Accountability Without Democracy: Lessons from African Famines in the 1980s

A Thesis Presented to The Division of History and Social Sciences Reed College

In Partial Fulllment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts

Daniel J. Sellers May 2013

Approved for the Division (Political Science)

Mariela Szwarcberg

Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I must thank my parents and family, who have provided support in all my endeavors. Without them I may very well not have made it to this point. Thanks go as well to all my friends, whether from Reed, Georgetown Day, or any other context, for helping make daily life that much more exciting. Of course, I also must thank my professors, especially Mariela Szwarcberg, my thesis advisor, and Chris Koski, my qual advisor, for providing guidance of all varieties, Xin Zhang, for introducing me to Amartya Sen and the realities of international development, and the members of my orals board, for providing valuable feedback and suggestions for future research. I will miss all of you, and value greatly our interactions and your teachings.

Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 7 11 15 18 20 29 29 34 37 41 41 41 41 45 50 57 61 67 74 81 83 89

Chapter 1: Literature Review . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Entitlements, Acquirement, and Freedom . 1.2 Famine Prevention in Post-Colonial Africa 1.3 Conceptualizing Famine . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 Identication . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2 Quantication . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 2: Theoretical Argument 2.1 Democracy and Elections . . . 2.1.1 Press . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3: Empirical Evidence 3.1 Case Selection . . . . . . . 3.2 Analytical Narratives . . . 3.2.1 Botswana . . . . . 3.2.2 Zimbabwe . . . . . 3.2.3 Kenya . . . . . . . 3.2.4 Uganda . . . . . . 3.2.5 Mozambique . . . . 3.2.6 Ethiopia . . . . . . 3.2.7 Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusion: Lessons From the African Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix A: Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

List of Tables
1 Case Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Devereux . . . . . . and not. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 15 17 26 27 32 36 48 69 70 78 83 84 85 86 87 88

1.1 Estimated Mortality of Select Twentieth Century Famines, (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Indexes of per capita food production in famine-aected aected African countries, 196195/96 . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Famine Intensity, Howe & Devereux (2004) . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Famine Magnitude, Howe & Devereux (2004) . . . . . . . .

2.1 Polity IV Scores, Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Freedom House Scores, Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Zimbabwe: Ocial Maize Sales, 197985 . . . . . . . Food Production in Ethiopia, 1977-84 . . . . . . . . . Average Grain Prices in Northern Ethiopia, 19815 . Relief and Political Representation by Region, Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A.1 Translation of Polity IV Executive Recruitment Concepts and Component Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.2 POLITY Scores for All African Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.3 XRREG Scores for All African Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.4 XRCOMP Scores for All African Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.5 XROPEN Scores for All African Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.6 Press Freedom Scores for All African Countries . . . . . . . . . . . .

List of Abbreviations
ARAP Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme BDP Botswana Democratic Party DRP Drought Relief Programme EPLF Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique KANU Kenya African National Union NCPB National Cereals and Produce Board RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance RRC Relief and Rehabilitation Commission SPLA Sudan Peoples Liberation Army SSU Sudan Socialist Union

TPLF Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front UNEOE United Nations Emergency Oce for Ethiopia ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZAPU Zimbabwe African Peoples Union

Abstract
Development economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen argues that democracies, by virtue of mechanisms of accountability, are better able to avert famines than non-democratic regimes. Using empirical evidence from colonial and independent India, Sen claims an anti-famine political contract, between the government and its supporters, predicated on the prevention of famine. Building on this theory, Sen later tested his argument using cases in Africa. Whereas Sens theory accurately predicts the outcomes, the causal mechanism he uses to explain variation is falisable. In studying the experiences of each African country that succumbed to famine in the 1980s, I nd that a free press and competitive elections are neither necessary nor sucient conditions for a country to avert famine. The results presented in this thesis question the presence and role of other causes contributory to famine prevention eorts, as well as the possibility of anti-famine commitments within lessthan-democratic polities.

Introduction
Despite modern advances in the production and distribution of food, episodes of hunger and food insecurity still occur today in many of the worlds least developed countries. Though hunger is not a modern malady, as Jean Dr` eze and Amartya Sen (1989:3) remind us, it is recurrent in parts of the world, and no civilization is totally immune. During the twentieth century, however, endemic famine was all but eliminated from regions outside Africa,1 and even within the continent there has been considerable variation. While certain countries have managed to avoid famine, others succumb repeatedly. Theories abound as to why this is the case, though perhaps the best-known explanation comes from Amartya Sen, who argues that with a relatively free press, with periodic elections, and with active opposition parties, no government can escape severe penalty if it delays preventive measures and permits a real famine to occur. That threat keeps governments on their toes (Sen 1990b). Democracies, Sen argues, are better equipped to prevent famines than non-democratic governments, which may be less responsive to the demands of the people. However, this argument is problematic for several reasons. First, while Sens argument does accurately predict the outcome of various African countries famine prevention eorts, in each case the inuence of their free press and competitive elections was less than clear, and in each case was dierent than in India, on whose experience Sens argument was originally based. While Sen came to explain his correlation using cases from Africa, it was derived from comparing the experiences of China and pre-independence India, both of which succumbed to famine, to postindependence India, which has not. Briey, while in colonial India, famine prevention became linked with independence as a cause for nationalist sentiment, signaling its importance to the post-colonial government, in Africa, famine prevention has (largely) remained an administrative obligation. Second, despite the predictive accuracy of Sens theory, in each (African) case, the reality is slightly, yet signicantly dierent than Sen claims. Thus, while Sen uses Ethiopia and Sudan as examples of countries that had neither competitive elections nor free press and experienced famine, this does not tell the whole story. In the early stages of Ethiopias 1983-5 famine, the dictatorial government did not suppress inforThe last famine in Europe occurred in the Soviet Union immediately after World War II, the last famine in China was a by-product of the Great Leap Forward of 1958-62, and the last famine in South Asia (to date) occurred in Bangladesh in 1974. Occasionally famines due to exceptional circumstances aict Southeast Asia (Cambodia in the 1970s, North Korea in the 1990s), but famine as an endemic problem in Asia and Europe seems to have been consigned to history (Devereux 2000:3).
1

Introduction

Table 1: Selected Cases Table 1a: Sens Cases Country Botswana Ethiopia Kenya Sudan (pre-1985) Sudan (post-1985) Zimbabwe Famine Democracy2 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No Press Freedom3 Free Not Free Not Free Not Free Free4 Partly Free

Table 1b: Additional Cases Country Famine Democracy No Yes Press Freedom Not Free Partly Free Mozambique Yes Uganda (pre-1984) Yes

mation about the impending crisis, with a brief exception during a time of national celebration. Rather, clear predictions were published about the food shortage that, nevertheless, were met with no response from Western governments or the UN, due to the countrys domestic politics. Sudan also descended into famine under an authoritarian government, and though between 1986 and 1989 the country experienced a free press and competitive elections, these were not enough to diminish or eliminate famine conditions. In truth, the democratic government was to blame not only for failing to respond to the famine, but also for encouraging its continuation. Botswana and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, are heralded by Amartya Sen and Jean Dr` eze as positive examples of famine prevention, claiming that democratic accountability [was] instrumental in averting famine despite severe food crises (de Waal 1996:195). Although Zimbabwe did manage to avoid famine following drought in 1982, around this time the province of Matabeleland was subject to government suppression of dissidents, which included the strategic withholding of relief. Though in 1982, Zimbabwe was fairly democratic, the next year marked the start of a downward trend, and by the end of the decade, the country was strongly autocratic. Throughout this time, the press was decidedly not free. Sens fourth case, Botswana, has maintained an extended period of electoral democracy and has managed to avoid famine, though the causality is dierent than in the Indian case: Since independence, Botswana has
(Marshall et al. 2011), Boolean average of POLITY from 19801980. See Appendix A and Section 2.1 (page 31) for tables and further discussion. Though POLITY measures more than just executive recruitment (elections), it is more reective of each countrys overall political climate. 3 (Freedom House 2012). See Section 2.1.1 (page 34). 4 Freedom House reports Sudans press as Not Free during this time, though de Waal reports that during this time, [Sudans] press was uncensored and vigorous, and often highly critical of the government (de Waal 1997:93).
2

Introduction

been run by a single party which has maintained its power through patronage networks, including relief programs. Throughout the decade, the countrys press was largely free from government intervention. Finally, Sen considers Kenya, which managed to avert famine following drought in 1983. Though Dr` eze and Sen attribute the governments responsiveness to eorts of elected members of parliament in the face of a de jure one-party state, limited but signicant press freedoms, and the threat of political instability, de Waal argues that Kenyas success in escaping famine was largely attributable to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap Moi, who recognized a rudimentary and implicit political contract: feed the central highlands and (most importantly) the cities, and the government will survive (de Waal 1997:35). However, despite arap Mois apparent recognition of this political pressure, his regime avoided tackling the structural causes of poverty and vulnerability (de Waal 1997:42), and committed innumerable human rights violations during and after this time (Adar & Munyae 2001). There are also reports of interference in press aairs by arap Mois regime (Ochieng 2011, Wanyande 1995) which further complicate the picture. In an attempt to further clarify Sens thesis, I will also consider the experiences of Mozambique and Uganda, both of which succumbed to famine. Mozambique, once a Portuguese colony, was ravaged by civil war from 1977 to 1992, and experienced famine twice throughout the 1980s: in 1983-4, from natural causes, and again in 1987 from the conict. Throughout the civil war, the country did not hold elections, and throughout the decade, the press was not free. Uganda also experienced famine, in 1980, resulting from environmental, economic, and post-conict issues following the deposition of Idi Amin the previous year, though the countrys political situation otherwise around this time likely contributed as well. In 1980, the countrys rst elections in eighteen years were held, though they resulted in the reelection of Milton Obote, who was previously deposed by Amin in 1971. Under Obote II, as his second term was known, the countrys elections were not totally free and fair, though they were rated as among the most legitimate in this report, and on the continent. While Ugandas press was deemed partly free in 1980, these freedoms were tenuous and uctuated throughout the decade. A third complication with Sens argument stems from a much more fundamental question: for what reasonsif anyshould democracy be supposed to have an advantage in ghting famine? A basic assumption of Sens claim is that civil and political rightsto free speech, to free association, to elect representatives of ones choice contribute to the protection of social and economic rights[such as] the right to food and livelihood (de Waal 2000:12). Indeed, throughout history, one of the most important aspects of civil and political rights has been their use in promoting social and economic rights. However, though it seems logical that citizens of a democracy would exploit their civil and political liberties to ensure their protection against famine, the reality is not so simple. Certainly, abuses of social and economic rights can and do occur in democracies, and often stem from a failure of related civil and political rights. How, thenif at allis famine dierent? Despite variation in each countrys response to the threat of famine, across all cases there emerges a pattern: In each case, the dominant motivation underlying

Introduction

governmental attempts to prevent famine (or underlying government inaction) is that its primary interestsmaintaining powerdepend upon it. Thus, in some cases, there exists a political incentive to prevent famine. However, this incentive is by no means unique to democratic polities. Indeed, in all democratic states there exist interests and interest groups whose demands are not met, and an authoritarian government may just as easily derive some legitimacy from meeting certain demands of the populace whether on the peoples conditions or the leaders. According to de Waal (2000), though, while eorts to this eect taken by autocratic or otherwise less-than-democratic governments may constitute an anti-famine program or commitment, these are mere privileges, granted to the population by the grace of the ruler. Only in the context of real democratic institutions (de Waal 2000:11), it is argued, can an anti-famine contract emergea lasting and, crucially, enforceable solution to famine. However, while the dierence between a repressive and a responsive government may be relatively easy to identify, the dierence, both theoretical and practical, between a commitment and a contract is less than clear (though a program seems more denable), and raises further questions regarding the nature of political incentives and government responses to them. As a result, we may extrapolate Sens thesis to a universal form: mechanisms of accountability, such as a free press and competitive elections, promote responsive governments. Yet, the mechanisms Sen describes may be distinct from the institutional form of government, or even any pre-existing institutional measures of accountability, which may exist without necessarily promoting any specic interest. It is apparent that neither the form of government nor the openness of the press signicantly account for a governments responsiveness to famine among its citizens. Instead, preventive action to famine seems more heavily inuenced by the desire of those in power to preserve and perpetuate the regime, a motive more widely shared across regimes of all forms. Having established that the presence and application of factors instrumental to anti-famine measures is independent of the form and structure of government, this thesis will attempt to reconcile Sens hypothesis with the experiences of African countries during the 1980s. In countries that experienced famine, what were the signicant causal mechanisms? And in countries that avoided famine, how (if at all) did governmental action contribute to the eort? More importantly, though, why did the government act at all? Beyond Sens initial casesBotswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and ZimbabweI have also included Mozambique and Uganda, both of which also experienced famine in the 1980s. By reevaluating each case, I argue that a free press and competitive electionssupposed preconditions to averting famineare, in reality, neither necessary nor sucient to achieving this objective. While these mechanisms of accountability are undeniably important to improving the quality of governance, they must be considered distinct from other specic issues, and from the political will to act. The structure of the thesis is as follows. After this introduction is a review of Sens thesis over time, followed by a review of literature on the topics of famine, elections, and press, and ultimately, an elaboration of my argument. In the second chapter, I provide further background on each case, focusing on the countries political regime

Introduction

and elections, operational freedom of the press, and food security and famine prevention eorts (or the lack thereof). Finally comes a conclusion, including implications and recommendations for future action.

Chapter 1 Literature Review

1.1 Entitlements, Acquirement, and Freedom

Though Sens theory appears most explicitly in his 1990 speech Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment, the notion that a free press and competitive elections could hold a government accountable stems from an earlier development by Sen: entitlements. Described as the set of dierent alternative commodity bundles that [a] person can acquire through the use of various legal channels of acquirement open to someone in [their] position (Sen 1990a:36)1 , a persons entitlements not only reect the goods available to them, but also the conditions under which such exchanges are carried out. Thus, a person who owns and lives o their land, for example, will establish command over food in a very dierent way than a wage laborer who is paid in cash. While the former conducts, so to speak, an exchange with nature (own-labor entitlement), the latter transacts with other members of society (trade-based entitlement2 ). It is of great importance, Sen argues, that these dierences in exchange conditions are considered in matters of hunger and food policywithout them, it is impossible to understand how people can or cannot acquire enough food. The problem of establishing command over commodities such as food Sen calls the acquirement problem. This problem, he explains, has been neglected throughout history, with Thomas Malthus and his intellectual descendants assuming the distribution of food within a society to be secondary to the per capita level of food production. Related to this so-called Malthusian pessimism3 is Malthusian optimism, not being worried about the food problem so long as food output grows as fast asor faster thanpopulation (Sen 1990a:35), which has historically helped justify delays in policy responses to hunger in light of stagnant or rising output per capita. Though this
Though this volume, which contains Food, Economics, and Entitlements was published in 1990, the chapter is noted as being an abridged version of a speech originally given in 1985. 2 Sen (1981) also identies production-based and inheritance and transfer-based entitlement relations. While the latter is generally of limited relevance to famine theory, the former is relevant insofar as it interacts with others trade-based entitlement prospects. 3 While population growth is supposed to be exponential, agricultural productivity is roughly linear, such that eventually demand will outpace supply capacity, thereby causing mass starvation and/or population controlan equilibration of supply and demand.
1

Chapter 1. Literature Review

is a serious problem under conditions of regular but non-extreme hunger (without starvation deaths but causing greater proneness to morbidity and mortality) (Sen 1990a:35), it can be disastrous if and when famine develops without any decline in food production per capita (such as Indias Bengal famine of 1943). As a result, Sen advocates considering entitlementsthe means by which people acquire commodities, including foodin addition to the level of food produced or available. Though this approach does not seek to provide a complete explanation of famine, Sen notes that famine reects widespread failure of entitlements on the part of substantial sections of the population (Sen 1990a:36). Because a persons entitlement is greatly inuenced by their initial endowment, starvation may be thought of as any commodity bundle that does not include sucient food. Thus, a persons entitlements may reduce them to starvation due to changes in their endowment (e.g. loss of land or labor power), or their exchange entitlement mapping (e.g. fall in wages, rise in commodity prices, or changes in employment). A few years later, Sen dramatically expanded the concept of entitlements by removing its tangible boundaries. In Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment (1990), Sen argues that famine constitutes not only a breakdown of vulnerable groups entitlements, but also violations of individuals positive freedom to survive. Building on Isaiah Berlin, Sen distinguishes between positive freedom, involving what, everything considered, a person can or cannot achieve, and negative freedom, which concentrates precisely on the absence of a class of restraints that one person may exercise over another (Sen 1990b). To illustrate the dierence, Sen imagines he desires to walk in a park. Were his inability to walk in the park due to a physical disability, only his positive freedom would be aected. If, on the other hand, walking in the park would certainly mean getting beat up by a gang of thugs, his negative freedom is aected as well. However, while Berlin interprets positive and negative freedom as disjoint, Sen argues that any violation of negative freedom is also a violation of positive freedom, though the converse does not hold. Thus, while the thugs act as a restraint on Sens ability to walk in the park (a violation of his negative freedom), they also diminish his ability to realize his desires of walking in the park (a restraint of positive freedom). Though this seems redundant, the crucial distinction is between violations of freedom as being of a positive versus a negative varietyincapacity versus prohibition. Libertarianism, for example, focuses solely on freedom from restraint. However, it is seen easily enough that these (negative) freedoms may yield violations of others (positive) freedom as well. Thus, Sen argues that poverty is not necessarily a violation of negative freedom: A person in extreme poverty is not free to do many things (e.g., feeding his family well, staying home when riots threaten his life), but the poverty and consequent failure of positive freedom may not be due to interference by others (Sen 1990b). Rather, poverty and famine represent serious violations of a persons positive freedom to survive. Despite the change in language, though, Sens policy solution remains the same: focus on vulnerable groups entitlements, and changes thereof. Within this framework, explanations of famine would take the form of economic and political changes that alter various groups relative economic power. By way of these considerations, Sen argues that the dierence between India prior

1.1. Entitlements, Acquirement, and Freedom

to independencewhich experienced the Bengal famine of 1943and India postindependencethe push for which was provoked in no small way by the Bengal famine of 1943was not the formation of a famine response policy, but rather a willingness to invoke the policy when necessary (Sen 1995). Though Indias Famine Codes of 1880 were designed under colonial administration, they were rarely invoked in time, if at all. Since independence, though, famine prevention measures have been used judiciously. Thus, Sen concludes, the governments accountability to its people, as made paramount by the countrys democratic revolution (and its resulting political contract), is the causal factor in the countrys newfound ability to avert famine. This case, then, illustrates that one set of freedomsto criticize, to publish, to voteare causally linked with other types of freedoms, such as the freedom to escape starvation and famine mortality (Sen 1990b). In colonial India, it was the reluctance of the British Government to take responsibility for famine relief that helped discredit it and foment nationalist movements, who used famine as an issue for mobilization. Eventually, sustained political agitation forced the government to take serious anti-famine measures, implicitly accepting a social contract (de Waal 1997:12). The Bengal famine of 1943 represented a significant breach of this contract, and independence came four years later. Post-colonial governments have continued to honor this anti-famine contract, and continue to be held accountable by the press and competitive elections (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:212). On the other hand, Sen considers China, which experienced no such popular democratic uprising. As a result of the countrys Great Leap Forward social and economic reformswhich attempted to rapidly modernize the countrys economy through processes of industrialization and collectivizationa tremendous famine befell them. From 1958-61, between sixteen and thirty million people are estimated to have died (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:210), though other estimates place the toll even higher. At this time, the government faced no pressure from newspapers, which were controlled, or from opposition parties, which were absent (Sen 1995). Indeed, the Chinese government itself was misled by the lack of free reporting, with its own propaganda and party ocialsall competing for credit in Beijingdistorting or fabricating statistics from around the country (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:213). Following the demise of [Soviet] communism in 1989 and the joint triumph of political and economic liberalism (de Waal 1996:194), though, Sens argument gained a new lease on life. However, instead of India and China, the new focus was on ve African cases: democratic Botswana and Zimbabwe and the questionablydemocratic Kenya, which averted famine in the early 1980s, and authoritarian Sudan and Ethiopia, which succumbed. Though Sen undoubtedly considers his theory robust to the circumstances of individual countries, there are important dierences among the countries to consider that present a challenge to Sens hypothesis. As in India, under colonialism, African governments faced little pressure to introduce anti-famine measures. Rather, it was only towards the end of the era that there arose any sense of administrative responsibility towards colonial subjects (de Waal 1997:26). However, before then, colonialism in the area was primarily exploitative, and relied on military power. In the early twentieth century, for example,

10

Chapter 1. Literature Review

famine was brought about in British Tanganyika (later Tanzania) (Little 1991) and German Ruanda-Urundi by colonial troops, in an attempt to suppress the populations (de Waal 1997). Elsewhere in Africa, though, colonial administrations had begun to acknowledge famine as a detriment to the local population. Following famine and food insecurity in Sudan during the 1910s, the colonial government attempted to transplant the Indian Famine Code to the country, resulting in the 1920 Sudan Famine Regulations. However, Sudan was very dierent than Madras, the Indian state on whose policies Sudans were based. First, there was not enough administrative capacity in Sudan to organize a system necessary to predict and prevent famine, let alone to undertake the prescribed relief eorts. Secondreective also of the generic dierence between (most) South Asian famines and (most) African ones (de Waal 1997:28)was that while in India, those most at risk of famine were agricultural laborers and rural artisans, in Sudan, those most at risk were largely pastoralist farmers and herders. Crucially, while the fortunes of the former depended on market conditions (i.e. food prices and employment), the wealth of the latter was held primarily in assets (such as livestock), meaning that famine in Sudan would be harder to predict but slower to arrive, reducing the advantage of responding quickly4 . The areas lack of transport infrastructure and the absence of any food markets also meant that the deference of the regulations to classical economics was inappropriate (de Waal 1997:28). In reality, de Waal argues, the Sudanese Famine Regulations were constructed primarily to deter political threats by prioritizing for subsidized food government employees and townspeople, followed by those in ood-prone riverine areas, while dwellers of more remote regions would be lucky to receive any assistance whatsoever. Though Sudans famine codes of the early twentieth century are notable for being somewhat inappropriate given their context, other African colonies also experienced relief policies which provided a bare minimum of assistance. While in certain instances, the legacies of colonial administrations did help instill an expectation of emergency relief provision (e.g. Tanzania), this was not the norm. There is thus a clear dierence between the approaches of famine-prevention regimes in India and in Africa: in the former, famine relief had become a right, while in the latter it was still seen as little more than an administrative duty. However, the situation was dierent in African cities, where, due to the growth of trade unions and nationalist sentiment, keeping the people fed became a political imperative, and consequently was perceived as a right. Politics of famine prevention in colonial Africa were further complicated by disputes regarding land use and soil conservation, with colonial governors seeing traditional techniques as backwards and damaging to the environment. As one might expect, the policies which resulted from this view generated resentment and resistance that signicantly helped strengthen nationalist sentiment. Policies dealing with epidemic disease control were met with similar hostility, owing both to their rudimentary
In terms of entitlements, while the wealth of agricultural laborers and rural artisans is primarily trade-based (or possibly production-based ), that of pastoralist farmers and herders is more along the lines of own-labor entitlements.
4

1.2. Famine Prevention in Post-Colonial Africa

11

nature (often involving population relocation) and the authoritarian manner in which they were implemented. Even as African countries achieved independence, there were no nationalist movements that utilized the prevention of famine as a party platform. Instead, other issues like racial identity and economic development tended to prove more salient, reecting both a relative lack of rural civic mobilization, and the problematic legacy of colonial anti-famine land-use policies. In promising macroeconomic and social welfare development, these regimes pursued technocratic policies which in some instances succeeded in averting famine. Ultimately, though, the authoritarian nature of the governments undermined their relief programs, leaving those most vulnerable unable to protect themselves. Thus, while systematic anti-famine policies were implemented in colonial Africa, they were markedly simpler than their Indian counterparts.

1.2

Famine Prevention in Post-Colonial Africa

Perhaps the clearest example of a minimal commitment to famine relief is Sudan. A British colony until 1956, the country descended into civil war almost immediately after gaining its independence. Though at this time, scholars note, the country exhibited structures which served to guard against localized food shortages degenerating into famine, their eectiveness was undermined by political instability. In 1969, Jaafar Nimeiri seized power and embraced political Islam, exacerbating the conict between the countrys Northern (Muslim) and Southern (Christian) halves. Nimeiris (corrupt) regime destroyed its domestic accountability during this time, exploiting its strategic position in the Wests anti-communist strategy, and the state began to decay domestically. In 1983, the specter of famine loomed in a few provinces, and though rains failed again in 1984, the government took no action. In an attempt to persuade international nanciers of his countrys stability, Nimeiri stated publicly that at that time, the situation in the Southcivil war, by all accountswas reassuring (de Waal 1997:91). Though Nimeiri did ultimately acknowledge the gravity of the conditions, the famine helped solidify a coalition against him, resulting in a popular democratic uprising in 1985. However, though the coalition used the famine to mobilize support, its use was largely tactical, such that the issue failed to attain any real political signicance. Following the regime change, Sudans famine response eort was delegated to international relief agencies and became a depoliticized, technical issue. This shift was reected in the creation of a technical early warning system that monitored economic, climatic, and agricultural data, in the spirit of the neo-liberal agenda for eviscerating government responsibilities (de Waal 1997:93). Though under the democraticallyelected Umma Party (1986-9), the country did possess liberal democratic institutions, in practice they did not extend beyond Khartoum and other (Northern) urban centers. War in the South continued to rage, as did the famine, and though at this time the press was unrestrained, there was little interest in covering either situation.

12

Chapter 1. Literature Review

Around this time, Ethiopia also failed to prevent famine, though the countrys prospects were not nearly so bright as Sudans after Nimeiri. Though Ethiopia was never colonized by a European power, Haile Selassies Solomonic empire came to an end in 1974 when he was deposed by a Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist military juntathe Dergue (council in Geez). Led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the country immediately became a one-party communist state. While after the countrys 1973-4 food crisis, the imperial government established a Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to help prevent future crises, following the revolution the Commission quickly became a tool of the Dergue. Land reforms enacted around this time were designed by a small number of intellectuals, without the involvement of the peasant base, and imposed from above. The Dergue also established a central grain marketing corporation which extracted food from rural populations to sustain a few cities and the ever-expanding armyprecisely the same pattern of distribution which prevailed before the revolution (de Waal 1997:110). During the 1980s, the RRC became a political tool to implement radical social reforms, and later the military used it to relocate people. The RRC was also tasked with procuring foreign aidmost of which went to fuel militiasand spreading propaganda identifying the countrys 1983-5 famine as the result of overpopulation and drought, as opposed to war. However, though drought and harvest failure did contribute to the famine, they cannot be considered direct causes. Even the governments economic and agricultural policies were not as integral to the famines sustainment as the counter-insurgency campaigns in Tigray and Wollo: The zone of severe famine coincided with the war zone, and the phases of the developing famine corresponded with major military actions (de Waal 1997:115). After the famine was uncovered by international media in the fall of 1984, the Dergue began to use aid as a strategic alibi (de Waal 1997:123), with a newly-formed UN Emergency Oce for Ethiopia acting as an international ofcial mouthpiece. On the other side of the frontline, the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) was much more cognizant of their reliance on the rural population, and so aligned their interests. By [linking] the political fortunes of the Tigrayan peasantry in the face of famine to the political fortunes of the TPLF (de Waal 1997:129), the TPLF was also able to frame the government as having genocidal intentions. Ultimately, de Waal explains, Ethiopias famines of the 1970s and 1980s are replete with ironies, which are explicable only by attention to the existence or not of an anti-famine political contract (de Waal 1997:132). While the failed response to the 1973 famine was elitist and institutionalized (and resulted in the fall of Haile Selassie), the response to the 1983-5 famine was, for a short time, thought of as a major policy success for the government of Ethiopia. Due to the way discourse about ghting famine is disconnected from discourse of internal conict, though, the TPLF has largely been unable to take credit for its actions. In Mozambique, too, did portions of the country experience famine conditions owing to domestic conict. Even before Mozambiques 1975 independence from Portugal, the territory was subject to a decade of sporadic warfare. Additionally, following the formation of the new governmenta one-party state based on Marxist principles most of the countrys roughly 250,000 Portuguese returned to Europe, leaving the economy in shambles. Civil war broke out in 1977, and lasted until 1992. Though

1.2. Famine Prevention in Post-Colonial Africa

13

during times of peace, Mozambique is a fertile country which has little trouble feeding its population and producing exports, between 1983 and 1984, the south-central region descended into famine, with most commonly cited statistics placing the death toll at around 100,000. A second major famine occurred in 1987, centered on the eastern Zamb ezia province, which was the result of conict. The civil war was characterized by extensive human rights violations by both sides, and only ended after the accidental death of the president and the end of the Cold War. Though political instability in Uganda arguably did not directly contribute to the countrys famine in 1980, the situation was indeed exacerbated by confusion and fragility following the fall of Idi Amin. After being deposed in 1979, Amin and his forces ed the the country, and around the same time, crisis struck Karamoja, a region periodically aicted by drought. Amins soldiers abandonment of a barracks within Karamoja further contributed to the instability, as traditional power relations were upset, and a power struggle following (possibly rigged) elections resulted in Karamojaalready a marginalized regionbeing caught in the crossre. In the end, an estimated 50,000 Karimojong perished. Though the human rights record of Milton Obotes regime was below par, the country did manage to avoid famine in Karamoja following drought in 1984, just before a coup removed Obote from the presidency. Dodge and Alnwick (1986), though, attribute this success entirely to eorts by international aid organizations. At the other end of the spectrum lies Botswana, whose government is noted for exhibiting an inherent sense of obligation and a keen sense of its electoral interests. Having gained independence from Britain in 1964, Botswana has consistently maintained what Freedom House judges as free and fair elections. In reality, though, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has beneted from an uneven playing eld (Levitsky & Way 2010:255)5 , winning every contest since independence by a considerable margin. When drought struck in 1982 (and continued for six years), the government enacted various programs in an attempt to prop up rural incomes. Though the countrys use of plow and tractor subsidies was socially regressive, the country did manage to avoid famine conditions. There are some, however, who argue that the countrys success was in no small part bolstered by its economic growth throughout the decade, rather than any political commitment to relief. The countrys constitution does not contain explicit guarantees for freedom of the press, and though the government occasionally interferes in media aairs, abuse by the BDP is neither as frequent nor as severe as other countries in the region (Levitsky & Way 2010:256). Though Dr` eze and Sen similarly laud Zimbabwe for enacting eective entitlement protection programs, preventing the countrys 1982-4 drought from precipitating a major famine, this is far from a complete picture. After gaining independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU party were elected to power. Less publicized than the countrys aversion of famine, however, was the ZANU military campaign conducted within the province of Matabeleland, home to supporters of the rival ZAPU party6 . This campaignGukurahundi 7 resulted in widespread famine conditions and the
5 6

XRCOMP in Polity IV. See Section 2.1 (page 31). While ZANU was Western-aligned, ZAPU supported the USSR. 7 Gukurahundi, meaning the early rain which washes away the cha before the spring rains, in

14

Chapter 1. Literature Review

deaths of between 10,000 and 20,000 people. Though this was obscured partly by Zimbabwe exploiting its strategic position between East and West, the Gukurahundi was also kept secret by restrictions on the content of news reports. It was not until 1987 that the campaign ended, following an agreement to unify ZANU and ZAPU (forming ZANU-PF). However, this relationship broke down some years later, and though the country has experienced limited multi-party democracy (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:146), in practice, Mugabe has held power throughout. Last, but not least, Dr` eze and Sen consider the case of Kenya. After peacefully gaining independence from the British in 1963, Kenya became a republic, with Jomo Kenyatta as its president. Political pressure prompted Kenyatta to consolidate power in 1966 after winning re-election, and established a de facto one-party state. Upon his death in 1978, then-Vice President Daniel arap Moi took his place, and though he enjoyed support from around the country, he was too weak to consolidate power. However, in 1982, some ocers of the air force attempted and failed to overthrow him, and arap Moi dismissed political opposition, establishing a de jure one-party state. In 1984, the country experienced a severe drought, in response to which an interministry drought response coordinating committee was established and given top priority. Ultimately, the country managed to avert famine, though there is evidence of widespread hunger leading to malnutrition. While Dr` eze and Sen attribute the governments responsiveness to political pressure from elected MPs, the (somewhat free) press, and the threat of political instability, de Waal argues that Kenyas success in escaping famine was largely attributable to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap Moi, who recognized a rudimentary and implicit political contract: feed the central highlands and (most importantly) the cities, and the government will survive (de Waal 1997:35). However, despite recognizing this pressure, action taken by arap Mois regime seemed oriented primarily towards the placation of his opponents, failing to address the countrys more fundamental causes of poverty. Additionally, there are reports of numerous human rights violations during and after this time (Adar & Munyae 2001), as well as of governmental interference in press aairs (Ochieng 2011, Wanyande 1995) which further complicate Dr` eze and Sens argument. To summarize, then: while Botswana and Kenya managed to avert famine conditions, neither were fully democratic. On the other hand, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda were all autocratic, and all failed to avert famine conditions (in most cases due to war-time politics). Finally, on rst glance, Zimbabwe also managed to avert famine, though in reality, the government indirectly created hunger to suppress political opposition. However, while anecdotal evidence is largely sucient to reconcile Sens theory with reality, it cannot provide general (or generalizable) denitions of famine, competitive elections, or a free pressall of which may be used to further examine the hypothesis validity. While for each variable, a simple binary measure (e.g., free press vs. restricted press) would seem to suce, in reality it is the gradations between which provide information pertinent to this endeavor, as they often reect decisions
the Chi-Shona language, was also known as the Matabeleland Massacres.

1.3. Conceptualizing Famine and actions of a political variety.

15

1.3

Conceptualizing Famine

While most popular denitions of famine include scenes of malnutrition and starvation resulting from a general lack of food, this is somewhat of a simplicationthough famine conditions may obviously result in starvation and destitution, these symptoms are generally indicative of breakdowns of other social systems as well. Exactly what systems are aected, though, and how, is a matter of debate. While some scholars argue that famine is the result of a decrease in relative exchange power of (vulnerable) populations (Ilie 1989, Sen 1981, Walker 1989), others emphasize nutrition (Dr` eze & Gr Sen 1989, O ada 2009), disease and social disruption (de Waal 1990), excess mortality (Howe & Devereux 2004), or other indicators as both reecting and stemming from famine conditions. Clearly, then, we are faced with a complex phenomenon. Seeing as denitions of nearly every aspect of famine are debated, it will serve us well to start with classical denitions of this unfortunate occurrence. Table 1.1: Estimated Mortality in Select Twentieth Century Famines
Years 1943 1958-62 1969-74 1972-75 1980-81 1982-85 1982-85 1983-85 1984-85 1988 Location (epicenter) India (Bengal) China West Africa (Sahel) Ethiopia (Wollo & Tigray) Uganda (Karamoja) Mozambique Zimbabwe (Matabeleland) Ethiopia Sudan (Darfur, Kordofan) Sudan (south) Excess Mortality 2.1m3m 30m33m 101k 200k500k 30k 100k 10k20k 590k1m 250k 250k Causal Triggers Conict Government Drought Drought Conict & Drought Conict & Drought Conict Conict & Drought Drought Drought
(Devereux 2000:6)

Early modern scholars of famine were inuenced by Thomas Malthus, who focused on the gap between food supply and demand, given a level of technological advancement and a xed amount of land. In his 1798 work An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Aects the Further Improvement of Society, Malthus identied famine as a shortfall in the supply of food in a given area and, simultaneously, the death by starvation of a substantial proportion of the inhabitants (de Waal 1997:20). However, de Waal notes, the picture painted by this descriptionone of great famine looming constantlyis entirely without empirical foundation. By the 1800s, though, Malthusian doctrine had reached a level of general popularity such that by the 1840s, Malthusianism was a guiding principle of British policy. Of the famine in Ireland, London believed that certain natural economic forces were to

16

Chapter 1. Literature Review

blame, and that these forces should be left aloneeventually, the population would reduce on its own to match the food supply. As a result, relief was delayed and very modest, and food was even permitted to leave the island. Malthus also inuenced policies of the East India Company, which made him a professor of history and political economy at its college in Haileybury. However, by the time of the 1880 Famine Commission, doctrinaire Malthusianism had fallen somewhat out of fashion, likely sparked by the realization that in most circumstances, the theory failed to correspond to reality. The 1880 Report of the Famine Commission acknowledged that famine was caused not by a general lack of food, but by a general lack of purchasing power, and in 1911, Lovat Fraser described famine as now [meaning] a prolonged period of unemployment, accompanied by dear food... (de Waal 2005:19). Despite criticisms of Malthus theory, though, it has remained popular since its inception, his vision of a gigantic famine decimating the population used even today to instill fears of unsustainable population growth (Datta-Ray 2013, Hassan 2013). Though Malthus theory of overpopulation leading to famine has fallen out of favor, the question of whether famines stem from natural or articial causes is still pertinent. Sen, however, claims that the distinction can be misleading: famine, he argues, is fundamentally a social phenomenon, involving the inability of large groups of people to establish command over food in the society in which they live (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:46) in the face of adverse meteorological conditions. Furthermore, though a natural catastrophe may cause (or exacerbate) food insecurity, a disasters impact will nonetheless depend upon how a society is organized. For example, a country with an extensive irrigation network could theoretically weather a drought much better than one without such redistributive infrastructure. That said, even the existence of droughts, oods, and other calamities is not independent of social and economic policies. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, problems of famine and hunger are often seen as related to climate change, overlooking the inuence of societal factors on how people produce and consume food. As Table 1.2 shows, though countries which experienced famine did also experience a decline in food production, so did Botswana and Zimbabweboth countries without a noted famine during the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s (von Braun et al. 1998:32). Though this table alone cannot establish food production as a (causal) factor of countries famines, it is interesting to note that almost all the countries examined in this report experienced a decline in production between 1971, 1981, and 1991 (only Kenya managed to increase its food production after the 1980s). This chart, however, leaves much to be desired, including but not limited to production statistics for the periods between evaluations. To those in power, the identication of famine as primarily resulting from drought or other natural causes can dramatically reframe lines of accountability, and may signicantly alter the policy response. Indeed, the identication of famine conditions as such at all represents a choice and is therefore more political than technical: rather than being found, a denition of famine must be agreed [upon] (Howe & Devereux 2004:4). The action and outcome of making this decision has great implications, including who may be held responsible for providing relief, and to whom. When famine is blamed on natural causes, as with the Sahelian famines of the 1970ssupposed

1.3. Conceptualizing Famine

17

Table 1.2: Indexes of per capita food production in famine-aected and not-aected African countries, 196195/96
Country 1961 1971 1981 1991 1995/96 88 82 110 96 n.a. 80 70 82 80 80 81 n.a. 82 102 82

Countries aected by famine at least once during the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s Angola 126 136 96 79 Burundi 100 104 102 91 Chad 111 103 99 102 Ethiopia 113 104 96 86 Liberia 91 99 102 66 Madagascar 104 109 100 86 Malawi 86 108 100 75 Mozambique 117 112 99 77 Niger 112 99 97 78 Rwanda 80 93 102 84 Sierra Leone 95 108 100 84 Somalia 99 109 101 78 Sudan 98 97 109 80 Uganda 121 126 102 98 Zaire 117 107 99 94 Countries without a noted famine during 1970s, 1980s, or Benin 97 Botswana 134 Burkina Faso 112 Cameroon 91 Central African Republic 90 Congo 117 C ote dIvoire 74 Gabon 99 The Gambia 160 Ghana 117 Guinea 101 Guinea-Bissau 112 Kenya 112 Lesotho 136 Mali 95 Namibia 114 Nigeria 129 Senegal 153 Swaziland 69 Tanzania 97 Togo 119 Zambia 101 Zimbabwe 101 1990s 99 150 116 111 95 107 88 114 163 129 101 110 110 127 100 127 135 139 95 93 117 105 127

95 102 100 101 102 101 100 96 116 99 101 95 95 96 106 93 97 124 107 97 97 97 119

119 68 119 78 94 92 93 82 90 116 90 103 103 70 96 98 123 98 85 78 95 96 78

136 72 127 86 92 84 106 76 58 134 95 90 90 75 90 67 135 107 78 74 90 81 67

NOTES: 1980 index = 100; n.a. = not available (von Braun et al. 1998:32).

18

Chapter 1. Literature Review

products of cyclical changes in heat coming from the sun (Okudi 1992:4)drought and famine (and consequently the prevention or alleviation thereof) are removed from the scope of agentive action. A similar argument that has existed since colonial times is the tendency to place blame on pastoral society. Mainly espoused by governments, liberal scholars and change agents, the idea is that these societies are backwards and conservative, emphasizing stock accumulation as opposed to quality control, pastoral mobility and cattle raiding (Okudi 1992:4). Thus, it is not uncommon to see Africas endemic twentieth century famines directly and solely attributed to the victims. In the case of Uganda, Akol (1985) argues that development of agricultural productivity in aected areas was impeded by a persistent rustling of livestock, leading to distress migration, and Alnwick (1985) attributes the countrys 1980 famine to the alarming amount of raids after the fall of Amins government in 1979, leading to a loss of animals and cropland. Akol also blames land fragmentation, stemming from customary Karimojong inheritance practices, as having limited agricultural productivity: By dividing the land into small plots among families, it is argued, the use of modern farming technologies is made impossible. Other scholars attribute food shortages in the area to the Karimojong culture of ritual feasts, for which large amounts of food and drink are prepared. However, these arguments are misleading, based on generalities, and present pastoralism simply as ignorance, with external factors such as the weather and market conditions left out of the picture. The assumption behind food decline is that there are extra mouths to eat and not extra hands to produce (Okudi 1992:5). In focusing on aggregate supply and demand of food, though, the exploitative nature of the market is ignored. While Sens argument for considering entitlements follows, Okudi argues that such an approach is as narrow in scope as it is limited to the immediate causes of famine and its consequences (Okudi 1992:5), and fails to expose the relationship between long-and short-term causes of famine.

1.3.1

Identication

Beyond identifying the cause(s) of a famine, there is still the question of what famine conditions entail, what distinguishes famine from mere episodes of food insecurity or chronic hunger, and, of course, how best to avert such an aiction. While pop conceptions of famine do tend to oversimplify, they can provide a helpful starting point for exploring what constitutes this complex occurrence. To some, famine is identied primarily as a health crisis, manifested by signicant changes in nutrition levels, or starvation. In this vein, Dr` eze and Sen (1989) distinguish famineinvolving acute starvation and a sharp increase in mortalityfrom chronic hungersustained nutritional deprivation on a persistent basis (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:7)as distinct yet related phenomena. While the former, they note, requires speed in intervention, often resulting in the use of existing distributional mechanisms, the nature of the latter is such that slower but more impactful policies may be enacted. This distinction is also important in considering the experiences of dierent countries. While India, for example, experiences regular hunger and endemic under-

1.3. Conceptualizing Famine

19

nutrition, the Bengal famine of 1943 was the result of acute starvation escalating into large-scale mortality. On the other hand, countries may become adept at dealing with persistent hunger but fall prey to considerable transient hunger, as in China during 1958-61. The distinction between these countries is especially notable, Dr` eze and Sen note, due to the seeming inability of either to overcome both endemic and transient hunger: While Indias success in famine prevention seems not to have reduced the countrys level of chronic hunger, China has achieved success in improving its citizens level of nutrition in normal times, though this has not translated to an ability to avert famine8 . However, de Waal (2000) argues that this distinctionbetween transient famine and chronic hungeris a fallacious one. As with most social scientic terms, he argues, there is generally a discrepancy between popular perceptions of such complex phenomena and arbitrary scientic bounds. Like a ne wine or hard-core pornography9 , Everyone can diagnose a famine when they encounter one, but identifying its crucial elements is rather more dicult (de Waal 2000:5). In part, this stems from the unpredictable relationship between various statistics (mortality, food supply, etc.) and impressions of the events at handwhile the Sahelian famine of the 1970s occurred without measured excess mortality, for example, the Bengal famine of 1943 is notable for having occurred without any decline in food availability. It is important, then, to at least attempt the establishment of an operational definition of famine, so as to allow, among other reasons, a distinction between chronic impoverishment and acute famineboth of which still satisfy Sens democracy prevents famine hypothesis. While it is easy to identify extreme cases of famine, there are at least as many borderline cases, especially in Africa. Many African countries, de Waal notes, have lived for years in a sort of economic twilight, suering extreme dislocation and poverty, and occasionally attracting international media and relief attention that points to starvation and famine (de Waal 2000:5). Indeed, there are communitiessuch as Southern Sudanwho would argue that they have suered famine continuously for some time. In an attempt to construct an operational denition of famine, de Waal (2000) identies four main components, with real-world instances combining some if not all to varying degrees: Hunger Includes subjective feelings of severe and prolonged hunger, the sociallydened going without acceptable food, and the measurable fact of undernutrition. Impoverishment Includes loss of livelihood, income and assets, and other components of increased poverty. For most rural people threatened with famine, the most concrete fears arising from famine are those associated with the threat of destitution. Social breakdown Social symptoms of famine typically include distress migration,
Dr` eze and Sen explore this further in Hunger and Public Action Chapter 11. I refer of course to the famous line from US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart (d. 1985) describing his threshold test for obscenity in Jacobellis vs. Ohio (1964).
9 8

20

Chapter 1. Literature Review splitting up of families, etc. For many famine-aected communities, these are not symptoms of famine, but are intrinsic elements of the unpleasant experience itself.

Mortality Many famines are accompanied by increased levels of mortality, usually concentrated among vulnerable groups such as children, the aged, and migrants. The highest death rates are invariably found in camps and other concentrations of destitute people. When social disruption is such that there is mass migration to camps, death rates tend to shoot up (de Waal 2000:6) De Waal also mentions a fth component to famine, which are coping strategies of individuals, families, and larger groups in response to any of the above occurrences. However, it is also possible, he notes, for famine to occur without any number of the above factors (though hunger is likely a universal element). Though uncommon, famine striking asset-rich societies is not unheard of (for example, the Dutch Hunger Winter of 194410 ), while others have occurred without social breakdown, or even without excess mortality. The nature and extent of a famine, then, depends greatly on social and economic responses to pleas made by aected populations. Rather than simply conceptualizing hunger and famine as on the same linear scale, famines may assume qualitatively dierent forms as they escalate. However, while this does help clarify famine conceptually, it does not make the identication of such an occurrence any less imprecise.

1.3.2

Quantication

A second vector along which famines may be distinguished is severitythe degree to which each factor is present. Though famine may occur without excess mortality, this statistic is nonetheless relevant in understanding the severity of such a crisis. However, for most famines, little is known about the scale of deaths. Estimates are always approximate, and reect the wishes of the publisher, whether it is a government or governmental organization seeking to hide or inate the crisis, or humanitarian actors attempting to draw support. For methodological reasons, Devereux (2000) explains, demographers and nutritionists prefer to release crude mortality ratesdeaths per thousandof particular population subgroups, though the media and public tend to desire aggregate totals which are not typically known with condence. Problems in estimating crude mortality rates may arise for a number of reasons. First, in poor countries, population data may be unreliable or unavailable. As a result, one method for estimating crude mortality rates involves scaling up mortality rates of observed population subgroups (e.g. malnourished children in refugee camps) to the national population, and comparing against normal mortality rates. However, the movement of large populations is itself associated with elevated mortality, because of loss of access to normal food sources and exposure to hazardous
Though notable for occurring in a more developed and asset-rich country, this famine occurred during and was generated in no small part by the Nazi occupation.
10

1.3. Conceptualizing Famine

21

environmentsnew disease vectors, lack of shelter, use of unsafe water (Devereux 2000:5), et cetera. Thus, refugee camps, paradoxically, tend to experience the highest mortality rates. Malnourishment experienced on the journey to the camp, as well as overcrowded and unsanitary conditions at many camps, make them breeding grounds for communicable diseases. Ultimately, an estimation based on such a case will likely be exaggerated. At the same time, though, mortality does not capture the full impact of famine, which often doubles when lost births due to fertility decline are considered (Devereux 2000:5). Instead, Devereux (2000) disaggregates mortality by age and sex, revealing patterns which reect interactions between biological and sociocultural vulnerability. The latter, like the former, is context-specic, so mortality rates specic to age and gender, for example, are not easily generalizable geographically or over time. Social hierarchies, cultural practices, and economic priorities, as well as age- and genderspecic biological vulnerability will also aect household-level mortality patterns11 . Considering that the nature of famine may change considerably as it escalates, de Waal identies three qualitative degrees of famine severity: 1. Famines involving primarily hunger and impoverishment; 2. Famines in which there are elevated rates of mortality; 3. Famines in which there are spectacularly high death rates alongside severe social dislocation and collapse (de Waal 2000:7). While most dictionary denitions of famine refer to types two and three, many experiential denitions, de Waal notes, include the rst type as well. Though these degrees of severity also include changes in exchange entitlement mappings (e.g., the ability to command food), they also consider antecedent and subsequent occurrences. If, for example, a famine escalates from a type one to a type two famine, it may be due to a coping strategy that involves large-scale migration and increases the incidence of disease, consequently raising mortality rates. Additionally, responses to famine may change over time as people learn from past experiences. Thus, in Sudan, for example, the failure of relief shelters during 1984-5 led many rural people to avoid migration to towns during the countrys 1990-1 drought and famine. In this case, death rates were likely lower as a result, though such a claim implies a degree of reliability among mortality gures which seems unlikely. After identifying component elements of famine as well as a qualitative scale of severity, de Waal proposes a (simplied) typology of famines, based on the sector of society aected and the primary causal elements:
That being said, generally, women are more resilient than men because females store more body fat than males, and a statistical eect also favors female survival because famines are associated with fertility declines, so maternal mortality rates fall for the duration of the food crisis. On the other hand, women often face higher social vulnerability than men, in cultural contexts where intrahousehold allocation rules for food, health care, and other basic needs favor males over females (Devereux 2000:11). This pattern of mortality was observed in Karamoja, Uganda.
11

22

Chapter 1. Literature Review

Pastoral These famine aect herders primarily. While their short-term cause is usually drought leading to a lack of pasture and water for animals, in the longterm, they generally entail an alienation of pastures for farms and plantations, and restrictions on nomadic movements. These are slow-onset famines. Because of the mobility of pastoralists, these famines tend to cover wide areas, but often they are invisible outside the pastoral areas. They may be extremely protracted. As well as relief distributions, eective responses can include buying up livestock at guaranteed prices and providing credit. Agrarian/Smallholder These are the paradigmatic African famines, aecting scattered farming populations. Commonly, drought-related production failures are the proximate cause, with deeper causes including exclusion from land, exploitative economic relationships, etc. These are also usually slow-onset famines. They can often be highly localized, and the more severe famines are often akin to a series of interconnected localized famines in which each locality is unable to assist its neighbor. Often there is an epicenter, from which waves of grain price rises and distress migrations move out. Only severe agrarian famines become visible outside the aected areas. Coping strategies are usually much more important than relief programs. A wide range of programs and policies, ranging from land preservation to prepositioning food stocks, can help prevent such famines, and a range of responses including food relief and labor-based relief projects can help ameliorate the eects. Class-based/Occupational In this category, wage laborers are often the worst hit occupation. These are the paradigmatic Asian famines, in which whole class of people (farm laborers, artisans, sherman) are suddenly rendered destitute by a collapse in the demand for their labor or a rise in the price of a staple food. Some recent African famines have become closer to this type. These famines tend to be rapid onset and cover a wide area, selectively aecting certain groups. They can be highly visible, with aected people ooding towns, and townspeople themselves suering. Political visibility and newsworthiness are certainly factors in the extent of political concern about these famines. In these famines, coping strategies are less eective, and state intervention is far more necessary. Grain price controls and employment guarantee schemes are the most eective relief measures. Wartime Wartime famines are usually associated with a catastrophic collapse of the livelihood base, either by physical destruction or conscation, or by severe restrictions on movement and economic activity. The nature of the famine depends very much on the nature of the war and the determination with which the belligerent parties pursue their famine-creating strategies. These famines can be very rapid, or can take years to develop (perhaps aected societies that are not normally famine-prone); they can be highly localized, or can cover a huge area. Occasionally, coping strategies can be forcibly prevented by belligerents, leaving aected people wholly reliant on relief. Sometimes these famines are

1.3. Conceptualizing Famine

23

almost completely invisibledeliberately kept that way by the belligerents (de Waal 2000:9). Despite these categories, many famines are, of course, compounds of the above types. Agrarian famines, for example, are commonly associated with pastoral famines; and changes in grain prices caused by agrarian or wartime famines may cause class-based famines in adjacent areas. In Ethiopia in 1983-5, for example, some of the highest mortality was recorded in areas which did not themselves suer a major production failure, but which were suddenly (and to their residents, inexplicably) struck by high food prices and immigration of destitute laborers (de Waal 2000:10). Very generally, de Waal notes that characteristic Asian famines have been class-based, rapid-onset, and high visibility, in response to which coping strategies are seen to be relatively ineective, making state action more important. On the other hand, most African famines have been more locality based, slow-onset, low visibility, and with greater roles for coping strategies and less for public action (de Waal 2000:10), contributing to a lesser political signicance. A slightly more rigorous approach to quantifying famine is taken by Howe & Devereux (2004), who propose a bipartite scale to estimating famine severity. In addition the magnitude of a faminethe aggregate impact of the crisisthe authors establish intensity as a separate metricreecting the severity of the crisis at a given location and time. While there do already exist approaches to quantifying famine, most are descriptive, ambiguous, or lack clarity necessary for use as an operational guide. Additionally, while qualitative denitions of famine are complex, in that they inevitably describe a causal relation between elements of society (e.g. whether famine is a natural disaster, social process, community crisis, et cetera), a denition based on numbers should, in theory, be immune to such biases (though the origins of the numbers themselves may be biased). During the 1980s and 1990s, there were a number of studies undertaken that examined the behavioral responses of populations aected by food insecurity. Patterns and sequences inferred from these observationscoping strategieswere identied, leading some to believe that these behaviors could serve as an indicator of worsening famine conditions. In this light, Walker (1989) identies four distinct stages of coping strategies: Stage (a) includes strategies for overcoming normal seasonal stress, such as rationing of food or diversifying of income. Stage (b) is the result of prolonged food stress, during which time increasingly irreversible strategies are employed, such as selling breeding livestock or mortgaging land, though these solutions simply substitute short-term gain for long-term troubles. Stage (c) is characterized by dependence on external support (Howe & Devereux 2004:358) such as food aid, and, if all else fails, Stage (d) starvation and death, will follow (Walker 1989).

24

Chapter 1. Literature Review

Between stages (a) and (b), Walker explains, the essential dierence... is that [strategies] in the second stage directly undermine the basis of the victims means of survival... [T]hey sacrice future security for present survival. If one wished to mark the true beginnings of famine, as opposed to seasonal food shortage, this might be the appropriate place (Walker 1989:50). One important insight from coping strategies literature, Howe & Devereux note, is that famines threaten livelihoods as well as lives, and that eective famine prevention requires early intervention to protect livelihoods, rather than mandating famine relief just to save lives (Howe & Devereux 2004:359). However, coping strategies are highly context-dependent, undermining their ability to serve as generalizable famine indicators. Other authors illustrate the complexities of isolating stages from each other, with some authors distinguishing coping from adaptive strategies, and others argue that coping strategies are not necessarily adopted sequentially, but concurrently. Ultimately, however, these do not eectively justify the presence and nature of coping strategies as a viable dimension by which famines may be distinguished. Whereas coping strategies are wholly context-specic, nutrition-related indicators, Howe and Devereux argue, may be compared universally. However, this metric also poses denitional problems, such as what specic rate of malnutrition or mortality may indicate the beginning of a famine. Another problem with nutritional indicators is that they generally refer to children under ve years of age, as there is no agreedupon denition of moderate and severe malnutrition among older population groups. Yet, children over ve and adults are demonstrated to be more aected by emergencies than are younger children, as adults will often reduce their intake to ensure that their children have enough. Thus, child malnutrition may serve as a trailing indicator, failing to manifest until well after adult malnutrition has set in. A third complication of nutrition-related metrics is the ambiguous nature of the relationship between nutritional status and food crises. This relationship is made problematic because malnutrition outcomes can be the result of other factors besides inadequate food intake, such as disease, an unsanitary public health environment or poor child-care practices (Howe & Devereux 2004:359). In particular, the point is raised that nutrition should not be taken as an indicator of famine without simultaneously considering wider food-security information, as low rates of malnutrition may mask a developing famine process: severe erosion of livelihoods and exhaustion of coping strategies (Howe & Devereux 2004:360). To provide greater operational clarity and accountability for famine prevention, Howe and Devereux propose adopting intensity and magnitude scaleswhile the former refers to the time- and location-specic severity of a crisis, magnitude refers to the aggregate impact of a crisis on the aected population. While their scale is inspired and inuenced by prior literature, it diers from previous indexes in three ways. First, the scale is intended to be generalizable, such that situations of food insecurity may be compared across the globe while at the same time recognizing that each crisis is grounded in a specic context. Second, the scales capture a greater complexity of famine impacts than other approaches and denitions (Howe & Devereux 2004:360) by disaggregating the intensity and magnitude; and third, the scales oer a much more nuanced and operationally-useful diagnosis of food insecurity than

1.3. Conceptualizing Famine do binary scales of famine or no famine. Intensity

25

To estimate a measure of intensity, the authors combine anthropometric and mortality indicators, as well as food-security descriptors. The anthropometric/mortality indicators provide cut-os for each level that can be compared across situations. The food-security descriptors capture the dynamic, self-reinforcing changes in the livelihood system associated with increasing degrees of food insecurity and famine, and can be adapted to specic circumstances (for example, drought or conict) and diverse contexts. (Howe & Devereux 2004:361)12 . Additionally, the authors establish a system of weighting anthropometric/mortality versus food-security indicators depending on which is estimated to occupy a more causal role. One issue with this scale, however, which has yet to be resolved, is the appropriate unit of analysis for determining the intensity level. The authors oer no solution, except to note that the intensity (localized) and magnitude (aggregate) measures are designed to be complementary. By creating an ordinal scale of localized foodinsecurity, the situation may be observed over time, and allows external stakeholders to make more informed decisions regarding aid. Magnitude A complete assessment of a crisis full impact, Howe & Devereux argue, can only be made in retrospect. Thus, magnitude refers to the scale of human suering caused by the entire crisis, as proxied by excess mortality (Howe & Devereux 2004:364). The authors also note that mortality of the magnitude scale starts at zero, rather than one, because, as has been established, malnutrition need not imply deaths. This is, the authors note, one resolution to a long-standing debate as to whether famines are characterized by excess mortality by denition. On the one hand, quantifying the impact of famine by excess mortality makes sense, as death is the most tragic human consequence of famine (Howe & Devereux 2004:364). Though on the other hand, to acknowledge that famine may occur or have occurred even without excess mortality better characterizes famine as a complex processes (marked chiey by hunger and destitution). As mentioned earlier, the intensity and magnitude scales are designed to work in tandem, and thus interact in specic ways: Any intensity level of 3 or above will register as a famine on the magnitude scale, even if it occurs in a very localized area, and even if no deaths are recorded (this could be a Category A famine) (Howe & Devereux 2004:364). However, the opposite is (clearly) not necessarily true: every incident which involves death is not necessarily a famine. Additionally, deaths may result from a food crisis condition, but the crisis may not be considered a famine unless the intensity of the conditions in any given area matches or exceeds level 3.
The anthropometric/mortality indicators and food-security descriptors can be thought of as registering the eects of a crisis on the lives and livelihoods, respectively, of the aected population (Howe & Devereux 2004:361).
12

26

Chapter 1. Literature Review

Table 1.3: Famine Intensity Scale

Level 0 Phrase Designation Food-security Malnutrition & Mortality Indicators CMR <0.2/10k/day & Wasting <2.5% CMR 0.2 but <.5/10k/day and/or Wasting 2.3 but <10% CMR .5 but <1/10k/day and/or Wasting 10 but <20% and/or prevalence of dema Food-security Descriptors Social system is cohesive; prices are stable; negligible adoption of coping strategies. Social system remains cohesive; price instability, and seasonal shortage of key items; reversible adaptive strategies are employed. Social system signicantly stressed but remains largely cohesive; dramatic rise in price of food and other basic items; adaptive mechanisms start to fail; increase in irreversible coping strategies. Clear signs of social breakdown appear; markets begin to close or collapse; coping strategies are exhausted and survival strategies are adopted; aected population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of the crisis. Widespread social breakdown; markets are closed or inaccessible to aected population; survival strategies are widespread; aected population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of this crisis. Complete social breakdown; widespread mortality; aected population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of the crisis.

Food-insecurity

Food crisis

Famine

CMR 1 but <5/10k/day and/or Wasting 20% but <40% and/or prevalence of dema

Severe famine

CMR 5 but <15/10k/day and/or Wasting 40% and/or prevalence of dema

Extreme famine

CMR 15/10k/day

CMR : crude mortality rate. Wasting : proportion of child population (six months to ve years) who are below eighty percent of the median weight-for-height or below 2 Z-score weight-for-height (Howe & Devereux 2004:362).

Ultimately, Howe and Devereux argue that while their metric is not perfect, the establishment of a universal famine scale has great implications for accountability. During a crisis, such a scale oers a basis to pressure intervention by responsible (or accountable) actors, and after the fact, they may be invoked to assign proportionate

1.3. Conceptualizing Famine

27

Table 1.4: Famine Magnitude Scale Category Phrase designation A B C D E Minor famine Moderate famine Major famine Great famine Catastrophic famine Mortality range 0-999 1,000-9,999 10,000-99,999 100,000-999,999 1,000,000 & over

(Howe & Devereux 2004:365)

accountability. Proportionality, it is argued, is important to establishing accountability both in terms of the number of deaths caused, as well as intent. However, while attempting to determine intent can increase accountability and bring perpetrators to justice, the authors warn against the realization of perverse incentives, such that governments and humanitarian agencies devote disproportionate resources and energy to ensuring simply that threshold malnutrition and mortality rates on the famine scales are not crossed (Howe & Devereux 2004:367). Additionally, on the part of a perpetratorif such a role existsthese perverse incentives may result in eorts to mitigate (or exacerbate) famine conditions to the extent that the crisis crosses one threshold or another. Instead, the authors advocate formulating policy solutions that address the underlying causes of famine, though the eort to do so may be prompted or catalyzed by the identication of more discrete levels.

Chapter 2 Theoretical Argument

2.1 Democracy and Elections

While there certainly is no dearth of scholarship regarding identifying the presence, scope, and causes of famine, we turn now to the relationship between famine and politics. While events which catalyze famine may be of a natural or meteorological character, another line of thought identies famine as resulting from a lack of action: Any society, with concerted eort, can prevent drought or other natural causes from escalating into famine. What circumstances, then, would alter a governments response, or provoke a government to respond? From Malthus (1798) comes a demographic explanation of famine: it is the result of food supply restricting unsustainable increases in the population. As has been addressed elsewhere, by this reasoning, famine is a natural phenomenon which cannot be averted. Though in retrospect we may call neglectful the government that allows famine to run its course (e.g. Britain prior to 1880), the logic behind this is such that famine is outside the scope of possible agentive action. From Sen (1981), we see an economic explanation of famine: it is the failure of some peoples entitlement relations to provide them access to enough food to survive. By such a conception, we may say that famines are allowed to occur when a government is insuciently concerned with protecting the entitlements of its citizens (i.e., preventing a relative degradation or decline of peoples exchange entitlement mapping). A policy solution, then, would take the form of entitlement protection, seeking to prevent changes in exchange conditions or in endowments. Finally, from Dr` eze and Sen (1989) and Sen (1999) come political reformulations of the entitlement argument: with competitive elections comes an incentive to appease voters as politicians struggle for reelection, while a free press guarantees information access to the public, helping politicians gauge public opinion and compelling governments to act. By this logic, famine may occur if and when one or both of the above institutions are in some way decient. De Waal (1990, 2000) responds to Sen, and though he believes in entitlement theory, he identies entitlements as part of a larger picture. Famines, it is argued, are composed of ve elements in varying proportions: hunger, impoverishment, social

30

Chapter 2. Theoretical Argument

breakdown, mortality, and coping strategies in response to the rst four. Thus, while famine prevention eorts should include entitlement protection measures, the presence and severity of each other factor should be considered as well. Sutter (2011), on the other hand, explores statehood as it mediates the connection between political institutions and famine. To disaggregate state quality, Sutter measures two forms of legitimacy: horizontalthe ethnic fragmentation of a countryand verticalthe proximity of the stateas a structure of political powerto the society (Sutter 2011:3). According to this conception of political famine response, institutions that promote (vertical) accountability, such as a free press and competitive elections, are made distinct from the political will necessary to utilize those mechanisms eectively1 . Another explanation, known as selectorate theory, comes from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002), who argue that governments possess a nite amount of response capacity: both democracies and autocracies face a trade-o between the cost of action and the cost of inaction. The government is assumed to maximize its political support to stay in power. As a result, famine mortality may occur if governments nd that inaction is the support-maximizing strategy (Sutter 2011). Key to this decision is evaluating the size of the selectorate (S )the set of people who have an institutional say in choosing leadersrelative to the winning coalition (W )the minimal set of people whose support the incumbent needs in order to remain in power (Mesquita et al. 2002). When W is small, leaders may focus on the particularistic transfer of goods and services, at the expense of the provision of public goods, while a large winning coalition encourages bandwagoning. While by this logic, when W is small, famine is somewhat Malthusian, this theory does account for the possibility of concerted action overcoming such a catastrophe. In all cases, legitimacy accompanies political authority and trust, which forms the basis of a better ability of institutions to protect citizens (Sutter 2011), and increases the states power to act. A second aspect of legitimacy is the respect of social contract, reecting how close the state is to society, and third, state legitimacy decreases the risk of shocks leading to famine, especially the likelihood of civil wars: trust in institutions build peace. While Mesquita et al. do not discuss the legitimacy of the state per se, the same responsiveness may be thought of as a successful broadening of the winning coalitionthe set of people whose support the incumbent needs to remain in power. Sutter proposes a few metrics for measuring state legitimacy. First is an examination of public opinion, and second is a behavioral approach, with contestation behaviors [meaning] a lower state legitimacy. In other words, people casting votes for non-incumbent candidates during elections indicates that at least some people would prefer an alternative regime to the one currently in power. Her third approach focuses on the change of legitimation discourses of politicians as a way to dene legitimacy (Sutter 2011).
Her examination of thirty-six countries over 1980-2005 reveals two ndings: as institutional quality improves, the likelihood of famine decreases; and even accounting for climatological and political shocks, a higher aggregate state legitimacy corresponds to a lower probability of famine.
1

2.1. Democracy and Elections Polity IV

31

In an attempt to more rigorously examine each countrys political situation over time, I have included the use of the Polity IV dataset in my analysis. Begun as an attempt to [code] the authority characteristics of states in the world system, the datasets level of analysis is a countrys polity: a political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; state; body politic (Marshall et al. 2011:1). Among other reasons, the dataset is particularly useful for its placement of democracy and autocracy as collinearcaptured as a countrys Polity Scoreas well as its disaggregation of executive recruitment. Table 2.1 contains Polity scores of relevant countries. For the scores of all African countries, see Appendix A. In each case, the score listed is the countrys average from 1980 to 1989, with the exceptions of Sudan, whose 1985 regime change warrants a distinction, and Uganda, whose score is only that under Obote II (1980-5). The rst score (POLITY) is simply the dierence between a countrys democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC) scores on a scale of +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy). Democracy is conceived as a combination of three interdependent elements: the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express eective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation (Marshall et al. 2011:14). According to these elements, the authors identify a mature and internally coherent democracy as one in which (a) political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial (Marshall et al. 2011:15). On the other hand, though autocracy has become a pejorative term in Western political discourse, the authors do not operationalize the concept as simply a lack (or negative value) of democratic components. Rather, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation, with chief executives chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in oce they exercise power with few institutional constraints (Marshall et al. 2011:15). Though the authors construct a combined polity score (POLITY), they note that regimes may simultaneously exhibit elements of both autocratic and democratic authority. Rather, this variable is included as a convenient avenue for examining general regime eects in analyses (Marshall et al. 2011:17). As with famine, though, scores near the middle of the spectrum are muddled somewhat, obscuring the combination of democratic and autocratic components. As a result, while POLITY is included in Table 2.1, this is mostly for the sake of readability. More detailed statistics are available in Appendix A. Also of note (in Appendix A) are periods during which countries scores are rated 77 or -88. Though Table 2.1 does not show these scores, they represent standardized authority scores, indicating years during which no assessed polity score could be awarded. A score of -77 represents a year of interregnum, or anarchy between successive regimes, and a score of -88 notes periods of transition.

32

Chapter 2. Theoretical Argument

Of countries in Africa, only three were awarded a standardized authority score during the 1980s: Chad, Sudan, and Uganda. Briey, after the death of Chads president in the late 1970s, central authority collapsed until 1985, when a strongly autocratic government (with a POLITY score of -7) was established. In 1985, Sudans autocratic president, Jaafari Nimeiri (-7) was overthrown, and in 1986, the democratic Umma Party (7) was elected. For this transition the country was awarded -88 in 1985. Uganda during the 1980s experienced a similar but opposite shift. Following the fall of Idi Amin in 1979, Milton Obote reassumed power (having previously been deposed by Amin in 1971). Obotes second term (3) was marred by widespread human rights abuses, and he was deposed in 1985, though his immediate successor only held power for six months. January 1986 saw another new president, Yoweri Museveni (-7), whose administration was also marked by internal conict and human rights abuses. He has held power since, though during that time the country has signicantly improved its Polity scores. The Polity dataset is derived from Eckstein and Gurr (1975), who identify a number of vectors by which authority patterns vary. However, their scheme is rather complex; as a result the Polity IV project focuses on six indicators of political authority patterns, elaborated into ordinal scales. Relevant in this context are components related to executive recruitment. Described by Eckstein and Gurr as involving the ways in which superordinates come to occupy their positions (Eckstein & Gurr 1975:150), executive recruitment is disaggregated into three components: (1) the extent of institutionalization of executive transfers, XRREG; (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, XRCOMP; and (3) the openness of executive recruitment, XROPEN (Marshall et al. 2011:20). Table 2.1: Polity IV Scores of Examined Countries Country Botswana Ethiopia Kenya Mozambique Sudan (Nimeiri) Sudan (Mahdi) Uganda (Obote II) Zimbabwe POLITY XRREG 6.3 -7.6 -6.8 -7.6 -7 3.5 3 -0.2 2 2 2 2 2 2.5 2 2 XRCOMP 2 1 1 1 1 2.25 2 1.7 XROPEN 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4

(Marshall et al. 2011)

XRREG The regulation of executive recruitment refers to the extent to which a polity possesses institutionalized mechanisms for the transferral of executive power. This has three

2.1. Democracy and Elections

33

possible values: (1) Unregulated, (2) Designational/Transitional, and (3) Regulated. Unregulated means that changes of the chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power (e.g. coups). Such transfers may be legitimized after the fact through (noncompetitive) elections or the enactment of legislation. Despite these attempts at legitimation, a polity remains classied as unregulated until the coup leader has been replaced (as head of government) via designative or competitive modes of executive selection (Marshall et al. 2011:21). However, a polity is not considered unregulated if elections are held within a reasonable time after the removal of the previous head. Designational/Transitional modes of recruitment entail selection of a new chief executive by members of the political elite without formal competition (including oneparty elections and rigged multiparty elections). Also considered here are polities with arrangements made following an initial unregulated seizure of power which seek to regularize future transitions of power2 , as well as polities in transition from selective to elective modes of selection3 or vice versa4 . Finally, under a Regulated scheme of recruitment, executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections (Marshall et al. 2011:21). The fundamental distinction between a regulated and an unregulated scheme of recruitment is the level of institutionalization, whether through legislative decree or lineage. Additionally, in regulated competitive systems, the method of selection is independent of whichever particular party holds power at the time. XRCOMP The competitiveness of executive recruitment refers to the extent to which prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Marshall et al. 2011:21). In other words, a competitive recruitment process is one in which no contending party or candidate possesses a handicap (though obviously incumbents do have some advantage). This also has three possible values: (1) Selection, (2) Dual/Transitional, and (3) Election. It is also important to note that if a politys regulation of executive recruitment (XRREG) is considered Unregulated (1) or involves a transition to or from that state, competitiveness is coded 0. Selection refers to the determination of chief executives by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court (Marshall et al. 2011:21). This also includes rigged or singlecandidate elections, replacement of presidents before the end of their term, military selection of civilian executives, selection from within an institutionalized single party, incumbent selection of successors, boycotts of elections by major opposition parties, et cetera.
For example, after constitutional legitimization of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as head of the military. 3 As during the period of guided democracy often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule. 4 i.e., regimes ensuring electoral victory through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a state of emergency before executive elections (Marshall et al. 2011:21).
2

34

Chapter 2. Theoretical Argument

Dual/Transitional implies a polity with dual executivesone chosen by heredity, the other by competitive election. This value is also used for transitional arrangements between selection and election. Election, of course, refers to the selection of chief executives via competitive elections between two or more parties or candidates, regardless of whether the election is direct or indirect. XROPEN The openness of executive recruitment is the extent to which all members of the politically active population have an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position of chief executive through an institutionalized process. If transfers of power are coded as Unregulated in XRREG, or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, XROPEN is coded 0. Four degrees of openness are used: (1) Closed, (2) Dual ExecutiveDesignation, (3) Dual ExecutiveElection, and (4) Open. Closed implies that executives are chosen hereditarilypower is assumed by right of descent. Though a ruler may proclaim themselves a monarch, their polity is not coded closed unless a relative actually succeeds them. Dual ExecutiveDesignation entails hereditary succession of one executive as well as selection (by either an executive or a court) of a second executive (a chief minister). Dual ExecutiveElection, on the other hand, entails hereditary succession of one executive, with a chief minister chosen by election. Finally, Open refers to executive selection by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election (Marshall et al. 2011:22). For a translation of Polity IV executive recruitment concepts and component variables, as well as component variable scores for all African countries by year (19801989), see Appendix A.

2.1.1

Press

Though literature reviewed thus far has pointed to various political mechanisms of accountability which mediate the relationship between the government and its citizens, this is only half the picture. Indeed, as much literature and multiple cases show, the presence of democratic institutions does not necessarily warrant their application towards the prevention of famine. Though institutionalized mechanisms of vertical or horizontal accountability may exist, the government may still possess a monopoly on the regulation of civilian activity, including the dissemination of information. Thus, an equally important mechanism for generating government accountability is one which is in practice distinct from the government itself (bottom-up, so to speak). Much in the way a governmental separation of powers can result in and benet from a system of checks and balances, so too can a protected press provide a check on government action (or inaction). As Sen notes, it is important to remember that state action is by no means independent of political ideology, public pressure, and

2.1. Democracy and Elections

35

popular protest (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:68). However, as with governmental mechanisms of accountability, the ecacy of the press is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, though a free press can help spread information within and between countriesin the latter case attempting to evoke embarrassment or shamea free press may only help prevent famine if those vulnerable to famine are considered fully citizens of the country (de Waal 1996:195). It is not enough for the press to simply possess the freedom to report, but a political trigger must be present as well. To return to Mesquita et al. and selectorate theory: in serving to help ght famine, the press must make clear who exactly the winning coalition includes, both to the government and to the voters. Devereux (2000) argues that a combination of primary and secondary mobilization is essential to catalyzing positive action in pursuit of rights. While primary mobilization is mobilization in pursuit of ones own interests (e.g., mass movements), secondary mobilization (a.k.a. activism) entails the activities of specialist institutions to promote human rights, democracy and other goals (de Waal 2000:14), placing pressure on politicians. While the former is important because politicians heed the logic of numbers (de Waal 2000:14), primary mobilization alone cannot overcome famine, as those who mobilize could be satised with food handouts, which does not an anti-famine policy make. Secondary mobilization, then, is necessary to identify issues and express them politically. For the sake of explicitness, it is print, visual, and other forms of broadcast media which must, in times of dearth, aid those aected in their ght against famine5 . As with my use of the Polity IV dataset to empirically examine countries regime characteristics, I have also considered Freedom Houses Freedom of the Press survey data to paint a more complete picture of each countrys civil and political freedoms. Unfortunately, though, in some instances there seem to be discrepancies between the numerical scores reported by Freedom House and more detailed historical accounts. Though in part this reects a lack, ironically, of transparency on the part of Freedom House to outline their methods of evaluation6 , this is also indicative of the complex, variable, and occasionally subjective nature of such a rating scheme. These discrepancies are interesting in their own right, and when they do arise, I have attempted to reconcile them with my own ndings. Conducted by Freedom House since 1980, the Freedom of the Press survey measures the degree to which a country permits the free ow of news and information7 . While cultural or economic factors may limit the ow of news within a country, this is dierent from a pattern of centralized control over news and information, which
Though the internet has largely upended the traditional media position as the sole means of distributing or broadcasting information, this principle applies equal well to so-called new or social media. 6 Though they do publish an outline of their methodology, for older cases especially the data is less extensive, and their conclusions less self-evident. 7 According to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, information freedom is a universal and basic human right. Article 19, specically, states that Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.
5

36

Chapter 2. Theoretical Argument

Table 2.2: Freedom House Scores of Examined Countries Country Botswana Ethiopia Kenya Mozambique Sudan Uganda Zimbabwe 1980 1981 1.5 0 0.5 0 0 1 0.5 1.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 1982 1.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 1983-4 1.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 1985 1.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 1986 1.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 1987 1.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 1988 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1989 2 0 0 0 0 0 0

0: Not Free, 1: Partly Free, 2: Free. (Freedom House 2012).

may be exhibited by countries across the spectrum of wealth. To estimate this, Freedom House undertakes a multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars. Each metric is researched and evaluated by several dozen analysts, and cases of major shifts are subjected to greater scrutiny. Comprised of twenty three methodology questions examining over one hundred indicators, the survey gauges countries press freedom in three categories: the legal, the political, and the economic environments. Legal environment This category, complementary to Politys XRREG, examines both the laws and regulations that could inuence media content and the governments inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the medias ability to operate. Positive elements include legal and constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, while negative elements may include security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of ocial media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists groups to operate freely. Political environment Under this category is evaluated the degree of political control over the content of news media... [including] the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; ocial censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media and the diversity of news available within each country; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. Economic environment Finally, examinations of the economic environment for the media include the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and

2.2. Theory

37

distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development and sustainability of the media (Freedom House 2012). From 1980 to 1988, Freedom House disaggregates countries scores into Print and Broadcast freedom (which I have combined to form half scores in Table 2.2), while from 1989 to 1992 they published consolidated statistics (after 1993 the measure becomes considerably more complex). For the rst eight years, then, I have simply averaged the two measures, with Not Free taking a value of 0, Partially Free, 1, and Free, 2. For a table of Freedom House press scores for all of Sub-Saharan Africa (disaggregated into Print and Broadcast freedom), see Appendix A. Countries with half scores include Botswana, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Throughout the decade, Botswana fared the best of any country (among those examined), exhibiting a print freedom score of 2, and a broadcast score of 1. Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, all had periods with print scores of 1 and broadcast scores of 0 (when both were not 0). No country on the continent exhibited more broadcast freedom than print freedom. For discussion of each, see Chapter 3.2. Also of note is the combined 1983-4 category. While the Freedom House scores for 1980 and 1981 were the result of evaluation during the previous year, starting in 1982, the evaluation period was extended. Thus, the 1982 score is the result of evaluation between January 1981 and August 1982, and the 1983-4 score is from August 1982 to November 1983. After this, the evaluation periods become a regular twelve month period again, though they start and end in November (e.g., the 1985 score evaluation period was 11/8311/84, the 1986 period was 11/8411/85, et cetera). As a result, for each year I have included the score of the year examined: In the 1980 column, for example, is what Freedom House reports as the countrys 1981 score, assessed during the 1980 calendar year.

2.2

Theory

Since the publication of Poverty and Famines in 1981, Amartya Sen and Jean Dr` eze have argued that democracyminimally, a regime with a free press and competitive electionsprevents famine. To support the argument, Sen rst considered India and China, noting that where one experienced a democratic revolution whose leaders successfully used famine to mobilize support, the other, in its pursuit of social and economic reforms, caused the greatest famine of the twentieth century without even realizing it (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:213). This dierence of outcomes Sen attributes to the formation of a political contract, predicated on the prevention of famine, between the revolutionary government and its supporters. This compactan explicit acknowledgement of a persistent and fundamentally important political issuewas also catalyzed by the countrys free press, which allowed the citizens to hold the government accountable, and was lent signicant weight when independence followed its breach by the colonial government.

38

Chapter 2. Theoretical Argument

In later texts, the argument is reformulated to t countries in Africa. While the rst, Botswana, supposedly maintained free and fair elections, in reality, a single party has won every contest handily. And though the second positive case, Zimbabwe, experienced political conict and famine in Matabeleland, this was not exposed until after the end of the Cold War, in part due to restrictions on the press. However, the countrys elections were, by most accounts, free and fair. Thus, while in Botswana the case could be made for the existence of an anti-famine political contract, it is imperfect. In Zimbabwe, the government may have been responsive to the needs of certain regions, though its actions in others indicate the lack of any signicant anti-famine contract. However, I argue that the history of Kenya is crucial to determining whether the causation is valid. As presented by Dr` eze and Sen, Kenya was a single-party state which, despite its lack of primary elections or political opposition, was responsive to the demands of the people due to elected members of parliament and a press which enjoyed limited but signicant press freedoms. De Waal, though, diminishes the signicance of the MPs and attributes government responsiveness to the astuteness of the President, who recognized the need for famine relief. However, in this case, the contract seems quite limited, painting a picture of the government response as mere political opportunismthough aid was distributed throughout aected areas (which were also politically signicant), the government also committed various human rights violations during and after this time (Adar & Munyae 2001). Further, while Dr` eze and Sen consider the countrys limited but signicant press freedoms as causal in the formation of this political contract, the reality seems more complex. While Freedom House rates the countrys press as Partly Free throughout the decade, Wanyande (1995) presents a more detailed analysis, describing the relationship between the state and mass media in independent Kenya as uneasy and conictual. Just as the state has continually accused the press of being unpatriotic and bent on serving the interest of Western nations at the expense of the interest of Kenya, the media accuses the government of undermining its freedom and right to inform and educate the public on matters of public importance. Wanyande also notes that while each sides perception of the other intensied following the advent of multi-party politics in the early 1990s, whereas under one party rule, the state could, with relative ease, suppress attempts by the media to expose its shortcomings (Wanyande 1995:56). De Waal corroborates, noting that neither parliament nor the press had signicant sway on the presidents decision to respond to calls for relief. Though Kenyas successful response to drought was prompted by a recognition of the peoples needs, it was not necessarily the result of any action by the press, and certainly was not motivated by the threat of being voted out of oceafter 1982, arap Moi dismissed political opposition and established a de jure single-party state. While on the surface this seems to follow Sens causal theory, any argument for a political contract in Kenya under arap Moi would be dubious at best. For both Botswana and Kenya, then, famine prevention eorts and political stability were aided by their governments direct provision of goods and services, as opposed to any more programmatic eortsreecting a sizable disparity between the selectorate and the

2.2. Theory

39

winning coalition. In summary, while under certain circumstances famine may become an issue salient enough to warrant continual prevention eorts (i.e. the formation of an anti-famine contract), this is not always the case. Further, it seems that in a countrys mission to avert famine, a free press and competitive elections are neither sucient nor necessary conditions to spur government action. Though such action may not, according to de Waal, constitute a strict anti-famine political contract, the distinction between such a contract and its diminished analogsa program or commitment is far from clear, and, more importantly, of questionable relevance.

Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence

This chapter includes specic details on the elections and press of each case, as well as their outcomes (e.g. whether they experienced famine or not). While I have attempted to include details regarding each case throughout the thesis where appropriate, this chapter includes consolidated summaries of each countrys relevant historical episodes.

3.1

Case Selection

For this project, I have chosen to consider all African countries that experienced a famine during the 1980s. This includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Uganda. Additionally, I have included Botswana and Kenya, which experienced drought and a reduction of marketed food, but managed to avert the onset of famine conditions. Though Dr` eze and Sen also consider the island nation of Cape Verde as a positive example of an anti-famine political contract, I have not included this country in my analysis because it did not experience famine during the 1980s1 . That being said, the countrys experience does accord with my reformulation of Sens theory.

3.2
3.2.1

Analytical Narratives
Botswana

Political Regime & Elections Botswana, Zimbabwes neighbor to the west, was a British colony until 1964, when the UK accepted proposals for a democratic self-government. The country ratied its constitution and held general elections in 1965, and formally declared independence in 1966. Seretse Khama, a leader in the independence movement, was elected the countrys rst President, and was re-elected twice. In 1984, Quett Masire became
1

For information on Cape Verdes famine prevention eorts, see (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:133).

42

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

President until his retirement in 1998. The country has held regular elections since independence, which international observers have consistently judged free and fair. Though the countrys press has been rated Free by Freedom House since 1973, Botswana does exhibit specic authoritarian tendencies. Since independence, for example, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has won every single election by a considerable margin. Though the elections have been observed as free and fair, the BDP has beneted from an uneven playing eld, in which extreme resource and media disparities undermined the oppositions ability to compete (Levitsky & Way 2010:255)2 . Institutions of Famine Prevention Scholars note the country for having the most enduring [anti-famine] system on the continent (de Waal 1997:35). Indeed, the country is considered something of an anomaly in sub-Saharan Africa for having maintained a functioning multi-party political system since its inception. Throughout the 1980s, though, the countrys harvests were insucient to meet its demands, satisfying only about thirteen percent of the countrys requirements for 1984. Though Botswanas electoral systemcharacterized by high levels of professionalism and accountabilityis undeniably important to the countrys improvement and self-preservation, it is arguably not the cause of the countrys implicit anti-famine political contract. Instead, de Waal argues, this contract comes from political commitment, a sense of administrative obligation, and accountability through participatory structures and electoral politics (de Waal 1997:43). The countrys ability to protect its food security has also been aided historically by its (relative) wealth, though at the same time this ability has been weakened by an absence of popular (i.e. secondary) mobilization for civil rights. Botswanas anti-famine system of the 1980s was conceived primarily in response to its program employed in 1979-80, which was conventional and moderately successful. During this time, child malnutrition and mortality rates rose slightly, and much food aid was distributed poorly. In response, the government commissioned an independent evaluation that recommended the establishment of a famine prevention system modeled on Indias Scarcity Manuals. This solution, however, did not consider an important dierence between the two countries: in Botswana there was no mass popular agitation, but instead a government with a sense of obligation and a shrewd sense of where its electoral interests lay (de Waal 1997:43). In the interest of bureaucratic integrity, the government commissioned, considered, and discussed publicly eleven more reports, and in January 1982, Botswana formally adopted a set of guidelines for a Drought Relief Programme (DRP). Modeled on Indian policy, the program was eventually reorganized and renamed the Department of Food Resources (DFR) Though the right to relief was granted and not fought for (as it had been in India), the DFR was an example of the characteristically Botswanan process of consultation and consensus-making, not of adversarial vigilance (de Waal
2

As a result, Levitsky and Way categorize Botswana as a competitive authoritarian state.

3.2. Analytical Narratives

43

1997:44), which helped ensure its continued success. Despite Botswanas high international credit rating, over ninety percent of the revenue for the Drought Relief Programme came from government stores. After 1984, though, the DRP began to serve the interests of the countrys commercial and bureaucratic elites, such that by 1989, the programs actions began to undermine its own eorts. In 1984, relief expenditures increased by 145% from the previous year, causing the Ministry of Finance to resist proposals for further spending. Despite this, the DRP shifted its focus from human relief programs to agricultural programs, which were more expensive and economically regressive, primarily benetting commercial herders, tractor owners, and other elites. Press The countrys constitution does not contain explicit guarantees of press freedom, though it does protect freedoms of speech, assembly, and expressionwhich are generally respected by the government. Similarly, Freedom House consistently rated the countrys press as Free during the 1980s. Although the Botswana Democratic Party occasionally breached civil liberties by shutting down independent radio networks, placing pressure on private media by adjusting allocated state advertising funds, and occasionally prosecuted (or deported) critics under the 1986 National Security Act, such abuse was neither as frequent nor as severe as in other countries in the region (Levitsky & Way 2010:256). Episodes of Food Scarcity Drought struck the country in 1982, and continued for six years. By 1984, reliefrelated expenditures had grown to fteen percent of total government expenditures, and around twenty percent of the rural working population was employed in a laborbased relief program. As a result, even though the drought was longer and more severe than that of 1979, malnutrition rose only slightly before falling to levels lower than before the drought. No excess mortality was reported, and between 1980 and 1984, death rates among children and infants fell by over thirty percent. Following the onset of this drought, though, the primary expenditure of the Drought Relief Programme became the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme (ARAP), which began in 1985. Designed as yet another relief program, in practice it amounted to little more than a subsidy to rural elites. Breaking the trend of public discussion employed in the creation of earlier anti-famine measures, ARAP was designed in secret and announced on the radio (to the surprise of both civilians and the Ministry of Agriculture). Begun as a one-year program, the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme was ultimately extended to four years and consumed over half of the Drought Relief Programmes annual expenditures. Seventy-ve percent of this was taken up by a 100% plowing subsidy to tractor ownerscommercial contractors who plowed more land than was ever cultivated. The expansion of commercial tractor ownership proved to be socially regressive, as well: By awarding subsidies to the individual in

44

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

whose name the land was registered, customary land tenure institutions (communal/mutual ownership among many relatives) were destroyed, as were the equally complex customs regarding oxen ownership and lending. This led to greater income inequality, as well as increasing the plot size and production of larger farmers while reducing or eliminating the agricultural productivity of small-holders. There was also a high misappropriation of funds, in contrast to most other Botswanan entitlement programs. Once again, an independent evaluation was commissioned. Though this report was highly critical of ARAP, the fact that it was commissioned at all reects and enduring sense of government obligation for rural welfare (de Waal 1997:46). The evaluation ultimately recommended delinking famine prevention from agricultural programs, and that the government should return to focusing on lasting solutions to the economic vulnerability of the poorest. During this time, though, the Drought Relief Programmes shortcomings were overshadowed by massive economic growth resulting from diamond miningbetween 1985 and 1990, Botswanas GDP grew at eighteen percent per year, up from three percent earlier in the decade. Ultimately, the strengths of the Drought Relief Programme lay not in any explicit anti-famine contract, but in the integrity of the public administration and the BDPs astute use of patronage and local institutions to ensure popular legitimacy while still pursuing policies aimed at enhancing the power and wealth of a commercial-governmental elite (de Waal 1997:47). Despite admirable levels of accountability, though, the program faced weakness in its inability to catalyze mass political mobilization for the enforcement of the governments commitment to relief. Instead, the poor still relied on structures of representation in which they had little power to set the agenda, such as Village Development Councils and general elections. While the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme exacerbated economic inequality, the Drought Relief Programme augmented state power with respect to the rural poor by recasting patronage networks as focused on state structures, rather than customary exchange networks. Thus, drought and famine relief in Botswana remained hostage to a patrimonial style of government, albeit a relatively benevolent one (de Waal 1997:47). Though Botswanas relief program is often invoked as a notable example of African anti-famine systems, it is important to remember that this ability was bolstered in no small part by the countrys economic growth. Summary The government of Botswana, a nation independent from Britain since 1964, is noted for exhibiting a sense of obligation and a sharp knowledge of its true power base. Since independence, the countrys elections have consistently been judged as free and fair, though in reality, they are not competitivethe Botswana Democratic Party has won every contest. While the country lacks constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, government intervention in media aairs is signicantly less frequent and severe than in neighboring countries.

3.2. Analytical Narratives

45

Drought struck the country in 1982, in response to which the government enacted (entitlement protection) programs to prop up rural incomes. Though eective in averting famine conditions, the programs were socially regressive and particularistic. Others argue that the countrys eort was the result of its economic growth during this time, rather than any political commitment to relief. Thus, while Botswana comes closest of any case to Sens ideal, any claimed antifamine contract must be considered diminished: The interests of certain classes were emphasized over others, though in this case a (politically) signicant population happened to involve agriculture and the production of food, and thus was able to also provide relief from famine conditions.

3.2.2

Zimbabwe

Political Regime & Elections Prior to the countrys birth in 1980, Zimbabwe was engaged in a protracted war of independence, during which the Rhodesian counter-insurgency used food as a weapon. Their techniques involved the forcible relocation of rural populations and restricted rural food supplies, creating widespread hunger just before independence. The plight of the guerrilla struggle was, therefore, based in part on an intimate symbiotic relationship between the front and the people, paving the way for a strong political contract. However, two complicating factors exist. First, the revolutionaries invoked traditional spirit mediums to gain legitimacyan idiom of power as alien to the style of post-liberation government as to colonial and minority rule (de Waal 1997:58). Second, the fronts claims of popular mobilization were constantly inated, with the force employing coercion and violence frequently. Even before independence, then, there were few signicant channels for popular representation, and dissent was subdued by internal party politics. February 1980 saw the creation of a liberated Zimbabwe, with Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party winning the rst election by a considerable margin. Polity reports this election as regulated, competitive, and open (ideal conditions). Elections were held again in March 1990, though independent observers reported the election as neither free nor fair3 . Institutions of Famine Prevention As a leader, Mugabe was committed to several radical agendas, though in the end a lack of executive ability betrayed him. Health and education services were improved almost as much as was promised before independence, and some structural inequalities of agricultural marketing were removed. Most notably, Mugabes government opened the countrys Grain Marketing Board to common (i.e., African) farmers, such that the number of registered producers increased from 30,000 to over 570,000 during the 1980s (see Table 3.1). Additionally, following drought in 1980, the government
3

http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zim1990election.htm

46

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

introduced a temporary Drought Relief Levy on income and corporate taxes which sought to nance future relief measures without resorting to foreign aid. The levy was relatively successful, and its funds were used for relief programs after the (milder) drought of 1987. Compared to other African countries, Zimbabwes economy is vigorous and diversied, though some social and economic inequalities remain from colonial times. Thus, the agricultural sector is starkly divided, with the majority of fertile land cultivated by a group of commercial farmers, while peasant production is largely limited to communal areas. Even within these communal areas, there exists regional variation in both agricultural potential and access to infrastructural support, with further divisions between ethnic and class groups. As a result, despite the economys relative prosperity, large sections of the population do live in acute poverty. Although they receive almost no attention, Dr` eze and Sen highlight the direct entitlement protection programs undertaken by Zimbabwe as a signicant factor in preventing the countrys 1982-84 drought from precipitating a major famine. Though the countrys food supplies grew around this time, a close examination of the facts reveals that the prevention of famine in 1982-4 must be attributed as much to farreaching measures of public support in favor of aected populations as to the growth of food supplies (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:146). Despite the governments socialist aims (Dr` eze & Sen 1989), the country has maintained private ownership and market incentives, though since independence the countrys social servicesparticularly those related to health and nutritionhave experienced considerable improvement4 . Press Prior to independence, restrictive laws consistently stied the media, and a free press became one of the main aims of the struggle. The colonial Ocial Secrets Act, for example, criminalized reporting on classied information, and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act gave colonial authorities the ability to prosecute individuals at will (Kumbula 1997). During the ght for independence, these ordinances were used by the Rhodesian Government to level a blackout on reporting about casualties, with the media instead instructed to report casualties only on the rebel side, as well as their retreats to Zambia and Mozambique (Chavunduka 2002). After independence in 1980, Mugabes government did not follow through with its pre-independence promises regarding media reforms, with the only repealed colonial act having prohibited reporting on debates in parliament. In January 1981, though, the government established the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust to expedite the transition of media control from the white minority to all of Zimbabwean society. Also at this time, the Ministry of Information inhibited the scope of reporting, despite its emphasis on a free, non-partisan, and mass-oriented media (Park & Curran 2000). This restriction on reporting was one of the primary reasons Gukurahundi was
For example, the percentage of children fully immunized in Zimbabwe increased from 27 per cent in 1982 to 85 per cent in 1988, and school enrollment increased at an annual rate of 20 per cent between 1979 and 1985 (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:147).
4

3.2. Analytical Narratives

47

met with such little international outcry. In addition to limiting the scope of information contained in reports, the government imposed curfews and denied press access to aected areas. A state of emergency was declared, which allowed the government to detain and arrest ZAPU leaders, and deport international journalists for their reporting of human rights abuses (Scarnecchia 2011:93). On a systemic level, Zimbabwe represented a Frontline State between the East and the West during the Cold War. Overshadowed by apartheid in South Africa, Mugabe was able to couch Gukurahundi as a campaign to quash Communist-allied ZAPU dissidents, who, in Mugabes words, would debilitate and nally destroy our sovereignty and unitary nationhood (Scarnecchia 2011:100). At the same time, though, Sen argues that political debate in the country was not uncommon, and that the press was relatively unconstrained (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:146). In fact, Dr` eze and Sen argue, the press played a great part in keeping the government focused on the drought throughout that period, constantly reporting on the prevalence of undernutrition and hardship in the countryside, echoing parliamentary debates on the subject of drought, calling for action against proteering, and exposing the scandal of rural women driven to prostitution by hunger (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:146). In the face of government pressure, though, the media did succeed in making advances in its ability to criticize the government. In 1987, despite threats from the national army, the Financial Gazette published an article on the countrys AIDS problem. Later in the 1980s, the government was criticized for being a one-party state, and a widespread corruption scandal was exposed. Since the 1980s, press freedom has been fairly inconsistent, causing Freedom House to rate it Partly Free. Episodes of Food Scarcity Soon after independence, the country began to experience a drought. This lasted three years, and peaked during the second year (1983). Though Zimbabwe is generally adept to produce a grain surplus, in the worst-aected areas of the country, maize harvestsZimbabwes principal staplecompletely failed during the drought. Because of its supposed adeptness, though, the country aimed to reduce variability in the food supply; Botswana, in contrast, was less predisposed to produce a surplus, and consequently attempted to prop up rural incomes during the same drought period. Zimbabwes strategy worked well in most areas, with local party chairmen doling out relief to those earning less than the legal minimum wage. Following two sequential years of massive reductions in maize sales to the Grain Marketing Board (see Table 3.1), remittances from relatives became a crucial line of support for many households, and as in Kenya, many of the households whose members resorted to wage labor in the wider economy were found to be the least susceptible to the drought. For others, though, government relief became the main or even the only source of food. Begun in 1982, the countrys famine prevention measures were taken early and given high political and nancial priority. The main entitlement protection measures included large-scale food distribution to the adult population and supplementary rations for children under ve. Weiner (1988) estimates the number of people for whom

48

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

Table 3.1: Zimbabwe: Ocial Maize Sales, 197985 Percentage sales by type of farmer Season 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 Total Sales (tons) 825,563 2,013,759 1,451,827 639,747 941,591 2,000,000 % n.a. +143% -27% -55% +47% +112% Large-scale commercial 87.9% 82.0% 70.4% 72.6% 58.6% 50.0% Communal lands 8.1% 14.4% 21.8% 21.4% 35.5% 45.0%
(Bratton 1987)

the government drought relief program supplied the primary means of survival during 1982-4 at about 2.5 millionroughly thirty percent of the population. However, that being said, estimates of how many households actually benetted from government food distribution are complex and varied (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:149). Despite variation in estimates of the number of beneciaries, though, the program is to be commended for its size and logistical complexity, though there were reports of delays, uncertainties, and frauds in the distribution of food. The programmatic distribution of food faced its own diculties, with some accounts describing the eligible population as limited only to households without any member in regular employment. There have also been disputes over how judicious the distribution actually wasthough some suggest the distribution was fair, others argue that the pattern was indiscriminate, blind to peoples actual needs. Such variation may have stemmed in part from the politicization of the program: at times, party members became involved in the provision of relief, leading to favoritism along party lines. Additionally, the distribution of food was limited to rural areasan unusual focus for relief programs, which tend to have an urban bias. Matabeleland As well publicized as these successes were, though, less publicized was the conict and famine in Matabeleland. In addition to unrest following inammatory remarks by a high-ranking ZANU ocial, the region was home to many supporters of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), Mugabes competition5 . The brutal suppression of this unrest came to be known as Gukurahundi 6 . Also known as the Matabeleland Massacres, the campaign lasted from 1982 to 1985, with an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Matabele murdered and tens of thousands more tortured in internment camps by Mugabes infamous North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade (Scarnecchia 2011). On the other hand, Sen describes this conict as a product of the programs
5 6

Whereas ZAPU was aligned with the Soviet Union, Mugabe and ZANU are allies of the West. The early rain which washes away the cha before the spring rains, in the Chi-Shona language.

3.2. Analytical Narratives

49

politicization, noting that the coverage of the drought relief programme in Matabeleland, the stronghold of political dissidents, has been described as exceedingly patchy (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:150). Leys (1986) adds that the government blamed the dissidents for disrupting relief eorts, even holding them responsible for the drought at one point. These accounts, however, seem more concerned with ocial provision of aid and the mechanisms thereof, rather than considering the situation as a whole. Nineteen eighty-four also saw the third consecutive harvest failure, causing drought relief to become a major source of food for people in Matabeleland. In addition to killing civilians outright, the Fifth Brigade exploited Matabelelands food dependence, with later reports noting the use of food as a weapon of coercion (de Waal 1997:59). Curfews and blockades were set up across the region, and soldiers began to control or block all food supply channels. When relief was distributed, recipients were not allowed to take any rations away, but had to eat their meals under army supervision, amounting to a sentence of starvation (de Waal 1997:59). Only after a unity agreement between ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 that merged their parties did the conict come to an end, though this was at the expense of competitive politics. Though the Matabeleland famine has not been systematically investigated, there is strong evidence pointing to its place as the result of a power struggle among the two parties. Despite this, Sen argues that the overall eectiveness of the countrys entitlement protection programs at this time is beyond question, with starvation deaths having been largely and perhaps even entirely prevented (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:151). Bratton (1987) even goes so far as to say that no person in Zimbabwe died as a direct result of starvation, though Leys challenges this record, acknowledging that in some instances, hunger may have led to death. Beyond this, the governments health and education eorts since independence have caused a noticeable improvement in the health status of the population of rural Zimbabwe in spite of the severe drought, most notably manifesting as an apparent decline in infant mortality throughout the drought period (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:151). A decline in child morbidity (in relation to immunizable diseases, at least) was also reported around this time, caused primarily by the governments widespread immunization campaigns. Overall, though, evidence regarding the nutritional status of the population during the drought is mixed. Many informal reports stressed rising levels of undernutrition in the early stages of the drought, though there is some evidence that this statistic declined following an expansion of the relief program in 1983. Over the whole drought period, then, there is a lack of any marked change in the nutritional status of the total Zimbabwean populationa remarkable accomplishment given the initial severity of the drought. Summary While at rst blush, Zimbabwe seems to have been equally eective as Botswana at preventing famine, the reality is less sensational. After gaining independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe assumed power, and in response to the countrys 1982-4 drought,

50

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

eective entitlement protection programs were enacted. However, while the programs prevented famine for their recipients, the government simultaneously undertook a military campaign within the province of Matabeleland, home to supporters of a rival party. The campaign, Gukurahundi, caused widespread famine conditions and the deaths of between 10,000 and 20,000 people. While in part the conict was obscured by Zimbabwes strategic position between East and West, the Gukurahundi was also prohibited as a subject of news reports. While prior to the conict, Zimbabwes press possessed limited freedoms, after 1982, the press became totally restricted.

3.2.3

Kenya

Political Regime & Elections A British colony until 1963, Kenya gained its independence peacefully following the election of Africans to the colonial Legislative Council. The country became a republic in 1964, and the countrys rst president, Jomo Kenyatta, remained in power until his death in 1978. As Vice President, Daniel arap Moi assumed power soon after, and was met with support throughout the country. Though he followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, Moi was nonetheless too weak to consolidate power. However, after a failed coup in August 1982 led by ocers of the Air Force, Moi took the opportunity to dismiss political opposition and successfully consolidated power, altering the constitution to establish a de jure single-party state. However, Dr` eze and Sen argue that the country retained an elected parliament, allowing for some degree of responsiveness.

Institutions of Famine Prevention Since Kenyas independence, it has experienced remarkable economic growth and stability. The government is a presidential republic, and the economy is mixed, with a strong private sector as well as a substantial public sector based on parastatal corporations. Coee and tea are the countrys chief exports, and the tourism industry also ourishes. The country has limited natural resources, though, with no domestic petroleum production, and around eighty percent of the countrys land is arid or semiarid. Food production is generally equal to consumption, though following poor harvests imports are required. Approximately eighty percent of the population lives in rural areas, mostly on the twenty percent of the land that receives enough rainfall to support agriculture. The countrys food grain marketing is managed by the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), a government-owned corporation. The Board is responsible for buying grain from farmersmostly maizeand reselling it to retailers across the nation; prices are set by the government and informed by the international market.

3.2. Analytical Narratives Press

51

At independence, Kenyas media was foreign-owned, but supported the government. Kenyattas administration generally did not harass the media, though his cabal of ministers frequently made calls to newsrooms, ostensibly to have some sensitive stories killed (Ochieng 2011). Kenyatta himself argued that the media should be free, but responsible. In 1978, though, when arap Moi assumed power, the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) immediately purchased the Nairobi Times and renamed it the Kenya Times. the paper became a government mouthpiece, and folded soon after Mois 2002 retirement. During Mois reign, the press was subject to nearconstant attacks by the government, including the arrest and detention of journalists and editors. Episodes of Food Scarcity Early in 1984, the country experienced a severe droughtthe worst rain shortage in a hundred yearsduring which time the production of maize declined fty percent. Similarly, wheat production and potato harvests were down seventy percent, and pastoralists reported similar rates of livestock mortality. However, disaster never struck, thanks to the governments entitlement protection eorts. Between March and May, the country generally experiences long rains, which fuel maize and wheat harvests, while between October and December come short rains, after which crops with shorter growing seasons are harvested. By April 1984, though, it was clear that the country was going to have a bad harvestwith the sun shining when there should have been rain, no technical early warning system was necessary. Around this time, the government launched an active response to the drought, beginning with the importation of food. The governments ability to do this was greatly aided by high global prices for tea and coee, two of the countrys largest exports. By the time it became clear the country was in the midst of drought, the National Cereals and Produce Board possessed a stock of maize which could last only four to six months. To further complicate the situation, the areas of the country which had the largest reserves generally suered least from the drought. While the NCPBs transport mechanisms allowed it to make marginal adjustments in inventories between storage facilities, it was never intended to make large-scale transfers all the way across the country. At the same time, though, the NCPB tightly regulated inter district movement, subcontracting only to licensed traders. During the drought, this had the eect of exacerbating local food shortages, as well as the price disparity across regions7 . At the behest of the President, there was established an inter-ministry drought response coordinating committee, which included members of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Directorate of Provincial Administration, and members of other
Sperling (1987) notes that as early as June 1984, District Commissioners had met to discuss food price variability.
7

52

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

core ministries. The committee was tasked with assessing the situation, establishing a response policy, initiating commercial imports of food, negotiating with international donors for food assistance, and establishing a task force to manage the import and distribution program. The Planning Department of the Ministry of Finance and Planning especially helped contribute to the eort, with strong analytical capabilities and access to data for assessing food requirements. Also notable was the eorts emphasis on ability rather than bureaucratic formality: Junior clerks who operated microprocessors found themselves with immediate access to the Director of Planning (Glantz 1987:277), resulting in unprecedented levels of productivity. Early on, the government decided the drought would be dealt with as a serious problem, but it would not be considered a crisis (Glantz 1987:277). Normal administrative systems would be used, with additional logistic capacity sourced from the private sector as needed. The response, it was decided, would be handled entirely by Kenyans, without the help of expats or international crisis-management consultants. The low prole adopted by the government helped keep public concern in check, and the country managed to avoid hoarding and public security issues typically associated with crisis droughts. The use of normal administrative systems also helped keep costs low. Most importantly, however, their use provided a conceptual frame of reference within which everyone could work. There would be no crises-motivated ad hoc programs (Glantz 1987:278, italics original). Even though the National Cereals and Produce Board sought to maintain a reserve of grain, the shortfall of 1984 made the importation of food inevitable. The critical question, however, was how much to import, and how to do so in an ecient and manageable way. Once the international community learned of the countrys need for food, the response was dramatic. The government found itself in the peculiar position of welcoming aid while discouraging the general public and the donors from characterizing the situation as a crisis (Glantz 1987:278). It is also possible that the magnitude of the response was aected by arap Mois stern position regarding Communists8 . To determine how much food would be needed, and the schedule according to which it would be imported, required an estimation of aggregate need, and of port and international transport capacity, respectively. In considering the scope of imports needed, the Ministry of Finance and Planning considered the problem from two perspectives. The rst focused on meeting aggregate nutritional requirements, while the second focused on national production shortfall as a proxy for imports needed. Ultimately, the second approach was used, because its relative simplicity facilitated operationalization, and because it would reproduce market conditions experienced in a normal year (Glantz 1987:278). In the end, more than 850,000 metric tons of grain were imported. Developing a schedule for the imports, however, proved to be particularly dicult.
From the beginning of his administration, anticommunism was a fundamental theme. Speaking on Mois behalf, then-Vice President Mwai Kibaki said once There is no room for communists in Kenya (Miller 1995:173).
8

3.2. Analytical Narratives

53

By estimating when the NCPBs stocks would run out, the government was able to establish the point before which food aid would have to enter the country: With the assumption that the 1984 short rains would not fail, the last imports would be needed before July 1985 for use during the last few weeks before the next years harvest. Early in negotiations with donors, though, it became clear that even with the most ecient eort of all parties involved, foreign assistance could not arrive until well after the depletion of domestic stocks. It also became evident that almost all assistance would arrive in the form of food, rather than money with which food could be purchased. As a result, it was clear that Kenya would have to import grain commercially using its own supplies to bide the time between the exhaustion of domestic supplies and the arrival of aid, as well as to account for possible delays of the donor-supplied grain. Another critical question to settle was the variety of maize to import. As Glantz (1987:279) explains, although there is little nutritional dierence, Kenyans strongly prefer to eat white maize as opposed to the yellow varieties. Unfortunately, there is very little white maize grown for human consumption outside East Africa, such that the variety already commanded a premium of around thirty percent. Because of import schedule and increased expenses facing the government, the decision was made to import the cheaper yellow maize, as it was felt that this premium for aesthetic preferences could not be justied (Glantz 1987:279). Beyond the savings in cost, the importation of inferior yellow maize had a secondary eect of encouraging informal rationing by consumers who could aord alternative food supplies; some scholars note that this ultimately contributed to an allocation more geared to the most desperate (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:141). Because the yellow maize was less desirable than its white counterpart, the demand could be expected to drop substantially as soon as the rains resumed and white maize became available again. This meant that the government could not import too much food, as it could end up with an inventory of valuable but unmarketable grain. Further, the Cereals and Produce Board would have to plan the distribution of maize well if some areas of the country continued to enjoy white maize from the hold-over NCPB stocks while other areas were being supplied only the imported yellow varieties, problems could be anticipated (Glantz 1987:280). Despite logistical diculties surrounding securing the import of food and coordinating it with domestic distributors, donor governments and organizations ultimately contributed nearly thirty four percent of total grain imports. To further emphasize that the drought was a series problem (but not a crisis), the government chose to distribute food primarily via well-established commercial channels, to further reduce variability in the price and availability of food. This would help decrease the likelihood of any informal food economies, as well as maintaining an air of stability and condence. Keeping food prices at normal levels, however, required a substantial subsidy of grain and its transport. Thus, entitlement protection eorts took two forms. First, the imported food was directed to help reduce variability in the food supply, and second, direct relief was provided to the neediest households. Initially, the government attempted to accomplish the former through employ-

54

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

ment generation, developing a food-for-work system, though that scheme was eventually trashed in favor of rural development projects with cash wages (similar to the systems Indian incarnation). Though workers were paid more than the daily cost of foodallowing them to build a small reserve for the interim between government employment and returning to their farms for the next plantingthe program ultimately fell far short of its target. Dr` eze and Sen attribute this to a lack of preparedness and supervisory capacity. On the other hand, the provision of unconditional relief in the form of free food rations (mainly from food aid) assumed considerable importance (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:140). Early in the serious problem (not a crisis), the government realized that despite its eorts to maintain normal market conditions, some households would need direct relief. As a result, District Commissioners were authorized to freely distribute food wherever needed, mainly through local chiefs, who knew better the needs of their people, it was argued. By most reports, the chiefs did an eective and equitable job. However, prior to the arrival of relief in 1985, the seven percent of the population who received rations (a gure as high as forty-ve percent in the worst-aected provinces) were each given very little food, with some reports estimating rations averaging only ve to ten percent of individual daily requirements. A number of NGOs also became involved in the response eort, with some groups establishing their own importation programs. To facilitate this, the government developed a system whereby the organization would draw grain immediately from the stocks already in Kenya, and the Cereals and Produce Board would import the difference. While most NGOs focused on food-for-work programs, some also provided seeds for the next harvest cycle. Though deserving of commendation, the eorts of involved NGOs proved dicult to coordinate, as each organization already had its own localized program and mode of operation. Because these programs had been established before the drought and were expected to continue afterwards, there was a reluctance to surrender autonomy for the sake of the larger coordination eort. As a result, throughout the drought, people and organizations struggled to obtain adequate information for planning and management decisionsdonors did not know how much they might be able to supply; the railway did not know how much of the crop from the 1984 long rains might be salvaged; and no one knew the extent of famine relief required (Glantz 1987:283). To overcome this, the Planning Department of the Ministry of Finance and Planning moved quickly to assemble pertinent information, identify where they lacked information, and organize a weekly series of reports that were made available to the community. The reports included information on current stocks and their rate of depletion, information regarding the arrival and distribute not grain shipments, and weather and crop forecasts9 .
The Planning Department also compiled available information on school feeding programs, commodity prices in various local markets around the country, domestic commodity transport costs, rainfall, food-relief distribution, crop-production estimates, livestock conditions, nutritional status of selected low-income communities, NGO program activities, and the status of railway rolling stock (Glantz 1987:283).
9

3.2. Analytical Narratives

55

The task force was run out of the Oce of the President, though responsibility for purchasing grain remained with the subcommittee and the transport and storage of grain was overseen by the Cereals and Produce Board. While in normal times, the NCPB system of purchasing and distributing grain operates smoothly, the massive volume of maize arriving, combined with the immediate need to transport it half-way across the country, meant that it was unable to meet the logistic demands of the response. The task force expedited grain clearance through the Port of Mombasa, as well as its transportation inland: logistics took priority in each ministry involved. Mombasa, the nations only port capable of receiving large ocean vessels, dedicated its best berths and all of its bulk grain-handling equipment to the eort of meeting the import schedule. Even with this total dedication of resources, there was just enough capacity, under ideal conditions (no rain, no arrival delays, no equipment problem) to accommodate the need (Glantz 1987:284). A few days before the rst ships arrived, though, the dockworkers union, not known for cooperating with management, spontaneously announced that it would, as its national duty, assume responsibility for ensuring that the incoming grain ships were unloaded expeditiously and that there were no delays. The union was able to keep its promise, such that the port [could] operate at more than 100% of designrated capacity (Glantz 1987:284). While there were few problems with the actual unloading of ships, many other issues arose, ranging from ships that drew too much water to enter the harbor, to grain spoiled by moisture, to complications at customs regarding imported spare locomotive parts. When the railway could not cope with the amount of grain to be transported, private truckers were mobilized to help. And when truckers noted that a government ban on night movement signicantly limited their capacity, the task force arranged to have the ban temporarily lifted, such that at one point nearly 1,000 trucks were involved in the eort. The drivers, like the dockworkers, went to extraordinary lengths to keep the food moving (Glantz 1987:284). Ultimately, Glantz argues, the success of Kenyas drouth response eort was a product both of ocial institutional action and cooperation by laborers in the name of national unity and pride. Cohen and Lewis (1987) stress the role political commitment play in the governments response, while Dr` eze and Sen emphasize the threat of political instability following the governments failure to avert famine following drought in 1979 (Dr` eze & Sen 1989:138). The instability argument, however, seems especially appropriate, as the aected Central and Eastern Provinces were both politically important and meteorologically and economically unstable, and because the drought conditions reached the outskirts of Nairobi. Regardless, the Kenyan case provides insights that challenge and improve conventional prescriptions for responding to food insecurity. While Dr` eze and Sen attribute the governments responsiveness to the actions of elected members of parliament, de Waal argues that the countrys ultimate success in escaping famine was largely attributable to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap Moi, who recognized a rudimentary and implicit political contract: feed the central highlands and (most importantly) the cities, and the government will

56

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

survive (de Waal 1997:35). However, despite the successes of arap Mois regime in averting famine during this time, the actions that were taken ultimately amounted to little more than the realization of a political opportunity to secure their own base of power, and did not represent a change in basic policy from colonial times. Thus, though hunger was averted, the Kenyan government avoided tackling the structural causes of poverty and vulnerability in both the highlands and the lowlands (de Waal 1997:42). Implications for Famine Response Eorts First, most response recommendations are based on analyses of the worst famines during which, by denition, existing structures and systems are unable to cope with the demands placed upon them. The conventional solution to this is the creation of institutional structures designed specically to respond to food shortages. Focusing on these types of responses, though, tends to overlook the eective action a government can undertake. By virtue of their non-crisis nature, the rare cases when government is successful in averting famine often go unrecognized, their signicance unappreciated. Their importance, however, lies in the fact that potential famines are prevented from growing to the point of attracting international attention (Glantz 1987:285). The Kenyan case, on the other hand, suggests, that there may be two major approaches to addressing food insecurity: the permanent structural strategy typically recommended by the international community, and a functional standby strategy (Glantz 1987:286). Without establishing any purpose-specic structural apparatuses, the government was able to draw upon the management and operational resources of existing administrative structures. While Kenya did undertake some steps deemed essential to food security, these were not integral to the eort of creating a crisis-response capability, but were part of a much more extensive national development strategy. This points to the possibility that the building of functional capacity to cope with occasional food shortages might be part of broader on-going development problems... Had the Kenyans adopted the full range of international recommendations... they would have been over-prepared for the food shortages they faced, and they would have incurred signicant additional costs (Glantz 1987:286). While carrying out the full range of international recommendations is often prohibitively and complex, it is better to view the recommendations, Glantz explains, as an argument for more forward planning, so that scarce human and institutional resources can be used more eectively and eciently in times of food shortages (Glantz 1987:286). The Kenyan experience also suggests that the application of existing government organizations may be more appropriate to averting famine than the creation of a permanent, institutionalized response capacity. Summary Kenya, having gained independence from the British in 1963, became a de jure oneparty state following a failed military coup in 1982. During this time, the countrys press experienced limited freedom, and yet despite these conditions, the government

3.2. Analytical Narratives

57

responded positively following drought in 1984. In response to failed rains, there was established an inter-ministry drought response coordinating committee which used existing institutional structures to distribute relief, and by all accounts was successful in averting famine conditions. While Dr` eze and Sen attribute the governments responsiveness to elected MPs and threats of political instability, de Waal argues that action was spurred by President Daniel arap Mois political shrewdness. Despite the governments famine response, though, there are reports of other human rights violations during and after this time, as well as of less enthusiastic responses to droughts later in the decade (though famine still did not occur).

3.2.4

Uganda

Political Regime & Elections Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962, with the countrys rst elections held the year prior. Though initially a republic, there occurred debates within the country over how centralized the government should be, with deep divides along national, religious, and ethnic lines. In 1966, Prime Minister Milton Obote suspended the constitution, and in 1967, a new one was ratied which expanded the presidents authority and abolished the division of traditional kingdoms. In 1971, Obote was deposed by a military coup led by Idi Amin, who declared himself president, dissolved the parliament, and amended the constitution to give himself absolute power. Under Amins rule, the country experienced signicant economic decline, social degeneration, and widespread human rights violations, resulting in the deaths of between one and ve hundred thousand Ugandans. Following a border altercation with Tanzania, the Tanzanian army, with Ugandan exiles, fought for the liberation of Uganda, and in 1979, Amin and his armies ed to Libya. In December 1980, the countrys rst elections in eighteen years were held, which resulted in Milton Obote and his Uganda Peoples Congress party returning to power. Though the Commonwealth Observer Group (a collection of groups formed to monitor elections throughout the Commonwealth of Nations) declared itself satised with the outcome of this election, there is considerable debate as to whether they were rigged. Polity lists the countrys elections as having Transitional or Restricted Elections, one category below competitive elections. The country has some of the highest scores on the continent at this time. Following a military campaign against the Uganda National Liberation Army comprised of exiled Ugandans against Amin (as well as Obote)Obote was deposed in 1985, by military coup. Amnesty International estimates the Obote II regime as responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 civilians across the country. Institutions of Famine Prevention In July 1978, when crop failures signaled a dearth of food, Amins government took no action. In 1980, the situation escalated, and eventually gained international attention following appeals by elders and an expos e in Londons Observer newspaper. However,

58

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

by the time relief supplies began to arrive in June 1980, a large number of people had already died, and the situation was quite severe. In summary, during the 1979-80 food crisis, the government did not take action to avert famine conditions. Press Though the state and local press were silent on the 1980 famine until its exposure by Western media, the government had been alerted about the situation from 1978 onwards by way of food monitoring in Karamoja, crop acreage and harvest assessments by agricultural ocers, and estimates of aected populations. By October 1978, there was correspondence at various levels of government regarding the food situation in Karamoja, and between September and October 1978, reports by the District Agricultural Ocers for South, Central, and North Karamoja had been sent to the Provincial Commissioner for Agriculture which indicated the loss of crops to disease and drought, as well as cases of starvation and migration by pastoralists. However, almost all indications of the drought and impending famine occurred under the reign of Idi Amin. Shortly after assuming power in 1978, Amin tortured and killed journalists... [and] shut down all newspapers except the one he used as his own propaganda vehicle (Robins 1997:124). Though Obote was (perhaps only slightly) less dictatorial than Amin, he did allow some independent newspapers to exist, but their editors and journalists suered constant harassment and prolonged imprisonment (Robins 1997:124). Episodes of Food Scarcity Since pre-colonial times, the Karamoja region of Uganda has been plagued by drought and famine. Since the 1970s, though, natural, social, and political events have left the area disaster-prone, with the majority of the population impoverished and extremely vulnerable to food shortages. During the 1980 famine, between 20,000 and 50,000 people were believed to have perished (Dodge & Alnwick 1986). Though the famine was centered in the Karamoja region, it also aected a number of other primarily districts, whose economies were also agro-pastoral and agricultural. However, though these areas experienced extreme food shortages between February and July 1980, both the intensity of the shortage and the disparity between the majority impoverishment and minority enrichment were most notable in Karamoja. Immediate causal factors included shocks to the rural economy in 1979 and 1980, including unusually low rainfall in 1979 and the war which ousted Idi Amin, both of which led to low agricultural production. The countrys ination led to the sale of agricultural produce to meet peasant demands, but these stocks were bought primarily by speculative traders, who later resold them at prices unattainable by the poor. This led to further impoverishment as many households resorted to sale of what they never would have considered objects of commercial transactions in normal times, i.e., land, cows, etc. (Okudi 1992:8). Episodic shocks also occurred in the early months of 1980, with neighboring Mbale

3.2. Analytical Narratives

59

and Tororo districts receiving unusually heavy rains that washed away most planted crops. The rampant theft of cassava from the elds also exacerbated normal seasonal hunger, and was largely attributed to people displaced from Karamoja. Within Karamoja, drought and raids were prevalent. Following minimal harvests in 1978, 1979 saw similar levels of crop yield. In addition to natural conditions, there were simply few crops planted due to the political instability, and the large-scale acquisition of guns and ammunition following the deposition of Idi Amin. After the war of liberation, Amins soldiers abandoned a large quantity of guns and ammunition in Moroto, a district within Karamoja, which were picked up by locals. For many groups, this marked a considerable advance in defense technology, and replaced old and homemade armaments. However, not all groups in Karamoja acquired weapons. While the populations closest to the abandoned barracks picked up weapons rst, some were soon traded to neighboring populations who were not, at the time, regarded as enemies. The guns were used mostly by the young, who served as defenders of their herds and communities. In reality, Okudi notes, the acquisition of guns was more destructive than constructive. It escalated raids to an unprecedented manner not only against traditional enemies, but among the Karimojong groups in an alliance with those who were once enemies (Okudi 1992:9). These raids exacerbated conditions considerably, and within months, those with weaker defenses had lost most of their herds. By October 1979, many people had too little food, and starvation and death rates began to increase. To make things worse, in January 1980, a cholera outbreak arrived from Sudan, and a key road was blockaded by militias in an attempt to mitigate raids emanating from Karamoja. Because the Karimojong people face a harsh environment and limited technology, pastoralism forms the basis of their society, with livestock herds comprising their principal source of food. Thus, Karimojong cows are rarely slaughtered, with food instead coming from animal products like milk supplemented by crops like sorghum and millet. The irregular rainfall of the area makes rain-fed agriculture unreliable, and it is not uncommon for seeds to be sowed up to four times per season. In addition, the low level of productive development means that even after good harvests, what is produced is consumed before the beginning of a new season (Okudi 1992:10). The pastoralist Karimojong are, therefore, extremely vulnerable to environmental irregularities, raids, or epidemics. To avoid the loss of animals and alleviate suering during times of disaster, traditional measures such as avoiding environmental degradation, close community solidarity through the exchange of gifts and ceremonies, keeping part of ones herds with relatives or friends, raids approved by elders and assistance to those who are victims of a crisis (Okudi 1992:10) are employed. However, during the 1980 famine, these traditional means of assistance collapsed across the region. Although the famine affected the whole region, peoples experiences varied across four vectors: geographical location, social dierentiation, age, and gender. The province of Karamoja at this point was divided into two districts: Kotido and Moroto, and though adjacent, each districts experience varied considerably. Kotido,

60

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

in the northeastern-most part of the country, experienced famine conditions to the greatest extent: Compared to Moroto District, Kotido is more remote and has poorer infrastructurefacilities of which were also looted by Amins eeing army. Kotido is also farther from Mbale and Soroti districts, on which the region depends for foodstus. As a result, after the loss of sorghum crops due to drought and disease in 1978-9, there was virtually no food for sale in the area. The prevalence of raids in Kotido was also higher than elsewhere. Subject to attacks from neighboring districts and counties, the semi-nomadic and agro-pastoralist populations in Kotido were generally less well-armed than other groups, which led to massive losses of animals, destruction of property, large-scale migration, and dependence on wild fruits as the last remaining animals were sent elsewhere for safekeeping. During the famine, Kotido was also the rst major region aected by the outbreak of cholera, with poor medical facilities and services exacerbating the situation. Bureaucratic problems and rampant corruption also plagued the distribution of relief, as did competition among NGOs in the area, with more remote areas assuming a lower priority for the distribution of supplies. Although relief began to arrive in June 1980, it was not until August that noteworthy quantities of medicine and milk arrived (via an international NGO), and in September, the French army began airlifting food into the bush. Moroto, on the other hand, was much less aected by the famine, though there was notable variation across the districts counties. While Matheniko County, for example, is generally the driest area in Moroto, it was the county least aected in 1980 for a few reasons. First, following the fall of Amin, residents of Matheniko acquired abandoned weapons and military superiority over their neighbors, allowing them to maximize their herds. However, Bokora County was among the worst hit. Though the area was agriculturally viable, it was among the rst regions subject to post-Amin pillaging raids10 . Bokora was also among the hardest hit during Karamojas 1975 famine, with raids, little rain, and poor harvests continually exacerbating the situation. Overall, three factors seemed to be of signicance during the 1980 famine: cattle, security, and the limited role of rain-fed agriculture in the local economy. Areas that were hit hardest (where traditional forms of assistance collapsed) were also those with few or no animals (due to raids), whereas those hit least were those with animals and military superiority. In the end, the 1980 famine in Karamoja seems to have ended not through any concerted government action, but simply with the passage of time. Since then, the region has continued to experience recurring food shortages, including following drought in 1984. However, during this time, the countrys relative political stability allowed for a more eective response. Dodge and Alnwick note that the response of the UN, UNICEF, and other international relief agencies helped keep starvation deaths to a minimum, though drought, armed conict and the displacement of large numbers of people (Dodge & Alnwick 1986:16) still occurred.

Between April and May 1979, 14,906 cows, 1,629 goats, twenty-four donkeys, fourteen chickens, two washing basins, and one saucepan were taken, and two boys murdered (Okudi 1992:15).

10

3.2. Analytical Narratives Summary

61

Though Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962, more signicantly, it gained independence from Idi Amin in 1979. However, around this time, the country experienced climactic hardship in the form of drought and crop failures, though between the twilight of Amins regime and the political instability that followed, the crisis received little attention. In 1980, famine struck Karamoja, a marginalized region that also housed a military barracks. As Amins forces ed the country, they abandoned their armaments, disrupting age-old power relations between ethnic groups in Karamoja, further exacerbating the food shortage. In the end, an estimated 50,000 Karimojong perished. While the countrys press was silent on the matter (until its exposure by Western media), in part this was due to the industrys total repression under Amin, though political instability between regimes did not help the situation.

3.2.5

Mozambique

Political Regime & Elections Prior to its independence, Mozambique was managed by Portugal. Ten years of sporadic warfare and a leftist military coup in Portugal in 1974 allowed the MarxistLeninist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) to take control of the territory. Within a year of Portugals Carnation Revolution, almost the entire Portuguese population had left Mozambique, and the country formally declared independence in June 1975. The rapid exodus left Mozambiques economy in shambles, though, and civil war against the Western-aligned Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) broke out soon thereafter, lasting from 1977 to 1992. From the time of independence to the resolution of the countrys civil war, FRELIMO was the only legal political party; the countrys rst elections were not held until 199411 Institutions of Famine Prevention Though droughts and famines have occurred throughout Mozambiques history, in the past, people were generally able to carry out various coping strategies. Prior to colonial rule, people grew and ate drought-resistant crops such as millet, sorghum, and cassava, though the arrival of the white man heralded the introduction of maize to the region, which soon became the national staple. However, maize is much more dependent upon rainfall, portending an era of precarious food security for the area. In addition, the Portuguese forced African men to grow industrial crops like cotton, and also forced them to provide labor in the mines of South Africa (Maier 1992:105). Beyond further exacerbating the areas food security, this placed additional burdens on women to grow food crops in addition to their preexisting domestic and reproductive duties. As a result of these policies, labor migration became signicant, yielding dependency on food imports as people failed to use remittances from South
11

http://africanelections.tripod.com/mz.html

62

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

Africa to develop agriculture. In the 1940s and 50s, famine became increasingly common, and in 1965, Portugal enacted a scorched earth policy along the Tanzanian border in its ght against FRELIMO supporters which often led to starvation. At independence, FRELIMO assumed power and stied all local trading, imposing a uniform policy of villagization and collective production that severely aected crop yields. It was through these policies, though, that FRELIMO hoped to invigorate industrial agriculture at the expense of peasant farming. This disruption was costly and ineective, and made the urban population reliant on food produced through a centralized and mechanized system of production. The time after independence also saw an unusual number of natural disasters. In 1977, the Limpopo and Incomati rivers ooded, damaging crops and livestock; in 1978, the Zambezi river also ooded, driving 220,000 people from their homes, and in 1979, Cyclone Justine damaged agriculture in the north of the country. Prior to 1980, however, the government was largely able to curtail damage via a Department for the Prevention of Calamities and Natural Disasters. Through this organization, the government was able to mobilize resources to deal with the crises, including foreign aid. Episodes of Food Scarcity In 1980, three factors contributed to the sharp decline in food production and marketing. First were military tactics used by RENAMO ghters, which were directed towards infrastructure, and the population displacement that resulted. Second were ocial policies that restricted rural trade, established communal villages, and forcibly recruited urban jobless to rural labor programs in the north. The third contributing factor was the weather, which in 1983-4 turned the economic disaster into widespread human tragedy (Maier 1992:108). During times of peace, Mozambique is a fertile country which has little trouble feeding its population and producing exports, agricultural and otherwise. Between 1983 and 1984, though, the south-central region of the country descended into famine, with most commonly cited statistics placing the death toll at around 100,000. A second major famine occurred in 1987, centered on the eastern Zamb ezia province, which was the result of conict. According to UNICEF, over 600,000 people perished during Mozambiques decadelong period of intermittent faminea toll which compares to Ethiopias famine of 1983-5. However, except for 1983-4, there were not scenes of mass starvation. Instead, famine meant chronic shortages of food and all consumer goods, constant insecurity and frequently homelessness, loss of assets such as livestock, and being forced to survive on a reduced diet of leaves and roots, and perhaps wild game, until it [became] possible to reach a food distribution center or plant and harvest a crop (Maier 1992:107). In the early 1980s, an unusually severe drought aected most of central and southern Mozambique, with the poorest families starting to suer extreme hunger. In Tete Province, many died of complications related to the lack of available food, though the famine received no publicity. In Gaza and Inhambane provinces, where REN-

3.2. Analytical Narratives

63

AMO was the most active, an estimated twenty-ve percent of normally marketed crops were lost. In the following year, as RENAMO attacks began in earnest, 100,000 Mozambicans sought refuge in neighboring Zimbabwe. International aid was slow to arrive, delayed until the crisis had already struck. In 1983, Zimbabwe (itself combatting famine) was the major food donor to Mozambique, and it was not until early 1984 (following a visit by US Senator John Danforth) that more food aid was sent. After 1984, though, Mozambique became massively dependent on foreign aid: Food shortages became chronic and food became almost unobtainable on the ocial market (Maier 1992:110). Where food surpluses did exist, they were sold on the black market or bartered, and in provinces such as Gaza, the black market accounted for as much as half of food surpluses. By 1986, harvests were down to roughly ten percent of 1981 levels, in turn eliminating incentives for peasants to produce a surplus. Mozambique is also a country of large urban populations, which only increased during the mid-1980s as rural food insecurity deepened. The simultaneous collapse of state and peasant farm marketing systems caused towns and displaced people to become reliant almost entirely on international aid, though even this did not prevent worsening malnutrition. At Maputo Central Hospital, for example, the number of admitted children who exhibited signs of acute malnutrition tripled between 1982 and 1990. Thus, while most famines aect rural populations and spare their urban counterparts, Mozambique seems to be an exception. 1985 and 1986 saw no reprieve from conict and hunger, with a major RENAMO oensive in Zamb ezia Province in late 1986 coinciding with the planting season. After attacks began on roads, over 500,000 were reported as at risk from famine, and over 270,000 were displaced. At the same time, there was a severe food shortage in the northern Niassa Province due to oods, poor harvests, and RENAMO activity, placing 400,000 people at risk of famine.. Additionally, 1986 oods in the Zambezi Valley washed away a portion of Tete Provinces rst harvests following three years of drought, placing around 500,000 at risk of a food shortage. Around this time, famine spread to the south of the country, even reaching the outskirts of Maputo, the capital. In Maputo Province, around 250,000 people faced serious food shortages in 1986 (sixty percent of the provinces population), and a further 22,000 were displaced following RENAMO attacks along the South African border. In Inhambane Province, around 430,000 people (thirty-eight percent of the population) were described as at risk, while in Sofala Province, around 570,000 were in danger, and over 450,000 had been displaced by the war. Serious malnutrition was also reported in the Chibabwwa area, where RENAMO burned maize, as well as along the border of Malawi. Between 1985 and 1986, UNICEF estimates that 150,000 children under ve years old died due to famine and war-related causes. Marginal recovery occurred in 1987, when agricultural production grew by seven percent, though around this time, crisis struck in Zamb eziapreviously the wealthiest and least famine-prone province in the countrymarking a second major famine situation.

64

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

While it is undeniable that many became destitute and suered hunger due to the RENAMO occupation of Zamb ezia, the 1987 famine cannot be blamed on RENAMO alone. The counter-insurgency strategy by the Mozambican Air Force (FAM) throughout 1987 also involved large-scale population displacement, so that people who had been scattered throughout the countryside, surviving on what they could grow and what they could obtain from the forests, were herded into army-controlled garrisons where no food was available, and none could be grown (Maier 1992:112). Despite this, there is little evidence of RENAMO or FAM deliberately creating famine. That being said: The basic military strategy of aiming to control the civilian population leads to famine as a direct and foreseeable consequence. Both RENAMO and FAM [attempted] to destroy the infrastructure in the others areas, and often in disputed areas as well. Both sides forcibly [relocated] populations away from their farms and means of livelihood, and [prevented] them from moving freely... The logic of war-created famine has not been one in which starvation is used to kill people, but one in which the threat of starvation is used to control people (Maier 1992:113). The abuse of food aid was also instrumental in maintaining famine conditions, with both RENAMO and FAM responsible for attacks on relief convoys and storehouses, as well as corrupt government ocials and merchants systematically diverting large amounts of relief food. Though famine was not a deliberate strategy, as one FAM ocer explained, people were relocated for their safety. Otherwise the bandits (RENAMO) would make them feed them. In remote areas we then destroy their eldsso the bandits will not become fat (Maier 1992:115). Between 1986 and 1988, 466 such accommodation camps were established, though many were more signicant as nodes of government control in a sea of insurgency (Maier 1992:115) which could not be maintained without international aid. As a result, the governments access to relief became one of its greatest assets in the war. The only tangible evidence of government forces systematically destroying crops as a tactic of war comes from their 1987 counter-insurgency campaign in Zamb ezia. Assisted by units from Tanzania and special forces from Zimbabwe, the operation entailed large-scale population displacement from districts that had come under RENAMO control. The governments scorched earth policy during these attacks directly contributed to the 1987 famine. All of this is not to say that RENAMO did not commit similarly grave atrocities. An early South African training manual for RENAMO, which taught readers how to ambush, retreat, and spread propaganda, also advised units to live o the land by capturing supplies and destroying everything remaining so as to deny the enemies access to it (Maier 1992:122). RENAMO also targeted infrastructure in its campaigns, including railroads, bridges, trucks, shops, FRELIMO oces, clinics, and schools. In 1982 alone, 140 villages were torched by RENAMO, and in 1982-3, they destroyed 900 rural shops. In addition to its tangible eects, the destruction of infrastructure also constituted a symbolic act, cleansing the area of government presence, providing an

3.2. Analytical Narratives

65

outlet for accumulated grievances of the populace, and returning the countryside to a subsistence condition (Maier 1992:122). However, one of the most devastating aspects of RENAMOs campaign was the obstruction or diversion of relief. Between 1984 and 1987, RENAMO destroyed and damaged relief trucks, killed drivers, and stole or destroyed over 400 tons of food and relief supplies. Over half of these attacks occurred in 1987a year which also saw some 4.5 million people face famine and the displacement of 1.6 million more. The destruction continued through 1988, and in 1989, RENAMO forced launched attacks on a railway line, destroying over 2,000 tons of relief food12 . Beyond this, though, it is dicult to generalize about RENAMOs operations, with the treatment of populations under their control varying considerably. According to accounts of Mozambicans who experienced it, RENAMOs administration can be categorized by geographical, logistical, and local political factors, with areas subject to taxation, control, or destruction. Given the uidity of the insurgency, though, these categorizations are tenuous at best. Taxation areas constituted much of RENAMOs dominion, the main function of which was to produce food and services for the organization, with RENAMO frequently only imposing on the local population light tribute demands, sometimes no more than that previously demanded by headmen or chiefs (Maier 1992:125). In control areas, though, RENAMO presence was much more apparent. Evidence from Gorongosa District, in Sofala Province, suggests that in 1985 RENAMO attempted to establish crude health clinics and schools, as well as an alternative administration. In most cases, though, these were nothing more than poor replicas of the system RENAMO had deliberately destroyed. Across control areas, the degree of RENAMOs benevolence was directly related to the progress of the war eort. However, people in these areas were secondary to the interests of the force, with occasional food extractions causing temporary starvation. When Zimbabwe entered the war fully in 1985, RENAMO was faced with the threat of air-based attacks. In response, larger bases were fragmented, with key strongholds moved to more inaccessible locations such as marshes or caves. Civilian food supplies in these areas deteriorated considerably as a result, and as they came under military pressure, more civilians were either forced to help transport supplies or were relocated. During this time, many areas of food production returned to government control, though in response RENAMO increased the taxation of other populations under its command. As a result, what local support RENAMO had built earlier turned to ambivalence in 1985-6. The experience at Gogogo base, elsewhere in Sofala, further illustrates RENAMOs pattern of administration. When faced with greater military or logistical pressure, RENAMO would become more authoritarian and repressive, [imposing] greater exactions on the local population (Maier 1992:126). It is precisely these demands on the peasantry, however, that determined the local populations changes for survival, and correspondingly the level of support for the force.
In 1991, a senior RENAMO ocial conrmed the role of food in their strategy: Food is a tool of war, we use it to make strategic gains, but so do the FRELIMO Marxists! (Maier 1992:124).
12

66

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

Until the late 1980s, however, there was generally more food available with areas under total RENAMO control. At the same time, though, the lack of any eective trade and marketing systems within these areas meant that natural calamities such as drought would create localized shortages, all but necessarily leading to hunger13 . Additionally, more deaths were reported to have occurred in areas controlled by RENAMO, who prevented migration, and though RENAMO did ultimately realize its inability to feed so many people, belatedly allowing them to leave, some died during their journey, and others from advanced malnutrition. Finally, Maputo and Gaza provinces were destruction zones, subject to the seemingly wanton destruction of health, educational and economic infrastructure, and food stores and food convoys (Maier 1992:127). From these areas, for example, came four reports one year of aid vehicles being destroyed, rather than rst removing the cargo. Empty trucks were also targeted on occasion, further hampering the governments relief eorts. These displays of dominance, then, were dramatic indicators of RENAMOs destructive capacity, signifying a deliberate and eective weapon of war. [This conspicuous destruction] sends a very vivid message to the thousands of hungry deslocados (displaced people) waiting for food relief to arrive in their accommodation centers and is very eective in eroding morale (Maier 1992:128). In some instances, this display of power signaled to the population a choice between RENAMO and starvation. As a result, food security all but dictated military strategy, in the end. After the death of Samora Machel, Mozambiques President, in a 1986 plane crash, Joaquim Chissano, his successor, implemented sweeping economic and political changes. In addition to transforming the country from Marxism to capitalism, Chissano successfully carried out peace talks with RENAMO, bringing the civil war to an end in 1992. Around this time, a new constitution was rated that created a multi-party political system, a market-based economy, and free elections. By 1993, more than 1.5 million Mozambican refugees returned from neighboring countries in one of Africas largest repatriation eorts (Smith 1993). Press Throughout Mozambiques civil war, there were many human rights violations, and even since the cessation of hostilities have there been concerns of infringements of press and other civil liberties, though the country has improved in recent years. Consequently, during the 1980s, Mozambiques press was rated as Not Free by Freedom House. Summary Even before gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, (the territory of) Mozambique was subject to a decade of sporadic warfare against the colonizers. After independence, there formed a one-party Marxist state, and civil war broke out, lasting
This was the case in Memba District, where two successive failed harvests early in 1989 caused the deaths of 5,000 people
13

3.2. Analytical Narratives

67

from 1977 to 1992. Between 1983 and 1984, part of the country experienced famine following severe weather and war-time peril, during which 100,000 people are estimated to have perished. The country experienced famine again in 1987, though in a dierent part of the country, and for dierent reasons (here, due to the conict). Throughout the decade, the countrys press was not free.

3.2.6

Ethiopia

Political Regime & Elections Unlike other countries in this study, Ethiopia was never colonized by a European power (though it was briey occupied by the Italians prior to WWII). In 1974, though, the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I came to an end, when he was deposed by a Marxist-Leninist military junta known as the Dergue (committee or council in Geez), led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, who established a one-party state. In 1973, in the nal years of the Ethiopian Empire, the countrys Wollo province suered a famine, during which it is estimated between 40,000 and 80,000 people died, and though in its wake, the imperial government established a Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to help prevent future crises, it was not enough to appease the people. Selassies government also suppressed information about the famine and refused to entertain the thought of relief, and it was not until a television documentary about the crisis aired in England that the situation became widely known. All of this helped foment the Dergue revolution, and upon assuming power, the revolutionary government instated widespread reforms with a promise to eradicate famine from the country. A decade later though, famine struck again. Institutions of Famine Prevention Prior to 1974, there had been little successful protest action taken by peasants, and there were no urban food riots. Indeed, the early stages of the revolution were relatively non-violent. Instead, revolutionary spirit came from students, town-dwellers, and junior army ocers, who used the symbolism of famine as part of a new political idiom (de Waal 1997:108). At this time, de Waal notes, Ethiopia wason paper, at leastbetter equipped to prevent famine than ever in its history. Rather, the shortcoming was that while the famine played a role in the revolution, the faminevulnerable people did not (de Waal 1997:108). After the revolution, land and RRC reform and other measures were the product of a small number of intellectuals. While the reforms were generally accepted, they were imposed from above; as a result, the gains of the revolution were tenuous, and the government struggled with its legitimacy. Coinciding with the Red Terrora bloody power struggle between the Dergue and other political groupsa series of measures were implemented to extract food from rural populations to sustain the ever-increasing army. Around this time, a central food extraction institution was established, though the corporation simply [bought] in ve provinces to supply three cities... precisely the same pattern of distribution which prevailed before the revolution (de Waal 1997:110).

68

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

Overall, the economic policies of the Dergue had disastrous consequences that caused mass impoverishment and were partly to blame for the scope of the famine of 1983-5. While early in its existence, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission produced admirable analyses of poverty and famine in Ethiopia, and achieved significant progress in its implementation of relief measures, by the 1980s, the RRC had become compromised as a tool of the Dergue. First, it was given a leading role in the governments attempts to cause social transformation in Ethiopia, which entailed creating a collectivized workforce that was drawn from urban beggars and drought victims. A second purpose of the RRC was to procure foreign assistance. After 1985, the RRC was very successful in securing aid, though much in nonwar regions it was largely channeled through international NGOs, most of the RRCs food was used to supply militias (especially in Eritrea and Tigray). Elsewhere, the RRC pushed international agencies to set up relief programmes in surplus-producing regions, where the [government] continued to collect substantial quotas (de Waal 1997:112). The RRC was also instrumental in spreading propaganda which framed the 1980s famine as resulting from overpopulation and drought, downplayed the role of war, and claimed that all victims were being reached by it and other aid organizations. Despite these claims, though, the RRC never interrupted the ow of early warning information, which would have inhibited its ability to procure aid. Press During the 1973-5 famine, Emperor Selassie suppressed information about the situation, and it was not until a documentary aired on British television that the international community began to respond. After the explosion of international attention, the Ethiopian Government instinctively sought to restrict foreign media and relief agencies, only drawing more attention to the situation. However, the Dergue soon began to use the relief presence to its economic, diplomatic, and military advantage. Key to this strategy was the creation of a UN Emergency Oce for Ethiopia (UNEOE). This oce sought to be the authoritative source of news information on the topic, though they deliberately obscured information, including their own reports. In the same month as the establishment of the UNEOE, the Ethiopian Government launched a silent oensive in Eritrea, so named for its lack of publicity. During the Eighth Oensive, launched in February 1985, the UNEOE did not mention any oenses, even when they involved direct attacks on relief programmes in the areas held by the EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front) and the TPLF (Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front). Information about diversion of food to the army and militia in Eritrea was suppressed (de Waal 1997:124), and the UNEOE consistently downplayed reports of forcible resettlement, rebutted independent research, and even appealed for aid at resettlement sites. Thus, not only did the governments control over media serve to veil its repressive military actions, but it also was able to aect the content of news that it did let out. As a result, through its own channels as well as through the UNOEOE the government of Ethiopia was able to exploit the international humanitarian community for aid,

3.2. Analytical Narratives while simultaneously engaging in continued domestic conict. Episodes of Food Scarcity

69

While many people speak of the Ethiopian famine as a homogeneous national phenomenon, this is misleading. This image, though, allowed the RRC to claim that it had been predicting the 1983-5 famine as early as 1981, and that over 4 million people were aected in that year. In reality, many of those aected were in one section of the country, aicted by a wholly dierent crisis precipitated by war between the Dergue and the Oromo Liberation Front. Another problem with this claim is the unreliability of statistics in the area at that time, with most gures for rainfall, food production, and famine-aected populations having been interpreted as indicating food insecurity only retrospectively. As late as early 1984, no one could truly have predicted the famine, with food production estimated as above average for 1981 and 1982 (see Table 3.2). It was not until February and March 1983, when destitute migrants [turned] up at feeding centers (de Waal 1997:114), that signs of famine began to arise. International NGOs began appeals for aid, and the RRC quickly revised its assessment and claimed a major production shortfall, retroactively identifying drought to disguise the destruction wrought by soldiers. Table 3.2: Food Production in Ethiopia, 1977-84 Production Total 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 99 110 122 117 115 127 118 110 Per Head 95 104 113 106 102 110 99 90

NOTE: 1974-6 = 100 (de Waal 1991:132)

The main harvest of 1983 was mediocre, but far from disastrousonly in Tigray was there a serious decit. Once again, though, famine occurred. In May 1984, the RRC claimed catastrophic drought following the failure of the short rains, and though the crops yielded by the short rainy season produce only a small proportion of crops grown in only certain parts of the country, the RRC played up the incident. A more impartial indicator of famine is the price of grain, which was consistently high in eastern and central Tigray, with elevated prices rippling outwards following the 1984

70

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

harvest failure (see Table 3.3). Rainfall data from the time corroborate, with localized droughts occurring in 1983, juxtaposed against above-average rainfall in other areas. It was not until the main harvest of 1984 that there occurred widespread and severe drought, aecting much of eastern and southern Ethiopia. Though not nearly as prolonged or severe as the famine in the north, the gures were conated in government statistics, giving the impression both that the entire country was suering from famine, and that this famine was unitary. The 1984 drought was thus made a scapegoat for the famine that had begun a year earlier, for dramatic eect. While drought and harvest failure contributed to the famine, though, they cannot be considered direct causes. Similarly, while the governments economic and agricultural policies contributed, they were not central to it. Rather, the principal cause of the famine was the counter-insurgency campaign of the Ethiopian army and air force in Tigray and north Wollo during 1980-85. The zone of severe famine coincided with the war zone, and the phases of the developing famine corresponded with major military actions (de Waal 1997:115). Five components of military strategy in particular helped create famine: military oensives aimed at the TPLF (Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front) strongholds (which were largely in the surplus-producing western lowlands); the bombing of markets in rebel-held areas; restrictions on movement and trade; the forced relocation of populations; and nally the manipulation of relief programmes (de Waal 1997:117). During oensives in 1980 and 1985, the army destroyed grain stores, burned crops and pastures, killed livestock, burned houses, enforced the collection of taxes and contributions (de Waal 1997:118), relocated farmers, and blocked supplies from Sudan, all with the intention of preventing food from reaching the TPLF. Tigray also saw aerial bombardment after 1980, especially of roads, which instilled terror and forced people to hide at night. As a result, many traders were forced to close business, and markets contracted or shut down altogether. Table 3.3: Average Grain Prices in Northern Ethiopia (birr per quintal, 100 kg) E. Tigray N. Wollo N. Gondar Nov/Dec 1981 Nov/Dec 1982 Nov/Dec 1983 Nov/Dec 1984 Jun/Jul 1985 100 165 225 300 380 50 65 90 160 235 40 55 45 70 165
(de Waal 1997:115)

A third component of the strategy involved restricting commerce and migration. Permits were made dicult and expensive to obtain, soldiers conscated goods, unauthorized travelers were liable to great punishment, and petty trade became almost impossible. Checkpoints were also established outside government-held towns to restrict the ow of grain. With grain no longer able to move from surplus-producing

3.2. Analytical Narratives

71

areas, prices skyrocketed, such that in 1982, price variation across towns reached some three hundred percent. The nal component to the governments campaign was the strategic manipulation of relief, including the denial thereof to non-government-controlled areas. Although relief abuse and restriction had less of an impact on the situation than other tactics, it was the most blatant example of food as a weapon. Until early 1984, international donors were (justiably) skeptical of the Ethiopian Governments appeals for relief, with evidence mounting that diversion and abuse of aid were among tactics employed in counter-insurgency eorts. In October 1984, though, the famine was thrust into the international media spotlight. While some were mobilized to action, others felt that the exposure resulted from collusion between private relief agencies and television broadcasters. As a result, the press became less brazen about identifying famine. Additionally, because the broadcast occurred during the prime fund-raising season for relief agencies (just before Christmastime), competition among NGOs intensied as each fought for media exposure and celebrity endorsements. At the same time, the priority for Western governments became to avoid embarrassment, such that aid became a strategic alibi (de Waal 1997:123). After the explosion of international attention, the Ethiopian Government instinctively sought to restrict media and relief agencies, thus drawing further attention to the famine. However, the Dergue soon began to use the relief presence to its economic, diplomatic, and military advantage, with the creation of a UN Emergency Oce for Ethiopia (UNEOE), the purported mission of which was the coordination of relief eorts with the Ethiopian Government, and to centralize the ow of information. However, these functions were already being served by domestic organizations, such that the main function of the UNEOE, de Waal notes, was to help maintain the appearance of competent action towards the famine without compromising its relationship with the Dergue by unduly antagonizing them. Nonetheless, the ocial UN view was that the agency enabled a broader and more eective response force. The Ethiopian Government intensied its actions (the creation of famine and manipulation of aid), and the UNEOE acted as its mouthpiece, with journalists frequently turning to it as an authoritative source of information. Rather than investigating abuses, though, the UNEOE consistently concealed disturbing evidence, including evidence produced by its own monitors (de Waal 1997:123). In the same month as the establishment of the UNEOE, for example, the Dergue launched a silent oensive in Eritrea, so named for its lack of publicity. The one international agency to withdraw from Ethiopia in protest was Doctors Wtihout Borders (MSF), who departed soon before the government issued an order for their expulsion. The organization later published a damning report of the situation, though this only caused other agencies to discredit them on the basis of incompetency. Though its ineptitude was not the cause of its expulsion, it is not inconceivable that MSF was politically na ve: its eld sta were unaware of the implications of reporting on what they had seen, and had they been more experienced they would have followed their colleagues in other agencies and remained silent (de Waal 1997:124). Thus, the relationship between international humanitarian actors, the media, and the Ethiopian

72

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

Government prevented any systematic evaluation of the famine. Perhaps the most remarkable distortion of the famine, however, involved the governments starvation of rural Tigray. In July 1985, UNEOE chair Kurt Jansson visited Tigrayan garrison towns with other government ocials, and though at this time, Tigray received only about a quarter of the food needed (given its population), his report stated that seventy-ve percent of those in need were receiving rations. Janssons visit had wider repercussions, and compelled the US government to become an accomplice in the cover-up. Days earlier, the US Congress requested President Reagan to determine whether the Ethiopian Government had used starvation as a weapon of war. If the answer was yes, the US would have been obliged to take drastic steps against the Ethiopian Government, and would have destroyed the credibility of government relief eorts. Janssons report was part of concerted pressure on the US to nd the Ethiopian Government not guilty (de Waal 1997:125). However, the Presidential Determination14 argued that policies taken by the Dergue have no doubt caused vast unnecessary suering including starvation, but that there was no evidence of the government conducting a deliberate policy of starvation at that time. The careful use of at this time allowed Mengistus administration to escape further scrutiny. The US also felt pressure domestically to continue providing humanitarian assistance: following aid concert events in England and America, it was necessary to bee seen as giving generously. Because media and politicians were prohibited from visiting rebel-held areas, it was necessary for US assistance to have a high media prole in government-held areas (de Waal 1991:365). This depoliticized the famine, and the Dergue began to exploit the media presence. A convenient scapegoat for the famine was found in the natural environment, the tropes of which are familiar: drought, overpopulation, and unsustainable land-use practices make the current population unsustainable without drastic changes in population and environmental management. Saving the natural environment became an especially suitable nonpolitical way in which Western (particularly American) donors could send aid to communist Ethiopia. In 1982, ocial aid ows to Ethiopia totaled $221 million, rising to $784 million in 1985. After a brief decrease, aid owed increased again following drought in 1987, coming to $984 million. However, the latter drought, de Waal notes, which elicited the fastest and most generous contributions ever to government-side relief eorts, was conned almost wholly to non-government-held Tigray (de Waal 1997:127). As a result, in Tigray, very many soldiers and very few locals enjoyed the benets of relief. Among TPLF-held areas of Tigray, the greatest force in ghting famine was the political relationship between the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and the people. Because the TPLF was founded by a small group of students and teachers, they believed from the beginning that the peasantry was crucial to a successful revolution. In the early stages of the war, the TPLF relief on peasants for supplies, as well as intelligence and recruits. In turn, the fronts social, economic, and political
Presidential Determination No. 85-20, Determination with Respect to Ethiopia, September 7, 1985.
14

3.2. Analytical Narratives

73

programs were created with the involvement of the rural population. The fronts rst reform process, land reform in Sobia, was protracted and deliberative, forming the foundation of a social contract in which the TPLF committed itself to acting in the interests of the peasants. The contract was enforceable because, without any rural support, the TPLF would have been quickly crushed by either of its militarily strong rivals (de Waal 1997:128). The TPLF also established a Relief Society of Tigray (REST) in 1978, a quasiautonomous relief administration with the face of an independent NGO. The organization was totally separate from the TPLF, and produced no revolutionary materials. At the same time, though, it distributed relief food through the village councils responsible for administration of the region, making the program virtually indistinguishable from the civil administration of the front to the people of Tigray (de Waal 1997:128). During 1983-5, the TPLF also shifted its focus to economic and social policies over ghting a conventional war. A policy trying to control market prices was abandoned, and a liberal policy of issuing trade licenses was instituted. Employment of wage laborers was encouraged. Moneylending was allowed (de Waal 1997:129). On a more practical level, though, these measures allowed the continuation of seasonal trading, migrant labor, and borrowingactivities upon which Tigrayan peasants relied heavily and which were prohibited by the Dergue. The liberalization policies of the TPLF ultimately proved crucial to lowering commodity prices, as the front came to control more territory (especially roads) and marketing infrastructure was (re)established. During the 1987 drought, the TPLF attempted to further link the political fortunes of the Tigrayan peasantry in the face of famine to the political fortunes of the TPLF (de Waal 1997:129). As a result, with the intensication of the Dergues war, peasants began to see their survival and freedom from famine as inseparable from the overthrow of the regime. Ultimately, de Waal concludes, Ethiopias famines of the 1970s and 80s are replete with ironies, which are explicable only by attention to the existence or not of an antifamine political contract (de Waal 1997:132). While the failed response to the 1973 famine was highly intellectual, elitist and institutionalized (de Waal 1997:132), the response to the 1983-5 famine was thought of as a major policy success for the government of Ethiopia, at least for a short time. Due to the way discourse about ghting famine is separate from discourse of internal conict, though, the TPLF was largely unable to take credit for its actions. Summary Ethiopia, unlike other countries in this report, was never colonized by a European power. In 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by a Marxist-Leninist military junta, the Dergue, after which the country became a one-party communist state. While the imperial regime had, following a food crisis in 1973-4, attempted to establish a domestic relief agency, it was not enough to save the empire, and the commission became a political tool under the Dergue. Throughout their administration, the Dergue focused primarily on taking military action against their opponents, often at

74

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

the expense of civilian (and opposition) food supplies, and from 1983-5, the country experienced a tremendous famine. The government used aid as an cover to continue its campaigns, even enlisting the UNs help, to great eect. In total, an estimated 500,0001,000,000 people died from conict and drought. Though while the country lacked a free press, information about domestic stocks was never repressed, as that would have curtailed aid shipments.

3.2.7

Sudan

Political Regime & Elections Prior to its independence in 1956, Sudan was under the purview of the British, who allowed the establishment of a democratic parliament following a series of polls. At independence, de Waal notes, Sudan exhibited two structures which stood as guarantees against localized food shortages degenerating into famine (in the North at least) (de Waal 1997:87). The rst was a civil service with a reputation for professionalism, which tasked itself with safeguarding local food supplies, and the second was the system of native administration of villages and sub-districts. However, the situation was undermined by political instability in the form of multiple coup attempts, the migration of many of the countrys professionals, and the failure of Sudans open door strategy for attracting foreign investment. Additionally, there was rampant corruption under the rule of Jaafar Nimeiri, who seized power in 1969. As a result, when the time came for Sudan to repay its foreign debts, it was unable, and Nimeri appealed to international lending and aid organizations, as well as invoking a spirit of national reconciliation. In practice, this meant abandoning political alliances with secular professionals as well as the South, and Nimeiris rule became characterized by an embrace of political Islam and deepening economic dependence (de Waal 1997:88). At this time, the countrys legal system was began a process of Islamization, with the appointment of a prominent Sudanese Muslim Brothers member to the post of Attorney General. Over time, prominent secularists and religious leaders left the regime, and the situation in the South degenerated into civil war. In an attempt to legitimize his governments use of political Islam, Nimeiri declared Islamic law in 1983 and proclaimed himself Imam. In so doing, however, he made the claim that he was accountable only to Allah, eliminating any remaining shred of commitment to popular welfare. Sudan by this point was massively in debt to foreign governments, while at the same time massive amounts of remittances were unocially being sent into the country. As a result, the government became signicantly less accountable to its internal tax base, and instead [relied] on the apparently magical liquidity of Islamist nanciers (de Waal 1997:88). Meanwhile, capitalist investors began to withdraw, and Islamic banks and merchants began to invest, exploiting their tax privileges, political connections and access to hard currency (de Waal 1997:89).

3.2. Analytical Narratives Institutions of Famine Prevention

75

The late 1970s and early 1980s also saw the decay of Sudans renowned system of local government. Ination devalued government salaries, and many civil servants joined the migration of professionals to the Gulf states. Corruption was widespread, and experiments in regional governance fostered factionalism, further lowering morale. During the 1980s, Sudan became a strategic player in the Cold War, and was seen as key to the anti-communist strategy after it changed alliances from East to West. Despite the countrys massive oshore debt, Nimeiri exploited this position to receive more foreign aid, making Sudan the recipient of the most US foreign assistance in subSaharan Africa (over $1.4 billion throughout the decade). However, this, combined with multiple debt reschedulings, served only to prolong the countrys impending economic crisis. The management of Sudans debt was such that by 1984, Nimeiris treasury was living from hand to mouth (de Waal 1997:89). Eventually, the country defaulted on its debt to the IMF, making Nimeiri accountable primarily to nanciers in Washington. Around this time, reforms demanded by the US and IMF included the widespread privatization of nationalized corporations and the radical slimming down of the state budget (de Waal 1997:90). These were welcomed by Islamist merchants, to whom it provided greater leeway for investment. At the same time, more non-state actors began to become involved in the reconstruction of southern Sudan, following the 1972 peace agreement. Unlike before, though, foreign aid was now being channeled to foreign NGOs over whom the Sudanese Government had no control. Press The Library of Congress reports that since the countrys independence, Sudans mass media has largely served to disseminate information supporting various political parties or ocial government views (depending on the power structure at the time). Radio has remained virtually a government monopoly, and television broadcasting [has] been a complete monopoly (Metz 1992). Freedom House corroborates, awarding Sudan scores of 0 (Not Free) for print and broadcast freedom until 1987, when print media gained some freedom. In the end, the famine in the South failed to become a political scandal in Sudan. In addition to a lack of interest by political groups in the North, northern journalists rarely covered the crisis, which would have meant traveling to an active war zone and challenging security restrictions. Equally important, though, was the lack of signicant interest among readers: Apart from the English language Sudan Times (edited by a Southerner), only the Communist al Meidan showed an interest, and that was largely conned to the political implications of the militias (de Waal 1997:96). Though press freedom plainly did not exist under Nimeiri (Associated Press 1989), there are conicting reports of the situation following the election of Mahdis Umma Party. The Library of Congress, in its report on Sudan, notes that prior to the 1989 coup to overthrow Mahdi, Sudan had a lively press, with most political parties publishing a variety of periodicals... Altogether, the country had fty ve daily or

76

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

weekly newspapers and magazines (Metz 1992), though all newspapers were banned by the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, who staged the coup. Episodes of Food Scarcity In 1983, the specter of famine loomed as drought decreased food production of north Kordofan, north Darfur, and the Red Sea Hills to twenty-ve percent of normal. Local governments attempted to distribute relief, but were restrained by extremely tight budgets and meager stores. Requests for assistance from the central government were also ignored, the assumption being that rains would simply return to normal the following season. By early 1984, the FAO estimated the relief needed in Darfur at 39,000 metric tons. Khartoum cut the gure to 7,000 metric tons, and even less was delivered. Nothing was sent to Kordofan. Rains failed again during the summer of 1984, and conditions became increasingly desperate. Apart from a (largely symbolic) declaration of emergency in Darfur, however, no action was taken by the government. There were mass migrations to towns and cities, including Khartoum, but around this time children in rural areas began to die. Though Nimeiri felt himself accountable only to Allah, in reality he had actual or potential nanciers as well, to whom the drought and famine were an embarrassment and a distraction (de Waal 1997:91). In an attempt to persuade international donors that Sudan was stable and a good recipient of aid, Sudan was forced to deny classifying the troubles in the South as war. Because the conict was not war, militias were mobilized instead of the army. Similarly, the government did not admit to famine, which would have shaken investors condence. In the end, Nimeiris strategy for averting famine was simply to deny that any problem existed. In November 1984 he said publicly, The situation with respect to food security and health is reassuring (de Waal 1997:91); it was not until January 1985 that he admitted to the reality of the situation. By this point, though, it had been a full year since drought became apparent, and an estimated 250,000 had perished. The famine did help solidify a broad coalition against Nimeiri, led by professionals, including doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. In November 1984, the Ministry of Health broke ranks and published an honest report on the famine conditions. Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Agriculture released estimates of the necessary relief that contradicted gures released by Nimeiri, calling for 160,000 metric tons of food for Kordofan and Darfur. The famine also divided the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), Nimeiris party (the only party). With the defection of Sudans largest city15 , there began the formation of an urban-rural alliance which would overthrow the government. In April 1985, there was a popular uprising by democratic forces. While the fall of Nimeiri was a triumph of the politicization of famine (de Waal 1997:92), the
15

Omdurman, population 526,284 in 1983.

3.2. Analytical Narratives

77

coalition which formed to overthrow him was fragile, and its use of famine largely tactical, such that in the end, no robust anti-famine political contract would emerge. Perhaps the most blatant example of political opportunism during the famine, though, was the rebel Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), which used its radio broadcasts to chastise the government for inaction over the famine, while the SPLA itself was helping to create famine in the south (de Waal 1997:92). After the fall of Nimeiri, many of the political classes who had mobilized lost interest in the famine, and the political agenda switched to prioritize peace with the South, elections, and Sharia law, with the interest in overcoming the drought coming only from those still aected by it. Immediately after the fall of Nimeiri, Dr. Al-Jazuli Dafallah, became interim prime minister, and promptly delegated responsibility for relief to international agencies, in light of Sudans now-bankrupt economy. In addition to helping depoliticize famine, this solidied the crisis as within the domain of relief organizations, rather than being owned by the democratic forces behind the uprisingfamine prevention became an internationalized technical issue, rather than a (domestic) political one. This shift was reected in the establishment of an early warning system which monitored economic, climatic, and agricultural data, reection the neo-liberal agenda for eviscerating government responsibilities (de Waal 1997:93). 1986 saw democratic elections return to Sudan, though they were spread over a twelve-day period and delayed in thirty-seven constituencies due to the civil war, as a result of which the Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Umma Party assumed power. During this time: Sudan enjoyed all the institutions of liberal democracy, at least in Khartoum and other urban centers. The press was uncensored and vigorous, and often highly critical of the government. Political parties, trade unions and professional associations were free to mobilize. There was no suspicion of fraud in the elections. The judiciary was independent and on several occasions overruled government decisions (de Waal 1997:93). It is arguable, though, that this liberalism was as much a reection of the weakness of government as of a true spirit of tolerance; but the freedoms were genuine and were used by, among others, human rights activists (de Waal 1997:93). At the same time, this period saw the most severe famine in Sudans modern history. In the South, famine was caused by the ongoing civil war, or more specically, how the war was fought. To aid their eorts, the government endorsed proxy militias to conduct raids, which were frequent, widespread, and devastating. Livestock were stolen, villages destroyed, wells poisoned, and people killed indiscriminately, and the militias were also implicated in peoples capture and enslavement. Those who managed to escape ed to garrison towns, where they were forced to sell their labor and assets cheaply, and were often prohibited from moving farther north, where there was the possibility of work or charity. Local government ocials and army commanders also prevented relief assistance from reaching displaced people. In one instance, relief food donated by the European Community sat for more than two years in wagons in a railway siding in el Muglad,

78

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

just a few hundred yards from a displaced camp where Dinka were starving (de Waal 1997:94). An estimated 30,000 people died in Western Sudanese displacement camps that year. Localized famines were also created by the military, whose tactics included raiding and requisitioning, scorched earth and sieges. The army and militias raided cattle and other movable goods and stole food on operations. Around garrisons the army prevented cultivation and cut down any cover, including standing crops, to give clear sight lines (de Waal 1997:94). Table 3.4: Relief and Political Representation by Region, 1986-1987 1986 Relief (mt) Equatoria Upper Nile Bahr el Ghazal Darfur Kordofan Eastern Northern Central Khartoum Total 5,000 1,000 2,000 51,000 107,000 35,000 2,400 18,000 2,000 223,400 1987 Relief (mt) 12,000 3,000 4,000 20,000 35,000 1,000 6,000 1,000 82,000 Number of Seats in Sudanese Constituent Assembly 20 7 9 43 43 31 20 55 34 262
(Keen 1994:151)

Due to the militias connections to Sadiqs Umma Party, there eventually developed a war economy, with a vested interest in the conicts continuation. Additionally, for some politicians, merchants, and ocers, the violence, famine, and failure of relief represented a policy success. Despite this, though, there is little evidence which points to a strategic plan to use the famine as a weapon of genocide. Instead, the moral, political and economic logic of the war as interpreted in Khartoum created a space where such near-genocidal motives and practices could ourish (de Waal 1997:95). The South was not only a war zone, but also an area with no legitimate political authority, which allowed state agents to act with impunity. This abolition of restraint did not develop automatically, of course, but was the result of state and local politics: Khartoum still had clients and allies in the South, whom it had to mollify, and who had power bases in their own right. But in Khartoum, the famine was virtually invisible (de Waal 1997:95). At the same time, the Sadiq government was exceptionally sensitive to the demands of Northern constituents, especially those from urban areas, and established a subsidy on wheat that was prohibitively expensive (equivalent to roughly seven percent of government revenue). The insistence by the IMF to remove this subsidy in

3.2. Analytical Narratives

79

March 1985 helped contribute to the downfall of Nimeiri, and while Sudans donors insisted it should be further cut or abolished, Sadiq refused to touch it, despite other agreed-upon austerity measures. Even the mention of cutting the wheat subsidy drew crowds in the streets, such that all government nance was hostage to this single issue (de Waal 1997:95), as well as reducing the governments accountability to a single, limited constituency. In the end, Sudans famine failed to become a political scandal. Though the press could have reported on it, there was little interest, and doing so would have meant traveling to an active war zone. At the same time, opposition groups in the North showed no real interest, and the few Southern MPs in parliament were largely unable to deal with the famine due to other pressing issues. The ocial SPLA also proved an obstacle, placing military victory over political mobilization, at best representing benevolent paternalism, while at worst, it was violent and extractive. Tactics used by the force created food shortages in many areas by requisitioning food, labor, and livestock, and exacerbated shortages in others. Garrison towns were reduced to starvation, and relief supplies were consistently blocked, inhibiting eorts by Northern politicians to build anti-famine alliances with aected populations. A glimmer of hope for relief came following widespread oods in August 1988, when there was criticism from all quarters over corruption and favoritism in the distribution of relief (de Waal 1997:97), but as the issue was gaining attention, the ruling coalition collapsed following a dispute regarding Sharia law. The 1988 peace accords between the SPLA and the Democratic Union Party (DUP), the second largest political party, made no mention of famine or famine relief, and it was only later in the year that Western donors took up the cause. By the end of 1988, pressure from Danish and American governments yielded Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS): a plan proposed, designed, and implemented almost exclusively by international relief agencies. In the end, political liberalism was unable to substantially alter the lines of accountability established in the nal years of Nimeiris regime. The exclusivism of the government combined with a lack of signicant opposition and an emphasis on international assistance contributed to an environment hostile to any democratic institutions helping provide protection from famine. Additionally, the government was sensitive almost exclusively to its urban constituents, and no urban-rural or NorthSouth coalition emerged which could force broader accountability. Summary Almost immediately after gaining independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan descended into civil war, and though the country was noted then for possessing competent safeguards against famine, in 1969, Jaafar Nimeiri seized power, and the state began to decay. In addition to exacerbating the conict with the south, Nimeiris preferred method of handling the threat of famine after 1983 was simply to ignore it. More concerned with the inow of international relief, Nimeiri focused primarily on maintaining an image of stability to his nanciers. In 1985, he was overthrown by a

80

Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence

popular democratic uprising, and famine (still rampant) became delegated to international relief agencies in the area. Thus, though under the Umma Party (1986-9), the country did possess a free press and (legislation enacting) competitive elections, famine failed to become a political issue, and was met with no concerted action (including by Northern reporters).

Conclusion: Lessons From the African Cases

In this thesis, I have argued that while Amartya Sens theory that a free press and competitive elections would allow a country to avert famine is not entirely accurate, its underlying causal mechanism is valid. However, press freedom and competitive elections are by no means the only mechanisms of accountability which could prompt a government to take action to avert famine. By examining Sens casesBotswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan as well as Mozambique and Uganda (thus completing the set of all African countries that experienced famine during the 1980s), I argue that though the causality is valid, in most cases countries famine prevention eorts were not motivated solely by freedom of the press and competitive elections. While either factor may be present in a polity, this is no guarantee that their function will be directed towards the prevention or aversion of famine conditions. In some cases, a governments response to famine was prompted by the domestic press, while in other instances it was the international media who exposed a crisis. In yet other cases, action was not taken despite the press freedoms, reecting either a lack of incentive to report or a lack of political imperative to act on the information. Thus, while a free press is, if anything, likely to expedite famine response eorts, it is by no means necessary. Additionally, while elections (representative politics) are generally considered necessary to align the interests of politicians with the voting population, they are by no means sucient. Beyond questions of what factors, if any, are sucient to prompt a famine response eort, this raises questions regarding the necessity of (representative) democracy to the eort, with the key political incentivemaintaining powerexisting independent of the institutional form of government. De Waal answers this by noting that despite the existence of other accountabilitypromoting institutions, press and elections may be used by the people to sanction elected politicians for past actions, while simultaneously projecting a (vague) image of desired political action16 . In this way, a contract is formed (so called for its enThis distinction, between considering voting as holding governments responsible versus espousing a mandate (Przeworski et al. 1999), illustrates one problem with voting, which is that votes are not bijective. This is to say, one vote is not cast per issue, but per bundles of issue stances (e.g. politicians). Thus, if votes are cast in an attempt to formulate a policy position, they are not terribly precise.
16

82

Conclusion: Lessons From the African Cases

forceability) which indicates to those in power the importance of a particular cause, such as preventing famine. In a liberal political system, various mechanisms can afford this ability, while under an authoritarian regime, the peoples only recourse is protest, whether peaceful or armed. However, as with famine versus chronic hunger, the threshold of an anti-famine political contract versus a commitment is less than clear, and, more importantly, of questionable relevance. First, in reality there is no perfect means of enforcement in representative politics, and so there can be no pure manifestation of a political contract. Second, while the preconditions for a contract are the same as for a commitment, the latter seems little more than an impermanent version of the former; the two can only be distinguished in retrospect. More signicantly, though, is the scope of a contract, both in terms of the parties involved and the oerthat which is agreed upon. While an anti-famine political contract in theory includes the government, the people, and famine, variation in each may lead to impure contracts, possibly resulting in famine conditions. In Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Kenya, for example, an anti-famine contract may be claimed to have existed, though only for a specic portion of the population (i.e. a greater disparity between the selectorate and the winning coalition). Additionally, while an agreement (be it a contract or some other pact) between a state and the people may entail the prevention of famine conditions (howsoever dened), the government may be free from addressing more fundamental causes, such as structural poverty or vulnerability to food insecuritya pattern observed in Kenya in 1984. Ultimately, freedom of the press and the regulation, competitiveness, and openness of elections cannot be considered panaceas for the prevention of famine. While these mechanisms of accountability are undeniably important to improving the quality of governance, they must be delinked both from specic issues and from the political will to take action.

Appendix A Tables

Table A.1: Translation of Polity IV Executive Recruitment Concepts and Component Variables
Polity IV Concept (1) Ascription (2) Dual Executive: Ascription & Designation (3) Designation Succession by birthright Ascriptive and designated rulers co-exist Brief Description XRREG Regulated (3) Regulated (3) Polity IV Component Variables XRCOMP Selection (1) Selection (1) XROPEN Closed (1) Dual-Des. (2)

Informal competition within an elite (4) Self- Self-selection Selection by seizure of power (5) Gradual Transition from Self-Selection (6) Dual Exec- Ascriptive and utive: Ascrip- elective rulers tion & Election co-exist (7) Transitional or Restricted Election (8) Competi- Formal competive Election tition among publicly supported candidates

Transition (2)

Selection (1)

Open (4)

Unregulated (1)

Not App. (0)

Not App. (0)

Transition (2) Regulated (3)

Not App. (0) Transition (2)

Not App. (0) Dual-Elec. (3)

Transition (2) Regulated (3)

Transition (2) Election (3)

Open (4) Open (4)

84

Appendix A. Tables

Table A.2: POLITY Scores for All African Countries

Country Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde CAR Chad Comoros Congo (Brazzaville) Congo (Kinshasa) C ote dIvoire Djibouti Egypt Eq. Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau Guinea Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 1980 -9 -7 -7 6 -7 -7 -8 -4 -7 -77 -5 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -7 -9 8 6 -7 -9 -6 -7 -7 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 9 -8 -8 -7 7 -7 -2 -7 -7 4 -7 -10 -6 -7 -9 3 -9 4 1981 -9 -7 -7 6 -7 -7 -8 -4 -7 -77 -5 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -7 -9 7 -7 -7 -9 -6 -7 -7 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 9 -8 -8 -7 7 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 -7 -10 -6 -7 -8 3 -9 4 1982 -9 -7 -7 6 -7 -7 -7 -4 -7 -77 -6 -7 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -7 -9 7 -7 -7 -9 -7 -7 -7 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 10 -8 -8 -7 7 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 -7 -10 -6 -7 -8 3 -9 4 1983 -9 -7 -7 6 -7 -7 -8 -4 -7 -77 -6 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -7 -9 7 -7 -7 -9 -7 -7 -7 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 10 -8 -8 -7 7 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 -7 -10 -6 -7 -8 3 -9 1 1984 -9 -7 -7 6 -7 -7 -8 -4 -7 -88 -6 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -8 -9 7 -7 -8 -7 -7 -7 -6 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 10 -8 -8 -7 -7 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 -7 -10 -6 -7 -8 3 -9 1 1985 -9 -7 -7 6 -7 -7 -8 -3 -7 -7 -7 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -8 -9 7 -7 -8 -7 -7 -7 -6 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 10 -8 -8 -7 -7 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 -88 -10 -6 -7 -8 -77 -9 1 1986 -9 -7 -7 6 -7 -7 -8 -3 -7 -7 -7 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -8 -9 7 -7 -8 -7 -7 -7 -6 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 10 -8 -7 -7 -7 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 7 -10 -6 -7 -8 -7 -9 1 1987 -9 -7 -7 7 -7 -7 -8 -3 -7 -7 -7 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -8 -9 7 -7 -8 -7 -7 -7 -6 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 10 -8 -7 -7 -7 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 7 -10 -6 -7 -5 -7 -9 -6 1988 -9 -7 -7 7 -7 -7 -8 -3 -7 -7 -7 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -8 -9 7 -7 -8 -7 -7 -7 -6 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 10 -8 -7 -7 -7 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 7 -10 -6 -7 -5 -7 -9 -6 1989 -2 -7 -7 7 -7 -7 -8 -3 -7 -7 -7 -8 -9 -9 -8 -6 -7 -8 -9 7 -7 -8 -7 -7 -7 -6 -7 -6 -9 -7 -7 10 -8 -7 -7 -5 -7 -1 -7 -7 4 -7 -10 -6 -7 -5 -7 -9 -6

85

Table A.3: XRREG Scores for All African Countries

Country Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde CAR Chad Comoros Congo (Brazzaville) Congo (Kinshasa) C ote dIvoire Djibouti Egypt Eq. Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau Guinea Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 1980 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 -77 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1981 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 -77 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1982 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 -77 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1983 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 -77 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1984 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 -88 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1985 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 -88 3 2 2 2 -77 2 2 1986 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1987 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1988 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1989 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 2 2 1 2 2

86

Appendix A. Tables

Table A.4: XRCOMP Scores for All African Countries

Country Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde CAR Chad Comoros Congo (Brazzaville) Congo (Kinshasa) C ote dIvoire Djibouti Egypt Eq. Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau Guinea Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 1980 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 -77 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 3 0 2 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1981 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 -77 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 3 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1982 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 -77 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 3 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1983 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 -77 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 3 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1984 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 -88 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1985 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 -88 1 1 0 1 -77 1 2 1986 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 1987 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1988 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1989 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2

87

Table A.5: XROPEN Scores for All African Countries

Country Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde CAR Chad Comoros Congo (Brazzaville) Congo (Kinshasa) C ote dIvoire Djibouti Egypt Eq. Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau Guinea Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 1980 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 -77 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 4 4 4 1981 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 -77 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 4 4 4 1982 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 -77 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 4 4 4 1983 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 -77 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 4 4 4 1984 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 -88 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 4 4 4 1985 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 -88 2 4 0 4 -77 4 4 1986 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 0 4 4 1987 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 0 4 4 1988 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 0 4 0 4 4 1989 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 2 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 0 2 4 0 4 0 4 4

88

Appendix A. Tables

Table A.6: Press Freedom Scores for All African Countries (Print/Broadcast)
Country Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde CAR Chad Congo (Kinshasa) Congo (Brazzaville) C ote dIvoire Egypt Eq. Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau Guinea Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Mozambique Niger Nigeria Senegal ??Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 1981 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 1/1 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 1/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 1/0 1/0 1982 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 1/1 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 1/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1983-4 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 1/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 1/1 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 1985 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 1/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 1/1 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 1986 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 1/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 1/1 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 1987 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 1/1 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 1988 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 1/1 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 1989 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1990 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

Data not available for Comoros, Djibouti, Namibia, or Rwanda.

References
[Abuoga & Mutere 1988] Abuoga, John B. and Mutere, Absalom A. The History of the Press in Kenya. Tech. rep., The African Council on Communication Education, Nairobi, Kenya, 1988. [Adar & Munyae 2001] Adar, Korwa G. and Munyae, Isaac M. Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978-2001. African Studies Quarterly, 5.1: 1, 2001. http://www.web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i1a1.htm [Akol 1985] Akol, Joshua. Socio-Cultural Roots of Disaster: Karamoja Case Study. A paper presented to the Uganda Red Cross Conference on Disaster Prevention held in Kampala 19 - 20 March, 1985. [Alnwick 1985] Alnwick, D.J. The 1980 Famine in Karamoja. Crisis in Uganda: The Breakdown of Health Services. ed. Cole, D.J. and Wiebe, Paul. Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1985. [Associated Press 1989] Associated Press. Journalists Accuse Military of Violating Press Freedom. Associated Press, 1989. http://www.apnewsarchive. com/1989/Journalists-Accuse-Military-of-Violating-Press-Freedom/ id-95a2346b9e3fe426e8f8d2b7a1bd6888 [Biti & Feltoe 1997] Biti, Tendai and Feltoe, Georey. Media Law and Practice in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe. Tech. rep., Media Institute of Southern Africa, 1997. [Bratton 1987] Bratton, Michael. Drought, Food and the Social Organization of Small Farmers in Zimbabwe Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future. ed. Glantz, Michael H. Cambridge University Press, 1987. 213244. [Bratton & van de Walle 1997] Bratton, Michael and van de Walle, Nicolas. Political Regimes and Regime Transitions in Africa, 1910-1994. [Computer le]. ICPSR version. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University [producer], 1996. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Poliical and Social Research [distributor], 1997. [Chavunduka 2002] Chavunduka, Mark G. The Role of the Media in Zimbabwe. The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development. ed. R. Islam. Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2002. 281290. http: //books.google.com/books?id=56punueI7G0C

90

References

[Cohen & Lewis 1987] Cohen, J. and Lewis, D. Role of Government in Combatting Food Shortages: Lessons from Kenya 1984-85 Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future. ed. Glantz, Michael H. Cambridge University Press, 1987. 269296. [Datta-Ray 2013] Datta-Ray, Sunanda K. A Demographic Disaster in the Making. Business Standard India (2013). http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/ a-demographic-disaster-in-the-making--113032200557_1.html [de Waal 1990] de Waal, Alex. A Re-assessment of Entitlement Theory in the Light of the Recent Famines in Africa. Development and Change 21: 469490, (1990). [de Waal 1991] . Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia. An Africa Watch Report. Human Rights Watch, 1991. [de Waal 1996] . Social Contract and Deterring Famine: First Thoughts. Disasters 20.3: 194205, 1996. [de Waal 1997] . Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. Indiana University Press, 1997. [de Waal 2000] . Democratic Political Process and the Fight Against Famine. Tech. Rep. 107, IDS, 2000. [de Waal 2005] . Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan. Oxford University Press, 2005. [Devereux 2000] Devereux, Stephen. Famine in the Twentieth Century. Tech. Rep. 105, IDS, 2000. [Devereux 2001] . Sens Entitlement Approach: Critiques and Countercritiques. Oxford Development Studies 29.3: 245263, 2001. [Dodge & Alnwick 1986] Dodge, Cole P. and Alnwick, David. KaramojaA Catastrophe Contained. Disasters 10.1: 1516, 1986. [Dr` eze & Sen 1989] Dr` eze, Jean and Sen, Amartya. Hunger and Public Action. Oxford University Press, 1989. [Dr` eze & Sen 1990a] Dr` eze, Jean and Sen, Amartya, eds. The Political Economy of Hunger Volume I: Entitlement and Well-Being. WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford University Press, 1990a. [Dr` eze & Sen 1990b] . The Political Economy of Hunger Volume II: Famine Prevention. WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford University Press, 1990b.

References

91

[Dr` eze & Sen 1991] . The Political Economy of Hunger Volume III: Endemic Hunger. WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford University Press, 1991. [Dueld & Prendergast 1994] Dueld, Mark and Prendergast, John. Without Troops & Tanks: The Emergency Relief Desk and the Cross Border Operation into Eritrea and Tigray. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994. [Eckstein & Gurr 1975] Eckstein, Harry, and Gurr, Ted Robert. Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry. New York, NY: Wiley, 1975. [Fraser & Rimas 2010] Fraser, Evan D. G. and Rimas, Andrew. Empires of Food: Feast, Famine, and the Rise and Fall of Civilizations. Free Press, 2010. [Freedom House 2012] Freedom House. Freedom of the Press: Global. Detailed Data and Subscores 1980-2012. (Press Freedom Edition). Washington, D.C.: Freedom House. 2012. [Gartrell 1985] Gartrell, Beverly. Searching for The Roots of Famine: The Case of Karamoja. Review of African Political Economy 33.War and Famine: 102110, 1985. [Gersony 1988] Gersony, Robert. Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conict-related Experience in Mozambique. Tech. rep., Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State, 1988. [Glantz 1987] Glantz, Michael H., ed. Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future. Cambridge University Press, 1987. [Hassan 2013] Hassan, Khawaja IzharUl. Population Pressures. The Express Tribune, 2 Apr., 2013. http://tribune.com.pk/story/529549/ population-pressures/ [Hickey 2011] Hickey, Sam. The Politics of Social Protection: What Do We Get From a Social Contract Approach? Tech. rep., Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2011. [Howe & Devereux 2004] Howe, Paul and Devereux, Stephen. Famine Intensity and Magnitude Scales: A Proposal for an Instrumental Denition of Famine. Disasters 28.4: 353372, 2004. [Howe 2010] Howe, Paul. Archetypes of Famine and Response. Disasters 28.4: 3054, (2010). [Ilie 1989] Ilie, John. The African Poor: A History. Reader in African History. Cambridge University Press, 1989. [Keen 1994] Keen, David The Benets of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989. Princeton University Press, 1994.

92 [Keneally 2011] Keneally, Thomas. Three Famines. PublicAairs, 2011.

References

[Kumbula 1997] Kumbula, Tendayi S. Press Freedom in Zimbabwe. Press Freedom and Communication in Africa, ed. Eribo, Festus and Jong-Ebot, William, 1997. 157185 [Levitsky & Way 2010] Levitsky, Stephen and Way, Lucan A. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press, 2010. [Leys 1985] Leys, Roger. Drought and Drought Relief in Southern Zimbabwe. Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen, 1985. [Little 1991] Little, Marylin. Colonial Policy and Subsistence in Tanganyika 19251945. Geographical Review 81.4: 375388, (1991). http://jstor.org/stable/ 215605 [Lubekmann 2005] Lubekmann, Stephen C. Migratory Coping in Wartime Mozambique: An Anthropology of Violence and Displacement in Fragmented Wars. Journal of Peace Research 42.4: 493508, 2005. http://jpr.sagepub.com/ content/42/4/493 [Maier 1992] Maier, Karl. Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique. Human Rights Watch, 1992. [Mandani 1986] Mandani, Mahmood. The Colonial Roots of the Famine in Karamoja: A Rejoinder. Review of African Political Economy 36.The Health Issue: 8592, 1986. [Manin et al. 1999] Manin, Bernard, Przeworski, Adam, and Stokes, Susan C. Elections and Representation Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge University Press, 1999. 2954 [Marshall et al. 2011] Marshall, Monty G., Jaggers, Keith, and Gurr, Ted Robert. Polity IV Project. Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc, 2011. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm [Mesquita et al. 2002] Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, Morrow, James D., Siverson, Randolph M., and Smith, Alastair Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders British Journal of Political Science 32.4: 559590, 2002. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092374 [Metz 1992] Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. Sudan: A Country Study Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sdtoc. html [Miller 1984] Miller, Judith. Famine Engulfs Ethiopia Again; Death Toll Rises. The New York Times 1984. http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/18/world/ famine-engulfs-ethiopia-again-death-toll-rises.html

References

93

[Miller 1995] Miller, Norman, Yeager, Rodger, and Orvis, Stephen. Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity (Second Edition) Studies in Comparative International Development 30.1: 104, 1995. [Munemo 2007] Munemo, Ngondizashe. Political Incumbency and Drought Relief in Africa. BWPI Working Paper 3, Brooks World Poverty Institute, Williams College, 2007. Gr Gr [O ada 2009] O ada, Cormac. Famine: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2009. [Ochieng 2011] Ochieng, Zachary. Kenya: Long, lonely road to press freedom. Free African Media 2011. http://freeafricanmedia.com/article/ 2011-02-16-kenya-long-lonely-road-to-press-freedom [Okudi 1992] Okudi, Ben. Causes and Eects of the 1980 Famine in Karamoja. Centre for Basic Research, Kampala, 1992. [Park & Curran 2000] Park, Myung-Jin and Curran, James. De-Westernizing Media Studies. Routledge, 2000. [Przeworski et al. 1999] Przeworski, Adam, Stokes, Susan Carol, and Manin, Bernard. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge University Press, 1999. [Robins 1997] Robins, Melinda B. Press Freedom in Uganda Press Freedom and Communication in Africa. ed. Eribo, Festus and Jong-Ebot, William. Africa World Press, 1997. 121135. [Scarnecchia 2011] Scarnecchia, Timothy. Rationalizing Gukurahundi: Cold War and South African Foreign Relations with Zimbabwe, 1981-1983. Kronos 37.1: 87103, 2011. http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid= S0259-01902011000100006&script=sci_arttext&tlng=pt [Sen 1981] Sen, Amartya. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation Oxford University Press, 1981. [Sen 1983] . Development: Which Way Now? The Economic Journal 93.372: 745762, 1983. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2232744 [Sen 1990a] . Food, Economics, and Entitlements. The Political Economy of Hunger Volume I: Entitlement and Well-Being. WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford University Press, 1990a. 3452. [Sen 1990b] . Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment. The New York Review of Books, 1990b. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/ jun/14/individual-freedom-as-a-social-commitment/

94

References

[Sen 1995] . Wrongs and Rights in Development. Prospect Magazine, 1995. http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/ wrongsandrightsindevelopment/ [Smith 1993] Smith, Ian. Mozambican Refugees and International Assistance. Canadas Periodical on Refugees 13.6: 13, 1993. https://pi.library.yorku. ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/%20article/viewFile/21751/20421 [Sperling 1987] Sperling, Louise. Food Acquisition During the African Drought of 19831984: A Study of Kenyan Herders. Disasters 11.4: 263272, 1987. [Stepan 2001] Stepan, Alfred. Arguing Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press, 2001. [Sutter 2011] Sutter, Camille. State legitimacy and famines in Sub-Saharan Africa. 2011. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37621/ [von Braun et al. 1998] von Braun, Joachim, Teklu, Tesfaye, and Webb, Patrick. Famine in Africa: Causes, Responses, and Prevention. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. [Walker 1989] Walker, Peter. Famine Early Warning Systems: Victims and Destitution. Earthscan, 1989. [Wanyande 1995] Wanyande, Peter. Mass Media-State Relations in Post-Colonial Kenya. Africa Media Review 9.3: 5475, 1995. [Weiner 1988] Weiner, Dan. Agricultural Transformation in Zimbabwe: Lessons for South Africa After Apartheid. Pergamon Press, 1988. [Wisner 1975] Wisner, Ben. Famine Relief and Peoples War. Review of African Political Economy 7783 (1975). http://www.jstor.org/stable/3997826