RECENT ASSESSMENTS OF THE U.S.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

ABBREVIATIONS
AG = Attorney General DI = CIA's Directorate of Intelligence FISA = Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act NSC = National Security Council
CIA = Central Intelligence Agency DirNSA = NSA Director HUMINT = Human Intelligence PFIAB = President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
CT = Counterterrorism DNI = Director of National Intelligence IAIP = DHS's Intelligence Analysis & SecDef = Secretary of Defense
CTC = CIA's Counts-terrorist Center DO = CIA's Directorate of Operations Infrastructure Protection Directorate SecDHS = DHS Security
DCI = Director of Central Intelligence DOD = Department of Defense 1C = Intelligence Community SecState = Secretary of State
DDCI = Deputy Director of Central Intelligence DOJ = Department of Justice NCTC = National Counter Terrorism Center SIGINT = Signals Intelligence
DHS = Department of Homeland Security FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation NIC = National Intelligence Council TTIC = Terrorist Threat Integration Center

(1) 1C MANAGEMENT

» DOD created the
Undersecretary of
Defense for Intelligence.
| « Create Cabinet-rank DNI | » Create DNI, separate
by statute, separate from from CIA Director, who
CIA Director. will actually use DCI's
» DNI to serve as current 1C management
President's principal intel authority.
adviser and establish and • Institute uniform payment
enforce 1C priorities. and benefits structure for
« DNI to implement 1C 1C to permit rapid
accountability system to redeployment of
identify exemplary and personnel.
poor performance. » Strengthen anti-leaking
» Need to review whether legislation.
classification system » Review the classification
impedes real-time system.
information-sharing. » Hold certain senior CIA,
NSA, and FBI officials
accountable for ill-
preparedness for 9/11.
—.._ ... _„„_.„„_ „,
.. j » Create newagency- |« f « Not new DCI: legal ] «• DCI's effectiveness
NCTC- to perform authorities needed.
domestic intel collection » Strengthen DCI's
and consolidate CIA, management of 1C by
FBI, and DHS CT replacing DDCI with a
analytical capabilities. DDCI for 1C and a DDCI
« NCTC Director appointed to run CIA.
by President and subject » Strengthen Community
to Senate confirmation. Management Staff.
• Dual-hat DirNSA and
MIMA Director as
Assistant Directors of
Central Intelligence for
SIGINT and Imagery
respectively, reporting to
DCI.
» Require DCI's
concurrence in SecDef
appointments of NSA,
NRO, MIMA directors.
» Create 1C Senior
Executive Service and
uniform personnel
standards to permit easier
personnel rotation
throughout 1C.
» Give 1C one-year window
to "rightsize" workforce
through accelerated
retirement and severance
packages.
« A single systems
architect, but not a single
authoritative leader, is
needed for DOD
intelligence.
_ . . system.
depends upon DCI visibly
having President's
confidence; cabinet rank
for DCI is irrelevant.
» 1C should emphasize
"corporateness" to
improve performance.
» Strengthen DCI's
management of 1C by
replacing DDCI with a
DDCI for Community
Management and a DDCI
to run analysis-oriented
CIA.
» DCI should have direct
control over a new
Clandestine Service.
« Require DCI's
concurrence in SecDef
appointments of NSA,
NRO, NIMA directors.
» Expand DCI authority
over 1C personnel for
rapid redeployment and
termination.
» Create Infrastructure
Support Office to
consolidate and
rationalize IC-wide
personnel, management,
training, and
communications
capability.
» Consolidate control of
DOD intel functions
under an Assistant
Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and a
uniforrmed Director of
Military Intelligence
« Standardize 1C Senior
Executive Service

• Unclear whether a DNI would need additional statutory authority to manage the 1C beyond what DCI already has. • Severing DNI from CIA might deprive DNI of bureaucratic support and clout DCI currently receives from heading CIA..
• Enshrining the DNI's authority by statute likely enhances the DNI's prestige. • Sens. Edwards and Graham have proposed creation of an entity similar to the NCTC but reporting to the Attorney General.
• DOD might resist creation of DNI for fear that DOD will lose control over DOD intel agencies, which provide combat support.
 .ELECTION
(3) ANALYSIS
» Created Terrorist Threat
Integration Center to fuse
DHS, FBI CT Division,
CTC, and DOD.
» CIA created CTC before
9/11. After 9/11, CIA
doubled CTC's size and
quadrupled CT analysts.
« DOD created Joint
Intelligence Task Force
for Counterterrorism
(JITF-CT) as all-source
analysis center.
» DOJ created the Foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task
Force (FTTTF) to
develop innovative data-
mining and analysis.
« DHS/IAIP responsible for
will identify
vulnerabilities and
analyzing all-source CT
intelligence.
CTC supports operations and might be perceived by parts of 1C as a CIA entity.
JITF-CT and JTTTF may not have full access to intelligence held by other 1C agencies.
« HUMINT: CIA needs
more ethnically and
culturally diverse
workforce.
« SIGINT: DirNSA should
present to DNI, SecDef,
and Congress a plan for
solving technical
challenges facing
SIGINT and integrating
NSAintoCT. Congress
should consider having a
civilian DirNSA and
lengthening DirNSA's
tenure.
» Create National
Intelligence Officer for
Terrorism on the NIC.
« Ensure that DHS
develops an effective all-
source terrorism
information fusion center,
with access to raw
intelligence and finished
products and participation
in the collection tasking
process.
» Invest in data mining and
other information
technology tools.
» Improve language
capabilities, e.g., by
establishing a Civilian
Linguist Reserve Corps.
HUMINT: Increase use
of non-official cover
(NOC) officers.
HUMINT: Less emphasis
on liaison services, whose
cooperation has inherent
limitations.
» Collection agencies
should certify training
curricula for other 1C
agencies so intelligence
collected by a particular
agency can be analyzed
throughout the 1C.
» Congress and the
Administration should
consider making CIA's
DI a separate agency,
responsible to DNI and
thus becoming a national
analytical organization.
» 1C must develop all-
source analysis fusion
center in which analysts
who seek information -
rather than collectors who
hold information -
determine what
information is shared.
« Provide DHS/IAIP with
full access to raw and
finished CT intelligence.
» Develop data-mining and
other information
technology tools (e.g.,
DARPA's Total
Information Awareness).
• Maintain restrictions on » NCTC can task other 1C
CIA and other foreign 1C agencies for collection.
agencies from collecting » Rescind 1995 DCI
information on U.S. guidelines on recruitment
persons. of human rights violators
as informants.
» ThetwokeyUSGCT » NCTC will acquire
analytical organizations CTC's and FBI's
should be (1) DHS for analytical capabilities.
domestic intelligence, and » NCTC will conduct
(2) CTC for foreign strategic-level
intelligence. intelligence analysis and
Exploit data-mining but create analytical products
respect civil liberties. to support other agencies'
operations.
» Other agencies should not
duplicate NCTC's
analytical capability.
» DHS should combine
NCTC's threat
information with DHS's
vulnerability information.
Creating an all-source fusion center may raise security concerns regarding the intelligence flowing to the center.
» HUMINT: Recruitment
of sources for CT
purposes is top 1C highest
priorities, and CIA
operational guidelines
should maximize IC's
ability to recruit sources
while observing basic
moral standards.
» SIGINT: Conduct
strategic assessment of
SIGINT effectiveness in
light of new
communications
technologies.
» Utilize more open-source
information.
» Reward DO officers
based on their
contribution to CIA's
mission, not the number
of sources recruited.
» HUMINT: CIA should
maintain offices in most
countries; closely monitor
liaison relationships due
to inherent risks.
» DOD should not conduct
HUMINT.
« SIGINT: Review NSA's
"technological health."
1C should consult with
key consumers
concerning their
intelligence needs.
* Monitor relations
between DO and DI to
ensure they are not too
close or too attenuated.
» Rename NIC as National
Assessment Center,
remove it from CIA (but
still reporting to DCI),
and reinvent it as all-
source analytical center.
» Improve analysts' skills
and expertise, utilize
open-source information,
and increase use of
outside experts.
» Strengthen electronic
links between producers
and consumers.
Under DDCI for
Community
Management, create IC-
wide organization
responsible for tasking
collection.
* 1C should maintain at
least minimal clandestine
collection presence in
most countries.
» HUMINT: Conslidate
DO and DOD HUMINT
capability into
Clandestine Service,
reporting directly to DCI.
» SIGINT: Review SIGINT
capabilities due to new
communications
technologies.
« Consolidate all technical
collection into Technical
Collection Agency
» 1C analytical capability
needs surge capability,
including civilian analyst
reserve program.
» CIA should become the
premier all-source
analytical agency.
• National Intelligence
Officers of the NIC
should become part of
CIA; the NIC's
evaluative office should
become National
Intelligence Evaluation
Council to evaluate 1C
performance.
« Increase use of open-
source material.
 ) INTELLIGENCE. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE. AND LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEGRATION
Created TTIC to fuse DNI should require "joint
DHS, FBI CT Division, tours" between 1C and
CTC, and DOD. law enforcement to
• TTIC to maintain an increase cooperation.
authoritative watchlist. » Administration should
« TTIC director is develop national terrorist
appointed by and reports watchlist center.
toDCI. • Administration should
» Implemented USA report to Congress
PATRIOT Act to increase whether barriers between
cooperation between law enforcement and
intelligence and law intelligence are reduced.
enforcement » Congress should review
» CIA deployed 25 analysts domestic intelligence
to FBI. authorities (e.g., FISA) to
» CIA created Associate determine adequacy.
DCI for Homeland 4 Congress should consider
Security. creating new domestic
intelligence agency; DNI,
AG, and SecDHS should
advise.
« President should review
classification system to
expand access by state
and local authorities to
CT information.
Explicit Presidential support buttresses TTIC's bureaucratic clout and likelihood of cooperation from 1C.
Delayed maturation of DHS's intelligence arm (Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate) will hamper
TTIC's effectiveness.
TTIC will presumably coordinate with DoD's NORTHCOM.
(5) RESOURCES
» President and Congress
should focus on long-
term CT investment and
avoid supplemental.
» Long-term CT investment
should give 1C sufficient
flexibility - with
Congressional oversight -
to respond to
unanticipated needs.
» President should consider
utilizing a separate,
classified 1C budget.
» Maintain PATRIOT
Act's facilitation of
intelligence/law-
enforcement information-
sharing (provisions will
sunset in 2005).
* Congress should consider
creating (1) a new
domestic security service,
(2) segregating FBI'S CT
activities into entity
reporting to FBI Director,
and (3) moving FBI's CT
activities to DHS/IAIP.
» FBI should be lead » Create NCTC to perform
agency for law
enforcement, while DHS
should lead collection of « NCTC will consolidate
publicly available or
voluntarily-supplied
domestic intelligence and » The NCTC will task
analysis of all-source
domestic intelligence.
» Develop decentralized
system to permit federal,
state, and local officials
to build ad hoc
information-sharing » FBI will focus on law
arrangements outside of
Washington, DC.
» Increase resources for
information integration
(as opposed to
information technology
generally).
» No change to IC's
domestic intelligence
collection.
CIA, FBI, and DHS CT
analytical capabilities.
collection agencies with
requirements and produce
and disseminate
analytical products to
federal, state, and local
officials.
enforcement; NCTC will
lack arrest/deportation
power.
TTIC may become - or be viewed as - a creature of CIA.
Unclear whether TTIC has authority to task collectors.
» Increase funding for
» Need to develop
structure. procedures to facilitate
intelligence/law-
enforcement information-
sharing without tainting
potential prosecutions or
compromising sources
and methods.
* President should
designate AG as law
enforcement's
spokesperson so law
enforcement speaks with
one voice, thus
facilitating
intelligence/law-
enforcement cooperation.
» President should clarify
that 1C may collect
information about non-
Li. S. persons overseas at
law enforcement's
request.
« NSC "Global Crime
Committee" should draft
guidelines governing law
enforcement's operations
overseas.
» Improve 1C budget » Give DCI authority to
collection and analysis. process by (1) realigning transfer limited amounts
budget categories into of money between 1C
functional groups (e.g, programs without
SIGINT and HUMINT), program managers'
each under a national approval; SecDef can
program manager who appeal to NSC.
reports to DCI, and » 1C should develop
(2) aggregating budget programming, budgeting,
data into community- and accounting system.
wide database. « Community Management
» 1C agencies should Staff should have
provide the DCI with program analysis and
sufficient information so evaluation capability,
that the DCI can monitor with authority to withhold
budget implementation. funds.
« President should disclose » Create IC-wide
the level of funds Technology Development
appropriated during the Office to preformed R&D
current fiscal year and functions.
request for next year.
» Conduct comprehensive
review of the IC's budg
 . .IINTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

Released strategy for CT The President should NSC "Committee on

in 2003.
DHS legislation directs
DHS to develop plan for
securing critical
infrastructure.
establish and enforce Global Crime" should
priorities throughout 1C. establish CT strategy.
NSC, DNI, SecDHS,
SecState, SecDef should
prepare CT strategy for
President

No report provides a comprehensive CT plan for 1C or critiques Administration CT strategy

CT strategy will be reevaluated as DHS matures

BRANCH OVERSIGHT

» CIA, DOJ, and DOD IGs President and NSC
should determine should oversee 1C.
accountability of Reconstitute NSC's
personnel for 9/11 and "Executive Committee"
take appropriate (DCI, SecDef, SecDHS,
disciplinary action. and AG) to manage high-
« Review 1C priorities level 1C resource
annually. planning.
Do not split White
House's oversight
structure between
national security and
homeland security
organizations.
PFIAB and its
Intelligence Oversight
Board should oversee
both foreign and domestic
intelligence activities and
should conduct periodic
reviews of domestic
intelligence.
» A Policy and Program
Steering Committee
composed of NCTC
Director, DCI, AG, and
SecDHS should oversee
NCTC.
President should use NSC
to set national 1C
priorities.
President should issue a f Reconstitute the NSC
new Executive Order "Committee on Foreign
governing the IC's Intelligence" (National
structure to replace E.O. Security Adviser, DCI,
12,333. SecState, SecDef,
DCI should still report Chairman of the Joint
directly to President Chiefs of Staff, AG - or
NSC should conduct their deputies), which
oversight of 1C and existed under Pres. Ford,
provide overall guidance to provide high-level
on IC's mission, set guidance and oversight.
collection and analysis
priorities, and
periodically assess IC's
performance.
Reconstitute NSC
"Committee on Foreign
Intelligence" (National
Security Adviser, DCI,
Deputy SecState, Deputy
SecDef), which existed
under Pres. Ford, to meet
semiannual!)' and report
annually to President.
Subordinate "Consumers
Committee" should meet
frequently to set
collection/analysis
priorities and assess IC's
performance.
Enhance the PFIAB's
role, e.g., to generate
creative solutions to
problems and explore
long-term issues. The
Intelligence Oversight
Board (which reviews
agency IGs) should be
more independent from
PFIAB and review IGs.

Whether President uses NSC to oversee 1C, and how NSC is structured for 1C oversight, depends upon each President; E.O. 12,333 is over 2 decades old and may constrain the 1C to Cold War-era authorities, structures, and policies.
Congressional mandating of particular NSC structure will not bind President Query whether the PFIAB is appropriate for sustained and in-depth oversight of 1C or whether new, full-time entity is needed.
Split in White House between homeland security and national security may artificially divide CT oversight
 CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
« » Executive Branch should
report 1C priorities to
Congress annually.
» 9/1 1 Commission should
recommend
improvements to
Congressional oversight.
including (1) changes in
budgetary process, (2)
rules governing
membership on oversight
committees, (3) whether
oversight committees
should merge, (4) extent
to which classification
impairs oversight, and (5)
how oversight can help
1C adapt to changes in
intelligence priorities and
policymakers' needs.
» Congress should require
that 1C officials subject to
Senate confirmation
pledge to implement
strong accountability
mechanisms.
» Congress should
vigorously oversee
Executive Branch's
efforts to determine
whether foreign
governments are
sponsoring terrorism
against U.S. j_
• Note Joint Inquiry request to 9/1 1 Commission.
• Effective oversight of 1C CT activities requires immediate clarification of intelligence, Armed Services, and Judiciary
committees' jurisdictions.
» Intelligence committees * Intelligence committees, • * Do not merge the two « Do not merge the two
• intelligence committees.
should conduct oversight not Judiciary committees, intelligence committees.
of IC's use of grand jury should conduct oversight End term limits for * Intelligence has no
and other protected law ofNCTC. members of intelligence natural constituency, thus
enforcement information, committees; if term limits Congress should build
even though DOJ opposes are maintained, extend public support.
such oversight by these terms from eight to ten « Congressional budget
committees. years. Congressional process hurts the 1C
» Congress should clearly leadership rather than because 1C budget must
state support for current party structure should still absorb part of any cuts to
counterterrorism policy, appoint members. DOD budget.
as past high-profile Committees' leadership « HPSCI should change
Congressional should still rotate. from a select committee
investigations of 1C » Congress should handle to a permanent committee
activities contributed to oversight carefully to in order to demonstrate
IC's risk-aversion. avoid dampening the risk- that intelligence is a
» Congress should consider taking, innovative normal governmental
how to conduct oversight thinking, and professional function, to decrease
of DOD covert action. judgment necessary for turnover, and to increase
effective intelligence expertise; House
activities. Congress leadership should still
should publicize a more select members and
balanced picture of IC's remove members who
performance. violate secrecy oath. In
any event, HPSCI
members' term limits
should be extended.
»
1
_^__- l ^ _ - J
• Query how Congress should conduct oversight without hindering the IC's effectiveness.