Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

On October 4, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, the decision of the lower court was affirmed on December 12, 1985. Petitioners raised the following errors: I. The lower court erred in adjudicating the lands subject of registration to applicant-appellee despite his failure to present the original tracing cloth plan the submission of which is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. II. The lower court erred in not denying registration in favor of J. Antonio Araneta since the amendment of the application was simply an attempt to avoid the application of the constitutional provision disqualifying a private corporation the Pacific Farms, Inc. in this case from acquiring lands of public domain. III. The lower court erred in not declaring the land known as the "Tambac Island" not subject of registration it being an island formed on the seas. IV. The lower court erred in adjudicating the land to the applicant under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, despite absence of any specific invocation of this law in the original and amended application. V. The lower court erred in not granting the government's motion for reconsideration at least to enable it to present proof of the status of the land as within the unclassified public forest, and hence beyond the court's jurisdiction to adjudicate as private property. VI. The lower court erred in not declaring that the applicant has failed to overthrow the presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. From the foregoing it appears that the more important issues are: 1) whether the presentation of the tracing cloth plan is necessary; and 2) whether the land known as "Tambac Island" can be subject to registration. By mere consideration of the first assignment of error, We can right away glean the merit of the petition. Respondent claims that the tracing cloth plan is with the files of the Land Registration Commission, and the only evidence that can be presented to that fact is the request for the issuance of a certified copy thereof and the certified copy issued pursuant to the request. 5 Respondent further argues that failure of the petitioners to object to the presentation of the certified copy of the tracing cloth plan was the basis of the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In a very recent decision of this Court, entitled The Director of Lands v. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and Lino Anit, 6 We have ruled that the submission of the tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement for registration. Reiterating Our ruling in Director of Lands v. Reyes, 7 We asserted that failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is fatal it being a statutory requirement of mandatory character. It is of no import that petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the certified copy of the said plan. What is required is the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for and objection to such requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly. 8 This case is no different from the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra wherein We said that if the original tracing cloth plan was indeed with the Land Registration Commission, there is no reason why the applicant cannot easily retrieve the same and submit it in evidence, it being an essential requirement for registration.

G.R. No. 73246 March 2, 1993 DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND J. ANTONIO ARANETA, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioners. Jimenez, Leynes & Associates for private respondent.

NOCON, J.: For review before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals in the land registration case entitled J. Antonio Araneta v. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development, AC-G.R. CV. No. 00636, 1 affirming the lower court's approval of the application for registration of a parcel of land in favor of applicant therein, J. Antonio Araneta. Evidence show that the land involved is actually an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf. Situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan, the area consists of 187,288 square meters, more or less. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, Act No. 496, as amended. The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of application. The opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the (1973) new Philippine Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11, Article 14. 2 The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the land is within the unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable. Other private parties also filed their oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn. In an amended application, Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment, there was no republication. Evidence presented by the applicant include the testimony of Placido Orlando, fishery guard of Pacific Farms, Inc., who said he has known the disputed land since he attained the age of reason for some forty (40) years now; that when he first came to know the property it was then owned by and in the possession of Paulino Castelo, Juan Ambrosio and Julio Castelo, and later on the whole island was bought by Atty. Vicente Castelo who in turn sold it to J. Antonio Araneta. Deposition by oral examination of Araneta was also presented, together with documents of sale, tax declarations and receipts, and survey of property. Applicant, however, failed to present the tracing cloth plan and instead submitted to the court certified copies thereof. While this case is pending here in Court, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of private respondent. 3 Apparently, Antonio Araneta had assigned his rights to and interest in Tambac Island to Amancio R. Garcia 4 who in turn assigned his rights and interest in the same property to Johnny A. Khonghun whose nationality was not alleged in the pleadings.

As to the second assignment of error, We are inclined to agree with petitioners that the amendment of the application from the name of Pacific Farms Inc., as applicant, to the name of J. Antonio Araneta Inc., was a mere attempt to evade disqualification. Our Constitution, whether 9 the 1973 or 10 1987, prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. Apparently realizing such prohibition, respondent amended its application to conform with the mandates of the law. However, We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the absence of republication of an amended application for registration is a jurisdictional flaw. We should distinguish. Amendments to the application may be due to change in parties or substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for. In the former case, neither the Land Registration Act, as amended, nor Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, requires republication and registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceeding upon just and reasonable terms. 11 On the other hand, republication is required if the amendment is due to substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for. As to the fourth assignment of error. We do not see any relevant dispute in the lower court's application of Presidential Decree No. 1529, instead of Act No. 496, in adjudicating the land to the then applicant, assuming that the land involved is registrable. Both laws are existing and can stand together. P.D. 1529 was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property, in order to facilitate effective implementation of said laws. 12 The third, fifth and sixth assignment of errors are likewise meritorious and shall be discussed forthwith together. Respondent asserts that contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the reports of the District Land Officer of Dagupan City, Land Inspector Perfecto Daroy and Supervising Land Examiner Teodoro P. Nieva show that the subject property is an unclassified public land, not forest land. This claim is rather misleading. The report of Supervising Land Examiner Nieva specifically states that the "land is within the unclassified forest land" under the administrative jurisdiction of the then Bureau of Forest Development. 13 This was based on the reports of Land Inspector Daroy and District Land Officer Feliciano Liggayu. Lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or Alienable Lands. 14 Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. 15 In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Courts have no authority to do so. 16 This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 17 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 18 Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the

property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present evidence and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. 19 In this particular case, respondent presented proof that as early as 1921, the subject property has been declared for tax purposes with receipts attached, in the names of respondent's predecessors-in-interest. Nevertheless, in that span of time there had been no attempt to register the same either under Act 496 or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. It is also rather intriguing that Vicente Castelo who acquired almost 90% of the property from Alejo Ambrosia, et al. on June 18, 1958 and from Julio Castelo on June 19, 1958 immediately sold the same to applicant J. Antonio Araneta on 3 July 1958. According to the report of Land Investigator Daroy, the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Vicente Castelo only in 1958 and the purported old tax declarations are not on file with the Provincial Assessor's Office. In any case tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by evidence. 20 The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants or of their predecessors-in-interest way back in 1921 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 21 Respondent's contention that the BFD, LC Map No. 681, certified on August 8, 1927 which was the basis of the report and recommendation of the Land Examiner, is too antiquated; that it cannot be conclusively relied upon and was not even presented in evidence, is not well taken. As We have said in the case of Director of Lands v. CA: 22 And the fact that BF Map LC No. 673 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, if omission there was, in fact. Respondent even admitted that Tambac Island is still an unclassified public land as of 1927 and remains to be unclassified. Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession the applicant may have had and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 23 The conversion of subject property does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. In effect what the courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. We reiterate that the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 24 In fairness to respondent, the petitioners should seriously consider the matter of the reclassification of the land in question. The attempt of people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their name should not only be viewed with understanding attitude, but as a matter of policy encouraged. 25 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decisions of the courts a quo are REVERSED. SO ORDERED.

COLLADO v. CA FACTS: Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of land (120 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court. She attached a technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert Pangyarihan1, stating this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. About a year later, Collado amended the application to include additional co-applicants and more applicants joined (petitioners). The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through the Municipal Attorney and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. ISSUES: 1. WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: CA annulled the decision of the Trial Court. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State. An applicant for registration of a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated from the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. The technical description which the petitioners attached to their application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed. This has been confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Petition is DENIED. 1. PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE LOT.

Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of one of their predecessors-in-interest2 as early as 1902. There have been 9 transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest. Also, they have declared the Lot for taxation and paid all the real estate taxes. The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land application. It is also not within any government reservation. Private rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33 (establishing the Marikina Watershed Reservation). Since EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, the Lot is excluded from such reservation. Assuming no private rights attached prior to the issuance of EO 33, the President had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable through Proclamation No. 1283. They say that the proclamation expressly excluded an area of 3780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the BosoBoso Townsite Reservation. They contend that the Lot in question is part of the excluded town site are and that under CA 141, town sites are considered alienable and disposable. 2. WON the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given due course.

Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA 141 3 (Public Land Act) or under the amendment by RA 19424 and PD 10735 (the law prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva had been in possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State. Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance of EO 33, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus, ever since, the land has become non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 could no longer be counted because the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable and disposable public agricultural land and not to forest lands, including watershed reservations. Possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation No. 1637, revising the area and location of proposed townsite. The new proclamation excluded the Lot in question and reverted it to MWR coverage. The certification presented by the petitioners that says that the Lot is covered by the reclassification is contradicted by the several documents submitted by the Solicitor General. In a Report, the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration confirmed that the Lot forms part of MWR and re commended the dismissal of the application for registration. Also, in a Letter, the Deputy Land Inspector of the DENR, confirmed that it is within the MWR. Lastly, Collados application attached a technical description stating that the Lot is inside the Mariquina Watershed. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, there is the presumption that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown. 2. ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT INVOLVING THE LOT ARE NULL AND VOID.

Petitioners: The petition for annulment of judgment was filed long after the decision of the land registration court had become final and executor and is no longer available because of res judicata. The land registration court had jurisdiction over the case, which involves private land. The Republic is stopped from questioning the courts jurisdiction because the Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.

Solicitor General: The decision of the land registration court was null and void because the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case. The land in question was not alienable and disposable. 3. WON the petition-in-intervention is proper. (more on procedural)

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT: Petitioners presented sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot.

The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public land. The Land Registration court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties. Possession and occupation of lands of public domain since July 26, 1894. A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. 5 Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.
3 4

1 2

Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands Sesinando Leyva

The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental ights. Estoppel or laches does not validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. Res judicata must be disregarded if its application would sacrifice justice to technicality. Also, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.

reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. 19 PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978,20 amended and updated Act 496. The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain.21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,22 explained thus: "One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine." Thus, Section 1, Article XIII23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources" barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV24 on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation". The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII 25 on "National Economy and Patrimony". Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.

The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.11 The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 12 which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."13 Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.14 The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.15 Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows: "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."16 Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141" for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 17 In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. 18 The Torrens system requires the government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or

LA BUGAL TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V WESTERN MINING CORPORATION PHILIPPINES CARPIO-MORALES; January 27, 2004

- Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. - Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary without or in excess of jurisdiction:

FACTS - Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners - SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition. - Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 7942, otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws. - July 25, 1987 President Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States currency (US $50,000,000.00). - March 3, 1995 President Ramos approved 7942 to govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. RA 7942 defines modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for filing and approval, assignment/transfer, and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. These also apply to FTAAs. - The law also prescribes the contractors qualifications, grants certain rights such as timber, water, easement rights and right to possess explosives. Surface owners or occupants are forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from entering private lands and concession areas. A procedure for settlement of conflicts is also provided for. - The Act restricts conditions for exploration, quarry and other permits. It regulates the transport, sale and processing of minerals, and promotes the development of mining communities, science and mining technology, and safety and environmental protection. - The governments share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated, taxes and fees are imposed, incentives granted. Aside from penalizing certain acts, the law likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and permits. - April 9, 1995 RA 7942 took effect. - March 30, 1995 Shortly before RA 7942 took effect, the President entered into and FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. - August 15, 1995 DENR Secretary Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942. This was later repealed by DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. - January 10, 1997 Counsels for petitioners sent letter to DENR Secretary demanding that they stop the implementation of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, giving them 15 days from receipt to act thereon. DENR has yet to respond or act on petitioners letter.

1) 2)

In signing and promulgating DAO 96-40 implementing RA 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that: It allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 4, 1987 Constitution It allows the taking of private property without the determination of public use and for just compensation It violates Art. III, sec. 1 It allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well as fully foreign owned corporations of the nations marine wealth contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 2 It allows priority to foreign and fully foreign owned corporations in the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources contrary to Art. XII In recommending approval of and implementing the FTAA between the President and WMCP because the same is illegal and constitutional

- They pray that the Court issue an order permanently enjoining the respondents from acting on any application for an FTAA; declaring RA 7942, DAO 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and, canceling the FTAA issued to WMCP as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void. - Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners contentions, argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry have not been met, the petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition and mandamus, and there has been a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. - WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001 WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, 60% of the equity of which is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipinoowned corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company. - Because of this, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001, approved the transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto). Because there is no final judgment yet, the case cannot be considered moot.

ISSUES 1. WON case is justiciable 2. WON EO 279 took effect 3. WON the WMCP FTAA is constitutional 4. WON RA 7942 is constitutional

HELD 1. Case is justiciable. Ratio In cases involving constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have legal standing.

- Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal BLaan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous peoples cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP. Even if they are not the actual parties in the contract, they claim that they will suffer irremediable displacement as a result of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities in their area of residence. - And although RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 were not in force when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to their validity is ripe for adjudication. RA 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing arrangements. The WMCP FTAA also provides that any term and condition favorable to FTAA contractors resulting from a law or regulation shall be considered part of the agreement. - The petition for prohibition and mandamus is also the appropriate remedy. Public respondents, in behalf of the Government, have obligations to fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such obligations on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void. - The contention that the filing of the petition violates the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in the first instance. Indeed, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 2. YES. Ratio When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. - Petitioners contend that EO 279 did not take effect because its supposed date of effectivity came after President Aquino had already lost her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. But it was explained that the convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the President it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted. 3. NO. Ratio The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the President and did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted. In accordance with Art. XII, sec. 2 of the constitution, FTAAs should be limited to technical or financial assistance only. However, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity. - WMCP nevertheless submits that the word technical encompasses a broad number of possible services, perhaps, scientific and/or technological in basis. It thus posits that it may well include the area of management and operations. The Court is not persuaded. Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Moreover, the management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate. - Respondents insist that agreements involving technical or financial assistance is just another term for service contracts. The proceedings of the CONCOM indicate that the members used the terms interchangeably. The Court is likewise not persuaded. While certain commissioners may have mentioned the term service contracts, they may have been using the term loosely and n ot in the context of the 1973 Constitution. Also, the phrase service contracts has been deleted in the 1987 Constitutions Article on National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to

retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adapted the old terminology instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms (agreements involving either technical or financial assistance). - The UP Law Draft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the same terminologies. And the UP Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial ownership of the countrys natural resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in theory, the State owns these natural resources and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries service contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural resources. But the proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical know-how in the large-scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources. Hence, they proposed a compromise technical or financial agreements. 4. NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Ratio Financial or technical agreements as contemplated in Art. XII, sec. 2 shall refer to financial agreements and/or technical agreements only and not to service contracts. - Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to fundamental law. Decision and void: 1) a) b) c) d) e) f) 2) 3) WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Court hereby declares unconstitutional

The following provision of RA 7942 The proviso in Section 3 (aq) Section 23, Section 33 to 41, Section 56, The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and Section 90. All provisions of DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision, and The FTAA between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.

THE SPANISH REGIME AND THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into these Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State's power of dominium, which is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property.79 In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign. The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.80

The Philippines having passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and conquest,81 earlier Spanish decrees declared that "all lands were held from the Crown."82 The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also to "all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth."83 Spain, in particular, recognized the unique value of natural resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an abundant source of revenue to finance its wars against other nations.84 Mining laws during the Spanish regime reflected this perspective.85

amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country's natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction. 96 In consideration for the right to exploit a natural resource, the concessionaire either pays rent or royalty, which is a fixed percentage of the gross proceeds.97 Later statutory enactments by the legislative bodies set up in the Philippines adopted the contractual framework of the concession.98 For instance, Act No. 2932,99 approved on August 31, 1920, which provided for the exploration, location, and lease of lands containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas in the Philippines, and Act No. 2719, 100 approved on May 14, 1917, which provided for the leasing and development of coal lands in the Philippines, both utilized the concession system.101

THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE CONCESSION REGIME By the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands" to the United States. The Philippines was hence governed by means of organic acts that were in the nature of charters serving as a Constitution of the occupied territory from 1900 to 1935.86 Among the principal organic acts of the Philippines was the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, more commonly known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, through which the United States Congress assumed the administration of the Philippine Islands. 87 Section 20 of said Bill reserved the disposition of mineral lands of the public domain from sale. Section 21 thereof allowed the free and open exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral deposits not only to citizens of the Philippine Islands but to those of the United States as well: Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are found, to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States or of said Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working of such mineral deposits is forbidden until the person, association, or corporation who or which has entered and is occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such additional sum or sums as will make the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said deposits are located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the same as mineral claims. Unlike Spain, the United States considered natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals and saw fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands.88 A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals within his property. 89 Thus, earlier jurisprudence90 held that: A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. x x x. x x x. The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and his location not only against third persons, but also against the Government. x x x. [Italics in the original.] The Regalian doctrine and the American system, therefore, differ in one essential respect. Under the Regalian theory, mineral rights are not included in a grant of land by the state; under the American doctrine, mineral rights are included in a grant of land by the government.91 Section 21 also made possible the concession (frequently styled "permit", license" or "lease") 92 system.93 This was the traditional regime imposed by the colonial administrators for the exploitation of natural resources in the extractive sector (petroleum, hard minerals, timber, etc.).94 Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. 95 Thus, the concession

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 186487 August 15, 2011

The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it are controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot 322.12 On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed13 the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.14 The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). COURT OF APPEALS RULING The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality. 15 The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court. Civil Case No. 751 In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC). Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly identified the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322, instead of Lot 258.16 On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss.17 After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaintin-intervention captioned the respondents causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and Damages.18 The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim over Lot 322 is a cloud on their title and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring his possession from Lot 258. 19 The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as owners of Lot 322. After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution on the respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling.20 In their prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to: 1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of action xxx for reformation of contracts be granted; 2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to exclude Lot 322 xxx. 3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.] THE PETITION The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarys jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same

ROSITO BAGUNU, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, Respondents. RESOLUTION BRION, J.: We resolve the motion for reconsideration1 filed by Rosito Bagunu (petitioner) to reverse our April 13, 2009 Resolution2 which denied his petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177 The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioners free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office). The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag. On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent 3 over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).4 On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner,5 who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application.6 The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands survey,7 and the free patent applications uniformly identified the subject land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the second and third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land. 8 On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petiti oners free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.9 The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates "the area in dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents]." 10 On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered: 1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx; 2. [The petitioners free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls 541-D, as included in Lot No. 258; 3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties] respective technical description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.11

issue is pending with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined claims of ownership over a real property matters beyond the DENRs competence to determine. The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within the competence of the courts. The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed by the CA , is contrary to the evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag), tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its ocular investigation. The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents claim of ownership over Lot 322, based on Atty. Binags testimony during the hearing on the respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as 1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty. Binags free patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership. Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents favor by claiming that the respondents presented no sufficient evidence to prove their (or their predecessor-ininterests) title. In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. THE RULING We deny the motion for reconsideration. Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45 The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged error of the DENR and the CA in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner bought an error that adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently took a cue from our April 13, 2009 Resolution, denying his petition, since his present motion limitedly argues against the DENRs jurisdiction and the CAs application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions.21 On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands22 on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,23 and even on this Court, when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine our discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.

The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain The petitioner insists that under the law24 actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot. In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties written agreement reflects their true intention.25 In the present case, this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and third sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership, but also the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.26 While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the present case, neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioners act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public land27 whose management and disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 292 28 reads: Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall: xxx (4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources; xxx (15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.) Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192, 29 the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141)30 by having direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents against the petitioners free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands, must likewis e determine the applicants entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional Office still has to determine the respondents entitlement to the issuance of a free patent 31 in their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable public lands;

courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands,32 unless grave abuse of discretion exists. After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction,33 such as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the contracts refer to the same property, identified as "Lot 322," - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction34 The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise. 35 The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public lands The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a better right over Lot 322) does not require the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within the competence of regular courts. We disagree. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact36 In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body , in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view."37 The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.38 (Emphases added.) The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, 39 the disposition and management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.40 While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by

occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations),41 the respondents complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot 322. 1avvphi1 Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on the respondents reivindicatory action pending final determination by the DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretarys exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,42 which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency. WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 150413 July 1, 2003

her predecessors-in-interests possession to hers, applicant appears to be in 4 continuous and public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and containing an area of nine thousand three hundred fortynine (9,349) square meters as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue. SO ORDERED.
5

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDRA LAO, respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 2 No. 56230, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-719. On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessors open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondents purchase of the property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for registration. Respondent likewise presented in evidence the 3 Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor, the survey plan and technical description of the property, and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as her predecessors-in-interest. On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit: x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in the concept of an owner possession of the subject parcel of land for more than thirty (30) years now; and that the same parcel was declared for taxation purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid; that the land involved in this case is not covered by any land patent. Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same property, as well as technical description and other documents presented, that the land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or public domain; and that tacking
1

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial 6 court. Hence, this petition for review raising the following errors: THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF 7 RESPONDENT. A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED 8 PERIOD AND ACTS OF POSSESSION. B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF 9 POSSESSION. C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND 10 DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain. Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states: Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides: The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which reduced the required period of possession to thirty years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law became effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains that the required period of possession remained the same. RA 6940 explicitly states that its provisions amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940 amends Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title set forth therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In 11 Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, we held that: Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,
12

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. According to petitioner, respondents witnesses did not state the exact period when respondents predecessors-in-interest started occupying the subject land. They only made sweeping statements to the effect that respondent had been in possession of the property for more than thirty years. Hence, it can not be conclusively determined whether respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have truly been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Furthermore, respondent failed to show how the property was transferred from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. No extrajudicial settlement of property was established. Consequently, respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa Medina and her predecessors-in-interest. There is merit in the petition. Candido Amoroso, respondents first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932 and that it was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence was presented to support his claim. Respondent submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-interest, including that of Edilberto. However, the earliest of these documents pertained to the year 1948 only, three years short of the required period. Respondents other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known about the property since he was ten years old, which was in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On cross-examination, however, he testified that he based his information on Edilbertos ownership of the land on the fact that the latter used to greet him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on admitted that he did not know with certainty whether 13 Edilberto was indeed the owner and possessor of the property. Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document evidencing the transfer of the land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not show the relationship between these parties. She only presented the deed of sale between her and the latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At most, respondents possession can only be reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria claimed possession of the property. Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the land commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141. Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under 14 the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public

thus:

This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally, "Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977." As amended Section 48 (b) now reads:

domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of 15 land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to 16 belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public 17 domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be 18 established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. In De Ocampo v. Arlos,
19

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for original registration of title over Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

it was held that:

x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical descriptions of the land, which contained no information regarding the classification of the property. These documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification stating that the land is open for disposition because no opposition to her application was ever made by the appropriate government agencies. She claims that in the absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the public domain are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to private ownership. As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation to show that the property involved is agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land being registered is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was agricultural and, 20 therefore, alienable part of the public domain. Thus, in Director of Lands v. 21 Funtilar, we held: It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials 22 or agents. It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes requires an 23 express and positive act from the government. It cannot be presumed; but must be 24 established by convincing proof.

HEIRS OF VENTURANZA VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: The title in question TCT No. 2574 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur was issued sometime in 1959 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza. The governments negotiation committee assigned a deputy clerk of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) to verify the true copies of TCT No. 2574 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza. Upon verification, it was discovered that the title covers only a parcel of land with an area of 451 square meters and not 23,944,635 square meters. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a complaint for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2574 and the Reversion of the Land Described Therein to the Republic of the Philippines. The trial court came out with its decision ordering the annulment and cancellation of the Venturanzas TCT. The trial court principally anchored its judgment on the ground that the reconstituted title issued in the name of Florencio Mora could have been fraudulently secured, hence, does not legally exist. On appeal, the Venturanzas argued that Moras reconstituted title from where their TCT No. 2574 was derived is already indefeasible on the ground that upon the lapse of one (1) year, the decision granting reconstitution of Moras title becomes final. The CA affirmed the trial courts ruling.

What makes petitioners cause doubly undeserving of merit is the finding of the two courts below that the land subject matter of this case is part timberland. A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found. Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

ISSUE: Whether or not the TCT of the Venturanzas is valid

HELD: We DENY. Petitioners are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer to original decrees of registration and not to orders of reconstitution. As it is, petitioners cannot even seek refuge in the Land Registration Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been brought within the operation of said law. As a necessary consequence, no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Moras T CT over the land which has never been originally registered. Petitioners also claim that they are protected by law considering that they were buyers in good faith. Again, this assertion is without basis considering that Moras reconstituted TCT, from where petitioners TCT was derived, is void. The only way by which Mora could have acquired ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that ownership to the petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own name.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 150824 February 4, 2008

Subsequently, Du spouses' TCT No. T-45587 was cancelled and was replaced by TCT No. T-57348 registered in the name of Lourdes Farms, Inc. subject of this case. 13 Lourdes Farms, Inc. mortgaged this property to petitioner LBP on April 14, 1980. 14 The validity of OCT No. P-2823, as well as its derivative TCTs, remained undisturbed until some residents of the land it covered, particularly those along Bolton Diversion Road, filed a formal petition before the Bureau of Lands on July 15, 1981. 15 Investigation and ocular inspection were conducted by the Bureau of Lands to check the legitimacy of OCT No. P-2823. They found out that: (1) at the time Sales Patent No. 4576 was issued to Bugayong, the land it covered was still within the forest zone, classified under Project No. 1, LC-47 dated August 6, 1923; it was released as alienable and disposable land only on March 25, 1981, pursuant to BFD Administrative Order No. 4-1585 and to the provisions of Section 13, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705; 16 (2) the land was marshy and covered by sea water during high tide; and (3) Bugayong was never in actual possession of the land.17 In view of the foregoing findings, the Bureau of Lands resolved that the sales patent in favor of Bugayong was improperly and illegally issued and that the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of the subject land. 18 Upon recommendation of the Bureau of Lands, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), instituted a complaint19 before the RTC in Davao, Branch 15, for the cancellation of title/patent and reversion of the land covered by OCT No. P-2823 into the mass of public domain. The complaint, as amended,20 was filed against Bugayong and other present owners and mortgagees of the land, such as Lourdes Farms, Inc. and the latter's mortgagee, petitioner LBP. In its answer with cross-claim,21 LBP claimed that it is a mortgagee in good faith and for value. It prayed that should TCT No. T-57348 of Lourdes Farms, Inc. be annulled by the court, Lourdes Farms, Inc. should be ordered to pay its outstanding obligations to LBP or to provide a new collateral security.22 RTC Judgment Eventually, the RTC rendered its judgment23 on July 9, 1996 determining that: x x x The mistakes and the flaws in the granting of the title were made by the Bureau of Lands personnel more particularly the Director of Lands who is the Officer charged with the following the provisions of the Public Land Law. x x x. It is clear that the mother Title, OCTP-2823 in the name of defendant Bugayong was issued at a time when the area was not yet released by the Bureau of Forestry to the Bureau of Lands. The area covered by OCT No. P. 2823 was not yet declared by the Bureau of Lands alienable and disposable when the said OCT was issued. The subdivision of the lot covered by OCT P-2823 into 4 lots covered by TCT Nos. T-32768, 32769, 32756 and 32771 did not cure the defect. x x x.24 The RTC explained that titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands are void ab initio if the land covered by it is a forest land.25 It went further by stating that if the mother title is void, all titles arising from the mother title are also void. 26 It thus ruled in favor of the Republic with a fallo reading: IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Original Certificate of Title No. P-2823 issued in the name of defendant Angelito Bugayong null and

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, respondent. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form.1 It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest, timber or mineral lands. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled. 2 The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may seem. Dura lex sed lex.3 Ang batas ay maaaring mahigpit subalit ito ang mananaig. Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) appealing the: (1) Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 23, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 64121 entitled "Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands v. Angelito Bugayong, et al."; and (2) Resolution5 of the same Court, dated November 12, 2001, denying LBP's motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dated July 9, 1996, declaring null and void Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2823, as well as other titles originating from it, on the ground that at the time it was issued, the land covered was still within the forest zone.7 The Facts OCT No. P-2823 was issued on September 26, 1969 in favor of one Angelito C. Bugayong. Said mother title emanated from Sales Patent No. 4576 issued in Bugayong's name on September 22, 1969.8 It covered a parcel of land located in Bocana, Kabacan, Davao City, with an area of 41,276 square meters. It was originally identified and surveyed as Lot No. 4159 under Plan SI-(VIII-1), 328-D. Marshy and under water during high tide, it used to be a portion of a dry river bed near the mouth of Davao River. 9 The land was initially subdivided into four lots, viz.: Lot Nos. 4159-A, 4159-B, 4159-C and 4159-D under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-139511 approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration on April 23, 1971.10 Consequently, OCT No. P-2823 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) replaced it, all in the name of Bugayong. Bugayong sold all of the four lots to different persons. Lot No. 4159-A, which was then under TCT No. T-32769, was sold to spouses Lourdes and Candido Du. Accordingly, said TCT was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-42166 in the name of spouses Du.11 Afterwards, the spouses Du further caused the subdivision of the land covered by their TCT No. T-42166 into two (2) lots. They sold one of said lots to spouses Felix and Guadalupe Dayola, who were issued TCT No. T-45586. The other remaining lot, registered under TCT No. T-45587, was retained by and registered in the names of spouses Du. 12

void. The following Transfer Certificate of Titles which were originally part of the lot covered by O.C.T. No. P-2823 are likewise declared void: 1.A. TCT No. 57348 in the name of defendant Lourdes Farms mortgaged to defendant Land Bank. B. TCT No. 84749 in the name of defendants Johnny and Catherine Du mortgaged to defendant Development Bank of the Philippines. C. TCT No. 37386 in the name of defendants spouses Pahamotang mortgaged to defendant Lourdes Du mortgaged with defendant Allied Bank. E. TCT Nos. 68154 and 32768 in the names of defendants/spouses Maglana Santamaria. 2. All private defendants shall give to the Davao City Register of Deeds their titles, who shall cancel the Transfer Certificate of Titles mentioned in paragraph number one. 3. Lot No. 4159, Plan SI (VIII-1) 328-D covered by O.C.T. P-2823 is hereby REVERTED to the mass of public domain. SO ORDERED.27 (Underscoring supplied) Disagreeing with the RTC judgment, LBP appealed to the CA on October 31, 1996. It asserted in its appellant's brief28 that it validly acquired mortgage interest or lien over the subject property because it was an innocent mortgagee for value and in good faith. 29 It also emphasized that it is a government financial institution. CA Disposition In a Decision thus:
30

recognized principle that the Director of Lands (now Land Management Bureau) is bereft of any jurisdiction over public forest or any lands not capable of registration. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom. And where the land applied for is part of the public forest, the land registration court acquires no jurisdiction over the land, which is not yet alienable and disposable. Thus, notwithstanding the issuance of a sales patent over the subject parcel of land, the State may still take action to have the same land reverted to the mass of public domain and the certificate of title covering said forest land declared null and void for having been improperly and illegally issued. Titles issued over nonalienable public lands have been held as void ab initio. The defense of indefeasibility of title issued pursuant to such patent does not lie against the State. Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. In such cases, prescription does not lie against the State. Likewise, the government is not estopped by such fraudulent or wrongful issuance of a patent over public forest land inasmuch as the principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the acts of its agents. x x x. 34 (Citations omitted) With respect to LBP's contention35 that it was a mortgagee in good faith and for value, the CA declared, citing Republic v. Reyes36 that: "mortgagees of non-disposable lands where titles thereto were erroneously issued acquire no protection under the land registration law. Appellants-mortgagees' proper recourse therefore is to pursue their claims against their respective mortgagors and debtors."37 When LBP's motion for reconsideration was denied, it resorted to the petition at bar. Issues LBP seeks the reversal of the CA disposition on the following grounds A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES' MORTGAGE RIGHT AND INTEREST AS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER (MORTGAGEE) FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH OVER THE SUBJECT LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. T-57348 IS VALID AND SUBSISTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE IN OUR COUNTRY. B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING PETITIONER LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES' MORTGAGE RIGHT AND INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT LAND AS VALID AND SUBSISTING UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF NON-IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING TO PETITIONER LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR UNDER ITS CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT LOURDES FARMS, INC., THAT IS, ORDERING SAID CO-DEFENDANT LOURDES FARMS, INC. TO PAY ITS OUTSTANDING OBLIGATION TO THE LAND BANK COVERED BY THE SUPPOSED NULL AND VOID TCT NO. T-57348, OR TO PROVIDE A

dated August 23, 2001, the CA ruled against the appellants, 31 disposing

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeals are hereby DISMISSED and the Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 17516 is hereby AFFIRMED.32 The CA confirmed that the "evidence for the plaintiff clearly established that the land covered by OCT No. P-2823 issued pursuant to a sales patent granted to defendant Angelito C. Bugayong was still within the forestal zone at the time of the grant of the said patent."33 It explained: Forest lands or forest reserves, are incapable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private properties. This is premised on the Regalian Doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but also in the 1987 Constitution. Our Supreme Court has upheld this rule consistently even in earlier cases. It has also been held that whatever possession of the land prior to the date of release of forested land as alienable and disposable cannot be credited to the 30-year requirement (now, since June 12, 1945) under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. It is only from that date that the period of occupancy for purposes of confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title may be counted. Since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981, appellants and their predecessors-in-interest could not claim any vested right thereon prior to its release from public forest zone. The inclusion of forest land in a title, "whether title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title." It is, of course, a well-

SUBSTITUTE COLLATERAL IN LIEU OF SAID TCT NO. T-57348.38 (Underscoring supplied) Our Ruling LBP has no valid and subsisting mortgagee's interest over the land covered by TCT No. T-57348. It has been established and admitted by LBP that: (1) the subject land mortgaged to it by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is covered by TCT No. T-57348; and (2) the said TCT is derived from OCT No. P-2823 issued to Bugayong.39 It was further ascertained by the courts below that at the time OCT No. P-2823 was issued to Bugayong on September 26, 1969, the land it covered was still within the forest zone. It was declared as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981. 40 Despite these established facts, LBP argues that its alleged interest as mortgagee of the subject land covered by TCT No. T-57348 must be respected. It avers that TCT No. T57348 is a Torrens title which has no written indications of defect or vice affecting the ownership of Lourdes Farms, Inc. Hence, it posits that it was not and could not have been required to explore or go beyond what the title indicates or to search for defects not indicated in it. LBP cites cases where the Court ruled that a party is not required to explore further than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest of any hidden defect of an inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right to it; and that a bank is not required before accepting a mortgage to make an investigation of the title of the property being given as security. LBP submits that its right as a mortgagee is binding against the whole world and may not be disregarded. 41 It further argues that review or reopening of registration is proscribed, as the title has become incontrovertible pursuant to Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529; and that its mortgage rights and interest over the subject land is protected by the constitutional guarantee of nonimpairment of contracts.42 The contention that LBP has an interest over the subject land as a mortgagee has no merit. The mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc. from which LBP supposedly obtained its alleged interest has never been the owner of the mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is legally impossible as the land was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981. Even at present, no one could have possessed the same under a claim of ownership for the period of thirty (30) years required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. 43 Hence, LBP acquired no rights over the land. Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged, to wit: ARTICLE 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage: (1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged; (3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. (Emphasis ours)

Since Lourdes Farms, Inc. is not the owner of the land, it does not have the capacity to mortgage it to LBP. In De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals,44 the Court declared: While it is true that the mortgagees, having entered into a contract with petitioner as mortgagor, are estopped from questioning the latter's ownership of the mortgaged property and his concomitant capacity to alienate or encumber the same, it must be considered that, in the first place, petitioner did not possess such capacity to encumber the land at the time for the stark reason that it had been classified as a forest land and remained a part of the patrimonial property of the State. Assuming, without admitting, that the mortgagees cannot subsequently question the fact of ownership of petitioner after having dealt with him in that capacity, still, petitioner was never vested with the proprietary power to encumber the property. In fact, even if the mortgagees continued to acknowledge petitioner as the owner of the disputed land, in the eyes of the law, the latter can never be presumed to be owner. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, mortgagees of non-disposable lands, titles to which were erroneously issued, acquire no protection under the Land Registration Law. 45 Even assuming that LBP was able to obtain its own TCT over the property by means of its mortgage contract with Lourdes Farms, Inc., the title must also be cancelled as it was derived from OCT No. P-2823 which was not validly issued to Bugayong. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable whether the title is a Spanish title or a Torrens title.46 It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral land. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.47 Moreover, the Court has already addressed the same issue in its Resolution of November 14, 2001 on the petition filed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in G. R. No. 149568 entitled "Philippine National Bank v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands," which also appealed the subject CA decision. PNB, like LBP, is also a mortgagee of another derivative TCT of the same OCT No. 2823. Said resolution reads: On September 22, 1969, Angelito C. Bugayong was issued a sales patent covering a 41,276 square meter parcel of land in Bocana, Barrio Kabacan, Davao City by the Bureau of Lands. On the basis of the sales patent, the Register of Deeds of Davao City issued OCT No. P-2823 to Bugayong. Bugayong later subdivided the land into four lots, one of which (Lot No. 4159-B covered by TCT No. T-32770) was sold by him to the spouses Reynaldo Rogacion and Corazon Pahamotang. After obtaining TCT No. T-37786 in their names, the spouses mortgaged the lot to the Philippine National Bank (PNB). As they defaulted in the payment of their loan, the PNB foreclosed the property and purchased it at the foreclosure sale as the highest bidder. Eventually, the PNB consolidated its title. Sometime in 1981, upon the petition of the residents of the land, the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation into the sales patent issued in favor of Angelito C. Bugayong and found the sales patent to have been illegally issued because (1) the land was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981; previous to that, the land was within the forest zone; (2) the land is covered by sea water during high tide; and (3) the patentee, Angelito C. Bugayong, had never been in actual possession of the land. Based on this investigation, the government instituted the present suit in 1987 for cancellation of title/patent and reversion of the parcel of land against Angelito C. Bugayong, the Rogacion spouses, and the PNB, among others.

On July 6, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision declaring OCT No. P-2823 and all titles derived therefrom null and void and ordering reversion of the subject property to the mass of the public domain. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition. First. Petitioner contends that it had a right to rely on TCT No. T-37786 showing the mortgagors Reynaldo Rogacion and Corazon Pahamotang's ownership of the property. The contention is without merit. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral lands. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled ( Republic v. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313 (1987)). (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480 (1987)). In this case, petitioner does not dispute that its predecessor-in-interest, Angelito C. Bugayong, had the subject property registered in his name when it was forest land. Indeed, even if the subject property had been eventually segregated from the forest zone, neither petitioner nor its predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the same under claim of ownership for the requisite period of thirty (30) years because it was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981. Second. Petitioner's contention that respondent's action for reversion is barred by prescription for having been filed nearly two decades after the issuance of Bugayong's sales patent is likewise without merit. Prescription does not lie against the State for reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation registered in favor of any party. Public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time ( Republic v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 223 (1996)).48 Contrary to the argument of LBP, since the title is void, it could not have become incontrovertible. Even prescription may not be used as a defense against the Republic. On this aspect, the Court in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,49 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,50 held: Petitioners' contention that the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of OCT No. 727 issued to them, considering that it took the government 45 years to assail the same, is erroneous. We have ruled in a host of cases that prescription does not run against the government. In point is the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, wherein we declared: And in so far as the timeliness of the action of the Government is concerned, it is basic that prescription does not run against the State x x x. The case law has also been: When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation x x x. Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis ours)

There is no impairment of contract but a valid exercise of police power of the State. The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts may not likewise be used by LBP to validate its interest over the land as mortgagee. The State's restraint upon the right to have an interest or ownership over forest lands does not violate the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts. Said restraint is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. As explained by the Court in Director of Forestry v. Muoz:51 The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman's decalogue. Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy of forest and forest reserves. To be sure, the validity of the exercise of police power in the name of the general welfare cannot be seriously attacked. Our government had definite instructions from the Constitution's preamble to "promote the general welfare." Jurisprudence has time and again upheld the police power over individual rights, because of the general welfare. Five decades ago, Mr. Justice Malcolm made it clear that the "right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good" and that the "liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." Mr. Justice Laurel, about twenty years later, affirmed the precept when he declared that "the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations" and that "[p]ersons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state." Recently, we quoted from leading American case, which pronounced that "neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm," and that, therefore, "[e]qually fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest." (Emphasis ours and citations omitted) In Edu v. Ericta,52 the Court defined police power as the authority of the state to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. It is that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.53 It extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. 54 It is a

ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary.55 Preservation of our forest lands could entail intrusion upon contractual rights as in this case but it is justified by the Latin maxims Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.56 While We sympathize with petitioner, We nonetheless cannot, in this instance, yield to compassion and equity. The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may seem.57 We cannot resolve the cross-claim for lack of factual basis. The cross-claim must be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. LBP filed a cross-claim against Lourdes Farms, Inc. before the RTC. 58 The cross-claim is for the payment of cross-defendant Lourdes Farms, Inc.'s alleged obligation to LBP or its submission of a substitute collateral security in lieu of the property covered by TCT No. T57348. However, the records do not show that Lourdes Farms, Inc. was required by the RTC to file an answer to the cross-claim. Likewise, Lourdes Farms, Inc. was not notified of the proceedings before the CA. It was not also made a party to this petition. LPB now contends that the CA erred in not granting its cross-claim against Lourdes Farms, Inc. We are thus confronted with the question: Should We now order Lourdes Farms, Inc. to comply with the demand of LBP? We rule in the negative. It may be true that Lourdes Farms, Inc. still has an obligation to LBP but We cannot make a ruling regarding the same for lack of factual basis. There is no evidence-taking on the cross-claim. No evidence was adduced before the RTC or the CA regarding it. No factual finding or ruling was made by the RTC or the CA about it. It bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari, the scope of this Court's judicial review of decisions of the CA is generally confined only to errors of law. Questions of fact are not entertained.59 Moreover, the failure to make a ruling on the cross-claim by the RTC was not assigned as an error in LBP's appellant's brief60 before the CA. Hence, the CA cannot be faulted for not making a ruling on it. As held in De Liano v. Court of Appeals ,61 appellant has to specify in what aspect of the law or the facts the trial court erred. The conclusion, therefore, is that appellant must carefully formulate his assignment of errors. Its importance cannot be underestimated, as Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court will attest: Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. Apparently, the cross-claim was taken for granted not only by the RTC but also by LBP. The cross-claim was not included as a subject or issue in the pre-trial order and instead of asking that the same be heard, LBP filed a motion62 to submit the main case for resolution. The main case was thus resolved by the RTC without touching on the merits of the crossclaim.

On the other hand, while the CA did not make a categorical ruling on LBP's cross-claim, it pointed out that: (1) as found by the RTC, there is a mortgage contract between LBP and Lourdes Farms, Inc., with LBP as mortgagee and Lourdes Farms, Inc. as mortgagor; and (2) LBP's proper recourse is to pursue its claim against Lourdes Farms, Inc. 63 The CA thus impliedly ruled that LBP's cross-claim should not be included in this case. Instead of making a ruling on the same, it recommended that LBP pursue its claim against Lourdes Farms, Inc. All told, although the relationship between LBP and Lourdes Farms, Inc. as mortgagee and mortgagor was established, the cross-claim of LBP against Lourdes Farms, Inc. was left unresolved. The Court is not in a position to resolve the cross-claim based on the records. In order for the cross-claim to be equitably decided, the Court, not being a trier of facts, is constrained to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Remand of the case for further proceedings is proper due to absence of a definitive factual determination regarding the cross-claim.64 WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the cross-claim of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines against Lourdes Farms, Inc. is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Davao City, for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 159589 December 23, 2008

5. Sepia copies of the survey plan establishing that the land area is more or less 109 hectares and that the Lot was already surveyed and the boundaries determined;10 6. Letter of Authority dated 30 June 1997 authorizing Engineer Roberto C. Pangyarihan (Pangyarihan) to represent the Land Management Sector, DENRRegion IV, and to testify on plan SWO-042121-003369-D covering the Lot;11 7. Technical Description signed by Pangyarihan proving the boundaries of the Lot as surveyed;12 8. Letter dated 22 April 1991 of Arnaldo Conlu (Conlu), Land Management Inspector, DENR-Region IV establishing that the Lot is alienable and disposable;13 9. First Indorsement dated 22 April 1991 of Rufo F. Lorenzo, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer, forwarding to the Regional Technical Director, Land Management Division, through the Chief, Surveys Division, DENR-Region IV the investigation report of Land Management Inspector, Conlu;14 10. Certifications dated 4 July 1995 and 23 November 1995 of Conrado C. Lindo, Municipal Mayor, and Flordeliza C. Soberano, Municipal Assessor of Ternate, Cavite, respectively, establishing that Juan Fabio was the declared owner of the Lot under Tax Declaration No. 1385 having an area of 200 hectares and situated in Calumpang and Caybangat, Zapang, Ternate, Cavite;15 11. Tax Declarations corresponding to different years showing that the Lot has been declared under the name of Juan Fabio for tax purposes: Tax Declaration No. 428 for the year 1947, Tax Declaration No. 302 for the year 1961; Tax Declaration No. 227 for the year 1969, Tax Declaration No. 210 for the year 1974, Tax Declaration No. 173 for the year 1980, Tax Declaration No. 1543 for the year 1985, and Tax Declaration No. 1385 for the year 1994;16 and 12. Certifications of the Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Ternate, Cavite stating that the real estate taxes for the years 1994 to 1997 were paid.17 After the presentation of exhibits establishing the jurisdictional facts, the trial prosecutor assigned to the case interposed no objection. Thus, the trial court ordered a general default against the public except the government. On 1 July 1997, respondents presented their evidence consisting of documentary exhibits and the testimonies of witnesses Esteibar, Pangyarihan, Dominga Fabio Lozano, Mariano Huerto, and Raymundo Pakay. Esteibar, the duly appointed representative of the heirs of Juan Fabio, testified that her grandfather, Juan, died in 1959 when she was only 13 years old. She attested that she was born on the Lot and knows that her grandfather owned, possessed and occupied the Lot until his death. Esteibar claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the Lot openly, publicly, continuously, peacefully, without interruption in the concept of an owner and adverse to the public since time immemorial up to the present or for more than 100 years. They had paid real estate taxes; planted trees, vegetables, rice, and banana plants; and raised animals on the Lot. Further, she stated that the Lot is neither mortgaged nor encumbered and that no other person other than her and her co-heirs are in possession of the Lot. The next witness, Pangyarihan of the Land Management Sector, DENR-Region IV, testified that he had been connected with DENR-Region IV since 1956. He was formerly the Chief of the Survey Division of DENR-Region IV from 1991 until his designation as

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN FABIO, namely: DOMINGA C. FABIO, SOCORRO D. FABIO, LYDIA D. FABIO, ROLANDO D. FABIO, NORMA D. FABIO, NORMA L. FABIO, ANGELITA FABIO, ROSALIE FABIO, DANILO FABIO, RENATO FABIO, LEVITA FABIO, IRENE FABIO, TERESITA MOLERA, ROSEMARIE C. PAKAY, LIGAYA C. MASANGKAY, ALFREDO F. CASTILLO, MELINDA F. CASTILLO, MERCEDITA F. CASTILLO, ESTELA DE JESUS AQUINO, FELECITO FABIO, and ALEXANDER FABIO, represented herein by ANGELITA F. ESTEIBAR as their Attorney-in-Fact, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 August 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66522, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, in LRC Case No. NC-96782 granting respondents application for registration of title to Lot No. 233 (Lot), Cad -617D, Ternate Cadastre. The Facts On 21 November 1996, respondents, who are the heirs of Juan Fabio, represented by Angelita F. Esteibar (Esteibar) as their Attorney-in-Fact, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, an application for registration of title 3 to the Lot with an approximate area of 1,096,866 square meters or 109.6 hectares. The Lot is situated in Barangay Sapang, Ternate, Cavite. The respondents sought the registration of title under the provisions of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529).4 In the application, respondents alleged that they are the owners of the Lot, including all the improvements, having acquired the same through a bona fide claim of ownership. They declared that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner for more than 100 years. 5 Together with the application for registration, respondents submitted the following documents: 1. Certificate of Death proving the fact of death of Juan Fabio; 6 2. Special Power of Attorney showing that the heirs authorized Esteibar to file the application;7 3. Order dated 25 November 1994 of Sydicious F. Panoy, Regional Technical Director, Regional Office No. IV-A, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), giving authority to survey the Lot, which survey was numbered SWO-042121-003369-D;8 4. Surveyors Certificate and Transmittal of Survey Returns signed by Geodetic Engineer Susipatro Mancha proving that the Lot was surveyed; 9

Special Assistant to the Regional Director in 1995. Pangyarihan affirmed that the Lot is 1,096,866 square meters or 109.6 hectares and that he recommended the approval of the survey plan, SWO-042121-003369-D, which includes the Lot, on the basis of submission of certain requirements like tax declarations, report of investigation by the land investigator and survey returns prepared by the geodetic engineer. He verified that the survey plan and the technical descriptions matched with each other and stated that there is no overlap or encroachment on other surrounding claims on adjacent or adjoining lots. Further, he confirmed that there is a notation at the left hand footnote of the approved survey plan which reads "this survey falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation and disposition hereof shall be subject to the final delimitation thereof as per Proc. No. 1582-A dated September 6, 1976." Dominga Fabio Lozano, the only living and youngest child of Juan Fabio and who was then 63 years of age, testified that she was born in 1934 in Calumpang, Ternate, Cavite. She alleged that she was born and has lived on the Lot, owned by her father Juan Fabio, who in turn inherited the land from his father Ignacio Fabio. She narrated that her father was born in 1887 and died in 1959 at the age of 72 as evidenced by his death certificate. She stated further that no one has ever questioned their ownership or disturbed their peaceful possession and occupation of the Lot. As a result, their possession of the Lot covers more than 100 years of continuous, uninterrupted, public, open and peaceful possession. Mariano Huerto, a helper of the late Juan Fabio, testified that since 1935, when he was only 12 years old, he had helped cultivate the Lot until he left the place in 1955. He stated that at the time he served as helper, Juan Fabio and his family were the ones who possessed and occupied the Lot. He helped plant vegetables, banana plants, papaya trees and upland rice and was familiar with the boundaries of the Lot. Raymundo Pakay, 70 years of age at the time and a resident of Ternate, Cavite, testified that he knew Juan Fabio as the owner of the Lot, which has an area of 200 hectares, more or less. He stated that Juan built a house there and could not recall of anyone else who claimed ownership of the Lot. On 7 August 1997, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Tagaytay City filed his Manifestation and Comment dated 28 July 1997: COMES NOW the government, through the undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Tagaytay City, assisting the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the Province of Cavite, by way of comment to petitioners formal offer of evidence dated July 3, 1997 hereby manifest that the government interposes no objection to Exhibit A up to PP together with its sub markings, the same being material and relevant to the instant petition. The government further manifests that considering the fact that it has no controverting evidence in its possession to refute the material allegations of the herein petitioner, the government is submitting the instant case for the immediate resolution of this Honorable Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the petitioner and the cross examination propounded by the Trial Prosecutor. 18 On 29 September 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision ordering the registration of the Lot in the name of Juan Fabio. The dispositive portion states: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding the application for registration and grant of title under Act 496, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 to be meritorious and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient and requisite under the law, this Court, confirming its previous Order of general default as against the general public, hereby decrees and adjudges and hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land as hereinabove described, identified,

and bounded and now the subject matter of the present application for registration of title in the above-entitled case, in favor of, and in the name of JUAN FABIO, of Barangay Sapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite. FURTHER, upon the finality of this DECISION, the Administrator, Land Registration Authority, is hereby ordered to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the Original Certificate of Title in favor of, and in the name of JUAN FABIO, of Barangay Sapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite, over the parcel of land described, identified and bounded as hereinabovementioned and subject matter of this Decision which decreed and adjudged the registration of its title in his name. SO ORDERED.19 The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner claimed that the trial court erred in ruling that respondents have acquired a vested right over the Lot which falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation. Petitioner asserted that the trial court disregarded the testimony of Pangyarihan who recommended the approval of the survey plan with the following notation: This survey falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation and disposition hereof shall be subject to the final delimitation thereof as per Proc. No. 1582-A dated September 6, 1976. x x x In essence, petitioner argued that the trial courts grant of registration is contrary to the provisions of Section 88 of Commonwealth Act No. 14120 and Proclamation No. 1582-A.21 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 29 August 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. 22 The appellate court ruled that the mode of appeal filed by petitioner was wrong. Since the lone question involved was one of law, petitioner should have filed a petition for review with this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure instead of filing an appeal under Rule 41. Nevertheless, the appellate court looked into the merits of the case and sustained the findings of the trial court: On the merits of the case, it may be true that the General Order 56 of the United States War Department dated 25 March 1904 reserved the subject property as a military reservation, however, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation 307 on 20 November 1967 which provides x x x. In other words, Presidential Proclamation 307 provides for an exception those properties subject to private rights or those on which private individuals can prove ownership by any mode acceptable under our laws and Torrens system. Proclamation 1582-A issued by President Marcos on 6 September 1976 again provided the following x x x. Without doubt, this complements and recognizes the rights acquired by private individuals under Proclamation 307, over the portion of the properties reserved under General Order 56 of the United States War Department dated 25 March 1904. Considering that the annotation appearing in the survey plan merely provides that the controversial portion shall be subject to final delimitation as per Proclamation 1582-A, the same is consistent with the provisions of Proclamation 307.

For wrong remedy and for lack of merit, the Court holds and so rules that the trial court erred not in granting petitioners application for registration of title. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged 29 September 1997 Decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. SO ORDERED.23 Hence, the instant petition. The Issues The issues for our resolution are (1) whether petitioner correctly appealed the ruling of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether the respondents have acquired a right over the Lot. The Courts Ruling The petition has merit. First Issue: Mode of Appeal Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the appeal is determined on the basis of the averments in the notice of appeal. Since the appeal involves questions of fact and law, petitioner correctly appealed the ruling of the trial court to the Court of Appeals and not directly to this Court. Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the remedy resorted to by petitioner before the Court of Appeals was not correct. Respondents contend that the issues actually raised in the appellants brief determine the appropriate mode of appeal, not the averments in the notice of appeal. Since the appellate court found that petitioner only raised questions of law, the appeal is dismissible under the Rules. Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which governs appeals from judgments and final orders of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals, provides: Section 2. Modes of appeal. (a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. (c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (Emphasis supplied) A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 24

In its appellants brief filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner interposed a lone assignment of error: The trial court erred in ruling that appellees have acquired a vested right over the subject property despite the fact that it falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation.25 Clearly, the issue stated by petitioner provides no confusion with regard to the truth or falsity of the given facts pertaining to the Lot and its location as established during the trial. It had been duly established that the Lot falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation as shown in the survey conducted and attested to by the DENR. Here, the only issue involved is the interpretation of a relevant order and proclamations denominating the Lot as part of a military reservation subject to the limitation that private rights should be respected. Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law. Thus, petitioners appeal under Rule 41 having been improperly bro ught before the Court of Appeals, it should have been dismissed by the appellate court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides: Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals . An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by the said court. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Nonetheless, the appellate court in resolving that petitioners appeal constituted a wrong remedy, looked into the merits of the case and found that the laws involved recognize the rights of respondents. As such, equity considerations require that we take a similar course of action in order to put a rest to this case. Second Issue: Validity of Respondents Title Petitioner asserts that both the trial and appellate courts failed to recognize the import of the notation in the survey plan stating that the Lot falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation. At the time the application for registration of title was filed, the Lot was no longer open to private ownership as it had been classified as a military reservation for public service. Thus, respondents are not entitled to have the Lot registered under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that they have acquired a vested right over the Lot. The Presidential Proclamations, which declared the Lot part of a naval reservation, provided for an exception that private rights shall be respected, taking the portion covered by private rights out of the reservation. Thus, respondents claim they are entitled to have the Lot registered under their names. The three proclamations cited reserving the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation for the exclusive use of the military are the following: (1) U.S. War Department Order No. 56 issued on 25 March 1904, (2) Proclamation No. 30726 issued on 20 November 1967, and (3) Proclamation No. 1582-A issued on 6 September 1976. Such proclamations state: U.S. War Department General Order No. 5627 U.S. War Department Washington, March 25, 1904. General Order No. 56

For the knowledge and governance of all interested parties, the following is hereby announced: The President of the United States, by the Order dated March 14, 1904, which provides that the reservations made by Executive Order of April 11, 1902 (General Order No. 38, Army Headquarters, Office of the Adjutant General, April 17, 1902), at the entrance of Manila Bay, Luzon, Philippine Islands, are arranged

in such a way that will include only these lands as later described, whose lands were reserved by the Order of March 14, 1904 for military purposes, by virtue of Article 12 of the Act of Congress approved on July 1, 1902, entitled "Act providing for the Temporary Administration of Civil Affairs of the Government of the Philippine Islands and for Other Purposes" (32 Stat. L., 691); namely: 1. In the northern side of the entrance to Manila Bay, in the province of Bataan, Luzon (Mariveles Reservation), all public lands within the limits that are described as follows: "Starting from the mouth of the Mariveles River in the eastern border and from here straight North to a distance of 5,280 feet; from this point straight to the East to intercept a line, in a straight direction to the South from a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 4); from there straight from the North until the aforementioned Station 4; from here straight to the East to a distance of 6,600 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 5); from here straight South to a distance of 6,600 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 6); from here straight to the East to a distance of 8,910 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 7); from here straight to the South to a distance of 7,730 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 8), situated at the northwest corner of the second creek to the east of Lasisi Point, 30 feet North of the hightide mark; from there in the same direction until the high-tide mark; from here towards the East following the shoreline up to the starting point." 2. In the southern side of the Manila Bay entrance, in the province of Cavite, Luzon (Calumpan Point Reservation), all public lands within the limits that are described as follows: "Starting from a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 1) situated in the cliff on the Eastern side of Asubig Point, 20 feet above the high-tide mark and about 50 feet from the edge of the cliff and continuing from there to the South 28 10 West, a distance of up to 22,000 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 2); from here to North 54 10' West at a distance of 5,146 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 3); from here towards South 85 35 ' 30 "West, at a distance of 2,455 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 4), situated on the beach near the Northeast corner of Limbones Bay, about 50 feet from the high-tide mark and following in the same direction until the high-tide mark; from here towards North and East following the shoreline until North 28 10 ' East from the starting point and from there encompassing more or less 5,200 acres. The markers are exact." 3. The islands of Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance. 4. The jurisdiction of the military authorities in the case of reservations in the northern and southern beaches of the entrance to Manila Bay and all the islands referred to in paragraph 3, are extended from the high-tide marker towards the sea until a distance of 1,000 yards. By Order of the Secretary of War: GEORGE L. GILLESPIE, General Commander, Chief of Internal General Staff, Official copy.

W.P. HALL, Internal Adjutant General. (Emphasis supplied) Proclamation No. 307 x x x do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for military purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, subject to private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of Ternate, province of Cavite, Island of Luzon, more particularly described as follows: Proposed Naval Reservation Calumpang Point A parcel of land (the proposed Calumpang Point Naval Reservation), situated in the municipality of Ternate, province of Cavite. Bounded on the NW., N. and E., by Manila Bay; on the SE. and S., by municipality of Ternate; and on the W., by Manila Bay. Beginning at a point marked "1" on the attached Sketch Plan traced from Coastal Hydrography of Limbones Island. thence N. 54 deg. 30 E., 750.00 m. to point 2; thence N. 89 deg. 15E., 1780.00 m. to point 3; thence N. 15 deg. 10 E., 6860.00 m. to point 4; thence N. 12 deg. 40 W., 930.00 m. to point 5; thence S. 77 deg. 20 W., 2336.00 m. to point 6; thence S. 49 deg. 30 W., 4450.00 m. to point 7; thence S. 12 deg. 40 E., 2875.00 m. to point 8; thence S. 30 deg. 30 E., 2075.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an approximate area of twenty eight million nine hundred seventy three thousand one hundred twelve (28, 973,112) square meters. NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future surveys." Proclamation No. 1582-A WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 307 dated November 20, 1967 and U.S. War Department Order No. 56 dated March 25, 1904 reserved for military purposes, and withdrew from sale or settlement, a parcel of land of the public domain situated in the Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite, more particularly described as follows: x x x WHEREAS, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Marines now need that portion of this area reserved under Proclamation No. 307, particularly, Cayladme Cove, Caynipa Cove, Calumpang Cove and Sinalam Cove, for their use as official station, not only to guard and protect the mouth of Manila Bay and the shorelines of the Province of Cavite, Batangas and Bataan, but also to maintain peace and order in the Corregidor area, which is now one of the leading tourist attractions in the country; x x x x x x containing an approximate area of EIGHT MILLION EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY (8,089,990) SQUARE METERS, more or less. The portion that remains after the segregation which are occupied shall be released to bona fide occupants pursuant to existing laws/policies regarding the

disposition of lands of the public domain and the unoccupied portions shall be considered as alienable or disposable lands. (Emphasis supplied) The proclamations established that as early as 1904 a certain parcel of land was placed under the exclusive use of the government for military purposes by the then colonial American government. In 1904, the U.S. War Department segregated the area, including the Lot, for military purposes through General Order No. 56. Subsequently, after the Philippines regained its independence in 1946, the American government transferred all control and sovereignty to the Philippine government, including all the lands appropriated for a public purpose. Twenty years later, two other presidential proclamations followed, both issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, restating that the same property is a naval reservation for the use of the Republic. There is no question that the Lot is situated within a military reservation. The only issue to be resolved is whether the respondents are entitled to have the Lot registered under the Torrens systems based on the limitation clause cited in the proclamations: (1) "subject to private rights, if any there be" in Proclamation No. 307, and (2) "the portion that remains after the segregation which are occupied shall be released to bona fide occupants pursuant to existing laws/policies regarding the disposition of lands of the public domain and the unoccupied portions shall be considered as alienable or disposable lands" in Proclamation No. 1582-A. This proviso means that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded from proving their claims. In effect, the State gives respect and recognizes the rights of private persons who may have acquired any vested interest to the Lot before the issuance of the General Order or proclamations. Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), also known as the Public Land Act, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands. 28 Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant or any other mode recognized by law, belongs to the State as part of the public domain.29 No public land can be acquired by private persons through any other means, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired through purchase or grant from the State, or through any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 30 Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073), provides:
31

SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. xxx To put it simply, Section 14(1) of PD 1529 states that there are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. To prove that the Lot is alienable and disposable land of the public domain, respondents presented in evidence a letter33 dated 22 April 1991 of Conlu, a Land Management Inspector of the DENR-Region IV. The relevant portion of the letter states: In examination [of] the above-noted subject, please be [informed] that I have examined the land x x x and the following findings [were] ascertained; That the land covers a portion of 3 (three) barangays, namely: Calumpang, Cabangat and Zapang, all within the municipality of Ternate, Cavite; That the land is within alienable and disposable zone under Project No. 22-B, L.C. Map No. 3091; That the land was declared for taxation purposes since 1945, the latest of which is Tax Declaration No. 1543 with a market value of P1,250,000.00 in favor of Juan Fabio x x x (Emphasis supplied) This letter-certification is insufficient. Conlu is merely a land investigator of the DENR. It is not enough that he alone should certify that the Lot is within the alienable and disposable zone. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain belongs to the President. 34 The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The DENR Secretary is the only other public official empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.35 From the records, this letter was the only evidence presented by respondents to prove that the Lot is alienable and disposable. In fact, not even the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) certified as correct the investigation report of the Land Management Inspector. The most that the CENRO officer did was to indorse the report to the Regional Technical Director of the DENR. 36 In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 32 Similarly, Section 14 of PD 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration through registration proceedings, provides:

custodian of such official record. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents have failed to present any of these documents. No document was presented to show that the DENR Secretary or the President has classified the Lot as alienable and disposable. No CENRO or PENRO certification was presented that the Lot, per verification through survey, falls within the alienable and disposable zone. The 22 April 1991 letter of Land Management Inspector Conlu is not proof that the DENR Secretary or the President has classified the Lot as alienable and disposable, or that the Lot falls within the alienable and disposable zone. The mere issuance of the letter does not prove the facts stated in such letter.38 Further, the burden is on respondents to prove that the Lot ceased to have the status of a military reservation or other inalienable land of the public domain. No proof was ever submitted by respondents that the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, or the Lot, ceased as a military reservation. Even if its ownership and control had been transferred by the Americans to the Philippine government, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation remained as an official military reservation. Thus, being a military reservation at the time, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, to which the Lot is a part of, can not be subject to occupation, entry or settlement.39 This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of CA 141, which provide: SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmens village and other improvements for the public benefit. SECTION 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied) Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 40 Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its declaration as a military reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is alienable and disposable. Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain.41 In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents occupation and possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner. While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law

imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony. 42 We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles. 43 In Republic v. Estonilo,44 we ruled that persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the properties in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands. Here, respondents failed to do so, and are thus not entitled to have the Lot registered in their names. Clearly, both the trial and appellate courts gravely erred in granting respondents application for registration of title. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 29 August 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66522. We DISMISS respondents application for registration and issuance of title to Lot No. 233, Cad-617-D, Ternate Cadastre in LRC Case No. NC-96-782 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15. SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLOS R. VEGA, et al., respondents.

RULING: The best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENRs original classification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground of substantial compliance. Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record. First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who testified that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection of the subject land. Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respondents-intervenors Buhays, expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable. Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas application for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable. In the Supplementary Report submitted during the trial court proceedings, the LRA did not interpose any objection to the application on the basis of the nature of the land.

G.R. No. 177790 January 17, 2011 Third Division

Sereno, J.

FACTS: The respondents Vegas filed an application for registration of title covering a parcel of land. They alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria, who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenz. Their mothers siblings died intestate, all without leaving any offspring. The Republic filed an opposition to respondents Vegas application for registration on the ground that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation. During the trial, respondents Vegas presented several exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents Vegas ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of the registration. Significant was the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the CENRO of Los Baos, Laguna, under the DENR. He attested to having conducted an inspection of the subject land and identified the corresponding Report which he had submitted to the Regional Executive Director, Region IV. The report stated that the area subject of the investigation was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, and that there was no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or by any other person. During the trial, respondents-intervenors Buhays entered their appearance and moved to intervene in respondents Vegas application for registration. Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the subject land consisting purportedly sold by respondents Vegas mother,Maria, to the formers predecessors in-interest - the sisters Gabriela and Isabel - by virtue of a Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan. They likewise formally offered in evidence a Subdivision Plan, which indicated the portion of the subject land, which they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-interest. The trial court, in its decision, granted respondents Vegas application and directed the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and respondents-intervenors Buhays predecessors, in proportion to their claims over the subject land. The Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, arguing that respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not contain the date when the land was declared as such. The appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable?

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 179978 August 31, 2011

On August 22, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, from all of the foregoing undisputed facts, this Court finds and so holds that the applicant DCD CONSTRUCTION INC., has a registerable title to Lot No. 5331-A with an area of 3,781 square meters as part of Lot 5331, CAD-681-D, under Csd-072223003891 which is identical to Lot No. 21225-A as part of Lot No. 21225, CAD-681-D, under Csd-07-006621, and is covered by Tax Declaration No. 0-0400469 situated in Taytay, Danao City, hereby confirming the same and ordering its registration under Act 496, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529, strictly in line with the Technical Description of Lot 30186, Danao, CAD-681-D, identical to Lot 21225-A, Csd-07-006621, upon finality of this decision. SO ORDERED.8 On appeal by respondent Republic of the Philippines, the CA reversed the trial court. The CA ruled that the evidence failed to show that the land applied for was alienable and disposable considering that only a notation in the survey plan was presented to show the status of the property. The CA also found that petitioners evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite possession as the land was bought by Vivencio Batucan only after the Second World War or in 1946, further noting that the earliest tax declaration submitted was issued only in 1988. As to the testimony of witness Andrea Batucan Enriquez, the CA held that it did not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court raising the following arguments: I IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE LAND APPLIED FOR IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, WHICH WARRANTS A REVIEW BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING IN MEGAWORLD AND HOLDINGS, INC. VS. HON. JUDGE BENEDICTO G. COBARDE, ET AL. AND SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ET AL. (A) THE BUREAU OF LANDS VERIFIED AND CERTIFIED THE SUBJECT LOT AS "ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE". (B) THE DENR CERTIFIED THAT ITS OWN LAND CLASSIFICATION MAP SHOWS THAT SUBJECT LOT IS "WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA". II THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND SETTLED DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH, DESPITE THE FACT THAT: (A) WITNESS ANDREA ENRIQUEZS TESTIMONY SHOWS THAT PETITIONERS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST ACQUIRED AND POSSESSED SUBJECT LOT IN 1942.

DCD CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated June 25, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77868. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated August 22, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao City, Branch 25 in LRC No. 147 (LRA Rec. No. N-73333). On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction, Inc., through its President and CEO Danilo D. Dira, Jr., filed a verified application for registration4 of a parcel of land situated in Taytay, Danao City with an area of 4,493 square meters designated as Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, CAD 681-D. It was alleged that applicant which acquired the property by purchase, together with its predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous, open, adverse, public, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property for more than thirty (30) years. Thus, petitioner prayed to have its title judicially confirmed. After compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, the trial court through its clerk of court conducted hearings for the reception of petitioners evidence. Based on petitioners documentary and testimonial evidence, it appears that although designated as Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, the approved technical description indicated the lot number as Lot 30186, CAD 681-D which is allegedly identical to Lot 21225-A, Csd-07-006621 consisting of 3,781 square meters. Lot 5331-part (4,493 sq. ms.) was subdivided into two (Lots 21225-A and 21225-B) so that the 712 square meters (Lot 21225-B) can be segregated as salvage zone pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 97-05.5 Andrea Batucan Enriquez, one of the six (6) children of Vivencio and Paulina Batucan, testified that her parents originally owned the subject land which was bought by her father after the Second World War. Vivencio and Paulina died on April 2, 1967 and November 11, 1980, respectively. Upon the death of their parents, she and her siblings inherited the land which they possessed and declared for tax purposes. On December 22, 1993, they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement With Absolute Sale whereby they sold the property to Danilo C. Dira, Sr., petitioners father.6 Danilo D. Dira, Jr. testified that the subject land declared under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 0400583 in the name of Danilo C. Dira, Sr. was among those properties which they inherited from his father, as shown in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate With Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 1996 and Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated February 27, 1997. On June 26, 2000, his mother, brothers and sisters executed a Deed of Absolute Sale whereby the subject land was sold to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner declared the property for tax purposes and also paid realty taxes. His father had possessed the land beginning 1992 or 1994, and presently petitioner is in possession thereof. Petitioner also assumed the P3.8 million mortgage obligation with Land Bank of the Philippines as evidenced by the Deed of Undertaking/Agreement dated March 30, 2000.7

(B) IN REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. SPOUSES ENRIQUEZ, THE SUPREME COURT CATEGORICALLY RULED THAT POSSESSION FOR 34 YEARS IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR REGISTRATION.9 We deny the petition. In Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. v. Cobarde, the Court held that as an exception to the binding effect of the trial court s factual findings which were affirmed by the CA, a review of such factual findings may be made when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider certain relevant facts that would lead to a completely different conclusion. In the same vein, we declared in Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company, 11 that while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties, a number of exceptions have nevertheless been recognized by the Court, such as when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, and when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Petitioner invokes the foregoing exceptions urging this Court to pass upon anew the CAs findings regarding the status of the subject land and compliance with the required character and duration of possession by an applicant for judicial confirmation of title. After a thorough review, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that petitioner failed to establish a registrable title on the subject land. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.12 Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.13 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State.14 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable and disposable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. 15 Incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 16 In support of its contention that Lot 5331-A, CAD-681-D under Csd-072223-003891 is alienable and disposable, petitioner presented the following notation appearing in the survey plan which reads: CONFORMED PER LC MAP NOTATION LC Map No. 1321, Project No. 26-A certified on June 07, 1938, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area (SGD.) CYNTHIA Chief, Map Projection Section17 L. IBAEZ
10

Atty. Paylado continues: Q Before this is given to the surveyor, did these two (2) documents pass your office? A Yes, sir. Q When you said it passed your office, it passed your office as you have to verify all the entries in these documents whether they are correct? A Yes, sir. Q Were you able to have a personal look and verification on these Exhibits "P" and "Q" and will you confirm that all the entries here are true and correct? A Yes, sir. Q Based on the records in your office? A As a whole. x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner contends that the foregoing declaration of Belleza conclusively proves that the LMS itself had approved and adopted the notation made by Ibaez on the survey plan as its own. Such approval amounts to a positive act of the government indicating that the land applied for is indeed alienable and disposable. We do not agree. First, it must be clarified that the survey plan (Exhibit "Q") was not offered by petitioner as evidence of the lands classification as alienable and disposable. The formal offer of exhibits stated that said document and entries therein were offered for the purpose of proving the identity of the land, its metes and bounds, boundaries and adjacent lots; and that the survey has passed and was approved by the DENR-LMS. And while it was also stated therein that the evidence is also being offered as part of the testimony of Belleza, nowhere in her testimony do we find a confirmation of the notation concerning the lands classification as correct. In fact, said witness denied having any participation in the actual approval of the survey plan. This can be gleaned from her testimony on cross-examination which immediately followed the afore-quoted portion of her testimony that the survey plan "passed" their office, thus: CROSS-EXAMINATION: (FISCAL KYAMKO TO THE WITNESS) Q Madam Witness, you said that Exhibits "P" and "Q" passed before your office, now, the question is, could you possibly inform the Court whether you have some sort of an initial on the two (2) documents or the two (2) exhibits? A Actually, sir, I am not a part of this approval because this will undergo in the isolated survey and my section is I am the Chief, Surveys Assistant Section, which concerns of the LRA, issuance of Certified Sketch Plans, issuance of certified Technical Descriptions of Untitled Lots to correct the titles for judicial purpose. Q In other words, since Exhibits "P" and "Q" are originals, they did not actually pass your office, is it not? A Our office, yes, but not in my section, sir. Q So it passed your office but it did not pass your section? A Yes, sir.

Petitioner assailed the CA in refusing to give weight to the above certification, stressing that the DENR-Lands Management Services (LMS) approved the survey plan in its entirety, "without any reservation as to the inaccuracy or incorrectness of Cynthia L. Ibaez[s] annotation found therein."18 Petitioner relies on the statement of Rafaela A. Belleza, Chief, Surveys Assistance Section, DENR-LMS, who testified (direct examination) as follows:

Q In other words, you had [no] hand in re-naming or renumbering of the subject lots, is it not? A It is in the Isolated Survey Section, sir. Q In other words, you cannot possibly testify with authority as to the manner by which the numbering of the subject lot was renumbered, is it not? A Yes, sir. x x x x20 (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the testimony of the officer from DENR-LMS, Rafaela Belleza, did not at all attest to the veracity of the notation made by Ibaez on the survey plan regarding the status of the subject land. Hence, no error was committed by the CA in finding that the certification made by DENR-LMS pertained only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the survey plan and not to the nature and character of the property surveyed. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; and administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.22 A certification issued by a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating that the lots involved were found to be within the alienable and disposable area was deemed sufficient to show the real character of the land. 23 As to notations appearing in the subdivision plan of the lot stating that it is within the alienable and disposable area, the consistent holding is that these do not constitute proof required by the law.24 In Menguito v. Republic,25 the Court declared: x x x petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation x x x indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.26 The above ruling equally applies in this case where the notation on the survey plan is supposedly made by the Chief of Map Projection Unit of the DENR-LMS. Such certification coming from an officer of the DENR-LMS is still insufficient to establish the classification of the property surveyed. It is not shown that the notation was the result of an investigation specifically conducted by the DENR-LMS to verify the status of the subject land. The certifying officer, Cynthia L. Ibaez, did not testify on her findings regarding the classification of the lot as reflected in her notation on the survey plan. As to the testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner, the CA noted that Engr. Norvic Abella who prepared the survey plan had no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain, while Rafaela A. Belleza who is the Chief of the Surveys Assistance Section, admitted on crossexamination that she had no part in the approval of the subdivision plan, and hence incompetent to testify as to the correctness of Ibaezs notation. More important, petitioner failed to establish the authority of Cynthia L. Ibaez to issue certifications on land classification status for purpose of land registration proceedings. Our pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.27 is instructive: In this case, respondent Environment and Natural Community Environment certified that "lot 10705, submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San

Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582." The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. x x x xxxx Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identif ied the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. xxxx Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

xxxx The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. x x x x28 (Emphasis supplied.) In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the notation inserted in the survey plan (Exhibit "Q") hardly satisfies the incontrovertible proof required by law on the classification of land applied for registration. The CA likewise correctly held that there was no compliance with the required possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner," are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the applicant to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession was of the nature and duration required by law. 29 The bare statement of petitioners witness, Andrea Batucan Enriquez, that her family had been in possession of the subject land from the time her father bought it after the Second World War does not suffice. Moreover, the tax declaration in the name of petitioners father, TD No. 0400583 was issued only in 1994, while TD No. 0-0400469 in its own name was issued in 2000. Petitioners predecessors-in-interest were able to submit a tax declaration only for the year 1988, which was long after both spouses Vivencio and Paulina Batucan have died. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. 30 And while Andrea Batucan Enriquez claimed knowledge of their familys possession since she was just ten (10) years old although she said she was born in 1932 -- there was no clear and convincing evidence of such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership. She never mentioned any act of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over the property throughout the alleged length of possession.31 There was no account of the circumstances regarding their fathers acquisition of the land, whether their father introduced any improvements or farmed the land, and if they established residence or built any house thereon. We have held that the bare claim of the applicant that the land applied for had been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for 30 years does not constitute the "well-nigh inconvertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration. 32 1avvphi1 As the Court declared in Republic v. Alconaba:33

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.34 (Emphasis supplied.) WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2007 and Resolution dated September 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77868 are AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 173808 September 17, 2008

subject property who attended the hearing were Hector Tiples, who opposed the supposed area of the subject property; and Pablo Garin, who declared that he had no objection thereto. 16 When its turn to present evidence came, respondent, represented by the City Prosecutor, manifested that it had no evidence to contradict petitioners application for registration. It merely reiterated its objection that the area of the subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner and the Tax Declarations covering the property, was only 600 square meters, while the area stated in the Cadastral Survey was 717 square meters.17 The case was then submitted for decision. On 26 June 2000, the RTC ruled on petitioners application for registration in this wise: As to the issue that muniments of title and/or tax declarations and tax receipts/payments do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of ownership, the same cannot hold through (sic) anymore it appearing from the records that the muniments of titles as presented by the herein applicant are coupled with open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner, hence, it can be given greater weight in support of the claim for ownership. The [herein petitioner] is a private individual who is qualified under the law being a purchaser in good faith and for value. The adverse, open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in the concept of owner of the [petitioner] started as early as in 1992 when their predecessors in interest from Lourdes Jardeleza then to the herein [petitioner] without any disturbance of their possession as well as claim of ownership. Hence, uninterrupted possession and claim of ownership has ripen (sic) into an incontrovertible proof in favor of the [petitioner]. Premises considered, the Application of Petitioner Fernanda Arbias to bring Lot 287 under the operation of the Property Registration Decree is GRANTED. Let therefore a DECREE be issued in favor of the [petitioner] Fernanda Arbias, of legal age, married to Jimmy Arbias and a resident of Golingan St. Poblacion, Estancia, Iloilo and after the Decree shall have been issued, the corresponding Certificate of Title over the said parcel of land (Lot 287) shall likewise be issued in favor of the petitioner Fernanda Arbias after the parties shall have paid all legal fees due thereon.18 Respondent, through the OSG, filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal 19 of the above Decision. In its Brief20 before the Court of Appeals, respondent questioned the granting by the RTC of the application, notwithstanding the alleged non-approval of the survey plan by the Director of the Land Management Bureau (LMB); the defective publication of the notice of initial hearing; and the failure of petitioner to prove the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessor-in-interest. On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision in which it decreed, thus: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court dated June 26, 2000 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the application for original registration of title is hereby DISMISSED. 21 The appellate court declared that the Certification of the blueprint of the subject lots survey plan issued by the Regional Technical Director of the Lands Management Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) was equivalent to the approval by the Director of the LMB, inasmuch as the functions of the latter agency was already delegated to the former. The blueprint copy of said plan was also certified22 as a duly authentic, true and correct copy of the original plan, thus, admissible for the purpose for which it was offered. The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside the allegation that the Notice of Initial Hearing posted and published was defective for having indicated therein a much bigger area than that described in the tax declaration for the subject property. The appellate court ruled that the property is defined by its boundaries and not its calculated area, and measurements contained in tax declarations are merely based on approximation, rather than computation. At any rate, the Court of Appeals reasoned further that the discrepancy in its land area did not cast doubt on the identity of the subject property.

FERNANDA ARBIAS, Petitioner Vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Fernanda Arbias seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005 and 19 July 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 72120. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision, reversed the Decision4 dated 26 June 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 34, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-1025, which granted the application of petitioner Fernanda Arbias to register the subject property under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree); and in its assailed Resolution, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On 12 March 1993, Lourdes T. Jardeleza (Jardeleza) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale5 selling to petitioner, married to Jimmy Arbias (Jimmy), a parcel of unregistered land situated at Poblacion, Estancia, Iloilo, and identified as Cadastral Lot No. 287 of the Estancia Cadastre (subject property), for the sum of P33,000.00. According to the Deed, the subject property was residential and consisted of 600 square meters, more or less. Three years thereafter, on 17 June 1996, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Application for Registration of Title6 over the subject property, docketed as LRC Case No. N-1025. She attached to her application the Tracing Cloth with Blue Print copies, the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the subject property, the Surveyors Certification, the Technical Description of the land, and Declaration of Real Property in the name of petitioner and her spouse Jimmy.7 On 3 September 1996, the RTC transmitted the application with all the attached documents and evidences to the Land Registration Authority (LRA),8 pursuant to the latters function as the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands. 9 On 13 April 1998, the LRA submitted its report to the RTC that petitioner had already complied with all the requirements precedent to the publication.10 Subsequently, the RTC ordered that its initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-1025 be held on 17 February 1999.11 On 6 January 1999, the respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Notice of Appearance and deputized the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City to appear on its behalf before the RTC in LRC Case No. N-1025. Thereafter, the respondent filed an Opposition to petitioners application for registration of the subject property. 12 The RTC then ordered that its initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-1025 be re-set on 23 July 1999.13 The LRA, thus, issued on 16 March 1999 a Notice of Initial Hearing.14 The Notice of Initial Hearing was accordingly posted and published.15 At the hearing on 23 July 1999 before the RTC, petitioner took the witness stand where she identified documentary exhibits and testified as to her purchase of the subject property, as well as her acts of ownership and possession over the same. The owners of the lots adjoining the

It was on the issue of possession, however, that the Court of Appeals digressed from the ruling of the RTC. The appellate court found that other than petitioners own general statements and tax declarations, no other evidence was presented to prove her possession of the subject property for the period required by law. Likewise, petitioner failed to establish the classification of the subject property as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner sought reconsideration23 of the afore-mentioned Decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution24 dated 19 July 2006. Petitioner now comes to us via the instant Petition, raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO AS IT DID NOT OBJECT TO PETITIONERS EVIDENCE AND PRESENT PROOF TO REFUTE THE SAME. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DEPARTING FROM THE WELL SETTLED RULE THAT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT A QUO, WHICH IS IN BEST POSITION TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR, CONDUCT AND ATTITUDE OF THE WITNESS AT THE TRIAL, ARE GIVEN MORE WEIGHT AND MUCH MORE THAT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR THE REPUBLIC IN THE COURT BELOW. III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOT IN QUESTION CEASES (sic) TO BE PUBLIC LAND IN VIEW OF PETITIONERS AND THAT OF HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST POSSESSION EN CONCEPTO DE DUENO FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS. IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT PETITIONERS APPLICATION FOR TITLING WITHOUT REMANDING THE INSTANT CASE FIRST TO THE COURT A QUO FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THE RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASES OF VICENTE ABAOAG VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 045 Phil. 518 AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO ET. AL., G.R. NO. 60413, OCTOBER 31, 1990. Petitioner ascribes error on the part of the Court of Appeals for failing to conclude that she and her predecessor-in-interest possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and that the said property had already been classified as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner contends that her documentary and testimonial evidence were sufficient to substantiate the said allegations, as correctly and conclusively pronounced by the RTC. Petitioner likewise points out that no third party appeared before the RTC to oppose her application and possession other than respondent. Respondent, then represented by the City Prosecutor, did not even adduce any evidence before the RTC to rebut petitioners claims; thus, respondent, presently represented by the OSG, is now estopped from assailing the RTC Decision. Petitioner finally maintains that assuming her possession was indeed not proven under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, instead of dismissing it outright. This Court finds the petition plainly without merit. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 25

http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/sep1998/94524.htm - _edn21 Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.26 Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 152927 states the requirements necessary for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title to be issued. In accordance with said provision, persons who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, may file in the proper trial court an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives. Hence, the applicant for registration under said statutory provision must specifically prove: 1) possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from 12 June 1945 or earlier; and 2) the classification of the land as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the case at bar, petitioner miserably failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed on her by the law. First, the documentary evidence that petitioner presented before the RTC did not in any way prove the length and character of her possession and those of her predecessor-in-interest relative to the subject property. The Deed of Sale28 merely stated that the vendor of the subject property, Jardeleza, was the true and lawful owner of the subject property, and that she sold the same to petitioner on 12 March 1993. The Deed did not state the duration of time during which the vendor (or her predecessors-in-interest) possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner. Petitioners presentation of tax declarations of the subject property for the years 1983, 1989, 1991 and 1994, as well as tax receipts of payment of the realty tax due thereon, are of little evidentiary weight. Well-settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.29 The Survey Plan30 and Technical Description31 of the subject property submitted by petitioner merely plot the location, area and boundaries thereof. Although they help in establishing the identity of the property sought to be registered, they are completely ineffectual in proving that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest actually possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner for the necessary period. The following testimonial evidence adduced by petitioner likewise fails to persuade us: Direct Examination of Fernanda Arbias: Atty. Rey Padilla: Q: You said you bought this property from the Spouses Jardeleza. Can you tell us how long did they possess the subject property? A: 30 years. Q: And you said you bought this property sometime in the year 1993. After 1993, do you know if anybody filed claim or ownership of the subject property? A: No, Sir. Q: Can you tell us if anybody disturbed your possession in the subject property? A: No, Sir.

Q: Are you possessing the subject property in concept of the owner open and continuous? A: Yes, Sir. Q: What are the improvements you introduced in the subject property? A: I have the intention to put up my house.32 Cross Examination of Fernanda Arbias: Prosecutor Nelson Geduspan: Q: How long have you been in open, continuous, exclusive possession of this property? A: Almost six (6) years. Q: And before that it is Lourdes Jardeleza who is in open, continuous and in actual possession of the property? A: Yes, Sir. Q: Of your own knowledge, aside from this predecessor Lourdes Jardeleza, has anybody had any claim of the property? A: No, Sir.33 Quite obviously, the above-quoted statements made by petitioner during her testimony, by themselves, are nothing more than self-serving, bereft of any independent and objective substantiation. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner cannot thereby rely on her assertions to prove her claim of possession in the concept of an owner for the period required by law. Petitioner herself admitted that she only possessed the property for six years. The bare claim of petitioner that the land applied for had been in the possession of her predecessor-ininterest, Jardeleza, for 30 years, does not constitute the "well-nigh inconvertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration.34 Second, neither does the evidence on record establish to our satisfaction that the subject property has been classified as alienable and disposable. To prove this requirement, petitioner merely points to an annotation in the lower left portion of the blueprint of the subject property, which recites: ALL CORNERS ARE OLD POINTS. ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PROJ. 44 BLK-1 PER LC MAP. 1020 APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY ON JULY 26, 1933. COORDINATES OF BLLM#1 N=1266998.39, E=516077.19 LAT 11o 27 27.4" N, LONG 123o 08 9.9" E.35 (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioners reliance on the above inscription is misguided. In Menguito v. Republic, 36 we held that an applicant cannot rely on the notation in the blueprint made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer indicating that the property involved is alienable and disposable land. We emphasized therein that For the original registration of title, the applicant must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation x x x indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said

surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.37 In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain. The fact that no third person appeared before the RTC to oppose the petitioners application for registration is also irrelevant. The burden of proof imposed by law on petitioner does not shift. Indeed, a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors.38 Furthermore, the court has the bounden duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to register.39 Petitioner cannot also invoke estoppel on the part of the OSG as to bar the latter from challenging the decision of the RTC. In land registration cases, the Solicitor General is not merely the principal, but the only legal counsel of the government. 40 The City Prosecutor appeared as counsel for the respondent before the RTC only after being deputized by the OSG. Being the representative of the Republic of the Philippines, the OSG, thus, falls within the purview of the doctrine which provides that estoppel does not operate against the state or its agents.41 Although exceptions from this rule are allowed, as when there is a need to uphold a policy adopted to protect the public or to protect the citizens from dishonorable, capricious and ignoble acts by the government,42 the same are not present in the instant case. In fact, public policy demands that the respondent, through the OSG, must deter dubious applications for registration of real property and protect within all legal means the inalienable public domain which rightfully belongs only to the State. Finally, this Court cannot subscribe to the submission of the petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners appeal outright instead of remanding the same to the RTC for further proceedings. The cases cited by petitioner, namely Abaoag v. Director of Lands 43 and Republic v. Sayo,44 are not on all fours with the instant case. In Abaoag, we remanded the case notwithstanding the failure of the applicants to prove their entitlement to the registration of their property because the public land laws 45 prevailing at that time granted a presumption of ownership in favor of the actual occupants of the particular property and against the State; while in Sayo, the case was ordered remanded for further proceedings since it was proven that an invalid compromise agreement was entered into between parties and non-parties to the land registration case, without the participation of the Solicitor General, and that some of the parties therein failed to adduce evidence to prove their land ownership. None of the above circumstances appear to be present in the case presently before us. Simply, petitioner failed to prove that she had an imperfect title to the subject property, which could be confirmed by registration. She had every opportunity before the RTC to present all the evidence in support of her application for registration, and neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has the duty, absent any compelling reason, to grant her a second chance by remanding the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72120 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-20189 October 31, 1923

VALENTINA JOCSON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANTERO SORIANO, administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion, deceased, defendant-appellee. Salinas and Salinas for appellant. Fidel Ibaez and Eusebio C. Encarnacion for appellee.

Valentina Jocson, under the foregoing facts, prayed that said seven lots be excluded from the inventory of the administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion, and that the same be returned to her immediately. The lower court denied her petition and decided that said lots were a part of the estate of Silvestre Estacion and that, as such, Antero Soriano, as administrator, had a right to include them in his inventory and to administer them. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed. The appellant now contends that the inchoate title to said lots belongs to her and that she has the sole and exclusive right to occupy and administer them. Her contention is based upon the provisions of Act No. 1120, with special reference to section 16 of the same. Act No. 1120 provides, among other things, that the actual occupant of any portion of the Friar Lands at the time of the purchase by the Government should be given a preference in the right to purchase the land or lot occupied. Silvestre Estacion was the actual occupant, as tenant, of the said seven parcels of land at the time of the purchase by the Government and at the time of his purchase from the Government, and he continued to be in possession of the same until his death. Said Act further provides that the purchaser had a right to make a partial payments until the full payment purchase price was paid. The Act further provides that the title to each and every parcel land sold should remain in the Government until the full payment of all installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been made , and that any incumbrance created by the purchaser against said parcels or lots shall be invalid as against the Government Section 16 provides that "in the event of the death of a holder of a certificate (of purchase of any portion of said land), the issuance of which is provided for in section 12 hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the Government of any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same. . . ." At the time of the death of Silvestre Estacion, he had nothing but an inchoate right in the parcels of land. The title was still in the Government. The Government being the owner, until full payment was made, had a perfect right to prescribe how such property should be disposed of in case of the death of the husband. The character of the right of Silvestre Estacion was very analogous to that of a homesteader. At No. 926, which provides for the granting of homesteads, in its section 3 contains a very similar provision to that of section 16 of Act No. 1120, for the disposition of the homestead in case the applicant dies before title in him is perfected, leaving surviving him a wife. Said section 3 provides that "in the event of the death of an applicant (for a homestead) prior to the issuance of a patent (title), his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to her" upon a proper showing, and until a final title or patent is issued for the land to the applicant the Government remains the owner.

JOHNSON, J.: The only question presented by this appeal is: When the purchaser from the Government of lots or parcels of land formerly belonging to the Friar State dies before complete payment is made, leaving a widow surviving him, do such lots or parcels belong to the estate of the deceased to be administered by his administrator, or may the wife have the inchoate title in such lots or parcels transferred to her and thus be eliminated or excluded from the state of her deceased husband? The facts in the present case may be stated as follows: (a) that some time prior to November 1, 1918, the said Silvestre Estacion purchased from the Government the following lots or parcels of land Nos. 1018, 723, 1007, 687, 270, 742, and 386; ( b) that said lots had therefore been purchased by the Government as part of the Hacienda de los Frailes en el Municipio de Santa Cruz de Malabon ; (c) that Silvestre Estacion and his predecessors had been in possession, as tenants, of said parcels of land since before the American occupation of the Philippine Islands; ( d) that he was the occupant, as tenant, of said parcels of land at the time the said hacienda was purchased; (e) that after he had purchased said lots he continued to make the partial payments under his contract, up to the time of his death; (f) that he left a widow surviving him, who in the present plaintiff; (g) that after the death of Silvestre Estacion, and on the 12th day of September, 1919, the said Valentina Jocson, as the surviving widow of Silvestre Estacion, taking advantage of the provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120, had said lots transferred to her (see Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, and G); (h) that notwithstanding the fact that the widow, Valentina Jocson, of Silvestre Estacion had said lots transferred to her in accordance with said section 16 after the death of her husband, the administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion took possession of the same, included them in the inventory of the estate and continued to administer the same as a part of the estate of the deceased.

Acts Nos. 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting homestead rights and special privileges under the laws of United States and the various states of the Union. The statutes of the United States as well as of the various states of the Union contain provisions for the granting and protection of homesteads. Their object is to provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of three institutions. Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to pauperism. (Cook and Burgwall vs. McChristian, 4 Cal., 24; Franklin vs. Coffee, 70 Am. Dec., 292; Richardson, vs. Woodward, 104 Fed. Rep., 873; 21 Cyc., 459.) 1awph!l.net The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster families as the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare. The sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection and durability. (Waples on Homestead and Exemptions, p. 3.) Under the statutory and constitutional provisions of the various states of the Union it has been held that "homestead privilege does not determine on the husband's death but is transmitted to his widow and children." (21 Cyc., 562.) In the case of the Estate of Fath (132 Cal., 609) the Supreme Court of California held that "a homestead selected by the husband in his lifetime . . . vests absolutely in his surviving wife . . . The descent of the homestead to the surviving widow was governed by the law in force at the death of her husband." (Dickey vs. Gibson, 54 Am. St. Rep., 321.) Neither does a widow lose her right in the homestead estate of her first husband by a second marriage. (Sanders vs. Rusell, 21 Am. St. Rep., 29; Miles vs. Miles, 88 Am. Dec., 208.) Upon the death of the husband, the wife may continue to occupy the whole of the homestead. (Nicholas vs. Purczell, 89 Am. Dec., 572.) The doctrine announced with reference to the right of the widow in the homestead upon the death of her husband, does no injustice to the creditors of the deceased, since they have it always in their power to protect themselves either by refusing credit or by demanding such security as will protect the from loss. (Keyes vs. Cyrus, 38 Am. St. Rep., 296.) Said section 16 (Act No. 1120) provides that in the event of the death of a holder of a certificate prior to the execution of a deed by the Government, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land upon a showing that she has complied with the requirements of the law for the purchase of the same. In the present case the widow took the steps

necessary under the law to protect her right, and had the necessary certificates of transfer made to her (Exhibits A to H). From that date the inchoate right which her husband possessed passed to her, and to her alone, and she had a right to continue making the partial payments required, and when completed, to secure an absolute conveyance from the Government. The law conceded to her the right held by her husband, without diminution of control, subject only to her completing the contract with the Government. That being true, we are fully persuaded that the administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion had no interest nor any control whatever in the administration of said lots or parcels of land. Under the law they did not belong to the estate of Silvestre Estacion. Whatever interest he had, passed immediately upon his death to his widow. The said lots constituted no part of the estate of Silvestre Estacion. Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be revoked; that the defendant, as administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion, exclude the said seven parcels of land immediately from the inventory of said estate, return the possession thereof to the plaintiff, and that he render to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cavite, within a period of thirty days, a full and correct account of his administration of said parcels of land, and that he pay over to Valentina Jocson whatever sum or sums may be due her. And, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A nonstock corporation must have members. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.

Facts: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. Paranaques Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government -owned andcontrolled corporations upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. MIAAs contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended for public use. The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA

Issue: WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Paraaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void.

Held: 1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax. c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. n MIAAs case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of conveyance. d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAAs assets adverse to the Republic. e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real property tax. However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land

area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.