Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
716 PAGE 1
In his book The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee, Jared Diamond
(Diamond, 1992, p161) notes,
In his recent book, Guns, Germs and Steel, Diamond shows how individual
survival can depend on group status and inter-group relations in a society that most
likely resembles that of our ancestors.
"Of course the Fayus will kill any trespasser; you surely do not think
they are so stupid that they would admit strangers to their territory? Strangers
would just hunt their game animals, molest their women, introduce diseases, and
reconnoitre the terrain to stage a raid later"(Diamond, 1992).
Diamond notes that the isolation resulting from this inability to travel has
produced numerous different languages, each typically spoken by at most a few
thousand people living within a ten mile radius. Such isolation was sufficient to
produce local diseases, local genetic mutations, and radically different local customs,
yet all local groups were still just that: groups, which had to function effectively or die
out. Their common features must be a showcase of the fundamental essentials of
human group life. It was under such conditions that our ancestors lived for most of the
life of our species.
A New Zealand reader will have noticed some similarity with Maori protocol
for arrival at a marae, developed independently thousands of miles from New Guinea.
The visitor acknowledges the potential enmity of his prospective hosts, and their
power over him. He identifies himself not by his given personal name and IRD
number, but by his group affiliations and geographical origin, in an attempt to
establish a basis for non-lethal interaction.
Vaughn & Hogg (Vaughan & Hogg, 1998) note that "there are almost as
many definitions of the social group as there are social psychologists who
research social groups". These authors define a group thus: "Two or more people
who share a common definition and evaluation of themselves and behave in
accordance with such a definition." They then go on to discuss a number of other
definitions, each with its own virtues and shortcomings.
Following this tradition, I will here propose my own definition: A group is a
set of people whose members would under some circumstances identify
themselves as members of said group by agreeing with the statement "I am a
[group name]", even if only in the privacy of their own minds, or who would be
identified by others, perhaps including non-members, as members of said group.
All definitions appear to agree that one basic essential of a group is a person's
emotional orientation, or feeling that he (or another) is identified with the group. An
emotion is thus fundamental to group membership and identity. Identification with an
otherwise unpopulated group or even a principle or creed is sufficient; no second
living person is required. One may be, for instance, the last Jedi Knight. Furthermore,
no time duration is specified; a group may last for moments or millennia.
sense of social obligation (deWaal & Berger, 2000). These monkeys also show such
group-optimising activities as conflict management and coalition building (Boehm,
2000), food sharing (deWaal, 1997), reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention,
and mediation (Flack & deWaal, 2000).
Our closest relative, the common chimpanzee, like us and like capuchins, also
forms hierarchical groups which exhibit familiar behaviour, including moderated
intra-group competition, coalition formation, perimeter defense, and inter-group
conflict that can end in genocide (Boehm, 2000; Goodall, 1986).
Have these primate species (and many more) independently developed these
social behaviours and chosen to practice them? Unlikely in the extreme. Have they
evolved them and passed them along as learned cultural traditions? Few would find
this an acceptable explanation. What other explanation is left? Only the explanation
that the behaviours are favoured, perhaps strongly, by an inheritance coded in the
DNA. In other words, that group behaviour has been positively selected for, and is
instinctive.
To dismiss group instincts in the same way that group selection was dismissed
in the 1960s would be a mistake. First, reports of the death of group selection have
been greatly exaggerated (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 1980). The logic that shows
individual selection invariably dominating and eliminating group selection can be
used to show that social insects did not evolve, a patent absurdity that demonstrates
the fallacy of the argument. Second, we do not need to demonstrate group selection
per se, but need only note that there could be selection for individuals who have traits
that make them likely to form groups, and to function and respond in certain ways in
relation to those groups. Whether the inheritance of such traits involves specific
physiological mechanisms that predispose us to certain responses, or whether we have
been selected to be especially receptive to training and cultural inheritance that
favours the formation of groups is a question that can be addressed separately.
genetic fitness, and the emotive centers have been programmed accordingly"
(Wilson, 1980, p275). It is precisely at the level of emotions that we find some of the
strongest empirical evidence for group instincts.
Disproportionate response
3. Teacher Ron Jones also found the children in his school frighteningly
susceptible to the lure of a group that he created almost casually, without advance
planning (Jones, 1980). He too, had to terminate his "Third Wave" group quickly to
avoid serious consequences, as the Third Wave disrupted the school, ballooning
TOM PARSONS GROUP INSTINCT 461.716 PAGE 7
within a week to a membership of 200, from the original 30 students in his class.
Certain characteristic group phenomena emerged spontaneously, such as a
"bodyguard" for the leader. Jones also found that regular school work was performed
better during the time of the Third Wave, suggesting a facilitating effect of group
membership that should be investigated further.
Psychologists in denial?
We tend to regard drives such as those that favor personal survival and
reproduction as the strongest and most fundamental. Maslow's hierarchy, for example,
ranks physiological needs and physical security as more fundamental than
"belonging". Somehow we lose sight of the fact that familiar groups such as cults and
TOM PARSONS GROUP INSTINCT 461.716 PAGE 8
armies routinely cause people to ignore the supposedly most fundamental drives and
act counter to the demands of personal survival and reproduction. How, then, can
those drives be regarded as fundamental? Is Maslow entirely wrong? His views are
still taught in undergraduate psychology classes without refutation, and an internet
search finds many professionals who earn their livelihoods offering services based on
his hierarchy. Why do we not consider the possibility that cults and armies can
command individuals to sacrifice their "most basic" needs because they are calling on
instincts even more basic than those they countermand?
explains the details of the process by which a group can reach a very poor decision,
the phenomenon is clearly understandable without reference to special theories or
specialist vocabulary.
Several years ago, Cherry wrote both an article and a book on a "socialization
instinct" that drives the formation of social bonds (Cherry, 1992; Cherry, 1994). He
rated his model as more useful than conventional ones, since it was based on
biological, as well as psychological and sociological aspects of human nature.
However, although the Social Science Citation Index shows that Cherry's studies of
troubled youth have been cited repeatedly by other writers, his works on the social
bond instinct appear not to have been cited at all. Cherry's use of a
psychosocial/biological approach to explore the influence of instinct on human groups
has apparently found no audience in the profession.
parsimonious simply to say that in both studies that were reviewed, troubled teenagers
rejected the therapist's leadership and formed their own group, using their own values.
Their group responses were more powerful than any techniques that the professionals
could bring to bear, even when nominally in control of the situation.
It appears that psychologists as a group resist the idea that the group is as
fundamental a phenomenon as the individual psyche. Why might this be?
Elsewhere Buford expands on this theme, describing events that clearly had
an emotional significance that he had not anticipated when he began his research into
crowd violence:
TOM PARSONS GROUP INSTINCT 461.716 PAGE 12
Buford was convinced that the emotion was like a drug high "generated by the
body itself". He was concerned because he could identify none of the classical reasons
for crowd violence. He saw no political or economic cause, no grievance or injustice
or feeling of social frustration.
No novice to the scene, at that point, Buford had been "going around with
violent people for around four years."(Buford, p218)
features that can be seen as eyes and mouth, which is responsible for the Man in the
Moon, the face on Mars, and the utility of Mr Yuck (the poison warning face).
Granted, the responders were students in a social psychology class and may
have had a mindset favouring group interpretations. Such a test might well get
different responses among different highly selected groups. Still, that other research
remains to be done. Until contradicted by better-controlled studies, this one stands as a
demonstration of our predisposition to see groups as a likely default interpretation of
the world, which seems consistent with the operation of group instincts.
Any justification for such a new way of regarding and organising well-known
facts must lie in at least one of three areas:
(a) experts in the field may come to agree that the instinct hypothesis is a
superior explanatory framework, providing the most parsimonious unifying principle
to simplify the explanation of disparate phenomena, or
(b) the hypothesis must suggest new experiments that are productive and new
phenomena that might not have been noted or discovered except for the inspiration of
the instinct hypothesis, or
(c) experiments or observations must be capable of falsifying the instinct
hypothesis itself and fail to do so, or must falsify competing viewpoints.
I believe that at least some of these criteria can be met for the group instinct
hypothesis.
So what?
If human behaviour in fact reflects the operation of group instincts, not only
the science of psychology, but all of society needs urgently to know more about those
instincts. Despite repeated and well-publicised tragedies, cults flourish, continuing to
claim headlines and victims. Genocide is a continuing threat in several areas of the
world. Gangs are a major social problem in industrialised society, as are tribes in
Africa and Asia.
TOM PARSONS GROUP INSTINCT 461.716 PAGE 15
I suggest that cults, as examples of the strongest type of group, would make a
good starting point for study. Experts have already determined that cults have certain
organisational and psychological features in common, such as a charismatic leader,
initiation rites, claims to possess a special truth or status, strict control of their
boundaries (informational, physical, membership), strong social controls on members'
behaviour, and a strong sense of isolation from (and persecution by) the rest of the
world (Galanter, 1989; Lofland, 1977; Lynch, 1996; Singer, 1995; Sparks, 1977).
Different cults (and gangs) display different levels of intensity in the function
of these structures, and different levels of power over their members. I suggest that a
study of the entire set of all such organisational and structural features that can be
found in any cult (or gang) will yield an image of the set of group instincts that they
use to gain such remarkable control over initially independent minds. Then those
instincts can be systematically studied in individuals, and groups themselves will be a
legitimate area of study for psychology (not just sociology) as a projection into the
environment of a basic component of the human mind.
For too long the best group technologists have not been practising
professional psychologists – they have been the Hitlers and the L Ron Hubbards, the
Reverend Moons and the Reverend Joneses. Not until the professionals can routinely
TOM PARSONS GROUP INSTINCT 461.716 PAGE 16
References
Aronson, E. (1988). The Social Animal. (Fifth ed.). New York: W H Freeman and
Company.
Blackmore, S. (1999). The Meme Machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boehm, C. (2000). Conflict and the evolution of social control. Journal od
Consciousness Studies, 7(1/2).
Buford, B. (1991). Among theThugs. New York: Random House.
Cherry, A. L. (1992). The Socialization Instinct: Individual, family, and social bonds.
Journal of Applied Social Sciences, 17(1), 125-139.
Cherry, A. L. (1994). The socializing Instincts: Individual, family and social bonds.
Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publications/Greenwood Publishing Group.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1999). Evolutionary Psychology, A Primer. .
deWaal, F. B. M. (1997). Food transfer through mesh in brown capuchins. Journal of
Comparative Psychology, 111(4), 370-78.
deWaal, F. B. M., & Berger, M. L. (2000). Payment for Labor in Monkeys. Nature,
404, 563.
Diamond, J. (1998). Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New
York: W W Norton & Company.
Diamond, J. (1992). The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee. London: Random
House.
Dishion, T. J., McCord, J., & Poulin, F. (1999). When Interventions Harm: Peer
Groups and Problem Behavior. American Psychologist, 54(9).
Flack, J. C., & deWaal, F. B. M. (2000). 'Any Animal Whatever': Darwinian Building
Blocks of Morality n Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Cognitive Science, 7(1/2).
Flippen, A. R. (1999). Understanding Groupthink from a Self-Regulatory Perspective.
Small Group Research, 30(2), 139-165.
1
Branch Davidians, Waco
2
Heaven's Gate, San Diego
TOM PARSONS GROUP INSTINCT 461.716 PAGE 17
Fowler, P. (2000, 19 March, 2000). Welsh or Maori. Yahoo! Australia & NZ News.
Galanter, M. (1989). Cults: Faith, Healing, and Coercion. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Goodall, J. (1986). The Chimpanzees of Gombe. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Haney, C., Banks, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1973). A Study of Prisoners andGuards in a
Simulated Prison. Naval Research Review(September, 1973).
Jones, R. (1980). The Third Wave. Whole Earth Review, The Next Whole Earth
Catalog (Summer, 1980).
Lancaster, J. B. (1975). Primate Behavior and the Emergence of Human Culture:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, United States of America.
Lofland, J. (1977). Doomsday Cult: A Study of Conversion, Proselytization, and
Maintenance of Faith. (Enlarged Edition ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Lynch, A. (1996). Thought Contagion. New York: Basic Books, HarperCollins
Publishers, Inc.
Rosenhan, D. L., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1995). Abnormal Psychology. New York: W
W Norton & Co.
Singer, M. T. (1995). Cults in Our Midst. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc.
Singh, J. A. L., & Zingg, R. M. (1928). Wolf Children and Feral Man. New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers.
Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselfish Behavior. Journal of Consciousness Studies, to appear.
Sparks, J. (1977). The Mind Benders: A Look at Current Cults. Nashville, Tennessee:
Thomas Nelson, Inc.
Vaughan, G., & Hogg, M. A. (1998). Introduction to Social Psychology. (Second ed.).
Sydney: Prentice-Hall.
Wilson, E. O. (1980). Sociobiology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.