Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 43:1 0021-8308

The Romantic Realism of Michel Foucault The Scientic Temptation

CHARLES R. VARELA

INTRODUCTION

The interest of this paper is Foucaults Foucault: the link between Foucaults identity and the intellectual orientation of the research strategies of archaeology, genealogy, and problematization in relation to the wide-spread charge of, for example, a Christopher Norris in philosophy and an Anthony Giddens in the social sciences, that Foucault was a determinist of some kind (Norris, 1994, p. 160; Giddens, 1987, p. 98).1 The theme of the relationship of Foucault to his research is the temptation to scientic realism in virtue of his reaching for a realist ontology of powers; and the issue dening that relation is that of connecting the notion of limit-experience, that is Foucaults experience of Foucault as an unformed energy . . . the space of an untamed exteriority that is outside the gates of time, and, the scientic experience of nature as the space of force-elds as power-centers of inuence (Miller, Ibid, pp. 3031, 105; Varela, 2009, pp. 290293). What we are dealing with here is Foucaults involvement in discovering the knot that ties his freedom [limit-experience] to the necessity of the world [force elds] (in Miller, Ibid, p. 78); hence, to recover the innocent freedom of nature [untamed exteriority/energy] (Miller, Ibid, pp. 114115). This issue of the possibility of freedom in nature constitutes Foucaults conicting theories of the subject, that is, subjectivation (freedom) and subjection (determinism). If Foucault is concerned with recovering freedom from the necessity of nature, there can be no serious question but that the theories of the subject are not only internally related to Kants theory of the transcendental subject, but also to Giddenss specic, that is sociological, problem of structure and agency. A key reason for this is that Kant, as I have shown elsewhere, was the rst to formulate the general problem of deterministic structure(s) and embodied human agency from the standpoint of a realist philosophy of science; thereafter the history of the problem can be seen to have been a series of footnotes to Kant (Varela, 2009, pp. 34, 267270). In a review of his work under the pseudonym of Maurice
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Florence entitled, Michel Foucault, the suggested relation to Kant is declared (Gutting, 1994, p. viii).
If Foucault is indeed perfectly at home in the philosophical tradition, it is within the critical tradition of Kant, and his undertaking could be called A Critical History of Thought (Florence, 1994 [1984], p. 314).

We can now refer to an interview just before his death where it is clear that what was essential to Foucault was the freedom side of Kants third antinomyhuman agency.
the study of thought is the analysis of freedom, [for,] thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reects on it as a problem (Foucault, 1997, p. 117).

In What is Enlightenment, then, of course, Foucault declares that his work had always been the expression of a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty (Foucault, 1994, p. 319 emphasis provided). Two years earlier, it is the aforementioned deeper faith in agency that underwrites this declared faith in liberty, asserting that, I believe in the freedom of people. To the same situation, people react in very different ways (Foucault, 1988, p. 14). Kants relevance then is clear: freedom as agency (rst critique) grounds freedom as liberty (second critique). I thus offer the following proposals: Kantian agency is central to Foucaults conicting theories of the subject, and, that the theories of subjection and subjectivation are a variety of Kants third antinomy; also, that Foucaults antinomy is a version of Giddens problem of structure and agency; and what connects Kant, Foucault, and Giddens is scientic realism. What threads these proposals together is the argument that Foucualt was reaching for a realist ontology of powers and thus he was exploring the possibility of being a scientist, the suggested purpose of which was to help him fruitfully address and resolve his structure and creativity problem.

WHICH FOUCAULT IS FOUCAULTS FOUCAULT: POSITIVIST OR REALIST?

I am not an artist, I am not a scientist. I am somebody who tries to deal with reality through those things which are always, often, far from reality. Foucault (1980)

I am taking the above quote to indicate an orientation that informed the standpoints of archaeology and genealogy, surely, but also problematization. A clue to that orientation is Foucaults admission that he was disenchanted with and hence abandoned philosophy ve years after his degree in philosophy in 1948
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(Foucault, 1977, p. 41; Cousins & Hussain, 1984, pp. 68; 1993; Miller, p. 65). He was disenchanted with almost all of the intellectual traditions of his time positivism, phenomenology, existentialism, existential phenomenology, hermeneutics, Marxism and Psychoanalysis; and the abandonment was an act of transgressioncommandingly working through those traditions in order to justiably transcend them. Nevertheless, when Foucault tells us that he is trying to deal with reality . . . through things . . . far from reality, The Order of Things intimates what he glimpses: the visible order . . . [is] only a supercial glitter above an abyss (Foucault, 1973, p. 251). We have a hint here of an ontological romanticism. Consider: while Foucaults pursuit is still philosophy, his transgression now invites us to wonder if he was reaching for a philosophy in a new key. But if not an artist and not a scientist, then, how are we to understand the possibility that he is searching for a philosophy beyond positivism and phenomenology, but, in keeping with the reality far from reality of Marxism and Psychoanalysis? While the empirical realism of positivism and phenomenology favors the supercial glitter, the Marxist theory of false consciousness dangerously presumed the realist ontology of the visible and the invisible, and the unconscious of Freudianism shamelessly exploited that danger, transforming it into a most dangerous method. If Foucault was not happy in his positivism, in this reach for a new philosophy of reality, then, which Foucault is Foucaults Foucault (Han, 2002, p. 6)? I argue that we should be astonished by Priviteras conviction that There can be no doubt about Foucaults positivism, but especially so by Dreyfus/ Rabinows view that Foucault was an extreme phenomenological positivist. My argument leads me to accede only to the rst part of Deleuzes declaration that his friend was a romantic positivist (Privitera, 1995, p. 114; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 50; in Privitera, Ibid, p. 129). Finally, I will explore the charge that Canguilhem dismisses, namely, that Foucault naturalizes culture by withdrawing it from history (Canguilhem, 2005, p. 75). My question, then: which possibility of naturalism was Foucault up to regarding the charge of a bleak determinism, that is that agency is absent in history (Norris, Ibid; Giddens, Ibid).

FOUCAULTS FOUCAULT: A CENTRAL PROPOSAL

Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same. . . . Leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see to it that our papers are in order (Foucault, 1972, p. 17, emphasis provided).

Must we capitulate before this warning and admit that the question of Foucaults Foucault is unanswerable? We and Foucault, however, are neither bureaucrats nor the police. And even if Privitera is right that Foucault is guilty of certain performative contradictions throughout his careera discourse/power/
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knowledge determinism for examplebeing a bureaucrat or the police in the performance of his criticality is not one of them (Privitera, 1995; Foucault, 1994, p. 133). After all, discussion and not polemics was his preferred style of criticality (Foucault, 1997, pp. 111113). One of Foucaults deepest beliefs, Pascalian through and through, is that we human beings are both monsters and incomprehensible, and that is exactly why we are to be accepted. The freedom of human agency that grounds our Pascalian features constitutes the core of his revolutionary humanism, and expresses exactly his point that humanism begins in compassion (Foucault, 1977, pp. 228229). Hence, Foucaults answer to the question as to whether his identity is unavailable is, simply, no. If no artist and, only for the moment, if no scientist, these denials are, perhaps, not the telling point. For, despite the spirit of the Cretan Liars Paradox that frames his performances, in a way that counts, we always know who he is. AlwaysMichel Foucault: a concrete intellectual who is seeking to engage one and all in concrete . . . relations between man and man (Foucault, 1973a, pp. 251253, 1977, pp. 218234, 1998, pp. 147149; Miller, 1993, pp. 68).

FOUCAULTS THEORY OF IDENTITY: THE CONCRETE PERSON

A concept of the concrete person that Foucault presupposes in being a concrete intellectual involved in concrete human discursive relations explicitly emerged in his two works, Mental Illness and Psychology and Dream and Existence, in 1954 (Foucault, 1954a, pp. 313, 1954b, pp. 3154; Miller, 1993, p. 5). Embracing the modern biological epistemic category of organic entity, Foucault points out that, by the early fties, the meta-pathological theory of mental illness as the autonomous reality of a specic entity in relation to the organism, should be abandoned. Instead, a privileged status [is] accorded to the overall reactions of the individual (Foucault, 1954a, pp. 2, 6, 7). Furthermore, the same privileged status is accorded to the notion of psychological totality. . . . it has reality and meaning only within a structured personality (Foucault, Ibid, p. 7). Furthermore,
In this priority given to . . . totality one can see a return to concrete pathology and the possibility of determining the eld of mental pathology and organic pathology as a single eld. After all, is not each . . . addressed to the same individual in his concrete reality (Foucault, Ibid, p. 8, emphasis provided)?

Even though the single eld idea is unworkable, he argues, nevertheless, when Foucault comments that the idea of the unity of body and mind is in the order of reality, especially with Freud in mind, he is opting for an anti-reductionist notion of the functional autonomy of personality (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 910). We have here the fundamental conception of the concrete reality of the total individual: the individual as personality refers to the unity of the human being as a
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whole (Foucault, Ibid, p. 9). As personality is the reality and measure of the human being, so, person is the reality and measure of personality. For Freud, only the rst statement is true: personality explains (away) the person through the theory of the unconscious; at best, personhood is the promise of the ideal completion of psychoanalytic therapy; in the meantime, Freud is the only person in relation to his theory of personality. Therefore, Foucaults conception of the concrete personality is the conception of the concrete person. He rounds out the latter with a social psychological theory of personhood: the historical and dialectical practices of social suggestions constitute the conditions for the genesis of persons (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 1213). In Foucaults essay on Binswangers Dream and Existence he explicitly moves from the social psychological theory of persons to its philosophical roots in the Sartrean/Heideggerian principle that human being is the existential moment of being in the world with others. Foucault uses Kantian freedom to dismiss the determinism/biologism that grounds the unconscious. During the time from the nineteen-thirties to nineteen-sixties, all together, Husserlian phenomenology, Heideggerian ontology, Sartrean Existentialism, and Merleau-Pontyan existential phenomenology constituted an antidote but not a solution to the scientic realism of Freudian psychoanalytic theory; thereafter, in the seventies the challenge culminated in the neo-humanist hermeneutic revolt within American Psychoanalysis against Freudian science (Varela, 2003, pp. 9698). The new metaphysical principle of exteriority supplanted the traditional metaphysics of interiority: life-world, being in the world, existence, and the lived body, were the kindred responses to the scandal of philosophy that Freuds Cartesianist metapsychology perpetuated in a suspect scientic edice. The suspicion was that Freud was a Wizard of Oz rather than a scientic wizard. Foucaults Dream, Imagination, and Existence emerged out of the fertile context of this early moment of Continental Philosophy (Foucault, 1954b, pp. 3178). His response to Freuds replacement of individual consciousness (freedom) with the socio-psychobiological unconscious (determinism) was to present the individual human being as an original existential reality ; this was to counter psychological positivism and its reductive concept of homo natura (Foucault, Ibid, p. 31). This initial encounter of Binswangerian existential psychoanalysis and Freudian scientic psychoanalysis gives us a Foucault focusing on what he refers to as a rigorous Heideggerian-informed anthropological science of the phemenological/existential content of the Human Fact (Foucault, 1986, p. 32, 1998, p. 250).
Not some objective sector of a natural universe, but the real content of an existence which is living itself and is experiencing itself . . . in a world that is at once the plenitude of its own project and the element of its situation (Foucault, 1986 [1954] Ibid, emphasis provided).

The Fact that is distinctively Human Foucault calls the originative movement of freedom; and he explicitly asserts that this is to displace Freuds biological equipment of the libidinal instinct (Foucault, Ibid, p. 51). Note what is revealed
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here: Foucault begins his theoretical career with a commitment to Kantian freedom against Freudian determinism, located at the site of the whole human being; where the powers of human agencyautonomy, imagination, reasonare the faces of one reality, the person (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 5675). Furthermore, now it is clear that the noumenal/existential core of personhood foreshadows what is to come, the problem of the conicting principles of transcendentalism and historicity in Foucaults theories of subjectivation and subjection. It is this problem that Canguilhems second aforementioned dismissal risks missing (p. 4). In fully embracing the Sartrean/Heideggerian principle that human being is the existential moment of being in the world with others, Foucault reads that principle according to his concept of personhood: the moment of being in the world is personal being; hence, the mode of being in the world with others is that of the concrete relations between concrete persons. From his concept of the concrete person something much more can be said on this matter than Mark Posters view that that concept nally rises to the level of the principle of maturity presented in Kants paper of 1784, What is Enlightenment (Poster, 1993, pp. 6380). For, in view of the fact indicated above that Foucault deliberately wrote a paper in 1984 with that exact same title, I will take Kant much more seriously in this context and therefore take Foucaults deep response to him seriously, and seriously problematic, in then arguing for the special philosophical character of Foucaults intellectual orientation to his research (Poster, 1993, pp. 6371).

EINSTEIN AND HARR: REALIST METAPHYSICS

In the discussion to follow I am using Harrs notion of the three ways that the terms philosophy/science can be relationally conceived: philosophy or science, philosophy of science, and philosophy in science. What frames Harres notion is Max Borns famous observation that theoretical physics is actual philosophy. Regarding the third relation, then, consider Einsteins letter to Moritz Schlick.
In general your presentation fails to correspond to my conceptual style insofar as I nd your whole orientation . . . too positivistic. . . . I tell you straight out: Physics is the attempt at the conceptual reconstruction of a model of the real world and its lawful structure. In short, I suffer under the unsharp separation of Reality of Experience and Reality of Being. You will be astonished about the metaphysicist Einstein. But every four-and two-legged animal is de facto in this sense a metaphysicist (in Manicas, 2006, p. 18, emphasis provided).

The realism of science must be sharply differentiated from the empirical realism of logical positivism, for, the philosophy in scientic theory is a depth realist metaphysics. Thus Harr can state:
Scientic theories are metaphysical devices for expressing the ontology of our world. The nature of explanation is relativised to the kinds of entities, properties and interactions named by the
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theory, and the kinds of predictions it can make will be dependent upon the ontology it presupposes (Aronson, Harr, & Way, 1995, p. 104).

The import of scientic realism for the question of Foucaults identity/ orientation is three-fold: Foucualts 1980 statement suggests that his reach for a new philosophy is a reach for a metaphysics, the metaphysics is realist, hence, not only is Foucault no more a philosopher than Einstein was in being a scientist, but he may well be no less a scientist than an Einstein was in being one of those two-legged animals. From this standpoint Derridas dismissal of Foucaults work on madness and civilization because it presupposes a metaphysic is irrelevant (Miller, 1993, p. 119).

IDENTITY AND ORIENTATION: METAPHYSICS FOR RESEARCH

Perhaps Hans Sluga is right that Nietzsches inuence won out over Heideggers (Sluga, 2005, p. 222). Thus, it might be supposed that Nietzsches doctrine of the will to power is particularly relevant to the widely shared judgment that Power . . . is Foucaults overarching theme (Collins & Makowsky, 1993, p. 257; Mohanty, 1993, p. 33; Miller, 1993, p. 15). In 1977 Foucault concurred:
When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about in Madness and Civilization or The Birth of the Clinic but power (in Hoy, 1986, p. 2).

However, he also reveals, for instance, in A Preface to Transgression 1963, that there is more to his interest in power than the sociological fact that Collins and Makowsky have in mind. Foucault offers his own In Praise of Philosophy in amending his earlier position on the end of philosophy (Merleau-Ponty, 1969, pp. 1926).
If philosophy is now experienced as a multiple desert, it is not because it has lost its proper object or the freshness of its experience, but because it has been suddenly divested of that language which is historically natural to it. We do not experience the end of philosophy, but a philosophy which regains its speech and nds itself again only in the marginal region which borders its limits: [nding] itself either in a puried meta-language or in the thickness of words enclosed by their darkness, by their blind truth. The profound distance that separates these alternatives . . . manifests . . . a profound coherence. This . . . real incompatibility is the actual distance from whose depths philosophy addresses us. It is from here that we must focus our attention (Foucault, 1977, p. 41).

Foucault is directing our attention to the problem of the blind truth of sexuality and the ineffectuality of discursive language before it, pointing beyond both the traditional religious and the modern biological and Freudian truth that are now, he believes, an obstacle (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 2933). Thus the root of [a
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liberated] sexuality . . . the movement that nothing can ever limit is not, exactly, sexuality, the power of desire, the libido, but the desire of desire, power (Foucault, Ibid, p. 33, emphasis provided; Miller, 1993, pp. 272274, 279). Thus, it is not Nietzsches Daemonic organismic will to power that informs Foucault here, but his own idea of the power of personhood, and a personhood that wills more power (Miller, Ibid, p. 72). A metaphysics inspired by the image of a ash of lightening in the night, and presented as a Critique and Ontology [which] comprehends nitude and being (Foucault, 1977, p. 38). Foucault is translating the metaphor, ash of lightening, by way of a transgression model of human being, into its essential form, the immediacy of being (Foucault, Ibid, p. 37). It is, I suggest, Nietzsches Daemon translated into an ontology of the reciprocity of power and being, not as things apart from process, but being as the power of the process of dynamical actionthe intersection of beings and their violent powers of creativity and excess, the making and unmaking of limits, and their transgression (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 2952, 35, 38; Miller, Ibid). Here, then, is Foucaults Preface to Metaphysics: centered in Heideggers unity of freedom and power, it is a Trinitarian marriage of Kants absolute spontaneity, Nietzches will to power, and Dostoevskys absolutely groundless wild choice (Varela, 1984, pp. 155164). But from Foucaults 1954 engagement in metaphysics we already have a cardinal principle which, now, we can see is being eshed out in the transgression paper: the existential moment of being in the world with others is the dynamical action of personhood. Thus, in Preface, when Foucault begins to declare his famous death of man theme, that The breakdown of philosophical subjectivity and its dispersion in a language that dispossesses it. . . . is probably one of the fundamental structures of contemporary thought, we now know how else to read it (Foucault, 1977, p. 42). Philosophical subjectivity is the Kantian subject, not the Foucauldian subjectthe person. In his next metaphysical paper (1966),The Thought of the Outside refers to the reality that constitutes the immediacy of being, discourse as Language to Innity (1963). While discourse is outside of the philosophical subject, it is not outside of the person whose being is the immediacy of discourse (Foucault, 1998, pp. 147169, 9091). Cartesianism gives way to a metaphysic of incorporeal materiality, that is the person, whose mind and body are united in the dynamical action process of being in the world with other persons (Foucault, 1977, p. 169). Its dynamism is Merleau-Pontyan: the movement that nothing can ever limit. In referring to Kants note to the Amphiboly of concepts of reection, Foucault sees the metaphysics of Preface as equivalent to the shift instituted by Kant when he distinguished the nihil negativum and the nihil privatiuma distinction known to have opened the way for the advance of critical thought (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 48, 36). In view of this, are we to conclude then that Foucaults interest in power is the concern of a philosopher whose special interest is the topic of ontology? That would certainly put him closer to Nietzsche (and Heidegger) whose interest in power was that of a philosopher and not that of a philosopher of
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science, nor indeed the interest of a practicing scientist in the philosophy in science; and Foucault was a practicing researcher. But as to the question of whether he should be slotted into the traditional philosophy or science relation, and especially now in view of the Kantian reference, why should we ever think so? There is no one to whom Foucault is closer, metaphysically, than Kant. And today, it is quite persuasive to believe, and it makes all the difference, that Kant was rst and foremost a philosopher of science, and then, a philosopher of transcendental Idealism. The reason: Kants philosophy of science was not that of a philosopher thinking philosophically about science, but rather it was the result of the philosophy that is in science, itself. In other words, because he was thinking through the philosophy in science, that is why Kant was thinking philosophically about science. To be accurate, and this is crucial, it was Newtons realist metaphysics of nature that Kant was articulating in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Varela, 2009, pp. 267292). For example, Kant was explicating the principle that Newtonian theory is an ontological connection between concepts, that is the concepts referencing [powers as] forces causing accelerations in a law-like way (Aronson, 1984, p. 91). And it is precisely Newtons realism where Kant and Foucault are most intimately connected. On this issue, a major point for this paper is this: I have never seen Foucault actually reject the Kantian idea, which he only seemingly dismisses in The Archaeology of Knowledge, of the powers of a constituent consciousness (Foucault, 1972, p. 203, emphasis provided). Did he reject consciousness?, yes: Thought. . . . at the level of existence, in its very dawning, is in itself an action (Foucault, 1977, p. 5, emphasis provided); powers of thought . . . [as] action, never. Now we can say that in the 1954 volumes the concept of person is a concept of the powerful particular (Foucault, 1954a, pp. 313, 1954b, pp. 4753). One of the perfect proofs of the importance of this truth is Foucaults reference in Madness and Civilization to the real person of the doctor. . . . and, his almost miraculous power to cure [patients that is] structurally located in the the doctorpatient couple (Foucault, 1973, p. 274). Foucault is here expressing the Kantian/Durkheimian principle that
this power had nothing extraordinary about it; it was to be explained and demonstrated in the efcacity, simply, of moral behavior [which is itself centered in] . . . the social and moral order [of society] (Foucault, 1973, Ibid, emphasis provided).

Here, then, we have Foucault in pursuit of a new metaphysics for his work, at the heart of which is a Kantian/Durkheimian interest in power in reference to both the subject, which he conceives of as a real [concrete] person, and to social life, which he conceives of as a concrete mode of relation[s] between man and man (Foucault, 1973, pp. 251252). Of course, then, in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault intends us to understand that the sovereignty of the gaze, the gaze that knows and decides, the eye that governs, is the sovereign person; and thus the real person in, What is an Author?; but, it is not the sovereign subject (Foucault, 1994, p. 89,
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emphasis provided, 1977, pp. 123124) The sovereign knowing, deciding, and governing gaze is personal beingthe sovereign person is personal agency! In relation to Kant and Durkheim, my proposal is that, precisely because the concept of person is to be situated in his reach for a realist metaphysics, Foucault is not a (traditional) philosopher. And even though Foucault himself conrms this, stating, I am not . . . a philosopher, others, for instance, Garth Gillan and Jitendra Mohanty, have challenged him (Foucault, 1982, p. 9; Gillan, 1987, pp. 3443; Mohanty, 1993, pp. 2940). Gillan claims that Foucault engages in philosophy only in the period of problematization, but, without being a philosopher: discourse and the body as nomadic desire are the two central ideas (Gillan, 1987, pp. 3435); Mohanty declares that Foucaults fundamental concepts, like power, are philosophical, and, that he is a philosopher, not a scientist (Mohanty, 1993, Ibid). Lets nd out why these two positions are unconvincing.

FOUCAULT AND KANT: METAPHYSICS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SUBJECT

Getting hold of Foucaults metaphysics enables me to do the following: to address Beatrice Hanss thesis in, Foucaults Critical Project: Between the transcendental and the Historical, that Foucault did not resolve the conicting theories of the determinism of subjection and the freedom of subjectivation; second, to trace that liability back to the ontology underwriting his work (Han, 2002, pp. 186, 184186, 196). For example, Dreyfus and Rabinow permit us to say that Foucault never abandoned the thesis that the practices of the human sciences, themselves, are a function of both determinate discursive formationssubjectionand self-determining intelligibilitysubjectivation (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 103) The fact that the transcendental and the Historical is the unresolved problem of Foucaults Critical Project keeps bringing Foucault back to Kant. Ian Hacking certainly acknowledges this, suggesting that Foucault has been completing a dialogue with Kant (Hacking, 1986, p. 39). But which one? In addressing the renowned four questions that underwrite Kants critiques Hacking asserts that Foucault deliberately inverted and destroyed each of them; for example, What is Man? asked Kant. Nothing, says Foucault (Hacking, Ibid). While Hacking omits Foucaults philosophical depth in relation to Kant, Hans above point indicates why one should never do so. Thus I maintain that, rst, Foucault could never have completed his dialogue with Kant, and, second, the importance of that fact cannot be revealed by Hacking because he emphasizes the wrong dialogue with Kant. It is the problem of Kants third antinomy concerning freedom and determinism that should be seen as reconguring the fourth question for Foucault, and thereby renewing its importance for him. Consider this: the conicting theories of the subject suggest that What is Man is still presumed in both the archaeological theory of the discursive formation of discourse practices and the genealogical theory of power relations and the elds of force they constitute, since, however de-centered, each of the men implicated in
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11

discursive practices and their power elds still raises the question of their constitutionmanas well as their historicity. With the shift to problematization this question of the constitution and historicity of the subject re-emerges with the theory of subjectivation that is exemplied by the aesthetics (or art) of existence (Foucault, 1988, pp. 4753). Now, even more helpful, then, is Foucaults pronouncement: We are all Neo-Kantians, and therefore, he continues, we are enjoined to honor the ceaselessly repeated injunction to return to the break established by Kantboth to rediscover its necessity and to understand its consequences more fully (in Han, 2002, p. 3). Thus, my thesis: the meaning of the fact that Foucault did not because he could not complete what he himself referred to as his essential task [of freeing] the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence by cleans[ing] it all of transcendental narcissism, is given in Hans conclusion that Foucault never got passed holding both a transcendental and an historical conception of the subject, to the very end. Let us be very clear here: precisely because Foucault was driven from the very beginning by the concept of the person and its noumenal/existential core, to then have conceived of the subject as being both transcendental and historical, meant, that he could not resolve the conicting theories of subjection and subjectivation. In virtue of the above, I am also contending that what we specically have here then is a Foucauldian variety of Kants third antinomy. On the one side, embracing historicity and, in effect, thereby rejecting transcendentalism, Foucault pays the price of the determinism of subjection. This makes perfect sense, of course, since, to plunge whole sale into historicity, while foregoing phenomenologys dodge that freedom is in a phenomenological realm that is insulated from the phenomenal world, while being in it, is to nd oneself right back in the phenomenal world of determinism (Varela, 2009, pp. 627). On the other side, returning to transcendentalism and in effect thereby rejecting historicity, Foucault explicitly tries to preserve freedom in the theory of subjectivation (Foucault, 1972, p. 203; Han, Ibid). Thus, taking Foucault to have accepted the standard rejection of transcendentalism/noumenalism, nevertheless, this means that the problem of the Foucauldian subject has been returned to the problem of presuming some kind of a metaphysical realm, in which freedom can be preserved and determinism reckoned with, somehow (Varela, 2009, pp. 67). Indeed, in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault has a promethean image which fully resonates with this idea of the renewed search for a metaphysics and its image of a ash of lightening in the night that will be suitable for a robust theory of the subject[with] the end of the innite on earth, the ame return[s] to its native re (Foucault, 1994 [1963], p. 1998). The deep metaphysical problem of this ame and its home in a native re turns out to be that of a liberty that rages beyond its bounds (Foucault, 1973, p. 246). Foucault has thus metaphysically moved beyond Nietzschean mystico-biologism: persons will from power, for more personal power. I now am even further convinced that it is the inherent difculties of Foucaults variety of the third antinomy that goes a long way in explaining his returns to Kant. At the center is
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the special problem of the returning of the ame to its native re: if it is language and hence discourse that is the house of the concrete person rather than the transcendental subject, how is this to be metaphysically understood?; and when discourse is linked up to the power/knowledge nexus, how is the metaphysical situation in this new alliance to be comprehended?; and particularly with reference to the determinism of subjection that certain critics claim not only is the fact of Foucauldian discourse, but also became the fate of the power/knowledge nexus. Moving into problematization and subjectivation, is the metaphysical problem of the preceding theoretical efforts now resolved? Specically, when in his penultimate return to Kant in, What is Enlightenment, where he reviews his Critical Project, takes up the problem of the subject, arbitrarily dismissing its transcendental ground, and then, in resorting to Baudelairs aesthetic theory of the subject as the nal effort to preserve freedom, from what metaphysical grounds has he indeed proceeded? The question is crucial because the aesthetic reinstatement of freedom leaves us exactly in the same logical place as the noumenal preservation of freedom. In Science for Humanism: the recovery of human agency, I only contended that Foucault reclaimed but did not recover freedom (Varela, 2009, p. ix), but part II will show that that follows from Foucaults failure to resolve his variety of the third antinomy. While it may not be, the economy, stupid, Foucaults returns to Kant nalize the demonstration that is presented here in part I that, if Foucaults work is to be understood on his terms, its the metaphysics, stupid.

FOUCAULTS RESEARCH STYLE: A DISCIPLINARY SCIENTIFIC DOMAIN?

Foucault believes that the term, domain of research, rather than the term, discipline, is the more exact designation of his styles of research (Foucault, 1998, p. 261). But note the implication: the former term is a discipline, but not exactly. Hence, I will exploit that implication by proposing the term disciplinary domain: a domain inclined toward being a discipline. And inclined is the operative word here, since Alan Sheridan is on to something when he asserts that in turning away from the disciplines of Marxism and Psychoanalysis, no one can say that [Foucault] founded a new one (Sheridan, 1980, pp. 12). It is not the nding of a new discipline that is really the point here; its not a specied theoretical content that Foucault is up to; such a move toward a discipline is more proto-theoretical than theoretical, in that sense. And, has he not been clear about this, even though he later relaxes the logicist demand, for instance, when he says, When the time nally comes to found a theory, it will have to dene a deductive order (Foucault, 1972, p. 11). Now, my compound term transgresses Foucaults idea of a discipline, either as one of the limitations of discourse discussed in The Order of Language, or in Discipline and Punishment, as a mechanism of the discourse/ power/knowledge nexus at work (Foucault, 1995, pp. 136141); for, what I have
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in mind is a domain in which some one could be a monster, like a Foucault, as well as a Mendel, and still be properly spoken of (Foucault, 1972, pp. 232, 224). While Foucault leads us to think that such a discipline nevertheless is still destined for the ante-chamber of the sciences proper, yet, it is to be located somewhere in the positive domain of knowledge wherein reside the empirical sciences; in the troublesome case of the human sciences, their location is perhaps indicated by the fact that Foucault was indeed making preparations for their funeral (Foucault, Ibid). Can we believe, then, that a style of research is a discipline, exactly, only if it meets the criteria of the proper sciencesthe formal and the physical sciences? There are no other criteria for Foucault? Stepping back and situating Foucaults alleged involvement in forging a disciplinary domain in the context of Gaston Bachelards philosophy of science, we may well have here a response of a serious student to his teachers intention to conceptualize the nature of the modern scientic spirit of, in this case, not physical science, but human science, and, for the future (Privitera, 1995, p. 5). After all, there is a strong suggestion that suffuses The Order of Things that Foucault was not ponderously presenting merely the history of various epistemes, but rather, to present them in order to work toward the next one. He seems to have been up against what he saw as the disappointment of the human sciences, in this regard, and the challenge of the counter sciences as a new epistemethe unthought generally, the unconscious specically (Foucualt, Ibid, pp. 322328, 323324, 373386). In any event, he comes off as one of the makers in the discursive practice of, something, that seemed to be in the making (Lemert & Gillan, 1982, p. 29). In conjunction with the reach for a new metaphysics, this reach for a new disciplinary domain to implement it, I now want to claim, betrays an unexpected intellectual temptation: Foucaults romanticism is inclined toward scientic realism. And that, would seem to be the proper context wherein to appreciate his continuous generation of ontological conceptions that we witness throughout his career: the concrete person, the dream and the anthropology of expression, medical gaze/glance/touch, episteme and the being of language, the archive/discursive formation/discourse practices, discourse/power/knowledge and subjection, subjectivation/Baudelairean subjectivity and the aesthetics of existence. A happy positivism?, no; intimations of an unwieldy realism, promising.

BEYOND THE STRUCTURALIST TEMPTATION: REALISM FOR RIGOR

It is time, now, to recognize that Gary Guttings once useful insight that Foucault did not submit to the structuralist temptation, has had its day (Gutting, 1989, p. 270). After all, I suspect that Foucault felt that structuralism was the wrong scientic game in town. In the works of 1954 discussed earlier, on the one hand, there is a call for a new rigor for mental medicine, and on the other, a call for a rigorous science of the human fact (Foucault, 1954a, p. 2; 1954b, p. 32). When, a decade
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later, Foucault declares that archaeology is, in a strict sense, the science of this archive, in view of his earlier interest in science for rigor along with his preface to metaphysics, we can now take this statement to be an instantiation of another moment of that interest that reveals that he was generally succumbing to a scientic temptation (1998 [1966], p. 263). It is simply not enough to ask, then, as Lemert and Gillan do, is Foucault an Artist? Or scientist?; and then, to reply with The answer that he is neither simply, yet both, and leave it at that (Lemert & Gillan 1982); and still it is not enough, when Sheridan claims that genealogy . . . [is] a gay science. . . . [and] that love of hypothesis pervades all of Foucaults work (Sheridan, Ibid, p. 222). For, it is the ontology of a strict sense of that gay science that is the telling issue. Hence, when Nietzsche can say, We have no sense for causa efciens: here Hume was right, so that both the causal power concept and its corresponding concept of agentive entity are ruled out, Nietzsche must be irrelevant to Foucault here, for, the concept of a concrete person would have been impossible to come up with (Schacht, 1992, pp. 182, 173184). And therefore, in view of his general interest in seeking scientic rigor that references a reality beyond visible order, realism must be the possibility of naturalism for Foucault. The systematic answer to which is now to be found not only as a direct implication of his meta-theoretical discussions of science in The Order of Things, but, denitively, in the form and in the formulation of the theory of discourse found originally in the latter, and of course, in both What is an Author and The Archaeology of Knowledge . However, if Gillan is right that discourse and the body are two of Foucaults fundamental conceptions, then his ontological concern with realism has specically to do with embodied discourse. My only amendment is this: the body and its desire is a Merleau-Pontyan code for the person and his/her powers in the practices of discourse underwritten by his metaphysics of dynamic action.

THE SCIENTIFIC TEMPTATION: A NEW CRITERION OF SCIENCE?

The Order of Things presents Foucaults unqualied respect for mathematics, astronomy, and physics in virtue of the three factors he himself has identied that constitute them as the sciences proper, systematicity, objectivity, formalization, and in particular the logicism of the latter (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 365, 347); and yet, even though it obviously had to be qualied, the empirical sciences, as sciences, were certainly respected. As for the human sciences, Foucault is ambivalent: he is somewhere between bending over backwards in trying not to be dismissive and being in mourning? (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 366367). But I want to set this issue aside, for, here, I argue that it is more fruitful to attend to the precise way Foucault identied each of the empirical sciences. His discourse on that issue shows us that, however unsystematic, he was actually indicating quite an important fourth criterion of science. In the Archaeology of Knowledge this criterion is not
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explicitly found among any of the four thresholds that lead to the emergence of discursive formations, especially in the three that are identied as systems of scientic thoughtformalization, scienticity, epistemologization (Barry, 2002, p. 52). But, when it is claimed in the above book that the archive, [in producing] the appearance of statements as unique events, is the atom of discourse, the forth criterion is exemplied by the theory of the archive/statement-connection. (Foucault, 1972, pp. 126131, 129, 80). Let us begin with Foucaults announcement that in biology the focus is on the energy of life, in economics the foci are the forces of the production and distribution of wealth, and for linguistics, the powers of language (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 243 244). Furthermore, with reference to his keen regard for the counter-sciences of Levi-straussian anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis, we should particularly notice their unique interest in the second element of The Analytic of Finitude, the unthought, in their case, the unconscious (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 322328, 373 386). But we all know that care must be taken here, for, while this is not the unconscious of Freud, it is the unconscious from Freud: they do not conceive of the unconscious in the same way as he didthe structural model of 1923to be sure, but they do conceive of it in the same senseas a realist explanation (Foucault, 1998, pp. 252, 249259). Which is to say, of course, that Levi-Strauss and Lacan infamously gave us their brand of determinism, and they did so, which is a separate thing, in Freuds realist format. And Foucault followed suit: archaeology signies the subsoil of our consciousness of meaning (Foucault, 1998, p. 263). In Michel Foucault and the Subversion of Intellect, Racevskis understands this perfectly.
In showing that Western man is subject to determinisms that transcend his consciousness of an identity, Foucault, in effect, assumes the role of psychoanalyst. His purpose is comparable to Lacans, since it also consists in showing. . . . that our humanity is not the image we construe of ourselves but something over which we have little control (Racevskis, 1983, p. 38).

In thus joining Freud, Lacan, and Levi-Struass in this theoretical manner, it is clear that although the traditional problem of freedom and determinism is central to Foucualts work, its proper context is the structure/agency problem. Yet, dening that problem in Foucaults case is a problem. From the very beginning of his work in psychology and existential psychoanalysis to the very end of his work in problematization, he believed what he had declared in, The Order of Discourse, that, it would be ridiculous to deny the existence of individuals who write and invent (Foucault, 1972, p. 222). But, contrary to that, not only is it shown in the above quote regarding the subsoil of consciousness that, at the very least, the language of his archaeological theory of discourse is deterministic, that intent is actually stated elsewhere when he claries the meaning of subsoil. First, this statement:
I have no difculty in accepting that mans languages, his unconscious, and his imagination are governed by laws of structure (Foucault, 1972, p. 20).
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And now this:

I have tried to disengage an autonomous domain that would be that of the unconscious of science, the unconscious of knowledge, which would have its own rules, just as the unconscious of the human individual also has its rules and determinations (Gutting, Ibid, p. 53, emphasis provided).

It is evident that the theory of discourse as an autonomous/anonymous unconscious domain of deterministic/determinate rules is deliberately Freudian in form and clearly realist in formulation (Foucault, 1998, p. 251). Although critics have noticed the line moving from Freud to Levi-Strauss to Lacan, and then to Foucault, they have not understood that it is the scientic realism of the explanatory format of all three and Foucault, that identies them, which is a separate matter, in their deterministic intent. That is, regarding the latter, when in What is an Author, Foucault can state that
the subject . . . must be stripped of its creative role and analyzed as a complex and variable function of [the unconscious of] discourse (Foucault, 1977, p. 138),

we have the following: the unconscious is the real agent, the conscious is only so in appearance. When Foucaults theoretical logic is thus spelled out, and the realism of its format is exposed, my decision to cast such a theory as a variety of the structure/agency problem gains in plausibility. After all, Giddens casts his problem as a realist problem; but he did so, remember, in order to transcend determinism: causal powers theory was to provide for a conception of freedom, that is the concrete person as personal agency (Varela, 2009, pp. 1011, 32034)! The point of Science for Humanism was to prove that he was right (Varela, Ibid, pp. 268292, 293321). We will see in part II that in Foucaults last return to Kant he reinstates Kantian freedom as the power of agency and of liberty; and he does so, forgetful of the realist metaphysics that he presupposed in the early fties, and had been dwelling in since the sixties. Stepping back and keeping before us what has been stated above, consider this fact: the human sciences of psychologism, sociologism, and historicism, with their traditional humanistic commitment to the sovereignty of the subject in its original Kantian format, and then in its phenomenological and existential recongurations, are the furthest away from Foucaults epistemological respect for the empirical sciences (Varela, 2009, pp. 1427). With this observation I want to bring out the critical fact that what the natural, empirical, and counter sciences have in common is a fourth criterion. And, that it is this factor which not only excludes the humanistically regarded human sciences from being empirical sciences, but it determines that biology, economics, and linguistics are a science, for that very reason. And, since Foucault obviously distinguishes the empirical from the natural sciences, that is why he did not declare that they also share the criteria of systematicity and formalization. In other words, the empirical sciences are not exactly the sciences proper, but they are sciences. This may well be the thrust of the reach for a disciplinary domainan empirical realist science.
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It is now time to show how Foucault himself actually introduces the three foci of the empirical sciences, the discursive context of which is the unfolding of the modern episteme emerging from the Kantian theory of the transcendental eld.
Opposite to this opening to the transcendental, and symmetrical to it, another form of thought questions the conditions of a relation between representations from the point of view of the being itself that is represented: what is indicated, on the horizon of all actual representations, as the foundation of their unity, is found to be those never objectiable objects, those never entirely representable representations, those simultaneously evident and invisible invisibilities, those realities that are removed from reality to the degree to which they are the foundations of what is given to us and reaches us: the force of labour, the energy of life, the power of speech (Foucault, Ibid, p. 244, emphasis provided).

With reference to the invisible invisibilities that are the realities that are removed from reality and hence are never objectiable objects, and that thus constitute the foundations of what is given to us and reaches us, what is being picked out here by Foucault is the depth realist feature that the Harr formulation of it quoted earlier (p. 9) declares constitutes science as a metaphysical/explanatory endeavor. Finally, note this remarkable comment by Foucault. If we consider,
the power to provide a foundation . . . for the various links that can join its various elements, [it is clear that] the condition of these links resides henceforth outside representation, beyond its immediate visibility, in a sort of behind-the-scenes world even deeper and more dense than representation itself. In order to nd a way back to the point where the visible forms of beings [life, labor, and language] are joined . . . we must direct our search towards that peak, that necessary but always inaccessible point, which drives down, beyond our gaze, towards the very heart of things. Withdrawn into their own essence, taking up their place within the force that animates them, within the organic structure that maintains them, within the genesis that has never ceased to produce them, things, in their fundamental truth, have now escaped from the space of the table. . . . It is from the starting point of the architecture they conceal, of the cohesion that maintains its sovereign and secret sway over each one of their parts, it is from the depth of the force that brought them into being and remains in them, as though motionless yet still quivering, that things . . . offer themselves, though very partially, to representation. And from their inaccessible store, representation can draw out, piece by piece, only tenuous elements whose unity . . . always remains hidden in that beyond (Foucault, Ibid, pp. 238239, emphasis provided).

And from the closing chapter of The Birth of the Clinic we know what that realist feature is which is the reference for what always remains hidden in that beyond, those invisible invisibilities. It is revealed in Broussaiss insight that localization [of disease at the organic site] demands . . . a causal schema that explicitly calls for the idea of the irritability of the tissue and the irritating power of the agent (Foucault, 1994, p. 189, emphasis provided). Hence, note that what we have here is a fourth empirical sciencean open disciplinary domain of which the archaeology is merely a possible, and only an initial, exemplar: a theory of discourse as an autonomous unconscious domain of rules has the determinate properties of power, energy, and force.
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From the above discussion in which I have laid out Foucaults discovery of scientic realism, and assuming that he could have been confronted with this in an interview between 1980 and 1984, we can easily imagine that he could have also commented at some point that, When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about [throughout the three domains of my research] but causal power.

FOUCAULTS FOURTH EMPIRICAL SCIENCE: A FATAL TENSION

The fourth empirical science leaves us with a position in a fatal state of tension. Taking the above statement that discourse is a determinate unconscious domain together with Foucaults statement in, The Order of Discourse, that discourse is not about objects or subjects, since it is neither language nor speech, note Foucaults declaration.
Finally, if it is true that these discursive, discontinuous series have their regularity, within certain limits, it is clearly no longer possible to establish mechanically causal links or an ideal necessity among their constitutive elements (Foucaualt, 1972, p. 231, emphasis provided).

We have here an explanatory standpoint whose tension stems from two assertions that contradict each otherthe thesis that discourse is deterministic and the thesis that discourse is non-deterministic. And it is presented in the realist format of Levi-Strauss and Lacan. Even though, if one were to insist, Foucault meant this position to be proto-theoretical, this comment does not save him, for weve seen that he did claim that any future theory would be deductive in form. Thus, as unmistakably deductive in form there is an allusion to determinism, and the scent of a Hempel. So, the link between the deductivism of structuralism and a determinist version of realist science cannot be ignored. Furthermore, in admitting that he confused too much the effects of power proper on enunciative play . . . with systematicity, the theoretical form, or something like a paradigm, this wont do as an answer (in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Ibid, p. 104) For, what exactly, is the confusion with regard to the theoretical nature of the alleged systematicity; what ontological paradigm is being alluded too? The Foucualt/Giddens connection centered on the idea that the sovereign person is personal agency helps us here. In his study of Foucaults epistemology Privitera suggests that Foucaults version of Giddenss problem is structure and creativity (Privitera, Ibid, pp. 97, 9198). Specically, it is the problem of the deterministic principle that being speaks the subject. And yet, after the Dreyfus/Rabinow criticism that Foucaults ascription of causal powers to discourse is incomprehensible, Foucault learned his lesson (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. xxiv). Moving from the archive/discursive formation/discourse dynamic to the dynamics of power relations and elds of forces the archaeological theory of the archive was abandoned. The lesson learned
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has to do with the metaphysical status of an alleged hidden mechanism producing statements. After all, he did, at least in the case of Freud, and Durkheim, point out in 1965, that Freud fatally discovered the unconscious as a thing; he perceived it as a certain number of mechanisms. . . . thereby [committing] psychology to a radical concretication (Foucault, 1998, p. 252). Nevertheless, note, that even after he dismissed not only these two concreticantions but the concreticantion of discourse after 1969, in 1980, we have seen that Foucault has claimed that he never gave up his search for the reality of things far from reality. Thus, considering both Foucaults resort to the discourse/power/knowledge dynamic and his commitment to realism, it cannot be a surprise that critics like Han (after quoting Foucualt himself: Foucault, 1995[1975], pp. 2728) and Privitera, for example, can still claim that the determinism of archaeological subjection continues in the genealogy; and furthermore, that critics like Giddens can, as weve seen, therefore declare that Foucaults determinism is a matter of the absence of agency in history (Han, 2002, p. 143; Privitera, Ibid, p. 122; Giddens, 1987, p. 98).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Foucaults scientic realist temptation reveals his theories of the subject to be a Giddensian problem of structure and creativity (Privitera, Ibid, pp. 97, 9198). To advance this understanding let us rene Guttings point about Foucaults resisting the structuralist temptation in light of Roy Boynes insight that the periodic table illustrates the core structuralist paradigm (Boyne, 2000, p. 194). The renement: Foucault was not engaged in the structuralist desire to achieve a Mendeleevian physics of the historical sciences. But even this is no longer the point: the deeper insight into structuralism and science is that the latter is a realist practice, hence, the core of the periodic table illustrates instead the Harran revelation that by mid-nineteenth century the causal powers construal of matter wins the day in physics and becomes the bedrock of modern eld theory (Varela, Ibid, pp. 267292). The import of this is that the Mendeleevian exemplar must be subsumed under the causal powers metaphysic because it underwrites it. But, what is now particularly important about that is this: in Foucaults case it is the unprincipled resort to causal powers ascription rather than the muddled aping of periodic table-reading by certain linguists, anthropologists, and psychoanalysts, that nails the crucial signicance of the structuralist temptation. For, as weve seen, when Foucault can initially assert that the archive is the atom of discourse, his later rejection of that idea implies that he somehow decided that it is, now, in effect, the ether of discoursean illegitimate unobservable explanatory causal power. How was that ever decided. Certainly no thought experiment analogous to the Michelson/ Morley experimental defeat of the ether hypothesis has ever been in evidence. The Dreyfus/Rabinow discussion of that issue does not help us (Dreyfus and Rabinow, Ibid, pp. 79103) Now for part II: the relationship of Foucaults
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scientic temptation to the problem of the unresolved conict between the theories of subjection and subjectivation, the theme of which is returning to Kant. Charles R. Varela Research Associate Department of Anthropology University of Illinois Champaign/Urbana, USA varela@Illinos.edu Acknowledgements. My special thanks to Rom Harre for the usual excellence of his reading of this paper. I also want to thank the anonymous reviewer who accurately saw the need for a revised introduction.

NOTE
1 In locating MFs theorizing in the context of the Norris/Giddens charge of determinism, I also want to relate that charge to what I will call the debate between the Frank Pearce and Tony Woodiwiss thesis that MF is a non-humanist variation of ordinary realismthe Durkheimian tradition of social fact determinismand the T. J. Berard defense against any such general charge and specic thesis. My discussion of Foucault on these matters should be read accordingly: 1) against the Pearce/Woodiwiss thesis Foucault is ultimately not a fatalist (determinist), though he is a realist, and, he is a humanist 2) partially for the Berard defense, Foucault is a realist and humanist, but he never quite resolved his structure/agency problem. Now, a special paper, perhaps, would be needed to give both sides a full and proper presentation; my reference is thus preliminary and thus an orientation to the discussion to follow in parts one and two (Berard, 1999).

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Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1983). Michel Foucualt: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutic. Second Edition. With an Afterword by and an interview with Michel Foucualt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Florence, M. (1994). Michel Foucault. In The cambridge companion to Foucault. Edited by Garry Gutting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foucault, M. 1962 [1954a.] Mental illness and psychology. Translated by Alan Sheridan. Forward by Hubert Dreyfus. California, Los Angeles, London: University of Californian. Foucault, M., & Binswanger, L. 1986 [1954b.] Dream and existence. Edited by Keith Hoeller. A Special Issue from the Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry. Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse of Language. Translated from the French By A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. 1973 [1961]. Madness and civilization. A history of insanity in the age of reason. New York: Vintage Books. Foucault, M. (1975). Discipline and punish. The birth of the prison. Translated from the French by A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books: A Division of Random House, Inc. Foucault, M. (1980). The Masked Philosopher. In Michel Foucault. Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth. Edited by Paul Rabinow. Translated by Robert Hurley and Others. Essential Works of Foucault 195484. Volume 1 Edited by James D. Faubion. Translated by Robert Hurley and Others. New York: The New York Press. Foucault, M. 1994 [1963]. The birth of the Clinic. An archaeology of medical perception. Translated from the French by A.M. Sheridan. NTranslated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books. Foucault, M. (1977). Language, counter-memory, practice. Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault. Edited, with an introduction, by Donald F. Bouchard. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Foucault, M. 1988 [1982]. Truth, power, self. An Interview with Michel Foucault. Rux Martin. In Technologies of the self. Edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton. Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press. Foucault, M. (1997). Michel Foucualt. ethics, subjectivity and truth. Edited by Paul Rabinow. Translated by Robert Hurley and Others. Essential Works of Foucault 1954 84. Volume 1 Edited by James D. Faubion. Translated by Robert Hurley and Others. New York: The New York Press. Foucault, M. (1998). Michel Foucault. aethetics, methodology and epistemology. Essential Works of Foucault 195484. Volume 11. Edited by James D. Faubion. Translated by Robert Hurley and Others. New York: The New York Press. Giddens, A. (1987). Social theory and modern sociology. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Gillan, G. (1987). Foucaults Philosophy. In The Final Foucault. Edited by James Bernauer. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, UK: The MIT Press. Gutting, G. (1989). Michel Foucaults archaeology of scientic reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gutting, G. (1994). The cambridge companion to foucault. Edited by Garry Gutting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hacking, I. (1986). The archaeology of foucault. In Foucault: A critical reader. Ed. By David Couzens Hoy. Oxford UK and Cambridge USA, 2740. Han, B. (2002). Foucaults critical project. Between the transcendental and the historical. Translated by Edward Pile. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Hoy, D. C. (1986). Introduction. In Foucault: A critical reader. Ed. By David Couzens Hoy. Oxford UK and Cambridge USA, 126. Cambridge USA, 2740.

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