SUPREME COURT FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, -versusA. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

, Respondents. x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION LAUREL, J.: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), The rule has nowh ere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the necessity of the case. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows: SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid ob structions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. The proper distincti on the court said was this: The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which

cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation. (Field vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.) In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest. The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing, without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation. The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins vs. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good. And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered.

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-28066 September 22, 1976 PEREGRINA ASTUDILLO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, RAMON P. MITRA, SALUD O. MITRA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, respondents-appellees. Jose Villa Agustin for petitioner-appellant. San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin for appellees Mitras. Manuel L. Lazaro & Leonardo A. Reyes, Gov't. Corp. Counsel's Office for appellee Board of Director of the PHHC.

The lower court treated the motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss. It dismissed Peregrina's petition on the grounds that she is a mala fide squatter and that the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra cannot be assailed by means of certiorari and mandamus. Peregrina appealed to this Court. Her four assignments of error raise questions of law. She contends that the lower court erred in holding that certiorari and mandamus do not lie in this case and that she has no right to question the award to Mitra, and in not holding that the award of Lot 16 to him was in contravention of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Law and of the constitutional provision that a Senator or Representative should not directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the government of any subdivision or instrumentality thereof during his term of office. In the ultimate analysis the issue is whether Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her. We hold that she has no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra and to require that she be allowed to purchase the lot. As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of the law, the award to Mitra did not prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot which could have been impaired by that award (Baez vs. Court of Appeals, L-30351, September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 22). The record does not show, and Peregrina does not claim, that she is a member of the Piahan Homeowners Association some of whose members are "deserving squatters" (Kempis vs. Gonzales, L-31701, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 439). In the familiar language of procedure, she was not entitled to sue Mitra and the PHHC for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of a wrong. Those respondents did not commit any delict or wrong in violation of her rights because, in the first place, she has no right to the lot. Not being principally or subsidiarily bound in the contract of sale between Mitra and the PHHC, she is not entitled to ask for its annulment (Art. 1397, Civil Code). Peregrina invokes the PHHC charter (erroneously referred to as section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 648) which provides that the PHHC should acquire buildings so as to provide "decent housing for those who may be unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith" and that it should acquire large estates for their resale to bona fide occupants. Those provisions do not sustain her action in this case. They do not justify her act of squatting on a government-owned lot and then demanding that the lot be sold her because she does not yet own a residential lot and house. She is not a bona fide occupant of Lot 16. The State is committed to promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the field of housing (Secs. 6 and 7, Art. II, New Constitution). But the State's solicitude for the destitute and the have-nots does not mean that it should tolerate usurpations of property, public or private. "In carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a Policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution" (Bernardo vs. Bernards, 96 Phil. 202, 206). Indeed, the government has enunciated a militant policy against squatters. Thus, Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972 orders city and district engineers "to remove all illegal constructions, including buildings ... and those built without permits on public or private property" and provides for the relocation of squatters (68 O.G. 7962. See Letter of Instruction No. 19-A). As noted by Justice Sanchez, "since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a widespread vice" (City of Manila vs. Garcia, L-26053, February 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 413, 418).

AQUlNO, J.: Peregrina Astudillo appealed from the "resolution" dated April 18, 1967 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Ramon P. Mitra and dismissing her petition for certiorari and mandamus (Civil Case No. Q8741). According to the pleadings of respondents Mitra and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) *, Mitra on December 28, 1957 applied, in behalf of his minor son, Ramon Mitra Ocampo, for the purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155 of the East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in Piahan, Quezon City. His application was approved on January 3, 1958. He made a downpayment of P840, an amount equivalent to ten percent of the price of the lot. On September 9, 1961 the PHHC and Mitra executed a contract of conditional sale. After Mitra had paid in full the price, which totalled more than nine thousand pesos, a final deed of sale was executed in his favor on February 18, 1965. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89875 was issued to him on March 1, 1965. The lot in question is acqually in the possession of Peregrina Astudillo. She constructed thereon a residential house (a shanty, according to Mitra). She admits that she has been squatting on the said lot "uninterruptedly since 1957 up to the present" (p. 52, Record). She filed with the administrative investigating committee of the PHHC a request dated February 24, 1963, praying for the cancellation of the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra and asking the committee to recommend that it be re-awarded to her. No action was taken on that request. On May 3, 1965 Peregrina filed in the lower court her aforementioned petition against the PHHC board of directors, the register of deeds of Quezon City and the spouses Ramon P. Mitra and Salud O. Mitra. She questioned the legality of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. She asked that Lot 16 be sold to her. After the respondents had filed their answers, the Mitra spouses filed a verified motion for summary judgment. They assumed that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. Peregrina Astudillo opposed the motion. The parties submitted memoranda.

The lower court did not err in holding that Peregrina Astudillo cannot use the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus to secure a judicial review of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: +.wph!1 SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person agrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant. Respondent PHHC board is not the board contemplated in section 1 of Rule 65. It does not exercise judicial functions. The award being questioned was a routinary corporate act that was within the board's competence. No jurisdictional issue was involved in that award. certiorari lies only for the correction of jurisdictional errors (Gov't. of the P.I. vs. Judge of 1st Instance of Iloilo 34 Phil 157, 159). Nor is the relief sought by Peregrina Astudillo, which is to compel the PHHC board to cancel the award of Lot 16 to Mitra and to resell it to her, a right that can be enforced by mandamus. What she wants is to force the PHHC to execute a contract of sale in her favor. That is not within the purview of the writ of mandamus. Thus, it was held that "the writ of mandamus is not an appropriate or even admissible remedy to enforce, the performance of a private contract which has not been fully performed by either party" (Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil. 337). In Jacinto vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853, a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance for certain lots in favor of the petitioner was denied. Generally, title to property cannot be litigated in a mandamus proceeding (City of Manila vs. Posadas, 48 Phil. 309, 337). It is not a ministerial duty of the PHHC board to award Lot 16 to Peregrina. Anyway, it has already been shown that as a squatter she is not clothed with any right to Lot 16 that may be enforced in a court of justice. The PHHC board completely ignored the alleged demands of Peregrina for the purchase of Lot 16. It did not render any decision against her. Its inaction cannot be assailed by certiorari or mandamus.

Peregrina's other assignment of error is that the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra was a violation of section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law and of section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, now section 11, Article VIII of the new Constitution. On the other hand, Mitra contends that the PHHC performs proprietary functions. He observed that the following high-ranking officials were awarded PHHC lots: Felixberto Serrano, Dominador Antonio, Manuel Lim, Fernando Lopez, Pacita M. Gonzales, Genaro Magsaysay, Daniel Romualdez, Felipe A. Abrigo, Bartolome Cabangbang, Juan Duran, Manuel Enverga, Angel Fernandez, Jose Nuguid, Antonio de Pio, Lorenzo Teves, Faustino Tobia, Pedro Trono, Marcelino Veloso and Valeriano Yancha. We are of the opinion that that assignment of error need not be resolved in this case. Having shown that Peregrina has no cause of action to assail the award of Lot 16 to Mitra, it follows that in this particular case she cannot assail that award by invoking the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law and the Constitution. This is not the proper forum for the ventilation of that question. (See Commonwealth Act No. 626; Hernandez vs. Albano, 112 Phil. 506; Solidum and Concepcion, Jr. vs. Hernandez, 117 Phil. 335). WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 139285 December 21, 2007

e) For the maintenance of the Cathedral and Peafrancia Shrine, which now include the Basilica Minore Housing our venerable image of Our Lady of Peafrancia and the venerable portrait of Divine Rostro; f) That the petitioner (church) is amenable to continue the leasehold system with the present cultivators or tenants.4 This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao in an Order dated December 8, 1997.5 A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated June 10, 1998.6 The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on Certiorari. Archbishop argued that even if the lands in question are registered in his name, he holds the lands in trust for the benefit of his followers as cestui que trust. Archbishop further argued that the deeds of donation by which the lands were transferred to him imposed numerous fiduciary obligations, such that he cannot sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber, or mortgage the subject lands. By this reasoning, Archbishop concluded that he is not the "landowner" contemplated by PD 27 and Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, the CARL of 1988. He then prayed that the assailed orders of the DAR be reversed, or in the alternative, that the alleged beneficiaries of the trust be each allowed to exercise rights of retention over the landholdings.7 The petition was dismissed by the CA in its February 4, 1999 Decision. 8 Archbishop filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied in the June 18, 1999 CA Resolution. 9 Archbishop now brings the matter before us through this petition. The Issues

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM and DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR (Region V), Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) has truly noble goals, and these noble goals should not be stymied by the creation of exemptions or exceptions not contemplated by the law. The Case In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres (Archbishop) questions the February 4, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48282, which upheld the December 8, 1997 and June 10, 1998 Orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Facts Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees. In 1985, Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office No. 19, Naga City, Camarines Sur several petitions for exemption of certain properties located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.2 Two of these petitions were denied in an Order dated November 6, 1986, issued by the Regional Director of DAR, Region V, Juanito L. Lorena.3 Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director, and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres. In his appeal, Archbishop cited the following grounds: a) That said properties are all covered by conditional donations subject to the prohibitions of the donors to SELL, EXCHANGE, LEASE, TRANSFER, ENCUMBER OR MORTGAGE the properties; b) That they are used for charitable and religious purposes; c) That the parishes located in depressed areas badly need them for the furtherance of their mission work, propagation of the faith, maintenance and support of their chapels, churches and educational religious institutions like the Holy Rosary Major and Minor Seminaries for the promotion of the priesthood vocation; d) For the preservation of good relationship between church and state thru noninfringement of the right to exercise religious profession and worship;

Archbishop raises issues he had raised previously, which, he contends, the CA failed to properly address. He claims that the CA erred in holding that he is only entitled to assert one right of retention as the subject properties are registered in his name. He further claims that an express trust had been created wherein he only held naked title to the subject properties on behalf of the beneficiaries. He argues that it is not the "landowner" contemplated by the law, but merely a trustee, and as such is entitled to as many rights of retention on behalf of the beneficiaries of each particular property. He then raises the question of the applicability of the ruling in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. The Land Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Davao City,10 which, he cites, ruled that properties held by the Church are held by it as a mere administrator for the benefit of the members of that particular religion. As Archbishop claims to be merely an administrator of the subject properties, he argues that these subject properties should have been exempt from the OLT. The Courts Ruling The petition has no merit. Archbishops arguments, while novel, must fail in the face of the law and the dictates of the 1987 Constitution. The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds "naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of ownership. Archbishop would have us read deeper into the law, to create exceptions that are not stated in PD 27 and RA 6657, and to do so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of landless farmers and farmworkers. Archbishop was found to be the registered owner of the lands in question, and does not contest that fact. For the purposes of the law, this makes him the landowner, without the necessity of

going beyond the registered titles. He cannot demand a deeper examination of the registered titles and demand further that the intent of the original owners be ascertained and followed. To adopt his reasoning would create means of sidestepping the law, wherein the mere act of donation places lands beyond the reach of agrarian reform. There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per landowner. Neither PD 27 nor RA 6657 has a provision for a landowner to exercise more than one right of retention. The law is simple and clear as to the retention limits per landowner. PD 27 states, "In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it"; while RA 6657 states: SEC. 6. Retention Limits.Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall the retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. Nothing in either law supports Archbishops claim to more than one right of retention on behalf of each cestui que trust. The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further interpretationthere is only one right of retention per landowner, and no multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party. Furthermore, the scheme proposed by Archbishop would create as many rights of retention as there are beneficiaries, which could in effect protect the entire available land area from agrarian reform. Under Archbishops reasoning, there is not even a definite landowner to claim separate rights of retention, and no specific number of rights of retention to be claimed by the landowners. There is simply no basis in the law or jurisprudence for his argument that it is the "beneficial ownership" that should be used to determine which party would have the right of retention. Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not have the power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage the transferred properties. He claims that these conditions do not make him the landowner as contemplated by the law. This matter has already been answered in Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City (Hospicio) v. Department of Agrarian Reform.11 In that case, wherein Act No. 3239 prohibited the sale under any consideration of lands donated to the Hospicio, a charitable organization, the Court found that the lands of the Hospicio were not exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform. In characterizing the sale of land under agrarian reform, we stated: Generally, sale arises out of contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the first essential requisite of every contract that is the presence of consent. Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the agreement. The absence or vitiation of consent renders the sale either void or voidable. In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicios property did not arise as a consequence of the Hospicios consent to the transfer. There was no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand, and the DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to constitute the contract that is to serve ultimately as the basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands. Instead, the obligation to transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27.12 We discussed further:

The twin process of expropriation under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly described in common law jurisdictions as "sale made under the process of the court and in the mode prescribed by law," and "which is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc." The term has not been precisely defined in this jurisdiction, but reference to the phrase itself is made in Articles 223, 242, 237 and 243 of the Civil Code, which uniformly exempt the family home "from execution, forced sale, or attachment." Yet a forced sale is clearly different from the sales described under Book V of the Civil Code which are conventional sales, as it does not arise from the consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law. Still, since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as it is authorized by law.13 Archbishops claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the subject properties is unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory sale under PD 27 and RA 6657 defeats such a claim. Other less scrupulous parties may even attempt creating trusts to prevent their lands from coming under agrarian reform, and say that the trustee has no power to dispose of the properties. The disposition under PD 27 and RA 6657 is of a different character than what is contemplated by jus disponendi, wherein under these laws, voluntariness is not an issue, and the disposition is necessary for the laws to be effective. Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged conditions of the donations would have primacy over the application of the law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditions of the donation, since it is by application of law and beyond Archbishops control. The application of the law cannot and should not be defeated by the conditions laid down by the donors of the land. If such were allowed, it would be a simple matter for other landowners to place their lands without limit under the protection of religious organizations or create trusts by the mere act of donation, rendering agrarian reform but a pipe dream. Archbishops contention that he is merely an administrator of the donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from the coverage of agrarian reform. Under PD 27, the coverage is lands devoted to rice and corn. Section 4 of RA 6657 states, "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture." The lands in Archbishops name are agricultural lands that fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall under the exemptions. The exemptions under RA 6657 form an exclusive list, as follows: SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. (a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform Program. In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the workerbeneficiaries or tenants who shall form cooperative or association to manage the same.

In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farmworkers shall no longer be necessary; however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply. (c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production center, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (As amended by R. A. 7881) Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not appear under the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as administrator does not create another class of lands exempt from the coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.14 does not create another definition for the term "landowner." We explained in Hospicio: It is axiomatic that where a general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, the Court will not curtail nor add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others. We cannot simply impute into a statute an exception which the Congress did not incorporate. Moreover general welfare legislation such as land reform laws is to be construed in favor of the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of the people. Since a broad construction of the provision listing the properties exempted under the CARL would tend to denigrate the aims of agrarian reform, a strict application of these exceptions is in order.15 Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the millions of Filipino faithful, as the lands are clearly not exempt under the law. He should not fear that his followers are simply being deprived of land, as under both PD 27 and RA 6657, he is entitled to just compensation, which he may then use for the benefit of his followers. His situation is no different from other landowners affected by agrarian reformthey are somewhat deprived of their land, but it is all for a greater good. As Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 16 recognized the revolutionary character of the expropriation under the agrarian reform law, we follow such lofty ideal for the resolution of this case. This grand purpose under the CARL must not be hindered by the simple expedient of appending conditions to a donation of land, or by donating land to a church. This is not to cast aspersions on religious organizations, but it is not fitting for them to be used as vehicles for keeping land out of the hands of the landless. The law is indubitably in line with the charitable ideals of religious organizations to ensure that the land they own falls into the hands of able caretakers and owners. As a religious leader, Archbishop can take solace in the fact that his lands are going to be awarded to those who need and can utilize them to the fullest. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the February 4, 1999 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48282. SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 132759 October 25, 2005 ALEJANDRO DANAN, ET AL, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTRELLA ARRASTIA, Respondents. x----------------------------------------x G.R. No. 132866 THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, Petitioners, vs. ESTRELLA ARRASTIA, Respondent. DECISION Tinga, J.: This deals with two separate Rule 45 petitions, later consolidated, filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ("DARAB") and Alfredo Danan, et al. Both petitions seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 33796, which reversed and set aside the DARAB Decision in DARAB Case No. 1551 and its Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners ("private petitioners") in G.R. No. 132759 are all residents of Lubao, Pampanga, claiming to be cultivating a vast landholding owned by the heirs of Teodorica Reinares Arrastia, Leticia Arrastia Montenegro and Juanita Arrastia ("Arrastia heirs"). Said property has an aggregate area of approximately three hundred (300) hectares and is situated at the Barangays of Lourdes, Baruya, and San Isidro, all within the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga. The records of the case show that the landholding had been subdivided and distributed among the Arrastia heirs and the corresponding certificates of titles issued accordingly. Petitioner in G.R. No. 132866 is the DARAB, the adjudication arm of the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR") that is tasked to implement the governments comprehensive agrarian reform program ("CARP"). The common respondent in both petitions is Estrella Arrastia, one of the Arrastia heirs and a coowner of the disputed property. Respondent Arrastia own 4.4630 hectares of the disputed property. The factual antecedents are as follows: Sometime in 1976, a certain Rustico Coronel leased the subject property for a period of twelve (12) years or until the crop year 1987 to 1988. 1 On September 27, 1986, persons claiming to be farmers and residents of Barangay Lourdes and Barangay San Rafael signed a joint resolution as members of the Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura ("AMA") to enter and lease the subject property from the Arrastia heirs. Then Pampanga Governor Brien Guiao favorably endorsed the resolution to then Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Heherson Alvarez. On the basis of said resolution but without the consent of the landowners, the AMA members, who are herein petitioners, entered the disputed land, cleared portions thereof and

planted various crops thereon. This culminated in a violent confrontation on May 21, 1988 that led to the filing of criminal charges against AMA members.2 On June 2, 1988, the AMA filed a complaint with petitioner DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. 0001, praying that respondent Arrastia be prevented from destroying standing crops on the disputed property and from fencing said property and that petitioners be allowed to continue with their farming thereon. On August 15, 1988, the DARAB ordered the DAR Regional Director to conduct an ocular inspection on the disputed property. 3 The inspection team submitted an Ocular/Investigation Report with the observation that there were no substantially significant plantings on the disputed property. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer ("MARO") of Lubao, Pampanga also submitted a report dated September 21, 1989, recommending the disqualification of private petitioners from availing of the benefits under the CARP. 4 On October 5, 1988, the DARAB issued an order denying AMAs motion for authority to cultivate. The order became final and executory on July 29, 1989, after the DARAB denied AMAs motion for reconsideration.5 On behalf of her co-heirs and co-owners, Arrastia instituted an action against private petitioners for violation of Section 73(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 on October 9, 1989. Arrastias complaint, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 2000, was raffled to Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga on October 9, 1989. The trial court, sitting as a special agrarian court ("SAC"), issued a temporary restraining order, and subsequently a preliminary injunction, both enjoining private petitioners from entering and cultivating the disputed property. On November 29, 1989, private petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ("PARAD") against Arrastia, alleging that they were actual tillers of the disputed property who were forcibly evicted by Arrastia from their tenanted lots through the use of armed men. In their complaint, docketed as DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P 89, they prayed that Arrastia be restrained from preventing them from reoccupying the property in question. Upon referral of the matter to the respective Barangay Agrarian Reform Committees ("BARC") of the Barangays of Lourdes, San Isidro, and San Rafael, BARC officials reported that the dispute could no longer be settled amicably. In particular, the BARC of Barangay San Rafael (Baruya), Lubao informed the hearing officer that private petitioners were tenants or actual tillers of the disputed property. The Lubao MARO also submitted the reports of other BARC officials.6 On the basis of the reports submitted by BARC officials and private petitioners affidavits, the hearing officer issued on December 9, 1990 an order granting a preliminary injunction to restrain Arrastia from disturbing private petitioners in the tilling of the disputed property. The PARAD hearing officer also directed the MARO to act on the petition for the coverage of the disputed property under the CARP.7 Meanwhile, on January 30, 1991, Arrastia filed an omnibus motion in DARAB Case No. 0001, questioning the jurisdiction of the hearing officer to issue an order of injunction. The DARAB denied said motion and subsequently issued the writ of injunction on September 22, 1992. Arrastia filed an answer in DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P 89, interposing the defense that the disputed land was not devoted to agriculture and that private petitioners were not tenants thereof. After due hearing, the PARAD rendered a decision in DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P 89 on May 13, 1993, declaring that the subject property is covered by the CARP and that private petitioners are qualified beneficiaries of the program. The adjudicator also issued an injunction prohibiting Arrastia from disturbing private petitioners occupation of the property. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board hereby renders judgment:

(1) Confirming and declaring that the subject landholding with an area of 300 hectares, more or less, situated at Barangays Lourdes, San Isidro and San Rafael (Baruya), Lubao, Pampanga, owned by the defendant and her co-owners are agricultural land subject to the coverage of RA No. 6657, and that plaintiffs are qualified beneficiaries who enjoy the benefits of agrarian laws including the right to an award of the lands they actually till in accordance with the procedure therein; (2) Making the preliminary injunction hereto forthwith issued, prohibiting the defendant and her co-owners and all other persons claiming any right or title under them, from continuing to exclude plaintiffs and from re-entry and re-occupation of the subject landholding as agricultural tenants and their restoration thereat, final and permanent; and (3) Ordering the defendant and her co-owners to pay plaintiffs the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus costs.8 Arrastia appealed the aforementioned decision to petitioner DARAB. The appeal was docketed as DARAB Case No. 1551. On March 28, 1994, the DARAB rendered its decision modifying the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The judgment of the Provincial Adjudicator is hereby modified as follows: 1. Declaring Dominador Flores, Rodrigo Serrano, Oscar Salazar, Alejandro Danan, Tirso Lingad, Francisco Santos, Dante Danan, Jesus Castro, Amado Escueta, Marcos Susi, Francisco Bernate, Felix Escueta, Ladislao Danan, Lamberto Danan, Carlito Santos, Orlando Santos, Jose Manansala, Eulalio Danan, Eddie Escueta, Conrado Castro, Pedro Tala and Victorino Tala to be agricultural lessees on their respective tillages, and ordering their reinstatement on the land; 2. Ordering the rest of the Plaintiffs-Appellees to be reinstated on the land and to possess and occupy their respective areas of cultivation; 3. Ordering the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer for the Province of Pampanga and the Municipal Reform Officer for the Municipality of Lubao, Province of Pampanga to immediately undertake administrative processes for the coverage of the land under Republic Act No. 6657 and other applicable agrarian laws, DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, DAR Department Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1993 and other DAR rules and regulations taking into consideration the qualifications of Appellees to be beneficiaries of the program as well as the right of retention of the owners of the subject landholding and the last paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 6657 which provides: Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within the period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares. 4. Ordering Defendant-Appellant, or any person or persons acting for and in behalf, to refrain from committing any act or acts which will disturb or in any way adversely interfere with the peaceful possession, occupation and farming activities of Appellees on the land itself; 5. Ordering Defendant-Appellant to pay Plaintiff-Appellees the reasonable amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees plus costs of the suit; and

6. Ordering the Regional Sheriff of the DAR Regional Adjudication Board, Region III, to implement this Order and submit a return to this Board within seven (7) days from receipt of this Order. This decision is immediately executory pursuant to Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657. 9 Aggrieved, Arrastia elevated the controversy to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB. On the issue of whether private petitioners are qualified beneficiaries under the CARP, the appellate court ruled in the negative mainly on the basis of the report of MARO Josefina Vidal which was quoted at length in its Decision. In the said report, the MARO recommended the disqualification of private petitioners from the coverage of the CARP in view of their continued violation of Sections 22 and 23 of Executive Order No. 229, under which persons, associations, or entities which prematurely enter lands covered by agrarian reform shall be permanently disqualified from CARP coverage and cited for contempt, respectively. The Court of Appeals also found private petitioners guilty of violating the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction issued by the SAC in Agrarian Case No. 2000 and also the temporary restraining issued by the Court of Appeals itself on April 13, 1994. The appeals court denied the motions for reconsideration separately filed by private petitioners. Hence, the petitions before this Court. In its petition, DARAB raised the following issues: 1.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE ENTIRETY OF THE DECISION APPEALED FROM, TO INCLUDE THE ORDER TO PLACE THE DISPUTED LANDHOLDINGS UNDER CARP COVERAGE, ON THE SOLE BASIS OF THE FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (FARMERS) THEREIN WERE DISQUALIFIED AS FARMER BENEFICIARIES; 1.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED ON THE DISQUALIFICATION OF ALL THE FARMERS (PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREIN), IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY (OR SOME) ARE AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OR NOT, ON THE SOLE BASIS OF A FIELD REPORT THAT WAS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED WITHOUT THE FARMERS AT LEAST GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, THUS, VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS.10 In turn, private petitioners in their petition impute the following errors to the Court of Appeals: 1. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FIRST DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. NO. 33796 AND REQUIRED THE DARAB TO ELEVATE TO IT THE RECORDS OF DARAB CASE NO. 1551 INCLUDING ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED SO IT COULD HAVE FULLY APPRECIATED ALL THE FACTS INSTEAD OF MERELY RELYING ON THE PLEADINGS FILED BEFORE IT. 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS BY ITS FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO CONSIDER SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PETITIONERS IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN DARAB CASE NO. 161-P89 AND DARAB CASE NO. 1551 RESULTING IN FINDINGS WHICH ARE NOT ONLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT ARE FURTHER PATENTLY PARTIAL TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS FROM ITS REVIEW OF THE DARAB DECISION IN DARAB CASE NO. 1551 WITHOUT ANY BASIS ON THE DECISION ITSELF THUS CITING ERRORS IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH WERE NOT ACTUALLY MADE BY THE DARAB.

4. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE DARAB WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO EVIDENCE PRESENTED BEFORE THE LATTER.11 The two petitions advance two main arguments: first, the Court of Appeals finding that private petitioners are ineligible to become CARP beneficiaries is without factual or evidentiary basis; second, the Court of Appeals reversal of the DARABs order to undertake administrative proceedings for the acquisition of the subject property for agrarian reform purposes is premature. Private petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals declaration that they are not qualified beneficiaries of the CARP has no evidentiary basis because it failed to order the transmittal of the DARAB records, particularly the reports of the different BARC officials establishing tenancy relationship between private petitioners and the owners of the disputed property. For its part, DARAB denies having categorically declared in its decision in DARAB Case No. 1551 that private petitioners are qualified beneficiaries because the administrative proceeding to determine the beneficiaries entitled under R.A. No. 6657 was yet to be undertaken not by DARAB but by the administrative officials of DAR. DARAB also describes as arbitrary and unilateral the MARO report quoted by the appellate court in support of its ruling that private petitioners prematurely entered the disputed property. The resolution of the issue on private petitioners eligibility under the CAR P calls for a review of the evidence on record to determine whether or not the conclusion of the Court of Appeals has factual basis. At the outset, it should be noted that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, as it is not a trier of facts. It is a settled doctrine that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, not to be disturbed unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 12 The DARAB and the Court of Appeals findings in respect to the status of private petitioners are conflicting. The DARAB found that private petitioners are either agricultural lessees paying rentals to the landowners or actual tillers in possession of distinct portions of the subject property. The Court of Appeals, however, found private petitioners as not qualified to become CARP beneficiaries on account of certain violations they committed and considered it unnecessary to ascertain their status as agricultural lessees or tillers. In view of the divergent opinions, the Court must review the evidence relied upon by the DARAB and the Court of Appeals in arriving at their respective conclusions. The Court affirms factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. The appellate courts conclusion that private petitioners committed particular violations warranting their disqualification from the CARP is based on the MARO report which has not been disputed by all the private petitioners. The MARO who prepared the report enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of her functions. Absent any showing that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in giving evidentiary weight to said report, said factual findings are generally deemed conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts.13 Anent DARABs contention that the MARO report was made unilaterally and without giving private petitioners the opportunity to be heard, the circumstances not nullify said report for lack of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied

to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.14 Private petitioners cannot claim denial of due process simply because they had ample opportunity to rebut the MAROs findings and present contrary evidence in the proceedings before the PARAD, the DARAB, or the Court of Appeals. Private petitioners insist that they are bona fide agricultural tenants of the disputed property. It is unnecessary to pass upon this issue in the light of the categorical finding of the appellate court that private petitioners are no longer entitled to avail of the benefits under the CARP. In any event, however, the claim is not well-founded. A perusal of the decision in DARAB Case No. 1551 reveals that DARAB classified two (2) sets of farmworkers, i.e., those who cultivated the land and paid corresponding rentals, and those who occupied and cultivated portions of the disputed property since 1986 as certified by BARC officials. Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.15 In the case at bar, it has not been sufficiently established that private petitioners occupation and cultivation of the disputed property was with the consent of the landowners. DARAB assails the Court of Appeals in reversing the DARAB decision in its entirety. It contends that the determination of private petitioners eligibility under R.A. No. 6657 has no bearing on its order to commence administrative procedure for the acquisition of the disputed property. As borne by the case records,16 respondent Arrastia owns only 4.4630 hectares of the subject property, which is below the retention limit under Section 617 of R.A. No. 6657 granting a right of retention of up to a maximum of five (5) hectares of agricultural land in favor of a landowner whose property may be acquired for distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of five (5) hectares. His land will not be covered at all by the operation land transfer program although all requisites for coverage are present. The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.18 For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, which supplies the details for the exercise of a landowner's retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers.19 Therefore, there is no legal and practical basis to order the commencement of the administrative proceedings for the placement of respondent Arrastias land under the CARP since her propertys land area falls below the retention limit of five (5) hectares. WHEREFORE, both petitions in G.R No. 132759 and G.R. No. 132866 are DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33796 is AFFIRMED. Costs against private petitioners. SO ORDERED.

order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98). Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119). The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168). On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187). Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it: (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." PARAS, J.: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80). On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81). Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).: rd Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ." (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling. In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ." The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.:-cralaw The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows: ARTICLE XIII x x x AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

EN BANC [G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.] 192 SCRA 51 LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

DECISION

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. x x x" Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11). On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words: "Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming. It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . . Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit. Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83). The petition is impressed with merit. The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).: rd Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning

except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]). The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionallymandated agrarian reform program of the Government. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11). The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30). In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted as follows: x x x "Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects. I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618). x x x The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows: x x x "Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang

inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621). It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21). Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).:-cralaw It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343). However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989). Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 137431. September 7, 2000] EDGARDO SANTOS, represented by his attorney-in-fact ROMEO L. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS DIAZ, ROBERTO ONG and AUGUSTO AQUINO, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) provides that just compensation to landowners shall be paid in cash and bonds. Hence, a trial court decision directing the payment of such compensation "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657" is not illegally amended but is merely clarified by an order, issued during the execution proceedings, that such amount shall be paid in cash and bonds. The Case Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the December 8, 1998 Decision [1] and the February 2, 1999 Resolution [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) [3] in CA-GR SP No. 48517, which had respectively dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, filed by petitioner, and denied reconsideration. The decretal part of the assailed Decision reads: "WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Order of April 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED." [4] The Facts The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized in the assailed Decision, as follows: "It appears that petitioner Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-3206 for the determination of just compensation regarding properties which were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in 1972. On August 12, 1997, the Regional Trial Court, sitting as an Agrarian Court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (1) fixing the amount of P49,241,876.00 to be the just compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands with areas of 36.4152 and 40.7874 hectares, respectively, and situated at Pinit, Ocampo, Camarines Sur which are portions of the agricultural lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 2883 and 2884 in the name of the [p]laintiff, and which were taken by the government pursuant to Land Reform Program as provided in Presidential Decree No. 27; and (2) ordering Defendant Land Bank of the Philippines to pay [p]laintiff the amount of FORTY-FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINE-EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE AND 34/100 (P45,698,805.34) PESOS, Philippine [c]urrency, in the manner provided by R.A. 6657, by way of full payment of the said just compensation. No pronouncement as to costs." "A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3,543,070.66 had in fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and bond; thus deducting it from the total amount adjudged, the balance unpaid amount[ed] to P45,698,805.34 which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance with RA 6657. "The Land Bank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which eventually dismissed the appeal in its Resolution dated December 17, 1997. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued

by the Regional Trial Court on December 4, 1997 and a notice of garnishment was served on the Land Bank on December 17, 1997. "On December 22, 1997, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order declaring that the Land Bank had complied with the writ of execution and ordered the same to release the amount of P44,749,947.82 to petitioner and the amount of P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court as commission fees for execution of judgment. "The Land Bank remitted the amount of P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court on December 24, 1997 and released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in cash and Land Bank Bond No. AR-0002206 in the amount of P41,128,024.81 to the petitioner. "Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution before the Regional Trial Court, praying that the payment of the compensation be in proportion of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and P32,499,745 in cash, alleging that the cash portion should include the amounts in the Decision representing the interest payments. "Before the motion could be resolved by the Regional Trial Court, petitioner moved to withdraw the same and instead filed a motion for release of the balance of the garnished amount. He claimed that the payment of P41,128,024.81 in Land Bank Bonds was not acceptable to him and that the said amount should be paid in cash or certified check. The respondent Land Bank, on the other hand, opposed the motion, contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied on December 24, 1997. "The Regional Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to release the balance of P41,128,024.81 from the garnished amount in cash or certified check. "The Land Bank moved for a reconsideration of the said Order, maintaining that the payment was properly made in Land Bank Bonds. "On March 25, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to hold the Land Bank in contempt for its refusal to release the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified check. "Respondent Regional Trial Court presided over by a new judge, resolved the two motions on April 24, 1998. It held that the payment of just compensation must be computed in the manner provided for in Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657. Thus, it ruled that:

"To summarize, the very issue to be resolved in the instant case is to determine how much should be paid in cash and how much also should be paid in bonds, to fully satisfy the judgment herein rendered in the amount of P49,241,876.00, the computation of which is as follows: Total land value per judgment P49,241,876.00 Amount payable in bonds: 70% (50 has) P22,323,932.75 75% (excess) P13,012,907.41 35,336,840.16 Amount payable in cash: 30% (50 has) P9,567,399.75 35% (excess) 4,337,635.81 13,905,035.56 Less:

Preliminary valuation: P3,543,070.66 Commissioner's Fee: 948,857.52 Payment to plaintiff on 12-24-97 3,621,023.01 P 8,112,951.19 ______________ P 5,792,084.37 "Consequently, not only must the Order of March 20, 1997 be reconsidered, but by implication, the Order of this Court dated December 22, 1997 is likewise deemed reconsidered. It goes without saying that the payment of just compensation must be made in accordance with Sec. 18, Republic Act No. 6657 in relation to Section 9, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as it does not contravene x x x the former. "On the basis of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit [i]n the motion to cite in contempt of court the Land Bank of the Philippines. "Be it also noted that Defendant Land Bank, through counsel, has submitted a re-computation of the compensation in accordance with her manifestation on oral argument [with] which this court begs to disagree. "WHEREFORE, Defendant Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the [p]laintiff the [c]ash [b]alance of FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND EIGHTYFOUR and 37/100 (P5,792,084.37), Philippine [c]urrency and the amount of THIRTY FIVE MILLION, THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY and 16/100 (P35,336,840.16) PESOS in government instruments or bonds to fully satisfy the Judgment herein in the amount of forty-nine million two hundred forty one thousand eight hundred seventy six (P49,241,876.00) pesos, Philippine [c]urrency as just compensation due the [p]laintiff. "Thus, the Order of this Court dated March 20, 1998 is hereby reconsidered and SET ASIDE and by implication, the Order dated December 22, 1997 is hereby deemed reconsidered and MODIFIED accordingly. "The Motion to Cite in Contempt of Court the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby DENIED.

ha[d] become final and executory. Nevertheless, in the exercise of her supervisory powers over the execution of a final and executory judgment, Judge Villegas-Llaguno found it necessary to modify the order of Judge Naval dated December 22, 1997 as regards the order of execution since it had erroneously applied Section 9, Article 39 of the Rules of Court regarding satisfaction of money judgments in the manner of payment even as to the portion required to be paid in bonds, and thus, had completely disregarded the portion in the final and executory decision of August 12, 1997 which makes direct reference to RA 6657. "The garnishment, on the other hand, of the amount of P45,698,805.34 from the Land Bank of the Philippines does not affect the execution of the judgment in the case. As above-expounded, the judgment was to be fully executed in accordance with the provisions of R.A. 6657 which allows the landowner to have the compensation be paid in cash and in bond, but not fully in cash, as herein petitioner would like to maintain. Technically, the garnishment which was made in this case pursuant to the order of execution by Judge Naval shall extend only to the cash portion of the judgment amount. On the other hand, with respect to the amount to be issued in bonds, the only jurisdiction of the trial court is to order the Land Bank of the Philippines to issue the corresponding bonds and deliver the same to herein petitioners. Hence, this Petition. [6] Issues In his Memorandum, [7] petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: "1. Did respondent judge act without jurisdiction when she issued the Order dated 24 April 1998 amending the final Judgment dated 12 August 1997? "2. Is it a ministerial duty of the respondent judge to order the release and of the Land Bank to release the garnished amount under Section 9 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court? "3. May respondent Land Bank question the legality of its own compliance with the Writ of Execution? "4. Are the respondent judge and the respondent Land Bank and its officials liable for damages under Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court?" [8] In short, the main issue is whether the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno was proper. The Court's Ruling

"SO ORDERED." We find no merit in this Petition. "Petitioner's motion to reconsider the above-mentioned Order was denied on June 17, 1998[;] hence, this petition." [5] The CA Ruling The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998 Order of the trial court. The appellate court opined that the Order merely ascertained the mode of compensation for petitioner's expropriated properties, as decreed in the final judgment, and was issued pursuant to the court a quo's general supervisory control over the process of execution. Said the CA: "RA 6657 is clear and leaves no doubt as to its interpretation regarding the manner of payment of just compensation. The provision allows the landowner to choose the manner of payment from the list provided therein, but since plaintiff had obviously wanted payment to be made in cash, then the trial court, through the new presiding judge, Judge Villegas-Llaguno, had only to apply Section 18 of R.A. 6657 which provides for the payment of a percentage thereon in cash and the balance in bond, in the exercise of her ministerial duty to execute the decision which Main Issue: Propriety and Efficacy of the April 24, 1998 RTC Order Petitioner insists that the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno was issued without jurisdiction. That is, it allegedly amended the August 12, 1997 judgment of the Special Agrarian Court by requiring the payment of compensation in cash and bonds. Assailed Order Not an Amendment, But an Iteration of Final Judgment The argument is not persuasive. The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment which had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order

did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the Order iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment. The August 12, 1997 judgment mandated compensation to the petitioner "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657." [9] There is certitude with regard to this assertion. The confusion in the present case, which required the issuance of the assailed Order, arose from petitioner's belief that the Land Bank had obligated itself to pay in cash the compensation due him. This fact can allegedly be gleaned from its compliance with the December 4, 1997 Writ of Execution and December 19, 1997 Notice of Garnishment. Compensation Due Petitioner to Be Paid Pursuant to RA 6657 However, it is clear from the August 12, 1997 judgment that the compensation was to be paid "in the manner provided by RA 6657." [10] Pursuant to Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in cash and bonds, as indicated below: "Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. -- The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land. "The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner: (1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions (a) For lands above fifty(50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned. Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time (b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares Thirty-percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at anytime." Be that as it may, petitioner contends that the bank is estopped from questioning its alleged undertaking to pay him in cash. This contention was purportedly manifested in its lettercompliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment. In the letter, respondent said that it was segregating a specified amount from the Agrarian Reform Fund, in order to pay him. He insists that such amount was garnished in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and should have been delivered to him pursuant to Section 9 of the same Rule. We disagree. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment [11] ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final judgment, to which execution must conform. [12] Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such judgment. Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with RA 6657. Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire adjudged amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39. We understand petitioner's desire to be paid in cash; after all, his compensation was long overdue. However, we cannot grant his Petition because it is not sustained by the law. In this regard, we recall the Court's explanation in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform: [13]

"It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional method for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. xxx xxx xxx

"With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the specter of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today. "Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are 'negotiable at any time.' The other modes, which are likewise available to be landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. "Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forbearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail." All told, we hold that the appellate court was correct in sustaining the propriety and the efficacy of the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno. In the exercise of her supervisory powers over the execution of a final and executory judgment, [14] such as her August 12, 1997 Decision, special circumstances attending its execution impelled her to issue the Order clarifying the terms thereof. Petitioner's claim for damages against the bank must likewise be denied because, as already explained, it was well within its rights in resisting the former's claim. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

(c) Sections 4 and 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order No. 62, Series of 1989 dated March 9, 1989, of the respondent Secretary of Health, which read as follows: Section 4. Violative Erroneous, and Impossible Prescriptions. 4.1. Violative Prescriptions:

G.R. No. 88265 December 21, 1989 4.1.1 Where the generic name is not written; SANTIAGO A. DEL ROSARIO, GEORGE G. GACULA, EDGARDO G. SANTOS, ALBANO S. SIBAL, ALBERTO C. REYES, NONITO P. ARROYO, EMMANUEL F. TERENCIO, DOMINGO S. DE LEON, MODESTO O. LLAMAS, FARIDA U. ALONTO, ZENAIDA A. FLOIRENDO, ISABEL A. MEJIA, LUZ P. MABANAG, RAMON H. RABAGO, JR., SAMUEL D. TROCIO and OSCAR M. BRION, petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. BENGZON, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health, respondent. Facundo T. Bautista for petitioners. Violative prescriptions shall not be filled. They shall be kept and reported by the pharmacist of the drug outlet or any other interested party to the nearest DOH Officer for appropriate action. The pharmacist shall advise the prescriber of the problem and/or instruct the customer to get the proper prescription. 4.3 Erroneous Prescriptions: 4.3.1 When the brand name precedes the generic name. 4.3.2 Where the generic name is the one in parenthesis. (a) Section 6, Pars. (a) and (b) of the Generics Act which provide: 4.3.3 Where the brand name in (sic) not in parenthesis. a) All government health agencies and their personnel as well as other government agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines. b) All medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private practitioners, shall write prescriptions using the generic name. The brand name may be included if so desired. (p. 6, Rollo.) (b) Section 12, Pars. (b), (c) and (d) of the same law which provide: b) For the second conviction, the penalty of file in the amount of not less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) but not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) at the discretion of the court. c) For the third conviction, the penalty of fine in the amount of not less than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not exceeding ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and suspension of his license to practice his profession for thirty (30) days at the discretion of the court. d) For the fourth and subsequent convictions, the penalty of fine of not less than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and suspension of his license to practice his profession for one year or longer at the discretion of the court. (pp. 6-7, Rollo.) and 4.3.4 Where more than one drug product is prescribed in one prescription form. 4.4 What to do with erroneous prescriptions. Erroneous prescriptions shall be filled. Such prescriptions shall also be kept and reported by the pharmacist of the drug outlet or any other interested party to the nearest DOH Office for appropriate action. xxx xxx xxx Section 7. Timetable of Implementation. In order to give all affected parties adequate time for learning and adjustment, the implementation of these Rules and Regulations shall be in three phases, as follows: Phase 1 Education Drive ... Phase 2 Monitoring of Compliance xxx xxx xxx Phase 3 Implementation. 4.1.2 Where the generic name is not legible and a brand name which is legible is written; 4.1.3 Where the brand name is indicated and instructions added, such as the phase 'No Substitution' which tend to obstruct, hinder or prevent proper generic dispensing. 4.2 What to do with Violative Prescriptions.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: This is a class suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein this Court is asked to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act No. 6675), and of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto, specifically:

Beginning September 1, 1989 the DOH and the other relevant agencies of government shall monitor compliance with these Rules and Regulations and all violations shall be subject to the appropriate sanctions and penalties provided for under these Rules and Regulations and the Generics Act of 1988. (pp. 7-9, Rollo.) On March 15, 1989, the full text of Republic Act No. 6675 was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on March 30, 1989, fifteen (15) days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order No. 62 was amended by Administrative Order No. 76 dated August 28, 1989 by postponing to January 1, 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. The petitioners allege that "as of this date, there is no breach or violation yet" of the law (p. 9, Rollo), which took effect on March 30, 1989. However, as the penal provisions will only take effect on January 1, 1990, it would have been more accurate to state that "as of this date, no breaches or violations of the law have been punished yet" (p. 9, Rollo). The petition is captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which this Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, we decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead. The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private practice on the other hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are allegedly required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the latter may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and veterinarians under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation. There is no merit in that argument for it proceeds from a misreading and misinterpretation of the letter and intent of paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the Generics Act. Indeed, as explained by the public respondent: ... while paragraph (a) enumerates the government transactions ('Purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines') where the sole use of generic terminology has been required, the 'prescription' of drugs is further governed by paragraph (b). And the use of the word 'all' in the latter provision emphasizes the absence of any distinction between government and private physicians. In other words, in prescribing drugs, physicians, whether in government service or in private practice, are both governed by exactly the same rules, and thus, are both authorized to include the brand name in their respective prescriptions. (p. 44, Rollo.) Furthermore, it may be observed that while paragraph (a) refers to "all government health agencies, and their personnel as well as other government agencies" (not necessarily physicians, dentists and veterinarians), paragraph (b) refers to "all medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private practitioners." Petitioners concede that the requirement for doctors, dentists, and veterinarians to use the generic terminology in writing their prescriptions, followed by the brand name in parenthesis, is "well and good" (p. 12, Rollo). However, they complain that under paragraph (d) of the law which reads:

(d) Drug outlets, including drugstores, hospital and non-hospital pharmacies and non-traditional outlets such as supermarkets and stores, shall inform any buyer about any and all other drug products having the same generic name, together with their corresponding prices so that the buyer may adequately exercise his option. Within one (1) year after approval of this Act, the drug outlets referred to herein, shall post in conspicuous places in their establishments, a list of drug products with the same generic name and their corresponding prices. (Annex A, p. 23, Rollo.) the salesgirl at the drugstore counter is authorized to "substitute the prescribed medicine with another medicine belonging to the same generic group." Since doctors are not allowed to instruct the druggist not to substitute the prescription, or to "Dispense only as Prescribed" (per Sec. 4, Adm. Order No. 62), the petitioners argue that "the act of prescribing the correct medicine for the patient becomes the act of the salesgirl at the drugstore counter, no longer the act of the physician, dentist, or veterinarian" (p. 12, Rollo). Here again, the petitioners have distorted the clear provisions of the law and the implementing administrative order. For it is plain to see that neither paragraph (d) of Section 6 of the Generics Act, nor Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 62, gives the salesgirl and/or druggist the discretion to substitute the doctor's prescription. On the contrary, Section 4, par. 4.1, of Administrative Order No. 62 directs the pharmacist not to fill "violative prescriptions" (where the generic name is not written, or illegibly written, and the prescription of a brand name is accompanied by the doctor's instruction not to substitute it), as well as "impossible prescriptions" (par. 4.5). Even a doctor's "erroneous" prescriptions "shall be filled," not substituted (par. 4.3, Adm. Order No. 62). And, Sections 3 and 5 of Adm. Order No. 63 enjoin the drug outlets not (to) favor or suggest" or "impose" a particular brand or product on the customer. The administrative older provides: In order to ensure the informed choice and use of drugs by the patient/ buyer, the drug outlet is required to: 3.1.1 Inform the patient/buyer of all available drug products generically equivalent to the one prescribed with their corresponding prices. In so doing, the drug outlet shall not favor or suggest any particular product so that the patient/buyer may fully and adequately exercise his option to choose (Sec. 3, Adm. Order No. 63 s. 1989). xxx xxx xxx The following acts or omissions are considered violations of these rules and regulations: 5.1 Imposing a particular brand or product on the buyer. ... (pp. 46-47, Rollo.) The salesgirl at the drugstore counter, merely informs the customer, but does not determine (for she is incompetent to do so) all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name, and their corresponding prices. That information she may obtain from the list of drug products determined by the Bureau of Food and Drugs to have the same generic name, or which are the chemical, biological, and therapeutic equivalent of the generic drug. All drugstores or drug outlets are required by the law to post such list in a conspicuous place in their premises for the information of the customers, for the choice of whether to buy the expensive brand name drug, or the less expensive generic, should be exercised by the customer alone.

The purpose of the Generics Act is to carry out the policy of the State: To promote, encourage and require the use of generic terminology in the importation, manufacture, distribution, marketing, advertising and promotion, prescription and dispensing of drugs; To ensure the adequate supply of drugs with generic names at the lowest possible cost and endeavor to make them available for free to indigent patients; To encourage the extensive use of drugs with generic names through a rational system of procurement and distribution; To emphasize the scientific basis for the use of drugs, in order that health professionals may become more aware and cognizant of their therapeutic effectiveness; and To promote drug safety by minimizing duplication in medications and/or use of drugs with potentially adverse drug interactions. (pp. 3839, Rollo.) or, as stated by the public respondent, "to promote and require the use of generic drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand-name counter-parts" (p. 39, Rollo) for "the therapeutic effect of a drug does not depend on its 'brand' but on the 'active ingredients' which it contains." The medicine that cures is the "active ingredient" of the drug, and not the brand name by which it has been baptized by the manufacturer. The public respondent points out that the institution of generics in the Philippines will compel physicians to prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic or "active ingredient," instead of their well-known brand names. Multiple medications which may produce potentially adverse, even lethal, chemical reactions in the patient will thereby be avoided. Patients with limited means will be able to buy generic drugs that cost less but possess the same active ingredients, dosage form, and strength as brand names, many of which are priced beyond the reach of the common tao because the high costs of advertising, packaging, royalties, and other inputs of production determine their pricing for the market. The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority. There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,

good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 495.) Petitioners have also assailed Section 12, paragraphs b, c and d, of the Generics Act prescribing graduated penalties (ranging from a reprimand to a fine of not less that P10,000 and the suspension of the physician's license to practice his profession for one [1]) year or longer, at the discretion of the court) for violations of its provisions. Petitioners' allegation that these penalties violate the constitutional guarantee against excessive fines and cruel and degrading punishment, has no merit. Penal sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed. They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on, for physicians, dentists and veterinarians may freely ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of suspension or cancellation of the physician's license is neither cruel, inhuman, or degrading. It is no different from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and Judicial Conduct. We hold that the Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are constitutional. In light of its beneficial provisions, we cannot heed the petitioners' plea to kill it aborning, i.e., before it has had a chance to prove its value to our people as envisioned by its makers. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.