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Culture as the Co-evolution of Psychic and Social Systems: New Perspectives on the Person Environment Relationship
Beat Thommen and Alexander Wettstein Culture Psychology 2010 16: 213 DOI: 10.1177/1354067X09353208

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Article
Abstract In this article we contribute a new theoretical perspective to the analysis of the relationship between individual and culture, and the person and the environment. Many hotly debated issues in cultural psychology, such as reication, the discourse of personality traits, and models of partwhole hierarchies are productively addressed. Taking a systemstheoretical approach following Niklas Luhmann and others, we distinguish three different types of system and their operational processes (biotic, psychic and social) and suggest that the personenvironment relationship should be conceptualized as a process of co-evolution of psychic and social systems. We discuss the critical role of communication in this process and its implications for the concept of culture. Our own research on classroom disruptions and problem behavior in educational settings provides illustrative examples for the kinds of methodological considerations generally relevant to a systemstheoretical approach in empirical research. Key Words behavior disorders, classroom disruption, communication, culture, Niklas Luhmann, personenvironment relationship, social systems, systems theory

Beat Thommen and Alexander Wettstein

PHBern, University of Applied Sciences, Switzerland

Culture as the Co-evolution of Psychic and Social Systems: New Perspectives on the PersonEnvironment Relationship
Questions concerning the relationship of individual and culture are as old as psychology itself: How is an individual person formed by culture? How are new cultural phenomena created, and how do cultures change? What are the interrelations between psychological processes on an individual level and social processes at the level of groups, societies or cultures? Valsiner (2007) distinguished three basic conceptualizations of the relationship between persons and culture:

Culture & Psychology Copyright 2010 SAGE Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) http://cap.sagepub.com Vol. 16(2): 213241 [DOI: 10.1177/1354067X09353208]

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1. A person belongs to culture. This position is represented mainly in intercultural psychology and states that a person belongs to a culture because of certain characteristics. Typically, members of this culture share certain patterns of thinking, feeling and behavior. 2. Culture belongs to a person. This position denes culture as an inherent, systemic organizer of each persons psychological system. These intra-psychological mechanisms determine the person independently from a particular environment. 3. Culture is part of the relationship of persons with the environment. Here culture is constituted in the diverse processes in which persons relate to the world, including their social environment. Culture is dened as the result of ongoing exchanges between persons and their environment. The rst two positions dene culture as a static entity, and they fail to deal, therefore, with questions of cultural development and change. There are different approaches for a process-oriented approach, summarized by the third position, but these tend toward reductionism by favoring one side or the other of the exchange, culture or person. Recent developments in systems theory, particularly studies building on the work of Niklas Luhmann, offer new perspectives for these old problems. A systems-theoretical approach conceives the relation between person and culture as a co-evolutionary process of individual psychic systems and social communicative systems. As a result, many tautologies and paradoxes confounding more established theories can be avoided.

Reication and the Language of Traits

The use of dispositional, static concepts is very common in personality psychology, social psychology and sociology. The use of dispositional concepts is inuenced by (culturally based) patterns of thinking and speaking, where everyday language offers a rich repertory of dispositional concepts describing psychological and social phenomena; for example, a person may be characterized as aggressive, honest, lazy, achievement-oriented, etc. Language itself predisposes us to think of people in terms of static and general traits. What we experience in the course of feeling, thinking and doing becomes similarly objectied and reied by the linguistic descriptions we use. As a result of such reication, psychological characteristics are seen like physical properties such as height, weight or hair color. Thinking and speaking in terms of dispositions and traits has inuenced the development of 214

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scientic theories. The psychology of personality is to a great extent a psychology of dispositional constructs (McCrae & Costa, 1997). The question of how cognitive, emotional and behavioral processes develop through exchanges with certain environments cannot be addressed by a trait-oriented, static theoretical framework. Reications are also used when attributing static properties to social groups, societies or cultures. In our everyday language we even speak of the character, or the soul, of a social or cultural group. Allport (1961), however, warned against equating analytical cultural constructs and actual occurring cultural processes. Moreover, many concepts such as norms, values or social knowledge are assigned to individuals as well as social groups. In descriptions of social knowledge and social representations, an implicit assumption is often made that social processes unfold like individual, psychological processes (see Jovchelovitch, 2007; Moscovici, 1961, 2000). The language of static traits and dispositions is an efcient tool, facilitating the characterization of psychological and social phenomena in a few words. In contrast, describing processes in a language that captures their ongoing, temporal character is much more complicated and circumstantial.

Part/Whole Models
According to Bachelard (2002), one of the main obstacles hampering progress in scientic theorizing about the relationship of individuals and culture is thinking in terms of partwhole relationships. Individuals are seen as parts of a group, and groups as parts of greater social units, of societies or cultures. However, by differentiating part and whole, a categorical distinction is being made that creates hierarchical relations between the whole and its parts. Problems arise when causal arguments are made on the basis of such a hierarchical system and its categorical distinctions. For example, the statement that the social system of a neighborhood inuences a family is paradoxical, because a particular family is itself part of the whole neighborhood system. Taken to its logical conclusion, the statement is, then, that a family inuences itself; a paradox well-known in the classic Barber paradox. When investigating the mutual inuence of individuals and their (social) environment, it is problematic to think in terms of partwhole hierarchies; this leads to inextricable logical problems.

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The PersonEnvironment Relationship: Holism and Dualism

Denitions of the personenvironment relationship fall between two extreme positions: holism and dualism. Both positions pose major epistemological problems. Radical holism proposes an inseparable personenvironment unit and, as a consequence, it does not enable thinking in terms of a personenvironment relationship. Dualism, however, posits the radical, exclusive separation of the person and the environment, which makes it difcult to consider interactions between the two elements and disregards their mutual interdependency. Valsiner (1998) proposes a third solution and introduces the concept of inclusive separation:
From the standpoint of inclusive separation, the dangers of dualism are eliminated a priori. The person and the environment are both separate and united; separation makes it possible to study their actual relationship as a process. The notion of unity here becomes explicitly available for study, since the duality of the personenvironment structure entails both unity and separation. The very differentiation of the person and the environment makes it possible to study the ways in which they are interdependent. Dualityco-presence and relationof differentiated parts that function within the same whole is not dualism but a form of systemic organization. (Valsiner, 1998, p. 21)

Following a dialectical approach, Valsiner (1998) contrasts the person and the environment on a conceptual level, but relates them on a functional level as interdependent. The relationship between the person and the environment therefore becomes the primary investigative focus. He thus obviates the problems of both extreme holism and extreme dualism. Several issues remain to be addressed, however: What are the methodological consequences of positing both unity and separation and their mutual relation? How can environment and person be captured independently? How can we think about processes between the person and the environment that are dependent and independent at the same time? Summarizing the discussion concerning the relation of individual and culture, we agree with a statement by Smedslund (1995) that psychologys problems are primarily theoretical and conceptual, and only secondarily empirical. In systems theory (particularly through developments in cybernetics II) there are theoretical and conceptual propositions which could help to solve some of these problems.

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The Theoretical Framework of Systems Theory: The Co-Evolution of Self-Referential Systems

Systems theory does not refer to a coherent, unied theory. Rather, systems theory subsumes a variety of approaches in different scientic disciplines, all of which, however, share some general principles. Systems theory developed from research in cybernetics, information theory, physics, chemistry, biology, neuro-biology, sociology, semiotics and philosophy. Similarly diverse are the applications of systemic thinking, but in philosophy of science in particular, systems theory led to new constructivist positions. It is not surprising, then, that the reception of systems theory is varied and ranges from euphoria to total rejection. Drawing on the principles of systems theory, we present an attempt at conceptualizing the individualculture and the person environment relationship in new ways, and we propose alternatives for dealing with methodological problems that arise in investigating these relationships. We base our argument and discussion primarily on Niklas Luhmanns (1995) conception of systems theory. Luhmans aim was to develop a sociological theory that was founded on systemstheoretical premises and was as general and coherent as possible. Systems Dened by their Operational Processes Systems theory conceptualizes systems consistently as processes, to the extent that they can only be dened by their ongoing processes. Hence, the central object of every investigation is processes unfolding in time. This is fundamentally a developmental approach, and the primary scientic interest is the description and explanation of how a certain system evolves from one state to the next. The position ts well with the claims made by Valsiner (1994) for a development-oriented psychology. In the case of investigating problem behavior, the key question should not be whether a child can be identied as having a behavior disorder (which is already the attribution of a state). From a systems theory perspective, the relevant questions in this case would be: In which situations does the problematic behavior occur? How do interaction partners react to this behavior? And what effect do these reactions have on the childs behavior? Instead of attributing personal traits and seeking causal explanations based on circumstances in the past, the processes of exchange between individuals and their environment, that is, their interaction partners, is essential. What is the sequence of interactions taking place? Do these interaction sequences develop in a stable, homeostatic way? Do they escalate or de-escalate in a certain direction? The intricate descriptions necessary for this kind 217

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of investigation demonstrate the problems involved in expressing a process-oriented view in our language. Our language is much more suited to characterizing persons by static traits than to describing interactions as they occur over time. It appears that our thinking about psychological phenomena and our language developed in a coevolutionary way (see Selvini-Palazzoli, 1989), a proposition that is itself based on a systemic view. Structure and Process This strong emphasis on processes as a crucial characteristic of systems is unfamiliar and goes against both scientic and ordinary, everyday thinking. The dualism of structure versus process mirrors the classic polarity between rather static and rather dynamic world views which, as an area of conict, brought about far-reaching controversies even among the ancient Greek philosophers. For Luhmann, the structure of a system consists of a constant, recurring series of events (see von Ameln, 2004, p. 106). By positing structures as regular patterns of processes occurring in time, Luhmann overcomes the dualism of structure and process. His conception is to a large extent compatible with the theory of Vygotsky (1929), who posited structure as a selection and series of psychic operations. Systems Constituted by Differences from their Environment Instead of beginning with partwhole distinctions (e.g., the individual as part of a dyad, the dyad as part of a group), Luhmanns conception of systems theory begins with the basic difference between system and environment. A system is dened as structurally and functionally oriented to a specic environment. Living systems (e.g. organisms) are open to their environment, with which reciprocal exchanges of material, energy and/or information take place. The borders between system and environment are ongoing outcomes of these exchanges. In a recursive process a system denes its unity and also its environment (von Uexkll & Kriszat, 1970). Systems constitute and maintain their unity by this very differentiation from their environment which, in turn, only emerges through the very operations of and exchanges with the system. As a consequence, systems must inevitably be seen as self-referential or autopoetic. According to Luhmann (1995, pp. 3234), systems have no possibility to come into contact with their environment other than through the processes and relational operations by which they are constituted, a form of self-contact by way of the environment, because they possess no other form of environmental contact than this self-contact (Luhmann, 1995, p. 33). 218

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This view has extensive epistemological ramications and led to new conceptualizations of constructivism (see Glasersfeld, 1997; Maturana & Varela, 1987; von Foerster, 1984; Watzlawick, 1984). According to the constructivist position, it is always a specic system, capable of recognition and knowledge, that performs perceptual and cognitive processes and thus differentiates itself from its environment. Hence, in any investigation and analysis, the precise system in operation has to be identied, that is, the difference between an observer (or system) of the rst order and a second-order observer who differentiates how a rst-order system makes distinctions and differentiates itself. Which sector of the observed eld is classied as the system and which as the environment is hence always relative to an observer who makes specic judgments and decisions. In this sense, scientic psychological knowledge is based on second-order observations, for example, when a scientist investigates cognitive or emotional phenomena or eventually third-order observations, when the nave theories of parents about the cognitive and emotional development of their children are the focus of investigation. There are diverse constructivist positions, ranging from radical constructivism (e.g. von Foerster, 1984) to social constructivism (Gergen, 1990, 1991) to a more moderate position of evolutionary constructivism (e.g. Vollmer, 1995). From a constructivist perspective, the problem of causality has to be reconsidered: the relation between a living system (e.g. a person) and its environment is not deterministic. To the contrary, the environment offers certain possibilities and a system chooses, depending on its perceptual and cognitive capacities, which properties of the environment it responds to (or, more precisely, which it recognizes and acts on). The person-systems perceptual sensibilities and cognitive capacities are crucial, because they render certain properties of the environment relevant while others remain unrecognized. Systems respond very selectively. Some incidents in the environment can cause upset and change, while others do not. Rather than an incident itself, it is the processes activated by an environmental incident in the system that are decisive. Bateson (1972) speaks in this context of a difference which makes a difference. Only those properties of the environment that a system can perceive as differences (in Batesons terms, the elementary units of information) have the potential to inuence the internal operations of the system. Vygotsky repeatedly discussed this point in his writings as well:
Even when the environment remains little changed, the very fact that the child changes in the process of development, results in a situation where the role and meaning of these environmental factors, which seemingly have remained

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unchanged, in actual fact do undergo a change, and the same environmental factors which may have one meaning and play a certain role during a given age, two years on begin to have a different meaning and to play a different role because the child has changed; in other words, the childs relation to these particular environmental factors has altered. (Vygotsky, 1935, cited in van der Veer & Valsiner, 1994, p. 339).

This non-deterministic view can be applied to all non-trivial living, information-processing systems, while deterministic explanatory models may be applied appositely to trivial systems like mechanical machines (see von Foerster, 1984). Reducing Complexity The main aims of a system are to keep alive and to reproduce. Because systems are considered operationally closed, any system only has direct access to, and can only dene itself by, its own ongoing processes. According to Luhmann (1995, p. 3338), living systems are thus selfreferential or autopoetic, and Maturana and Varela (1987) called the process of self-reproduction autopoiesis. The question is, however, how systems can maintain their unity and secure their survival in a particular environment, especially since there are no physical structures to guarantee stability and order. Although we speak in relation to psychic systems of knowledge, motives, self, identity, even soul, static physical correlates for these have never been empirically ascertained. General systems theory argues that systems survive by reducing the complexity of their operational processes in relation to their environment. Environments have the potential to generate more complexity (of information, for example) than a particular system can process and handle. A system reduces complexity, however, by enforced selectivity; certain perceptions produce particular and specic operational responses. Abstraction and generalization are organizational processes limiting the range of possible operations in relation to certain perceptions, but systems are thus capable of building complex and enduring operational patterns of higher levels. Valsiner (1998) calls these selective organizational processes constraints and attractors. Rather than structures of questionable ontological status, patterns (regularities of sequences and processes) guarantee the identity and survival of a system. According to this dynamic view, no structures existing independently of any processes are assumed to exist; on the contrary, a system sustains its unity and survival by reproducing stable patterns of processes as operational sequences. The concepts of operational closure, self-organization and autopoiesis do not contradict the postulate that all living systems are 220

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open toward their environment. Operational closure only refers to those processes going on within a system and their relative autonomy, but at the same time, through these very processes, an exchange of information, material and/or energy with the environment takes place. These exchanges are highly selective, however, because they depend on what the environment affords and on the capacities of the particular system, i.e., its perceptual and operational capacities. Co-Evolution and Structural Interconnection What answers can a systems-theoretical approach offer to questions about the development of systems? How do systems develop when they function autonomously and are self-referential? Taking evolutionary theory into account, there are several points from which we can begin to formulate answers. The environment offers a wide range of possibilities to any system. In the evolution of species, living systems developed different ways of using the potentialities of the environment and securing their survival through mutation. Different and diverse solutions proved to be viable for survival in a particular environment. A systems autonomy is, therefore, always relative: relative to a specic environment and the potentialities it affords. An environment thus limits the developmental possibilities of self-referential systems. Maturana and Varela (1987) call this ongoing interaction between system and environment structural interconnection. It needs to be said here that a second-order observer (e.g. a scientic psychologist) may identify two living systems in his environment and describe a structural interconnection between them. From a systems-theoretical perspective, then, development can be conceptualized as the co-evolution of interacting living systems. If these interactions are successful, their development is complementary and they mutually ensure their survival. The development of human beings is much more intricate, of course. To a great extent, people live in a physical and symbolic environment that they have created themselves (e.g. cultural creations such as writing, meaningful objects such as churches, trafc signs, to name a few). Human systems thus co-evolve with a culturally constructed environment that they have made themselves. As a consequence, what are cultural achievements appear to human beings in their ontogenesis as if coming from outside. Much of socialization consists of an individuals appropriation of these cultural achievements in the course of their development. An individual internalizes externally given, culturally dened rules of behavior and routines. This view was primarily introduced to psychology by Vygotsky (1997, p. 91ff), and 221

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following Vygotsky different studies in developmental psychology have demonstrated the close connection between sociocultural environment and cognitive development (e.g. Toomela, 1996, 2003). In the next section, we further develop the phenomenon of co-evolution in a cultural environment. Three Types of System and their Modes of Operation The criterion for differentiating types of system is their mode or quality of operations. This makes sense, because autopoiesis affords a certain operational homogeneity of a system, so that psychic operations, for example, connect with other psychic operations, or physical operations with physical ones. As neuro-psychological research drastically demonstrates (Roth, 1996), physical electric impulses are a necessary condition for the psychic sensation of emotions, but these psychic sensations and experiences cannot be reduced to electric impulses. According to the criterion of homogeneous modes of operation, Luhmann (1995) denes three types of systems (see Figure 1). In everyday life, we think of another human being as a unity. According to Luhmann, however, a human being is not a single homogeneous system but consists of different biotic and psychic systems. As a consequence, theoretical statements should refer to the specic system with its specic mode of operation. For each type of system (e.g. psychic), the other system (e.g. biotic) forms its environment, and they evolve together (co-evolution). Social systems are dened as systems by their own qualities, and communicative processes are constitutive for social systems. Consequently, questions can be asked as to how different systems co-evolve: the psychic and the biotic system within a person; the psychic system of a teacher and the psychic system of a student; or a teachers and their students individual psychic systems and the communicative system in the classroom.

Living systems Biotic processes (Manifest behavior) nonlinguistic paralinguistic linguistic

Psychic systems Psychic processes (Consciousness) cognition feeling motivation

Social systems Communicative processes information addressees meaning/ understanding

Figure 1. Operations and types of systems

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Biotic Processes as a Precondition for Psychic Processes While purely physical systems (e.g. planetary constellations) are largely subject to environmental inuences, by means of cognitive processes living systems (e.g. mammals) have the capacity to represent their environment. Living systems actively seek favorable conditions and withdraw from undesirable conditions and inuences. Living systems can be described through their biotic (bio-physiological) processes, such as neurobiological or motor processes manifesting as behavior, which are a precondition for psychic processes but, as argued above, cannot be reduced to biochemical processes (see Lang, 1993). Psychic Systems and Consciousness Psychic systems are, through their semiotic processes, capable of developing representations of their environment and themselves. It is this capacity that differentiates psychic systems qualitatively from biotic systems. Luhmann (1995, pp. 262267) denes this capacity as consciousness. Consciousness does not exist independent of semiotic processes within psychic systems. Various theories state that consciousness developed parallel to biotic developments of the neural system and to social developments, that is, communication, and that both ontogenetically and phylogenetically, consciousness is linked to communication processes. Language, the medium for communication, is the most important link between psychic and social systems; it is the most powerful medium for semiotic processes as well as communicative processes. Wygotski (1985, 309ff)/Vygotsky (1987) demonstrated in a variety of experimental studies the central function language has in transmission, since it is a culturally available tool for the development of higher cognitive functions. Psychic processes can be distinguished as cognitive, affective/ emotional and motivational processes, and they are all greatly interdependent. Ciompi (1999) characterizes affects as:
an encompassing psycho-physical mood (brought about by internal or external stimuli) of varying quality, duration, and degree of consciousness. Affects are the crucial providers of energy or motors and motivators of any psychic dynamic, and they determine the focus of attention. Affects are like locks or gates which open or close access to different psychic processes. Affects create continuity; their impact on cognitive elements is like a kind of glue or connective tissue and they determine the hierarchy of our thought content. Affects can be identied, therefore, as eminently important reducers of complexity. (Ciompi, 1999, p. 67)

While processes of consciousness depend on and correlate with bio-physiological processes, their qualities can only be accessed as 223

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experience and as externalizations of these experiences by means of language. This causes methodological problems for neurological investigations of consciousness and psychological research; we will discuss some of the latter below. Social Systems are Dened by Communication Systems are dened by their modes of operations. According to Luhmann (1995, pp. 137175), social systems are nothing but communications. It is signicant to note that actual communicative processes are constitutive of a social system and not aggregates of individuals who identify themselves as belonging to some social group or other. It follows that if communication processes end, the social system ceases to exist. Luhmanns (1995) denition of communication differs from those of traditional communication theory, whereby communication is the transmission of information from a sender to a recipient (see Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Wiener, 1948). For Luhmann, this denition is too ontological, because it suggests that information exists in the head of a sender and is transmitted by way of a physical medium to the head of a recipient. For Luhmann, the concept refers exclusively to the self-referential processes of a social system. Information is the operation by which a system reduces uncertainty by selecting some operations and disregarding others. Through enforced selective information-processing, a system reduces complexity when dealing with a particular environment. Drawing on Bhler (1990), Luhmann denes communication as a synthesis of three selections: a selection of information, a selection of an addressee and a selection of meaning. Communication transcends acts of single individuals, and communication should not be considered a chain of communicative acts. The selectivity of what is uttered, information, and the selectivity of understanding always enter into communication, and precisely these differences, which enable its unity, constitute the essence of communication (Luhmann, 1995, p. 164). For example, when at the beginning of a lesson a teacher asks the students to put their books on their desks, there is a threefold selection to this communication: information (selection 1: information: what?) the teacher could have asked the students to put their rubbers on their desks; she addresses her message to all students of the class (selection 2: addressee: who?)she could have addressed her message to only one student; and essential to communication is that the students understand the message (selection 3: meaning). Understanding is a social phenomenon and can only be deduced from the students 224

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reactions. Whether a message has meaning cannot be decided on the basis of the processes of a single individual but only on the grounds of how the processes of at last two psychic systems are related. The students reactions will show whether the teachers message has connectivity (in German, Anschlussfhigkeit). The selection of meaning is connected with processes of mutual expectations, for which Luhmann (1995, pp. 103136) coins the concept double contingency. The students could react as the teacher expects and put their books on their desks. But a show of recalcitrance or outright protest against it would also demonstrate meaningful communication, because if the students did not understand what the teacher wanted of them, they could not protest and do the opposite. The students, as addressees, make in turn a selection of information, addressee and meaning. If a selection in one of the three domains does not take place, whatever happens should not be characterized as communication in Luhmanns sense. In such cases, the teacher may not make a selection of information (e.g. he always utters the same sentence), or the students may not feel addressed at all, or the students reactions may be beyond what could reasonably be expected, that is, their responses lack connectivity. Understanding can always include misunderstanding, and according to Luhmann this is in fact most frequently the case. Mutual understanding only has to go as far as is necessary to coordinate systems interactions (see Grice, 1975). Interrelations between the Three Types of System With regard to operational closure, the three different systems function autonomously, but they function interdependently due to their structural connections. For example, psychic processes are dependent on bio-physiological conditions, so that neural systems make cognitive, emotional and motivational processes possible. But psychic processes cannot be reduced to biotic processes, nor are they determined by them. Likewise, psychic processes are a precondition for communicative processes in social systems, but communicative processes have qualities that cannot be derived from psychic systems. Each of the three systems can be considered as an environment for any other. As environments, they simultaneously enable and delimit the possibilities of the related systems. The conception of systems as operating simultaneously and in parallel makes this view possible and stands in contrast to traditional notions of systems as hierarchically structured. It also opens up questions about how different systems evolve, and evolve in exchange with each otherthat is, what we, drawing on Luhmann (1995), call co-evolution. Employing this notion 225

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in our empirical investigation, we would ask, for example: How do teachers psychic processes (e.g. their opinions about challenging behaviors) match or correspond to communicative processes (e.g. communication about certain content)? Or, in reverse: Do certain communicative patterns develop in parallel with students psychic processes (e.g. demotivation)? Culture as Communication Following Luhmann, culture cannot be dened in terms of individual membership to a social community or in terms of territorial boundaries. Culture as an attribute of social systems consists of communication. Systems theory avoids making the kinds of static ascriptions made through traditional concepts like social knowledge, values, norms or roles that are, it needs to be stressed, analytical constructs devised by researchers and not phenomena that can be the subject of empirical investigation. Rather, culture is constituted, maintained and changed by communication. When communicative processes occur in the same or in similar ways repeatedly, communicative patterns are formed. They are structurally related to psychic systems, and communicative patterns can therefore inuence (not determine) parallel developments in psychic systems (as patterns of expectations, for example). Psychic systems have a capacity for (symbolic) generalization, which is in turn a condition for communicative processes. Patterns that reduce the complexity of psychic systems operations develop in parallel with communicative systems, as a co-evolutionary process of psychic and social systems. This concept of pattern is comparable to Valsiners (1998) concept of constraints with regard to psychic systems. Constraints structure a psychic systems possibilities of thinking, feeling and acting. Constraints describe patterns of processing, leading to a reduction of complexity in a system, always in relation to a given and specic environment. Patterns can be distinguished by laypersons as well as researchers, and they can refer to properties of psychic systems or social systems. To avoid paradoxical reasoning, however, who asserts the existence of a pattern and to which system it refers must be dened. Using the concept for different subjects and objects often leads to epistemological problems; if pattern can refer to the activities of researchers or laypersons, and to processes of psychic or communicative systems, it remains vague. Moreover, its use as an explanatory concept often results in tautologies, for example when communicative patterns are explained by psychic patterns and vice-versa.

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Thommen & Wettstein Culture as Co-evolution

Culture as the Co-Evolution of Psychic and Social Systems Within a systems-theoretical framework, culture can be conceptualized as the enduring patterns of the co-evolution of psychic and communicative processes. These patterns often result in generalized symbolic forms. Language is the most prominent and powerful cultural product and the most effective medium to deal with culturally relevant processes in psychic and social systems. Language has the advantage that hidden operational processes and patterns are exteriorized and symbolically represented. Through writing in particular, language attains constancy over time and enables the conservation of otherwise ephemeral processes (see Donald, 1991). By means of language, representations of semiotic processes can be transmitted over time and space. Therefore, language and the related semiotic processes are an effective cultural means of coordinating individuals psychic processes, their manifest behavior and communicative processes. Having said that, written language is rst of all nothing more than black ink on a white piece of paper, and like all physical objects it is subject to physical decay. Besides, it remains a physical artifact, an incomprehensible sign, as long as it is not interpreted by psychic processes and transmitted by communicative processes. Pointing this out, we are trying to avoid the danger of seeing signs as if they are psychic processes, when in fact they are merely triggers and results of psychic or communicative processes. From this perspective, it becomes intelligible why different people and groups have been ghting for thousands of years over the proper interpretation of contentious linguistic artifacts (such as the Bible), or why the interpretation of the meaning of texts will never come to a denite end (this article will be no exception). Besides language, culturally relevant semiotic processes are represented by other symbols. Different icons u. , H) may channel and coordinate psychic and communicative processes more or less successfully both in small or global social groups. Similarly, physical objects can be loaded with cultural meaning. For example, religious symbols and buildings such as crosses, cathedrals, mosques or synagogues activate diverse psychic processes, depending on the perspective of the interpreter. These psychic processes develop parallel to communicative processes, which can end in consensus or in hostile battles between persons with a different social history. Symbols are very powerful and economic cultural devices for guiding thought and action (Vygotsky, 1929) and coordinating communication, but they sometimes miss their target. Symbolically transmitted rules and prescriptions are often violated (e.g. the violation of a schools house rules or an infringement of trafc rules). Using 227

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physical barriers to guide behavior is much more laborious but sometimes more effective (e.g. a fence to mark the border of a schoolyard, street barriers or prison architecture). A strictly process-oriented conception of culture (dened as structurally related psychic and communicative systems) offers productive perspectives on questions that arise when cultural phenomena are objectied as concepts. Those processes should only be considered cultural if researchers identify and construct them as such (i.e. as regular and enduring patterns of co-evolution). This is itself an accomplishment and construction of psychic systems in the sense of a second-order observationor a third-order one if researchers make statements regarding a persons observation about their own psychic system, the system of a partner, or the cultural system in which they live. A question about how students themselves explain the origin of behavior problems in the classroom is a third-order observation by a researcher about students second-order observations about themselves and their behavior. Differences between the students secondorder observations and the researchers third-order observations can be explored further through questions such as: Are there differences between everyday cultural psychology and academic cultural psychology (see Bruner, 1996; Thommen, 1985)? Cultural phenomena are often specic to certain situations, persons, groups and times: this is compatible with a dynamic, process-oriented concept of culture. Individual and situational differences (variations) are indispensable for evolutionary change. Without variation there will be no selection and no evolution. Social minorities often initiate different psychic and communicative processes and are a powerful motor for enduring cultural change (see Mugny & Prez, 1991). When investigating cultural phenomena empirically, the type of system that is the focus of investigations must be specied. The main focus of cultural psychology is the co-evolution of psychic and social systems. The traditional categorization of perspectives as sociological, socialpsychological or personality-psychological cannot be maintained, because these emphasize only different aspects of the same coevolutionary process. The extent to which semiotic processes in different psychic or social systems accord is an empirical question that is settled by researchers when making (more or less arbitrary and nominal) decisions as to whether a phenomenon should be described as cultural. In doing so, they take into account the number of persons reporting equal semiotic processes and the degree of consensus among them. Accords form a continuum, from private phantasms (as when the picture of a school 228

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structural links co-evolution

time

perturbations

psychic processes

communicative processes

Figure 2. Structural links and co-evolution of psychic and communicative processes

building evokes memories of ones rst teacher) to globally shared interpretations of icons (e.g. an arrow). The Benets of a Multi-Perspective Approach The current tendency of theories in the social sciences to separate analytically some topological or temporal segments of reality causes restrictions and a lack of investigation into complex relationships between social and individual processes. The microgenetic coordination of goal-directed behavior, the acquisition of conventionalized semiotic processes in ontogenesis, and the historical changes of these processes make for three different time foci and three levels of differentiation which together a researcher has to bring to a topic. Each process within a system can be analyzed from a microgenetic, ontogenetic or sociogenetic perspective (see Wygotski, 1985, p. 31). From a microgenetic perspective, the constancy or variability of processes within a person or among persons in the same situation can be investigated. An ontogenetic perspective looks at changes of processes over a certain period of life or a lifetime. From a socio-genetic perspective, the variability or constancy of processes over historical 229

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periods is being investigated. Generally, these three perspectives are not conceptualized and investigated simultaneously and in relation to each other. If two perspectives are mentioned it is often in a reductionist way, because facts determined from one perspective are often taken as causal factors for explanations from another. By contrast, systems theory conceptualizes the different types of system as functioning autonomously but being structurally linked, without the subordination of one system to another. New Questions for Old Problems Systems theory differentiates strictly between psychic and communicative processes. Cultural processes have a qualitatively different status, since they emerge from the co-evolution of psychic and communicative processes. The crucial question, then, is no longer about the relationship between individual and culture, but about the interrelation of psychic and communicative processes that lead to coevolutionary cultural patterns. Valsiners (1998, p. 21) concept of the inclusive separation of person and environment is based on an expansion of classical two-value logic: a and non-a can be seen as complementary parts of a system and are not mutually exclusive. Such a solution based on logic addresses certain conceptual problems, but it does not address the temporal dimension of processes unfolding in time. In systems theory, the concept of environment is completely relative (e.g. von Uexkll & Kriszat, 1970): environments differ in relation to a processing system. It also has to be specied which system denes a certain environment (literally another system) as an environment; this includes, for example, the environment dened by the system of a researcher. According to Luhmann (1995), the functional system of science forms a self-referential system. Communication within the scientic community as well as between science and other functional systems (e.g. the political system that provides nancial support and applies results) determines which scientic ndings will persist and disseminate and which will disappear. This, however, does not indicate anything about their epistemological truth. Different episodes in the history of science illustrate this statement. For example, Aristarchos of Samos argued as early as 400BC that the earth moves around the sun, but for religious and political reasons this theory was only accepted around 2000 years later.

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Theoretical and Methodological Consequences: The Investigation of Classroom Disruptions

Problem Here we illustrate theoretical and methodological consequences of a systems-theoretical approach by discussing an empirical example: that of the development of classroom disruptions. At rst sight, classroom disruptions do not appear to be a cultural phenomenon. They are usually regarded as individual students psychic problems (e.g. Myschker, 2005) or as social problems of the whole class as a community (e.g. Kounin, 1970; Molnar & Lindquist, 2006). But according to our denition of culture as the co-evolution of psychic and social systems, the emergence of classroom disruptions can be interpreted as a cultural phenomenon of all members of a class sharing a classroom. In this study we are especially interested in questions of how individual behavior, psychic processes and social processes in the class interact. The systems-theoretical framework we have outlined allows us to dene the various qualitative processes with conceptual precision, to record them empirically, and to describe the patterns of events going on, both internal to these processes and among them. Following a systems-theoretical and constructivist approach, the problem can be formulated using the following questions (see Figure 3): Which processes can be described and which patterns of processes can be identied:

in the living systems of teacher and students (behavior)? Example: Violating classroom rules, a student leaves his chair at his desk 12 times during a lesson. Each time the teacher admonishes him to go back to his desk. in the psychic systems of teacher and students (cognitive, emotional, motivational)? Example: The teacher is convinced that he will succeed in achieving a behavior change if he consistently admonishes the student every time. The student is happy about the personal attention he gets from the teacher. in the social system of the class (communication)? Example: The communication between teacher and student unfolds time and again according to the same pattern. The student gets up, the teacher admonishes, the student does not respond to the admonishment, and so forth . . .

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How do the different systems co-evolve? In our study, we concentrate on the co-evolution of psychic systems and the social system.

How are they structurally linked? What patterns can be identied, taking into account the operational processes in the two systems? Example: Even though the teachers intervention does not result in the student changing his behavior as desired, the teacher does not change his strategy. The conviction in the teachers cognitive system and the positive feelings triggered in the student (psychic system) lead to a communicative process that takes the same stereotypical course time and again.

Most theories of problem behavior and classroom disruption address issues of type and . Learning theories in general do not go beyond this conceptual level. Bandura, Ross and Ross (1961), in their classic baby-doll experiment about imitation of aggressive behavior, for example, dened properties of the environment as a static variable or a group of variables, but not as an autonomous social system. Thus, questions of the co-evolution of psychic and social systems could not arise. Their explanations are restricted to operations within living and psychic systems. Labeling behavior as problematic is a normative judgment, and normative judgments are made by persons or groups of persons about the psychic processes of other persons. A systems-theoretical approach, however, allows the following questions to be raised about so-called problem behavior: Who judges which processes as problematic or disruptive? Is it the actor him/herself, an interaction partner, or the researcher? These issues can be addressed in turn and any differences or agreements can be stated explicitly. In our empirical study we, as researchers, dene only those communicative processes as disruptive that refer to the communicative process itself and attempt to steer it, because they impede curriculum-related activities in the classroom. Describing Operations of Three Different Types of System In our investigation of classroom disruptions we focus on an independent description of operational processes in three qualitatively different systems using the following methods (see Figure 3):

Observing bio-physiological and motor processes (especially behavior) of teachers and students Analyzing psychic processes of teachers and students Describing communicative processes between teacher and students.

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Statem ents about structural links

Statem ents about structural links

Living systems

Psychic systems

Biotic processes Manifest behavior - non-verbal - para-verbal - verbal

Psychic processes - cognition - feeling - motivation

Social systems

Commun icative processes - contents - addressees - sense/ comprehension

Inferring by observation and

analyzing self-reports

Observation of
manifest behavior

Observation of
communicative processes

Resea rcher
Second- and third-order observations

Figure 3. System processes and methodological approaches

Our descriptions are based on certain theoretical assumptions about each of these specic processes. The descriptions are the starting point for statements of a higher order concerning the co-evolution of these processes, which are developing in parallel. The Observation of Manifest Behavior In this context we are interested in registering manifest behavior as far as verbal, non-verbal and paraverbal behavior is concerned. We refer to a rich tradition of methods of behavior observation developed by Gestaltpsychologie and eld theory (Khler, 1973; Lewin, 1963), ecological psychology (Barker & Wright, 1955) and ethology (EiblEibesfeldt, 1989). Through systematic behavior observation (Fassnacht, 1982, 1995) and an event-sampling technique, we assess two variables: on-task/off-task behavior and students aggressive behavior (see Wettstein, 2006, 2008).

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Analyzing Psychic Processes Psychic systems reproduce themselves through self-referential processes (see Luhmann, 1995, pp. 59102) and through semiotic processes in particular, psychic systems create meaning (Sinn). The creation of meaning, making sense, is a property of both psychic systems and communicative systems. We argue that meaning and sense-making is the evolutionary achievement, by common drift, of psychic and social systems. If psychic processes are not reduced to observable biotic processes, they have to be interpreted by the psychic system itself (self-consciousness) or other perceptive psychic systems (interaction partners or researchers). The investigation of psychic and social systems has to be compellingly reconstructive and interpretative (Bohnsack, 2007; Vogd, 2005). The attribution of meaning is always an act carried out by a particular psychic system, either as an act of self-attribution or as an attribution to processes as they are perceived. For the researcher as a rst-, second- and third-order observer, therefore, two methodological possibilities open up (see Wettstein & Thommen, 2009):

1. Psychic processes (e.g. motives, aims, feelings) can be analyzed, interpreted and inferred from observable biotic processes. Manifest behavior, expressed bodily and/or through language, enables insight into cognitive constructs such as intention, motive and aims. 2. Because of their capacity for self-perception and self-reection, psychic systems can interpret and communicate their own psychic processes; the methods introspection and self-confrontation make use of this capacity to gain access to psychic processes. When interpreting both ones own and others behavior, the construction of meaning is based on a foundation of more or less conventional semiotic processes and mutual expectation. Psychic and social processes cannot be described in an objective way. They are part of a poly-contextual order which presents differently, depending on the specic interpreter and their specic perspective and semiotic history (e.g. Bohnsack, 2003). The researchers challenge is to reconstruct patterns of psychic processes and communication in such a way that they can shed light on the co-evolutionary process. Researchers are able to interpret behavior only when they are themselves members of these culturally shared semiotic processes. They interpret it against the background of their own knowledge, beliefs and values (see Boesch, 1996). This has far-reaching epistemological consequences, but a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article; here we offer only a few remarks. 234

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Because every interpretation is bound to an observing psychic system, there is no absolute objective knowledge. This also applies to an empirically working scientist who is, therefore, not in a privileged position when making truth claims for his or her interpretations. Having said that, there are agreed rules and procedures in science that govern observations and the research process; therefore, the very operations involved in research become comprehensible, transparent and hence open to criticism. We all know, however, that there is no general agreement in science about the precise rules and procedures our never-ending epistemological and methodological disputes are testimony to that. Describing Communicative Processes Communicative operations have qualities that cannot be reduced to psychic processes. To describe the particular qualities of communicative processes, it is necessary to observe repeated events of interacting psychic systems, because they cannot be reconstructed as the accumulation of behavioral expressions of psychic systems. Communicative processes are based on already existing semiotic processes and at the same time constitute new meanings, and we are therefore confronted with methodological problems comparable to those met when interpreting psychic processes. One of our primary concerns is the question: Are there stable, escalating or de-escalating patterns of communicative processes? Stability or escalation may refer to different aspects of communicative processes: to the selection of information, to the selection of an addressee, or to the question of understanding. Luhmann (1995) proposed a general theory of communication. In order to make this theory fruitful for empirical work, his guiding ideas have to be made more specic and applicable to classroom situations. Our recently published explorative study (see Wettstein & Thommen, 2006) is a rst attempt in this direction. Here we offer an illustrative example. In the communicative processes between teacher and students, three themes alternate. From the standpoint of the institution, it is desirable that communication deals with curriculum matters (Theme 1). When lessons become challenging, however, communication often shifts to Theme 2, the negotiation of social rules, or even to Theme 3, when the students doubt the authority of the teacher. Our analyses so far show that an increase in problem behavior is linked to a high degree with the development of communication, as in the example above. From these ndings about the co-evolutionary processes of biotic (problem 235

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Theme 3. Communication about the power to define social values, norms and rules; i.e., who is authorized to steer action? Teacher: Im the boss here. Student: You arent my mother. So dont order me! Theme 2. Communication about steering actions: social values, norms and rules Student (loudly): I hate dictations. I dont want to correct my mistakes. Teacher: Hey, not in that tone of voice. Theme 1. Communication about content and curriculum matters for this lesson Teacher: Today we will talk about your dictations. Student: Takes his booklet out of the desk.

Turning points

Figure 4. Themes of communication: critical turning points of escalation

behavior) and communicative processes it is possible to derive a range of highly promising interventions by teachers who are facing problem behavior. Improving the didactic quality of lessons can signicantly contribute to keeping communication between teachers and students to the content level (Theme 1) rather than letting it drift to the steering level (Theme 2) or even power level (Theme 3). With regard to formal criteria, communication processes and their effects on problem behavior can be analyzed by the following questions: 1. Who initiates a change of theme? Example: Time after time, students begin to discuss classroom rules and to question them. The teacher attends to their questions. 2. Over a longer period of time, communications deal with a particular theme (constant pattern) or communications rapidly shift between different themes (uctuating pattern). Example for the constant pattern: The students are working on their tasks for the particular lesson. The teacher provides input where appropriate. Example for the uctuating pattern: The students are working on their tasks. The teacher intervenes often, whenever she perceives minor violations against classroom rules. With regard to methods, the particular challenge is how patterns of communicative processes that are going on over time can be recorded and described. Methodological approaches to analyzing and describing processes in dynamic systems can be found in synergetics and 236

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clinical psychology (Haken & Schiepek, 2005; Molenaar & Valsiner, 2005), in family systems research (van Geert, 1998; van Geert & Lichtwarck-Aschoff, 2005) and in research of organizational processes (Vogd, 2005). We attempt to translate these approaches to the description of psychic and communicative processes in the classroom and to shed light onto their co-evolution.

How to Ascertain Structural Links between Systems

We conceptualized culture as the co-evolution of psychic and social systems. As a methodological consequence, sequences and patterns of processes going on in two operationally closed systems have to be interrelated and regularities of a higher order have to be identied. Luhmanns particular formulation of a systems theory provides a conceptual framework that allows us to represent processes in different, qualitatively diverse and concurrent or parallel existing systems as well as their interdependencies and interrelations. Investigations committed to this conceptual framework have to proceed with new, appropriate methods. In the social sciences, many methods and models have been developed for handling aggregated data of different groups, but only very few for the description of data representing time series. When the temporal factor is critical, the situation is comparable with, to use a metaphor, the score of a piece of music (see Haken & Schiepek, 2005; Vorsmann, 1972). Methods and models need to be developed further that enable the identication of synchronic and diachronic, constant and changing, harmonious and non-harmonious patterns among the different tunes of this scorethat is to say among biotic, psychic and communicative processes that are parallel processes, concurrently occurring over time. Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Dr Claudia Gross (Department of Anthropology, University of Auckland, PB 92019, Auckland, New Zealand (email: c.gross@auckland.ac.nz) for the translation of the German text into English. She has not only translated the text but was at the same time an important discussion partner with regard to theoretical and conceptual issues.

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Biographies
BEAT THOMMEN, PhD, is a lecturer and researcher at the Institute for Special Needs Education, PHBern, School of Teacher Education, University of Applied Sciences, Switzerland. In a current research project he is investigating teacherstudent interaction and classroom disturbances. He is interested in the consequences of systems theory and co-constructivist approaches for

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design and methods in empirical research. ADDRESS: PHBern, Institut fr Heilpdagogik, Zhringersstrasse 19, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland. [email: thommenb@evard.ch] ALEXANDER WETTSTEIN, PhD, is currently working as a Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Special Needs Education, University of Applied Sciences in Bern, Switzerland. His main eld of research is systematic behavior observation in educational settings. He has conducted a series of eld studies on social behavior in naturalistic educational settings. In 2008 he authored the Observation System for the Analysis of Aggressive Behavior in Classroom Settings, BASYS, and published a series of articles concerning the quality of teaching and social interaction in educational settings. In his current research project he is investigating aggressive adolescents environments.

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