MEMORY

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an actual existent, the object is outside being . It is this claim that provides the basis for M einongs theory of objects. Mental acts can be directed both to a logical contradiction (the round square) and empirical non-existents (green virtue or the golden mountain). It is precisely this sort of consideration that led B rentano to view the intentional object as an immanent objectivity regardless of its transcendent existence or non-existence. Furthermore, mental acts can be directed to individual realities that do not exist in the present, but have existed or will exist. But M einong rejects any response distinguishing between the immanent merely presented object and the transcendent actuality (or non-actuality). It is clear to M einong that the objects to which our experiences are directed cannot be immanent, for there is no acceptable sense in which we can say that the golden mountain exists immanently in us. W hat does exist in the act is the content golden mountain, but that is a far cry from saying that the golden mountain itself exists-in our acts. W hen we speak o f the go lden m o untain, we are no t referring to the content of our experience. Moreover, as seen in the case of intending past and future objects, the content and the actual object have different properties. Intending in a memorial presentation the no-longer existent maple tree in the front yard of the house occurs in the present. Since the presentation is in the present, so too must its content be in the present. But the intended object is past. The content in which an object appears is real, present, and psychic , but the object appearing in it might be non-real, not presently existent, and n o n -p s ych ic. Such diffe re nc e s in pro p e rtie s a re w ha t re quire s the distinction between the content and object of the act. Finally, mental acts can be directed also to ideal relations (such as the equality of 3 and 2 + 1 or the difference between red and green). Statements of these ideal relations express truths, but the relations do not exist in the way individual physical objects, e.g., the desk and the door, exist. Ideal relations subsist, whereas the round square, green virtue, and the golden mountain neither exist nor subsist. According to M einong, an ontology must account for the being of such non-existent, non-actual, ideal objectives. M EM ORY (Errinerung) . Memory is the present encounter of a past object precisely as past. Husserl rejects the view that the memorial presentation of a past object is mediated by an image or sensuous content that is itself present. Husserl maintains that such a view is contradictory for a present image or content cannot present anything as past. The memorial presentation, according to Husserl, directly apprehends the past as such.