EVIDENCE-Case Digest 1. Ong Chia v. Republic Facts: -Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China.

In 1932, when he was 9, he arrived at the port of Manila. Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. -On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. -Petitioner stated that he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended; - During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. -TC: granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine Citizenship -The state appealed that petitioner 1. failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; 2. failed to state all his former residence in violation of CA 473, Sec 7 3. failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in violation of Sec 2 4. had no lucrative trade or occupation and previous income have been insufficient or misdeclared 5. failed to support his petition with documentary evidence -CA: reversed the decision of the TC and denied the application for naturalization -Petitioner contention: that the CA erred in considering the documents which had been merely annexed by the State to its appellant brief, and not having presented and formally offered as evidence, are mere scraps of paper devoid of any evidentiary value because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Issue: Whether or not the in naturalization cases, the appellate court can deny an application for Philippine citizenship on the basis of documents not presented before the trial court and not forming part of the records of the case.

Held: YES. The contention has no merit. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provides that: These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient . Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents. It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.

2. People v. Ador Facts: -Absalon Abe Cuya III and Rodolfo Ompong Chavez died by multiple and mortal gunshot wounds on March 10, 1997. -Two separate information were filed against the Adors. Only 4 of the 6 Adors were taken into custody namely, Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, the other 2 remained at large. -16 witnesses were presented by the Prosecution in its effort to secure the conviction of the accused. -TC: Acquitted Diosdado Sr., Allan and Rosalino Ador(s) but denied demurrer to evidence against Godofredo Later on Convicted: Diosdado Ador III and Godofredo Ador for the crime of murder Acquitted: Diosdado Ador Jr. Issue: 1. 2.

(4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense. Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the conviction of the accused based on the circumstantial evidence presented. Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against them. But, while it is true that alibi and denial are the weakest of the defenses as they can easily be fabricated, absent such clear and positive identification, the doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused must yield to the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, while denial is concededly fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused cannot be based thereon. The rule in criminal law is firmly entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 2. Custodial Investigation NO. The admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including the gun in question cannot be considered in evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to counsel. Godofredo was already under custodial investigation when he made his admissions and surrendered the gun to the police authorities. The police had already begun to focus on the Adors and were carrying out a process of interrogations that was lending itself to eliciting incriminating statements and evidence. Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel, have already attached to the Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with the assistance of counsel. Admissions under custodial investigation made without the assistance of counsel are barred as evidence. The records are bare of any indication that the accused have waived their right to counsel, hence, any of their admissions are inadmissible in evidence against them. As we have held, a suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were gospel truth. Thus, in Aballe v. People, the death weapon, a four-inch kitchen knife, which was found after the accused brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot where he had concealed it, was barred from admission as it was discovered as a consequence of an uncounseled extrajudicial confession. Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the accused committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the accused cannot be established, more so to a moral certainty. It is when evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty. The Adors were Acquitted.

Whether or not circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the accused Whether or not admissions made by Godofredo under custodial investigation may be considered as evidence against him

Held: 1. Circumstantial Evidence NO. The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. It may be the basis of a conviction so long as the combination of all the circumstances proven produces a logical conclusion which suffices to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that all the accused are guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis which may be consistent with their innocence. Also, it should be acted on and weighed with great caution. Circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction. Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. Guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence: (1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and

3. People v. Domingcil Facts: -On August 12, 1994, Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferds Upholstery Shop located in Laoag City reported to SP04 Rodrigo Ventura that Manny Domingcil went to their shop looking for a buyer of marijuana. He told the appellant that he knew of someone who was interested and ready to buy marijuana and then instructed the latter to bring one kilo of the substance to a store located in front of a school in Laoag City that same day. Acting on the said report, SP04 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant was charged before the RTC of Laoag City for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, for the sale and delivery of one kilo of marijuana to a poseur-buyer. -TC: Convicted -Petitioner denied the crime charged and contended that he was merely instigated by Oliver into procuring the marijuana. Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the appellant should prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Held: NO. It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself such that common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or speculation. Testimonies that do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence. Besides, instigation, or the appellants claim of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is a common standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The appellants claim that the prosecution offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the P500.00 buy money and did not account for its failure to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof is not supported by the records. The records show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the marked money, was in fact offered in evidence by the prosecution. The appellant would surely have objected if the prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the bill. The appellant did not do so. The only ground for his objection to the admission of the marked money was that it was self-serving. Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court, the absence of the original of the marked money is inconsequential. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases; it is merely corroborative evidence. Moreover, the appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana but also for the delivery thereof, which is committed by the mere

delivery or transfer of the prohibited drug. The consideration for the transaction is of no moment. All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact that the prosecutions evidence fully shows and confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to reverse or even modify the findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution.

4. Custodio v. Sandiganbayan Facts: -This is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan for the double murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983. Petitioners invoke the following grounds for the reopening of the case: 1. Existence of newly discovered evidence a. Independent forensic evidence b. Key witness to the actual killing of Sen. Aquino 2. Grave violation of due process by reason of: a. Insufficient legal assistance of counsel; b. Deprivation of right to counsel of choice; c. Testimonies of defense witnesses were under duress; d. Willful suppression of evidence; e. Use of false forensic evidence that led to the unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants. 3. Serious misapprehension of facts on the part of the Sandiganbayan based on false forensic evidence -Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquinos security detail upon his arrival in Manila from his threeyear sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was also gunned down at the airport tarmac. -In December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision to acquit all the accused, including the petitioners. However, the trial before the Sandiganbayan was found to be a sham trial, thus the SC nullified the acquittal and ordered that a re-trial be conducted. -During the re-trial, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitted the other accused, found the petitioners guilty as principals for the crime of murder in both criminal cases, who were sentenced reclusion perpetua in each case -The petitioners, assisted by the Public Attorneys Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask the Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman. Issue: 1. Whether or not newly discovered evidence exists to warrant the re-opening of the case 2. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process because they were deprived of adequate legal assistance Held: 1. No. The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds: (a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial; (b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following: (a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence. (b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record. (c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered. These standards, also known as the Berry rule, provides that: Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the Courts. x x x Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a

new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial. 2. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4. That it is not cumulative only viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. 6. A new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness. It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence. The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it. Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial. The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proffered during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. The materials they have cited were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented the petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not the military, but Rolando Galman, who killed Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to present any new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial even with the exercise of due diligence. If they really wanted to seek and offer

the opinion of other forensic experts at the time regarding the physical evidence gathered at the scene of the crime, there was ample opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided. 2. No. An experienced lawyer in criminal cases, Atty. Jimenez vigorously defended the petitioners cause throughout the entire proceedings. The records show that the defense presented a substantial number of witnesses and exhibits during the trial. Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. The general rule is that the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. In People vs. Umali: So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial; and in general the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had counsel proceeded differently.