortable lives. It plays a major role in our fight against poverty, hunger and disease. This is why it is difficult to agree with Feyerabend that a world in which science plays no role whatever...would be more pleasant than the world we live in today. The commitment of writers like Feyerabend to humane values, thus, leads them to disregard the needs of the vast humanity. And, although they relentlessly attack cannons of scientific reasoning, they also find it convenient to doubt whether we have an explanation for all the misery and an excellent way out of it. Now their skepticism may be justified. Perhaps we have not been able to analyse the problems facing a large part of humanity adequately. The question is, however, whether we will be able to do so. If we repudiate truth and rehabilitate prejudice, superstition and mysticism; abandon rationality in favour of irrationality; and exalt subjectivity over objectivity; we undermine the very possibility of analysing social reality adequately. In the absence of such an analysis, we would not know how to go about solving the problems facing millions of people. This is why truth must remain the most important norm to regulate our inquiries. The needs of the people in large parts of the world, far from necessitating dilution of standards of social inquiry, require us to adhere to them. The Traditional Approach Instead of relying on our values, perspectives derived from social background or some other academic consideration for selecting subjects for investigation, thus, the task is to concentrate on problems facing society. The importance of writing Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 149 in response to problems is, as noted earlier, greatly emphasized by Popper. His inquiries into the history of ideas show that scientific theories are developed in the process of solving theoretical problems, which arise when existing theories are subjected to critical scrutiny. This view of scientific inquiry is, of course, not acceptable to historians like Kuhn, who feel that far from being interested in theoretical work, in testing their theories or developing new theories, scientists premise current theory as the rules of [their] game, concentrating on the puzzles it offers (Kuhna, 1981: 123). In this context, it may be noted that some of even those who agree with Popper that theoretical inquiry lies at the heart of science, however, question his claim that scientists theorize in response to the problems of existing theories. For, according to Feyerabend, for example, the history of science shows that theories can start even from some irrelevant activity (Feyerabend, 1979: 17180). This is why he does not think that asking scientists to write in response to theoretical problems would prove profitable. Although the anarchist thinking of Feyerabend has proved attractive to many, including those interested in the study of social and political life, it is not certain how helpful it would prove in developing scientific knowledge. It is not possible for us to go into this question, but there is no doubt that this view will not prove helpful to those studying social and political life, especially in countries like India. The plea to theorize in response to irrelevant activities may seem fascinating to those living in societies which are not facing major social problems, but those living in societies facing such problems as poverty, unemployment and exploitation on a massive scale cannot take an anarchist position, assume anything goes, and turn against method. They must write in response to major social problems. It will be a mistake to think, however, that when Popper advances a plea to write in response to social problems, he has in mind the approach adopted by traditional political thinkers. In fact, he attacks political theorists like Plato for advocating large-scale changes in social life and favours altering one institution at a time. In his view, we should make our way step by step, carefully comparing the results expected with the results achieved, and always on the look-out for unavoidable consequences of our attempts to alter institutions. This is how we learn about social and political life. According to Popper, thus, small-scale changes, combined with critical analysis, is the main way to practical results in social sciences (Popper, 1963a: 58). There is, no doubt, a great deal of truth in this argument. Every society is faced with several problems which it tries to tackle by adjusting institutions within the framework of other institutions. Social scientists, too, analyse these problems and formulate proposals for solving them, which they submit to critical scrutiny. They also study the results of altering institutions and compare them with the results expected. In these ways, they learn a great deal about social life. In the history of mankind, however, societies have also faced problems which required restructuring social and political life on a large scale. We may refer, for example, to the change from the closed, tribal society to the open society which took place in ancient times in the Greek citiesa change which Popper Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

150 / OM BAKSHI greatly admires (Popper, vol. 1, 1963b). He also shows that Plato developed his social and political ideas in response to the problems that these cities then faced. Although Popper is known more for his attack on Platos plea for large-scale changes in social life, he has great admiration for Plato as a sociologist. One of the most interesting features of his interpretation, which has often gone unnoticed, is that Plato approached social phenomena in the spirit of scientific investigation. Popper refers not only to the wealth and detail of his observation but also to the amazing acuteness of his sociological intuition. Plato saw things which had not been seen before him, and which were rediscovered only in our time. In this context, Popper mentions his emphasis upon the economic background of the political life and the historical development, which was later revived by Marx. Indeed, in his opinion, Plato was able to identify factors which proved extremely useful in analysing the existing situation. In particular, he analysed society in terms of classes and showed that class-war was the main force of social dynamics. Although the setting for Platos empirical inquiry was provided by his speculative theory of forms, Popper does not think it prevented him from constructing an astonishingly realistic theory of society, capable of explaining the main trends in the historical development of the Greek states as well as the social and political forces in his own day. This interpretation of Platos thought challenges the conventional interpretation which regards Plato as an idealist with little interest in empirical reality. While Poppers critique of Platos rejection of moral ideas like equality has attracted a great deal of attention, we must complement him for drawing attention to the empirical aspect of Platos thought, which historians have tended to ignore. It is important to note, however, that his interpretation does not lend support to his own concept of sociological inquiry. In particular, it does not show that we learn about social and political life only when we try to adjust institutions within a framework of existing institutions. Rather it shows that we learn when we grapple with the major problems facing society. The same conclusion can be drawn from Poppers account of social and political thought of Marx (Popper, vol. 2, 1963b). While it is widely believed that he criticizes Marx for advocating large-scale reconstruction of social life, we should not ignore that he also highlights Marxs keen sociological insight into the existing reality, praising his analysis of the existing capitalist economy, for example, his analysis of the tendency towards the accumulation and concentration of wealth, his theories of increasing productivity, of the trade cycle, of surplus population and so on. Popper also refers to his theory of the state which furnishes an enlightening interpretation of the conditions of his time. Indeed in his view, Marx opened and sharpened our eyes in many ways. His use of class analysis to study the working of the institutions of the industrial system, for example, was admirable. His plea to consider things in their relation to economic background, too, was a most valuable suggestion, indeed it was an extremely valuable advance in the methods of social science. Popper goes much further than this and highlights Marxs contribution to the methodology of Downloaded social science. He points out that by questioning the view that from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 151 sociology must in principle be reducible to social psychology, Marx opened the way to the more penetrating conception of specific realm of sociological laws, and of a sociology which was at least partly autonomous. In Poppers view, to have questioned psychologism is perhaps the greatest achievement of Marx as a sociologist. Also, as we will see later, Popper lays great stress on the need to study the unintended consequences of our actions. In this context, it is worth noting that he acknowledges his indebtedness to Marx who was one of the first to analyse the unintended consequences of the voluntary actions of people acting in certain situations (Popper, 1972: 125). It is therefore not surprising that Popper regards a return to pre-Marxian social science as inconceivable. The question, however, is, whether such a view of Marxs sociological and economic analyses of contemporary society can be reconciled with the position that he was a major exponent of the historicist method, which Popper regards as very poor. That his assessment of Marxs empirical analysis would lead many to wonder whether his criticism of the historicist method was justified, has not escaped the attention of Popper. But he does not find any confusion in his thinking, because, according to him, Marx did not use the historicist method when he analysed existing society. This might come as a surprise to the followers of Marx as well as to historians of ideas. But it shows Poppers deep insight into Marxs thought when he points out that Marx made an honest attempt to apply rational methods to the most urgent problems of social life. In other words, instead of relying on laws of historical development, historical tendencies, or stages of development, Marx carefully analysed existing social conditions. In particular, he relied on the logic of class situation to explain the working of institutions of the capitalist system. This is what Popper calls the method of institutional analysis. It is clear, however, that he is not saying that Marx learned from small-scale changes, altering one institution at a time, comparing the results expected with the results achieved, which, as noted earlier, is the approach he recommends for social sciences. This interpretation of Marxs approach to social and political life enables us to see Marx in a different light. It is not hard to see, however, that it will invite considerable opposition, since it goes against the traditional interpretation which places his view of history at the centre of his thought. The fact is that it also goes against Marxs own belief that the historical method, as developed by him, helps in unraveling the mysteries of social life. Historians of ideas would attach much importance to what Marx himself believed. This is not to deny that there would be many who would not regard this interpretation as unwelcome. For in recent years, there has been a tendency to encourage the reader to develop his own interpretation of the text. But we need to distinguish our reason for accepting this interpretation of Marx from their reason to develop interpretations. The exponents of new tendencies in contemporary thought exhort the reader to develop his own interpretation for the pleasure of the experience, while we are interested in learning how to make sociological inquiries meaningfully. The method of inquiry that Marx adopted will be of great interest to http://isq.sagepub.com all those who hisBUNGA analysis of19, social reality highly. Downloaded from byrate RAVI BABU on October 2009

152 / OM BAKSHI This is why it is surprising that Popper continues to regard Marx as an exponent of the historicist method, although his own analysis shows that Marx relied on rational methods for analysing social reality, which would be considered crucial by scholars interested in the methodology of social science. Those who think that the real strength of Marxs social thought lies in his analysis of the existing society will not have much interest in his historicist method. This does not mean, however, that we write off Marxs interpretation of history. For we might find it helpful when approaching past societies, although, as Marx himself pointed out, we need to be cautious in applying it. We should remember that when Marx generalized from his theory of class, which he had derived from the capitalist society of his time, and claimed that history of all hitherto existing societies was the history of class struggle, he was careful to point out that the two-class model was applicable more to the society in his own time than to past societies, which were often characterized by a manifold gradation of social rank. The Revolt Against Theory It is arguable, thus, that in a world characterized by poverty, hunger and disease, the need to theorize about social and political life cannot be denied. But what we find is the development of a strong sentiment against theory in recent decades. The exponents of post-modern thinking refer to theories as meta-narratives, grandnarratives, grand theories and so on, rejecting them for being logocentric, linear and totalizing. We might think that the notion of theory defended in this article is much more modest than the kind of theories which seem to be the target of this attack. But those who mount this attack do not care much about such niceties. They want to end the intellectual hegemony that, they believe, is implicit in the very notion of theory. They question the truth claims of theory and deny its privileged status. With them theory has become community specific, true only, if at all, in terms of its own discourse. Whereas social science must decide which of the competing theories is true, post-modernist thinking doubts the possibility of deciding between opposing points of view. Nor does it think it worthwhile to choose between or reconcile opposites. It welcomes the situation where a variety of theories exist, and none can claim superiority over any other. The resentment against theory is, of course, not new. As we have seen, in the mid-twentieth century it was widely believed that facts, not theories, give knowledge. This had led social scientists to focus on small segments of social life. The truth is that even those who do not take a specifically anti-theoretical stand, favour small-scale investigations. One reason for this tendency is that, unlike traditional thinkers who moved freely between different aspects of social life, social scientists have divided the study of social life into economic, social, political and other aspects. The result is that they have become essentially students of subjects like economics, political science and sociology, and so tend to choose topics which fall in the domain of their own subjects. Indeed the tendency to chop-up social reality has not stopped here. In their enthusiasm to make a more rigorous analysis Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 153 of social and political life, social scientists concentrate on ever smaller segments of it. This they think helps to observe facts more clearly. But there has been a feeling that piecemeal observations give us nothing but fragments torn out of their context. The accuracy obtained by a meticulous attention to detail is, thus, outweighed by the loss of perspective. In other words, those who concentrate on minute segments of social reality fail to see the wood for the trees. Indeed sociologists like Mannheim do not think we could even understand fragments adequately without relating them to other aspects of social life. There will be many who will be sympathetic to this view. But Mannheim goes much further than this and claims that we can understand petty details adequately only by relating them to the total structure of society. The task, according to Mannheim, is to piece together fragmentary observations provided by small-scale investigations so as to develop knowledge of the structure of society as a whole (Mannheim,1954: 2636, 184). The need to study society as a whole has been emphasized by the followers of Marx, too. They are also critical of research in social science which focuses on limited aspects of social life, since this prevents one from grasping the true nature of society or the direction in which it is evolving. Those who accept this view of social inquiry, we are told, treat society as it exists as given, as natural. According to writers like Lukacs, only by studying society as a whole can we understand that it is a capitalist society and that it is moving towards socialist transformation. Hence Lukacss advice to adopt the method developed by Marx, at the heart of which, he believes, lies the concept of totality. It is this method, rather than Marxs theories, which is for Lukacs the distinguishing feature of what he calls orthodox Marxism. Instead of relying on the findings of social sciences like Mannheim, Lukacs turns to the perspective of the working class for developing the view of society as a whole (Lukacs, 1993: 126). It is views such as these which give credence to the thinking of post-modern writers, whose major target when they attack grand theories, is Marxs social theories. This is not to deny that there is a great deal of truth in the view which questions the usefulness of focusing on small segments of social life. For we often have to relate these to large-scale phenomena to make sense of them. When some commodities become scarce in the market, we refer not just to a railway employees strike, for example, or to truck owners agitation, but also to such large-scale phenomena as the operation of market forces. This does not mean, however, that we have to study all aspects of social life, that we have to study society as a whole. For we need to study only those aspects which help us in adequately analysing the phenomena in which we are interested. In any case, we cannot study society, indeed anything, as a whole. For, as Popper argues, our study of any phenomenon, natural or social, is inevitably selective. But this does not mean that there are no wholes or that a thing is a mere sum of its parts. Nor does it mean that a society is no more than a sum of individuals composing it, on whom we must focus. Even those who accept the validity of this argument might still wonder whether it has any lessons for social scientists. For Poppers argument is that even if we Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

154 / OM BAKSHI want to study society as a whole, we can study only some aspects of itaspects which we find useful for making sense of the phenomena in which we are interested. We should not ignore the feeling widely shared by scholars, however, that our account should be comprehensive, that we should take into account all aspects of social life. We often find critics indicting scholarly inquiries for ignoring aspects close to their own hearts. It is well known that, while writers like Lukacs believe that Marx studies society as a whole, Marx has often been criticized for concentrating on the economic aspect and ignoring other aspects, a criticism which even Engles, who collaborated with Marx in his scholarly pursuits, seemed to concede. The truth is that social reality can be analysed in a variety of ways. The relevant question is whether a given analysis helps in adequately explaining the phenomena under investigation. We can, no doubt, criticize it for ignoring certain aspects of social reality. But we must show that ignoring them renders the analysis inadequate. It is possible to argue, however, that what those who want to study society as a whole have in mind is the need to study large-scale social phenomena and not literally every aspect of it. There is some substance in this objection, since this view has generally been advocated by those dissatisfied with the tendency to concentrate on small segments of social life. An exponent of this view like Lukacs argues, thus, that we can make sense of a variety of social phenomena only when we relate them to the way economic goods are produced. This is certainly not a plea to take every aspect of society into account but to rely on certain large-scale economic phenomena. It is clear that Lukacs has in mind the economic theories of Marx. Those who feel that the task is to theorize about social and political life should have no objection against such a view. The only question is whether this is what Lukacs has in mind, because he is critical of the very concept of social science which aims at analysing social reality. He believes those who concentrate on analysing social reality tend to acquiesce in it. Lukacs is not alone in visualizing the work of traditional social and political thinkers in a grandiose manner. There has been a strong tendency among historians of ideas to interpret them in a similar vein. Writers like Berlin, for example, believe that at the heart of political theory, as traditionally conceived, lie values like equality, freedom and justice. The values a thinker espouses are, however, closely connected with his view of man, which, in turn, depends on the metaphysical model he accepts (Berlin, 1962: 133). This view of political theory is very grandiose and can be described as meta-narrative or grand theory. Although it is true that through the ages social and political theorists were deeply concerned about moral issues, the question is how they went about studying it. No doubt, thinkers like Plato, Aristotle and Hegel were deeply concerned about metaphysical questions. They often took interest in the study of human nature, too. But, still, it is not certain whether the views of writers like Berlin provide an adequate understanding of what traditional thinkers were doing. For instance, the analysis of social conditions in Greek cities made by Aristotle in Politics, which has won the admiration of historians of ideas, had little to do with his concept of man developed Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 155 in Nichomachean Ethics or with his metaphysical theories like that of final cause developed in his Metaphysics. Rather the basis of his concept of proportional justice is provided by his analysis of existing conditions in Books IV, V and VI of Politics.6 To take another example, Marx was not much interested in philosophical questions.7 Nor had his analysis of the capitalist society of his times much to do with his view of man as developed in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.8 The principles of socialism he propounded were, in fact, closely connected with his analysis of existing capitalist society. We can understand social and political theories of writers like Aristotle and Marx more adequately if we consider them as attempts to find solutions to the problems of their societies. This view of political theory is much more modest in comparison to the grandiose view accepted by Lukacs, Berlin and others. It does not even have the kind of universality which many writers believe is its major characteristic. We should realize that a theory concerned with problems facing societies like India would apply to one kind of society, admittedly large in number. Those who think that political theories must be applicable to every society, past or present, might be disappointed. But the value of a theory which has relevance to the lives of a major part of humanity cannot be exaggerated. It is not hard to imagine, however, that in societies which succeed in addressing their major problems, scholarly interest might shift to local knowledge, to personal
6 The author agrees with Professor Narinder Kapurs observation that in the authors earlier work, Aristotles Political Theory, Aristotles moral ideas are treated more as a response to the social and political conditions which obtained in ancient Greek cities, a position that reflected the dominant philosophical position (Kapur, 2001). But the close relationship between Aristotles moral thinking and his empirical analysis has been stressed in several of his subsequent writings (see, for example, Bakshi, 1986: 1618). It may be argued, no doubt, that Aristotle accepted virtue, which was closely connected with his concept of man, along with free-birth and wealth, that provided the basis for participating in the political life of the cities, as a legitimate basis for claim to power. But we should remember that he did not think there was much possibility of realizing the view of justice which recognized virtue as the sole claim, even as one of the claims. This is why he did not have much interest in aristocratic forms of government. The author is thankful to Prof. Kapur for his comments on the concept of moral reasoning developed in Bakshi, 2000 (pp. 97113). 7 Many would object, however, that historicism provided the framework for Marxs thinking, but, as discussed earlier, it is arguable that this objection is misconceived. 8 It is possible to argue, no doubt, that Marxs concept of socialism is closely connected with his concept of man developed especially in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Those who take this view can claim that when Marx talked of socialism he was visualizing a society in which man would be able to realize his species powers. The trouble is, however, that this interpretation leaves out Marxs entire analysis of the existing capitalist society. And this analysis was the product of his efforts to explain why the working class was subjected to brutal exploitation. It showed that the condition of the workers was not the result of some chance factors but of the way social and economic life was organized in the capitalist society. Nor did he think that there was much chance of these problems being solved within the existing system. This analysis provided the basis for developing principles of socialism. He felt that the condition of a major part of society could be ameliorated only by reorganizing social and economic life on the basis of these principles. The point is, thus, that Marx was not trying to maximize happiness but to minimize suffering. Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

156 / OM BAKSHI testimony, to direct experience of individuals and communities. In these societies, scholars could begin to doubt the usefulness of analysing social and political reality and to discover virtues in community-based narratives, in traditional narratives and so on. Although resentment against theorizing about social and political life has been brewing for long, it is only in recent times that conditions have been created in the West in which it could flourish. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that these conditions do not obtain in countries like India, which continue to face major social and economic problems. This is why those who advance a plea to give up theorizing about social and political life in these countries need to re-examine their position. Rethinking Nature of Science Many would sympathize with the argument developed so far that the kind of problems which are widely believed to arise in the study of social and political life, making social sciences different from natural sciences, are not insurmountable. But even some of them might wonder how far such an argument could go, given the doubts that have been raised about theories in natural sciences in the last few decades. While for long scientific theories were regarded as true, making the contrast with social sciences (which many thought could not develop a reliable knowledge of social reality) sharp, it has been realized that even well-corroborated scientific theories might reveal errors over time. This realization dawned on philosophers and historians of science when Newtons theory, the very paradigm of scientific knowledge for long, began to encounter difficulties in accounting for the phenomena to which it purported to apply. Many have begun to wonder, thus, whether the concept of truth could be used even in the context of scientific theories. Although some thinkers have tried to salvage the situation by replacing the concept of truth with that of probable truth, it is not certain whether this comes to grips with the issues raised by the fate of some of the even well-corroborated theories. For, as Popper argues, a theory stands falsified once we discover evidence against it. This is why there must be a more radical solution to the questions which have arisen in the philosophy of science. In Poppers view, thus, the history of a theory like that of Newton shows that we can never be certain that our theories are true, since we cannot close the possibility of discovering evidence against them. This might leave many particularly those interested in developing social science on the model of natural science disheartened, but not Popper, who believes that the task is rather to search for evidence which undermines our theories. In opposition to the views of writers belonging to the Vienna Circle who emphasize the need to verify theories, he highlights the role of critical scrutiny of theories in the growth of scientific knowledge. His argument is that refutation of our theories spurs us to develop new and better theories, which are nearer truth than those that they have replaced. This is why Popper does not think we can dispense with the concept of truth. Even if we can never be certain that what we know is true, truth must remain a norm, indeed the most important norm, to regulate our inquiries. Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 157 This is an ingenious solution to the problems which have arisen in the philosophy of science. But Poppers view of scientific inquiry is not acceptable to all. The most serious challenge to it comes from Kuhn, whose views, widely discussed by historians and philosophers of science, have proved particularly attractive to those inclined to a relativistic position in social sciences. The thrust of his argument is that the scientist, far from being interested in critically examining the current theory, as postulated by Poppers view of scientific inquiry, premises it as the rules of his game. He is mainly interested in exploring it: in fleshing out, articulating and extending it. This is what Kuhn calls normal science. He does not deny that the current theory could be subjected to critical scrutiny. But he insists that this takes place when it is in crisis, which is brought about by its inability to cope with persistent anomalies. The feeling is widespread that Kuhn has drawn attention to certain aspects of scientific research which had been ignored for long. The question is, however, whether we should derive our view of science from normal science, the work routinely done by scientists, or from theoretical revolutions, science at its best. Kuhn believes we should derive it from the former, since it accounts for the overwhelming majority of work done in the basic sciences. He agrees with his critics that theoretical revolutions are the central episodes in scientific advance those which make the game worth playing and the play worth studying (Kuhn, 1981b: 241). But, still, he does not think we are justified in deriving our view of science from its occasional revolutionary parts. Writers like Popper and Lakatos, on the other hand, focus on theoretical revolutions, since progress in science depends on them.9 They regard normal science as boring, uninteresting and pedestrian, indeed a danger to science10 (Feyerabend, 1981; Lakatos, 1981; Popper, 1981). They even question Kuhns claim that normally there is one dominant theory in each scientific discipline. The truth, according to them, is that very often scientific disciplines are characterized by competing theories. This results in a critical scrutiny of theories on a more or less regular basis rather than occasionally, when the ruling theory is in crisis, as Kuhn thinks. In any case, as noted earlier, Kuhn admits that critical scrutiny of theories takes place when the hold of the ruling theory is weakened, following its failure to cope with persistent anomalies. But he does not agree with the orthodox Popperian position which focuses on the role of rational considerations in making a choice between competing theories. According to him, a study of science as it has actually been practised shows that irrational considerations play a major role in the process. Kuhns view has generated a big controversy, with his critics claiming that he relies on the bandwagon effect to explain the transition from one theory to another. This is not to say that they deny the role of irrational considerations in science. But while they emphasize the need to reduce it, to make science more rational, those who think that science is what scientists do, wonder whether we can legislate
9 10

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158 / OM BAKSHI for scientists. This is widely believed to be the position of Kuhn, although he denies that he relies on mob psychology to explain the transition from one theory to another. He is at pains to argue that there are good reasons for choosing one theory rather than another. Although it might be unfair to dismiss his protests altogether, there is little doubt that he does not regard truth-content of theories as the main reason for making a choice between competing theories, the reason which lies at the heart of Poppers thinking. Since the whole emphasis of Kuhn is on the psychology or sociology of research, rather than on the logic of discovery, on which Popper focuses, we might think that the difficulties in comparing theories that he has in mind have to do with the mental make-up of scientists or the nature of scientific communities. But the reason why Kuhn denies the possibility of meaningfully comparing scientific theories is that they are incommensurable. This is an argument with which social scientists would be familiar. For the feeling has been widespread that rational communication is possible only between those who agree on basic assumptions. This view is, of course, not without substance. We often find it difficult to understand the arguments of those who accept different frameworks. Even when the same terms are used, they often carry different meanings. For long, social and political thinkers regarded this as the bane of social science. What Kuhn is arguing is that even in natural sciences there are severe communication difficulties between those who accept different theories. This is one of the major controversies in the history and philosophy of science. Thinkers like Popper do not deny that there are difficulties in comparing theories, but insist that it is just a dogma that they are like mutually untranslatable languages. They think we can always compare the truth-content of theories. The truth-content of Einsteins theory, for example, is greater than that of Newtons. On the other hand, Kuhn doubts whether we can ever say that the truth-content of the new theory is greater than that of the theory it superseded. This would come as a surprise to people in everyday life who think that there has been a phenomenal growth of scientific knowledge in the last few centuries. This is also the thinking of writers like Popper who believe that since we can compare the truth-content of theories, it is possible in science and only in science to say that we have made genuine progress: that we know more than we did before. This is the reason why Popper believes that theoretical revolutions lie at the heart of science. It is clear that there are major disagreements among historians and philosophers of science. Although Kuhn has drawn attention to certain aspects of science which had been ignored for long, serious doubts can be raised about his view of science, in particular about the claim that we cannot rationally choose between competing theories. The exponents of the relativistic view in social science need to be cautious in invoking his name. This discussion is likely to leave many a social scientist exasperated. Let us try to clarify the issues which have been raised by it. It is widely argued that we make empirical inquiries with the help of our values, concepts, theories and so on. Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 159 By drawing attention to certain aspects of social reality, they help us in making sense of what goes on around us. But the trouble is that they also keep us from observing a variety of other aspects. This is the reason why those belonging to higher castes often fail to notice the disabilities suffered by the masses occupying the lower rungs in the caste hierarchy, particularly the dalits. While this lends credence to the view which places perspectives derived from social background at the heart of the study of social life, we should remember that we often modify or alter our beliefs or acquire new ones. It is therefore not surprising that in the twentieth century those belonging to the higher castes generally became aware of the sufferings of the dalits. Indeed a major contribution to the upliftment of dalits was made by the leaders of the freedom movement like Gandhiji, who belonged to the upper castes. This is why we should be skeptical of the claim that we are captives of the beliefs that we derive from the social background. Even those who concede this might still wonder, however, whether we rationally examine our beliefs, changing them if we find them inadequate. There is no doubt an element of truth in this objection, for there could be a variety of social and political factors which lead us to change our beliefs. Many would explain the change in the attitude towards dalits by referring to the need to forge a strong national movement by including all sections of the Indian society or the electoral compulsions of political parties today. This does not mean, however, that we do not rationally discuss our beliefs but that, while physicists may critically examine their theories when they come across facts which raise doubts about their theories, we are often forced by conditions of social life to critically examine our ideas, to alter them, even to abandon them. This has generally not received attention of those who believe that the task of social scientists is far more difficult than that of natural scientists. At any rate, we often critically examine our beliefs when we are confronted with different beliefs. Following the advent of British rule, when people in India became conversant with more egalitarian ideas, for example, they began to critically discuss principles, in particular those of caste, which had regulated their social life for ages and to make attempts to alter them. In fact, a number of movements to bring about changes in social life were launched. The truth is that clashes between cultures have often proved very fruitful. Historians of ideas have shown that discussions about social and political issues started in ancient times when, following development of international trade, the Greeks came in touch with a variety of beliefs obtaining in different regions. For this loosened the hold of beliefs that they had imbibed from their social backgrounds, creating conditions in which critical discussion on social and political issues could take place. Similarly, when our accounts and theories clash with other accounts and theories, we are forced to take into account facts we may be ignoring. This is perhaps the reason why Mannheim feels that free-floating intellectuals could be more objective. He does not really think that they get rid of their prejudices when their social ties are weakened, but that they areBABU forced toOctober grapple Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BUNGA on 19, 2009 with competing

160 / OM BAKSHI accounts of reality provided by those joining this stratum from different sections of society, and so to take into account facts which might be eluding them (Mannheim, 1936: 137, 1957: 143f). It is difficult to agree with the exponents of the relativist view, thus, that we tend to disregard facts on which those who do not share our perspective may rely. They seem to think that the grip of our ideas on us is so tight that, no matter how strongly facts contradict our accounts or theories, we are unable to take notice of them, and if we cannot ignore them, we try to fit them into our accounts or theories and, what is more, succeed in this. This is a large assumption which needs to be substantiated. All those who take this position show that social scientists often ignore evidence against their accounts or theories. Although such evidence lends support to this position, it does not provide a secure basis for claiming that they cannot take it into account. For there is enough evidence to show that social scientists do take into account evidence against their theories. Take, for example, the sociological theories of Marx which provide one of the most powerful frameworks in the history of ideas. Although innumerable scholars have accepted his framework, they have also critically examined his theories, modified them, even abandoned them and developed new theories. The criticism of Marxist theories by scholars writing in a liberal democratic framework has played a major role in their rethinking. We should also not discount the possibility that our frameworks, instead of rendering us blind to evidence which might undermine them, may actually help us to discover it. For as Popper argues, our investigations may belie the expectations with which we begin, revealing social reality to be very different from what, thanks to our framework, we believed it to be. The Role of Ideas The argument developed in the last few pages would not be entirely acceptable to all those who feel that the hold of frameworks is particularly strong in the study of social and political life. They might argue that they are not thinking only, even mainly, of the psychological or sociological factors, which as Kuhn has shown influence natural scientists also, but of the role that ideas play in social life. Their argument would be that social and political thinking is not politically neutral. It may promote the interests of some and harm those of others. Hence the tendency on our part to view social and political ideas in the light of our interests, approving those which serve them and disapproving those which harm them. Many would find this view corroborated by their everyday experience. Surprising though it may seem, however, this view is not entirely correct. For in everyday life our interests often come in conflict with our metaphysical beliefs, religious tenets or moral convictions. It would be too much to say that we sacrifice them whenever it suits our interests. This has not escaped the attention of the exponents of this view, who do not deny the importance of moral considerations in social and political life. But they insist that the ideas widely accepted in a society, although Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 161 often presented as eternal verities, serve the interests of the ruling classes, with the result that the interests of those at the receiving end suffer. This argument is likely to leave many dissatisfied, since all it shows is that the ideas widely accepted in society serve the interests of the ruling class rather than of all those who accept them, in particular of those belonging to the disadvantaged sections of society. We might think that this undermines the view that we accept ideas which serve our interests, but not the exponents of this view. For it is one of the main themes in their writings that the hold of these ideas on our thinking is so strong that it does not even occur to us to ask whose interests they serve and that once we realize they serve the interests of the ruling classes, we would reject them and choose those which serve our interests. The task is, thus, to break their hold on our thinking. This position is commonly associated with the name of Gramsci, who argues that, thanks to the hegemony of the ruling class ideas over society, those belonging to other classes, including workers, imbibe them. In this way, the ideas of the ruling classes play a major role in strengthening their hold on power. Gramsci is a Marxist who is interested in reorganizing social life on the basis of socialist principles. This is why he believes that the task is to combat the ideas widely accepted in society. He exhorts intellectuals associated with communist parties to show the class character of these ideas. This, he thinks, would weaken the hold of ruling class ideas on the minds of workers, preparing them for a struggle for power (Gramsci, 1978). The need to consider the role that ideas play in social life to be the very essence of ideas has generally been emphasized by those who espouse the cause of the people at the receiving end in society. This concern for people at large gives their argument its appeal. We should remember that in a world characterized by poverty, exploitation, hunger and disease, it is hard to deny the moral worth of ideas which serve the interests of the masses. This is why we need to question the validity of the view that moral considerations have no place in social life and that all that matters is what serves our interests. It is not difficult to imagine that many a social scientist would be sympathetic to the view that we need to become conscious of the role that ideas play in social life, whether they serve the interests of the beneficiaries of the system or those at the receiving end. But, still, he might point out that those at the receiving end are often not a homogenous lot. In any given society, we would find among them a variety of groups having their specific, sectional interests. In the context of society in India, for example, we find such groups as dalits, other backward castes, industrial workers, landless peasants and tribals, who would define their interests differently. The section which the followers of Marx have in mind is, of course, the working class. But they do not identify its interests with improvement in the economic condition of the workers but with reorganization of social life on the basis of socialist principles. There could be difference of opinion on such an interpretation of the interests of workers even among those interested in addressing their needs. It should be however, that analysis Downloaded fromnoted, http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU Marxs BUNGA on October 19, 2009 of the capitalist

162 / OM BAKSHI society convinced him that there was little possibility of improvement in the conditions of workers in the capitalist system. This is why he thought they needed to work for overthrowing it and establishing a socialist order. But this was to be a society in which not only the interests of the working class but also those of other disadvantaged sections of society would be served. Although Marx felt that the working class would spearhead the struggle for the new social order, he did not think it would be the only section of society to benefit from it. In the language of political theory, a society based on socialist principles was to be a just society. This is why it would be a mistake to think that he disregarded the moral aspect of social and political thinking. We should remember that the moral worth of ideas is a question separate from that of their role in social life. It is hard to see, for example, how one would convince people, including workers, that claims regarding the moral worth of democratic ideas are false. It is possible to argue, no doubt, that the institutions devised to give effect to these ideas tend to strengthen the hold of ruling classes on power by imparting legitimacy to it, but it is equally hard to deny that these institutions enable those at the receiving end to improve their lot. In this context, we should also remember that the working classes had played a major role in the development of democratic institutions. The role of these institutions in the empowerment of dalits, the weakest section of the Hindu society, cannot be exaggerated. We should also realize that combating ideas widely accepted in society is a difficult task. We can, no doubt, criticize them from a variety of points of view. But, since we want to break their hold on society, our thinking must be acceptable to a sizable section of society, particularly those at the receiving end. We should not ignore the possibility that the ideas which catch our fancy may not be acceptable to many. It is not unusual to find little attention being paid to schemes designed to bring heaven on earth. Those belonging to the disadvantaged sections of society often ignore ideas meant to help them in their struggle for power. This would become clear if we remember that in spite of the vast literature produced by Marxist intellectuals, the sway of liberal democratic ideas over societies in the West, far from diminishing, has increased over the years. In the mid-twentieth century, it was widely felt that the working classes had moved away from socialist thinking. There was even a feeling that they had acquired tastes and ways of behaviour more characteristic of the middle classes. The exponents of this view sought to explain these developments with the help of changing conditions of social life. In particular, they referred to the improvement in the economic condition of the workers. In this way, these sociologists showed that there was a close relationship between the economic conditions and the ideas accepted in their societies. It is true that claims regarding the solution of the problems of workers and the changes in their mentality did not go unchallenged. But few among those influenced by Marxist thinking denied improvement in the economic condition of workers.
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Whither Social Science? / 163 Hardly any claimed that the thinking of the workers in the West was particularly revolutionary. In this context, it is worth remembering that one of the major themes in the writings of Marx pertained to the close relationship between ideas accepted in society and social and economic conditions as they existed. In particular, he argued that the continuing, if not increasing, economic misery of the working classes would constitute one of the main causes of the ascendancy of socialist ideology. Those who claimed changes in the mentality of workers argued that this condition no longer obtained in Western societies. Although they were interested in showing that workers were not behaving in a manner visualized by Marx, they agreed with him on the relationship between ideas and social reality. It is arguable, thus, that if intellectuals want to intervene on the side of the masses, they need to give careful thought to the role they could play, although it might be more tempting to accept a view which puts them at the centre of the struggle for a more humane social order. This needs to be understood correctly. The point is not that they are not free to develop ideas, but that whether their ideas would become a social force has much to do with the conditions obtaining in society. The feeling that they can impose any idea they like on society is misconceived. This is why, instead of remaining content with dabbling in the realm of ideas, they need to carefully analyse social conditions. Indeed those who want to play a meaningful role in social life should remember that an analysis of social conditions alone could provide the basis for developing concepts and theories to help the masses in their struggle for power. This is why it is imperative especially for them to retain truth as a norm to regulate their sociological inquiries. The argument developed in the last few paragraphs may not be acceptable to those sympathetic to the thinking which has been on the ascendancy in recent times. While it shows truth to be on the side of those at the receiving end in society, writers like Foucault argue that it is in fact an ally of those in power. We might think that this would weaken the struggle of those at the receiving end, but not these writers, who could consider our thinking to be antiquated. In keeping with the intellectual temper of our times, they believe that the task is to undermine truth, since this would help in altering power relations. Hence their attack on social/human sciences which claim to provide a scientific knowledge of social reality. Their argument is that we can view social reality from a variety of points of view, giving us several views of social reality, none of which could claim to be more true than the others. The argument that power relations in society can be altered by undermining social/human sciences would come as a surprise to scholars who believe that those at the receiving end in society must aim at capturing the state apparatus. But this is not Foucaults aim. For him, there is no focal point of power, the sovereign state, ruling class or ruling elite. This was the situation, he believes, that existed long ago. But we live in an age in which a far more comprehensive system to control human behaviour has come into existence. Today power is exercised at
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164 / OM BAKSHI innumerable points, says Foucault. When he talks of the exercise of power, what he has in mind is the ways in which people are disciplined, normality is fostered. His whole effort is to show how in Western societies people are moulded into normal as opposed to abnormal, delinquent or deviant individuals. While many would think that these societies are committed to liberal values, to freedom, Foucault focuses on the spread of oppressive and conformist tendencies in them. These tendencies are so pervasive and powerful that Western societies are becoming more and more like prisons. In order to understand contemporary societies, thus, we need to study the sites where power is physically administered such as hospitals, asylums, schools, factories and so on, and physically endured or resisted by patients, criminals, the mentally ill, workers and others. This power is exercised by such professionals as psychiatrists, forensic scientists, doctors and others, who derive their power from human/social sciences like psychiatry, ethnography, criminology and sociology. Working in different places and in different ways, these professionals serve the interests of the system, as if guided by an invisible hand (Foucault, 1979, 1980). Since these professionals derive their power from social/human sciences, the task, according to Foucault, is to undermine these sciences. This he does by questioning the claim of these sciences to truth. While social sciences claim to provide true knowledge of social reality, Foucault argues that truth is more the result of rules which engender it, the rules accepted in a society at a given time. This is not a position which will come as a surprise to those conversant with contemporary thought. For the position that truth is relative to our conceptual frameworks has often been taken in our times. Indeed one of the main tenets of relativist thinking today is that every framework has its own standards to decide what is to count as true and what is not. Instead of showing the findings of sciences like criminology and psychiatry to be false, thus, Foucault attacks the very basis of these sciences. It is clear that a writer who puts forward an argument like this is not interested in reorganizing social and political life. We might be tempted to agree with writers like Habermas who criticize Foucault for being conservative or with those like Walzer who criticize him for being an anarchist, even a nihilist, because he does not provide an alternative conception of society (Walzer, 1986: 5168), but we should remember that the problems in which he is interested do not pertain to the way social and political life is organized. It is also not hard to imagine that in societies which have succeeded in largely addressing their major economic problems, scholarly interest may shift to such problems as how normality is fostered in society. However, it is arguable that while problems in which writers like Foucault are interested may not be regarded as trivial, they cannot be the main concern of social scientists in societies like India facing massive problems of poverty, unemployment and exploitation. Since these problems are not the product of the claims of professionals to scientific knowledge, the approach adopted by writers like Foucault is hardly suited to address them. In particular, social scientists in countries like India have to analyse social and political reality; therefore they Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 165 need to ask whether it is advisable to endorse the position of these Western writers on the relativity of truth, on their rejection of theorizing about social and political life. It is, of course, too much to expect that they will completely ignore the kind of issues raised by writers like Foucault; but they need to think of alternative ways of addressing them. Psychological Assumptions in Social Science The view that a careful analysis of social conditions helps us in making conjectures about regularities in human behaviour would appear open to the objection that it does not take into account mental traits of people whose behaviour is being studied. The objection will be endorsed by many in everyday life who often rely on psychological traits to make sense of the behaviour of people around them. The feeling is strong among social scientists also that we need to take into account such phenomena as the desire to maximize profit, impulse to conflict, longing for power and so on. The need to rely on psychological traits has been felt for long. Thinkers like Hobbes and Bentham tried to understand what happened in social life by analysing human nature. Even a thinker like Plato felt that social life was the reflection of human mind. There are, of course, differences among the exponents of the psychological approach. For example, while scholars like Watkins rely on dispositions (Watkins, 1982: 82104), others like Ayer rely on motives (Ayer, 1969: 624). It is, however, not possible to discuss such differences among scholars. What is important is that they agree on the need to rely on mental traits. In spite of the proclivity to readily turn to psychological explanations for human behaviour, the psychological approach is not free from problems. For while we may see no difficulty in analysing the mental traits of Lenin, Gandhi and others, few would claim that it is possible to acquire this kind of knowledge about all those involved in the socialist revolution in Russia or the national movement in India. We should also remember that a variety of psychological factors would operate in any social situation. We cannot possibly include all of them while analysing it. Nor can we calculate their relative influence. The exponents of the psychological approach admit these difficulties, but the enthusiasm for this approach remains undiminished. For the feeling is that we can ignore individual peculiarities and concentrate on such general characteristics as greed, fear and desire for power. Although this would permit us to have recourse to psychological phenomena, it creates new problems. In particular, we can no longer rely on our knowledge of the psychological traits of the agents acquired through personal experience or through scholarly investigations. This is why we often find it difficult to establish a clear relationship between psychological traits and social phenomena. This difficulty has not eluded exponents of the psychological approach, who admit the possibility of deriving a given social phenomenon from different psychological assumptions. There is no dearth of evidence in contemporary thought to illustrate this.19, At one stage, to give Downloaded from political http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 2009

166 / OM BAKSHI an example, Russell held that possessivenessthe passion to have and to hold is the ultimate source of war (Russell, 1963: 27), but later he argued that war sprang from an impulse rather than from a calculation of the advantage to be derived from war. The reason why war was a recurring feature of international politics was that a large proportion of mankind [had] an impulse to conflict (Russell, 1980: 55, 75). Many would feel, however, that these criticisms of the psychological approach are besides the point. For our views regarding motives, desires, impulses and so on, far from being empirical generalizations about human nature, are derived from our concepts of man. Those who hold this view believe that questions regarding the nature of man are essentially philosophical questions, the point being that when studying social reality, we are, in fact, engaged in interpreting it. War may appear to be the product of greed, if we accept one view of man, and of impulse to conflict, if we accept another. The same phenomenon can, thus, be interpreted in a variety of ways. Those who take this position would concede, even emphasize, that we go beyond what we observe when we analyse intentions. For the thoughts and feelings which are constitutive of intentions are often not manifest in actions. There is also the possibility that the agents may try to hide their intentions. Indeed often all we can say is that they would not have acted in the manner they have if they did not intend to. It can be argued, thus, that while wescholars as well as people in everyday lifemay think we are merely reporting what is happening around us, we might, in fact, be interpreting it. This is why we often find a variety of views about the same social phenomenon. This conclusion would dishearten those exponents of the psychological approach who visualize social science in the image of natural science. Be that as it may, the attempt to reduce the study of social and political life to motives, desires and impulses is open to question. For historians and social scientists are often able to transform what appear to be psychological elements into elements of the situation. We may be tempted to explain the relative prosperity of Huguenot traders in the seventeenth century France, for example, by referring to a widespread disposition among them...to plough back into their businesses a larger proportion of their profits than was customary among Catholic competitors (Watkins, 1958: 39095). But historians may find such an explanation to be unsatisfactory. They would advise us to analyse the economic conditions of seventeenth century France, the kind of business enterprises that flourished, which of them, if any, were especially noted for concentration in them of Huguenots, and so forth. In other words, a careful analysis of Huguenot economic activity would help us to explain their relative prosperity (Goldstein, 1958: 8). Hence the feeling that, instead of accepting motives and dispositions as a natural stopping place in our search for explanation of social phenomena, we should try to transform them into situational factors. The critics of the psychological approach, thus, argue that it is possible to explain human behaviour to a very large extent in terms of theon situation in which it occurs. Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 167 Hence the feeling that we can develop social science independently of all subjective or psychological ideas. The task, according to thinkers like Popper, is to analyse social situations sufficiently to explain actions with the help of situations. This view is based on the assumption that our actions are objectively appropriate to the situation. This is why Popper thinks we can transform the elements which initially appeared psychological into elements of the situation. The man who appeared to be motivated by certain wishes, thus, becomes a man who is actually pursuing certain objective aims. We explain the desire to maximize profit, for example, by referring to market institutions. The task, according to Popper, is to construct models of situations and to try to deduce from them the way individuals will behave, the assumption being that they behave rationally. Although this might appear to be a psychological assumption concerning the rationality (or otherwise) of human nature the truth, according to Popper, is that when he speaks of rational behaviour or irrational behaviour, he has in mind the behaviour which is, or which is not, in accordance with the logic of that situation (Popper, 1963b, vol. 2: 97).11 The plea to eliminate any reference to psychological phenomena is likely to be resisted strongly. Because we often find it helpful not only in ordinary life but also in scholarly inquiries to refer to the mental traits of the people whose actions we want to understand. The reason why these references appear meaningful is that they pertain to the role of individuals in specific events. This is why they could be ignored by those making generalizations about social and political life. The task of social science, as defended in this article, is to discover regularities in social life and not to concentrate on specific events, which may be of interest to those making historical inquiries. Indeed, it can even be argued that those investigating particular events would also find it more rewarding to study social conditions, instead of turning to motives and desires of actors readily. The advantage of this approach is, as Popper points out, that, while explanations in terms of motives and desires can hardly be critically discussed, those in terms of social conditions are capable of being critically discussed and improved. To analyse social life in terms of motives and desires is also to ignore the possibility that our actions may have consequences that we did not desire. The importance of investigating the unintended consequences of actions cannot be exaggerated. For social life is characterized by phenomena like poverty, unemployment and economic depression which no one may desire. Since they are the unintended consequences of actions, we cannot understand them in terms of motives and intentions. To do so would completely undermine the task of social science. For this would mean that an explanation of social phenomena consists in the discovery of individuals or groups who are interested in their occurrence and who have conspired to bring them about. This is to assign social science the task of developing what Popper calls the conspiracy theory of society. Although this
11

For further discussion on the question of rationality of human behaviour, see below, pp. 17374.
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168 / OM BAKSHI approach is misconceived, it is widely used in scholarly inquiries. Wars, we are told, are forced upon reluctant populations by despotic and Machiavellian governments. Poverty is often attributed to the evil designs of capitalists. There is a great deal of truth in this argument. But the trouble is that we often find that powerful individuals and groups have a role in bringing about certain events. An authoritarian regime may provoke a war to strengthen its hold on its subjects. A political party may whip up communal or ethnic passions to mobilize support. This is admitted by Popper. But he argues that thanks to the unforeseen consequences of their actions, the outcome is often substantially different from what they set out to achieve. This will be clear to anybody who compares the hopes of revolutionaries who brought about the revolution in 1917 and the practice of socialism in Soviet Union, particularly under Stalin. The need to investigate the unintended consequences of actions, thus, cannot be exaggerated. But, still, this view would not be entirely acceptable to those who believe that man is the maker of social life, although Popper does not think it difficult to reconcile the two views. He agrees that man is the maker of social life, but argues that this is true only in the sense that God is not the maker of it, not in the sense that man makes it consciously. Many would find it hard to deny the validity of this argument, but they might still wonder whether the question has been addressed satisfactorily. For, while it is true that a large number of institutions like family and market have grown over time, it cannot be denied that we also consciously try to shape social life. This is so obvious that it can hardly escape the attention of any student of social life. Nor does it that of Popper. He admits that we consciously design institutions, but argues that such institutions do not turn out the way we intended, thanks to the unintended consequences of the intended actions, including the effects on the desires and hopes of those affected by them, even most people in society. One might feel that this would also be the fate of our efforts to reorganize social life on a large scale. But surprisingly this is not the position taken by Popper. While he exhorts social scientists to desist from offering psychological explanations, he himself turns to the (ill) motives of those making such efforts. He admits that numerous efforts have been made in our time to bring about large-scale changes in social life, but argues that this is because conspirators have come to the fore. His argument would gladden the hearts of those who are the beneficiaries of the system, but would leave many a student of social life dissatisfied. No doubt Popper would be justified in drawing attention to the differences between what men like Gandhi, Lenin and Mao wanted to achieve and what they succeeded in achieving. He would also be right in advising those interested in reorganizing social life to carefully study the likely consequences of their efforts. But it is hard to agree with him that such efforts are merely the handiwork of some (evil) persons. While there is no dearth of cases of attempts to surreptitiously bring about changes in social life, people like Gandhi, Lenin and Mao led mass movements. We need to carefully examine social conditions to
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Whither Social Science? / 169 know why these movements arose. This is an inquiry with which historians are conversant, although they, too, do not ignore the role played by these leaders. Disenchantment with the Model of Science Poppers hostility to large-scale social change prevents him from recognizing the role of ideas in social life and from accepting it as the task of social science to study whether our beliefs will remain beautiful dreams or play a meaningful role in shaping the conditions of life. The view of social science defended in this article would perhaps meet the objections of those critics, especially the followers of Marx, who are interested in reorganizing social life. But it is not certain whether it would also meet the objections of those who place beliefs at the very heart of sociological inquiry. For the feeling is widespread that we can understand the meanings actions have for the agents only when we take into account their beliefs. The desire to study human behaviour by relating it to social conditions, which is based on the model of science, is regarded as misconceived. Instead of trying to explain human behaviour in terms of causes, thus, we are exhorted to search for reasons. The validity of this argument will be clear to those studying alien cultures. They would point out that when we study the behaviour of people with a different cultural background, there is always a possibility of misunderstanding it. This we can avoid by paying attention to the beliefs of the agents. In everyday life, too, we often try to understand the behaviour of people we know by referring to their principles. The exponents of this view of social science, however, are interested not so much in the principles accepted by individuals as those accepted widely in society. Understanding an action, thus, involves placing it in its appropriate form of life. According to writers like Winch, we can understand beliefs by focusing on the language used in everyday life (Winch, 1980). This is derived from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein which identified meaning with use. The exponents of this view, thus, turn the study of social and political life into a philosophical inquiry. Although this view has proved attractive to many, there is a strong feeling that understanding a form of life is not as unproblematic as it might appear at first instance. For our preconceptions are likely to colour our understanding of it. The tendency to question the adequacy of science as model for the study of social and political life is not new. This view was forcefully advocated by writers like Dilthey in the nineteenth century and endorsed by those like Gadamer in the twentieth century. The feeling has grown that the task is to develop interpretations, not theories, as social scientists assumed for long. Those who take this view believe that accepting text as the model for the study of social and political life is far more helpful in understanding what goes on around us, because it helps us in adequately grasping the meaning that actions have for the agents.
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170 / OM BAKSHI The attempt to turn social science into an interpretative discipline is not without difficulties. For, as mentioned earlier, the feeling is widespread that when we try to understand beliefs obtaining indifferent societies we obviously do so in the perspectives derived from our own cultures. But this means we do not understand them as the people whose cultures we are investigating understand them. Hence critics wonder whether we can understand them adequately. This difficulty has not escaped the attention of the exponents of new trends in contemporary thought. But they believe that those conscious of such a possibility can check their own understanding for distortions which their pre-conceptions may have brought about. Such an exercise might even help them in understanding their own cultures more adequately. Those unsympathetic to this approach, however, might still remain unconvinced. They would also have no difficulty in finding evidence that lends credence to their scepticism. But we should remember that we have often succeeded in understanding different ways of life. In this context, it is worth noting that some of the admirable accounts of the Hindu way of life have come from Western scholars. Many would like to know, however, how we can go about checking the validity of interpretations. The exponents of this view point out that we try to show that our reading of a given text helps us in understanding different aspects of it adequately and our reading of different aspects of it leads us to a better understanding of the text as a whole. But the fact is that such a discussion can take place meaningfully only between those who have a common understanding of the language concerned (Taylor, 1985: 18). It is clear that this kind of exercise is very different from the way scientists go about testing their theories. Few among those who accept the model of science would regard it as satisfactory. We should remember, however, that interpretations are not like scientific theories. While scientists would feel uneasy when confronted with competing theories, wondering which of them should be preferred over others, there is nothing odd if there are several competing interpretations of the same phenomena. Critics of this approach need to give some thought to the plea of its protagonists to desist from relying on the yardstick of science for judging interpretations. The difficulties in proving validity of interpretations might seem a major weakness to those who imbibe a more positivist outlook, but perhaps not to some of the exponents of new trends, especially those who want to develop interpretations for the pleasure of the experience. Their position is that all interpretations are equal in value. These difficulties would also not unduly worry those who want to undermine the interpretations from which is derived the power to regulate and control the lives of those at the receiving end in society. This would be the view of writers like Foucault, for instance. However, such a relativist position may not be acceptable to writers who want to uphold the interpretations which provide the basis of empowering those at the receiving end in society. For instance, this would be the position of feminists who assert the validity of their own account of social life. But this brings us back to the question about how they could claim privilege for their perspective which is but one of the several perspectives for understanding what is going on in society. Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

Whither Social Science? / 171 In this context, it is not surprising that a feeling has developed that the task is not so much to develop interpretations as to undermine them, to deconstruct them. This might seem similar to the views of those philosophers of science who emphasize the role of criticism in the growth of scientific knowledge, the idea being that criticism of our theories challenges us to develop new and better theories. But this is not the position of writers like Derrida for whom deconstruction is the aim. There is also the fact that deconstruction focuses more on marginal metaphors and other rhetorical devices that the writer uses. This might come as a surprise to many, for traditionally scholars have been enjoined to focus their energies not on the efforts of the author to create an impression but on his main argument or idea. It should be admitted, however, that the aim of deconstruction, too, remains the same, to undermine the main argument. But it focuses on rhetorical devices to show that, far from helping the author in his attempt, for example, to reconstruct social reality, they weaken it. This view of the task of social science would particularly leave those sympathetic to the more traditional view of social science perplexed. We should remember, however, that the need to make a careful analysis of social life would be felt strongly by those who want to intervene in social life. Since Western societies have largely succeeded in addressing major problems of social life, the urge to intervene in social life has considerably weakened. It is not surprising, therefore, that social scientists are not unduly worried about the adequacy of different views of social reality. For the first time in the history of social thought, thus, conditions have been created in which relativism and scepticism can flourish as perhaps never before. Although these tendencies arose as soon as the quest for reliable knowledge began, they seem to have finally triumphed over it. It might be objected, however, that the desire to intervene in social life has not disappeared altogether. Those who take this position could draw attention to the existence of several social movements in the West. We should remember, however, that those who claim that major social problems have been addressed more or less successfully, do not imply that all problems have been solved.12 They would have no hesitation in admitting that there still exist some disadvantaged sections in society like ethnic and religious minorities. It is worth noting, however, that those interceding on their behalf are interested more in changing the beliefs or attitudes of people towards these groups than in reorganizing social and political life. This is why they, too, are not interested in analysing it. The task, as they visualize it, is to interpret the norms and rules constitutive of different social groups. Changing Focus of Sociological Inquiry The contemporary interest in rules and norms makes a break with the approach traditionally adopted by political theorists. While through the centuries it was
12

For instance, this was the position of the end of ideology theorists (see below, pp. 17677). Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

172 / OM BAKSHI believed that the task was to develop theories which had wide, if not universal, application, the exponents of new trends in social science argue that, given the diversity of beliefs obtaining in different societies, there is little possibility of developing theories which would be applicable to all of them (MacIntyre, 1982b: 17188). The feeling is that the quest of universality, which inspired the study of social and political life for long, is misconceived. The exponents of the new trends even claim that those who try to develop theories which could be universally applicable, usually end up analysing other societies in terms of theories derived from their own societies. There is much in contemporary thought to lend credence to this claim. It has been widely noted that political scientists in the West, particularly those in America, have sought to analyse politics of different societies, including the more traditional societies in Asia and Africa, in terms of such functions as interest articulation and interest aggregation whose definition is strongly influenced by the bargaining culture of their own societies (Taylor, 1985). That there are wide differences in beliefs among societies few would deny. It is also true that grasping beliefs obtaining in a given society does help in understanding the behaviour of people in that society. By referring to liberal democratic principles, for example, we can understand the actions of people participating in elections or the actions of their elected representatives in state legislatures or the parliament in India. It is true that doubts are often raised whether when electing their representatives people are guided by such rational considerations as policies and programmes of candidates as traditionally postulated by democratic theory. For the feeling is that voters in India are guided by, among other things, caste considerations. The students of contemporary government and politics, however, would not regard this as unusual. Because it is widely recognized that political institutions are affected by the social milieu in which they function. It may be pointed out, however, that this shows the limitations of depending on rule books rather than on the language used by the people. For their language would help us to grasp norms and rules which actually regulate their social and political behaviour. Many would find this corroborated by their everyday experience. Those studying Indian politics would also agree that we cannot understand much of what is going on in Indian politics without taking caste into account. Some of even those who accept this argument might still point out, however, that the principles which regulate the behaviour of people in India are undergoing changes in our time. This might appear puzzling to those who think caste is playing an increasing role in Indian politics. There is, no doubt, a great deal of truth in their thinking. But it would be a mistake to ignore the changes taking place in social life. For example, in certain sections of the Indian society, caste may no longer be a decisive, even a relevant, consideration for deciding marriages. The feeling is growing among the educated middle class that questions such as these are best left to the persons concerned. Although the principle of caste continues to regulate the lives of a vast majority of the people in India, the new thinking is gradually gaining ground.
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Whither Social Science? / 173 It could be argued, however, that this does not undermine the position of the exponents of the new approach, since the behaviour of the people remains rulegoverned. Even those who accept this argument, however, might not remain content with grasping norms that are gradually gaining acceptance. They might think it necessary to study the causes of the change and draw attention to the role of the market forces, spread of education, increasing urbanization and so on. This is not an inquiry with which social scientists are unfamiliar. They often try to explain in causal terms why certain norms are gaining wider acceptance, while others are losing ground. The exponents of the new approach, however, are not particularly interested in such an inquiry, their main concern being with the norms and rules which regulate the behaviour of people at any given time. The need to analyse social conditions, however, cannot be exaggerated. For such an analysis would help not only in showing why the norms are changing but also, more importantly, in explaining human behaviour. In everyday life, we may find ourselves in situations when we are without norms to provide meaningful guidance. For changes in social life often render existing norms anachronistic, while new norms may still not have crystallized. This forces us to try to adjust ourselves to the new conditions. In such situations social scientists may be able to explain our behaviour only by relating it to social conditions. Those who rely on norms may not be able to make much sense of it. Indeed the situation may be more complex than this. For we often continue to accept norms and rules even after they have been rendered anachronistic by changing conditions of social life. Those who concentrate on them, thus, may not be able to make sense of what is going on. We can understand this with the help of an example drawn from everyday experience. In a society like India that is rapidly undergoing urbanization, when those living in rural areas move to cities, they are unable to maintain extended family ties, although they often continue to accept the norms of an extended family which they had imbibed from their social background. In the new conditions, they are constrained to develop nuclear families. This often creates considerable tension and unhappiness in their lives, since their beliefs pull them in one direction while their conditions, in another. Any attempt to understand their behaviour with the help of their beliefs would result in misunderstanding it. We need to relate it to the new conditions of life. Whither Social Science? It should be admitted, however, that the discussion in the last few paragraphs shows the situation to be more complex than visualized by the exponents of new trends in social science, not that norms and rules have no role in social and political life. Indeed we often refer to them for making sense of what is going on around us. For example, as noted earlier, we can hardly ignore the role of caste and communal considerations. There are several political parties which derive support from different caste and religious groups. Even those wedded to certain social
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174 / OM BAKSHI and economic programmes and policies have no hesitation in taking advantage of caste and communal sentiments. The truth is that political parties generally formulate their election strategies keeping in mind these factors. It is clear that these calculations are made on the assumption that people act as members of social groups. This raises questions about the thinking of the exponents of methodological individualism regarding the nature of social groups. Before we proceed further with our discussion on new trends in social science, we need to discuss it. It is argued by Popper that civilizations, races or nations do not act, individuals act. This is true, since collectivities are not concrete entities. But few among those who emphasize the need to focus on groups would claim that they are concrete phenomena. The question is whether we can derive the behaviour of agents from the groups to which they belong. According to Popper, groups are nothing more than models for analysing social reality. He does not think individuals behave differently when they become members of some groups. But, as we have seen, this is not entirely true. We often make sense of the behaviour of people by grasping norms and rules of groups to which they belong. To say that we need to grasp the norms and rules constitutive of social groups is to raise doubts about the usefulness of attempts to discover regularities in human behaviour by relating it to social conditions. For this denies the assumption which provides the basis for such attempts, namely, that we act rationally in response to social conditions. Writers like Taylor argue that this assumption might be valid if we examine the behaviour of people in the economic sphere but not in other spheres of social life. This argument would leave many a social scientist perplexed. For it means that social sciences like sociology and political science are different not only, as writers have argued for long, from natural sciences but also from economics. While this may dishearten those trying to develop social sciences on the model of natural science, it is hard to deny that we can understand much of what happens in social life with the help of norms and rules obtaining in society. We need to remember, however, that norms and rules do not remain static. And, as they change, the nature of groups undergoes changes, becoming more or less cohesive, even disappearing. In the last few decades, for example, the caste system has been greatly strengthened, thanks to the working of the electoral system in India. It is well known that castes like Yadavs, Lodhs, Kurmis, Jats and Rajputs play a significant role in the politics of several north Indian states. On the other hand, Parsis, one of the most advanced communities in India, is finding it hard even to survive. The changing nature of the working classes in Western societies provides another example.13
13 We should also remember that those who want to reorganize social life will be guided by certain beliefs. While the protagonists of new trends who emphasize the need to focus on norms and rules have taken keen interest in ethnic or religious communities, we can understand the behaviour of people who want to bring about changes in social life by referring to their beliefs. In the history of mankind, there are numerous examples of a set of people accepting certain beliefs, organizing themselves and intervening in social life, although in the last hundred years or so more such attempts have Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com RAVI BABUMarx BUNGA had on October 19, 2009 been made than at any time in the past. This was by also what in mind when he discussed the

Whither Social Science? / 175 Both views of social science enjoy wide support in contemporary thought. The view that we should model the study of social life on natural science has, of course, been held for long. The spectacular success of science in our times has given it great strength, although this has not succeeded in squashing opposition to it. As noted earlier, the feeling remains that we can understand human behaviour only when we take into account the beliefs held by those whose behaviour we want to understand. The task of social science is, thus, to provide rational understanding, rather than causal explanation, of human behaviour. There is, as we have seen, substance in this view, but the trouble is that much of what happens in social life can be explained only causally. It is true that such explanations may not give any idea of the meaning actions may have for the agents but we should remember that much of what happens in social life is the unintended result of our actions. It is not easy to decide which view of social science to accept, since both the views are supported by cogent arguments. This question might seem misconceived to some. Although there has been a strong tendency to emphasize opposition between the two approaches, it has also been argued that these approaches supplement each other. This is the position taken by MacIntyre, for example (MacIntyre, 1982a: 1532). He has no doubt that we need to understand actions in terms of reasons, but cautions the exponents of new trends in social science against denying the usefulness of analysing their causes. In his opinion, the right approach would be to begin by exploring the reasons an agent has for acting in a certain manner and then to investigate the causes of his action. This is, of course, not an entirely new position. It was Weber who had argued long ago that we can provide a satisfactory account of an action only when we explore both the reasons for it as well as the causes of it. It is not hard to imagine that many a social scientist would be sympathetic to this view. For we can make sense of the behaviour of businessmen in the market, for instance, both in terms of the principles of market morality as well as the compulsions of the market system. In everyday life, too, we often refer to reasons as well as causes for making sense of what is going on around us. The trouble with this proposal is, however, that much of what happens in social life is the unintended consequence of our actions. It would make no sense to talk of the reasons that a person has for being poor or unemployed, for losing his investments when the stock market collapses, or when inflation eats into his savings. Since social sciences deal with phenomena such as these, the usefulness of this proposal is open to doubt. The question about which view of social science we should accept remains. It is interesting that the arguments put forward by the exponents of both the views of social science are essentially academic in nature. While we may not disregard
role of workers in social life. He felt that, while we can classify those related to the process of production in a certain way as workers, their behaviour would undergo major changes when they imbibe socialist ideas. Then it would not approximate what is considered rational behaviour in the market, but would aim at changing the market institutions themselves. Downloaded from http://isq.sagepub.com by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009

176 / OM BAKSHI them completely, we need to examine the usefulness of these approaches in addressing the problems of social life. Those who feel that the work of social scientists should be relevant to the needs of society would regard this as a major consideration in deciding the issue. Others might wonder, however, whether we can rule out scholarly inquiries in the pursuit of beauty, creativity or happiness. There may not be much sympathy for this view in countries like India which are facing major social problems, but it is not hard to imagine that it might find supporters in societies which succeed in addressing at least their major problems. And, as we have noted earlier, there has been a feeling among scholars in the West that their societies have greatly succeeded in this. This feeling found strong expression in the writings of the end of ideology theorists, which were popular in the midtwentieth century.14 Their argument was that ideological thinking was a response to the problems which arose in the wake of the industrial revolution. The benefits which accrued from it were cornered by the middle classes, leaving little for the working classes. The socialist ideology was an attempt to address this problem. Thanks to the development of the welfare state, however, it was argued that the working classes had got their due, resulting in the end of ideology. The exponents of this view did not claim that the success in addressing this problem had left no problems to be addressed, but that these were relatively minor problems, such as those regarding old age pension, which did not quite call for theoretical reflection. There was also a feeling that the existing liberal democratic society was an ideal state itself in operation. With the realization of this state, the quest of political thinkers over the centuries had ended. It was even argued that, thanks to such developments as these, history had come to an end. The end of ideology theory was the subject of intense discussion and controversy in the mid-twentieth century. It was widely criticized on the ground that what had happened was not so much the end of ideology as the triumph of liberal democratic ideology over socialist ideology, which had begun to lose ground after its initial spectacular successes in the twentieth century. This is why critics of the end of ideology theory felt it was more of an ideology, hiding the true nature of the existing social system. Those influenced by Marxist thinking also wondered whether the problems of the workers had been adequately addressed, but, significantly, few among them denied improvement in the conditions of workers. We should remember that Marx, too, believed that the solution of the problems of workers would be a development of great significance, signalling the beginning of history. Although Marx and the exponents of the end of ideology theory might disagree as to whether history would begin or end, they were in agreement that the problems of the working classes were the main problems of our times and that their solution would be the mark of a new era. They also agreed that the solution of these problems would have far reaching consequences for the study of social and political life. While we have already referred to the
14

For a discussion on the end of ideology theory, see Bakshi, 1987: 4446.
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Whither Social Science? / 177 views of scholars who felt that there was no longer any need to theorize about social and political life, we should also note that Marx, too, believed that such a development would signal the end of social science. The end of ideology theory gradually ceased to be a subject of scholarly discussion, although with writers like Rorty espousing it, there are signs of its resurgence. In any case, the feeling that there are no major problems to be addressed continues to provide the basis of much scholarly work in the West. Thus the focus has increasingly shifted to studying meanings of concepts like liberty, equality and rights or elucidation of principles (of justice) which provide the basis of existing society. Social scientists may not have lost interest in what goes on around us, but they try to understand actions as agents understand them. It is therefore not surprising that they are no longer concerned with unintended consequences of actions but with what the agents intended to do. Hence the interest in the norms and rules obtaining in society. Such developments have resulted in placing language at the heart of social science. In the West, thus, the study of social and political life has become essentially an academic pursuit. The exponents of new trends in social science have little interest in such problems as poverty, exploitation and unemployment. A leading exponent of the view that regards social science as an interpretative discipline like Taylor is critical of theories developed by social scientists in the West, not because they do not help in solving problems facing a vast majority of the humanity, but because they do not help in understanding, for instance, the process of decision making in a traditional Japanese village. And the task of social scientists in India, which is facing massive social and economic problems, is, we are told, to develop a concept of politics by articulating the self-definition of people engaged in the practices of politics in India instead of accepting a concept which articulates the atomistic-instrumentalist politics of Western societies (Taylor, 1985: 13233). The increasingly academic orientation of social science in the West has even been acknowledged by some of its exponents. According to MacIntyre, for example, social science has become essentially a philosophical discipline which concentrates on such problems as the relationship between intention and effects, consequences and results of action. It may not ignore social reality completely but it is interested in events which have already taken place (MacIntyre, 1986; see also Taylor, 1985: 5657), whereas those concerned with problems facing society would be interested in analysing the prevailing conditions of social life. They may make historical inquiries, but these will be guided by their concern for present society. This essentially academic orientation of the new social science conforms to the view of political theory as developed by thinkers like Isaiah Berlin. While traditionally political theorists were deeply concerned about the problems of social and political life, Berlin feels that it is the product of rational curiosity (Berlin, 1962). It tries to elucidate political beliefs on the basis of which we act and to study the concepts of man and the metaphysical models underlying them. It is not surprising that the political thinking of Rawls, which has been
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178 / OM BAKSHI widely acclaimed in recent times, seeks to elucidate principles which provide the basis of societies in the West. He is dissatisfied with utilitarianism because it does not quite succeed in this task, not because it does not concern itself with social and political problems facing humanity. These comments on new trends in social science might not be entirely acceptable to some, in particular to those who think that focusing on norms and rules helps in dealing with issues of social life with greater sensitivity. There is some substance in this objection which we need to grasp. The exponents of this view point out, for example, that awareness of norms and rules which constitute societies in Asia and Africa would help one to become conscious of their cultural distinctiveness. They are critical of the tendency among social scientists in the West to advise these societies to model themselves on Western societies. This was the meaning of the concept of development not so long ago. Today scholars in the West have increasingly become aware of the ethnocentricism of their thinking. The feeling has grown that societies in Asia and Africa should develop along lines more in keeping with their distinct cultures. It is also felt that paying attention to the norms and rules which constitute ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities would help one to become aware of their distinct needs and concerns. Since increasing interest has been taken in such groups, many would find it unfair to deny the usefulness of this concept of social science. This view of social science also seems very attractive to many in a country like India which is home to a large number of minority groups; but it has its problems, too. To begin with, we may find some practices of the cultures we are investigating to be repulsive. Many would wonder, for example, whether we should continue to accept the principle of caste on the basis of which social life in India has been traditionally organized or abandon it in favour of the Western concept of equality. Of course, revulsion against caste hierarchies, particularly against the practice of untouchability, has led to the acceptance of the principle of equality as the basis of legal and constitutional practices in India. But the question could be more difficult to decide when it pertains to minority groups. Instead of discussing such moral issues, however, we could pay more attention to the effects of social, political and economic changes on the norms and rules which have traditionally defined social life in countries like India. Those pertaining to caste will not help us to understand the role being played by dalits, who have occupied the lowest rung in the social hierarchy through the centuries in the politics of a state like Uttar Pradesh. Nor would the norms pertaining to family help us to understand the role that women, traditionally restricted to rearing families, are increasingly playing in professions, bureaucracy, business and industry. We have to refer to the spread of education, the increasing reach of the market, rapid industrialization and urbanization, working of democratic institutions and so on to understand the changes that have taken place in social life in the last few decades. The developments in information and communication technologies have greatly
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Whither Social Science? / 179 strengthened the process of change. The norms and rules which constitute different social groups are also being gradually eroded, giving rise to a variety of social problems which we can understand more by analysing social conditions than by analysing language. This is why even those interested in the problems of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups would not find focusing on norms and rules useful beyond a point. The changes taking place in beliefs widely accepted in India have not escaped the attention of scholars. There is also a great deal of concern about the erosion of traditional values, ways of behaviour and attitudes as people in India are increasingly taking to a Western lifestyle. It has been commonly argued that these changes have to do with the kind of economic development taking place in the country. Indeed there is a widespread feeling that we are mindlessly developing along Western lines, instead of adopting a model rooted in our own culture.15 Although several such models have been constructed, the model which has attracted the most scholarly attention is that developed by Gandhi. It is often argued that the highly Westernized elite led by Nehru, which ruled India after it gained independence, rejected the Gandhian model that regards self-sufficient village as the basic social, economic and political unit and relies on agriculture and handicraft, particularly khadi, in favour of the Western model which puts faith in industry and technology. Although this line of reasoning has been popular with scholars in India, its inadequacy will become clear if we remember that no significant effort has been made to replace it with a more indigenous model, although major changes have taken place in Indian politics since the adoption of this model. Those who took part in the freedom movement, inherited power from the colonial rulers and favoured the Western model of development have been replaced by new leadership over the years. In the midst of declining fortunes of the party which occupied the centre of Indian politics for decades, myriad new parties have emerged at the national as well as regional levels. With caste proving an effective means to mobilize people in politics, the castes/classes which dominated Indian politics for long have been replaced by a plethora of castes and their ever changing combinations. In the midst of these changes, however, the model of development has remained unchanged. Even those who entertained misgivings about it began to support it when they came to power. Indeed in the last few years, instead of replacing it with a more indigenous model, efforts have been made to copy the Western model more closely. This is why we should resist the temptation to take recourse to a conspiracy theory to explain why this model was adopted and examine whether the clue could be provided by the social and economic conditions obtaining in the country at the time India gained independence from colonial rule. In particular, we should remember that the market system had come into existence long ago, an extensive network of transport and communications had been established and
15 For a critical discussion on this line of argument in contemporary Indian thought, see Bakshi, 1993.

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180 / OM BAKSHI industrialization of the country had started. It is also worth keeping in mind that a system of Western education was flourishing at that time, evolution of representative institutions had begun, a large bureaucracy was functioning effectively and so on. In other words, we need to take into account the social and economic changes which had been underway for more than a century and a half. This does not mean that the conditions which existed on the eve of Independence determined the lines on which development could take place, but that we can have a meaningful discussion about the model of development only when we examine the possibilities which were open in those conditions. The Way Forward Although it is hard to fault those interested in the problems of ethnic and religious communities, we should remember that countries like India, unlike those in the West, face major problems like unemployment, poverty and economic exploitation. We can understand these by analysing social conditions, not by grasping norms and rules obtaining in these societies. This has far reaching implications for the study of social and political life. For these are the kind of problems in response to which political theorists wrote over the centuries. The conditions in which political theory could flourish may have disappeared in the West, but they continue to obtain in these countries. This gives their scholars an opportunity to continue the tradition which has been languishing in the West.16 Many in the West would find it hard to accept the view that political theory is in the doldrums there.17 Its condition may have seemed gloomy in the mid-twentieth century, but they would not agree that this is so today. However, one wonders why, if this is so, they find it necessary to periodically reassure themselves about the state of political theory. This is not to say that there is simply no basis for this view. For some kind of theorizing goes on all the time. Hence the possibility of claiming resurgence of political theory when scholars take interest in methodological issues pertaining to the study of social and political life; or when they apply the techniques of linguistic analysis to concepts like liberty, equality and rights; or when they take interest in such issues as the rights of the unborn or of future generations, the responsibility of man for nature, the risks of being defended to death and so on. This is the reason why it is possible to claim the return of
It might appear somewhat anomalous that, although the focus of the entire article is on social sciences, it ends with a plea to develop political theory. This might be an issue particularly for those who take the division of the study of social and political life into different academic disciplines seriously, but perhaps not for those conversant with the history of political thought. For traditionally social and political thinkers did not draw sharp lines between different aspects of social reality which have been separated for purposes of academic inquiry in the last two to three centuries. They had no hesitation to study any aspect of social reality which had a bearing on the problems they were studying. And they studied social, economic, political and other aspects under the heading of political theory (for a detailed discussion on this issue, see Bakshi, 1987: 1619). 17 For a detailed discussion onhttp://isq.sagepub.com the state of political in our times, see Bakshi, 1987. Downloaded from by RAVItheory BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009
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Whither Social Science? / 181 grand political theory even by referring to the work of writers who have attacked the very possibility of theorizing (see, for example, Skinner, 1997). If it is accepted, however, that the task of political theory is to study social and political life, the aim being to analyse major problems facing society and to find solution to them,18 then, there is little sign of theorizing in the traditional style in the West. And if it is accepted that major problems have been largely addressed, then, there is little possibility of it. Many scholars in the West might find it disconcerting that the tradition of political theory, one of the major achievements of Western civilization, could flourish in societies not Western. Others might find it amusing that those who had no role in the development of this tradition could lay claim to it. Some might even be pleasantly surprised that it could fall to the lot of those whom they introduced to a tradition of reasoning that is essentially Western, to continue it. There might be other responses, depending on how the capabilities of scholars in countries like India are assessed. In particular, doubts could be expressed by those who find little evidence of theoretical work being done in these countries. This is likely to leave many in countries like India uneasy. They might think that this view does not give sufficient credit to the scholarly work done by them. While it would be unfair, even harsh, to dismiss their claims summarily, the fact remains that they have excelled mainly in copying intellectual fashions such as value-free social science, linguistic analysis and post-modernism emerging from the West. Sociologists of knowledge would find it interesting to explore reasons for this tendency. The argument advanced in this article has, however, more to do with social conditions in which political theory has traditionally flourished than with the intellectual competence of scholars.19 Whereas those conditions obtain in countries like India, they no longer seem to in the West. This conclusion may be disputed by those who feel that the view that the problems facing the working classes in the West have been solved is rather optimistic. It is also possible to argue that even if these problems have been largely addressed, this does not mean that all problems have been solved for all times. This is no doubt a sane view, since it is the task of scientists, natural or social, to search for problems which need to be addressed. But while we may debate the nature of social conditions obtaining in the West, there is no doubt that societies like India face major problems. Instead of copying intellectual fashions originating in the West, social scientists in India should address them. The question is, however, whether they would do so. It is too much to hope that this article will be able to bring about change in their priorities. The aim of this article is much more modest: to show why they must. October 2005

This view of political theory has been developed in Bakshi, 1987. If intellectual competence were the main consideration, political theory would be flourishing in the West. For there cannot befrom any doubt about the of scholarly writings Downloaded http://isq.sagepub.com by quality RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009 in the West.
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