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People v. Montanez GR 148527, March 17, 2004 Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts: Edmundo Ollanes testified that in the evening of July 20, 1993, he was fishing along the seashore at Pangabuan, Toledo City with Joven Hintogaya and his younger brother, Perlito Ollanes. They stopped fishing by 11:00 a.m., sold their catch, and went home. Edmundo took a shortcut, while Joven and Perlito walked home together. He and Perlito had a flashlight with them, while Joven carried a kerosene lamp. Perlitos house was only about forty meters from his, and Joven lived only about eighteen meters away. As Edmundo was climbing the stairs to his house, he heard gunshot coming from the direction of the house of Perlito. He rushed to the scene and passed by Jovens house. He then saw his brother lying prostrate nearby. As he was facing towards the ground, the left side of his face tilted towards his left shoulder, he saw the appellant, who was armed with a long firearm. Edmundo carried his brother in his arms and noticed the gunshot wounds on the latters chest. He was still alive, but barely breathing. Perlito told him that he was on the verge of death. When Edmundo asked Perlito who shot him, the latter declared that it was the appellant. Perlito mentioned the appellants name three times. Edmundo carried Perlito to the hospital, but the latter died on the way. Issue: Whether or not the statement of Perlito is a dying declarartion? Held: Yes, Perlitos statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying declaration. The statement is highly reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if the declarant did not make a statement that he was at the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition. People v. Bernal GR 113685, June 19, 1997 Romero, J. Facts: It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat." 3 When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the abduction. Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel

room. He advised Naty "not to do it again because she (was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge. Issue: Whether or not the statement made by Openda, Jr. (victim) is a declaration against interest? Held: Yes, Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence of facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons. Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13 because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. Tison v. Court of Appeals GR 121027, July 31, 1997 Regalado, J. Facts: The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation. The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement 2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name. Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented

as the lone witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment 5 was filed by herein private respondent. Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Issue: Whether or not the statement of Tison (petitioner) is considered as a declaration about pedigree as an exception to the hearsay rule? Held: Yes, The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration. American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus: One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order

to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of necessity. The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. People v. Mendoza GR 115809, January 23, 1998 Mendoza, J. Facts: Danilo Manalus, a taxi driver, was stabbed to death neat the Pangilinan Compound along Congressional Avenue, Barangay Bahay Toro, Quezon City at about 10:30 p.m. on February 15, 1992. The alleged assailant, now accused-appellant, was apprehended at the scene of the crime by a tricycle driver, Bonifacio Wycoco, subsequently turned over to the police and charged, together with a certain John Doe, with robbery with homicide. The prosecution presented seven witnesses, among whom were Wycoco, the tricycle driver, and Louie Jose, another tricycle driver. Wycoco testified that, on the date and time in question, while driving his tricycle along Congressional Avenue in Quezon City, he came upon three men who were shouting "hold-up." He saw accusedappellant (whom he subsequently identified in court) on top of the victim holding a sharp knife thrust into the taxi driver's body ("nakasaksak sa katawan ng taxi driver"). From where he was, he saw through the open right front door on the passenger's side of the taxi the driver fending off the attacks of accused-appellant who was using a fan knife or "balisong." He saw that they were at each other on the driver's seat ("Magkapatong sila sa isang upuan sa tabi ng driver"). Wycoco grabbed accused-appellant by the collar and tried to pull him away. As accused-appellant resisted, Wycoco hit him on the left leg with a lead pipe, causing him to fall on his knees and preventing him from fleeing from the scene. Witness Louie Jose came upon the two. He testified that he tied both hands of the accused-appellant. Jose asked accused-appellant, "Why did you say it is a hold-up," to which the latter responded "I am getting

despondent because I do not have money to buy milk for my child ("Naaaburido ako dahil sa wala akong pambili ng gatas para sa anak ko)." According to him, a policeman, Danilo Ramos, then arrived and Wycoco turned accused-appellant over to him. Issue: Whether the extrajudicial statement of accused-appellant Mendoza is admissible as evidence? Held: Yes, Admittedly, all that the prosecution witnesses can testify of their own personal knowledge were the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged stabbing of Danilo Manalus, which was however, admitted by accused-appellant as being done by him in selfdefense. It may be that Wycoco's knowledge is limited to the stabbing of the victim. However, when taken in relation to the other evidence of the prosecution, Wycoco's testimony shows that the violence resulting in homicide was committed in the course of a robbery. The key piece of evidence clearly showing robbery in this instance comes from the accused-appellant himself. He was asked by Louie Jose, "Why did you say it is a hold-up?" In response accused-appellant spontaneously answered, "I am getting despondent because I do not have money to buy milk for my child." ("Naaaburido ako dahil sa wala akong pambili ng gatas para sa anak ko"). 25 The test of admissibility for evidence as a part of the res gestae is stated with congency by justice Ricardo J. Francisco thus: . . . whether the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event which it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 26 Tested by this standard, the extra-judicial admission of accusedappellant was clearly part of the res gestae and therefore correctly admitted by the trial court as evidence against the accused-appellant. People v. Villarama GR 139211, February 12, 2003 Corono, J., Facts: On November 2, 1996, the spouses Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak went to the cemetery to light candles for the dead, leaving behind their three young children, Arthel (8 years old), Bernadeth (6 years old) and Elizabeth (4 years old), playing inside their house without adult supervision. That perhaps was the biggest mistake of their lives and one the couple will always regret. On that fateful day, their youngest child fell prey to the rapacious desires of a beast in the person of the childs own uncle, appellant Gorgonio Villarama. Approximately between five to six oclock in the afternoon, appellant, 35-year-old Gorgonio Villarama, elder brother of the victims mother Merlita, arrived at the Tumulaks house and found the three children by themselves. Thereupon, appellant ordered the two older children, Arthel and Bernadeth, to pasture the goats, leaving the youngest, Elizabeth, with him. Once alone, appellant undressed Elizabeth and made her lie down while he pulled down his pants and briefs to his knees, and thereafter mounted his niece Elizabeth. This was the scene which greeted the prosecutions eyewitness, Ricardo Tumulak, younger brother of Elizabeths father Rosendo, when he arrived at his brothers house to return the bolo he borrowed from the latter. Ricardo peeped through the open window to check

why his niece was crying and saw appellant, with briefs and pants slipped down to the knees, on top of Elizabeth who was naked. When appellant noticed Ricardos presence, he hurriedly stood up and scurried away through the backdoor. Ricardo immediately entered the house and dressed up the crying child. Ricardo then called his mother, the victims paternal grandmother, who was in the house nearby. The grandmother asked Elizabeth what happened but the child did not answer and just continued crying. Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak got home at about six oclock in the evening. They were met by Rosendos parents who told them what happened. Merlita immediately went to her daughter who had not stopped crying and asked Elizabeth what happened and why was she crying. It was then that Elizabeth spoke and told her mother that her uncle Baby, herein appellant, removed her panties, made her lie down and then inserted his penis inside her vagina. Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of the victims parents were hearsay since they did not witness the actual rape and were only relating rape as allegedly told to them by Elizabeth (victim)? Held: No, There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Pertinent to the case at bar is Section 42 which provides: SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such occurrence. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence when she pointed to appellant as her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement was spontaneous because the time gap from the sexual assault to the time the victim recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was very short. Obviously, there was neither capability nor opportunity for the 4-year-old victim to fabricate her statement. The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her age, the victim could not have had the sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her mother that her uncle made her lie down, took off her panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina. The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old child. Such a brutal experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth was still crying when her parents arrived reinforces the conclusion that she was still in a traumatic state when she made the statements pointing to appellant. [G.R. No. 136303. July 18, 2000] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES, ANTHONY BALTAZAR PALMONES, accused-appellants. Facts: The information charged accused-appellants of the crime of murder. Both accused were arraigned on and both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. During trial the prosecution first presented Sonny Boy Redovan, a 28 year-old farmer who was the nephew of the victim. He testified that at around 10:00 in the evening of April 27, 1997, his mother and elder brother informed him that something had happened to his uncle SP02 Asim Mamansal. They

then rushed to the Kidapawan Doctors Hospital and proceeded to the emergency room. Upon seeing his uncle, the witness went near him and asked him what had happened to him. His uncle answered that he had been waylaid. The witness then asked the victim who the perpetrators were and the victim answered that it was Juany and Tony Palmones which were the nicknames of the two accusedappellants. He claimed that while he was talking with his uncle, there were attendants, nurses, and other bystanders whom he did not know present inside the emergency room. A few minutes after he talked with the victim, a certain Dr. Aguayo arrived and examined the wounds of his uncle. About and hour later, he saw Police Inspector Alexander Tagum arrive and he heard him ask his uncle who had shot him. The witness then heard his uncle positively answer the policeman that his assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones. When Police Inspector Alexander Camilon-Tagum testified, he declared that he was at the Kidapawan, Cotabato Police Outpost. After receiving a radio report, he proceeded to Brgy. Magsaysay, Kidapawan where he discovered that one of his men, SP02 Mamansal, was shot. After conducting an initial investigation of the crime scene, he sent his men towards different directions to look for suspects. He then proceeded to the hospital together with another witness, Alice Villamor. At the hospital, he confronted the victim in the emergency room and asked him about his assailants. The victim answered that it was Juany and Tony Palmones. At that time, he claimed that Dr. Aguayo and two other medical ladies were inside the room. These two testimonies became the basis of the decision that convicted the accused-appellants. Issue: Whether or not the victims dying declaration suffices to be an exception to the hearsay rule. Ruling: No. As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay, and is inadmissible as evidence. There are several exceptions however to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the first one of which is the admissibility of dying declarations given under the circumstances specified in the Rules. As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, murder or parricide win which the decedent was the victim. In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be proven that that the declaration was made under a consciousness of impending death which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand, or there must be a settled hopeless expectation. In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was ever presented by the prosecution. It was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim whether he believed that he was going to die out of his injuries or any other similar question. Sonny Boy Redovan claimed that he was able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing he revealed of their conversation was the alleged identification of the victim of his two assailants. For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted that the only question he asked of the victim was if the victim knew who had shot him. While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant explicitly state his perception that he has given up the hope of life the circumstances surrounding his declaration must justify the conclusion

that he was conscious of his impending death. In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of his condition. As testified to by Dr. Mark Aguayo, the vital signs of the victim, prior to his operation, were quite stable. Moreover, from the time the victim was brought to the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at 12:00 midnight, he was still able to talk intelligently with at least four (4) other persons on various matters. The fact that his vital signs were strong and that he still had strength to converse with these four (4) witnesses belie the conclusion that the victim was under the consciousness of death by reason of the gravity of his wounds. Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae. Finally, after a thorough reading of the testimonies presented by both sides, it is even doubtful that the victim ever uttered these alleged ante mortem statements in the first place. We note that the testimonies of Sonny Boy Redovan and Investigator Alexander Tagum are contradicted not only by the witnesses for the defense but also by the prosecutions own witnesses. Dr. Mark Aguayo, the doctor who performed the operation on the victim and who is an impartial and disinterested witness, categorically stated that the victim told him that he did not recognize those who had shot him. He likewise testified that witness Sonny Boy Redovan told him in the emergency room that the victim was not able to recognize his assailants because of darkness. Similarly, the wife and the daughter of Asim Mamansal, who were also able to talk with the victim prior to his death, likewise denied that the victim ever told them the identity of his assailants. We fail to see why the victim should choose to tell some people the identity of his assailants and deny his knowledge of the same to others. With respect to the witnesses for the defense, Alex Siago and Patricio Fuertes, who were both present at the site of the shooting immediately after the incident, testified that they did not hear the victim identify his assailants. Patricio Fuertes even stated that at the hospital, he heard Mamansal tell the police officers present that he did not recognize

those who had shot him. Most importantly, Alice Villamor, who was the lover of the victim and who was with him during the shooting, categorically stated that it was not possible to recognize the assailants as the area where the shooting happened was dark. Moreover, she was able to talk with Mamansal at the hospital where he told her that he did not see the persons who had shot him. This testimony of Villamor is quite significant and we fail to see why the trial court failed to consider the same in its decision. Alice Villamor, as the lover of the victim, had no motive to lie for the defense and had all the reason to speak the truth in order to seek justice for the death of her lover. The accused-appellants should be acquitted. G.R. No. 147649 December 17, 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, MARLITO LOBRIGAS (At Large) and TEODORICO MANTE (acquitted), accused. FRANK LOBRIGAS, accused-appellant. Facts: Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante were charged with murdering Felix Taylaran by beating him. Upon arraignment the accused-appellant Frank Lobrigas pleaded not guilty. The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: The victim Felix Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden. On February 19, 1996, he asked for permission not to work for it was raining and he had to go to the store of Teodorico Mante. At 4:00 p.m., Felix returned to Castor Gudens house with bruises on his face and injuries all over his body. He told Castor that he was mauled by accused-appellant Frank Lobrigas, accused Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante at the store. Felix spent the night in Castors house and left the following morning to go to the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his cousin, to heal his wounds in the saltwater. However, the next day, Felix Taylaran died. Rosa Taylaran Solarte, daughter of the victim, testified that a day after the mauling, her father came to her house and told her that he was beaten up by Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante. He told her that he was in pain and felt weak. He then went to the house of Lorie Aguilar apparently to recuperate. Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of Castor Guden and Rosa Solarte are admissible hearsay. Ruling: Gudens statements should be admitted while Solartes should not be considered as admissible hearsay but as independently relevant statements only. Although the declarations made to Guden cannot be deemed a dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same are nonetheless part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the mauling of the victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations were made shortly after the mauling incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating accusedappellant. The declaration concerns the circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer present. Nevertheless, The SC held that Rosa Solartes testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct

from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. There was no clear indication in this case that the accused-appellant and his companions purposely used their joint efforts to consummate the crime. Consequently, the crime committed by accused-appellant was only homicide. G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents. Facts: Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went to the check-in counter of the defendant's Naga branch at least one (1) hour before the published departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach of contract of carriage. Defendant disclaim any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of plaintiff on the said flight was due to their having checked-in late for their flight. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and so did the CA on appeal. Issue: Whether or not the evidence points towards the plaintiffs being late. Ruling: The plaintiffs were late. As a rule, the determination of a question of fact depends largely on the credibility of witnesses unless some documentary evidence is available which clearly substantiates the issue and whose genuineness and probative value is not disputed (Legarda v. Miaile, 88 Phil. 637, 642). The exception to the rule now runs true in this case. It is an admitted fact that the private respondents knew of the required check-in time for passengers. The time requirement is prominently printed as one of the conditions of carriage on their tickets, i.e., that the airport passenger should check-in at least one hour before published departure time of his flight and PAL shall consider his accommodation forfeited in favor of waistlisted passengers if he fails to check-in at least 30 minutes. It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who checked-in late after the private respondents (TSN, November 23, 1987, p. 13). In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and the private respondents) are entries made in the

regular course of business which the private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection (20 Am Jur S 1179, 1029 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p. 654). Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform language (Spouses Vicente and Salome de Leon v. CA., et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992). This dictum is amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the private respondents in their complaint (where they claimed that no one was at the counter until thirty (30) minutes before the published departure time and that the employee who finally attended to them marked them late, Records, p. 2) and in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two different PAL personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter. Private respondents' only objection to these documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae (32 C.J.S., S. 411, 30-31). Based on these circumstances, We are inclined to believe the version of PAL. G.R. No. 140023 August 14, 2003 RUDY LAO, Petitioner, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., Respondent. Facts: The original action was lodged before the trial court as Civil Case No. 17045 for breach of contract and damages, as a result of the insurance companys refusal of petitioners claim on the insurance policy of Rudy Laos truck which figured in an accident during the effectivity of the policy. Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck. The truck was insured with respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. for the maximum amount of P200,000 and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover any damages that might be caused to his goods. While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, also owned by petitioner Lao. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around P110,692, while the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were placed at P35,000 more or less. Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper drivers license at the time of the accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anits drivers license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the "authorized driver" clause of the insurance policy. In addition, respondent cited the following excerpts from the police blotter of the Iloilo INP, to wit: C-UN-85 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY W/ PHY INJURIES R/ IMPRUDENCE 11:30 PM Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a collision took place at Brgy. Buhang, Jaro, IC. Investigation conducted by Pat. Villahermosa, assisted by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed that at about 8:00 PM this date at the aforementioned place, a collision took place

between a truck (Hino) with Plate Nr FB[S] 917 owned by Rudy Lao and driven by BOY GIDDIE Y COYEL, 38 yrs, a res. of Balasan, Iloilo, with License Nr DLR 1108142 and another truck with Plate Nr. FCG538 owned by Rudy Lao and driver (sic) by LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, 33 yrs, a res. of Brgy Laya, Balasan, Iloilo with License Nr 1836482. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a drivers license authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D. Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three days after the accident. The trial court dismissed Laos case for lack of cause of action. Issue: Whether or not the police blotter, being the basis of the decision of the lower courts, is admissible evidence. Ruling: Yes. Petitioner contends that the police blotter was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating policeman himself, attesting that it was Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who was driving the insured vehicle. Respondent avers that the same police report and testimony were of dubious nature. Both trial and appellate courts noted that the report was made three days after the accident and did not form part of the official police records. The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia, where we said that "entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value," since the Court there found that "the entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars". Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names. MERALCO v. Quisumbing (important part only) This Court has recognized the Secretary of Labors distinct expertise in the study and settlement of labor disputes falling under his power of compulsory arbitration.[17] It is also well-settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if supported by substantial evidence, are

entitled not only to great respect but even to finality. [18] We, therefore, have no difficulty in accepting the unions caveat on how to handle a Secretary of Labors arbitral award. But at the same time, we also recognize the possibility that abuse of discretion may attend the exercise of the Secretarys arbitral functions; his findings in an arbitration case are usually based on position papers and their supporting documents (as they are in the present case), and not on the thorough examination of the parties contending claims that may be present in a court trial and in the face-to-face adversarial process that better insures the proper presentation and appreciation of evidence.[19] There may also be grave abuse of discretion where the board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial function fails to consider evidence adduced by the parties.[20] Given the parties positions on the justiciability of the issues before us, the question we have to answer is one that goes into the substance of the Secretarys disputed orders: Did the Secretary properly consider and appreciate the evidence presented before him? We find, based on our consideration of the parties positions and the evidence on record, that the Secretary of Labor disregarded and misappreciated evidence, particularly with respect to the wage award. The Secretary of Labor apparently also acted arbitrarily and even whimsically in considering a number of legal points; even the Solicitor General himself considered that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion on at least three major points: (a) on the signing bonus issue; (b) on the inclusion of confidential employees in the rank and file bargaining unit, and (c) in mandating a union security closedshop regime in the bargaining unit.

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