*294 Gorman v Standen. Palace-Clark v Same.

Queens Bench Division 9 October 1963

[1963] 3 W.L.R. 917 [1964] 1 Q.B. 294

Lord Parker C.J. , Ashworth and Hinchcliffe JJ. 1963 Oct. 9. VagrancyProstitutionBrothelPremises home of two womenWomen related and both prostitutesOne woman the tenant and occupier of the premisesWhether a "brothel""Assist in the management of a brothel" Sexual Offences Act, 1956 (4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69), s. 33 . A stepmother was the tenant of premises in which she lived with her stepdaughter and young daughter aged 15. On a number of occasions police officers watching the premises saw the stepmother and stepdaughter enter with a number of men. On October 26, 1962, police officers entered the premises and found the stepmother and stepdaughter each in bed with a man. In another room the daughter was in bed asleep. The stepmother made a statement to the police and the stepdaughter, after seeing the statement, said "It's my fault - she's frightened of me. If I told her to go upstairs and sleep with a man she would do it." The stepmother was charged with keeping a brothel, contrary to section 33 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 , 1 and with allowing a young person, her daughter, to reside in a brothel, contrary to section 3 of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933 . The stepdaughter was charged with assisting in the management of a brothel, contrary to section 33 of the Act of 1956. The stepmother contended that the premises were not a brothel since she and the stepdaughter used it as their home and neither resorted there indiscriminately; the stepdaughter also contended that there was no evidence that she was assisting in the management. They were both convicted. On appeal:Held: (1) that a "brothel" for the purposes of section 33 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 , was a house resorted to by more than one woman for the purposes of prostitution, and the fact that one of two women was the tenant and occupier of the house and it was their home did not prevent it from being a brothel. It followed therefore, that the stepmother was rightly convicted. Singleton v. Ellison[1895] 1 Q.B. 607 , D.C. and Caldwell v. Leech(1913) 109 L.T. 188 , D.C. distinguished. (2) That, although the mere fact that a woman participated in activities therein did not mean that she assisted in the management of a brothel within section 33 (which contemplated the case where a man not living on the premises had there a woman who assisted in the management), where, as here, the two women were living *295 together in the same premises in the relationship of stepmother and stepdaughter, and the evidence showed that the stepdaughter had a part in what went on in the house, it was possible to say that she was assisting in the management, and, in the circumstances, there was just sufficient evidence to support her conviction. Both appeals must therefore be dismissed. CASES STATED by Hampshire justices sitting at Gosport.

GORMAN v. STANDEN. On October 25, 1962, an information was preferred by the prosecutor, Eric Gordon Standen, inspector of police, against the defendant, Barbara Joan Gorman (hereinafter referred to as "the stepdaughter"), that she on various days between October 4 and 14, 1962, did assist in the management of a brothel at 2, Tintern Road, Gosport, contrary to section 33 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 . The justices heard the charge on November 23, 1962, when they gave leave for it to be amended by substituting October 27, 1962, for October 14, 1962. The following facts were found. That the stepdaughter at all material times resided at 2, Tintern Road, Gosport, with her stepmother, Mara Palace-Clark, who was the tenant of the premises, and with her stepmother's daughter Sally Edith Priestley, otherwise Palace-Clark. Police officers kept observation on the premises between the hours of approximately 10.45 p.m. and 1.30 a.m. on October 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 23 and 25, 1962. On various occasions they observed the stepdaughter and stepmother return together to the premises with men, and sometimes the stepdaughter with a man and at other times the stepmother with a man or men. On a number of occasions not all the men had left the premises by the time the police ceased observation and on occasions men were seen to leave at or about 7 a.m. During that period at least 19 different men resorted to the premises, in some cases in the company of the stepdaughter or of the stepmother or of both of them. Of the 19 men, two were identified as resorting to the premises on more than one occasion. On October 5, 12, 23 and 26, 1962, the stepdaughter returned to the premises in the company of the stepmother and men. At 10.45 p.m. on October 5, 1962, the stepdaughter arrived at the premises with a man, accompanied by the stepmother and another man. All entered the premises together. At 12.30 a.m. the following day one of the women was alone with a man in an upstairs room and the other was *296 alone with a man in a downstairs room with the lights off. At 10.50 p.m. on October 6, 1962, the stepdaughter arrived at the premises on foot in the company of a man, whom she led to the side door and then herself went to the front door and entered the premises. Later, she opened the door and admitted the man into the premises by it. At 12.10 a.m. the following day the man left the premises and at 1 a.m. the stepdaughter had the following conversation with another man within the premises. The man said: "I've done nothing wrong. I've done you no harm." The stepdaughter replied: "I'm not going upstairs," and then, after an inaudible remark by the man, "What will you give me then?" At about 10.45 p.m. on October 11, 1962, the stepdaughter arrived at the premises on a motor cycle driven by a man whom she then admitted by the front door. At about 11.20 p.m. on October 13, 1962, a man came out of the side door of the premises and urinated in the alley. The stepdaughter said to him from inside the house: "What are you doing out there? I told you it was the first door on the right. You are drunk." The man then returned to the premises. At 10.45 p.m. on October 25, 1962, the stepdaughter and the stepmother, accompanied by four men, arrived at the premises in a motor car. Two of the men went with the stepdaughter to the front door of the premises by which she admitted them, while the other two men went with the stepmother to the side door of the premises by which she admitted them. At about 1.40 a.m. on October 26, 1962, a number of police officers entered the premises, having in their possession warrants of arrest for the two women. They then found one Hunt, who was one of the men who had been seen to resort to the premises on more than one occasion, asleep on a settee in a ground floor room; the stepmother unclothed in bed in an upstairs bedroom with one Pugh, who had also been seen to resort to the premises on more than one occasion; and the stepdaughter unclothed in bed with another man in another upstairs bedroom. After the prosecutor had seen the stepdaughter in bed with the man he read the warrant to her, cautioned her and left her. Later, when he returned to the room, the stepdaughter said to him: "I'll tell you something mate - you won't believe this. I've had lots of different blokes to sleep with me here but this one didn't touch me because I have been spewing. You can look for yourselves at the side of the bed. This is a laugh." Subsequently, the stepdaughter came downstairs and said to P.C. Boekee, indicating

P.C. Croker and the prosecutor, "That *297 fat bastard is horrible. So's the one with glasses. He's had me before for this, I got away with it last time but I won't this time. You can't when they catch you in bed with a bloke." The stepdaughter then said: "Well, I am a bloody prostitute and I don't care who knows it. I have had hundreds of blokes." Later the stepdaughter said: "I suppose I shall get six months for this. Well at least I will have a dinner. Do they give you a good dinner in prison?" At Gosport police station a statement was taken from the stepmother by the prosecutor. Thereafter the prosecutor formally cautioned and charged the stepdaughter. In reply to the charge the stepdaughter said: "You can write up a statement the same as my stepmother's." The prosecutor said he started to read the statement of the stepmother to they stepdaughter and after a second or two she said: "It's my fault - she's frightened of me. If I told her to go upstairs and sleep with a man she would do it." It was contended by the stepdaughter that there was no case to answer on the grounds that the premises were not a brothel because they were occupied by the stepdaughter and the stepmother as their home and that neither of them resorted thereto indiscriminately, and that there was no evidence that the stepdaughter had assisted in the management of the premises as a brothel. It was contended by the prosecutor that the evidence showed conclusively that the stepdaughter and the stepmother habitually used the premises for the purpose of illicit sexual intercourse with men, and that the premises were, therefore, by definition a brothel; and that the evidence of the women acting in concert, confirmed by the stepdaughter's statement, "It's my fault - she's frightened of me. If I told her to go upstairs and sleep with a man she would do it," clearly showed that the stepdaughter had assisted in the management of the brothel. The justices were of the opinion that both the stepdaughter and the stepmother habitually used the premises for the purpose of having illicit sexual intercourse with men and habitually had sexual intercourse with such men and the premises were, therefore, a brothel, and that the stepdaughter had assisted in the management of the premises as a brothel. The justices therefore convicted the stepdaughter and sentenced her to one month's imprisonment. The questions for the opinion of the High Court were whether they premises were in law a brothel and, if the premises were in law a brothel, whether there was any evidence to support the *298 justices' finding of fact that the stepdaughter assisted in the management of the premises as a brothel. PALACE-CLARK v. STANDEN. On October 19, 1962, an information was preferred by the prosecutor, Eric Gordon Standen, inspector of police, against the defendant, Mara Palace-Clark (hereinafter referred to as "the stepmother"), that she on divers days between October 4 and 14, 1962, did keep a brothel at 2, Tintern Road, Gosport, contrary to section 33 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 , and on October 26, 1962, a second charge was preferred by the prosecutor against the stepmother that she, having the custody of Sally Edith Palace-Clark, a young person who had attained the age of four years and was under the age of 16 years, did on October 26, 1962, allow the young person to reside in a brothel at 2, Tintern Road, Gosport, contrary to section 3 of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933 . By consent of the stepmother, the justices heard the two charges together on November 23, 1962. They gave leave for the first information to be amended by substituting October 27 for October 14, 1962, and in the second charge the name of the young person to be amended to Sally Edith Priestley, otherwise Palace-Clark. The justices found the following facts; that at all material times the stepmother resided at 2, Tintern Road, Gosport, of which premises she was the tenant, and her stepdaughter, Barbara Joan Gorman, and her daughter, Sally Edith Priestley, otherwise Palace-Clark, then aged 15 years, resided with her at the premises. Police officers kept observation on the premises between the hours of approximately 10.45 p.m. and 1.30 a.m. on October 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 23 and 25, 1962. On various occasions they observed the stepmother and her stepdaughter return together to the

premises with men, and sometimes the stepmother with a man or men and at other times the stepdaughter with a man. On a number of occasions, not all the men had left the premises by the time the police ceased observation, and on occasions men were seen to leave the premises at or about 7 a.m. During the period at least 19 different men resorted to the premises, in some cases in the company of the stepmother or of the stepdaughter or of both of them. Of the 19 men, two were identified as resorting to the premises on more than one occasion. At about 1.40 a.m. on October 26, 1962, a number of police officers entered the premises, having in their possession warrants *299 to arrest the two women, and found one Hunt, who was one of the men who had been seen to resort to the premises on more than one occasion, asleep on a settee in a ground floor room; the stepmother unclothed in bed in a room upstairs with one Pugh, who had also been seen to resort to the premises on more than one occasion; the stepdaughter unclothed in bed with another man in another upstairs bedroom; and the daughter asleep in bed in another bedroom. It was contended by the stepmother that there was no case to answer upon the ground that the premises were not a brothel because they were occupied by her and her stepdaughter as their home and that neither of them resorted thereto indiscriminately. It was contended by the prosecutor that the evidence showed conclusively that the stepmother and stepdaughter habitually used the premises for the purpose of having illicit sexual intercourse with men and that the premises were, therefore, by definition a brothel. The justices were of opinion that both the stepmother and stepdaughter used the premises for the purpose of having illicit sexual intercourse with men and habitually had illicit sexual intercourse with such men and that, therefore, the premises were a brothel, and that the daughter was at the material time aged 15 years and was allowed by the stepmother to reside in the premises. The justices therefore convicted the stepmother of the first charge and sentenced her to one month's imprisonment, and also convicted her of the second charge and sentenced her to two months' imprisonment, the sentences to run consecutively. The question for the opinion of the High Court was whether the said premises were, in law, a brothel. Michael King for the defendants. The legislature has never defined the term brothel; at common law a brothel is the same as a bawdy house. A brothel must be used by prostitutes - persons who have illicit sexual intercourse. [Reference was made to Winter v. Woolfe.2 ] The premises forming the brothel must be resorted to by prostitutes: Singleton v. Ellison3 ; Strath v. Foxon.4 Thus premises to which two or more women resort for illicit sexual intercourse with men will be a brothel. In this case the defendants did not resort to the premises for the *300 purposes of prostitution. Both were in the house by right; it was their home. In Durose v. Wilson 5 there was little evidence as to how the flats were used, but the porter was admitting persons to the flats for illicit sexual intercourse; in this case neither defendant used a third party to admit the men onto the premises. [LORD PARKER C.J. Suppose three prostitutes desiring to carry on their trade took a joint tenancy of premises?] The test of whether a person is on the premises by right and not resorting thereto is whether the premises are bona fide their home. A joint tenancy used as a subterfuge would not satisfy the test: Durose v. Wilson. 6 Avory J. in Caldwell v. Leech 7 distinguished Durose v. Wilson. 8 The stepmother here should have been charged under section 36 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 , as the tenant or occupier of the premises. The prosecution failed to show that the stepdaughter had assisted in the management of the brothel; her statement that her stepmother would do what she told her was not evidence of management but merely that she had the stronger will. There is a difference between keeping and managing a brother in section 33 of the Act; there was no

evidence that the stepdaughter assisted in the management and, indeed, the stepmother was charged with the keeping of a brothel not managing it. Patrick Back for the prosecutor. The question of what constitutes a brothel is a difficult one. Singleton v. Ellison9 would seem to be authority for premises being a brothel where two or more women use the premises for the purposes of prostitution or illicit sexual intercourse. It would not seem to matter whether the premises are used as the women's bona fide home or whether they are tenants or licensees. Providing the premises as a whole are used for prostitution then they are a brothel. There would seem to be the necessity not only for two or more women having illicit sexual intercourse but for each woman to have illicit sexual intercourse with more than one man: per Avory J. in Caldwell v. Leech. 10Rex v. de Munck 11 stated that prostitution was the sale by a female of her body, and Winter v. Woolfe12 that prostitution could be merely illicit sexual intercourse without gain. In the latter case reference was made to *301 Reg. v. Justices of Parts of Holland, Lincolnshire, 13 which concerned the offence of permitting premises to be kept as a brothel; the landlord was taking no part in the keeping of the brothel. In the present case the stepmother was keeping a brothel and the stepdaughter assisted in the management of it. King replied. LORD PARKER C.J. stated the facts and continued: Logically, the first question here is whether these premises were used as a brothel. There is no definition in section 33 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 , as to what constitutes a brothel. The statute merely says this: "It is an offence for a person to keep a brothel, or to manage, or act or assist in the management of, a brothel." That offence and others, under the Sexual Offences Act, 1956 , derive from the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 , where, in section 13 , it is provided that: "Any person who - (1) keeps or manages or acts or assists in the management of a brothel ..." shall commit an offence. That Act again gives no definition of a brothel, and accordingly, one is driven back to the meaning of "brothel" at common law. At common law, a brothel was the same thing as a bawdy house. The further definition of what is involved in a bawdy house or a brothel has been variously stated in the cases. Sometimes it is stated as a place resorted to by persons of both sexes for the purpose of prostitution; sometimes it is referred to as a place used by persons of both sexes for the purposes of prostitution. The form of indictment for keeping a bawdy house was referred to by Avory J. in Caldwell v. Leech, 14 where he said 15 : "It is only necessary to look at the form of indictment against a person for keeping a bawdy-house, which has been in force from time immemorial, where we find that the words are: 'Did keep and maintain a certain house and in the said house for filthy lucre and gain divers evil-disposed persons, women as well as men, upon the times and days aforesaid as well in the night as in the day unlawfully and wickedly did receive and entertain,' etc." It certainly contemplates there that women, in the plural, will use the premises. In 1931, in Winter v. Woolfe,16 Avory J. was again dealing with the word "brothel," and he there approved a definition given by Grove J. in Reg. v. Justices of Parts of Holland, Lincolnshire. 17 *302 Avory J., in Winter v. Woolfe,18 said: "I am content to accept the definition of a brothel given by Grove and Lopes JJ. in the case of Reg. v. Justices of Parts of Holland, Lincolnshire. 19 Grove J. said: 'The sole question is whether there was any evidence to support this conviction before the justices for permitting these licensed premises to be a brothel ... I don't think that the matter of nuisance is of any importance, for it is too well known that these places are often kept in such a way as to be no nuisance at all, but kept perfectly private. But what needs only to be proved is this, namely that the premises were kept knowingly for the purpose of people having illicit sexual connection there.' Lopes J. said: 'Now, the sole question before the justices was whether the applicant permitted his premises to be a brothel. What is the meaning of permitting the premises to be a brothel? I think my brother Grove has given a very apt definition, namely, that it is permitting people of opposite sexes to come there and

have illicit sexual intercourse. That is a very complete and satisfactory definition of the whole matter.'" Accordingly, it would seem clear that before premises can be said to be a brothel, people of both sexes, in the plural, must go there. On the evidence it is perfectly clear that the premises were used by two women for illicit sexual intercourse, and with a number of men. Prima facie, therefore, one would say it was a brothel. What is said against that by Mr. King, for whose argument the court is indebted, is that one ought, as it were, to eliminate one of those women, namely, the stepmother, because she was herself the occupier and tenant of the premises. He relied for that contention on the decision of the court in Singleton v. Ellison20 and also on Caldwell v. Leech. 21 In Singleton v. Ellison22 it was held that where a woman occupied a house and had men in for the purpose of fornication with her she had not committed the offence of keeping a brothel within the meaning of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 . Wills J. said 23 : "I am of opinion that the decision of the magistrate was right. A brothel is the same thing as a 'bawdy house' - a term which has a well-known meaning as used by lawyers and in Acts of Parliament. In its legal acceptation it applies to a place resorted to by persons of both sexes for the purpose of prostitution. It is *303 certainly not applicable to the state of things described by the magistrates in this case, where one woman receives a number of men." In Caldwell v. Leech 24 the respondent let out a room to her sister who brought on to the premises let to her, men for the purposes of fornication with her. It was found as a fact that the respondent lived there with her husband and did not have men in for the purpose of sexual intercourse. Again it was held that the premises did not constitute a brothel. It seems to me that the ratio decidendi of those decisions was not that it did not constitute a brothel because it was the tenant and occupier who was having men in for sexual intercourse, but because there was only one woman in the premises doing it. A bawdy house by definition is a house resorted to or used by more than one woman for the purposes of fornication. In the present case there were two women bringing men there and the fact that one of them was the tenant and occupier does not, as it seems to me, prevent the premises from being a brothel. So far as the second limb is concerned, namely: was the stepmother keeping it, the evidence is all one way and nothing turns in this case, as I understand it, on any argument as to the word "keeping." It follows, therefore, that the stepmother was properly convicted on both charges. So far as the stepdaughter was concerned, I confess that the evidence is very thin. I take it that it must be right that the mere fact that a woman participates in the activities being conducted in the brothel does not make her a person assisting in the management of a brothel. "Assisting in the management of a brothel" seems to me to contemplate in the ordinary way the case of a man who runs a brothel not living there himself; he keeps and manages it but he has on the premises a woman who assists in the management. That, no doubt, is the ordinary case contemplated. But where, as here, the two women are living together in the same premises in the relationship of stepmother and stepdaughter and where, as the evidence shows, albeit it is thin, that it is the stepdaughter who has a part, at any rate, of the say of what goes on at that house, then, as it seems to me, it is possible to find that she was assisting in the management. In those circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that there was just enough evidence to support the conviction of the *304 stepdaughter. In the result, it seems to me that both these appeals must be dismissed. ASHWORTH J. I agree. HINCHCLIFFE J. I also agree.

Representation
Solicitors: Amphlett & Co. for Donnelly & Elliott, Gosport ; Theodore Goddard & Co. for R. V. Stokes & Co., Portsmouth . ([Reported by HILARY JELLIE, Barrister-at-Law.] )

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1. Sexual Offences Act, 1956, s. 33 : "It is an offence for a person to keep a brothel, or to manage, or act or assist in the management of, a brothel." 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 14. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 24. [1931] 1 K.B. 549; 47 T.L.R. 145 . [1895] 1 Q.B. 607 , D.C. [1956] 1 Q.B. 67; [1955] 3 W.L.R. 659; [1955] 3 All E.R. 398 , D.C. (1907) 21 Cox C.C. 421; 71 J.P. 263 , D.C. (1907) 21 Cox C.C. 421; 71 J.P. 263 , D.C. (1913) 109 L.T. 188 , 191, D.C. 21 Cox C.C. 421 . [1895] 1 Q.B. 607 . 109 L.T. 188 , 191. [1918] 1 K.B. 635 . [1931] 1 K.B. 549 . (1913) 109 L.T. 188 , D.C. [1931] 1 K.B. 549; 47 T.L.R. 145 . (1882) 46 J.P. 312 . [1931] 1 K.B. 549 , 555. 46 J.P. 312 , 313. [1895] 1 Q.B. 607 , D.C. 109 L.T. 188 . [1895] 1 Q.B. 607 . 109 L.T. 188 .

13. (1882) 46 J.P. 312. 15. Ibid. 191.

23. Ibid. 608.

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