National Commission on the Terrorist

Attacks Upon the United States

US Intelligence Management, Collection and Analysis

1) Overview
a) Counterterrorism intelligence - unique challenges of the target
b) Pre-9-11 intelligence management, collection and analysis - did the system work?
c) Resources and intelligence priorities
d) Covert Action - uses and effectiveness against the terrorist threat
2) Intelligence Management
a) White House management and oversight of US intelligence
b) Congressional oversight of US intelligence
c) Joint DCI-SecDef Management of intelligence and its implications for counterterrorism
d) Responsibility, authority and accountability of US counterterrorism intelligence
e) Alternative models to managing US intelligence
f) Findings and recommendations
3) Intelligence Collection
a) Assessment of the counterterrorism collection prior to 9-11
i) Key players, agencies, programs, priorities, resources
b) Assessment of the counterterrorism collection strategy prior to 9-11
i) Overall effectiveness of the collection strategy
c) Critical collection methods / techniques for counterterrorism intelligence
i) Relative contributions of open sources, HUMINT, SIGINT, MINT, others
ii) Open Source intelligence (OSINT)
(1) Status of Open Source prior to 9-11
(2) Current OSINT system (leadership, organization, capabilities, overseas presence,
automation)
(3) Assessment of OSINT reporting on terrorism prior to 9-11
(4) Perceptions of the field office, role of foreign liaison
iii) Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT):
(1) Status of US HUMINT prior to 9-11
(2) Current HUMINT system (leadership, organization, capabilities, overseas
presence, assets, automation)
(3) Assessment of HUMINT reporting on terrorism (al Qa'ida, UBL) prior to 9-11
(4) Perceptions of the field offices, role of foreign liaison, emergence of CTICs
 iv) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT):
(1) Status of US SIGINT prior to 9-11
(2) Current SIGINT system (leadership, organization, capabilities, overseas presence,
automation)
(3) Assessment of SIGINT reporting on terrorism (al Qa'ida, UBL) prior to 9-11
(4) Foreign partners,
d) Findings and recommendations
4) Intelligence Analysis
a) Status of counterterrorism analysis efforts prior to 9-11
b) Current 1C analysis (key players, organizations, capabilities, and products)
c) Assessment of the reporting on al Qa'ida, UBL prior to 9-11
d) Effectiveness of 1C analysis£>n counter-terrorism
e) Combining foreign and domestic counterterrorism intelligence - TTIC
f) Findings and recommendations
5) Covert Action
a) Effectiveness of lethal and non-lethal authorities on the terrorist target
b) Findings and recommendations
6) Conclusions
a) Overall assessment of intelligence and the attacks of 9-11
b) Intelligence's role in preventing future terrorist attacks
c) Adjusting / Retooling intelligence for the new threat environment