[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990] LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. FACTS: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989. Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1989 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms prayer the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26 and 31, 1989.

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. ISSUE: WON Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 is unconstitutional. HELD: YES. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing corporate farms which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement production-sharing plans (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.

[G.R. No. 61293. February 15, 1990] DOMINGO B. MADDUMBA and ANITA C. MADDUMBA, petitioners, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Represented by its Chairman, Board of Trustees, HONORABLE LEONILO OCAMPO, respondent. FACTS: On December 10, 1980, respondent GSIS conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties. Included in the properties offered to the public was a house and lot situated at 3377 New Panaderos Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4749 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. Petitioner Domingo B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and submitted his sealed bid in the amount of P98,000.00 in Philippine currency. The bid was subject to the condition that there should be a down payment of 35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid. Accordingly, petitioner enclosed with his sealed bid a manager's check in the amount of P9,500.00 and cash in the amount of P300.00 to complete the P9,800.00 proposal bond. Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These bonds were issued to petitioner as payment for his riceland consisting of twenty-six hectares located in Cordon, Isabela acquired by the Government from him under Presidential Decree No. 27. However, the GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was withdrawn by petitioner. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down payment "and all future installments." Thereafter, on November 16, 1981, petitioner paid in cash the balance of the required down payment. A "Deed of Conditional Sale" was executed by the parties on November 19, 1981, where the petitioner as vendee agreed to pay the vendor GSIS "the

balance of the purchase price of SIXTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIVE & 50/100 (P63,705.50) PESOS. Philippine currency, in SIXTY (60) monthly installments of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN & 69/100 (P1,416.69) PESOS. Philippine currency, at twelve (12%) percent interest per annum, compounded monthly, beginning December 1, 1981." The first installment in the amount of P1,416.00 was paid by petitioner on December 3, 1981. When the second monthly installment became due, petitioner sent a letter dated January 5, 1982, to the GSIS Board of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly amortizations with his Land Bank bonds commencing in January, 1982 until the exhaustion of the said bonds. Petitioner invoked the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251. The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on January 22, 1982, denied petitioner's offer. The board resolved to reiterate the policy that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as payment only at a discounted rate to yield the System 18% at maturity. In a letter dated February 12, 1982, petitioner asked the Board of Trustees to reconsider Resolution No. 91. Petitioner reiterated his reliance on Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and further supported his position with the contention that the policy of the GSIS contravenes the ruling in the case of Gonzales, et al. vs. The Government Insurance System, etc., et al.. Likewise, petitioner submitted an opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, dated February 12, 1982, wherein it was stated, inter alia, that if the GSIS accepts the Land Bank bonds as payment thereof, it must accept the same at par or face value. To accept said bonds at a discounted rate would lessen the credibility of the bonds as instruments of indebtedness. In a letter dated May 31, 1982, petitioner was advised by the Manager, Acquired Assets Department, GSIS that Resolution No. 415 was adopted on May 18, 1982 by the GSIS Board of Trustees denying the request of

petitioner. Hence, on August 5, 1982, the instant original action for mandamus was filed by petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251 effective July 21, 1973, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value in payment for a residential house and lot purchased by the bondholder from the GSIS. HELD: Yes. It is not disputed that under the above quoted provisions, a government-owned or controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets. As a matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank is entitled to preference. What respondent GSIS is resisting, however, is its being compelled to accept said bonds at their face value. Respondent, in support of its stance that it can discount the bonds, avers that "(a) PD 251 has amended Section 85 of RA 3844 by deleting and eliminating the original provision that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted in the amount of their face value; and (b) to accept the said bonds at their face value will impair the actuarial solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death, retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its more than a million members, the majority of whom are low salaried government employees and workers."

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000] ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners. ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

[G.R. No. 134958. January 31, 2001] PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein represented by SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and GUILLERMO S. FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio City, respondents. FACTS: Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special Order31, Special Order 25, and Department Administrative Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority.- Special Order (SO) 31 (1990): Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region- Special Order (SO) 25: Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide- DAO 2: Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25 The same year SO 31 was issued, relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. -These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to the SOs, the heirs of A peg Carantes filed application for CALC for some portions of land in the Camp John Hay Reservation, overlapping some of the land occupied by the petitioners. The petitioners contend that if not for the respondents timely resistance to the Orders, the petitioners would be totally evicted from their land.- Petitioners filed in the CA petition to enjoin respondents from implementing Orders on ground that they are void for lack of legal basis. CA ruled that SO31 has no force and effect for preempting legislative prerogative for it was issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586 (National Integrated Protected Systems), but it sustained SO25and DAO 2 on the ground that they were issued pursuant to powers delegated to DENR

under RA7586.- Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of SO25 and DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing the application of CALC of Heirs of Carantes. ISSUE: WON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid HELD: Not a justiciable controversy. The petition was prematurely filed. There is yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land. Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which the DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation of petitioners asserted right to possess the disputed land.- Definition of justiciable controversy: a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.- Subject to certain welldefined exceptions, the courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.

[G.R. No. 59603. April 29, 1987] EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

[G.R. No. 127296. January 22, 1998] EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ, NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, J.F. FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power Corporation), respondents. FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 573[3] withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside as permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain parcels of the public domain which included Parcel No. 9 - Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. They were primarily for use as watershed area. The parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit admission,[4]within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. Petitioner Edubigis Gordula filed with the Bureau of Lands, an Application[5]for a Free Patent over the land. Manuel Fernandez and several others also filed free patent applications covering other parcels of land in the area. Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security Officer of the Cavinti reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum to the President of the Napocor informing him of the fences and roads being constructed in the saddle area, more particularly, in the lots sold by petitioner Fernandez to petitioner Estrellado. Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, filed against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of Free Patent and Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled against petitioners. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of land are non-disposable and inalienable public land?

HELD: The two (2) parcels of land were public disposable and alienable lands before the issuance, by the former President, of Proclamation No.573, on June 26, 196. The property was, however, later reserved, under Proclamation No. 573, as a permanent forest, on June26, 196[9]. Since then, the property became non-disposable and inalienable public land. By their very nature or by executive or statutory fiat, they are outside the commerce of man, unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form and inconvertible into any character less than of inalienable public domain, regardless of their actual state, for as long as the reservation subsists and is not revoked by a subsequent valid declassification. Petitioners do not contest the nature of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted that it lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable and in disposable. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula, did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.

J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared unconstitutional because violative of equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate. ISSUE: WON HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is included within its terms. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants believe in gf that veterans subdivision is the real owner. Only when the place vastly improved with building of roads, infrastructure did petitioner claimed for the first time that they are the owners.

[G.R. No. 84647. May 23, 1991] MARIA ALICIA LEUTERIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF BENITO LEUTERIO, respondents. FACTS: Pablo Leuterio died in San Luis, Pampanga on June 15, 1950, leaving a large estate consisting of several parcels of land in Pampanga. His widow, Ana Maglanque -- who had been one of his domestic servants and later his mistress, and whom he had married a few months before his death, more precisely, on February 25, 1950 -- took possession of his estate and administered it. On July 23, 1957, Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of Pablo Leuterio, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for her appointment as guardian of Maria Alicia Leuterio, then 16 years of age, alleged to be the legitimated daughter of said Pablo Leuterio. On November 20, 1957, Benito Leuterio, a brother of Pablo Leuterio of the full blood, instituted proceedings for the settlement of the decedent's intestate estate in the same Court of First Instance of Pampanga, praying for his appointment as administrator. Benito Leuterio's petition pertinently alleged that Pablo Leuterio had died without leaving a will; that he was survived, not only by said Benito Leuterio, but also by a) the children of Elena Leuterio, deceased, sister of the full blood of the decedent; b) Vicente D. Leuterio, the son of Gregoria Leuterio, also deceased, and also a sister of the full blood of Pablo Leuterio. That Pablo Leuterio died a widower; and that the claim of Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of the decedent, that the latter had left a legitimate daughter was "without foundation in fact and in law." The petition was opposed by Ana Maglanque and Maria Alicia Leuterio (the latter being represented by the above named Patrocinio Apostol). After hearing, the Probate Court appointed Ana Maglanque administratrix of Pablo Leuterio's estate.

The event leading directly to the appellate proceedings at bar was the filing in the settlement proceeding by Maria Alicia Leuterio on October 19, 1962 of a pleading entitled "Assertion of Rights," in which she averred that she was the only forced heir of Pablo Leuterio and therefore entitled to succeed to the latter's entire estate, subject only to the rights accorded by law to her mother, Ana Maglanque. In respect of this claim, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and issues, as regards the celebration and the validity of the marriage of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglanque; the identity of the decedent's relatives by consanguinity, supra; the character of the decedent's estate as being "his own separate, exclusive properties and, therefore, his capital. ISSUE: WON the Probate Court had erred 1) in rejecting (as spurious) Exhibit D, "which is the certificate of the record of birth of Maria Alicia Leuterio in the Civil Registry of San Luis, Pampanga;" 2) "in not giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of Gervacio Bagtas and Paula Punzalan who are disinterested witnesses and who are school teachers at the San Luis Elementary School where appellant Maria Alicia Leuterio was studying;" 3) "in holding that the testimony of Don Sotero Baluyut given in the form of a deposition appears to be in the form of an accommodation;" 4) in not declaring (on the basis of the evidence) that Maria Alicia Leuterio has been in the possession of the status of a natural child before and after the marriage of her parents * * ." HELD: "In this case, the Court is not inclined to conclude that there was an express desire on the part of Pablo to recognize Maria Alicia as his natural child. As previously adverted to, the birth certificate, baptismal certificate and the photographs do not bear the signatures of Pablo expressing his acknowledgment of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter with Ana Maglanque. Indeed, Maria Alicia is said to have been born, reared and raised in the house of Pablo. Appellees explain this by stating that Ana was a househelp in the house of Pablo. Pablo has no child with his previous wife, and it is not unusual if he looked upon Maria Alicia as if she were his own daughter in or outside his residence. Upon these considerations, the court a

quo was correct in rejecting the testimonies of Dar Juan, Paula Punzalan and Gervacio Bagtas, and the deposition of Sotero Baluyut. With respect to Dar Juan, Punzalan and Bagtas, the lower court saw and observed their demeanor in the witness stand and objected to their vital claims. With respect to the testimony of Sotero Baluyut, petitioners admit that he and Pablo were very close friends. "What clinches the case in favor of appellees, to Our mind, is the absolute lack of a document or writing, such as receipts of payment of school fees in the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, or a letter to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite the lapse of 9 years from the birth of Maria Alicia in 1941 up to his death in 1950. In her appeal to this Court, petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio submits that the Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it was "clear and patent error" on its part 1) to surmise "that the action of the petitioner for legitimation is based on voluntary recognition," and 2) to hold that the "facts and the laws involved place this case squarely on all fours with the case of Colorado et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L39948, February 28, 1985, although the action of herein petitioner is one for compulsory recognition and for legitimation." The petition is without merit, and cannot be granted. It seems to this Court that both the Court of Appeals and the Probate Court were aware of the precise nature of the petitioner's recourse: a judicial declaration of her compulsory or involuntary recognition as Pablo Leuterio's natural child. The record discloses that the Probate Court went to some lengths to stress the distinction between voluntary and compulsory recognition, and to make petitioner's counsel identify the exact character of the remedy that she was seeking -- whether it be voluntary, or compulsory, recognition -- quoting in this connection, the exchange between the Judge and petitioner's attorney, which culminated in the latter's description of the desired relief as "not voluntary acknowledgment in the sense that the decedent did not execute a public document expressly acknowledging the petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio as his natural child. Because we believe that a public document is one of the evidence of compulsory acknowledgment." It said: "There should not be confusion in terms: one thing is the acknowledgment of a child by the father, made voluntarily; another is the action that should

be instituted by the child against the father to compel the latter to acknowledge him as a natural child. The continuous possession of the status of a natural child, tolerated by his father and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself, constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, at most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge him. However, the action for this purpose should be brought within the periods of time prescribed in Article 137 of the old Civil Code (now Article 285 of the new Civil Code). (Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil. 385)." The Probate Court's statements correctly reflect the state of the law at the time. In fact, it is consistent with the statement of the law attempted by petitioner's own distinguished counsel, citing Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 737, 738, viz.: "The father of a natural child may recognize it in two different ways: (a) by a voluntary recognition (Art, 131, civ. code); (2) by an involuntary recognition enforced by either a civil or criminal action (Art. 135, Civ. Code; Art. 499, Pen. Code). "A voluntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) in the record of births; (b) by will; and (c) by any other public instrument. (Art. 131, Civil Code). "An involuntary recognition of a natural child is made: (a) by an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity; (b) by giving such child the status of a natural child of the father, justified by direct act of the child of the father or his family (art. 135, Civ. Code); and (c) by a criminal action for rape, seduction or abduction. (par. 2, art. 449, Pen. Code)." It was in this sense, too, that the Court of Appeals appeared to have understood and applied the law to the case. As much is apparent from its declaration that "(r)ecognition under the Civil Code of 1889 must be precise, express and solemn (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 161), whether voluntary or compulsory (Baron vs. Baron, 63 OG No. 2, Jan. 9, 1967)." Like the Probate Court, whose judgment it affirmed, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence failed to prove either the existence of "an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity," or the "giving (to) such child (of) the status of a natural child of the father" conformably with Article 135 of the Civil Code of 1889. Hence, there was no factual basis on which to rest a declaration of involuntary recognition by Pablo Leuterio of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter.

Now, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, by familiar doctrine, conclusive on this Court and are not thus subject of review, specially where those findings are the same as those made by the Trial Court. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but none obtains in the case at bar. The petitioner also contests the Appellate Court's holding that Article 283 of the present (1950) Civil Code has no retroactive effect. That conclusion was no doubt based on the fact that Article 2260 of the same Code expressly accords such effect only to voluntary recognition thus by inference excluding compulsory recognition for the causes or under the circumstances enumerated in Article 283, with its "catch-all" provision that recognition may be compelled if the child has in his favor "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father." While a contrary view, i.e., in favor of retroactivity, may find support in the excepting clause of Article 2253, also of the Civil Code, which gives effect to rights declared for the first time therein, though arising from acts done or events occurred under prior law provided no vested or acquired rights of the same origin are prejudiced thereby, there is little point in pursuing that question insofar as the resolution of this appeal is concerned. Whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only prospectively, the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court of Appeals rejected in its entirety -- as variously, insufficient, unpersuasive and spurious -petitioner's evidence both oral and documentary bearing on her alleged status as a natural child of Pablo Leuterio. That rejection forecloses the claim of petitioner to either voluntary or compulsory recognition, be it made under the Civil Code of 1889 which was in force at the time of her asserted birth or, in the case of compulsory recognition, under the more liberal Article 283 of the present Code. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the door to "any evidence" of paternity in an action to compel acknowledgment, Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence, sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject when offered in a court of law, or strip the courts of their function and prerogative of passing upon its acceptability after applying such tests. Such evidence here having been found wanting after due assessment as already stated, petitioner's claim was properly denied.

[G.R. No. 109490. February 14, 1994] PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDUARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SPOUSES CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG, SPOUSES CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, SPOUSES SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA, and LETICIA NOCON CHAN, respondents. On 11 July 1985, Firestone, Boomtown, spouses Cynthia D. Ching and Ching Tiong Keng, spouses Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ong Eng Chong, spouses Soledad Yu and Yu Sy Chia, and Leticia Nocon Chan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati, Metro Manila, a complaint for annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titles against Patrocinio E. Margolles, Virginia E. Villongco, Edgardo C. Espinosa, Lucia E. Laperal, Norma E. Espinosa, Teresita E. Casal, Alice E. Sotto, Veronica Gana, and Equitable Banking Corporation. Also included among the defendants were the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. The complaint averred that the parcels of land in question were registered in the names of Benito Gonzales and Emeterio Espiritu was issued pursuant to a decision in Land Registration Case No. N-6625, dated 22 July 1969. On 04 February 1976, the property was subdivided by Gonzales and Espiritu into five lots, resulting in the issuance of five TCT. Months after plaintiffs took possession of the premises, the defendants demanded that the plaintiffs vacate the premises. Claiming ownership, the defendants, on their part, traced their titles from Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 issued to the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Ma. Juliana Carlos on 26 March 1929 pursuant to Decree No. 35183 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30406. On 04 April 1956, OCT No. 4216 was cancelled and, in its place, TCT No. 43555 was issued to Lorenzo Gana and Veronica Gana married to Ramon Rodriguez. TCT No. 43555 was itself likewise cancelled (on the same day) and TCT No. 43556 was issued, this time in the name of Veronica Gana alone. On 13 August 1956, Veronica Gana sold the land to Patrocinio Margolles, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 46302. Margolles subdivided the property into seven (7) lots, each lot being covered, respectively, by TCTs No. 379913, No. 379914, No. 379915, No. 379916, No. 379917, No. 379918 and No. 379919.

On 03 November 1972, Margolles sold 1/2 interest in the property to Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation and TCTs No. 382176, No. 382177, No. 382178, No. 382179, No. 382180, No. 382181 and No. 382182 were thereupon issued in the names of both Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation and Patrocinio Margolles. On 17 May 1973, Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation reconveyed its interest to the property to Patrocinio Margolles and, again, new TCTs No. 410535, No. 410536, No. 410537, No. 410538, No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 were issued in the name of the latter. Subsequently, TCTs No. 410536, No. 410538, No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 were cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. S-17992 was issued to Peltan Development Corporation. Margolles subdivided the remaining parcels covered by TCTs No. 410535 and No. 410537 into fifteen (15) lots, each of which was titled in her name, i.e., TCTs No. S-16369 up to No. S-16383, inclusive. These titles, except TCTs No. S-16372 and No. S-16373 which were retained in her name, were later cancelled and transferred to her brother and sisters, her co-defendants and co-petitioners in the present case. The transferees Virginia Villongco and Norma Espinosa later mortgaged their own lots to Equitable Banking Corporation. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the genuineness and authenticity of Original Certificate of Title No. A-S-47, against an overlapping Original Certificate of Title No. 4216, was sufficiently established; (2) Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 was issued while the property was still unclassified public land; and (3) Whether or not the claim of the petitioners was correctly barred by laches. The first issue is basically factual. Ordinarily, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to exceptions, such as when there are compelling reasons to justify otherwise, or when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record. This case is so illustrative of such exceptional instances. To support their claim that OCT No. 4216 is genuine, the petitioners have submitted, among other things, the following pieces of documentary evidence:

(1) The original of OCT No. 4216, as well as the owners duplicate certificates, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal; (2) The publications (in the English and Spanish versions) of the Official Gazette (1927 editions), containing notices of the initial hearing in Land Registration Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), instituted by the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, covering a parcel of land in Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias; (3) The order of then CFI Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, dated 23 March 1961, in LRC Case No. N-2126 (GLRO Record No. N-6564), denying the registration of a parcel of land by reason of the certification, dated 26 June 1959, of the Land Registration Commissioner, Antonio N. Noblejas, that a portion of the property covered in this post-war land case had been decreed under Decree No. 351823, issued on 05 March 1929, in the name of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), and while said case covered only a part of the property in dispute, it did show, however, that the decree was, in fact, issued to the spouses Gana and Carlos; (4) The Report, dated 07 June 1983, of the Land Registration Commission's Verification Committee, sustaining the validity of Decree No. 351823 in favor of Lorenzo J. Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos; (5) Page 209 of the Book of Decrees (Old Book) of the Land Registration Commission, showing that a decree was "okayed" in GLRO Record No. 30406 (LRC Case No. 672), under the entry "Date O.K. for Decree" on "1-22-29" (22 January 1929) and that a decree was issued under the entry "Date Decree Issued" on "3-5-29" (05 March 1929); (6) The certified true microfilm reproduction of plan Psu-49273 covering a parcel of land in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, surveyed for Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1926; (7) The decision of this Court in Guico vs. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415, pointing to the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in LRC Case No. 672 in favor of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos; and (8) The letters of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, stating that the information and documents submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission were not sufficient to support an action for cancellation of OCT No. 4216 and the derivative titles thereof.

HELD: The above documentary evidence is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside. It is our considered view that the appellate court has committed serious error in refusing to give any probative value to such evidence. All that the private respondents could basically proffer against OCT 4216 are that (1) The title is invalid, fake and spurious, which must have been the work of "some unscrupulous elements" who could have access to "the Registry Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal," that explains petitioners' failure to present a copy of the decision in Land Registration Case No. 672 or Decree No. 351823; and (2) Assuming OCT No. 4216 to have been issued, the same is invalid having been issued on still unclassified land of the public domain. Section 3, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, taken from Section 321 of Act No. 190, states: "Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office." It has been plainly shown that the failure of the petitioners to produce the Decree is due to the burning of the Archives of the Court of First Instance of Rizal during the liberation of Pasig, in consequence of which all pre-war land registration cases in Rizal have been destroyed. The respondents own witness, Eduardo Santos, Jr., has testified that the records of pre-war registration cases are thus incomplete as can be expected. The Certification,

dated 02 May 1980, of Reynaldo S. Vergara, Acting Chief of the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority, states that the pre-war record of LRC Case No. 672, GLRO Record No. 030406 for the province of Rizal, is not among the records on file with the Vault Section of the Docket Division since the same must have been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last world war. Certainly, the petitioners cannot be held to account for those lost or destroyed records. The private respondents argue that the petitioners should have asked for the reconstitution of the LRC case and the decree in accordance with Act No. 3110 and Republic Act No. 26, or that they could have opposed, or intervened in, the proceedings in LRC Case No. N-6625 (LRC Record No. N36579) where OCT No. A-S-47 has been decreed. For failing to do so, the petitioners, it is now contended, should be held bound by the order of default issued by the land registration court. The argument is unacceptable. The petitioners are not covered by the general order of default in LRC Case No. N-6625. Republic Act No. 26 only covers lost or destroyed certificates of title. The original of OCT No. 4216 is not extant; it has, in fact, been presented in evidence. Act No. 3110, on the other hand, applies only to pending judicial proceedings. This Court has heretofore held, thus "The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. x x x. "xxx xxx xxx.

"If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next preceding stage where records are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must gain perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and decide it anew,--all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted. "x x x. Act No. 3110, was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and

continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution law. x x x. "x x x. (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the expenses and suf(f)er the annoyance and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on the pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when all along and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court which has not committed any negligence or fault at all. Furthermore, Section 45 of Act No. 3110, provides that "(n)othing contained in (the) Act shall be construed to repeal or modify the provisions of Section Three Hundred and Twenty One of Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety." Section 321 of Act No. 190 is now Section 3 (aforequoted), Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule." Hence, even if the petitioners have failed to have the records of the LRC case reconstituted, they are not precluded from establishing by other evidence the requisite proof of validity of OCT No. 4216. Quite recently, in Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano, said: "x x x. The copy of OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certified true copy of the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The admissibility of such a copy in court proceedings is an exception to the ordinary rule on secondary evidence; such admissibility is in fact mandated by Section 47 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act). Under the Land Registration Act which was in force at the time OCT No. 351 issued, the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was an official transcript of Decree No. 1425, with respect to the land covered by such decree situated in the Province of Rizal. "Thus, OCT No. 351 constitutes direct proof of the existence of Decree No. 1425 upon which the Ortigas TCTs (Nos. 77652 and 77653) are based. x x x." (Footnotes omitted; underscoring supplied.) The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216, issued in favor of the spouses Gana and Carlos, is invalid, so covering, as it

supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the private respondents base their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO) No. 4-1141 (1968), implementing LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A. According to them, Las Pias comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which 1,200 hectares have been declared alienable and disposable public lands in 1928, under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, and that "Tindig na Mangga" has not been covered thereby until the reclassification in 1968. As such, they submit, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property in question to the petitioners predecessors-in-interest. No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the above contention. To the contrary, in fact, is the letter, dated 27 April 1988, of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads: "Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it allegedly covers land within the forest zone. There is no clear-cut proof to that effect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of the Timber Management Division, Bureau of Forest Development, dated July 31, 1979, simply states that the tract of land situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, Metro Manila containing an area of 197,525 square meters as shown and described on this plan Psu-04-006417 x x x was found to be within the Alienable or Disposable Block of LC Project No. 13-A of Las Pias, Rizal certified as such on January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623. The certification refers to land with an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state the relationship of said land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216 which has an area of 99.6157 hectares. "xxx xxx xxx.

"Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the cancellation of OCT No. 4216 is premised mainly on the allegation that the land is within the forest zone, having been allegedly released as A & D land only in 1968. But the recommendation is based on the same certification of Mr. de la Rosa of the Bureau of Forest Development which, as earlier observed, does not make any clear reference to the land covered by OCT No. 4216 and is, therefore, vague and inconclusive." Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766, Project 13, could be presented, albeit understandably, considering that even the records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority (NAMREA) have apparently been lost or destroyed during the second World War.

In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (a case to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court), the Republic sought to prove that, at the time an original certificate of title was issued, the land covered thereby was still within the forest zone. It offered as evidence a land classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961. The Court ruled: x x x. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps failed to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These x x x are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity x x x." Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968, provides: "1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code, I hereby declare as alienable or disposable and place the same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for administration and disposition in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be and to the conditions herein specified, the portions of the public domain situated in the Municipalities of x x x Las Pias, x x x Province of Rizal x x x which are designated and described as alienable or disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968." (Underscoring supplied.) The issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929, conferring a private right, is then amply protected by FAO No. 4-1141; otherwise, certificates of title issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified. Finally, the private respondents raise estoppel by laches on the part of the petitioners. Laches is "the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the

party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or has declined to assert it. Contrary to private respondents claim that no action was taken by the petitioners until a petition for quieting of title was filed in 1985 by the private respondents themselves, the records would indicate that upon the subdivision of the lots in question by Espiritu and Gonzales, and the subsequent transfers of the same to the private respondents in 1976, a demand was seasonably made by the petitioners for the private respondents to vacate the premises. From the time OCT No. A-S-47 was issued to the private respondents in 1969 until the demand was made in 1976, only seven (7) years had elapsed. Lastly, it is a settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. The titles of the petitioners, having emanated from an older title, should thus be upheld. .

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990 FACTS: Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable. CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention. ISSUE:

Whether or not land is alienable

HELD: The SC affirmed. Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not

confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. IAC (1986) Labels: 1986, Case Digest, Juris Doctor, Land Titles and Deeds, Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds) FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of ISSUES: W/N the land is already a private land - YES W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc YES already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law 2. NO If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are

granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

JOYA VS. PCGG [225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson andWoods International, Inc concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manilaalleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary to Catalino sign Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas

the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to

the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.

After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded.

On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

(2) Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation".

(3) Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress.

(4) Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items. (5) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court.

Held: This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without process complying and and just their with constitutional and any constitutional or statutory requirements of statutory defect in their due

compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, acquisition subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money. Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition

deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Case Digest MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997] Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a closebidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy

of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong

Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage wi ll fall on the hands of foreigners. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

Manosca Vs CA Case Digest Manosca Vs. Court Of Appeals 252 SCRA 412 G.R. No. 106440 January 29, 1996 Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose. Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted. Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.

MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association Authority (BAVA), (MMDA), respondent petitioner herein,

herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separatingthe subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.

Held: The

Court held

that

the

MMDA

does

not

have

the

capacity

toexercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

Technology vs CA (193 scra 147) Facts: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayors permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of companys plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation. Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling. Issue: 1. Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant. YES. 2. Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion. NO. Ruling: 1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized

that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business. 2. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following: a. Building permit; b. Mayor's permit; and c. Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. 3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels. 4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made. It found that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. 5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati. 6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to

the health of the residents of the community. Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.