7.

Statutory Interpretation
7.1. The Role of Statutory Interpretation The courts must ascertain the meaning of a statute in order to apply it. Even the most well drafted statute may be capable of more than one interpretation in any particular situation this is a function of the nature of language and the desire of opposing parties to find interpretations which favour their own case. Additionally, some statutes may be inherently ambiguous. The courts have developed principles to assist them in ascertaining the meaning of statutes. Although some of these are described as rules they do not have the binding force of law and there is no universal acceptance regarding their precise meaning. These principles can be divided into 4 categories: Primary Rules Secondary Rules Extrinsic Aids Presumptions 7.2. Primary Rules of Statutory Interpretation 7.2.1. Nature of Primary Rules The primary rules deal with the courts overall approach to interpretation. It is not possible to say, in advance, precisely which approach a court will take in a particular case. (Whichever approach is taken, the court will also make use of secondary rules, extrinsic aids and presumptions.) 7.2.2. The Traditional Rules (a) The Literal Rule

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Traditionally, the English courts have taken a literal approach to the interpretation of statutes. The Literal Rule is the cornerstone of this approach. The literal rule requires the courts to give the words of a statute their plain meaning. It is for a court to interpret Parliaments intention from what it has actually said not from what it thinks it meant to say. This can produce some surprising results as, in practice, words seldom have a single plain meaning. Whiteley v Chappell (1868-69) LR 4 QB 147 It was a statutory offence to impersonate any person entitled to vote at an election. The defendant impersonated someone who was on the electoral register but who had died before the election. He was acquitted as deceased persons had no right to vote in the election. Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hinchy [1960] 1 All ER 505 Section 25(3) of the Income Tax Act 1952 provided that a person who failed to deliver a correct income tax return should forfeit the sum of 20 and treble the tax which he ought to be charged under this Act. The House of Lords held that, in addition to the penalty of 20, a taxpayer who had declared only part of his Post Office interest was liable to pay treble the whole tax chargeable for the year, and not merely treble the tax on the undeclared income. (b) The Golden Rule The Golden Rule is an extension of the Literal Rule. It allows the court to depart from the Literal Rule where this would produce an obviously absurd result. McMonagle v Westminster City Council [1990] 1 All ER 285 McMonagle was charged with using premises as a 'sex encounter establishment' without a 2
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licence, contrary to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. The definition of such an establishment was premises at which performances which are not unlawful are given which...comprise the sexual stimulation of persons admitted to the premises... McMonagle's defence was that the prosecution had not proved that the performance in question were not unlawful. As they may have been unlawful he would not therefore have required a licence and he was not therefore guilty of the offence! The House of Lords rejected this interpretation as being absurd. The words which are not unlawful had been introduced by an incompetent draftsman simply to emphasise that the grant of a licence conferred no immunity from the criminal law. Keene v Muncaster [1980] RTR 377 The Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1973 make it an offence to park a motor vehicle overnight in the road with the offside against the kerb. However, this is not an offence if a uniformed police officer has given permission to park in this way. The defendant was a uniformed police officer who parked his car overnight with its offside against the kerb. He was prosecuted and relied on the defence that he had given himself permission. His defence was rejected. The court applied the golden rule and held that permission meant that permission had to be given by one person to another. He was therefore convicted of the offence. (c) The Mischief Rule The Mischief Rule can be applied by the courts to resolve an ambiguity which is produced by the application of the Literal Rule. It involves asking what mischief in the common law, was intended to be corrected by the statute. The court then applies the interpretation which is consistent with correcting the mischief.
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Gardiner v Sevenoaks Rural District Council (1950) 66 TLR The Celluloid and Cinematograph Act 1922 imposed various health and safety requirements on those controlling premises where film was stored. Gardiner stored large quantities of film in a cave and the Council served notice on him, requiring him to comply with the Act. He claimed that his cave was not subject to the Act as it could not be described as premises. The court held that the Act was designed to protect people who worked in storage locations and there was no reason why a cave which was used for this purpose should be excluded from the Act. Accordingly, in this Act, the word premises applied to a cave. Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR Under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 it was an offence for a prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street.for the purpose of prostitution. The defendants were prostitutes who solicited men in the street from the balconies of buildings overlooking the street. Their defence was that they had not committed the offence as they were not in the street when they were soliciting. This was rejected by the court which applied the Mischief Rule as to the meaning of in a street. This is explained by Lord Parker CJ in his judgment: Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes..For my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone. 7.2.3. The Purposive Approach The Purposive Approach to statutory interpretation can be seen as an extension of the Mischief Rule. Instead of confining itself simply to the mischief which the statute was intended to correct, the court resolves ambiguities by reference to the statutes overall
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purpose. Indeed, many modern statutes are not simply intended to correct mischiefs in the common law but have a wider social agenda. Under the purposive approach the courts should try to give effect to this wider statutory purpose in interpreting ambiguous provisions in statutes. The purposive approach has gained favour in recent years. In 1969 the Law Commission urged the courts to adopt this approach. It has been the traditional approach of the courts in European jurisdictions. The statutes in these countries are expressed in broad general principles and the courts fill the gaps by interpreting them in the context of their legislative purpose. English courts increasingly have to adopt this approach when interpreting European Community legislation and there is also a trend towards a more purposive approach when interpreting domestic legislation. Whilst the English courts continue to place their emphasis on the language of the statute, there is an increasing willingness to resolve ambiguities in domestic legislation by reference to the statutory purpose (and even to read words into the statute where this is inadequate to give effect to an EC directive: Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] 2 All ER 363). Knowles v Liverpool City Council [1993] 1 WLR 1428 Knowles was employed by the Council and was injured at work whilst handling a defective flagstone. He claimed damages from them under the Employers Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969. The Council claimed that they were not liable as a flagstone could not be equipment within the Act. The House of Lords held that it could. The purpose of the statute was to protect employees from exposure to dangerous materials. The words equipment should be interpreted in this context. The Council were therefore liable for Knowles injuries. 7.3. Secondary Rules of Statutory Interpretation 7.3.1. Nature of Secondary Rules The secondary rules are concerned, less with the overall approach to interpretation, and more with the precise application and structure of
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language within the statute. They are therefore sometimes described as rules of language or intrinsic aids to interpretation. 7.3.2. Noscitur a sociis (The meaning of a word can be gathered from its context.) Individual words or sections should not be interpreted in isolation but in the context of the whole statute. All parts of the Act can be referred to in this context, including the long and short title, the preamble (if any), the definition section as well as section headings and marginal notes. 7.3.3. The ejusdem generis rule (Of the same class) Where general words follow particular words, the general words are construed as being limited to the subject matter of the class outlined by the particular words. Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co Ltd [1899] AC 143 A statute prohibited the keeping of a house, office, room or other place for betting. The defendant kept an uncovered enclosure for betting. The House of Lords held that he was not in breach of the statute. The enclosure was not an other place within the meaning of the statute. It was not ejusdem generis with the particular places previously listed as they were all indoor places. 7.4. Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 7.4.1. Nature of Extrinsic Aids Extrinsic aids to interpretation are those which come from outside the statute which is being interpreted. They include the following: 7.4.2. Dictionaries

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7.4.3. Other Statutes Human Rights Act 1998 This Act requires existing legislation to be interpreted in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights, so far as this is possible. Interpretation Act 1978 This Act lays down various definitions which apply unless there is a contrary intention (express or implied) in a particular statute. For example under section 6, unless the contrary intention appears: (a) words importing the masculine gender shall include females; and (b) words in the singular shall include the plural and words in the plural shall include the singular 7.4.4. Judicial Precedent Where a court has previously made a decision on the interpretation of the statutory provision being considered, this decision will be binding under the doctrine of judicial precedent. Decisions by the courts on an earlier statutory provision that has been subsequently replaced by the provision under consideration do not strictly constitute binding precedents. Nevertheless the courts will generally follow them unless there is a reason for departing from the earlier interpretation. 7.4.5. Pre-Parliamentary Materials Courts may have recourse to official publications that precede and form the basis for legislation, including: Government White Papers Royal Commission Reports
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Law Commission Reports Criminal Law Revision Committee Reports

7.4.6. Parliamentary Materials (Hansard) Traditionally, courts were not permitted to refer to records of Parliamentary debates to assist them with the interpretation of a statute. Although this continues to be the general position it must now be understood in the context of the rule laid down in the following case. Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42 The case concerned the liability to income tax of schoolmasters at Malvern College. They were entitled to educate their children at the school at a concessionary fee rate of about 20% of normal fees. As this was a benefit in kind they were obliged, under section 63 of the Finance Act 1976, to pay income tax on the difference between the amount they paid and the cost to the school of educating their children. The Inland Revenue argued that this should be calculated on the basis of the marginal cost to the school for each child. The schoolmasters claimed that the full cost to the school, including an apportionment of overheads, should be used for the calculation. Section 63 was capable of either interpretation but when the provision was going through Parliament the Financial Secretary to the Treasury had made it clear that the government intended it to have the meaning being argued by the schoolmasters. The House of Lords decided to admit the evidence of the parliamentary debate (in Hansard) and found in the schoolmasters favour. Their Lordships ruled that Hansard could be referred to by courts where: Legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity The material relied upon consists of statements by a minister promoting the Bill The statements relied upon are clear

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7.4.7. Post-Parliamentary Materials The courts may refer to guidance published by government departments about the implementation of legislation in interpreting bits meaning. 7.5. Presumptions 7.5.1. Nature of Presumptions Certain presumptions of statutory interpretation have developed over the years. In the absence of a clear contrary intention within the statute the courts will presume that Parliament intended the statute to have the meaning favoured by the presumption. All presumptions may be rebutted by clear contrary wording in the statute. 7.5.2. Examples of Particular Presumptions 7.6. Bibliography Wood, D., Law and the Built Environment, Macmillan, 1999, p. 16 Owens, K., Law for Non-Law Students, Cavendish, 2001, pp. 22 - 25
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In favour of individual liberty Against the interference with private property rights Against retrospective operation Against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts

Slapper, G. & Kelly, D., The English Legal System, Cavendish, 2001, pp. 166 182 McLeod, I., Legal Method, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, chapters 18 & 20 Keenan, D., Smith & Keenans English Law, Longman, 2001, pp. 162 167 & 644 646 Card, R., Murdoch, J. & Murdoch, S., Law for Estate Management Students, Butterworths, 1998, paras. 3.21 3.32

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