CONFERENCE WORKBOOK

for

"TEXTS IN CYBERNETIC THEORY"

An In-Depth Exploration of the Thought of HUMBERTO R. MATURANA WILLIAM T. POWERS ERNST VON GLASERSFELD

A Conference of THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR CYBERNETICS

October 18-23, 1988 Felton, California

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. II.

Conference Description "An Outline of Control Theory" by William T. Powers "An Exposition of Radical Constructivism" by Ernst von Glasersfeld "Ontology of Observing: The Biological Foundations of Self Consciousness and The Physical Domain of Existence" by Humberto R. Maturana Notes Pages (for your convenience)

III.

IV.

V.

TEXTS IN CYBERNETIC THEORY Designed to provide an opportunity for informal, serious study of three viewpoints in cybernetics, this special confer ence of the American Society for Cybernetics will devote each of the first three full days to reading, examining, elucidating, and discussing a specific text embodying the primary ideas of a particular cybernetic theoretician. The day's author will respond to questions of explication arising from small-group study of the text, as well as provide additional elaboration of his theoretical viewpoint and its implications in an evening lecture accompanied by further questions from the floor as well as general discussion. The aim of each "author day" will be to understand the author's viewpoint. The final day and a half will engage the authors in dialogue and discussion of issues that have emerged in the previous days. In addition to promoting a deeper understanding of three major points of view in cybernetic theory, the conference will provide three of our theorists the rare opportunity of being heard very carefully simultaneously offering each participant an opportunity to examine more deeply his or her own theoretical constructs. In short, the conference aims to foster a context in which all of us can learn and explore together, freeing each other from the stifling mode of "my ideas against your ideas" and instead working together against the ideas: to clarify as fully as possible some of the major current ideas in cybernetics, as well as their implications. All conference participants will be expected to have read thoroughly each of the three papers contained in this confer ence workbook prior to arriving at the conference. Participants can facilitate discussion at the conference by making note of questions which arise as they familiarize themselves with the texts in the weeks preceding the conference. At the same time, since the whole point of the conference is learning together, no one should let relative lack of familiarity with all the minutiae of one or more of the theoretical viewpoints prevent their attendance. Also, out of courtesy to our speakers and to the total weave of the conversation, all participants are expected to attend the entire conference, and there will be no late arrivals. Our three speakers have worked hard to provide us excellent self-contained presentations of all the major facets of their respective theoretical viewpoints as you will see in the following pages. If in reading these texts we exercise half the care they devoted to writing them, we will have a fruitful conference indeed. Come prepared to work, and, as always in the ASC, to have fun. - Rod Donaldson, Conference Chair

An Outline of Control Theory William T. Powers Nearly 100 years ago, William James pointed out that organisms differ from every other kind of natural system in one crucial regard: they produce consistent ends by variable means. He made this observation just at the dawn of so-called scientific psychology: his words were quickly forgotten. In their eagerness to make the study of behavior into a science, the American psychologists who became the intellectual leaders of the movement called behaviorism decided to let pure reason govern their approach. In a physical universe, one seeks the LaGrangian: the summing-up of present causes in sufficient detail to allow prediction of future effects. Because the universe is lawful and regular, they reasoned, regularities in behavior must be caused by regular influences on the behaving organism. Thus to predict behavior, all we had to do was study the conditions under which it took place with sufficient precisian and care. From such studies would come behavioral laws like the laws of physics. Using these laws the psychologist could then not only predict what behaviors would occur, but by manipulating the environment, control behavior. From the very beginning, therefore, scientific psychology assumed a property of behavior that is precisely the opposite of the one William James noticed. The psychologists decided that if regularities of behavior occurred, they could be traced back to regular antecedents, and that by manipulating those antecedents they could cause the behaviors to occur again. In this way they created an imaginary kind of organism that behaves in a way that real organisms do not behave, and proceeded to spend the next nine decades so far trying to make real organisms act like the imaginary one. This imaginary organism is in fact far older than behaviorism. It came into existence with Galileo and Descartes. The early successes of the physical sciences were based on the fact that in at least some regards, the non-living natural world behaves regularly when subjected to regular influences. The world is a mechanism, and mechanisms do only what they are made to do by outside forces. All of the sciences of life, as they firmed up, sought to apply the same successful methods to determining the mechanisms of life. Behaviorism was born of these earlier approaches; in fact it was directly shaped by the thinking of biologists. To speak of the "mechanisms" of life is to make a number of subtle but powerful assertions. The subtlest is this: if organisms are mechanisms, they are operated by the world around them. To explain their behavior, therefore, we need look only at their surroundings, and of course at their physical makeup. The physical makeup, however, only establishes the physical thing on which the environment works: without some external force to act

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on it, the mechanism will do nothing. Whatever it does do, it is caused to do. This conception of life meant, of course, that to explain behavior we needn't refer to anything inside the organism. No concept of consciousness, thought, or will was needed, because if all behavior could be explained by referring to visible causes, what more could we add to the explanation by assuming inner causes as well? What would be left for them to cause? This line of argument, of course, assumed something that was very far from accomplished: that we could, in fact, account for behavior in terms of external causes. As the twentieth century got under way, and as more and more scientists pledged alliegance to the principle of external causation, a disinterested observer might have noticed a peculiar fact. Every single attempt to explain behavior in terms of external causation failed. Each one failed, that is, in any terms a physicist or an engineer might apply. Instead of regular responses to outside stimuli, experimentalists kept finding only irregular responses, so irregular that it often took hundreds of trials or hundreds of experimental subjects to reveal that some regularity might lurk beneath the otherwise random-looking data. By the 1930s it had become obvious that the regularities of behavior were all but hidden because of a new property that was named "variability." So the sciences of behavior became mostly ways of applying statistics to ferret out suggestions of regularity. If there had not been such an enormous commitment to the causal picture of behavior, and so many earnest efforts to show that it was really correct, there would have come a time when these scientists would have stood back, assessed the situation, and given up the basic assumption as a failure. Any physical scientist would have done so long before. By the 1930s the cause-effect assumption was, however, far too well established to be thrown out or even seriously questioned by mainstream scientists. Essentially all scientific work regarding behavior was based on looking for regular causes of regular behaviors or at least for correlation coefficients that might be taken as hinting at such a relationship. The scientific world had settled on a general picture of the mechanisms of behavior, and while there was continual wrangling about just how this or that cause affected behavior, there was no disagreement about causality itself. To this point, the concept of mechanism had essentially only one meaning: a sequence of causal links that began with some primary effect and propagated, one link to the next, until it terminated in some observable event. One part of the mechanism affected the next, and so on to the final effect. But on the

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morning of August 2, 1929, a Bell Laboratories engineer named H. S. Black discovered a principle that brought a new kind of mechanism into view. On that morning, on the way to work, H.S. Black suddenly understood how to analyze negative feedback. The artificial control system Black didn't publish his discovery for four years, but it quickly became the foundation for a new approach to the design of physical systems. The basic problem Black had solved was this: given an electronic amplifier that had part of its output connected to subtract from its input, how could this feedback arrangement be stabilized, so it would not "run away?" Obviously, one answer is not to feed back very much of the outputs if the feedback effect is very small, nothing untoward will happen. But what if the net amplification factor, tracing completely around the feedback loop, were very large say, 1000? This would seem to mean, under the old causal analysis, that any small disturbance would be fed back to the same place with 1000 times the amplitude and the next time around it would have become 1,000,000 times as large, and so on. Black showed how an amplifier with any magnitude of "loop gain" could be made stable, provided that the feedback effect opposed the initial disturbance that the feedback was negative, not positive. The trick Black discovered was how to make the feedback stay negative. Systems with large amplification and stable negative feedback soon proved to have some fascinating properties. Their behavior seemed almost independent of their physical properties. Even though stabilizing them meant slowing their responses somewhere in the feedback loop, they were capable of far faster and more precise action than systems without feedback. The speed lost through the slowing factors was far more than made up by the fact that very high amplifications could be used. Black was primarily a telephone systems engineer, looking for ways to build reliable long-lived amplifiers out of imperfect components. But there was another branch of electrical engineering that found a different use for his principles, the branch that eventually came to be known, early in World War II, as control-system engineering. During the 1930s some engineers were looking for ways of substituting automatic machinery for human beings in certain tasks, primarily tasks that took a whole human being's attention full-time just to keep some simple physical variable like steam pressure or airspeed under control. There was nothing in any existing theory of behavior that could explain how a human being managed to accomplish even the simplest of these tasks. Theories of behavior were long on metaphor and qualitative assertions, but very short on instructions for how to build a machine that would behave as organisms were assumed to behave.

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An engineer, some engineer once said, is someone who learns what is necessary to get the job done. In this case, what the engineers had to learn was how organisms really work. They solved this problem from scratch, inventing in the process a new kind of machine. Being interested only in the machine, they didn' t realize that they had revolutionized the sciences of life. It is probably no coincidence that these engineers worked primarily with electronic systems. They were accustomed to systems in which there were no moving parts except at the output, systems in which everything interesting took place in the form of changing voltages and currents. An electronics engineer was perfectly happy to point to a circuit chassis and say, "That s the RF signal, and here's where it gets turned into the IF, and here is the detector that turns it into audio, and here is where the music comes out." In fact, all those currents and voltages were just currents and voltages, until they were named and given functional meaning by the engineer. So there is something appropriate about the fact that engineers working with networks of anonymous and essentially identical electronic signals managed to discover how to build machines that imitate, in a rudimentary way, the kinds of behavior that are accomplished by a brain: a brain in which there are no moving parts and everything that happens occurs in the form of networks of anonymous and essentially identical neural signals. To shorten the story, the engineers eventually discovered that in order to control some physical variable, a control system had to have certain basic parts, connected in the right relationships. First, whatever was to be controlled had to be continuously represented by an electronic analogue signal. If a position of an object was to be controlled, some measuring device had to be attached to the object so that as the object moved from point A to point B, an electrical signal changed from magnitude A to magnitude B. This was the sensor. Second, not surprisingly, the control system had to be able to affect whatever was to be controlled. An electronic signal inside the system had to be converted, through an effector, into some physical effect that acted on the variable to be controlled. If an object's position was to be controlled, then the effector would be a motor or a pneumatic piston or a solenoid. For the best control, the amount of action had to be essentially proportional to the amount of driving signal, although it was found that this proportionality could be very approximate. Having thus dealt with the input and output processes, analogous to human senses and human muscles, the engineers then tackled the third problem, the heart of the matter. Exactly HOW did the sensory signal have to affect the output effector to get the result envisioned control of the external variable?

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It's clear that if the sensor indicates that the position or whatever is in error, the sensory signal should operate the effector to make the position or whatever change back toward the right state. A positive deviation should lead to an effort having a negative effect on the deviation, and vice versa when negative and positive are interchanged. Negative feedback. The problem was that you can't simply connect the sensor's signal to the effector and get the right result. If you do that, the control system will energetically force the position/whatever toward the state that creates zero sensory signal. If all you want is to keep the position/whatever nailed to the low end of its range of variation that will do fine (although a nail would also work), but what if you want to control something around some state other than zero, or around a variable state? Consider the poor stationary engineer whose job it is to stand with one hand on a valve wheel and keep a steam pressure gauge at a constant reading. He may not even know that the wheel changes the draft in a furnace and varies the bailing rate of water in the pressure vessel. His job is to keep that needle at the right reading, and all he has to know to do this job is that turning the wheel clockwise will raise the reading and turning it counterclockwise will lower it. Or is that all he has to know? Actually, he has to know one more facts the right reading. The dial tells him the present pressure, but not the right pressure. If the dial indicates 328 pounds per square inch, that is too much, and he has to turn the valve counterclockwise. If it indicates 326 pounds per square inch, that is too little and he has to turn the valve clockwise. Only if the reading is 327 pounds per square inch is it all right not to turn the wheel. As the factory is putting widely varying demands on the steam supply, the engineer hardly ever gets to leave the wheel alone and think about philosophy. So how is the control-system engineer to get that "right reading" into the control system? It's just one position of the needle among all the positions the needle might have, and a phone call from the production manager might result in making some other reading the right one, so 327 pounds now calls for turning the wheel right or left. There is clearly a reference-reading against which the actual reading is being compared, and that reference reading, to have any effect, must be carried inside the human being's head. So the control-system engineers had to provide a reference signal inside the control system they were building. The reference signal represented the intended pressure. The sensor represents the state of whatever is being controlled as a signal, a voltage with an analogous magnitude. It makes sense to compare one voltage to another, and that is what was done: the reference signal was also a voltage. In the nick of

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time, the 6SN7 vacuum tube came along and (in a circuit called a differential amplifier or "long-tailed pair") provided the basis for an electronic comparator that could generate an output voltage that was reliably proportional to the difference between two input voltages. One input voltage was the sensor signal, the other the reference signal. And now the output of the system could be zero when the input was NOT zero, A motor connected to the draft-adjusting valve could stop turning when the error signal coming out of the comparator was zero, which occurred when the sensor voltage was, say, 32.7 volts, just matching the reference voltage of 32.7 volts. The sensor and reference signals, of course, were calibrated so that one volt meant 10 pounds per square inch in this imaginary but generic design. The sensor didn't read the dial: it was the same pressure sensor that made the needle move. Now if the pressure was too low the motor would turn one way, if it was too high the motor would turn the other way, and if it was "just right" meaning that the sensor signal matched the reference signal, whatever its setting the motor would not turn at all. The control-system engineer could then explain to the stationary engineer that his life of drudgery was over, and also that he had lost his job. Verbal descriptions of the way control systems work are almost certain to be misleading unless critical details are spelled out with care. The sheer mechanics of speaking or writing stretches out the action so it seems that there is a sequence of well-separated events, one following the other. If you were trying to describe how a gun-pointing servomechanism works, you might start out by saying "Suppose I push down on the gun-barrel to create a position error. The error will cause the servo motors to exert a force against the push, the force getting larger as the push gets larger." That seems clear enough, but it s a lie. If you really did this demonstration, you would say "Suppose I push down on the gun-barrel to create an error ... wait a minute. It's stuck." No, it isn't stuck. It's simply a good control system. As you begin to push down, the little deviation in sensed position of the gun-barrel causes the motor to twist the barrel up against your push. The amount of deviation needed to make the counteractive force equal to the push is so small that you can neither see nor feel it. As a result, the gun-barrel feels as rigid as if it were cast in concrete. It creates the appearance of one of those old-fashioned machines that is immovable simply because it weighs 200 tons, but if someone turned off the power the gun-barrel would fall immediately to the deck. Nothing but the effector, the motor's armature suspended on good bearings in a spinning magnetic field, is holding it in place. The motor does this because the control system is exceedingly sensitive to tiny deviations of sensed position away from the reference position.

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The gun is so well-stabilized that it resists any amount of push you can exert, without a tremor. The operator of this gun, on the other hand, can easily make it swivel from one position to another just by turning a knob between two fingers. The knob varies the reference signal. When the reference signal changes, the definition of "zero error" changes, and the control system acts instantly to make the sensed position stay in a match with the new definition. If the operator twiddles the knob idly back and forth, the motor and gears may scream and the lights may dim, but the gun-barrel will also twiddle idly back and forth under precise control. World War II started only six years after Black published the secret of negative feedback, and sophisticated control systems were pointing gun-barrels before the war s end (I learned to troubleshoot and repair control systems during that war). Into the middle of this feverish development came Norbert Wiener, Arturo Rosenblueth, and Julian Bigelow. They were not the only people to see that control systems behaved in some mysterious fashion as if they were alive even teenaged Electronic Technician's Mates could see that but they were the only ones with an ingenious name for this phenomenons cybernetics, from a Greek word for steersmanship. Cybernetics In 1948 Norbert Wiener published Cybernetics: Control and communication in the animal and the machine. In this book he showed that the organization of a negative feedback control system was in one-to-one correspondence with the organization of certain neuromuscular "reflex arcs;" he even suggested new ways of looking at purposive or directed behavior as a whole in terms of control theory. This topic interested many others, and soon gave rise to the Macy Conferences, at which gatherings of scientists explored not only control-system theory, but other topics such as information theory, communication, and self organizing systems. The next major publication was W. Ross Ashby's Design for a brain, in 1952. Here Ashby took the basic control-theoretic idea and expanded on it in detail. Among other important concepts, Ashby introduced the idea of "ultrastability" , a special property that he gave to a m u l t i -control-system model that enabled it to maintain itself as a control system under drastic changes in its surroundings, even in its own circuitry. This was the first clear statement of a model of organisms showing how they could be responsible for their own organization. Unfortunately, engineers were under-represented in the early ranks of cyberneticists, one primary exception being Bigelow, who considered himself, however, a proponent of information theory.

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Perhaps if engineering experts on control theory had been called in early in the game, their conventional and practical knowledge of control systems would have completely stifled the inventiveness that kept cybernetics going. But a price was paid for that intellectual freedom. It was clear to all the early cyberneticists that control systems behaved in ways that were very different from any concept of behavior that had existed until then. Instead of action being the end of a causal chain, it was simply one part of a closed causal circle. The relationship between organism and environment, when organisms were seen as control systems, was no longer one of obedience to external forces. Instead, the organism itself became an active agent in the world, its inner organization being responsible for what it did. The early years of cybernetics were full of the excitement that comes from seeing a familiar phenomenon in a new light. The implications of circular causality were simply enormous. Studying behavior suddenly became far less important than studying the inner organization of the brains its inner logic, its use of language, its capacity to do something with incoming stimuli beside respond to them in a blind mechanical way. Organisms began to appear autonomous. All these new concepts followed, however, from a basic new conception of mechanism that few cyberneticists understood. Most o f those who attached themselves to this movement were attracted by what seemed a series of exceptionally coherent insights into the nature of behavior, insights that came, apparently, from nowhere, or at least from a few outstandingly ingenious minds. Most of these cyberneticists understood that somewhere in the background was some technological stuff that had got the whole thing started, but they were not technologists and weren't very interested in machines. It was this new collection of concepts that caught their attention. So they began to guess about how such systems might be organized so as to behave in this new way. There is where the price of ignorance started to be paid. In fact the basic principles of operation of closed-loop systems had been worked out in considerable detail before Wiener and his colleagues ever appeared on the scene. Machines that imitated the purposiveness of human behavior had been designed after a careful analysis of how human beings behaved in that same way (although without any intention of explaining human behavior). The mathematics needed to analyze circular causation, based largely on H. S. Black's work, had matured and was in regular use by engineers. The machines whose behavior inspired the birth of cybernetics were already understood. There was no need to guess about how these newly-appreciated phenomena came about. What cybernetics had to add to this picture was not an explanation of closed-loop phenomena, but a creative exploration of the significance of these new principles as they applied to

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human behavior. In large part, and to the degree possible at the time, this was done. The way was paved for revising some of our most basic notions of what organisms are and what their actions mean. But at the same time, a body of spurious conjecture appeared, produced by people unaware of or uninterested in the existing knowledge about control systems (or else, aware of it in a peripheral way but convinced that its essence could be captured in a few cleverly-stated rules of thumb). The most unfortunate aspect of the conjectures was that they were all grounded in the old cause-effect conception of behavior; the radical switch of viewpoint actually required was simply too fundamental to be accomplished without basic knowledge of the principles of control. Those principles, never firmly grasped, soon faded from view. The leaders of cybernetics began, without knowing they were doing so, misleading. One person, who later became a president of the American Society for Cybernetics, announced that he had always considered purposive behavior to be adequately modeled by a drop of water sliding down an inclined plane under the guiding influence of gravity. Another famous cyberneticist, summing up what had been learned during the Macy Conferences, announced that no closed-loop system could avoid runaway oscillations if the feedback factor were greater than unity. Still another proposed that the basic principle of regulation amounted to sensing the cause of a disturbance, and converting that information into a precisely-computed compensatory effect on the controlled variable. Many others proclaimed that control was based on sensing errors, as if error could be observed in the outside world. Others said that control amounted to calculating the precise program of action that would correct an error, and then executing it. Many others said that incoming sensory information "guides" behavior, and another very popular notion was that control consists of limit cycles or alternating sequences of error and corrective actions. Every mistake that could be made was made, authoritatively. While these views missed the main point, some of them nevertheless contained a grain of truth, and served to keep alive the flavor, if not the substance, of control theory. The basic phenomenon of circular causality continued to be recognized, and its implications expanded. Furthermore, the idea that organisms are active agents was crucial in encouraging explorations of brain models, computer models for the most part, and in leading to the development of new philosophical stances, all pertinent to control theory. The weakness at the foundations was not fatal; at least the implications of control theory continued to be recognized, and continued to attract people who saw that this view made more sense than conventional ones, even if they could not defend it. We now come to the real subject of this outlines the control-system model I am trying to introduce, or rather re-

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introduce, to cybernetics. It is not easy for cyberneticists to concede that there is something fundamental about their own discipline that they have missed, especially when the one who makes this claim seems to be an outsider. A certain amount of resistance, even hostility, is to be expected, and I assure the reader that I have already accepted it and discounted it. I have to do so, to remain consistent with the principles I believe to apply to human nature. But something is demanded of cyberneticists, too; they must at least take under advisement the possibility of thinking the unthinkable. I ask no more than understanding of what I propose. Cybernetic control theory While I already knew a little about control theory at the time, my lifelong interest in applying it to human behavior began only after I read Wiener and Ashby in 1952. It seemed to me that they had uncovered a vastly important principle of behavior, new to the life sciences. Being unknown and feeling ignorant, I determined to learn more about control theory and its applications to behavior, so that some day I could enter those exalted halls of cybernetics with something to contribute. This project began in 1953, in collaboration with a physicist, R. K. Clark. We were soon joined by a clinical psychologist, R. L. MacFarland, and began to learn control theory in depth, my role being that of an engineer/physicist who was designing and building control systems as part of the job of a medical physicist. Clark really made the whole project possible by finding us both a position at the V. A. Research Hospital in Chicago, where I worked as his assistant. MacFarland was the Chief Clinical Psychologist there, and made important contributions in translating our somewhat austere models into terms that conventional psychologists might conceivably understand. Our first paper describing the control-system model was published in 1960, in the shadow of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's book on the organization of behavior, where the TOTE unit acquired its unfortunate lease on life. I will not bore the reader with tales of the meager acceptance that greeted our publication: cyberneticists have had their own problems, for similar reasons, with the Establishment. This brief review of my own history is by way of saying that my interest in control theory was originally inspired by cybernetics, and was always intended, at least as a background hope, for use by cyberneticists (as well as psychologists). I thought, for many years, that I was simply catching up.

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Neither will I bore the reader by re-running the laborious process by which we arrived at the final model, after backing out of many blind alleys. 1 will pass over the ensuing years of intermittent discouragement, the regrouping that ended with my book in 1973, my subsequent tentative forays into the American Society for Cybernetics, and the rise of the Control Systems Group, that rumor of Visigoths poised on the borders of cybernetic civilization ready to plunder and rape and otherwise violate the comfortable ways of the ASC. None of these matters will be important if the basic concepts of this theory are clearly understood. We have all been through the wars. We are all on the same side. Let's get to it. The nature of control The first thing that must be understood is that control is something that a control system does, not something that is done to it. The second thing is that in a control system there is no "controller." Control is a phenomenon that arises when an active system, constructed in a specific way, interacts with its immediate environment. The third thing is that the relationship between control system and environment is not symmetrical. Even though each affects the other, only the control system controls. The word "environment" means here the passive physical environment that takes no action of its own, but behaves as it is made to behave by natural forces: the world of the physicist. The presence of other control systems is a complication we will take up later. A control system senses its environment and acts on it. Sensing means representing, and representing, if it is to mean anything reasonable, means analogizing. A sensor responds to some specific aspect of its environment, some variable outside the sensor, by generating a signal that is a quantitative analogue of the state of the variable. Bear with me for now: this concept of representation will become more interesting. Acting means generating some physical effect whose magnitude and direction depend smoothly on the magnitude and sign of a driving signal inside the control system. Again, bear with m e : we are speaking of the foundations of more complex actions. As explained earlier, the sensor signal representing the external variable is compared with an internal reference signal that is of the same physical nature as the sensor signal. The result is an error signal that is zero only when the sensor signal matches the reference signal. The action of the system is driven by the error signal. In order for control to appear, the parts of this system must act in specific ways. The sensor signal, for example, must

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vary over a range from minimum to maximum as the external variable goes through its whole possible range of change. This relationship establishes the range within which control is possible. The action of the system must affect the external variable at least in the dimension that is sensed. If an action caused by a positive error signal changes the sensed variable in one direction, the action caused by a negative error signal must change the variable as sensed in the opposite direction. The overall effect of these relationships must be that the action driven by either sign of error signal must tend to alter the external variable in the direction that makes the sensor signal come closer in magnitude to the reference signal, so that the error signal becomes smaller. This is the basic requirement -for negative feedback. These requirements give us the qualitative basis for control phenomena. But there is a critically important quantitative basis as well, which accounts for the asymmetry of control. The error signal drives the output action. It makes a great deal of difference how much error is required to produce a given amount of action. The ratio of action to error is called the error sensitivity of the control system. The output function, the effector of the control system, not only converts from signalunits to physical-world units of effect, but it enormously increases the level of energy that is involved in all variations. The output function is a transducer, but it is also an amplifier. The output action of the system is connected to the external variable through an environmental link. In this link the laws of thermodynamics prevails no more comes out than went in. Between the action and the effect on the external variable there is usually some degree of loss of effect. There may be a change in energy level in passing from the external variable to its sensory representation, but if we normalize both variables to their total range of change, there is no amplification. Almost all of the amplification (that is not simply a change of units) that occurs in this control process occurs in the output function, in the conversion from error to action. Here thermodynamics means nothing: the system is supplied from outside with whatever amount of energy it expends. The books do not have to balances this is a thermodynamically open system. It is a peculiarity of control systems that causation often seems to reverse itself. If we compare two control systems with greatly different error sensitivities, our first guess might be that the system with the greater error sensitivity, all else being equal, would produce the greater amount of action. What actually happens is that the system with the greater error

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sensitivity contains the smaller error signal, and its action is essentially the same as what the other system produces. If you double the error sensitivity, the result is very nearly to halve the error signal, not to double the amount of action. There is one last consideration that has nothing to do with the process of control itself, but which is one of the major reasons why control is necessary: disturbances. The external variable is affected not only by the system's action, but by the world in general. The temperature of a house is affected not only by the furnace's output, but by heat entering, leaving, or being generated by other sources in the building. The path of a car is affected not only by the d r i v e r s ' steering efforts, but by crosswinds, tilts and bumps in the road, soft tires, and misalignment of the wheels. A savings-account balance is affected not only by depositing and withdrawing money, but by service charges, computer errors, and crooked employees. Variables that organisms control are controlled because they will not spontaneously come to the states desired by the organisms, and even when brought to those states, will not stay there. The physical environment is in a continuous state of variation, so much so that no specific action can have one specific consequence. There can be no such thing as computing an action that will have a desired result, unless one has taken great pains to shield those results against all normal independent influences. That may be approximately possible in the laboratory, but it does not happen in normal environments. Furthermore, as we are beginning to hear, the lawfulness of the physical world itself is largely illusory even discounting Heisenberg. Many natural phenomena are so sensitive to slight variations in initial conditions that even though we can prove, by backward reasoning, that they are lawful, we cannot establish initial conditions accurately enough to turn those deductions into reliable predictions. The behavior of higher organisms is clearly one of these phenomena. Behavior results from the application of muscle forces not very reproducible in themselves to the masses of the body. The result is not "movement" but acceleration. Even to turn an effort into a position requires a double time-integration, which vastly magnifies all force variations, and by greater and greater amounts as time progresses. And this does not begin to take into account the indirect effects of limb movements that, in order to produce the larger patterns of behavior, must be integrated again and again, all the while being subject to unpredictable disturbances. It is not necessary to invoke control theory to show that the old causal model of behavior is wrongs all we need do is look realistically at what is involved in making "the same behavior" occur twice in a row in a disturbance-prone and semi chaotic universe.

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If organisms simply behaved blindly, the consequences of their actions would be essentially unpredictable. The same action applied ten times in a row would have ten different consequences, in most cases radically different. The physical world, uncontrolled, drifts in a kind of gigantic Brownian movement, showing order on an intermediate time-scale but for the most part simply changing aimlessly. Control systems impose order on this aimless drift. The automobile, buffeted by winds, jolted by bumps, dragged by uneven friction, wearing out asymmetrically from one minute to the next, nevertheless clings to a path that deviates by no more than one or two feet from the right path in 100 miles. This regularity is wholly unnatural, and can be accounted for only by knowing that there is a control system at the steering wheel. The fact that there is behavior at all shows us that there is control. To grasp the behavior of a control system correctly, it is necessary to think of all parts of the system at once. Control is not a sequential process, but a process of continuously and energetically maintained equilibrium among all parts of the system and between the system and external influences. If a disturbance arises that tends to change the external variable being controlled, the system does not wait to act until the disturbance has finished its work. Instead, the action of the system begins to change the instant there is any deviation of the sensor signal from the reference signal. Because this action opposes the error, it also opposes the effect of the disturbance. As the disturbance increases and decreases, so does the action opposing it increase and decrease. The sensor signal, in this process, varies slightly away from the reference setting, but if the error sensitivity is reasonably high only a tiny amount of error is needed to keep the action balanced against the disturbance at all times. For all practical purposes the action prevents the disturbance from affecting the controlled variable. You will notice that some familiar concepts customarily associated with control processes are missing here. The first missing factor is any ability of the control system to sense the cause of a disturbance of the external controlled variable. While a more complex system could sense the cause of the disturbance, doing so would not materially improve control. The control system responds only to deviations of its own sensor signal from the reference signal. Why there is a deviation, whether it is due to a single cause of disturbance or to the combined effects of a thousand independent causes all acting at once (the normal case), is irrelevant. All the control system needs to monitor is the controlled variable itself: if the controlled variable starts to depart from its correct state, the system acts directly on it to keep it where it belongs. There may be a few circumstances in which "feed-forward" would be advantageous, but it can never

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substitute for the basic process of control. I should add that pure compensation, in which only the state of the disturbance (not the controlled variable) is sensed and a compensating action is calculated and applied along with the effect of the disturbance, will not work at all in most circumstances. It may seem to work on paper, where we can represent variables by simple whole numbers and give the imaginary system knowledge of all disturbances acting (and of the links from each disturbance to the controlled variable), but in the real world it can't even come close to explaining what we observe. Another missing factor is any provision inside the control system for computing the proper amount of output to correct a given error. The only thing approximating an output computation is the amplification of the error signal, the system's error sensitivity. In order to compute the right amount of output to produce a given effect on the controlled variable, the control system would need a great deal of information that its simple sensor signal does not carry. It would need to know the momentary properties of the physical link connecting its action to the controlled variable, and it would need to know what amount and direction of disturbance will be acting at the time when the output calculation is put into effect. To get the required information it would need a vast array of extra sensors and a very large computer programed with the laws of physics and the ability to predict future disturbances. Furthermore, it would need to know about its own properties, because the instant that the output computation began to have its effect, the input variable would change to a different state, making the computation obsolete. The concept of "computing the appropriate action" is not only superfluous, but amounts to a very poor design. In the real world, human beings often try to control complex events in this way, thinking that logically it has to work, but in fact such efforts usually prove fruitless, as witness the attempts of the Federal Reserve to regulate the economy by diddling interest rates. Finally, also missing is the entire concept of a "controlled action." Control systems do not control their actions: they vary them. What they do control is the variable affected both by the action and by disturbances. And in the final analysis, what they really control is the sensor signal that represents the external variable. All the rest of the system functions to maintain the sensor signal in a match with the reference signal. The action of the system is determined at every moment by the nature of the feedback link to the controlled variable and by the amount and direction of net disturbance that is acting. If the action itself were controlled, the variable could not be stabilized against disturbance. If the driver of a car controlled the steering wheel instead of the position of the car, the car would go immediately into the ditch, because no one position of the steering wheel will keep the car on the road for very long.

Fig. 1 : Generic control-system diagram

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Fig. 1 shows the basic relationships we have been talking about. A hierarchy of control What we have seen so far would probably be called a "homeostatic" system. We have a system that maintains a onedimensional variable at a constant level matching a fixed reference signal. This system might behave very energetically as disturbances come and go, but the net result of its action would be a variable that is held constant. By now, however, it should be clear that the control system's action focuses on maintaining its own sensor signal in a match with the reference signal. Nothing was said that specifies the setting of that reference signal, and nothing was said to limit the reference signal to a single fixed value. If the reference signal varies in magnitude, the first effect will be to create error. Instead of the sensor signal departing from the reference signal, the reference signal departs from the sensor signal, but the result is precisely the same: an error signal that is highly amplified to produce action. The basic arrangement has not changed: the system will still be organized to alter the sensor signal in the direction that makes the error smaller. But now its action will have the effect of making the sensor signal change, rather than holding it constant. In a well-designed control system, errors are never allowed to get very large. Consequently, when the reference signal changes, the output action will drive the controlled variable to change right along with the reference signal. This is the gun operator twiddling the control knob. Changing the reference signal is a way of changing the external controlled variable in a predetermined way namely, the way the reference signal changes. If the reference signal changes smoothly from a low value to a high value, so will the controlled variable change, quite without regard to any other physical influences acting on it. The control loop will automatically produce whatever fluctuations in action are required to make the controlled variable obey the reference signal rather than other influences. So whatever is capable of manipulating the reference signal is also capable of manipulating a variable in the environment of the control system. The way that variable changes is determined by the cause of the reference-signal changes, and more important, ceases to be dependent on all the physical laws that would otherwise determine how it behaves. The control system has taken over that variable, cut it out of the normal flow of inanimate nature and made it behave as the control-system or as the manipulator of the reference signal wishes it to behave. The

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aimless drift that the variable would naturally exhibit is replaced by purposive change. Regularity has been imposed on Chaos. Note that we still do not have purposive action. The actions of the system are still dictated by disturbances and by natural resistance of the variable to being changed. For any given state of the controlled variable, the action might be found anywhere within its possible range, depending on what else is doing something to the controlled variable, or trying to. Purpose can be seen only in the controlled variable itself in its variations that have been rendered immune to the normal forces affecting it. The purposiveness of a home thermostat is not to be seen in the furnace's turning on and off. It is to be seen in the steady temperature of the room where the sensor is located: 68 degrees in the daytime, and 62 degrees at night, when the little purposive computer lowers the reference signal for the temperature-control system. Rain or shine, summer or winter, the temperature stays at one or the other intended level. The furnace turns on and off as it must. Controlled variables, not actions, contain the evidence of purpose. In the human body, at the lowest level of behavioral organization, there are something like 600 to 800 small control systems, each of which controls the sensed amount of strain in one tendon. The signal representing tendon strain is sent to the spinal cord, where it is compared (by subtraction) against a reference signal arriving from higher centers. The resulting error signal drives the muscle associated with the same tendon. These systems are small, but they are not weak: the range of strain that can be detected and controlled ranges from about a tenth of a gram up to something over 300 kilograms, in the system associated with a normal biceps muscle. The reference signal that reaches the spinal comparator has been described regularly as a "command" signal, its function being to cause a specific amount of muscle contraction. But that is not how it works. The reference signal specifies how much signal is to be generated by the sensors that detect tendon strain. If disturbances alter that strain, the local control loop will automatically raise or lower the muscle tension to leave the net strain the same. It is the stretching of the tendon, not the contraction of the muscle, that is under control. More specifically, it is the signal, analogous to tendon strain that is controlled. In each case, this signal follows a branching path. One branch goes to the spinal comparator, as mentioned. The other branch continues upward, or inward, carrying a copy of the sensor signal in the direction from which the reference signal is coming. When everything is working properly, the upgoing copy of the sensor signal varies exactly as the descending reference signal varies. From the standpoint of the

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higher systems generating the reference signal, the effect is to control a sensation of effort simply by varying a signal standing for the amount of intended effort. The brain "wills" an effort by emitting a reference signal: immediately, that same amount of effort is experienced. The lag is imperceptible, amounting to no more than 20 milliseconds. It's no wonder that we have trouble separating the sense of willing an action from the experience of the action occurring. Paralysis, of course, makes the difference frighteningly obvious. We have now created a class of control systems, the set of all effort-control systems. Everything that a human being does that could be called overt behavior is done by varying the reference signals reaching these systems. Everything. Whether a person is playing a piano concerto, painting the Mona Lisa, pressing the button that starts a war, making a lying speech to skeptical constituents, skating for an Olympic medal, or pounding on the keys of a word-processor, the acts involved are all accomplished by varying the reference signals reaching these 600 to 800 first-order control systems. No system higher than the first order can act directly on the environment by generating physical forces. The actions of all higher systems consist entirely of generating outgoing neural signals. There are no moving parts in this system above the first level. There are only signals, and systems that receive, manipulate, and generate signals. This is not the place to present 30 years of elaboration on this concept of levels of control. I will only try to sketch in the basic relationships that seem reasonable to propose. As far as I know, there is considerable neurological evidence in support of these suppositions, and nothing known to speak against them. But I am not pretending to be a brain researcher; I'm only trying to put together a feasible picture of an organization that has, within the bounds of what we know, a chance of actually existing. Perhaps these suggestions will raise some questions in the minds of real brain researchers. I'm far from the first to suspect control systems in the brain, but I don't believe that anyone else has approach the problem quite in this way (at least before I did). My little claim to fleeting fame. Having isolated the first-order behavioral control systems, we now have a collection of incoming sensory signals, a subset of which is under control, and a collection of outgoing signals that become reference signals for the first-order systems. We can ignore the probability of cross-connections and other complications at this and other levels, in the interest of seeing the big picture first. It's clearly possible now to think of a second level of control. At this second level, a control system would receive

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some s e t o f f i r s t - o r d e r s e n s o r y s i g n a l s (most o f w h ic h come from r e c e p t o r s no t i n v o l v e d i n e f f o r t c o n t r o l ), and w o u ld r e - r e p r e s e n t t h i s s e t o f s i g n a l s by c o m b in in g them in p e r c e p t u a l c o m pu tin g f u n c t io n s to c r e a t e a new s e t of s i g n a l s . E a ch se c o n d - o rd e r p e r c e p t u a l s i g n a l t h u s p r o d u c e d w i l l r e p r e s e n t some new ty p e of i n v a r i a n t of t h e f i r s t - o r d e r w o r ld (e v e r y s i n g l e - v a l u e d f u n c t i o n of m u l t i p l e v a r i a b l e s g e n e r a t e s some s o r t of i n v a r i a n t ) . I hav e r e a s o n t o t h i n k , b u t w i l l s w a l l o w t h e t e m p t a t io n t o e l a b o r a t e , t h a t e a c h new l e v e l a c t u a l l y r e p r e s e n t s a new t y p e o f v a r i a b l e in e x a c t l y t h e s e n s e of R u s s e l l ' s T h e o ry of T y p e s . O n c e an a s p e c t o f t h e f i r s t - o r d e r w o r ld h a s b e e n r e p r e s e n t e d a s a o n e - d im e n s io n a l s e c o n d - o r d e r p e r c e p t u a l s i g n a l , we can q u i c k l y a s s e m b le a c o n t r o l s y s t e m . We n e e d a r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l fr o m s t i l l h i g h e r u p , and a c o m p a rato r t o g e n e r a t e an e r r o r s i g n a l . And we n e e d an o u t p u t f u n c t i o n t h a t w i l l a m p l i f y t h e e r r o r s i g n a l and s e n d t h e r e s u l t i n t h e form of r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l s t o a l l t h e f i r s t - o r d e r c o n t r o l sy s te m s t h a t c an a f f e c t t h e s e c o n d - o r d e r p e r c e p t u a l s i g n a l . T h e e f f e c t may b e d i r e c t , th r o u g h p athw ays in s id e the b o d y , or i n d i r e c t , through pathw ays that i n c l u d e t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . T h e e f f e c t may b e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h a l t e r i n g t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , o r b y a l t e r i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of p a r t s o f t h e body t o i t , a s when t h e e y e s move. How many s e c o n d - o r d e r c o n t r o l sy s t e m s m ight e x i s t ? A g r e a t m any: a b e t t e r q u e s t i o n w o u ld b e , how many c a n b e a c t i v e a t t h e sam e t i m e ? H e r e t h e r e i s a fu n d a m e n t a l l i m i t . T h e num ber of f i r s t - o r d e r c o n t r o l s y s t e m s s e t s o n e l i m i t on how many i n d e p e n d e n t c o m b i n a t io n s o f m u s c le t e n s i o n can b e p r o d u c e d a t t h e sam e t i m e . T h e number i s l a r g e , b u t i t i s n o t i n f i n i t e . A s e c o n d l i m i t e x i s t s , s e t by t h e number o f d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s , in d e p e n d e n t o f e a c h o t h e r , t h a t a r e p e r c e p t u a l l y com pu ted from t h e s e t o f a l l f i r s t - o r d e r p e r c e p t u a l s i g n a l s (a t a n y o n e t i m e ) . At m o s t , 6 0 0 t o 8 0 0 su c h s i g n a l s m ig h t c o n c e i v a b l y c o e x i s t , b u t i n f a c t t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f t h a t many in d e p e n d e n t f u n c t io n s b e in g d is c o v e r e d by t h e b r a in has to b e v e ry s m a ll. L et u s j u s t s a y t h a t t h e r e i s some num ber o f i n d e p e n d e n t d i m e n s i o n s of t h e f i r s t - o r d e r w o r ld t h a t c o u l d b e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o m p u te d , and t h a t i t must b e c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s t h a n 6 0 0 . Why i s t h i s l i m i t on n u m b e rs i m p o r t a n t ? B e c a u s e of a c o n s i d e r a t i o n l e f t o u t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n so f a r . E ven j u s t on a n a t o m ic a l e v i d e n c e , we know t h a t e a c h s p i n a l c o m p a r a to r neuro n r e c e i v e s no t j u s t o n e r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l , b u t i n most c a s e s h u n d r e d s of th e m . T h e r e c a n b e o n l y o n e n e t r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l a t a t im e f o r one f i r s t - o r d e r c o n t r o l s y s t e m , b u t b e c a u s e t h e c o n v e r g i n g r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l s c a n h a v e b o th p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s on t h e n e t s e t t i n g , t h i s n e t r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l h a s to be c o n s i d e r e d a s t h e w e i g h t e d sum o f t h e o u t p u t s o f many h i g h e r o r d e r s y s t e m s . We c an s a y " s e c o n d -o r d e r " s y s t e m s ; t h e r e a r e a r g u m e n ts a g a i n s t r e f e r e n c e s i g n a l s s k i p p i n g o r d e r s on t h e way

FIG.

A HIERARCHY OF C O N T R O L
behaving

in p u ts an d o u tp u ts are sh o w n r r

in p u t s onl y a r e sh o w n

outputs only ar e shown

o rg a n ism /e n v iro n m e n t b o u n d ary e n v ir o n m e n ta l d i s t u r b a n c e s

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down in a control hierarchy (such signals would be treated as disturbances and canceled). We thus have a picture in which some number of independently-acting second-order control systems act by sending multiple amplified copies of their error signals to many firstorder control systems, specifically those whose actions can alter the second-order perceptual signal directly or indirectly. The second-order systems therefore share the use of overlapping sets of first-order systems. No one second-order system determines the net reference setting for any one first-order control system. The net reference setting for one first order system is always a compromise among the demands of all the second-order systems that affect it. What's interesting about this arrangement is that it can actually work. The crucial part of this sharing of control is not the separation of output effects those are simply added together, with the appropriate sign to maintain negative feedback around each loop. What matters is that all the second-order input functions produce perceptual signals capable of independent variation: the input functions must be linearly independent. G iven these conditions, we have a well-known setup for the solution of large sets of simultaneous equations by analogue computation. Digital computers can be set up to do the same thing, far more slowly, using "methods of steep descent" and other arcanities. It is possible for many second-order control systems to maintain quite independent control of their own perceptual signals, despite having to act through a set of shared first-order control systems. Fig. 2, thought up and drawn by Mary Powers and a handy program, shows a few of the arrangements possible in a large hierarchy of control systems. Of course only a few connections are shown, with some deliberately confined to input or output effects for clarity. In the middle and on the right are shown some short-circuit connections, in which the outgoing reference signals bend back to become inputs to the same systems, without involving lower systems or the environment. This is the "imagination connection" that enables us to think to envision the effect of doing things but without doing them. Above the level of the imagination connection, the perceptions are perfectly normal, except perhaps for the combinations in which they can occur. We have a sense "that" something is happening, without the lowest-level details to make it vivid or real. This diagram has a vague resemblance to a real nervous system, which would become much stronger if at each level we stretched the connecting lines and clumped all the input functions together, and all the comparators and output functions together. Then we would have a realistic picture of the sensory nuclei, the motor nuclei, the upgoing and downgoing tracts, and the collaterals that run crosswise at every level in the brain.

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At every level that may exist, we can expect the same sort of arrangement. Each new level of perception creates a new class of entities that can be controlled by varying reference signals at the next lower level. If you trace out any higher order control system, you will see that the control loop always (except for imagination) involves effects in the external world. This permits us, as external observers organized in the same way, to discover the aspects of the shared world that are under control by another organism, even though those aspects be highly abstract. All that is required is that we learn to apply the same stages (or equivalent stages) of perceptual computation to the basic sensory input we are getting from what we presume to be a common environment. This is how we attack the problem of communication under the control system model. There are obvious questions about the highest level of control, and obvious answers that I will not spend time on here. I hope it is suspected that far more could be said about this hierarchy than I have said. Most people take about two years to get the full picture of this model even when they're trying; we won't get that far in one paper. There are two main subjects that still really need discussion I will abandon the notion of getting into the biochemical control systems and evolution, because this is already a very dense and long presentation. One subject is epistemology, which takes on a particularly important significance in this model, and the other is reorganization, the key to the development of an adult control hierarchy and also, although I won't go this far, the route to understanding physiological growth and the evolution of species. I want to show how the control model bears on two subjects that have became centrally important in cybernetics over the past ten or fifteen years. And I would like to say at least a word or two, at the end, about the picture of human existence and aspirations that control theory can give us. The view from inside To this point we have been looking at control systems and the world with which they interact from a viewpoint that is convenient but artificial. From where we stand, or float, we can see the physical environment surrounding the body, the brain an nervous system inside the body, and the signals spreading through millions of channels in the brain. Our X-ray eyes penetrate the skin to reveal muscles contracting and relaxing, putting stresses on tendons that give way slightly, exciting the little sensory nerves embedded in them. In the outside world we can see objects, but also the forces and influences that connected them together. When we put matters that way, it has to be clear that this entire picture is imaginary. It is, in short, a model: a model of a brain in a model of a world.

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Here is a simple question: according to this model, where is the model? If you look at Fig. 2, you will see those imagination connections that allow higher systems in the brain to generate perceptual signals for themselves without causing them in the normal way by acting on the external world. The model says that this imaginary picture of the brain and the external world exists in the brain, and is created inside the brain. My brain. Perhaps, a little bit, your brain too. In particular, the model implies that all these things we experience, whether in imagination or "really" (there is no remarkable difference), reside in the upgoing perceptual pathways. This leads me to make a proposal for which there can be, in the nature of things, no direct evidence, but that does make a lot of things fall into place rather neatly, It is this: the objects of experience of any kind exist in the form of perceptual signals continually rising through the brain. This proposal in no way pins down who, what, or where the perceiver is, the noticer, the observer. It concerns only that which is observed. The objects of observation, I am proposing, are neural perceptual signals in the brain. If you were to spend a few decades systematically and skeptically examining the real solid three-dimensional physical world that you see, feel, hear, touch, and taste, I claim that you would find it to consist of a number of types of experience. From simplest to most complex, I claim that these types can be named roughly this ways intensity, sensation, configuration, transition, event, relationship, category, sequence, program, principle, and system. The words need some elaboration to make their intended meanings clear, but you get the flavor. These types of experience have an interesting relationship to each other. The ones farther along in the list "higher" depend for their existence on the existence of types lower in the list (I do many things backward: my list goes from bottom to top, and I write it left to right). Furthermore, if you want to change a particular experience of a given type, you will find it necessary to change experiences of lower types. Those relationships, however, are not reciprocal: a lower type of experience does not depend on a higher one, and can be changed without changing a higher one. As we go up the list, the relationships between types are the relationships between successive stages of invariants, each stage abstracted from the previous one by a new rule, as in Russell's Theory of Types. This, not by accident, is exactly the structure of the perceptual part of the control hierarchy in Fig. 2. It also seems to be the structure of the perceiving functions at various levels in the brain, give or take some topological transformations, and allowing for the fact that models are always neater than nature.

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But this is not just a structure of perceptual functions: it is a structure of control systems. A control system at any level acts on a world consisting of lower- level control systems, the means of acting being to send varying reference signals to some of the lower systems. These control actions ultimately result in the lowest-level systems doing things to the outside world, and thus to the lowest level of perceptual input signals, the intensity signals. The first-order signals are abstracted to become second-order signals, and so on until we reach the system we began with, where the effect of that system's action is to maintain its own perceptual signal in a match with the reference signal it is being given from above. But here we are floating in space again, while the point, if I haven't mentioned it, is to see how it is to be a system like the one in Fig. 2. When you are a system like this, you find that by acting you can alter the world you perceive. When you learn its rules well enough, you can learn how to make many of those perceptions come to states you have experienced before and liked, or to stay away from states you have experienced before and d i d n t like. When you see a flower, you can move it to your nose or your nose to it, use your diaphragm to pull air in, and experience a scent that you judge as pleasant. If it's a pretty flower that ought to have a scent but doesn't, you can supply a scent in imagination. You can supply a scent at a low level, like a hallucination, or at a higher level, like an impression of niceness. Whatever you do alters your perceptions: that's how you know you're doing something. You perceive your own efforts and their immediate effects such as skin pressure; you perceive effects of those efforts as objects change their (visible) positions, orientations, and velocities. You use your ability to control your limbs as ways of controlling other objects; you use control of other objects to create movements and events in relationship to other movements and events; you control movements and events to maintain certain categories of experience in the states you intend; you maintain these categories in sequences that constitute progressions of familiar kinds; you adjust these progressions according to rational decisions, choices, tests, and symbolic equivalences; you carry out rational processes in support of general principles that you defend, and you maintain those principles as a way of sustaining whole systems within which you live and experience and which you try to maintain, systems like a self, a science, a society, a culture, a world, a uni verse. All of our actions, according to this control model, are part of a process of controlling perceptions. To understand this idea properly, you have to abandon all the meanings the word

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control h a s accu m u lated, meanings that r e p r e s e n t , m o stly, bad g u e sse s as to what i s g o in g on. C o n t r o llin g does not fe e l l i k e t r y i n g : i t i s la c k of control th a t f e e l s l i k e t r y in g . C o n t r o llin g i s j u s t d o i n g . You d o n 't have to " t r y " to look at something you ju s t lo o k . Your oculomotor control system s snap th e object you want to look at to th e center of your v is u a l f i e l d , and t h e r e i s no s e n s e of t r y in g at a l l . You d o n 't " t r y " to w r ite your name; you ju s t w r it e i t . By fa r the m ajo rity of control p ro c e s s e s that go on at a ll th e s e l e v e l s are s k i l l f u l , s w i f t as t h o u g h t , s t a b l e , and s eem in gly e f f o r t l e s s . You form an id e a of what i s to happen and i t happens at th e same tim e. You j u s t do i t . There i s no p ro c e ss of la b o r io u s ly s e l e c t i n g some in ten d ed p e r c e p t io n , f i g u r i n g o ut a way to get c lo s e r to i t , and then p a i n f u l l y working your way toward ze r o e r r o r . That o nly happens when you d o n 't know what y o u 'r e d o in g . M ostly our p e r c e p tio n s trac k our in t e n t i o n s w ith no p e r c e p t i b l e l a g . T h a t 's w hy, som etim es, t h e y 'r e h ard to te ll a p a r t. Of c o u r s e at the h ig h e r l e v e l s of c o n t r o l , p a r t ic u l a r l y t h e c o g n it iv e l e v e l s , t h in g s happen more s lo w ly u n l e s s w e 'r e im a g in in g . There has to be tim e fo r a ll the lower-level system s to b r in g t h e i r p e r c e p tio n s to whatever the momentary net r e f e r e n c e s ig n a l s p e c i f i e s . The lowest level system s h ave a lag of p er h ap s 5 0 m il l i s e c o n d s , w hereas th e h ig h e s t o n e s , o p e r a tin g at t h e i r f a s t e s t , may lag as much as h a l f a second or a sec o n d . Some c o n tr o l p r o c e s s e s may take much longer than t h a t : I'm in v o lv e d in one that h as been g o in g on fo r l e t ' s s e e , 198 8 minus 1 9 5 3 p lu s one th irty - s ix y e a r s . Of c o urse a w is e person d o e s n 't t o l e r a t e p ro tracte d e r r o r ; he or she r e d e f i n e s the c o n t r o l l e d q u a n tit y so i t can in f a c t be h eld at i t s r e fe r e n c e le v e l w ith o u t la rg e e r r o r . I 'm making p r o g r e s s , t h a t 's more l i k e it. To say th a t b eh av io r e x i s t s in order to control p e r c e p t io n s i s not to say th a t a ll p e r c e p tio n s a re under c o n t r o l. Much th a t we can s e e h ap pening around us happens w ithout b e n e f i t of our a d v i c e or e f f o r t . But we do come to "e x p e c t " th e w orld to be a c e r t a in way; th a t i s , even w itho u t s p e c i f i c a l l y in t e n d in g to do s o , we s e t up r e fe r e n c e s i g n a l s a g a in s t which we compare p e r c e p t io n s even when we have no d ir e c t way of a f f e c t i n g them: an in n e r model of how the world should b e . As long as th e world matches t h e s e e x p e c t a t io n s , we e x p e r ie n c e no error and go about our a f f a i r s n o rm ally. But ju s t l e t the sun r i s e in t h e West one m o rn in g , and se e how much e r r o r you would e x p e r ie n c e , and how f r a n t i c a l l y you would s t a r t to a ct to tr y to do som ething about t h i s g r o s s m istake. You can s e e that t h i s model im p lie s an ep iste m o lo g y . If what we e x p e r ie n c e c o n s i s t s e n t i r e l y of p erceptual s i g n a l s in the b r a i n , i t f a l l o w s that we do not e x p e r ie n c e t h e c a u s e s of th e s e s i g n a l s . The c a u s e s l i e o u t s i d e , acc o rdin g to t h i s m odel, beyond our s e n so ry e n d in g s where w e, th e o bservers who e x p e r ie n c e o nly

An outline of control theo r y

Powers

p.25

perceptual signals, h a v e no contact. Our motor efforts disappear into that world, and we know nothing of what they do to the world until the effects return to cause changes in our intensity signals. What we can k n o w of that external world consists only of what we can sense, and what we can imagine. Sensing and imagining occur inside, not outside, the brain. How would a brain organized as this model is organized ever know that an external world, other than the apparent one, actually exists? There a r e at least two kinds of evidence available. One kind is t h e fact that in order to bring any perception under control, the brain must discover how to manipulate reference signals to have the required effects. This can be done only by trial and error, with perhaps a smidgin of genetic help. The relationship between what must be done and the result that it has constitutes a model of some "property" of the external world. The fact that stable properties can be found is evidence that there is something lawful and stable outside the boundaries of experience. In more formal surroundings, this is called "scientific method" (except in the behavioral sciences, where scientific method means assuming a cause-effect model and then throwing out all data that doesn't conform to it). The second line of evidence is found in the very fact that control is necessary. The world will not usually meet our needs, desires, or expectations unless we do something do it, and even when we have learned how to maintain the world as we wish it to be (in the respects we can affect) we find that we still have to vary our actions in order to maintain it in any particular state. In other words, those perceptions are subject to influences other than our own actions. Disturbances. The driver of a car can deduce the direction and strength of a crosswind that he cannot sense in any way, simply by observing how he is holding the steering wheel. He quite automatically varies the position of the steering wheel in the way required to keep the scene in the windshield constant, showing that the car is in the right position on the road. He has no preference for wheel position. Thus he can "see" the crosswind, deduce it from his own control actions, without any other way of sensing it. He could, of course, be wrongs there could be something horribly wrong with the car. That's really a third line of evidence: we can be wrong. We can go through half a lifetime or more thinking we have really got something nailed down, have full control and a competent model of what is happening, only to have some trifling incident turn our whole idea upside down, utterly destroying, for a while, our confidence in our ability to know anything. Such an experience, however, should give us more confidence, not less. What should make us lose confidence is finding that we can no longer detect the mistakes that tell us we can still, somehow, be in contact with reality.

An outline of control theory

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This is certainly not a philosopher's approach to epistemology; it's a purely practical approach. I think that practicality, pragmatism of the right sort, is the key idea here. Knowing that it's all perception, we will think in new ways about most of our own experiences and actions. But will we then give up making models, just because we know they are "only" models? That would be foolish, because then we would be giving up the basis for giving up models, wouldn't we? I think the best course is to admit that what we call knowledge consists entirely of models, models of a body, of a brain, of a physical and chemical reality, of a society, of everything. Rather than giving up models, we should become conscious of the process of making models. If we know we're making models, we won't go around telling people that they are wrong for trying out different models, or that they are right even if their models are sloppily constructed and unconnected with any other models. We should be looking to make all of our models consistent with each other, and worrying very seriously when they are not, and being fussy about what we wi11 accept as a model. We ought to test the hel1 out of our models, because if they don't behave the way our experiences behave, they are worse than sloppy: they're delusory. They're useless. They're dangerous. Of course when we know we're making models, we can be free to try out any ideas we please, as long as we realize that we're playing what is in the end a serious game. We are trapped in here, folks, and our very survival depends on making models that in some way reflect the regularities of the real universe that is right out there, but that we can know only approximately and only by way of models. Fun and games make life interesting, but somebody has to take out the garbage. But it's not that bad. Making models is really fun. Hello? One last point before we leave this subject barely touched. I have made the claim that our experiences of the world fall into eleven types (more or less). Does this mean that the real universe is organized that way? I think my answer would be pretty obvious: of course not, although we can conjecture that there is some reason for these particular types to have evolved (the evolution-model). Basically, the types of perceptions are determined completely by the types of perceptual functions that are applied to each level of signal, and it is highly probable that each person organizes perceptions, within each type, quite differently. But there is a miracle going on that anyone interested in epistemology should acknowledge. The miracle is that we can talk together at all about anything. Everything enters our nervous systems at the lowest level, becoming available to the brain first as a huge collection of identical intensity-signals. It takes many layers of

An outline of control theory

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information-processing before those intensities can be turned into the perception of a sentence, and more yet before a string of grammatically and syntactically ordered words can be used to evoke a non-verbal experience, the perceptual meaning of the sentence. I must turn my meaning into a sentence, and utter it, and you must turn the sound-intensities back into a sentence and the sentence into a meaning before anything resembling what is in my awareness springs up in your awareness. So how do we ever come to believe that the meaning you get is the one I intended? Very often it's not the same. We only think it's the same, and sometimes fatally, assume it's the same. Finding out if it is the same is basically impossible, but even reaching some level of confidence in the sameness requires a long process of backand-forthing, of cross-checking, of "If I understand you correctly, then when I do this, you'll do that." Yet, look at this: over ten thousand words so far, and I still have some hope that you are with me. What you have made out of all these words, I will know only when you do or say something relevant to them as I intend their meanings. Epistemology is a very faint echo of the real problem, which is communication. With that, let us pass on to the final topic.

Reorganization I'm going to give short shrift to this subject partly because my endurance in sustaining this long narrative is beginning to wear down about as far as the reader's must be. This is a critically important subject; unfortunately, I don't know much about it, and can speak only in generalities. This is one place where I really wish I were a good mathematician. The idea of reorganization is an essential part of this model, and has been since its beginnings. It was suggested laid out pretty completely by W. Ross Ashby in his notion of "ultrastability," and independently by Donald T. Campbell as "blind variation and selective retention.' The basic idea is simple, and older than either Ashby or Campbell. There are many forms of learning, but the most fundamental is learning something for which there is and could be no basis in prior experience. This is the kind of learning that has to take place when you grab the knob of an unmarked door and try to open it. With no hints available, the door might require either a pull or a push: nothing in nature says it has to be either way. So what do you do to figure out how this door opens? You don't figure it out. You pull. Or you push. Whichever comes to mind first. If the door doesn't open, you have the information you need: do the opposite. If it opens, you also have the required information: don't change the way you did it. But before you

An outline of control theory

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could get that information, to select the right move out of the possible moves, you had to try something for no reason. This is what I assume to be the basic principle of reorganization, which I could not put any better than Campbell did. Act at random, and select future actions on the basis of the consequences. Another way of putting this is a little more systematic, and suggests at least some sort of organized system at work. Suppose we have a reorganizing system that is capable of acting on another system (of which it actually could be a part) to change the organization of that system. In this case I don't mean the organization of the behavior of the target system, but the very structure of that system, the physical connections in it. Changing the structure will, of course, change the behavior, but the reorganizing system doesn't act on the behavior directly. It acts on the behavino system. That's how Ashby's ultrastable homeostat works. It doesn't inject signals into the homeostat: it switches connections. The reorganizing system must not only be able to alter physical connections in the target system, but it must know when to stop altering those connections. This is the "selective retention" part. Each change in the structure of the behaving system will alter the way that system interacts with its environment. The change in interaction will have many consequences, most of which, probably, are irrelevant to the system as a whole. Some of these changes, however, will have indirect effects on the welfare of the system itself, including the reorganizing system. These indirect effects are the basis for selection, and therefore the basis for starting and stopping the process of reorganization. Selection necessarily implies a selection criterion. Some indirect effects of behavior are "good" and some are "bad", or at least "not good enough." But this reorganizing system has to be dumb. It has to work even when the system it is working on has only the barest suggestion of competence in it. It has to work without any theory, without any knowledge of an external world, without any memories of prior experience (from this lifetime, anyway). So this system has to be told, somehow, what is good or not good enough, and perhaps even too good. It has to be given reference signals from somewhere. For lack of a better idea, I ' 11 say DNA. Furthermore, these reference signals have to have highly specific meanings. It won't do to posit a reference signal that says "survive!' How could a dumb reorganizing system with no linguistic capabilities know what "survive" means? It won't do to

An outline of control theory

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say "organise behavior." There isn't any behavior to organize at first. No, these basic reference signals have to be expressed in much more concrete terms that have direct meaning to the reorganizing system. They have to say things like "this much blood sugar" or "this body temperature" or "this carbon dioxide concentration in the blood." Of course they might also say more interesting things, like "no more than this amount of total error signal in the brain," or even "this pretty pattern of forms in your vision." We mustn't underestimate the power of a billion years of evolution. The selection criteria that make reorganization work as it does might prove to be extremely sophisticated. But we know one thing they will not be: intelligent. Intelligence is something that gradually forms as the brain becomes organized into a hierarchy of perception and control. Intelligence is the product, not the cause, of reorganization. The intellectual skills found in the fully-formed adult control hierarchy are not available before it has been built. The reorganizing system has to work from the very beginning of life, so it can't take advantage of what it has not yet brought into being. The reference signals let's call them "intrinsic" reference signals to distinguish them from the kind in the acquired hierarchy of control can have no effect by themselves; they are only specifications. The reorganizing system has to be able to sense the states of the variables that relate to the reference signals. And the sensed states have to be compared with the reference signals; the reorganizing system has to contain comparators, one for each intrinsic variable. Ashby called these intrinsic variables "critical variables." He saw the reference states as upper and lower limits, while I see them as single target values, but that's the sort of difference we might hope to settle through experiments, and isn't important here. So we arrive at the idea that the reorganizing system is really a control system. It is, however, a very peculiar sort of control system, in that its output actions are random. It does not act "against" errors it continues to act until the error disappears. The error, of course, is simply the total absolute difference between the sensed intrinsic state and the set of all corresponding intrinsic reference signals. Ashby didn't spell out the perceptual functions or the reference signals in his ultrastable homeostat, but he did build them into it, perhaps without even realizing exactly what he had designed. One helpful nation is the idea of rate of reorganization, which would be measured simply as so many changes per second, or hour. If there is a lot of intrinsic error, the reorganization rate will be high. As intrinsic error falls, assuming it does, the rate of reorganization will slow, until finally when the

An outline of control theory

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Control theory is above all a theory of living autonomous systems. Living systems are all control systems, the only natural ones, and the essence of their lives is to control what happens to them, rather than leaving their fates to wind, tide, erosion, and entropy. But the human control systems that concern us most are also very new control systems, largely ignorant of their own nature and prone to treat other living systems, including human ones, as little more than objects to be moved or disturbances to be overcome. Indeed there have been times in human history when many people saw inanimate nature as full of purposive control systems, and human beings as only passive victims of nature's intentions. It is not easy for control systems, human beings, to live together. Even when they attempt to cooperate, they end up pitted against each other over minor differences in perception or goal. They just can't help trying to keep their own errors corrected. To be with others one has to learn deliberately to loosen the control, to lay back, to tolerate error, to be a little less skillful. To expect less, perhaps, of group efforts than of individual ones, but to value them, perhaps, more. To let reorganization ease the strain. To realize how isolated we are; how miraculous it is that we have any contact at all, mind to mind. To appreciate the vast sea of mystery that fills the space between us, through which we would have great trouble steering without the touch of other human hands on the helm, the surprise of other human thoughts about the course.

Draft prepared for

"TEXTS IN CYBERNETIC THEORY", Special Fall Confere n ce of ASC,

1988

An

Exposition

of

Radical

Constructivism

Ernst von Glasersfeld

SRRI, Hasbrouck Laboratory University of Massachusetts AMHERST, MA 01002

Michel

de Montaigne is often listed among the sceptics.

This is a little misleading because he actually used his outstanding wit and erudition to defend the realm of re ligious -faith against the threat of the P y r r h o n i e n s . These "Pyrrhonists" were a subversive group of thinkers who had rediscovered Sextus Empiricus and his account of Pyrrho, father of scepticism in the Hellenic world. the

Montaigne merely He put it as

cut down to size the efforts of human reason. concisely as one can:
La peste de 1'homme, c'est

l' o p i n ion de s a voir. 1

The translation that seems the most adequate to me would be: Mankind's plague is the conceit of knowing. Radical conceit. constructivism is an effort to eliminate that

It does not deny the possibility of knowing, but it

strives to show that knowledge is not the commodity the t r a dition of Western philosophy would have us believe. Indeed,

constructivism is a theory of active knowing, not a conventional epistemology that treats knowledge as an embodiment "in itself", independent of

of Truth that reflects the world the knower. are:

The basic principles of radical

constructivism

* This text is a composite and contains pieces from several papers, among which: "Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and Teaching", to be published in Syn these, 1989; "The Reluctance to Change a Way of Thinking , to be published in The I r i s h J o u r nal o f Psy c ho l o gy , 1908; "Environment and Communication" , prepared for the Action Group 1, International Conference on M a t h e m a t ics Education UCHE-ii, Budapest, August 1988.

1 a) Knowledge is not passively received either through the senses or by way of communication; b) knowledge is actively built up by the cognizing subject. 2 a) The function of cognition is adaptive logical sense of the term); (in the bio-

b) cognition serves the subject's organization of the experiential world, not the discovery of an objec tive ontological reality. To adopt these principles means to relinquish the mainstays of an inveterate conceptual network. rational view of the world. It means getting out of habitual pathways and reconceptualiz ing a different In short, it involves a good deal of thinking and, as Betrand Russell once said, people would rather die than think, and they do.

Knowledge

and

"R e a l i t y "

One of the differences between the vocational practice of theology and religion, on the one hand, and the lay practice of science and philosophy, on the other, we were told in school, is that the first is founded on a dogma that is held to be absolute and immutable because it stems from divine revelation; all lay practice, instead, is tentative because it develops theories that are always open to refutation by new ways o f thinking, new findings, or novel experiments with things or thoughts. Scientists and philosophers, therefore, are supposed to be open-minded and to welcome the solution of stubborn problems, even if the new solutions entail a change of ideas and the demise of concepts that seemed well established in the past. Montaigne and some of his contemporaries had a very clear view of this dichotomy. They were sceptics with regard to the rational knowledge of science and believers with regard to the traditional tenets of religion. A look at the subsequent history of ideas, however, quickly shows that scientists and philosophers do not always live up to this ideal open-mindedness. The concepts and

methods they shakable o r s of pened when

have grown

up of

with

frequently f a i th

seem to be as u n a nd the p e r p e t r a t This h a p -

as a n y m a t t e r tend

religious treated

innovation to Darwin

to b e

as h e r e t i c s .

and

h i s t h e o r y of on

evolution, and

to Einstein to

he first

published

relativity,

it h a p p e n e d

Alfred drift.

Wegener when In t h e s e

he s u g g e s t e d

t he i d e a of with and, of

continental advocated trig-

instances

the break

tradition

by t h e n e w gered

theory

was unm i s t a k a b l e on

consequently,

violent

indignation

t he p a r t

those who were The new theories

anxious w on they of

to m a i n t a i n

t he e s t a b l i s h e d they enabled and

dogma.

eventually, were not

because

scientists to c o v e r a

to do things larger area

able

to do b efo r e fewer

exp erience with New ideas

assumptions. d o not often gain as decisive vican e x profound in

in p h i l o s o p h y not

t or ie s.

I would why it

be so presump tuo us

to offer live with

planation

is a p p a r e n t l y

so e a s y to

epistemological that regard,

c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . Being that t h e quip

a little

cynical from

I feel

I earlier

quoted

Bertrand

Russell

says

something

to t he p oi nt . Busch, Go tt

Besides,

there to

is a G e r m a n me,

saying

(f ro m W i l h e m I iebe z u."

I believe) i mm er Lord

which,

s e e m s r e l e v a n t : "Der fa e l lt ' s but von selber

m u ss

z i e h n , dem must forever If

Teufel pu ll ,

(The g o o d fall

to the the fits

d ev i l

things

quite by themselves.) with o n e of straight

one replaces thinking, that it

ethical our

connotation well;

situation will

It s e e m s

q u i t e n a t u r al t here are

philosophical

problems or it

be shelved

when

cherries

to be p i c k e d as it m a y,

enemies is an

to b e f o ug h t . fact that the prethe

Be this Socratics major

historical

already

saw very Western

clear ly what for

was the

to rema in next world

p r o b l e m of

philosophy a fully of

2 5 0 0 years: exists and out

If o n e a s s u m e s , "out there",

(a) that

structured

independent

any experien cin g has the task one h a n g s

subject, of the finding

(b ) t h at what an that

the co g n i z i n g world is

subject

"really"

like,

m i l l s t o n e of the sub-

irreducible paradox

around

o n e ' s neck.

Whatever

ject p e r c e i v e s o r c o n c e i v e s of the subject's ways and

will

necessarily perceiving

be the result and c o n c e i v -

m e a n s of

ing and t h ere is no way ever

to c o m p a r e these r e s u l t s with The s ce p t i c s ha ve not

what t h e r e was in the first place. ce as ed to r e i t e r a t e this, but

it has not d e t er re d p h i l o s o p hThe urge

ers -from t rying to -find a way a ro u n d the impasse. to p e r s e v e r e k no w le d qe " in the quest for that u n o b t a i n a b l e in er adicable. objective

"o b je ct iv e some

s ee m s almost

(And therefore,

p h i l o s o p h e r s concluded, ab le after all.)

k nowledge must be obta in-

T he t r o u b l e was

(and is)

that the sceptics'

a r g u m en t s

h a v e a l w a y s focused on the negative. true k n o w l e d g e of the o b j e c t i v e w or ld

By r e i t e r a t i n g that is impossible, knowledge, they

ha ve h el p e d to p e r p e t u a t e t he to be any good, This idea

idea that

in order

woul d have to be about the o b j e c t i v e world.

is at the very c o re of the West er n e p i s t e m o logical and t he occasional dissi de nt s, who tried to get

tradition

away f ro m it, h av e had v i r t u a l l y no effect. The last th ree decades, ho we ve r, have m a n i f e s t e d s y m pt o ms

that ma y time that

i n d i c a t e a c h a n g e . It is c e r t a i n l y not the first s c i e n t i f i c d e v e l o p m e n t s are having an i n f l u en c e on t hi nk in g of ph il os o ph e rs , but I b e li ev e it

the p r o f es s io na l is t h e first ions about defending.

time that s c i e n t i s t s are r a is i ng s e r io us q u e s t -

the kind of e p i s t e m o l o g y p h i l o s o p h e r s h a ve been The d i s r u p t i o n s h o w s itself in t he d i s c i p l i n e

that h as b e c o m e known as the P h i l o s o p h y of S c i e n c e and a w a r e n e s s of t r o u b l e was s pr e ad to a much wider p ub li c by R e v o l u t i o n s . There, was t he ex pl i ci t un-

K u h n ' s The S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c d i s g u i s e d and for e v e r y o n e to read, ment that ... research

state-

in p a r ts of p hi losophy, and even art history,

psy cho lo gy , c o n v e r g e to paradigm

l in gu i st ic s , suggest that

all

the tr ad it io na l

e p i s t e m o logical

is s o m e h o w askew.

Tha t f a i l u r e to fit is also ma de s t ud y of

i n c r e a s i n g l y ap pa re nt by the historical science ... . N on e of

t h e s e c r i s i s - p r o m o t i n g s u bj e ct s

has yet p ro d u c e d a v i a b l e a l t e r na t e to the traditional epistemological p ar a di gm , but they do b egin t o suggest

what

some of 1970,

that

paradigm's

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s will

be.

(Kuhn, While paradigm" Kuhn's stitute

p . 121) of the "t r a d i t i o n al of subsiding e p i s t e m o l o g i ca l in the y ea rs since

the tr ou ble s have

shown no s i g n one c o u l d

publication, h as

not h o n e s t l y

s ay that

any s u b and

been g e n e r a l l y teaching

accepted.

In most h i g h s c h o o l s

Universities

c o n t i n u e s a s th oug h n o t h i n g i mmutable some of no t us, objective however,

had h a p -

pened and t h e q u e s t promising of as ever.

for For

T r u t h s were as a d i f f e r e nt v i e w but r a t h e r

kn o wl e dg e ha s of

e me rg ed , pursuing

as a new i n v e n t i o n

as the r e s u l t dissidents. deliberately s hou ld be in-itself. tual the

suggestions

made by much e a r l i e r one in t ha t it

T his view d i f f e r s d is c a r d s the

from t h e o l d that

notion of with an

k n o w l e d g e c o u l d or independent worldthat th e c o n c e p as

a representation It r e p l a c e s we c a l l it

o b s e r v e r -

the demand

constructs knowing to

kn o wl e dg e be v i a b l e it. (T his

in t h e w or ld in fact,

subject what t h e

experiences

is,

quite

similar

p r a g m a t i s t s h a v e been

saying.) acknowledged 1929 that went

L u dw i g

Fleck,

whose monograph of w ro te an e a r l i e r it

1 9 3 5 Kuhn in

as a f o r e r u n n e r , virtually presages year s: The c o n t e n t

article

unnoticed what the

although

already

contained

much t h a t in r e c e n t

Young

T u r k s h a v e been p r o p o s i n g

of

our of

k n o w l e d g e must be c o n s i d e r e d culture. 1929, p. It resembles

the

free creation ditional Every of myth

our

a tra-

(Fleck

425). as it is a member

thinking

individual, has it its

insofar

some s o c i e t y , and

own r e a l i t y (p .426).

according to

which Not

i n whi ch

lives

o n l y t h e ways and means of t o the scientific

p r o b l em s o l u t i o n s but of also,

are

subject

style,

and t o an (p. 427).

e ve n g r e a t e r

extent,

the c h oice

problems

Vico

- The

First of

Constructivist "creation" in our or, as I prefer to

The n o t i o n say, win

cognitive

c o n s t r u c t i o n , was a d o p t e d and then extensively

century

by Mark B a l d Piaqet's

elaborated

by J e a n

Piaget.

constuctivist theory of cognitive development and cognition, to which I shall return later, had, unbeknownst to him, a striking forerunner in the Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico. Vico's epistem o logical treatise (1710) was writ-

ten in Latin and remained almost unknown.

Vet no present-day

constructivist can afford to ignore it, because the way Vico formulated certain key ideas and the way they were briefly discussed at the time is, if anything, more relevant today then it was then. The anonymous critic who, in 1711, reviewed Vico's first

exposition of a thoroughly constructivist epistemology expressed a minor and a major complaint. The first with which

any modern reader might agree was that Vico's treatise is so full of novel ideas that a summary would turn out to be (e.g., the introduction of

almost as long as the work itself developmental

stages and the incommensurabi1ity of ideas at or individual stages, the origin of

different historical conceptual

certainty as a result of abstraction and formal-

ization, the role of 1anguage in the shaping of concepts). The reviewer's second objection, however, to my purpose here, is more relevant

because it clearly brings out the pro-

blem constructivists run into, from Vico's days right down to our own. Vico's treatise De aritiquissima Italorum sapientia (1710), the Venetian reviewer says, is likely to give the

reader "an idea and a sample of the author's metaphysics rather than to prove it." By p r o o f , the 18th-century review er intended very much the same as so many writers seem to intend today, namely a solid demonstration that what is asThis conventional demand

serted is true of the "real" world.

cannot be satisfied by Vico or any proponent of a radically constructivist theory of knowing: one cannot do the very thing one claims to be impossible. tion of Truth from a radical To request a demonstra-

constructivist shows a funda-

mental misunderstanding of the author's explicit intention to operate with a different conception of knowledge and of its relation to the "real" world.
6

One of Vico's basic ideas was that epistemic agents can

k n o w nothing but the cognitive structures they themselves

have put together. He expressed this in many ways, and the most striking is perhaps: "God is the artificer of Nature,

man the god of artifacts ," Again and again he stresses that "to know" means to k n o w h o w to make. He substantiates this

by saying that one knows a thing only when one can tell what components it consists of. Consequently, God alone can know the real world, created it. because He knows how and of what He has the human knower can know only what

In contrast,

the human knower has constructed. For constructivists, therefore, the word k n o w l e d g e refers

to a commodity that is radically different from the objective representation of an observer- independent world which the mainstream of the Western philosophical been looking f o r . tradition has

Instead, k no w le d ge refers to conceptual

structures that epistemic agents, given the range of present experience within their tradition of thought and language, consider viable. The most frequent objection to radical constructivism, the beginning of the 18th century as well at

as now, takes the It is the main

form of discarding it as a kind of solipsism.

objection that George Berkeley had to contend with when he published his major epistemological work, A treatise con-

cerning the principles of human k n o wledge , in 1710 (by a strange coincidence, it was the same year that Vico publishIf one keeps

ed his treatise at the other end of Europe). Berkeley's title in mind, clares "esse est percipi"

it will be clear that when he d e (to be is to be perceived), the

being he is talking about is the only one the human knower can conceive of, and that is being in the world of experience, being constituted by the kind of permanence that results from invariants created by an e x p e r i e n c e r 's successful similation as-

(I shall explain this term later in the context But Berkeley's opponents, just as to-

of Piaget's theory).

day's critics of constructivism, reacted as though he had been talking about the "wor1d- in- itself" rather than about

the principles of human knowledge. Both Vico and Berkeley were concerned with the human activity of knowing. Both had strong ties with the religious dogma that claims an absolute, eternal order of the universe. Their way of reconciling their blatantly subjectivist theories of knowledge with the requirement of an immutable objective world were parallel and equally ingenious. For Berkeley the unity and permanence of ontological existence was assured by God's perception which, because God is considered omniscient, was ubiquitous and all-encompassing. Vico, instead, maintained that, while the human mind could know only what the human mind itself had constructed, God knew the world as it is, because He had created it. So m e matic. Recent Elements "reality" it merely

Radical constructivism is less imaginative and more pragIt does not deny an ontological denies the human experiencer the possibility of acquiring a "true" representation of it. The human subject may meet that world only where a way of acting or a way of thinking fails to attain the desired goal but in any such failure there is no way of deciding whether the lack of success is due to an insufficiency of the chosen approach or to an independent ontological obstacle. Warren McCulloch expressed it very simply: "To have proved a hypothesis false is indeed the (1965, p. 154). What we call "knowledge", peak of knowledge"

then, is the map of paths of action and thought which, at that moment in the course of our experience, have turned out to be viable for us. Such a limitation of the scope of human understanding is, of course, considered dangerous heresy by all who, in spite of the sceptics age-old warnings, still cling to the hope that human reason will sooner or later unravel the mystery of the universe. Richard Rorty, in his Introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism , announces this shift of focus in terms that fit the constructivist's position just as well as the pragmatist's:
8

He (the pragmatist) drops the notion of truth as correspondence with reality altogether, and says that modern science does not enable us to cope because it corresponds, it just enables us to cope. p.XVII) Constructivism is a form of pragmatism and shares with it the attitude towards knowledge and truth; and no less than pragmatism does it go against "the common urge to escape the vocabulary and practices of one's own time and find something ahistorical and necessary to cling to" (Rorty 1992, p. (Rorty 1982,

165). When the anonymous reviewer complained that Vico did not prove his thesis, he in fact reproached Vico for not having claimed for his "metaphysics" (which was actual1y a theory of knowing) the correspondence with an ahistorical ontic world as God might know it. But this nation of correspondence was precisely what Vico like the pragmatistsintended to drop. Present-day constructivists, however, if pressed for corroboration rather than proof in the traditional sense, have an advantage over Vico. They can claim compatibi1ity with scientific models that enable us to "cope" remarkably well in specific areas of experience. Far instance, one might cite the neurophysiology of the brain and quote Hebb's: At a certain level of physiological analysis there is no reality but the firing of single neurons (Hebb 1958, p. 461). This is complemented by von Foerster's (1970) observation that all sensory receptors (i.e. visual, auditory, tactual, etc.) send physically indistinguishable "responses" to the cortex and that, therefore, the "sensory m o d a l i t i e s " can be distinguished only by keeping track of the part of the body from which the responses come, and not on the basis of "environmental features". Such statements make clear that contemporary neurophysiological models may be compatible with a constructivist theory of knowing but can in no way be integrated with the notion of transduction of "information"
9

from the environment that any realist epistemology demands.

Cognition

as

an A d a p t i v e F u n c t i o n

Constructivism differs from pragmatism in its predominant interest in how the knowledge that "enables us to cope" is arrived at. The work of Jean Piaget, the most prolific constructivist in our century, can be interpreted as one long struggle to design a model of the generation of viable knowledge. In spite of the fact that P iaget has reiterated in1967a, pp.210ff) that, from his pernumerable times (cf.

spective, cognition must be considered an adaptive function , most of his critics argue against him as though he were concerned with the traditional quest -for "true" knowledge, i.e., knowledge that could be said to correspond to an ontological reality. This misinterpretation is to some extent due to a misconception about adaptation. The technical sense of the term that Piaget intended comes from the theory of evolution. In that context, adaptation refers to a state of organisms or species that is characterized by their ability to survive in a given environment. Because the word is often used as a verb (e.g. this or that species has adapted to such and such an environment), the impression has been given that adaptation is an activity of organisms. This is quite misleading. In phylogeny no organism can actively modify its genome and generate characteristies to suit a changed environment. According to the theory of evolution, the modification of genes is always an accident. Indeed, it is these accidental modifications that generate the variations on which natural selection can operate. And nature does not as even Darwin occasionally slipped into saying (Pittendrigh 1958, p.397)

select "the fittest", it merely lets live those that have the characteristics necessary to cope with their environment and lets die all that have not. This interpretation of the theory of evolution and its vocabulary is crucial for an adequate understanding of Piag e t 's theory of cognition. Knowledge for Piaget, as for
10

Vico, is never real world.

(and can never be) a "representation" of the

Instead it is the collection of conceptual

structures that turn out to be adapted or, as I would say, viable within the knowing subject's range of experience. (Note: Piaget nevertheless uses the word "representation" and so do I; but it is intended to refer to a representation of a prior experience, not a picture of the "external" world; hence, I spell it with a hyphen, which Piaget did

only occasionally.) Both in the theory of evolution and the constructivist theory of knowing, "viability" is tied to the concept of equilibrium. Equilibrium in evolution indicates the state of an organism or species in which the potential for survival in a given environment is thought to be genetically assured. In the sphere of cognition, though indirectly linked to survival, equilibrium refers to a state in which an epistemic agent's cognitive structures have in the past yielded expected results, and continue to do so, without bringing to the surface conceptual conflicts or contradictions. In neither case is equilibrium necessarily a static affair, like the equilibrium of a balance beam, but it can be and often is dynamic, as the equilibrium maintained by a cyclist. To make the Piagetian definition of knowledge plausible, one must immediately take into account (which so many interpreters of Piaget seem to omit) that a human subject's experience always includes the social interaction with other cognizing subjects. But introducing the notion of social interaction, raises a problem for constructivists. If what a cognizing subject knows cannot be anything but what that subject has constructed, it is clear that, from the con structivist perspective, the others with whom the subject may interact socially cannot be posited as an ontological given. I shall return to this problem, but first I want to ex p 1 icate the basis of a Piagetian theory of learning.

11

The

Context

of S c h e m e

Theory

Two of the

basic concepts of Piaget's theory of cogni-

tion are assimilation and accommodation . Piaget's use of these terms is not quite the same as their common use in ordinary language. Both terms must be understood in the context of his constructivist theory of knowing. Unfortunately, contemporary textbooks in developmental psychology, most of which devote at least a few pages to Piaget, often fail to explain this. Thus one reads, for instance: Assimilation is the process whereby changing elements in the environment become incorporated into the structure of the organism. At the same time, the organism must accommodate its functioning to the nature of what is being assimilated360) This is not at all what Piaget meant. One reason why assimilation is so often misunderstood is that its use as an explanatory postulate ranges from the unconscious to the deliberate. Another stems from disregarding the fact that Piaget uses that term, as well as "accommodation", within the framework of his theory of schemes. An example may help to illustrate the two extreme forms of assimilation. When the nail that holds up the wire to my computer falls out of the wall in my study and I use my shoe to hammer it in again, I am deliberately assimilating the shoe to the It may work, or it may not, but even function of a hammer. (Nash 1970, p.

if it does work I am not led to believe that the shoe is a hammer. The other form of assimilation the one so many developmental psychologsts have misappropriated from Piaget lacks that awareness. It is this second form that is epistemological1y more interesting. An infant quickly learns that a rattle it was given makes a rewarding noise when it is shaken. This provides the infant with the ability to generate the noise. Piaget sees this as the "construction of a scheme" which, like all schemes, consists of three parts:

12

(1) Recognition of a certain situation

(e.g. the presence

of a graspab1 e item with a rounded shape at one end); (2) association of a specific activity with that kind of item (e.g. picking it up and shaking it); (3) expectation of a certain result (e.g. the rewarding noise). It is very likely that this infant, when placed in its highchair at the dining table, will pick up and shake a qraspable item that has a rounded shape at one end. We call that item a spoon and may say that the infant is assimilating it to its rattling scheme; but from the infant' s perspective at that point, the item is a rattle. It is a rattle because what the infant perceives of it is just those as pects that fit the rattling scheme a n d n o t what an adult would perceive as the characteristics of a spoon.2 Then, however, when the infant shakes the item, it does not produce the result the infant expects: generates a perturbation tive change. it does not rattle. This ("disappointment"), and perturba-

tion is one of the conditions that set the stage for cogniIn our example it may simply focus the infant' s attention on the item in its hand, and this may lead to the perception of some aspect that will enable the infant in the future to recognize spoons as non-rattles. That development would be an accommodation , but obviously a rather modest one. Alternatively, given the situation at the dining table, it is not unlikely that the spoon, being vigorously shaken, will hit the table and produce a different but also very rewarding noise. This, too, will generate a perturbation (we might call it "enchantment") which may lead to a different accommodation , a major one this time, that initiates the "spoon banging scheme" which most parents know only too well . This simple illustration of scheme theory also shows that the theory involves, on the part of the observer, certain presuppositions about cogniz ing organisms. The organism is supposed to possess a t . least the following capabilities3 ;

The ability and, beyond that, the tendency to establish recurrences in the flow of experience; this, in turn, entails at least two capabilities,

remembering and retrieving

(re-presenting) experiences,

and the ability to make comparisons and judgements of similarity and difference; apart from these, there is the presupposition that the organism likes certain experiences better than others, which is to say, it has some elementary values. The first three of these are indispensable in any theory

of learning. Even the parsimonious models of classical and Operant conditioning could not do without them. As to the fourth, the assumption of elementary values, it was explicitly embodied in Thorndikes Law of Effect: "Other things being equal, connections grow stronger if they issue in satisfying states of affairs" (Thorndike 1931/1966, p . 101). learning theories It remained implicit, in psychological

since Thorndike, but the subjectivity of what is "satisfyinq" was more or less deliberately obscured by behaviorists through the use of the more objective sounding term "reinforcement" . The learning theory that emerges from Piaget's work can be summarized by saying that cognitive change and learning take place when a scheme, instead of producing the expected result, leads to perturbation, and perturbation, in turn, leads to accommodation that establishes a new equilibrium. Learning and the knowledge it creates, thus, are explicitly instrumental. But here, again, it is crucial not to be rash and too simplistic in interpreting Piaget. His theory of cognition involves a two-fold instrumentalism. On the sensorymotor level, action schemes are instrumental in helping organisms to achieve goals in their interaction with their experiential world. On the level of reflective abstraction, however, operative schemes are instrumental in helping or-

ganisms achieve a coherent conceptual network that reflects the paths of acting as well as thinking which, at the
14

org a n i s m s ' present p o i n t be viable. tarian" The first

of experience,

have turned out to called "utili-

instrumentality might be

(the kind p h i l o s o p h e r s have traditional1y scorned). is strictly "epistemi c " . As such, may

The second, however, be of some

philosophical shift in the

interest above all because it e n the conception of paradoxical "knowledge", a

tails a radical

shift that e l iminates

conception of Truth ontological test. The

that requires a f o r e v e r shift that substitutes for correspondence w i t h knowledge alizations. that results It does In not

unattainable viability

in the experiential

world

ontological

reality applies to

from inductive inferences and generaffect deductive inferences view, in logic

and mathematics.

Piaget's

the certainty of conoperations and 1961;

clusions in these areas not to sensory-motor 1985b ).

pertains to mental (cf.

material

Beth & Piaget

Glasersfeld,

The S o c i a l C o m p o n e n t
In connection with itarian" or ant role. the concept of viability, social interaction be it uti l an importinter"epistemic", plays social

Except for

animal

psychologists, on among

action refers to what goes guage. As a rule it is

humans and involves lan-

also human field,

treated as essentially different organisms have with other items because it is more or less

from the interactions in their experiential tacitly assumed that leged experiential tion of denying sofar as

humans are from the very outset p riviConstructivists have no intenBut inthe cog-

entities.

this

intuitive human prerogative. of knowing attempts to model

their theory that

nitive development

provides the individual of his

organism field,

with all the furniture

or her experiential

they want to avoid assuming categories as innate. ize a model On the f or the Hence,

any cognitive structures or there is genesis the need to hypothesof "others".

conceptual level,

sensory-motor

the schemes a developing keep viable will come to in-

child builds

up and manages to

volve a large variety of

"objects".

There will be cups and

15

spoons, building blocks and pencils, rag dolls and teddy bears all seen, manipulated, and familiar as components of diverse action schemes. But there may also be kittens and perhaps a dog. Though the child may at first approach these items with action schemes that assimilate them to dolls or teddy bears, their unexpected reactions will quickly cause novel kinds of perturbation and inevitable accomm odations. The most momentous of these accommodations can be roughly characterized by saying that the child will come to ascribe to these somewhat unruly entities certain properties that radically differentiate them from the other familiar objects. Among these properties will be the ability to move on their own, the ability to see and to hear, and eventually also the ability to feel pain. The ascription of these properties arises simply because, without them, the child's interactions with kittens and dogs cannot be turned into even moderately reliable schemes. A very similar development may lead to the child's construction of schemes that involve still more complex items in her experiential environment, namely the human individuals who, to a much greater extent than other recurrent items of experience, make interaction unavoidable. (As we all remember, in many of these inescapable interactions, the schemes that are developed aim at avoiding unpleasant consequences rather than creating rewarding results.) Here again, in order to develop relatively reliable schemes, the child must impute certain capabilities to the objects of interaction. But now these ascriptions comprise not only perceptual but also cognitive capabilities, and soon these formidable "others" will be seen as intending, making plans, and being both very and not at all predictable in some re spects. Indeed, out of the manifold of these frequent but nevertheless special interactions, there eventually emerges the way the developing human individual will think both of "others" and of him- or herself. This reciprocity is, I believe, precisely what Kant had in mind when he wrote:

16

It is manifest that, if one wants to imagine a thinking being, one would have to put oneself in its p lace and to impute one's own subject to the object one intended to consider ... (Kant 1781, p.223) o th" My brief account of the conceptual construction of

ers" is no doubt a crude and preliminary analysis but it at least opens a possibility of approachi ng the problem without the vacuous assumption of innateness. Besides, the Kantian notion that we impute the cognitive capabilities that we isolate in ourselves to our conspecifics, leads to an explanation of why it means so much to us to have our experiential reality confirmed by others. The use of a scheme always involves the expectation of a more or less specific result. On the level of reflective abstraction, the expectation can be turned into a prediction. If we impute planning and foresight to others, this means that we also impute to them some of the schemes that have worked well for ourselves. Then, if a particular prediction we have made con-cerning an action or reaction of an other turns out to be corroborated by what the other does, this adds a second level of viability to our scheme; and this second level of viablity strengthens the experiential reality we have constructed. (cf. Glasersfeld 1985a, 1986) on Communication (Shannon 1948)

A Perspective

The technical model of communication

established one feature of the process that remains important no matter from what orientation one approaches it: The physical signals that travel from one communicator to another for instance the sounds of speech and the visual patterns of print or writing in linguistic communication Instead, they should be considered instructions to select particular meanings from a list which, together with the list of agreed signals, constitutes the "code" of the particular communication system. From this it follows that, if the two lists and the conventional associations that link
17

do

not actually carry or contain what we think of as "meaning".

the items in them are not available to a receiver before the linguistic interaction takes place, the signals will be meaningless for that receiver. From the constructivist point of view,
communication

this feature of

is of particular interest because it clearly

brings out the fact that language users must individually construct the meaning of words, phrases, sentences, and texts. Needless to say, this semantic construction does not Once a certain amount of ("syntax") have been

always have to start from scratch. vocabulary and combinatorial rules

built up in interaction with speakers of the particular language, novel these patterns can be used to lead a learner to form combinations and, thus, novel conceptual compounds.

But the basic elements out of which an individual's conceptual structures are composed and the relations by means of which they are held together cannot be transferred from one language user to another, er to an infant. from individual let alone from a proficient speak-

These building blocks must be abstracted experience; and their interpersonal fit,

which makes possible what we call communication, can arise only in the course of protracted interaction, through mutual orientation and adaptation (cf. Maturana, 198 0 ) .

Though it is often said that normal their

children acquire a closer examina-

language without noticeable effort,

tion shows that the process involved is not as simple as it seems. If, for instance, you want your infant to learn the

word "cup", you will go through a routine that parents have used through the ages. You will point to, and then probably

pick up and move, an object that satisfies your definition of "c u p " , and at the same time you will repeatedly utter the word. It is likely that mothers and fathers do this "intuiti.e., without a well-formulated theoretical basis. But the fact that it There

ively",

They do it because it usually works.

works does not mean that it has to be a simple matter. are a t . least three essential

steps the child has to make.

The first consists in focusing attention on some specific sensory signals in the manifold of signals which,
18

at every

moment,

are available within the child's sensory system;

the

parent's pointing provides a merely approx imate and usually quite ambiguous direction for this act. The second step consists in isolating and coordinating a group of these sensory signals to form a more or less discrete visual item or "thing". The parent's moving the cup

greatly aids this process because it accentuates the relevant figure as opposed to the parts of the visual are to form the irrelevant ground.4 The third step, then, is to associate the isolated visual field that

pattern with the auditory experience produced by the parent's utterances of the word first "cup". Again, the child must

isolate the sensory signals that constitute this audi(the manifold auditory and the parent's

tory experience from the background

signals that are available at the moment);

repetition of the word obviously enhances the process of isolating the auditory pattern as well as its association with the moving visual pattern.

If this sequence of steps provides an adequate analysis of the initial acquisition of the meaning of the word "cup",

it is clear that the child's meaning of that word is made up exclusively of elements which the child abstracts from her own experience. Indeed, anyone who has more or less method-

ically watched children acquire the use of new words, will have noticed that what they isolate as meanings from their experiences in conjunction with words is often only partially compatible with the meanings the adult speakers of the language take for granted. Thus the child's initial concept and someit may

of cup often includes the activity of drinking, times even what is being drunk, e.g., milk. take quite some time before the continual social

Indeed,

linguistic and

interaction with other speakers of the language pr o -

vides occasions for the accommodations that are necessary for the concept the child associates with the word "cup" to become adapted to the adults' instance, sport. extended use of the word, for

in the context of golf greens or championships in

19

The process of accommodating and tuning the meaning of words and linguistic expressions actually continues for each of us throughout our lives. No matter how long we have spoken a language, there will still be occasions when we realize that, up to that point, we have been using a word in a way that now turns out to be idiosyncratic in some particular respect. Once we come to see this essential and inescapable subjectivity of linguistic meaning, we can no longer maintain the preconceived notion that words convey ideas or knowledge; nor can we believe that a listener who apparently "understands" what we say must necessarily have conceptual structures that are identical with ours. Instead, we come to realize that "understanding" is a matter of fit rather than match. Put in the simplest way, to understand what someone has said or written means no less but also no more than to have built up a conceptual structure that, in the given context, appears to be compatible with the structure the speaker had in mind and this compatibility, as a rule, manifests itself in no other way than that the receiver says and does nothing that contravenes the speaker's expectations. Among proficient speakers of a language, the individual's conceptual idiosyncracies rarely surface when the topics of conversation are everyday objects and events. To be considered proficient in a given language requires two things among others: to have available a large enough vocabulary, and to have constructed and sufficiently accommodated and adapted the meanings associated with the words of that vocabulary so that no conceptual discrepancies become apparent in ordinary linguistic interactions. When conversation turns to predominantly abstract matters, it usually does not take long before conceptual discrepancies become noticeable even among proficient speakers. The discrepancies generate per-

turbations in the interactors, and at that point the difficulties become insurmountable if the participants believe that the meanings they attribute to the words they use are true representations of fixed entities in an objective world

apart from a ny speaker. c o n s t r uc tiv ist

If , instead,

the p a r t i c i p a n t s take a a l a n g u a g e user's m e a n -

view and assume that

ings cannot b e an y t h i n g but sub jec tiv e c o n s t r u c t s derived from the s p e a k e r ' s tion and a d a p t a t i o n individual experiences, same a c c o m m o d a -

is us u a l l y possible. the use of l a n g u a g e for instance

From this p e rs pec tiv e, in teaching i s sumed to be.

far more c omplicated than

it is mostly p r e "informa"The a c t -

It cannot

be a means of t r a n s f e r r i n g As R o r t y says:

tion" or k n o w l e d g e to the student. ivity of utt e r i n g s e n t e n c e s

is one of the t h i n g s people do (1982, p.XVII). linguistic

in order to c ope with their environment" This inherent c known. and inescapable

i n d e t e r m i n a c y of

om o a n i c u t m is s o m et hi ng Intuitively,

the best t e a c h e r s hav e always aware of the fact "perturbed" will

they h av e also been

that st u d e n t s w h o s e co g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s a r e not by an e x p e r i e n c e they t h e m s e l v e s regist er

as a failure,

n o t "a c c o m m o d a t e " to form new c o nce pts and new u n d e r s t a n d ing, but c o n t i n u e to "assimilate" new e x p e r i e n c e s to the i n d e p e n d e n t l y of any

s tru ctu re s t he y a l r e a d y have. epis tem ol ogi cal "telling" ori en t a t i o n ,

Thus,

they have a l w a y s known that is not a m a t -

is not enough,

be ca use u n d e r s t a n d i n g

ter of p a s s i v e l y r e c e i v i n g but of ac t i v e l y b u i l d i n g up.

Some

Further

Considerations is a p a t t e r n indeed, of ma int a i n i n g

The pat t e r n of a s s i m i l a t i o n c a t e g o r i z a t i o n s , co ncepts, so me e x p e r i e n c e m a k e s their universal and,

w h o l e t h eor ies until It is a

adequacy qu est io nab le.

p a t t e r n from the c o n s t ruc ti vis t

p o i nt of view.

Whenever a t h i n k i n g s ub j e c t has th e o r i e s and c o n c e p t s that have proved useful in the past, the s u b j e c t has, as it were,

a c o n s i d e r a b l e v es t e d quo. That is to say,

interest in m a i n t a i n i n g

the status ass im i l a t e

the h ol d e r s of a t h e o r y will they p os s i b l y can,

new e x p e r i e n c e s as long as

even in the

face of c o n s i d e r a b l e perturbations. Silvio Ceccato, mental the Italian pioneer in t h e analysis of

o p e r a t i o n s and co nstruction, work,

o nc e a f ter a public d i s "If

cussion of his

o v e r hea rd an aged p h i l o s o p h e r say:

21

Ceccato were right, the rest of us would be fools!"5 Most readers of the works of Piaget and the contemporary constructivists are not as direct and outspoken. Instead, they desperately try to assimilate what they read and hear, disregarding all sorts of clues and bending the interpretation of words to their own notions; and when this proves impossible, they conclude that the author is contradicting himself, because what he says is no longer compatible with their own conceptual construction . In this vein, they often brand constructivism as just another form of solipsism. But in doing so, they of course disregard the fact that constructivism does not deny an ontological reality it merely holds that no such reality can be known. Radical constructivism is unashamedly instrumentalist the philosophical sense of that term) and this cannot but offend advocates of the maxim "Truth for Truth's sake". Consequently, if they don't call it solipsism, they dismiss it as cheap materialism. But this, again, is inappropriate. The instrumental ism embodied in constructivism is not to be equated with materialism. The second principle listed above states that the function of the cognitive activity is adaptive. The concept of adaptation intended here, as I said before, is the basic biological concept in the Darwinian theoIt refers to the fit with the environment, ry of evolution. (in

which is to say, every species or organism found alive and capable of reproducing must, by that very fact, be considered adapted at that moment in the history of living organisms. To be adapted, therefore, means no more and no less than to be viable. For the observing biologist, of course, this viability refers to the fit with an environment that is external to the organism. But precisely because the biologist is an observer, this environment cannot be the "wor1d-in-itself". From the constructivist point of view, to observe means to focus attention on a specific part of one experiential field. Usually, the focusing of attention involves categorizing what one focuses on as an item of a particular kind, a

property, a relation,

a thing,

a process, etc.

The moment

such a categorization is made,

the rest of one's e x p e r i e n -

tial field becomes t h e item's environment . This is analogous to the simultaneous creation of a "figure" and its "ground".

There, too, the moment the line drawn by the pencil becomes cateqorizable as the sheet an image of a particular item, the rest of The observer's

is inevitably seen as "ground".

discrimination of figure and ground or organism and envi r o n ment is, of course, quite legitimate, and so is the b i o l o -

gists subsequent observation of specific relationships b e tween the observed organisms and their environment. But once

it is understood that all this discriminating, categorizing, and establishing of relationships takes place w i thin the observer's experiential f i e l d , it becomes clear that no result of these operations can pertain to the world as such, that is, the world a s it might the observer's activties. "exist" objectively without

FOOTNOTES 1. Montaigne wrote this in his Apologie de Raymond Sebond (1575-76) and it can be found on p . 139 of volume 2 of

the complete edition of his E s s a i s , edited by Pierre M i chel 2. (Paris, 1972).

This notion of assimilation seems quite compatibe with the view of philosophers of science who maintain that all observation is necessarily "theory-laden". but they are (cf.,

3.

Piaget nowhere lists these presuppositions, implicit in his analysis of conceptual for instance, Piaget, 1937 and 1967 b).

development

4.

Note that, even if the child has coordinated sensory signals to form such a "thing" in the past, each new re cognition involves isolating it in the current experien-

ti al field. 5. I owe this anecdote to a personal communication: Silvio

Ceccato told it to me shortly after the event, sometime about 1960.

R E FE R E N C E S
Anonymous: 1711. 'Osservajioni ', Giornale de ' Letterati d 'It aJi a (Venice), 5, article Vll. Berkeley, G.: 1710. A Tr eat ise Concerning the Principles of umart Under stan d ing. Open Court, La Salle, Illinois (1963). Beth, E.W. , & Piaqet, J.: 1961. Epistemolog ie Mat hem atique et Ps y c h o 1o g ie . Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Fleck, L . : 1929. 'Zur Krise der "Wirklichkeit"', Die Naturuissenschaften, 1 7 , 23, pp.425-430. (The excerpts from this paper were translated by E.v.G.) Fleck, L .: 1935. Entstehung und Entw ic k lung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Benno Schwabe, Basel, Switzerland. (Reprinted: Suhrkamp, 1980, Noe r dlingen, Germany.) F o e r s t e r , H.von: 1970. 'Thoughts and Notes on Cognition', in P.Garvin (Ed.), Cognition; A Multiple Vie w , pp.25-48. Spartan Books, New York. Glasersfeld, E.von: 1985. 'Representation and Deduction', in L. Streefland (ed.), Proceedings of the 9 th Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Vol .1, State University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, pp. 484-489. Glasersfeld, E.von: 1986. 'Steps in the Construction of "Others" and "Reality", in R.Trappl (ed.). P o w e r , Autonomy, Utopia, Plenum, London, pp. 107-116. H e b b , D.O.: 1958. 'Alice in Wonderland or P sychology among the Biological Sciences', in Harlow & Woolsey (eds.), Bio logical and Biochemical Bases of Behavior, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, pp.451-467. Kant, I.: 1781. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2, Auflage (Ge sammelte Schriften, Bd.IV). K o e nigl. Preussische Akademie, 1910f f ., B e r 1in . Kuhn, T.S.: 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press (2nd edition), Chicago. (First published 1962.) McCulloch, W.S.: Cambridge, MA. 1965. Embodiments of M i n d . M.I.T. Press,

Maturana, H.R.: 1980. 'Biology of Cognition', in H.R.Maturana & F.J.Varela (eds.), Autopoiesis and C o g n i t i o n , R e i d e l , Dordrecht/Boston, pp. 5-58. Nash, J . : 1970. Developmental Psychology . Prentice-Hal1, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Piaget, J.: 1937. La construction du reel chez l 'enfant. Delachaux et Niestl , Neuchtel, Switzerland. Piaget, J.: Paris. 1967 a. Biologie et connaissance Gallimard,

Piaget, J,: 1967 b. Books, New York.

Six Psychological Studies. Vintage

Pittendrigh, C.S.: 1958,'Adaptation, Natural Selection, and Behavior", in A.Roe & G.G.Simpson (eds.), Behavior and Evolution , Yale University Press, New Haven, pp.390416. Rorty, R.: 1982. Consequences of Pragmatism. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Shannon, C.: 1948, 'The Mathematical Theory of Communication', Bell Systems Technical Journal, 2 7 , 379423 and 623-656. Thorndike, E . : 1966. Human Learning. M.I.T.Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (first published, 1931). Vico, G.: 1710, De antiquissima Italorum sapientia. (With Italian translation by F.S.Pomodoro, Stamperia de' Classici Latini, Naples, 1858).

T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S

CONTENT

PAGE

1 2 3 4

PURPOSE

...........................................................

THE PROBLEM

....................................................... 4 .............................................. 5 5 5 6 8

N A T U R E OF THE ANSWER

T H E S C I E N T I F I C D O M A I N ............................................. 4.0 P r a x i s of L i v i n g a n d E x p l a n a t i o n s ......................... 4. 1 S c i e n t i f i c E x p l a n a t i o n s ................................... 4.2 Science ...................................................

O B J E C T I V I T Y IN P A R E N T H E S E S ....................................... 9 5.0 I l l u s i o n an d P e r c e p t i o n : the t r a d i t i o n a l a p p r o a c h ... . . . . . .9 5.1 A n I n v i t a t i o n ............................................ 10 5. 2 O b j e c t i v i t y in P a r e n t h e s e s ............................... 11 5.3 T h e U n i v e r s u m v e r s u s th e M u l t i v e r s a ...................... 11 B A S I C N O T I O N S ................................................... 12 6. 1 T h e O b s e r v e r ............................................. 12 6.2 U n i t i e s .................................................. 12 6.3 S i m p l e an d C o m p o s i t e U n i t i e s ............................. 12 6.4 O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d S t r u c t u r e ............................... 13 6.5 S t r u c t u r e D e t e r m i n e d S y s t e m s ............................. 14 6.6 E x i s t e n c e ................................................ 16 6.7 S t r u c t u r a l C o u p l i n g a n d A d a p t a t i o n ....................... 16 6.8 D o m a i n of E x i s t e n c e ...................................... 16 6.9 D e t e r m i n i s m .............................................. 17 6 . 1 0 S p a c e .................................................... 17 6 . 1 1 I n t e r a c t i o n s ............................................. 18 6 . 1 2 P h e n o m e n a l D o m a i n s ....................................... 18 6 . 1 3 M e d i u m , N i c h e , a n d E n v i r o n m e n t ........................... 18 BASIS 7.1 7.2 7 .3 7.4 7 .5 7.6 7.7 F O R T H E A N S W E R : T H E L I V I N G S Y S T E M ........................... 19 Science Deals Only with Structure Determined Systems . 19 R e g u l a t i o n a n d C o n t r o l ................................... 19 L i v i n g S y s t e m s A r e S t r u c t u r e D e t e r m i n e d S y s t e m s ..... . 20 D e t e r m i n i s m a n d P r e d i c t i o n ............................... 20 O n t o g e n i c S t r u c t u r a l D r i f t ............................... 21 S t r u c t u r a l I n t e r s e c t i o n .................................. 24 T h e L i v i n g S y s t e m ........................................ 26 My C l a i m ............................................ 26 I m p l i c a t i o n s ........................................ 26 C o n s e q u e n c e s ........................................ 27 7.8 P h y l o g e n i c S t r u c t u r a l D r i f t .............................. 28 7.9 O n t o g e n i c P o s s i b i l i t i e s .................................. 30 7 . 1 0 S e l e c t i o n ................................................ 31

T HE A N S W E R .................................................... 8. 0 D o m a i n of E x i s t e n c e and P r a x i s ........................ 8.1 C o g n i t i o n ........... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... 8.2 L a n g u a g e ..............................................

32 32 32 34

C O N S E Q U E N C E S .................................................. 36 9.1 E x i s t e n c e E n t a i l s C o g n i t i o n in L i v i n g S y s t e m s .......... 36 9.2 T h e r e Are as m a ny C o g n i t i v e D o m a i n s as t h e r e are D o m a i n s of E x i s t e n c e ................................... 37 9.3 L a n g u a g e Is the H u m a n C o g n i t i v e D o m a i n ................. 37 9.4 O b j e c t i v i t y ............................................ 38 9.5 L a n g u a g i n g Is O p e r a t i o n in a D o m a i n of S t r u c t u r a l C o u p l i n g ............................................... 38 9 .6 L a n g u a g e Is a D o m a i n of D e s c r i p t i o n s .................... 39 9.7 S e l f - C o n s c i o u s n e s s A r i s e s w it h L a n g u a g e ................. 39 9. 8 H i s t o r y ................................................ 40 9.9 T h e N e r v o u s S y s t e m E x p a n d s the D o m a i n of S t a t e s of the L i v i n g S y s t e m ................................... 40 9 . 1 0 O b s e r v i n g T a k e s P l a c e in L a n g u a g i n g .................... 41 T HE D O M A I N OF P H Y S I C A L E X I S T E N C E REALITY .............................. 43 48

10 11 12

.......................................................

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITY

................................ 49

O N T O L O G Y OF O B S E R V I N G : T H E B I O L O G I C A L F O U N D A T I O N S OF S E L F C O N S C I O U S N E S S AN D T H E P H Y S I C A L DO MA I N OF E X I S T E N C E H u m b e r t o R. M a t u r a n a

PURPOSE My purpose in thi s es s a y is to e x p l a i n cognition as a biological phenomenon, and to show, in the p r o c e s s , how l a n g u a g e arises and g i v e s o r i g i n to self c o n s c i o u s n e s s , revealing the ontological f o u n d a t i o n s of the p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as a limiting cognitive domain. In orde r to do this, I shall start f r o m two u n a v o i d a b l e e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s that ar e at the same tim e my p r o b l e m and my e x p l a n a t o r y i n s t r u m e n t s , n am e l y ; a) that cognition, as is a p p a r e n t in the fact th at an y a l t e r a t i o n of the b i o l o g y of our n e r v o u s s y s t e m a l t e r s our c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t i e s , is a b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n tha t mu st be e x p l a i n e d as such; and b) th at we, as is a p p a r e n t in this very sam e e s sa y , e x i s t as human beings in l a n g u a g e u s i n g l a n g u a g e for our explanations. These two e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s are my s t a r t i n g po in t b e c a u s e I must be in t h e m in any e x p l a n a t o r y a t t e m p t ; th ey ar e my problem because I c h o o s e to e x p l a i n them; and they ar e my unavoidable i n s t r u m e n t s b e c a u s e I m u s t use c o g n i t i o n and l a n g u a g e in o r d e r to e x p l a i n c o g n i t i o n and l a n g u a g e . In o t h e r w or ds , I p r o p o s e not to take c o g n i t i o n and l a n g u a g e as g i v e n u n e x p l a i n a b l e p r o p e r t i e s , but to t a k e them as p h e n o m e n a of our h u m a n d o m a i n of e x p e r i e n c e s that a r i s e in the praxis of our li vi ng , and that as s uc h d e s e r v e e x p l a n a t i o n as biological phenomena. At the s am e time, it is my p u r p o s e to use our c o n d i t i o n of e x i s t i n g in l a n g u a g e to s ho w h o w the p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e a r i s e s in l a n g u a g e as a c o g n i t i v e do ma in . T h a t is, I i n t e n d to s h o w that the o b s e r v e r and o b s e r v i n g , as b i o l o g i c a l phenomena, a r e o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i m a r y w i t h r e s p e c t to the object and the p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e . THE PROBLEM I sh a l l t a ke c o g n i t i o n as the f u n d a m e n t a l p ro b l e m , a nd s h a l l e x p l a i n l a n g u a g e in the p r o c e s s of e x p l a i n i n g c o g n i t i o n . 2.

1.

We h u m a n b e i n g s a s s e s s c o g n i t i o n in any d o m a i n by s p e c i f y i n g t he domain w it h a q u e s t i o n and d e m a n d i n g a d e q u a t e behavior or a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in that d o m a i n . If w h a t we o b s e r v e as an a n s w e r satisfies us as a d e q u a t e b e h a v i o r or as a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in the domain s p e c i f i e d by the q u e s t i o n , we a c c e p t it as an e x p r e s s i o n of c o g n i t i o n in that d o m a i n , and c l a i m that he or she who a n s w e r s our q u e r y k n o w s . Th u s , if s o m e o n e c l a i m s to k n o w a l g e b r a that

is, to be an a l g e b r a i s t - - w e d e m a n d of him or her to p e r f o r m in the d o m a i n of w ha t we c o n s i d e r a l g e b r a to be, and if a c c o r d i n g to us she or he p e r f o r m s a d e q u a t e l y in that do ma i n , we a c c e p t the claim. If the question a s k e d is not a n s w e r e d with wh at we c o n s i d e r to be a d e q u a t e b e h a v i o r or a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in the do mai n th at it s p e c i f i e s , the b e i n g ask ed to p e r f o r m (the a l g e b r a i s t ) disintegrates or d i s a p p e a r s , it lo s es its cla ss i d e n t i t y as an entity existing in th e o p e r a t i o n a l domain specified by the q u e s t i o n , and the q u e s t i o n e r p r o c e e d s h e n c e f o r t h a c c o r d i n g to its nonexistence. In these circumstances, si n ce a d e q u a t e b eh a v i o r (or a d e q u a t e a c t i o n ) is the o nl y c r i t e r i o n that we h av e and can use to assess cognition, I s h a l l take a d e q u a t e behavior or adequate a c t i o n in an y d o m a i n s p e c i f i e d by a q u e s t i o n , as the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d w h e n e x p l a i n i n g c o g n i t i o n . N A T U R E OF T H E A N S W E R I am a b i o l o g i s t , a nd it is from my experience as a biologist that in th is es s a y I am t r e a t i n g the phenomenon of c o g n i t i o n as a b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n . Furthermore, s i n c e as a biologist I am a s c i e n t i s t , it is as a s c i e n t i s t t h at I sh a ll p r o v i d e a b i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of the p h e n o m e n o n of cognition. In order to do this: a) I s h a l l m ak e e x p l i c i t w h a t I shall consider as an adequate b e h a v i o r in the c o n t e x t of what I c o n s i d e r is a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n ( s e c t i o n 4), so t h at all the i m p l i c a t i o n s of my e x p l a n a t i o n may be a p p a r e n t to the r e a d e r and she or he m ay k n o w w h e n it is a t t a i n e d ; b) I s h a l l m a k e e x p l i c i t my e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a n d i n g w i t h r e s p e c t to the n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y ( s e c t i o n 5), so t h at the o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of my e x p l a n a ti o n may be a p p a r e n t ; c) I s h a l l m a k e e x p l i c i t the n o t i o n s that I shall use in my e x p l a n a t i o n by s h o w i n g how th ey b e l o n g to our daily l i fe ( s e c t i o n 6), so tha t it may be a p p a r e n t ho w we are i n v o l v e d as h u m a n b e i n g s in the e x p l a n a t i o n th at I s ha l l p ro vi de ; and d) I sh a l l m a k e e x p l i c i t the nature of the biological p h e n o m e n a i n v o l v e d in my e x p l a n a t i o n ( s e c t i o n 7), so tha t it may be a p p a r e n t ho w we are i n v o l v e d as l i v i n g s y s t e m s in the e x p l a n a t i on as well as in the p h e n o m e n o n of c o g n i t i o n i t s e l f . Finally, in the p r o c e s s of e x p l a i n i n g the p h e n o m e n o n of c o g n i t i o n as a biological phenomenon I s h a l l s h o w h o w it is tha t scientific theories a r i s e as fr ee c r e a t i o n s of the h u m a n mi n d, h ow it is that they explain human experience and not an independent objective world, and how the p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e a r i s e s in the e x p l a n a t i o n of th e p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r as a f e a t u r e of the o n t o l o g y of o b s e r v i n g ( s e c t i o n s 8 to 11). 4. THE SCIENTIFIC DOMAIN We find o u r s e l v e s as h u m a n b e i n g s her e and now in the p r ax is of li vi ng , in the happening of bein g human, in language l a n g u a g i n g , in an a p r i o r i e x p e r i e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g that is, everything that happens, is and h a p p e n s in us as p a r t of our p r a x i s of l i v i n g . In the se c i r c u m s t a n c e s , whatever we say a b o u t how a n y t h i n g h a p p e n s t ak e s pl a c e in the p r a x i s of o ur l i v i n g as a c o m m e n t , as a r e f l e c t i o n , as a r e f o r m u l a t i o n , in s h o r t , as an e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r a x i s of our li vi ng , and as suc h
5

3,

it does not r e p l a c e or c o n s t i t u t e the p r a x i s of l i v i n g that it p u r p o r t s to e x p l a i n . T h u s , to say that we ar e m ad e of ma tter, or to say that we are i d e a s in the mi nd of God, are both explanation s of that w h i c h we live as our e x p e r i e n c e of being, yet n e i t h e r m a t t e r nor ideas in the min d of G o d constitute the experience of be in g that w h i c h they are s u p p o s e d to exp la in . Explanations take p la c e operationally in a metadomain wi th r e s p e c t to that w h i c h the y e x p l a i n . F u r t h e r m o r e , in daily life, in the ac tua l d y n a m i c s of h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n s , an e x p l a n a t i o n is a l w a y s an a n s w e r to a q u e s t i o n a b o u t the o r i g i n of a gi ve n p h e n o m e n o n , and is a c c e p t e d or r e j e c t e d by a l i s t e n e r who a c c e p t s or rejects it a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r or not it satisfies a particular i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i o n of a c c e p t a b i l i t y that he or she s p e c i f i e s . Therefore, t he r e a re as m a n y different k i n d s of e x p l a n a t i o n s as th er e are d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a of a c c e p t a bility of reformulations of the h a p p e n i n g of living of the o b s e r v e r s that the o b s e r v e r s sp ec if y. A c c o r d i n g l y , ev er y d o ma in of e x p l a n a t i o n s as it is d e f i n e d by a p a r t i c u l a r criterion of acceptability, c o n s t i t u t e s a c lo se d c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n as a d o ma in of a c c e p t a b l e s t a t e m e n t s or a c t i o n s for the o b s e r v e r s that a c c e p t that c r i t e r i o n of a c c e p t a b i l i t y . Science, m o d e r n sci en ce , as a cognitive d o m a i n is not an e x c e p t i o n to this. I nd e e d , modern science is th at p a r t i c u l a r c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n that ta ke s wh at is c a l l e d the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of validation (acceptability) of the s t a t e m e n t s that p e r t a i n to it. Let me m a k e this e x p l i c i t . i) Scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s . S c i e n t i s t s u s u a l l y do not reflect u p o n the c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of sc i e n c e . Yet, it is p os s i b l e to a b s t r a c t , f r o m w h a t m o d e r n s c i e n t i s t s do, an o p e r a t i o n a l (and, h e nc e, e x p e r i e n t i a l ) s p e c i f i c a t i o n of w ha t c o n s t i t u t e s a s c i e n t if i c explanation as the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of w ha t they claim are t he i r scientific statements. Furthermore, it is possible to d e s c r i b e this c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of scientific statements as a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of w h a t is usually called the scientific method. A. D i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of h u m a n a c t i v i t i e s e n t a i l d i f f e r e n t i n t e n tions . Thus , as the i n t e n t i o n of d o i n g ar t is to g e n e r a t e an a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e , a nd the i n t e n t i o n of d o i n g t e c h n o l o g y is to p ro d u c e , the i n t e n t i o n of d oi n g s c i e n c e is to e x p l a i n . It is, therefore, in the c o n t e x t of e x p l a i n i n g th at the criterion of validation of a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n is the c o n j o i n e d satisfaction, in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of an o b s e r v e r , of fou r o p e r a tional conditions, one of wh ic h, the p r o p o s i t i o n of an ad hoc m e c h a n i s m that g e n e r a t e s the p h e n o m e n o n e x p l a i n e d as a p h e n o m e n o n to be w i t n e s s e d by the o b s e r v e r in his or h er p r a x i s of living, is the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n . And, it is in the context of explaining that it must be understood t ha t the scientific explanation is the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c statements. F i n a l l y , it is a l s o in the c o n t e x t of e x p l a i n i n g that it must be r e c o g n i z e d that a modern scientific community is a community of observers (henceforth called standard observers) tha t use the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of validati on of thei r s t a t e m e n t s . Now, the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of 6

s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s e n t a i l s fo ur o p e r a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s : a) The specification of the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d through the stipulation of the o p e r a t i o n s t ha t a standard observer m u s t p e r f o r m in his or her p r a x i s of l i v i n g in or d e r to a l so be a w i t n e s s of it in his or her p r a x i s of li vi ng . b) T h e p r o p o s i t i o n , in the d o m a i n of o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s of the p r a x i s of l i vi ng of a s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r , of a m e c h a n i s m , a g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m , w h i c h w he n a l l o w e d to o p e r a t e gi v e s ri se as a c o n s e q u e n c e of its o p e r a t i o n to the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d , to be w i t n e s s e d by the o b s e r v e r a l s o in his or her praxis of liv ing. This generative mechanism, th at is u s u a l l y c a l l e d the explanatory hypothesis, t a k e s pl a c e in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r in a d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n t h a n the p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n in w h i c h the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d is w i t n e s s e d , and the latter as a consequence of the former stands in an operational metadomain wi th respect to it. I nd e e d , the phenomenon to be e x p l a i n e d and its generative mechanism take plac e in different nonintersecting phenomenal domains in the prax i s of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r . c) T he d e d u c t i o n , th at is, the c o m p u t a t i o n , in the d o m a i n of operational c o h e r e n c e s of the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the standard o b s e r v e r e n t a i l e d by the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m p r o p o s e d in (b), of other phenomena tha t the s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r s h o u l d be a b l e to witness in hi s or her d o m a i n of e x p e r i e n c e s as a r e s u l t of the o p e r a t i o n of s u ch o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s , and the s t i p u l a t i o n of the o p e r a t i o n s th at he or she s h o u l d p e r f o r m in o r d e r to do so. d) The actual witnessing, in h is or her domain of experiences, of the p h e n o m e n a d e d u c e d in (c) by the standard o b s e r v e r w ho a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m s in his or her p r a x i s of l i v i n g the o p e r a t i o n s s t i p u l a t e d a ls o in (c). If these four operational conditions are conjointly s a t i s f i e d in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the s t a n d a r d observer, the generative mechanism proposed in (b) becomes a scientific e x p l a n a t i o n of the p h e n o m e n o n b r o u g h t fo r t h in (a). These fou r operational conditions in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the observer constitute th e c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of scientific explanations, an d s c i e n c e ( m o d e r n s c i e n c e ) is a d o m a i n of statements directly or indirectly v a l i d a t e d by scientific explanations. Accordingly, it f o l l o w s tha t the re ar e no s uc h t h i n g s as scienti f i c observations, scientific hypotheses, or scientific predictions; there are o nl y s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s and scientific statements. It al so f o l l o w s that t he s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r c a n m a ke s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s in any d o m a i n of his or her p r a x i s of l i v i n g in w h i c h he or she can m a ke s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s . B. A c c o r d i n g to A a s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t is v a l i d as a s c i e n tif ic s t a t e m e n t o n l y w i t h i n the c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d observers tha t is d e f i n e d as such b e c a u s e th ey ca n r e a l i z e an d a c c e p t the scientific e x p l a n a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of th e ir statements. This makes scientific statements consensual state-

ments, a nd the c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d observers a scientific community. That in p r i n c i p l e any h u m a n b e i n g can belong to the scientific c o m m u n i t y is due to two f ac t s of e x p e r i e n c e : one is that it is as a l i v i n g h u m a n bein g th at an o b s e r v e r can realize and a c c e p t t h e s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a tion of h is or her s t a t e m e n t s and b e c o m e a s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r , the other is th at the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of scientific statem en ts is the o p e r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of a c t i o n s and statements in d ai l y life, ev en if it is not us ed w it h the same car e in o r d e r to a vo i d c o n f u s i o n of p h e n o m e n a l dom ai ns . In de ed , these two e x p e r i e n t i a l fact s c o n s t i t u t e the f u n d a m e n t for the cl a i m of u n i v e r s a l i t y that s c i e n t i s t s m a k e for thei r s t a t e m e n t s , but w h a t is p e c u l i a r to s c i e n t i s t s is t h at they a re careful to a v o id c o n f u s i o n of p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s w h e n a p p l y i n g the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s in the p ra xi s of li vi ng . C. Scientists and p h i l o s o p h e r s of s c i e n c e u s u a l l y b e l i e v e that the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s c i e n c e and t e c h n o l o g y reveals an i n d e p e n d e n t o b j e c t i v e rea l it y, and t ha t s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s re ve al the f e a t u r e s of an i n d e p e n d e n t u n i v e r s e , of an o b j e c t i v e world . Or, in ot h e r words, many s c i e n t i s t s and p h i l o s o p h e r s of science believe that w i t h o u t the i n d e p e n d e n t e x i s t e n c e of an objective reality, s c i e n c e co ul d not take pl ac e. Yet, if one does, as I h a v e don e ab ove , a constitutive, an ontological, a n a l y s i s of t he c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s , one c an se e tha t s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s do not require the a s s u m p t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y b e c a u s e s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s do not explain an independent objective reality. Scientific explanations e x p l a i n the p ra xi s of l i v i n g of the observer, and t h ey do so w i t h the o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s b r o u g h t f o r t h by the observer in his or her p r ax is of li vi n g . It is this f a ct that g i v e s s c i e n c e its b i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s a nd that m a k e s s c i e n c e a cognitive domain bound to the b i o l o g y of the observer with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s tha t ar e d e t e r m i n e d by the o n t o l o g y of o b s e r v i n g . ii) S c i e n c e . In c o n c l u s i o n , the o p e r a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n of w h a t constitutes a scientific explanation as the criterion of validation of scientific statements, reveals the following characteristics of scientific s t a t e m e n t s in gen e ra l, an d of s c i e n c e as a d o m a i n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s in p a r t i c u l a r : A. Scientific s t a t e m e n t s are c o n s e n s u a l s t a t e m e n t s va l id on ly within the c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r s that g e n e r a t e s them; an d s c i e n c e as the d o m a i n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s does not n ee d an i n d e p e n d e n t o b j e c t i v e re al i ty , nor d o es it r e v e a l one. Therefore, the operational e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s c i e n c e as a c o g n i t i v e domain r e s t s o n l y on the o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e that takes pl a c e in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r s that generate it as a p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions in the p r a x i s of th ei r l iv i ng t o g e t h e r as a s c i e n t i f i c c o m m u n i t y . Science is no t a m a n n e r of r e v e a l i n g an i n d e p e n d e n t re al i ty ; it is a manner of b r i n g i n g fo rt h a p a r t i c u l a r on e bo un d to the c o n d i t i o n s t ha t c o n s t i t u t e the o b s e r v e r as a h u m a n being. B. Since t he m e m b e r s of a c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d observers ca n

generate scientific s t a t e m e n t s in any p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n of the pr a x i s of l i v i n g in w h i c h they can ap p l y the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a tion of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s , the u n i v e r s a l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r body of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s w i t h i n the huma n d o m a i n w i ll d e pe nd on the u n i v e r s a l i t y in th e h u m a n d o m a i n of the s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r s that can g e n e r a t e su ch a body of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s . Finally, scientific statements a re v a l i d on ly as long as t he scientific explanations that s u p p o r t t he m a re valid, and t h e s e ar e va li d only as long as the four o p e r a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s t h at must be c o n j o i n t l y s a t i s f i e d in th e ir c o n s t i t u t i o n are s a t i s f i e d for all the phenomena that ar e d e d u c e d in t h e p ra xi s of l i v i n g of the standard observers in the domain of operational coherences s p e c i f i e d by the p r o p o s e d g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m . C. It is frequently said that scientific explanations are reductionist propositions, adducing that they consist in expressing the p h e n o m e n a to be e x p l a i n e d in m or e bas ic terms. This v i ew is i n a d e q u a t e . Scientific explanations a re consti tutively non-reductionist e x p l a n a t i o n s b e c a u s e they c o n s i s t in generative p r o p o s i t i o n s an d not in e x p r e s s i n g the phenomena of one domain in p h e n o m e n a of a n o t h e r . T h i s is so b e c a u s e in a scientific e x p l a n a t i o n the p h e n o m e n o n e x p l a i n e d m u s t a r i s e as a result of the o p e r a t i o n of the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m , and c a n n o t be par t of it. In fact, if the l a tt er were the case, the explanatory proposition w o u l d be c o n s t i t u t i v e l y i n a d e q u a t e and would have to be r e j e c t e d . The phenomenon explained a nd the phenomena proper to the generative mechanism constitutively p e r t a i n to n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s . I). T h e generative mechanism in a s c i e n t i f i c explanation is brought f o r t h by a s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r f r om his or h e r domain of experiences in his or her p r a x i s of l i v i n g as an ad hoc p r o p o s i t i on th at in p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , the c o m p o n e n t s of the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m , as w e l l as the p h e n o m e n a proper to t h e i r o p e r a t i o n , have a foundational character with respect to the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d , a nd as such their v a l i d i t y is in p r i n c i p l e a c c e p t e d a p r i o r i . Accordingly, every s c i e n t i f i c d o m a i n as a d o m a i n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s is f o u n d e d on basi c e x p e r i e n t i a l p r e m i s e s n ot j u s t i f i e d in it, a nd constitutes in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r a d o m a i n of operational coherences brought fo r t h in the operational coherences entailed in the generative mechanisms of the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s t ha t v a l i d a t e it. 5. O B J E C T I V I T Y IN P A R E N T H E S E S If on e loo ks at the two s h a d o w s of an o b j e c t that s i m u l taneously partially i n t e r c e p t s th e pa t h s of two d i f f e r e n t li gh ts , on e w h i t e and one red, a n d if o n e h a s t r i c h r o m a t i c v is i o n , then one see s t ha t the a r e a of the s h a d o w f r om the w h i t e li g h t that receives red l ig h t l o o k s red, an d th at the a r ea of the s h a d o w from the red l i g h t t ha t r e c e i v e s w h i t e l ig h t l o o k s b l u e - g r e e n . T h i s e x p e r i e n c e is c o m p e l l i n g and u n a v o i d a b l e , e v e n if one k n o w s th at the a r e a of the s h a d o w f r o m the red li g h t s h o u l d look white or gray b e c a u s e it r e c e i v e s onl y w h i t e light . If on e a s k s h o w it

is that one sees blue-green where there is white light only, one is told by a reliable authority that the experience of the bluegreen shadow is a chromatic illusion because there is no bluegreen shadow to justify it as a perception. We live numerous experiences in our daily life that we class like this as illusions or hallucinations and not as perceptions, claiming that they do not constitute the capture of an independent reality because we can disqualify them by resorting to the opinion of a friend whose authority we accept, or by relying upon a different sensory experience that we consider as a more acceptable perceptual criterion. In the experience itself, however, we cannot distinguish between what we call an illusion, a hallucination, or a perception: illusion, hallucination, and perception are experientially indistinguishable. It is only through the use of a different experience as a metaexperiential authoritative criterion of distinction, either of the same observer or of somebody else subject to similar restrictions, that such a distinction is socially made. Our incapacity to experientially distinguish between what we socially call illusion, hallucination, or perception, is constitutive in us as living systems, and is not a limitation of our present state of knowledge. The recognition of this circumstance should lead us to put a question mark on any perceptual certainty. i) invitation. n A The word "perception" comes from the Latin expression per capire. which means "through capture" and carries with it the implicit understanding that to perceive is to capture the features of a world independent of the observer. This view assumes objectivity, and, hence, the possibility of knowing a world independent of the observer, as the ontological condition on which the distinction between illusion, hallucination, and perception that it entails is based. Therefore, to question the operational validity in the biological domain of the distinction between illusion, hallucination, and perception, is to question the ontological validity of the notion of objectivity in the explanation of the phenomenon of cognition. But, how then to proceed? Any reflection or comment about how the praxis of living comes about is an explanation, a reformulation of what takes place. If this reformulation does not question the properties of the observer, if it takes for granted cognition and language, then it must assume the independent existence of what is known. If this reformulation questions the properties of the observer, if it asks about how cognition and language arise, then it must accept the experiential indistinguishability between illusion, hallucination, and perception, and take as constitutive that existence is dependent upon the biology of the observer. Most philosophical traditions pertain to the first case, assuming the independent existence of something, such as matter, energy, ideas, God, mind, spirit,...or reality. I invite the reader to follow the second path, and to take seriously the constitutive condition of the biological condition of the observer, following all the consequences that this constitutive condition entails. ii) Obj ectivity in p arentheses. The assumption of objectivity is not needed for the generation of a scientific explanation.

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Therefore, in the process of being a scientist explaining cognition as a biological phenomenon I shall proceed without using the notion of objectivity to validate what I say; that is, I shall put objectivity in parentheses. In other words, I shall go on using an object language because this is the only language that we have (and can have), but although I shall use the experience of being in language as my starting point while I use language to explain cognition and language, I shall not claim that what I say is valid because there is an independent objective reality that validates it. I shall speak as a biologist, and as such I shall use the criterion of validation of scientific statements to validate what I say, accepting that everything that takes place is brought forth by the observer in his or her praxis of living as a primary experiential condition, and that any explanation is secondary. iii) The universum versus the multiversa. The assumption of objectivity, objectivity without parentheses, entails the assumption that existence is independent of the observer, that there is an independent domain of existence, the universum, that is the ultimate reference for the validation of any explanation. With objectivity without parentheses, things, entities, exist with independency of the observer that distinguishes them, and it is this independent existence of things (entities, ideas) that specifies the truth. Objectivity without parentheses entails unity, and, in the long run, reductionism, because it entails reality as a single ultimate domain defined by independent existence. He or she who has access to reality is necessarily right in any dispute, and those who do not have such access are necessarily wrong. In the universum, coexistence demands obedience to knowledge. Contrary to all this, objectivity with parentheses entails accepting that existence is brought forth by the distinctions of the observer, that there are as many domains of existence as kinds of distinctions the observer performs: objectivity in parentheses entails the multiversa. entails that existence is constitutively dependent upon the observer, and that there are as many domains of truths as domains of existence she or he brings forth in her or his distinctions. At the same time, objectivity in parentheses entails that different domains of existence constitutively do not intersect because they are brought forth by different kinds of operations of distinction, and, therefore, it constitutively negates phenomenal reductionism. Finally, under objectivity in parentheses, each versum of the multiversa is equally valid if not equally pleasant to be part of, and disagreements between observers, when they arise not from trivial logical mistakes within the same versum but from the observers standing in different versa, will have to be solved not by claiming a privileged access to an independent reality but through the generation of a common versum through coexistence in mutual acceptance. In the multiversa, coexistence demands consensus, that is, common knowledge.

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6.

BASIC NOTIONS Everything said is said by an o b ser ver to another observer that could be him or herself. Since this condition is my e xpe riential starting point in the praxis of living as well as my problem, I shall make explicit some of the notions that Ishall use as my tools for explaining the ph enomena of cognition and language, and I shall do so by reve ali ng the actions in the praxis of living that they entail in our daily life when we do science. Indeed, by revealing what we do as observers I am making e x pli ci t the ontology of the observer as a con stitutive human c o n d i t i o n .

i) The o b s e r v e r . An observer is, in general, any being operating in language, or, in particular, any human being, in the un der s t a n d i n g that language defines h umanity. In our individual ex perience as human beings we find o u r sel ves in language, we do not see o u r se lve s growing into it: we are already observers by being in language when we begin as o b s erv ers to reflect upon language and the condition of being observ ers . In other words, whatever takes place in the praxis of living of the observ er takes place as distinctions in language through languaging, and this is all that he or she can do as such. One of ray tasks is to show how the observer arises. ii) Unities. The basic operation that an observer performs in the praxis of living is the op eration of distinction. In the ope ra tio n of di stinction an observer brings forth a unity (an entity, a whole) as well as the med i u m in which it is distinguished, and entails in this latter all the o p er ati ona l coheren ces that make the distinction of the unity possible in his or her praxis of living. iii) Simple and composite u n i t i e s . An observer may d i s t i ng ui sh in the praxis of living two kinds of unities, simple and c omposite unities. A simple unity is a unity brought forth in an o p e ra tio n of dis tinction that c o n s t i t u t e s it as a w h ol e by specify ing its properties as a col lec ti on of di me nsi ons of i n t era cti on s in the medium in which it is distinguished. Therefore, a simple unity is ex c l u s i v e l y and complete ly c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the properties through which it is brought forth in the praxis of living of the observer that di stinguishes it, and no fur th er expla nat ion is needed for the origin of these properties. A simple unity arises defined and charact eri zed by a c o l l ect ion of properties as a matter of d i s t i n cti on in the praxis of living of the observer. A c o m p o s i t e unity is a unity d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a simple unity that th rough further operations of d i s t i n c t i o n is decomposed by the o b s erv er into components that through their composition would c ons tit ut e the original simple unity in the domain in which it is di sti ng uis hed . A co mposite unity, therefore, is oper ati on all y di sti n g u i s h e d as a simple unity in a m e t a d o m a i n with respect to the domain in which its components are d i s t i ngu ish ed because it results as such from an operation of c o m pos iti on . As a result, the components of a composite unity and its correlated simple

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unity are in a constitutive relation of mutual specification. Thus, the properties of a composite unity distinguished as a simple one entail the properties of the components that constitute it as such, and conversely, the properties of the components of a composite unity and their manner of composition determine the properties that characterize it as a simple unity when distinguished as such. Accordingly, there is no such thing as the distinction of a component independently of the unity that it integrates, nor can a simple unity distinguished as a composite one be decomposed into an arbitrary set of components disposed in an arbitrary manner of composition. Indeed, there is no such thing as a free component floating around independently of the composite unity that it integrates. Therefore, whenever we say that we treat a simple unity as a composite one, and we claim that we do so by distinguishing in it elements that when put together do not regenerate the original unity, we in fact are not decomposing the unity that we believe that we are decomposing but another one, and the elements that we distinguish are not components of the composite unity that we say that they compose. iv) Organization and structure. A particular composite unity is characterized by the components and relations between components that constitute it as a composite unity that can be distinguished, in a metadomain with respect to its components, as a particular simple unity of a certain kind. As such, a particular composite unity has both organization and structure. These can be characterized as follows: a) The relations between components in a composite unity that make it a composite unity of a particular kind, specifying its class identity as a simple unity in a metadomain with respect to its components, constitutes its organization. In other words, the organization of a composite unity is the configuration of static or dynamic relations between its components that specifies its class identity as a composite unity that can be distinguished as a simple unity of a particular kind. Therefore, if the organization of a composite unity changes, the composite unity loses its class identity; that is, it disintegrates. The organization of a composite unity is necessarily an invariant while it conserves its class identity, and vice v ersa, the class identity of a composite unity is necessarily an invariant while the composite unity conserves its organization. b) In a composite unity, be this static or dynamic, the actual components plus the actual relations that take place between them while realizing it as a particular composite unity characterized by a particular organization, constitute its structure. In other words, the structure of a particular composite unity is the manner in which it is actually made by actual static or dynamic components and relations in a particular space, and a particular composite unity conserves its class identity only as long as its structure realizes in it the organization that defines its class identity. Therefore, in any particular composite unity the configuration of relations between components that constitutes its organization must be realized in its structure as a subset of

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all the actual relations that hold between its actual entities interacting in the composition.

components

as

It follows from all this that the characterization of the organization of a composite unity as a configuration of relations between components says nothing about the characteristics or properties of these components other than that they must satisfy the relations of the organization of the composite unity through their interactions in its composition. It also follows that the structure of a composite unity can change without it losing its class identity if the configuration of relations that constitutes its organization is conserved through such structural changes. At the same time, it also follows that if the organization of a composite unity is not conserved through its structural changes, the composite unity loses its class identity, it disintegrates, and something else appears in its stead. Therefore, a dynamic composite unity is a composite unity in continuous structural change with conservation of organization. v) Structure determined systems. Since the structure of a composite unity consists in its components and their relations, any change in a composite unity consists in a structural change, and arises in it at every instant necessarily determined by its structure at that instant through the operation of the properties of its components. Furthermore, the structural changes that a composite unity undergoes as a result of an interaction are also determined by the structure of the composite unity, and this is so because such structural changes take place in the interplay of the properties of the components of the composite unity as they are involved in its composition* Therefore, an external agent that interacts with a composite unity only triggers in it a structural change that it does not determine. Since this is a constitutive condition for composite unities, nothing external to them can specify what happens in them: there are no instructive interactions for composite unities. Finally, and as a result of this latter condition, the structure of a composite unity also determines with which structural configurations of the medium it may interact. In general, then, everything that happens in a composite unity is a structural change, and every structural change occurs in a composite unity determined at every instant by its structure at that instant. This is so both for static and for dynamic composite unities, and the only difference between these is that dynamic composite unities are in a continuous structural change generated as part of their structural constitution in the context of their interactions, while static ones are not. It follows from all this that composite unities are structure determined systems in the sense that everything that happens in them is determined by their structure. This can be systematically expressed by saying that the structure of a composite unity determines in it at every instant: a) the domain of all the structural changes that it may undergo with conservation of organization (class identity) and adaptation at that instant; I call this domain the instantaneous domain of the possible changes of state of the composite unity.
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b) the d o m a i n of all the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that it m ay undergo w i t h l os s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a nd a d a p t a t i o n at tha t i ns t a n t ; I c al l this domain the instantaneous domain of the possible d i s i n t e g r a t i o n s of the c o m p o s i t e unity . c) the d o m a i n of all the d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of the m e d i u m that it a d m i t s at that i n s t a n t in interactions that trigger in it changes of stat e; I call this domain the instantaneous domain of the possible perturbations of the c o m p o s i t e unity. d) the d o m a i n of all the d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of the m e d i u m that it a d m i t s at th at i n s t a n t in interactions that trigger in it its disintegration; I c a l l th is domain the instantaneous d o m a i n of the p o s s i b l e d e s t r u c t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n s of the c o m p o s i t e unity. These fo ur domains of structural determinism that characterize ev e r y s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m at ev e r y instant a re o b v i o u s l y not fixed, a n d th ey c h a n g e as the s t r u c t u r e of the structure determined system changes in the f l o w of its own i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r a l d y n a m i c s or as a r e s u l t of its interactions. These general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s t r u c t u r e determined systems have several a d d i t i o n a l c o n s e q u e n c e s of w h i c h I s h a l l mention six. T h e f i r s t is tha t d u r i n g the o n t o g e n y of a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r mined s y s te m, its four d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r m i n i s m c h a n g e following a c o u r s e c o n t i n g e n t to its i n t e r a c t i o n s an d its own internal structural dynamics. T h e s e c o n d is th at s o me s t r u c t u r e determined s y s t e m s ha ve r e c u r r e n t d o m a i n s of structural determinism because they h a v e r e c u r r e n t structural configurations, while others do not because their structure changes in a nonrecurrent manner. T he t h i r d is t h at a l t h o u g h the s t r u c t u r e of a structure determined system determines the structural c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of the m e d i u m w i t h w h i c h it ma y i n t e r a c t , al l its i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n d e p e n d e n t s y s t e m s a r i s e as c o i n c i d e n c e s , and these coincidental i n t e r a c t i o n s c a n n o t be predicted from the structure of the s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m a l o n e . The fourth is t h a t a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y e x i s t s o nl y w h i l e it m o v e s t h r o u g h the medium in i n t e r a c t i o n s tha t a re p e r t u r b a t i o n s , and th at it d i s integrates a t the f i r s t d e s t r u c t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n . The fifth is t ha t s i n c e the m e d i u m c a n n o t s p e c i f y w ha t h a p p e n s in a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m b e c a u s e it o nl y t r i g g e r s the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that occur in the s y s t e m as a r e s u l t of the system's interactions, al l that ca n h a p p e n to a c o m p o s i t e un i t y in r e l a t i o n to its i n t e r a c t i o n s in the m e d i u m is t h at the c o u r s e f o l l o w e d by its structural changes is c o n t i n g e n t u p on the sequence of th e s e interactions. F in a l l y , the sixth is t ha t since mechanistic systems ar e s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m s , a nd s i n c e scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s e n t a i l the p r o p o s i t i o n of m e c h a n i s t i c s y s t e m s as the systems tha t generate the phenomena to be e x p l a i n e d , in scientific explanations we deal, and we c a n only deal, with structure determined systems. vi) Existence. By p u t t i n g o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s , we a c c e p t

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that c o n s t i t u t i v e l y we c a n n o t c l a i m the i n d e p e n d e n t e x i s t e n c e of t h i n g s (e nt i t i e s , u ni t i e s , id eas , etc.), and we r e c o g n i z e that a u n i t y e x i s t s o nl y in its d i s t i n c t i o n , in the p r a x i s of living of the o b s e r v e r , th at b r i n g s it fo rt h . But we a l so r e c o g n i z e that t he distinction takes pl a c e in the p r a x i s of l iv in g of the o b s e r v e r in an o p e r a t i o n that s p e c i f i e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y the c l a s s i d e n t i t y of the un i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d , e i t h e r as a s i m p l e un it y or as a c o m p o s i t e one, and its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as the d o m a i n of t he o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s in w h i c h its d i s t i n c t i o n m a k e s se ns e as a f e a t u r e of his or her p r a x i s of l ivi ng. S i n c e the c la s s i d e n t i t y of a c o m p o s i t e un i t y is d e f i n e d by its o r g a n i z a t i o n , and since th is can be r e a l i z e d in a c o m p o s i t e u ni t y only while it i n t e r a c t s in a d o m a i n of p e r t u r b a t i o n s , e x i s t e n c e in a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y e n t a i l s the c o n s e r v a t i o n of its o r g a n i z a t i o n as w el l as the c o n s e r v a t i o n of its o p e r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e in the domain of o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s in wh i c h it is distinguished. Similarly, si n c e the c l a s s i d e n t i t y of a s i m p l e u n i t y is d e f i n e d by its p r o p e r t i e s , and s i n c e th e s e are d e f i n e d in r e l a t i o n to the operational d o m a i n in w h i c h the s i m p l e u ni t y is distinguished, existence in a s i m p l e u ni t y e n t a i l s the conservation of the properties tha t d e f i n e it and the operational structural c o r r e s p o n d e n c e in w h i c h th e se p r o p e r t i e s are r e a l i z e d . vii) Structural coupling or adaptation. I call structural c o u p l i n g or a d a p t a t i o n the r e l a t i o n of d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r a l correspondence w i th the m e d i u m in w h i c h a un i t y c o n s e r v e s it s cl as s identity (organization in the ca se of a c o m p o s i t e uni ty , and operation of its p r o p e r t i e s in the c as e of a s i m p l e on e ), and which is e n t a i l e d in its d i s t i n c t i o n as it is b r o u g h t f o r t h by the o b s e r v e r in his or her p r a x i s of living. Therefore, conservation of class identity and conservation of adaptation are constitutive conditions of e x i s t e n c e for a n y unity (en tity, system, w h ol e, etc.) in the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e in w h i c h it is b r o u g h t fo r t h by the o b s e r v e r in his or he r p r a x i s of l i v i n g . As c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e for any u n i t y , conservation of class identity and c o n s e r v a t i o n of adaptation are p a ir ed conditions of e x i s t e n c e th at e n t a i l e a ch o t h e r so that if o ne is l os t the o t h e r is lost, an d the un i t y e x i s t s no mo r e . W h e n this happens, a composite u n i t y d i s i n t e g r a t e s and a simple un i ty disappears. vi i i) Domain of e x i s t e n c e . T h e o p e r a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n that b r i n g s f o r t h and s p e c i f i e s a u n it y, a l s o b r i n g s f o r t h an d s p e c i fies its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as the d o m a i n of t he operational coherences e n t a i l e d by t he o p e r a t i o n of the properties through which the u n i t y is c h a r a c t e r i z e d in its d i s t i n c t i o n . In other w o r d s , the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of a s i m p l e u n i t y is the d o m a i n of operational validity of th e p r o p e r t i e s that d e f i n e it as such , an d the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y is the d o m a i n of operational validity of the p r o p e r t i e s of t he components that constitute it. Furthermore, the c o n s t i t u t i v e operational coherence of a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as the d o m a i n of o p e r a t i o n a l validity of the properties of the e n t i t i e s tha t define it, e n t a i l s all that s uc h v a l i d i t y r e q u i r e s . Accordingly, a simple unity exists in a s i n g l e d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e s p e c i f i e d by its

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properties, and a composite unity exists in two in the domain of existence specified by its properties as it is distinguished as a simple unity, and in the domain of existence specified by the properties of its components as it is distinguished as a composite unity. The entailment in the distinction of a unity of its domain of existence as the domain of all the operational coherences in the praxis of living of the observer in which it conserves class identity and adaptation, is a constitutive condition of existence of every unity. A unity cannot exist outside its domain of existence, and if we imagine a unity outside its domain of existence, the unity that we imagine exists in a different domain than the unity that we claim that we imagine. ix) Determinism. To say that a system is deterministic is to say that it operates according to the operational coherences of its domain of existence. And this is so because due to our constitutive inability to experientially distinguish between what we socially call perception and illusion, we cannot make any claim about an objective reality. This we acknowledge by putting objectivity in parentheses. In other words, to say that a system is deterministic is to say that all its changes are structural changes that arise in it through the operation of the properties of its components in the interactions that these realize in its composition, and not through instructive processes in which an external agent specifies what happens in it. Accordingly, an operation of distinction that brings forth a simple unity brings forth its domain of existence as the domain of operational applicability of its properties, and constitutes the simple unity and its domain of existence as a deterministic system. At the same time, the operation of distinction that brings forth a composite unity brings forth its domain of existence as a domain of determinism in terms of the operational applicability of the properties that characterize its components, in the praxis of living of the observer. Accordingly, the operation of distinction that brings forth a composite unity brings forth the composite unity as well as its domain of existence, as deterministic systems in the corresponding domains of operational coherences of the praxis of living of the observer. x) Space. The distinction of a unity brings forth its domain of existence as a space of distinctions whose dimensions are specified by the properties of the unities whose distinctions entail it as a domain of operational coherences in the praxis of living of the observer. Thus, a simple unity exists and operates in a space specified by its properties, and a composite unity exists and operates in a space specified by its properties as a simple unity if distinguished as such, and in a space specified by the properties of its components if distinguished as a composite unity. Accordingly, as a simple unity exists and operates in a single space, a composite unity exists and operates in two. Finally, it follows that without the distinction of a unity there is no space, and that the notion of a unity out of space, as well as the notion of an empty space, are nonsensical. A space is a domain of distinctions.

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xi) Interactions. Two simple unities interact when they, as a result of the interplay of their properties, and in a manner determined by such interplay, change their relative position in a common space or domain of distinctions. A composite unity interacts when some of its components as a result of their interactions as simple unities with other simple unities that are not its components, change their manner of composing it, such that it undergoes a structural change. It follows that a simple unity interacts in a single space, in the space that its properties define, and that a composite unity interacts in two, in the space defined by its properties as a simple unity, and in the space that its components define through their properties, also as simple unities, as they constitute its structure. xii) Phenomenal domains. A space is constituted in the praxis of living of the observer when he or she performs a distinction. The constitution of a space brings forth a phenomenal domain as the domain of distinctions of the relations and interactions of the unities that the observer distinguishes as populating that space. A simple unity operates in a single phenomenal domain, the phenomenal domain constituted through the operation of its properties as a simple unity. A composite unity operates in two phenomenal domains, the phenomenal domain constituted through the operation of its properties as a simple unity, and the phenomenal domain constituted through the operation of the properties of its components, which is where its composition takes place. Furthermore, the two phenomenal domains in which a composite unity operates do not intersect and cannot be reduced one to the other because there is a generative relation between them. The phenomenal domain in which a composite unity operates as a simple unity is secondary to the composition of the composite unity, and constitutes a metaphenomenal domain with respect to the phenomenal domain in which the composition takes place. Due to this circumstance, a composite unity cannot participate as a simple unity in its own composition. xiii) M e d i u m , n i c h e . and environment. I call the medium of a unity the containing background of distinctions, including all that is not involved in its structure if it is a composite one, with respect to which an observer distinguishes it in his or her praxis of living, and in which it realizes its domain of existence. The medium includes both that part of the background that is distinguished by the observer as surrounding the unity, and that part of the background the observer conceives as interacting with it, and which it obscures in its operation in structural coupling (in its domain of existence). I call this latter part of the medium operationally defined moment by moment in its encounter with the medium in structural coupling, the niche of the unity. Accordingly, a unity continuously realizes and specifies its niche by actually operating in its domain of perturbations while conserving adaptation in the medium. As a consequence, the niche of a unity is not a fixed part of the medium in which a unity is distinguished, nor does it exist with independency of the unity that specifies it; it changes as the domain of interactions of the unity changes (if it is a composite 18

one) in its d y n a m i c s of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e ( s e c t i o n v c). In these circumstances, a n o b s e r v e r c a n d i s t i n g u i s h the n i c h e of a unity, r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r it is s i m p l e or c o m p o s i t e , o nl y by using the u n i t y as an i n d i c a t o r of it. Finally, I c a ll the environment of a un i t y all tha t an o b s e r v e r distinguishes as s u r r o u n d i n g it. In o t h e r w o r d s , w h i l e the ni c h e is that part of the m e d i u m tha t a uni ty e n c o u n t e r s ( i n t e r a c t s with) in its o p e r a t i o n in s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g , a nd o b s c u r e s w i t h its p r e s e n c e f r om t he v i e w of the o b s e r v e r , the e n v i r o n m e n t is that pa rt of the medium th at an o b s e r v e r s ee s a r o u n d a unity . Thus , a dynamic c o m p o s i t e u n i t y (like a l i v i n g s y s t e m ) , as it is d i s t i n g u i s h e d in th e p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r , is s e en in an e n v i r o n m e n t as an e n t i t y w i t h a c h a n g i n g n i c h e that it s p e c i f i e s while it slides t h r o u g h the m e d i u m in c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l change with c o n s e r v a t i o n of cl a s s i d e n t i t y an d a d a p t a t i o n . A composite unity in its m e d i u m is like a t i g h t r o p e w a l k e r that m o v e s on a r op e in a g r a v i t a t i o n a l field, an d c o n s e r v e s its balance (adaptation) while its s h a p e ( s t r u c t u r e ) c h a n g e s in a m a n n e r c o n g r u e n t w it h t he v i s u a l an d g r a v i t a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s that it u n d e r g o e s as it w a l k s ( r e a l i z i n g its n ic h e ) , a nd f a l l s w h e n th is s t o p s b e i n g the case. 7. B A S I S F OR T H E AN SW ER ; T H E L I V I N G S Y S T E M T h e a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n of c o g n i t i o n r e q u i r e s no w that we reflect u p o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of living systems, a nd t ha t we m a k e some a d d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l an d o n t o l o g i c a l considerations a bo u t the c o n d i t i o n s that our understanding of l i v i n g s y s t e m s m u st s a t i s f y . i) S c i e n c e d e a l s only w it h s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m s . To the e x t e n t that a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n e n t a i l s the p r o p o s i t i o n of a structure d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m as the m e c h a n i s m th at g e n e r a t e s the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d , we as s c i e n t i s t s can d ea l on ly with structure determined systems, a nd we c a n n o t h a n d l e s y s t e m s that c h a n g e in a m a n n e r s p e c i f i e d by the e x t e r n a l a g e n t s t h a t impinge u p o n them. A c c o r d i n g l y , w h a t e v e r I say a b o u t l i v i n g s y s t e m s w il l be said in the u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h at all the p h e n o m e n a to w h i c h the y give r is e a r i s e t h r o u g h t h e i r o p e r a t i o n as s t r u c t u r e determined systems in a d o m a i n of existence also brought forth as a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m by th e o b s e r v e r ' s d i s t i n c t i o n . ii) R e g u l a t i o n and c o n t r o l . As w a s i n d i c a t e d in s e c t i o n 6 xii, the d i s t i n c t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y e n t a i l s the d i s t i n c t i o n in th e praxis of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r of two p h e n o m e n a l domains t h a t do not i n t e r s e c t b e c a u s e the o p e r a t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e unity as a s i m p l e on e is s e c o n d a r y to i ts c o m p o s i t i o n . As a re s ul t, th e w h o l e c a n n o t o p e r a t e as i t s o wn c o m p o n e n t , and a c o m p o n e n t cannot operate in place of the w h o l e th at it integrates. In these circumstances, notions of c o n t r o l or r e g u l a t i o n do not connote actual operations in the c o m p o s i t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y , b e c a u s e s u ch o p e r a t i o n s t ak e p l a c e o n ly in th e r e a l i z a t i o n in the present of the p r o p e r t i e s of the composite unity's components in th e ir a c t u a l i n t e r a c t i o n s . N o t i o n s of r e g u l a t i o n an d c o n t r o l o nl y c o n n o t e r e l a t i o n s t a k i n g pl a c e in a descriptive
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domain as the observer relates mappings in language of his or her distinctions of a whole and its components in his or her praxis of living. iii) Living systems are structure determined systems. In order to explain the phenomenon of cognition as a biological phenomenon, I must treat living systems-as structure determined systems. I consider that to do so is legitimate for several reasons. I shall mention three. The first is an operational one: we know as a feature of our praxis of living that any structural change in a living system results in a change in its characteristics and properties, and that similar structural changes in different members of the same species result in similar changes in their characteristics and properties. The second is an epistemological one: if we do not treat living systems as structure determined systems we cannot provide scientific explanations for the phenomena proper to them. The third is an ontological one: the only systems that we can explain scientifically are structure determined systems; therefore, if I provide a scientific explanation of the phenomenon of cognition in 1iving systems, I provide a proof that living systems are structure determined systems in our praxis of living as standard observers, which is where we distinguish them. iv) Determinism and prediction. The fact that a structure determined system is deterministic does not mean that an observer should be able to predict the course of its structural changes. Determinism and predictability pertain to different operational domains in the praxis of living of the observer. Determinism is a feature that characterizes a system in terms of the operational coherences that constitute it, and its domain of existence, as it is brought forth in the operations of distinction of the observer. Accordingly, there are as many different domains of determinism as domains of different operational coherences the observer brings forth in her or his domain of experiences. At difference with this, a prediction is a computation that an observer makes of the structural changes of a structure determined system as she or he follows the consequences of the operation of the properties of the components of the system in the realization of the domain of determinism that these properties constitute. As such, a prediction can only take place after the observer has completely described the system as a structure determined system in terms of the operational coherences that constitute it in his or her domain of experiences. Therefore, the success or failure of a prediction only reflects the ability or inability of an observer to not confuse phenomenal domains in his or her praxis of living, and to indeed make the computation that constitutes the prediction in the phenomenal domain where he or she claims to make it. In these circumstances, there are two occasions in which an observer who does not confuse phenomenal domains in dealing with a structure determined system will not be able to predict its structural changes. One occasion is when an observer knows that she or he is dealing with a structure determined system by virtue of experience, in the praxis of living, with its components, but cannot encompass it in his or her

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descriptions, and, thus, cannot effectively treat it as such in its domain of existence and compute its changes of state. The other occasion is when an observer in his or her praxis of living aims at characterizing the present unknown state of a system assumed to be structure determined, by interacting with some of its components. By doing this the observer triggers in the system an unpredictable change of state that he or she then uses to characterize its initial state and predict in it a later one within the domain of determinism specified by the properties of its components. Therefore, since the domain of determinism of a structure determined system as the domain of operational coherences of its components is brought forth in its distinction in the praxis of living of the observer, and since in order to compute a change of state in a system the observer must determine its present state through an interaction with its components, any attempt to compute a change of state in a structure determined system entails a necessary uncertainty due to the manner of determination of its initial state within the constraints of the operational coherences of its domain of existence. This predictive uncertainty may vary in magnitude in different domains of distinctions, but it is always present because it is constitu tive of the phenomenon of cognition as a feature of the ontology of observing and not of an objective independent reality. With this I am also saying that the uncertainty principle of physics pertains to the ontology of observing, and that it does not characterize an independent universe because, as I shall show further on, the physical domain of existence is a cognitive domain brought forth in the praxis of living of the observer by the observer as an explanation of his or her praxis of living. v) Ontogenic structural drift. It is said that a boat is drifting when it slides floating on the sea without rudder and oars, following a course that is generated moment after moment in its encounter with the waves and wind that impinge upon it, and which lasts as long as it remains floating (conserves adaptation) and keeps the shape of a boat (conserves organization). As such, a drifting boat follows a course without alternatives that is deterministically generated moment after moment in its encounters with the waves and the wind. As a consequence of this, a drifting boat is also always, and at any moment, in the only place where it can be, in a present that is continuously emerging from the sequence of its interactions in the drift. The deterministic process that generates the course followed by a drifting boat takes place as a feature of the structural dynamics of the structure determined system constituted by the boat, the wind, and the waves, as these are brought forth by the observer in his or her praxis of living. Therefore, if an observer cannot predict the course of a drifting boat, it is not because his or her distinction of the boat, the wind, and the waves, in his or her domain of experiences, does not entail a structure determined system in which the course followed by the boat arises in a deterministic manner, but because he or she cannot encompass in his or her description of the interactions between the boat, the wind, and the waves, the whole structure of the structure determined system in which the course followed by the boat is a

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fe a tu re of its c h a n g e s of s t r uc tu re . W h at h a p p e n s w i t h the g e n e r a t i o n of the c o u r s e f o ll o we d by a drifting boat, is the g e n e r a l ca se for the g e n e r a t i o n of the course followed by the structural changes of any s t r u c t u r e determined s y s t e m that the o b s er ve r d i s t i n g u i s h e s in his or her p r ax is of l i v i n g , as it i n t e r a c t s in the m e d i u m as if w i t h an independent entity with conservation of class identity (organization) an d adaptation (structural coupling). Si n ce l i vi ng s y s t e m s ar e d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e determined systems, this applies to th e m; and the o n t o g e n y of a l i v i n g sys tem, as its history of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s wit h c o n s e r v a t i o n of o r g a n i z a t i o n and a d a p t a t i o n , is its o n t o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l drift. All th at applies to the c o u r s e f o l l o w e d by a d r i f t i n g boat ap pl i e s to the c o u r s e f o l l o w e d by the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s t ha t take pla ce in the ontogeny of a l i v i n g s y s t e m and to the c o u r s e f o l lo we d by the displacement of a living system in the medium during its ontogeny. L e t me m a k e th is c le ar. In g e n e r a l terms, a d r i f t is the c o u r s e followed by the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s of a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m that a r i s e m o m e n t a f t e r m o m e n t g e n e r a t e d in the i n t e r a c t i o n s of the s y s t e m w it h a n o t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t sy st em , wh i l e its r e l a t i o n of correspondence (adaptation) w it h thi s ot h er system (medium) and its o r g a n i z a t i o n (class identity) remain invariant. A c c o r d i n g l y , the i n d i v i d u a l l i f e h i s t o r y of a l i v i n g s y s t e m as a h i s t o r y of c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that f o l l o w s a course g e n e r a t e d m o m e n t aft er m o m e n t in the b r a i d i n g of its internally generated structural dynamics with the s t r u c t u r a l changes t r i g g e r e d in it by its r e c u r r e n t i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h the medium as an i n d e p e n d e n t e nt ity , and w h i c h l a s t s as long as its organization an d a d a p t a t i o n are c o n s e r v e d , ta k e s plac e as a structural drift. S i m i l a r l y , s i n c e the c o u r s e of the d i s p l a c e ment of a l i v i n g s y s t e m in the m e d i u m is g e n e r a t e d m o m e n t after moment as a r e s u l t of its i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h the m e d i u m as an independent entity w h i l e its o r g a n i z a t i o n an d adaptation ar e conserved, th e displacement of a l i v i n g s y s t e m in the medium while it realizes its n ic h e ta k es p l a c e as a drift. Living systems exist in continuous structural a nd p o s i t i o n a l drift (ontogenic drift) while they are alive, as a m a t t e r of constitution. As in th e c a s e of a d r i f t i n g boat, at any m o m e n t a l i v i n g s y s t e m is w h e r e it is in the me di um , and ha s the s t r u c t u r e t ha t it has, as th e p r e s e n t of its o n t o g e n i c d r i f t in a d e t e r m i n i s t i c manner, a nd c o u l d not be a n y w h e r e o t h e r t ha n w h e r e it is, nor c ou l d it h a v e a s t r u c t u r e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the one that it has. T h e m a n y d i f f e r e n t p a t h s that an o b s e r v e r ma y c o n s i d e r p o s s i b l e for a d r i f t i n g boa t to f o l l o w at a n y instant, or the m a n y different ontogenic courses that an observer may consider p o s s i b l e for a l i v i n g s y s t e m at any m o m e n t , ar e p o s s i b l e o nl y as i m a g i n e d a l t e r n a t i v e s in the d e s c r i p t i o n of w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n in e a c h c a s e if the c o n d i t i o n s were d i f f e r e n t , a nd not a c t u a l a l t e r natives in th e c o u r s e of the boat or in the o n t o g e n y of the living system. A d r i f t is a p r o c e s s of c h a n g e , and as is the c a se with all processes of c h a n g e in structure determined systems, it f o l l o w s a c o u r s e w i t h o u t a l t e r n a t i v e s in the d o m a i n

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of determinism in which it is brought forth by the distinctions of the observer. Indeed, such imagined alternatives are imaginable only from the perspective of the inability of the observer to treat the boat, the wind, and the waves, or the living system and the medium, that he or she brings forth in his or her praxis of living, as a known structure determined system whose changes of structure he or she can compute. If we are serious about our explanations as scientists, then we must accept as an ontological feature of what we do as observers that every entity that we bring forth in our distinctions is where it is, and has the structure that it has, in the only manner that it can be, given the domain of operational coherences (domain of determinism) that we also bring forth as its domain of existence in its distinction. Finally, let me mention several implications of all this for the entities that we bring forth as living systems in our praxis of living: a) Since for a living system a history of inter actions without disintegration can only be a history of perturbations, that is, a history of interactions in the niche, a living system while living necessarily slides in ontogenic drift through the medium in the realization of its niche. This means that aim, goal, purpose, or intention, do not enter into the realization of a living system as a structure determined system. b) Since the structure of a living system is continuously changing, both through its internal dynamics and through the structural changes triggered in it in its interactions with operationally independent entities, the niche of a living system (the features of the medium that it actually encounters in its interactions) is necessarily in continuous change congruent with the continuous structural drift of the living system while it remains alive. Furthermore, this is so regardless of whether the observer considers that the environment of the living system changes or remains constant. This means that as an observer brings forth a living system in her or his praxis of living, it may appear to her or him as continuously changing in its use of a constant environment, or, conversely, as unchanging in a continuously changing environment, because the observer cannot see the encounter of a living system and its niche, which is where conservation of adaptation takes place. c) Conservation of adaptation does not mean that the manner of living of a living system remains invariant. It means that a living system has an ontogeny only while it conserves its class identity and its dynamic structural correspondence with the medium as it undergoes its interactions, and that there is no constitutive restriction about the magnitude of its moment after moment structural changes other than that they should take place within the constraints of its structural determinism and its conservation of organization and adaptation. Indeed, I could speak of the laws of conservation of organization and adaptation as ontological conditions for the existence of any structure determined system in the same manner as physicists speak of the laws of conservation in physics as ontological conditions for the occurence of physical phenomena.

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Every l i v in g system, i n c l u d i n g us o b s e r v e r s , is at an y m o m e n t w h e r e it is, has the s t r u c t u r e tha t it has, a nd do es w h a t it d oe s at th at mo m en t, a l w a y s in a s t r u c t u r a l and relational situation that is the p r e s e n t of an o n t o g e n i c d ri f t that starts at its i n c e p t i o n as s u c h in a p a r t i c u l a r pl a c e w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r structure, and follows the only c o u r s e t ha t it can fo l lo w. Different k i n d s of l i v i n g s y s t e m s d i f f e r in the spectrum of ontogenies that an o b s e r v e r c a n c o n s i d e r p o s s i b l e for e ac h of th e m in his or her d i s c o u r s e as a r e s u l t of their different initial s t r u c t u r e s a nd different starting p la c e s , but e a ch o n t o g e n y tha t take s pl ac e t a k e s pl a ce as a u n i q u e o n t o g e n i c dr i f t in a p r o c e s s w i t h o u t a l t e r n a t i v e s , vi) Structural intersection. W h e n an o b s e r v e r b r i n g s fo r th a c o m p o s i t e un i t y in his or her p r a x i s of l ivi ng , he or she b ri ng s forth an e n t i t y in w h i c h the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between c o m p o n e n t s that c o n s t i t u t e s its o r g a n i z a t i o n , is a s u b s e t of all the a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s th at ta ke p l a c e b e t w e e n its components as these r e a l i z e its s t r u c t u r e and c o n s t i t u t e it as a w h o l e in the domain of e x i s t e n c e in w h i c h th ey a r e b r o u g h t f o r t h (see s e c t i o n 6, iv). As such, the o r g a n i z a t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y d o e s not exhaust the r e l a t i o n s and i n t e r a c t i o n s in w h i c h the components that realize it may p a r t i c i p a t e in the ir d o m a i n of existence. The result of this c i r c u m s t a n c e is th at in the structural r e a l i z a t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y , its c o m p o n e n t s ma y p a r t i c i p a t e , through other properties t h a n tho se th at i n v o l v e t h e m in the realization of its organization, in the realization of the organization of m a n y other composite unities w h ic h, thus, i n t e r s e c t s t r u c t u r a l l y w i t h it. F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n the c o m p o n e n t s of a composite unity are themselves composite unities, the c o m p o s i t e u n i t y may p a r t i c i p a t e in s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r s e c t i o n s that take place t h r o u g h the c o m p o n e n t s of its components. In any ca s e, when an o b s e r v e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s two or m o r e structurally intersecting s ys t e m s , he or s he distinguishes two or more d i f f e r e n t c o m p o s i t e u n i t i e s r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h the s a m e body. Structurally intersecting systems exist an d operate as s i m p l e u n i t i e s in d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s s p e c i f i e d by thei r different organizations. Yet, d e p e n d i n g on ho w t h e i r s t r u c t u r a l intersection ta k e s p la ce , structurally intersecting composite unities ma y e x i s t as s u c h in t h e s am e or d i f f e r e n t domains of existence. Th u s, when tw o composite unities structurally intersect through th e i r c o m p o n e n t s , they share components and have as c o m p o s i t e u n i t i e s the s a m e d o m a i n of existence. But, when tw o composite unities structurally intersect through the components of the c o m p o n e n t s of on e or both, t he y do not sh a r e components and as c o m p o s i t e u n i t i e s h a ve d i f f e r e n t domains of existence. Nevertheless, since in a structural intersection t h e r e are c o m p o n e n t s or c o m p o n e n t s of c o m p o n e n t s , or both, tha t simultaneously p a r t i c i p a t e in th e s t r u c t u r e of s e v e r a l systems, s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s t h a t t a k e p l a c e in one of s e v e r a l s t r u c t u r a l l y i n t e r s e c t i n g s y s t e m s as p a r t of i ts o n t o g e n i c d r i f t m ay g iv e rise to s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s in t h e o t h e r i n t e r s e c t i n g s y s t e m s and thus p a r t i c i p a t e in the ir o t h e r w i s e i n d e p e n d e n t o n t o g e n i c d r i f t s . In other w or ds , s t r u c t u r a l l y i n t e r s e c t i n g s y s t e m s ar e s t r u c t u r a l l y
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interdependent because, either through the intersection of their domains of structural determinism, or though the intersection of the domains of structural determinism of their components, or through both, they affect each o t h e r s structures in the course of their independently generated structural changes, and although they may exist as composite unities in different domains, their ontogenic drifts intersect forming a network of coontogenic drifts. Thus, an observer may distinguish in the structural realization of a human being as a living system the simultaneous or successive intersection of a mammal, a person, a woman, a doctor, and a mother, all of which are different composite unities defined by different organizations that are simultaneously or successively conserved while they are realized in their different domains of existence, with particular characteristics that result from the continuous braiding of their different ontogenic drifts through the continuous interplay of their structural changes* Furthermore, these structural intersections result in dependent domains of disintegrations as well as dependent domains of conservations which need not be reciprocal, when the conservation of one class identity entails the conservation of structural features that are involved in the conservation of another. For example, in the structural intersection of a student and a human being in a living system, the conservation of the class identity "student" entails the conservation of the class identity "human being," but not the reverse: the disintegration of the student does not entail the disintegration of the human being, but the disintegration of the human being carries with it the disintegration of the student. Also, a particular composite unity may disintegrate through different kinds of structural changes, like disintegrating as a student through failing an examination or through attaining the final degree, with different consequences in the network of structural intersections to which it belongs. The structural intersection of systems does not mean that the same system is viewed in different manners from different perspectives, because due to their different organizations structurally intersecting systems exist in different phenomenal domains and are realized through different structural dynamics. It only means that the elements that realize a particular composite unity as its components through some of their properties as simple unities, participate through other of their properties as simple unites as components of other unities that exist as legitimately different ones because they have different domains of disintegrations. The interactions and relations in which the components of a system participate through dimensions other than those through which they constitute it, I call orthogonal interactions and relations, and it is through these that structurally intersecting systems may exist in nonintersecting phenomenal domains and yet have unidirectional or reciprocal relations of structural dependency. Finally, it is also through the orthogonal interactions of their components that structurally independent systems that exist in nonintersecting phenomenal domains may also have coontogenic drifts.

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vii) The living s y s t e m . In 1970 I p r o p o s e d th at l i v i n g s y s t e m s are dynamic s y s t e m s c o n s t i t u t e d as a u t o n o m o u s unities through bei n g closed circular concatenations ( c l os ed networks) of molecular p r o d u c t i o n s in w h i c h the d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of molecules that c o m p o s e t h e m p a r t i c i p a t e in the p r o d u c t i o n of e a ch ot her , and in w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g c an c h a n g e e xc ep t the c l o s e d c i r c u l a r i t y of the c o n c a t e n a t i o n of m o l e c u l a r p r o d u c t i o n s that constitutes th e m as u n i t i e s (see M a t u r a n a 1970, in M a t u r a n a and V a r e l a 1980). In 1973 F r a n c i s c o V a r e l a and I e x p a n d e d thi s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of li v i n g s y s t e m s by s a y i n g : first, that a c o m p o s i t e u ni t y whose o r g a n i z a t i o n ca n be d e s c r i b e d as a c l o s e d n e t w o r k of productions of components th at t h r o u g h th ei r i n t e r a c t i o n s constitute the network of productions that produce t h e m an d specify its extension by c o n s t i t u t i n g its b o u n d a r i e s in their domain of existence, is an a u t o p o i e t i c sy st em ; and s ec o n d , th at a l i v i n g system is an a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m wh o s e c o m p o n e n t s are molecules. Or, in o t h e r w o rd s, we p r o p o s e d th at l i v i n g s y s t e m s are m o l e c u l a r autopoietic s y s t e m s an d t h at as s u ch th ey e xi s t in the m o l e c u l a r space as c l o s e d n e t w o r k s of m o l e c u l a r p r o d u c t i o n s that specify their o wn l i m i t s (see M a t u r a n a and V a r e l a 1973, in M a t u r a n a and Varela 1980; a nd Maturana 1975). N o t h i n g is said in t h is description of the m o l e c u l a r c o n s t i t u t i o n of l i v i n g systems as autopoietic systems about thermodynamic constraints, b e c a u s e the realization of l i v i n g s y s t e m s as m o l e c u l a r s y s t e m s e n t a i l s the s a t i s f a c t i o n of s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s . In fact, the s t a t e m e n t t ha t a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y e x i s t s as s uc h in the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of its components, implies the satisfaction of the conditions of e x i s t e n c e of t he s e c o m p o n e n t s . T he recognition that living systems are molecular autopoietic systems c a r r i e s w i t h it s e v e r a l implications and c o n s e q u e n c e s of w h i c h I sh a l l m e n t i o n a few: A. Implications: a) L i v i n g s y s t e m s as a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s are structure determined systems, an d e v e r y t h i n g tha t applies to s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m s a p p l i e s to them. In p a r t i c u l a r this m e a n s t ha t e v e r y t h i n g th at o c c u r s in a l i v i n g s y s t e m t a k e s pla ce in it in the a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n of the p r o p e r t i e s of its c o m p o n e n t s through relations of neighborhood (relations of contiguity) c o n s t i t u t e d in t h e s e v er y same o p e r a t i o n s . Accordingly, notions of regulation and control do not a nd cannot reflect actual operations in th e s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of a living system because th ey do not c o n n o t e a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s of n e i g h b o r h o o d in it. These notions only reveal relations that the o b s e r v e r establishes when he or she c o m p a r e s d i f f e r e n t moments in the course of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s in the n e t w o r k of p r o c e s s e s that take p la c e in the structural r e a l i z a t i o n of a particular living system. T h e r e f o r e , th e o n ly p e c u l i a r thi ng a b o u t l i v i n g s y s t e m s as structure determined s y s t e m s is tha t t he y a r e molecular autopoietic systems. b) A u t o p o i e s i s is a d y n a m i c p r o c e s s that ta k e s p l a c e in the o n g o i n g f l o w of its o c c u r r e n c e and c a n n o t be grasped in a static instantaneous v i e w of distribution of components. Therefore, a l i v i n g s y s t e m e x i s t s onl y t h r o u g h the c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n e n t a i l e d in its a u t o p o i e s i s , and only while t h is is c o n s e r v e d in the c o n s t i t u t i o n of its

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ontogeny. Th is c i r c u m s t a n c e ha s two ba s ic r e s u l t s : one is that living systems c a n be r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h m a n y d i f f e r e n t changing dynamic structures, the other is th at in th e generation of l i n e a g e s t hr o u g h r e p r o d u c t i o n , l i vi ng s y s t e m s a r e c o n s t i t u t i v e l y open to c o n t i n u o u s p h y l o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e . c) A l i vi ng s y s t e m e i t h e r e x i s t s as a d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m in s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g in the m e d i u m in w hi c h it is b r o u g h t forth by the o b s e r v e r , th at is, in a r e l a t i o n of c o n s e r v a t i o n of a d a p t a t i o n t h r o u g h its c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e in the realization of its n ic he, or it d o e s n ot e x is t. Or, in o t h e r w o rd s, a l iv in g system while living is n e c e s s a r i l y in a d y n a m i c relation of correspondence with the m e d i u m t h r o u g h its operation in its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e , an d to l iv e is to gl i d e t h r o u g h a d o m a i n of perturbations in an o n t o g e n i c d ri f t that t a k e s p l a c e t h r o u g h the r e a l i z a t i o n of an e v e r c h a n g i n g niche. d) A l i v i n g s y s t e m as a structure determined s y s t e m o p e r a t e s only in t he p r e s e n t that is, it is d e t e r m i n e d by the s t r u c t u r e that it ha s at an y in st a n t in the s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of its a u t o p o i e s i s in the m o l e c u l a r s p a c e and therefore it is n e c e s s a r i l y o p e n to the f lo w of molecules t h r o u g h it. At the s am e time, a l i v i n g s y s t e m as an autopoietic system g i v e s r i se o nl y to s t a t e s in autopoiesis; o t h e r w i s e it d i s i n t e g r a t e s . T h e r e f o r e , l i v i n g s y s t e m s a re c l os ed s y s t e m s wi th r e s p e c t to t h e i r d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s . B. Consequences: a) To the e x te nt that a l i v i n g s y s t e m is a structure determined system, and e v e r y t h i n g in it takes pl ac e through neighborhood relations b e t w e e n its c o m p o n e n t s in the present, notions of p u r p o s e and goal tha t i m p l y t h a t at eve ry instant a la t e r s t a t e of a s y s t e m as a w h o l e o p e r a t e s as part of it s s t r u c t u r e in t he p r e s e n t do not ap p l y to l i v i n g s y s t e m s and c a n n o t be used to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e i r o p e r a t i o n . A living system may appear to o p e r a t e as a p u r p o s e f u l or goal-directed system o n l y to an o b s e r v e r who , h a v i n g s e e n the o n t o g e n y of o th e r l i v i n g s y s t e m s of the s a me k i n d in the s am e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in h is or her praxis of l ivi ng , c o n f u s e s p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s by putting the c o n s e q u e n c e s of it s o p e r a t i o n as a w ho l e a m o n g t he p r o c e s s e s that c o n s t i t u t e it. b) B e c a u s e t h ey ar e s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m s , for living systems there is no i n s i d e or outside in thei r operation as a u t o p o i e t i c u n i t i e s ; they ar e in a u t o p o i e s i s as c l o s e d w h o l e s in t h e i r d y n a m i c s of st ates, or t h ey d i s i n t e g r a t e . At the sam e time, an d for the sa me reason, l i v i n g s y s t e m s do not use or m i s u s e an e n v i r o n m e n t in th ei r o p e r a t i o n as autopoietic unities, nor do t h e y c o m m i t m i s t a k e s in t he i r o n t o g e n i c drift s. In fact, a living s y s t e m in its o p e r a t i o n in a m e d i u m wi th conservation of organization and a d a p t a t i o n as b e f i t it as a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m , b r i n g s f or t h its e v e r c h a n g i n g ni ch e as it r e a l i z e s i t s e l f in i ts d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e , th e b a c k g r o u n d of o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s w h i c h it does not d i s t i n g u i s h and with w h i c h it do es not i n t e r a c t . c) L i v i n g s y s t e m s n e c e s s a r i l y form, through their r e c u r r e n t i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h e a c h o t h e r as we ll as with the n o n b i o t i c m e d i u m , c o o n t o g e n i c and c o p h y l o g e n i c s y s t e m s of b r a i d e d s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t s that last as l o ng as th ey conserve their a u t o p o i e s i s t h r o u g h t he c o n s e r v a t i o n of their reciprocal structural couplings. Such is biological evolution. As a re s ul t, ev e r y living system, including us human b e in gs as

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observers, is a l w a y s f ou n d in its s p o n t a n e o u s r e a l i z a t i o n in its domain of e x i s t e n c e in c o n g r u e n c e w i t h a b i o t i c and a n o n b i o t i c m ed iu m. Or, in o t h e r words , e ve r y l i v i n g s y s t e m is at ev er y instant as it is a n d wh e r e it is a n o d e of a network of coontogenic d r i f t s t ha t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s all the entities with which it i n t e r a c t s in the d o m a i n in w h i c h it is br ou g h t fo r t h by the o b s e r v e r in his or her p r a x i s of living. As a consequence, an o b s e r v e r as a l i v i n g s y s t e m c a n on ly d i s t i n g u i s h an e n t i t y as a no de of the n e t w o r k of c o o n t o g e n i c d r i ft s to w h i c h it be lon gs , an d w h e r e it e x i s t s in s t r u c t u r a l co up l i n g . d) The o n ly th in g peculiar to living systems is that th ey are autopoietic s y s t e m s in the m o l e c u l a r s p a c e . In these circums ta nc es , a gi v e n p h e n o m e n o n is a b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n o nl y to the e x t e n t that its r e a l i z a t i o n e n t a i l s the r e a l i z a t i o n of the autopoiesis of at l e a s t one a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m in the m o l e c u l a r spac e. e) M o d e r n p r o k a r y o t i c and e u k a r y o t i c c e l l s are typical autopoietic s y s t e m s in the m o l e c u l a r s p ac e, an d b ec a u s e their autopoiesis is not the r e s ul t of t h e i r b e i n g c o m p o s e d by m or e ba s ic a u t o p o i e t i c s u b s y s t e m s , I call them f i r s t or d e r a u t o p o i e t i c sy s t e m s . I c al l s e c o n d o r d e r a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s s y s t e m s whose autopoiesis is the r e s u l t of th e i r bei ng c o m p o s e d of m o re ba s i c a u t o p o i e t i c un i t i e s ; o r g a n i s m s as m u l t i c e l l u l a r s y s t e m s a re such. Yet, organisms may also " be," and I t hi n k t h a t m o s t of t h em a c t u a l l y are, fi r s t o r d e r a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s as c l o s e d n e t w o r k s of m o l e c u l a r p r o d u c t i o n s t h at i n v o l v e i n t e r c e l l u l a r p r o c e s s e s as m u c h as i n t r a c e l l u l a r ones. A c c o r d i n g l y , an o r g a n i s m wo u ld ex i st as s u ch in the structural intersection of a first o rd e r a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m w i t h a s e c o n d o r d e r one, b o th r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h th e a u t o p o i e s i s of the c e l l s that compose th e la tter. T hi s happened originally with the eukaryotic cell as this arose through the e n d o s y m b i o s i s of p r o k a r y o t i c o n e s (Margulis 1981). f) An o r g a n i s m as a second order autopoietic system is an e c t o c e l l u l a r s y m b i o n t c o m p o s e d of c el ls , u s u a l l y of c o m m o n o r i g i n but not a l w a y s so, t h a t c o n s t i t u t e it t h r o u g h t he i r c o o n t o g e n i c d r if t. An o r g a n i s m as a f i r s t o r d e r a u t o p o i e t i c sy st em, h o w e v e r , is not c o m p o s e d of c e l l s e ve n t h o u g h its r e a l i z a t i o n d e p e n d s on the r e a l i z a t i o n of the a u t o p o i e s i s of the c e l l s that intersect structurally w i t h it as th ey c o n s t i t u t e it in t h e i r coontogenic drift . The fi r s t a nd second order autopoietic systems that i n t e r s e c t s t r u c t u r a l l y in the r e a l i z a t i o n of an organism, ex i st in d i f f e r e n t n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s . viii) P h v l o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t . R e p r o d u c t i o n is a p r o c e s s in which a s y s t e m g i v e s o r i g i n t h r o u g h its f r a c t u r e to two systems characterized by t he s a me o r g a n i z a t i o n ( c l a s s identity) that characterized the o r i g i n a l one, but w i t h s t r u c t u r e s th at vary w it h r e s p e c t to it ( M a t u r a n a 1980). A r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n y or l in e a g e , then , is a s u c c e s s i o n of s y s t e m s generated through s e q u e n t i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n s th at c o n s e r v e a p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , e a c h p a r t i c u l a r r e p r o d u c t i v e l i n e a g e or p h y l o g e n y is defined by the particular organization conserved through th e sequential reproductions t ha t constitute it. Therefore, a reproductive phylogeny or l i n e a g e l a s t s o n l y as long as the o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t d e f i n e s it is c o n s e r v e d , r e g a r d l e s s of h ow m u ch the s t r u c t u r e t ha t r e a l i z e s thi s o r g a n i z a t i o n in e a c h successive

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member of the l i n e a g e c h a n g e s w i t h e ac h r e p r o d u c t i v e step ( s ee M a t u r a n a 1980, and M a t u r a n a and V a r e l a 1987). It f o l l o w s t ha t a reproductive p h y l o g e n y or l i n e a g e as a s u c c e s s i o n of ontogenic drifts, constitutively o c c u r s as a d r i f t of the s t r u c t u r e s that realize the o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n s e r v e d a l o n g it. It a l s o follows tha t each of the reproductive steps th at constitute a r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n y is the o c c a s i o n th at op e n s the p o s s i b i l i t y for a discrete, l ar g e or sm al l , c h a n g e in the c o u r s e of its s t r u c t u r a l d r if t. As such, a r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n y or l i n e a g e comes to a n end t h r o u g h the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s of its m e m b e r s . And th is o c c u r s e i t h e r b e c a u s e a u t o p o i e s i s is lo st a f t e r the las t of th em , or b e c a u s e t h r o u g h the c o n s e r v a t i o n of a u t o p o i e s i s in the o f f s p r i n g of the las t of them , a p a r t i c u l a r set of r e l a t i o n s of the d r i f t i n g s t r u c t u r e b e g i n s to be c o n s e r v e d through the following sequential reproductions as the organization that defines a nd starts a ne w l i n e a g e . T h i s has several general i m p l i c a t i o n s of w h i c h I sh al l m e n t i o n on ly a few: a) A m e m b e r of a reproductive phylogeny either stays in structural coupling (conserves adaptation) in its d o m a i n of existence u nt i l its reproduction, an d the p h y l o g e n y c o n t i n u e s , or it d i s i n t e g r a t e s b e f o r e t h e n and the p h y l o g e n y e n d s w i t h it. b) A l i v i n g system is a m e m b e r of the r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n y in w h i c h it a r i s e s o n l y if it conserves through its o n t o g e n y the organization that d e f i n e s the p h y l o g e n y , and c o n t i n u e s the p h y l o g e n y onl y if such organization is c o n s e r v e d t h r o u g h its reproduction. c) Many d i f f e r e n t r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n i e s c an be c o n s e r v e d o p e r a t i o n a l l y embedded in e a ch o th er , f o r m i n g a s y s t e m of n e s t e d p h y l o g e n i e s , if t h e r e is an i n t e r s e c t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of the different organizations tha t d e f i n e them . When this happens th e r e is always a fundamental reproductive phylogeny whose realization is n e c e s s a r y for the r e a l i z a t i o n of a l l t h e o t h e r s . This h a s o c c u r r e d in the e v o l u t i o n of l i v i n g s y s t e m s in the f o rm of the phylogenic dr if t of a system of branching nested reproductive phylogenies in w h i c h the f u n d a m e n t a l reproductive p h y l o g e n y is that in w h i c h a u t o p o i e s i s is c o n s e r v e d (see M a t u r a n a 1980, and Maturana and V a r e l a 1 9 87 ). Th u s, the system of branching p h y l o g e n i e s d e f i n e d by t he c o n s e r v a t i o n of a u t o p o i e s i s t h r o u g h r e p r o d u c t i v e c el l s in e u k a r y o t i c o r g a n i s m s , has carried embedded in it, t h r o u g h th e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r s e c t i o n of their realizations, many staggered nested organizations th at c h a r a c t e r i z e the c o i n c i d e n t l i n e a g e s c o n s e r v e d t h r o u g h it. This c i r c u m s t a n c e we r e c o g n i z e in the m a n y n e s t e d t a x o n o m i c c a t e g o r i e s th at we d i s t i n g u i s h in any o r g a n i s m w h e n we c l a s s i f y it. For example, a h u m a n b e i n g is a v e r t e b r a t e , a mammal, a primate, a H o m o , a nd a H om o s a p i e n s a l l d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to d i f f e r e n t s y s t e m s of p a r t i a l l y o v e r l a p p i n g phylogenies that ar e conserved together t h r o u g h the c o n s e r v a t i o n of the human being's autopoiesis. d) T h e o n t o g e n i c d r i f t s of the m e m b e r s of a reproductive phylogeny ta ke place in r e c i p r o c a l structural coupling with many different, and also continuously changing, living and n o n l i v i n g s y s t e m s th at f o r m pa rt of the medium in w h i c h t h e y r e a l i z e th e i r n i c h e s . As a re su l t , ev e r y i n d i v i d u a l ontogeny in l i v i n g s y s t e m s f o l l o w s a c o u r s e e m b e d d e d in a s y s t e m of coontogenies th at constitutes a network of cophylogenic structural drifts. This can be g e n e r a l i z e d by s a y i n g t h at

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evolution is constitutively a coevolution, and that every living system is at any moment where it is, and has the structure that it has, as an expression of the present state of the domain of operational coherences constituted by the network of cophylogenic structural drifts to which it belongs. As a result, the operational coherences of every living system at every instant necessarily entail the operational coherences of the whole biosphere. e) The observer as a living system is not an exception to all that has been said above. Accordingly, an observer can only make distinctions that, as operations in his or her praxis of living, take place as operations within the present state of the domain of operational coherences constituted by the network of coontogenic and cophylogenic structural drifts to which he or she belongs. ix) Ontogenic possibilities. The ontogeny of every structure determined system starts with an initial structure that is the structure that realizes the system at the beginning of its existence in its inception. In living systems such initial structure is a cellular unity that may originate either a) as a single cell or as a small multicellular entity through a reproductive fracture from a cellular maternal system whose organization it conserves, or b) as a single cell de novo from noncellular elements. In every living system the s y s t e m s initial structure constitutes the structural starting point that specifies in it what an observer sees as the configuration of all the courses of ontogenic drifts that it may undergo under different circumstances of interactions in the medium. As a result, what constitutes a lineage in living systems is the conservation through their reproduction of a particular initial structure that specifies a particular configuration of possible ontogenic drifts; and what constitutes the organization conserved through reproduction that specifies the identity of the lineage is that configuration. Accordingly, a lineage comes to an end when the configuration of possible ontogenic drifts that defines it stops being conserved. The configuration of possible ontogenic drifts that specifies a lineage through its conservation I call the ontogenic phenotype of the lineage. In each particular living system, however, only one of theontogenic courses deemed possible in the ontogenic phenotype by the observer, is realized as a result of its internal dynamics under the contingencies of the particular perturbations that it undergoes in its domain of existence with conservation of organization and adaptation. Consequently, and in general, it is only within the domain of possibilities set by their different or similar initial structures that different composite unities may have different or similar ontogenic structural drifts under different or similar histories of perturbations in their domains of existence. Indeed, nothing can happen in the ontogeny of a living system as a composite unity that is not permitted in its initial structure. Or, in other words, and under the understanding that the initial structure of a living system is its genetic constitution, it is apparent that nothing can happen in the ontogenic structural drift of a living system that is not allowed in its genetic constitution as a feature of its possible

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a l iv in g sy s te m, c o n s e r v a t i o n of l iv i ng ( c o n s e r v a t i o n of auto poiesis and of a d a p t a t i o n ) c o n s t i t u t e s a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in those circumstances, and, h en ce , k n o w l e d g e : l i v i n g s y s t e m s are c o g n i tive s y s t e m s , and to l i ve is to k n o w . But, by s h o w i n g this I hav e a l so s h o w n tha t an y i n t e r a c t i o n wi th a l i v i n g s y s t e m can be vi ew ed by an o b s e r v e r as a q u e s t i o n posed to it, as a c h a l l e n g e to its li fe th at c o n s t i t u t e s a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e w h e r e he or she e x p e c t s a d e q u a t e a c t i o n of it. And, at the same time, I have al so shown, then, t h at the a c t u a l a c c e p t a n c e by th e o b s e r v e r of an a n s w e r to a q u e s t i o n posed to a living s y s t e m , e n t a i l s his or her r e c o g n i t i o n of a d e q u a t e a c t i o n by the l i v i n g s y s t e m in the domain s p e c i f i e d by the q u e s t i o n , and th at t h is r e c o g n i t i o n of adequate a c t i o n c o n s i s t s in the d i s t i n c t i o n of the l i v i n g s y st em in that d o m a i n u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of c o n s e r v a t i o n of autopoiesis and a d a p t a t i o n . In w h a t f o l l o w s I p re s e n t t hi s g e n e r a l e x p l a n a tory proposition under the gu is e of a particular scientific explanation: a) Th e p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d is a d e q u a t e a c t i o n by a l iv in g system at any m o m e n t in w h i c h an o b s e r v e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s it as a living s y s t e m in a c t i o n in a p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n . And I pr op o s e this as the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d in the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that the a d e q u a t e a c t i o n s of a l i v i n g s y s t e m are its i n t e r a c t i o n s with conservation of class i d e n t i t y in the d o m a i n in which it is distinguished. b) Given that s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g in its d o m a i n of existence ( c o n s e r v a t i o n of a d a p t a t i o n ) is a c o n d i t i o n of e x i s t e n c e for any s y s t e m d i s t i n g u i s h e d by an o b s e r v e r , the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m for adequate action in a l i v i n g s y s t e m as a s t r u c t u r a l l y changing s ys tem , is the s t r u c t u r a l d ri f t with c o n s e r v a t i o n of a d a p t a t i o n through which it s t a y s in c o n t i n u o u s a d e q u a t e a c t i o n while it realizes its niche, or disintegrates. Since a system is distinguished o nl y in s t r u c t u r a l coupling, when an observer d i s t i n g u i s h e s a l i v i n g s y s t e m he or she n e c e s s a r i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s it in a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in the d o m a i n of its distinction, and distinguishes it as a s y s t e m th at constitutively remains in s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g in its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e r e g a r d l e s s of how m u ch its structure, or the s t r u c t u r e of the m e d i u m , or both, c h a n g e w h i l e it s t a y s a l i v e . c) G i v e n the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m pr o p o s e d in (b), the f o l l o w i n g phenomena can be deduced to tak e p la c e in the d o ma in of e x p e r i e n c e s of an o b s e r v e r : i) the o b s e r v e r s h o u l d see a d e q u a t e a c t i o n ta kin g p la c e in th e for m of c o o r d i n a t e d b e h a v i o r in li vi n g systems that are in coontogenic structural drift wh i l e in recurrent interactions with conservation of reciprocal adaptation; ii) the o b s e r v e r s h o u l d see that l i v i n g s y s t e m s in coontogeny separate or disintegrate, or both, wh en the ir r e c i p r o c a l a d a p t a t i o n is lost. d) T h e p h e n o m e n a d e d u c e d in (c) are a p p a r e n t in the domain of experiences of an o b s e r v e r in the d y n a m i c s of c o n s t i t u t i o n and realization of a s o c i a l s y s t e m , and in all circumstances of recurrent interactions between li vin g systems during their

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o n t o g e ni es , in w h a t a p p e a r s to us as l e a r n i n g to live One of these c a s e s is our hu m a n o p e r a t i o n in l a n g u ag e.

tog eth er.

The s a t i s f a c t i o n of th es e four c o n d i t i o n s re sul ts : a) in the validation, as a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n , of ray p r o p o s i t i o n that c o g n i t i o n as a d e q u a t e a c ti on in living sy s te ms is a consequence of t h e i r structural dri ft with conservation of o r g a n i z a t i o n and a d a p t a t i o n ; b) in s h o w i n g th a t a d e q u a t e a ct io n ( cog nit io n) is c o n s t i t u t i v e to l iv ing s y s t e m s be ca us e it is en t a i l e d in th e i r existence as such; c) in entailing that different l i v i n g s y s t e m s d i f f e r in th e i r domains of adequate actions ( d o m a i n s of c o g n i t i o n ) to the e x t e n t that they realize d i f f e r e n t n ich es ; and d) in s h o w i n g that the d o m a i n of adequate actions ( d o ma in of c o g n i t i o n ) of a li vi ng s y s t e m ch an g e s as its st ru ctu re , or th e s t r u c t u r e of the m e d i u m , or both, chang e wh il e it c o n s e r v e s o r g a n i z a t i o n and a d a p t a t i o n . At the sam e tim e, it is a p p a r e n t f r o m all of the a bo v e that wh at I say of c o g n i t i o n as an e x p l a n a t i o n of the p ra xi s of l iv ing takes place in the p r a x i s of living , a nd t h a t to the e xt en t that what I say is effective action in the generation of the p h e n o m e n o n of c o g n i t i o n , what I say take s p l a c e as c o gn it io n. If this s ou nd s s t r a n g e , it is only be ca u s e we a r e in the habit of th i n k i n g about cognition in the e x p l a n a t o r y pa t hw ay of o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h o u t p a r e n t h e s e s , as if the p h e n o m e n o n c o n n o t e d by the word c o g n i t i o n e n t a i l e d p o in t in g to s o m e t h i n g wh os e e x i s t e n c e can be a s s e r t e d to be i n d e p e n d e n t of the pointing of the ob s er ve r. I h av e s h o w n that th is is not a n d c a n n o t be the case. Cognition cannot be u n d e r s t o o d as a b i o l o g i c a l phenomenon if objectivity is no t put in p a r e n t h e s e s , nor ca n it be u n d e r s t o o d as su ch if o ne is not w i l l i n g to f o l l o w al l the c o n s e q u e n c e s of such an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l act. Let us no w t r e a t h u m a n o p e r a t i o n in l a n g u a g e as one of the p h e n o m e n a w h i c h t a k e p l a c e as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the o p e r a t i o n of c o g n i t i o n as a d e q u a t e (or e f f e c t i v e ) a c t i o n . It is p a r t i c u l a r l y necessary to p r o c e e d in this m an ne r b e c a u s e our operation in la n g u a g e as o b s e r v e r s in the prax is of l i v i n g is, at the same time, our problem an d our instrument for analysis and explanation. ii) L a n g u a g e . W e h u m a n b e i n g s are l i v i n g s y s t e m s that exis t in l a n g u ag e. This m e a n s th at a l t h o u g h we e x i s t as hu ma n beings in l a n g u a g e and a l t h o u g h o ur c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s ( d o m a i n s of adequate a c ti on s) as s u c h t a k e p l a c e in the d o m a i n of languaging, our languaging ta k e s p l a c e t h r o u g h our o p e r a t i o n as l i v i n g sys tem s. A c c o r d i n g l y , in w h a t f o l l o w s I sha ll c o n s i d e r w h a t tak es place in l a n g u a g e as l a n g u a g e a r i s e s as a b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n from the operation of living systems in r e c u r r e n t interactions wi th conservation of organization and a d a p t a t i o n through the ir coontogenic structural drift, and t h u s show l a n g u a g e as a c o n s e q u e n c e of th e s am e m e c h a n i s m that e x p l a i n s th e p h e n o m e n o n of cognition: a) W he n two or m o r e a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t em s i n t e r a c t r e c u r r e n t l y ,
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and

the dynamic structure of e ac h follows a course of change contingent up on the h i s t o r y of e a c h ' s interactions w i t h the others, there is a c o o n t o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l dr if t that g i v e s rise to an o n t o g e n i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d d o m a i n of r e c u r r e n t interactions between them which appears to an o b s e r v e r as a domain of consensual coordinations of actions or distinctions in an environment. T h i s o n t o g e n i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d d o m a i n of r e c u r r e n t interactions I call a d o m a i n of consensual coordinations of a c t i o n s or d i s t i n c t i o n s , or, mo re g e n e r a l l y , a c o n s e n s u a l d o m a i n of interactions, be ca us e it a r i s e s as a p a r t i c u l a r manner of living t o g e t h e r c o n t i n g e n t u po n the u n i q u e h i s t o r y of recurrent interactions of the participants during th e i r coontogeny. Furthermore, because an o b s e r v e r can d e s c r i b e such a d o m a i n of recurrent interactions in semantic terms, by referring the different c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s (or d i s t i n c t i o n s ) i n v o l v e d to the d i f f e r e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s that th ey h av e in the d o m a i n in w h i c h they a re distinguished, I a l s o cal l a c o n s e n s u a l domain of interactions a linguistic domain. Finally, I ca ll th e b e h a v i o r through w h i c h an o r g a n i s m p a r t i c i p a t e s in an o n t o g e n i c d o m a i n of recurrent interactions, c o n s e n s u a l or l i n g u i s t i c according to whether I w a n t to e m p h a s i z e the o n t o g e n i c o r i g i n of the b e h a v i o r (consensual), or its i m p l i c a t i o n s in the p r e s e n t s t a t e of the ongoing interactions (linguistic). Similarly, I speak of coordinations of actions or coordinations of distinctions, a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r I wa nt to e m p h a s i z e w ha t t a k e s p l a c e in the interaction in r e l a t i o n to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s (coordinations of actions), or w h a t tak es p l a c e in the i n t e r a c t i o n s in r e l a t i o n to an e n v i r o n m e n t ( c o o r d i n a t i o n s of d i s t i n c t i o n s ) . b) When o n e or mor e l i vi n g s y s t e m s c o n t i n u e th e i r coontogenic structural drift t hr o u g h t he i r recurrent interactions in a consensual domain, it is p o s s i b l e for a r e c u r s i o n to t ak e plac e in their c o n s e n s u a l b e h a v i o r r e s u l t i n g in the p r o d u c t i o n of a consensual c o o r d i n a t i o n of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions. If t h i s w e r e to h ap pe n, what an o b s e r v e r w ou l d see w o u l d be tha t the p a r t i c i p a n t s of a c o n s e n s u a l d o m a i n of i n t e r a c t i o n s w o u l d be operating in thei r consensual behavior making consensual distinctions u po n their c o n s e n s u a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , in a process that would recursively make a consensual action a consensual token for a c o n s e n s u a l d i s t i n c t i o n that it obscures. In de ed , this p r o c e s s is p r e c i s e l y w h a t t a k e s p l a c e in our l a n g u a g i n g in the p r a x i s of li vin g. Accordingly, I c l a i m tha t the p h e n o m e n o n of l a n g u a g e ta k e s plac e in t he c o o n t o g e n y of l i v i n g s y s t e m s w h e n two or m o r e o r g a n i s m s o p e r a t e , t h r o u g h th e i r r e c u r r e n t o n t o g e n i c consensual interactions, in an o n g o i n g process of recursive consensual c o o r d i n a t i o n s of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions or d i s t i n c t i o n s ( M a tu ra na , 1 9 78 ). Or, in o t h e r w o r d s , I c l a i m th a t s uc h recursive consensual coordination of consensual coordinations of a c t i o n s or d i s t i n c t i o n s in any d o m a i n , is the p h e n o m e n o n of l a n g u a g e . F u r t h e r m o r e , I c l a i m th at o b j e c t s a r i s e in language as consensual coordinations of actions that o p e r a t i o n a l l y o b s c u r e for f u r t h e r r e c u r s i v e c o n s e n s u a l coordinat i o n s of a c t i o n s by the o b s e r v e r s the c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s ( d i s t i n c t i o n s ) that they c o o r d i n a t e . O b j e c t s are, in the process of l a n g u a g i n g , c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s that

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sys te ms . T h i s is a r b i t r a r y si n c e wha t I h av e said in r e l a t i o n to existence applies to eve ry e n t i t y brought fo r t h through an operation of d i s t i n c t i o n . Therefore, I m a k e thi s distinction only because I am s p e a k i n g of l i v i n g systems and the wo rd c o g n i t i o n is h i s t o r i c a l l y bound to t h em t h r o u g h us. W i t h i n this restriction we as observers can say that th e re are as man y d o m a i n s of c o g n i t i o n as th er e are d o m a i n s of e x i s t e n c e specified by the d i f f e r e n t i d e n t i t i e s that l i v i n g s y s t e m s c o n s e r v e t h r o u g h the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r a u t o p o i e s i s . These different cognitive domains intersect in the s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of a living system as the l i v i n g s y s t e m r e a l i z e s t he different identities that define them as d i f f e r e n t d i m e n s i o n s of simultaneous or successive structural couplings, o r t h o g o n a l to th e fundamental structural coupling in w h i c h the l i v i n g system realizes its autopoiesis. As a r esu lt , t he s e d i f f e r e n t c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s may ap p e a r or d i s a p p e a r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y or i n d e p e n d e n t l y a c c o r d i n g to whether the different structurally intersecting unities that specify t he m i n t e g r a t e or d i s i n t e g r a t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y or simul taneously (see s e c t i o n 7 vi). Thus, when a student graduates, the c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s p e c i f i e d by the o p e r a t i o n in the d o m a i n of structural coupling that defines t he identity "student" disappears t o g e t h e r w i t h the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the st ud e nt , or, when a bachelor marries, the c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n that the identity "bachelor" defines as a d o m a i n of operational coherences in structural coupling, d i s a p p e a r s t o g e t h e r w i t h the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the bachelor. Conversely, w h e n a s t u d e n t g r a d u a t e s and a bachelor marries, the i d e n t i t i e s " g r a d u a t e " and " h u s b a n d " a p p e a r w i th the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s s p e c i f i e d by the operat i on al c o h e r e n c e s t ha t t he s e i d e n t i t i e s e nt a i l . It f o l l o w s , therefore, that a l i v i n g s y s t e m may o p e r a t e in as m an y different cognitive d o m a i n s as there a re different identities that the different dimensions of its structural c o u p l i n g a l l o w it to r e a l i z e . It a l so f o l l o w s that the d i f f e r e n t identities that a l i v i n g s y s t e m may realize are necessarily flui d, and c h a n g e as the d i m e n s i o n s of its s t r u c t u r a l coupling c h a n g e w i t h its s t r u c t u r a l dr i ft in the h a p p e n i n g of its li vi n g . To h a ve an identity, to o p e r a t e in a p a r t i c u l a r domain of cognition, is to o p e r a t e in a p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n of structural coupling. iii) Language is t he h u m a n c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n . Human beings as living systems operating in l a n g u a g e o p e r a t e in a d o m a i n of recursive reciprocal consensual perturbations that constitutes the ir domain of e x i s t e n c e as such. Therefore, l a n g u a g e as a domain of r e c u r s i v e c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions is a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e , and, as such, a c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n d e f i n e d by the recursion of consensual distinctions in a d o m a i n of consensual distinctions. Furthermore, h u m a n be ing s as living systems o p e r a t i n g in l a n g u a g e c o n s t i t u t e o b s e r v i n g , and become ob s e r v e r s , by b r i n g i n g forth objects as primary consensual coordinations of actions distinguished through secondary consensual coordinations of a c t i o n s in a p r o c e s s that obscures the a c t i o n s t ha t t h e y c o o r d i n a t e . H u m a n be in g s , t h e r e f o r e , e x i s t in the d o m a i n of objects th at t h ey bring forth through

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la n g u a g i n g . At the s am e time, hu m a n b e i n g s by e x i s t i n g as observers in the domain of objects brought forth t hro ugh l an g u a g i n g , ex i s t in a d o m a i n that a l l o w s t h em to ex p la in the happening of the ir l i v i n g in l a n g u a g e t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e to their o p e r a t i o n in a d o m a i n of d y n a m i c r e c i p r o c a l s t r u c t u r a l co u pl in g. iv) Objectivity. Objects ar is e in language as c o n s e n s u a l coordinations of actions that in a domain of consensual d i s t i n c t i o n s a re t o k e n s for mor e basic c o o r d i n a t i o n s of act io ns, w h i c h they o b s c u r e . W i t h o u t la n g u a g e and o u t s i d e l a ng u ag e there are no o b j e c t s , because objects o nl y arise as c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s in the r e c u r s i o n of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a tions of a c t i o n s that l a n g u a g i n g is. For l i v i n g sy st e m s that do not o p e r a t e in l a n g u a g e , the re are no o b j e c t s ; or in other words, o b j e c t s are not part of th ei r c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s . Sin ce we hum an b ei ng s are o b j e c t s in a d o m a i n of o b j e c t s that we bring forth and operate upon in l a n g u a g e , l a n g u a g e is our p e c u l i a r d o ma in of existence and ou r peculiar cognitive domain. Within these circumstances, objectivity arises in l a n g u a g e as a m a n n e r of operating with o b j e c t s w i t h o u t d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the a c t i o n s that th ey o b s cu re . In th is m a n n e r of o p e r a t i n g , d e s c r i p t i o n s a ri s e as c o n c a t e n a t i o n s of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s that r e su lt in f urt he r consensual coordinations of actions wh ich , if performed without distinguishing how objects arise, can be distinguished as manners of l a n g u a g i n g that t ak e p l a c e as if objects e x i s t e d o u t s i d e of l a n g ua ge . Objects a re operational r e l a t i o n s in l a n g u a g i n g . v) L a n g u a g i n g : o p e r a t i o n in _a d o m a i n of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g . To the e xt ent that l a n g u a g e a r i s e s as a c o n s e n s u a l d o m a i n in the coontogenic structural dr i f t of living systems involved in recurrent interactions, the o r g a n i s m s that o p e r a t e in l a n g u a g e o p e r a t e in a d o m a i n of r e c i p r o c a l c o o n t o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g through reciprocal structural perturbations. Therefore, to operate in l a n g u a g e is not an a b s t r a c t a c t i v i t y , as we usually think . To l a n g u a g e is to i n t e r a c t s t r u c t u r a l l y . L a n g u a g e ta k e s p la c e in the domain of r e l a t i o n s between organisms in the r e c u r s i o n of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions, but at the s a m e time l a n g u a g e ta k e s place through structural interactions in the d o m a i n of the b o d y h o o d s of the languaging organisms. In ot h e r words, a l t h o u g h l a n g u a g i n g takes place in the s o c i a l d o m a i n as a d an c e of r e c u r s i v e r e l a t i o n s of c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s , i n t e r a c t i o n s in l a n g u a g e as s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e o r t h o g o n a l to that do m ai n, and as such tr ig g e r in the bodyhoods of the p a r t i c i p a n t s s t r u c t u r a l changes that c h a n g e as m uc h the p h y s i o l o g i c a l b a c k g r o u n d ( e m o t i o n a l standing) on wh i c h they c o n t i n u e thei r l a n g u a g i n g , as the c o u r s e that this physiological change follows. The r e s u l t is that the s o c ia l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s th at c o n s t i t u t e l a n g u a g i n g , as e l e m e n t s of a d o m a i n of r e c u r s i v e o p e r a t i o n in s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g , b e c o m e p ar t of the medium in w h i c h the participant l i vi ng systems conserve organization an d adaptation through the s t r u c t u r a l changes that t he y u n d e r g o c o n t i n g e n t to t he i r participation in that do m ai n. T hu s , although the d o m a i n of coordinations of actions and the d o m a i n of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e of the participants
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in l an guage do not intersect, their chan ge s are coupled o r th o g o n a l l y through the structu ra l in te ra ct io ns that take place in language. As the body changes, languaging changes; and as l a n g u a g i n g changes, the body changes. Here resides the power of words. Words are nodes in c o or di na ti on s of act io ns in l anguaging and as such they arise through s tructural i nt e rac ti on s between bodyhoods; it is through this interplay of c oo r d i n a t i o n s of a ct ion s and changes of bodyhood that the world that we bring forth in languaging becomes part of the domain in which our o nt o ge n ic and phylogenic str uc tu ra l drifts take place. vi) Language is a domain of d e s c r i p t i o n s . La nguage is a system of re cu r si ve consensual c oo rd in a ti o ns of actions in which every c on s en s u a l co ord in at io n of actions becomes an object through a recursion in the consensual co or d in at i on s of actions, in a p ro ce ss that becomes the oper at io n of distinction that d i s t i n g u i s h e s it and c o nst itu te s the observer. In these c i r c u m stances, all pa rticipants in a language domain can be ob servers with respect to the sequences of coor di na ti on s of a ct io ns in w hi ch they participate, c o n st i tu ti n g a system of re cursive distinctions in which systems of d is ti nc ti ons become obje ct s of di st in c ti o n. Such rec urs iv e d is ti nc ti on s of d is t in c ti o ns in the happening of living in language that bring forth sys te ms of ob jects, c ons ti tu te the ph eno me no n of de scription. As a result, all that there is in the human domain are d es c ri p t i o n s in the h ap p e n i n g of living in language which, as ha p pe n in gs of living in language, become objects of d es c ri pti on s in language. Descriptions, however, do not rep la ce the h appening of living that they constitute as d escriptions; they only expand it in recurs io ns that fo ll ow its op erational co herences. Accor di ng ly , scientific e x p l a na t io n s, as systems of des cr ipt io ns , do not r e pl ac e the p h e n o m en a that they explain in the domain of h ap pen ing of living of the observer, but bring forth opera ti on al c o h e r e n c e s in that do ma in that allow for further d e sc ri pt ion s in it. vii) S e l f - c o n sc i ou s ne ss arises wi th language. For a living sy s te m in its operation as a closed system, there is no inside or ou ts id e; it has no way of m ak in g the d i st i nc ti on . Yet, in language such a d i s t i n c t i o n arises as a p ar ti cu la r consensual c oo r din at io n of a c ti o ns in which the pa rt i ci p an ts are r e cur si ve ly brought f o r th as di st in ct io ns of systems of d is ti nc t io n s. When this happens, self-consciousness arises as a domain of d i s t i n c t i o n s in which the obse rv er s pa rt icipate in the consensual distinctions of their p a r ti c ip at i on s in l an gu ag e through languaging. It follows from this that the individ ua l exists only in language, that the self exists only in language, and that self-consciousness as a p he n om e no n of self distinction takes place only in language. F urt he rm or e, it also follows that since la ng u ag e as a domain of c on s en su a l c oo r di na t io n s of a c ti ons is a social phenomenon, s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a social ph en omenon, and as such it does not take place within the anatom ica l c onf in es of the bodyhood of the living systems that g en er ate it; on the contrary, it is external to them and pertains to their domain of i nt e ra c ti on s as a manner of c oexistence.

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viii) H i s t o r y . Th e s i g n i f i c a n c e or m e a n i n g of any giv en b e h a v i o r resides in the circumstances of its enaction, not in the characteristics of the d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s of the b e h a v i n g l i vi ng s y s t e m or in any p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e of the b e h a v i o r i tse lf . In ot h e r words, it is not the c o m p l e x i t y of the inn e r s t a t e s of a living system or of its n e r v o u s s yst em , nor any a s p e c t of the b e h a v i o r it se l f , that d e t e r m i n e s the na tur e, me a n i n g , r e l e v a n c e , or c o n t e n t of any gi v en be h av i or , but r a t h e r its p l a c e m e n t in the o n g o i n g h i s t o r i c a l pr oc es s in w h i c h it ar i se s. The h i g h e r hum an functions do not take plac e in the brain: language, abstract thinking, love, devotion, reflection, rationality, altruism, etc., ar e not f e a t u r e s of the d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s of the hu ma n be i ng as a l i v i n g s y s t e m or of its n e r v o u s s y s t e m as a n e u r o n a l ne t w o r k ; th ey are s o c ia l h i s t o r i c a l p h e n o m e n a . At the same time, history is not part of the d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s of a l i v i n g s y s t e m because thi s l a t t e r ta ke s place only in the pre se nt, instant after instant, in the o p e r a t i o n of its s t r u c t u r e in c h a n g e s that o c c u r out of time. History, time, fu t ur e , and p a s t as w el l as s p a c e e x i s t in l a n g u a g e as form s of e x p l a n a t i o n of the h a p p e n i n g of living of the o b s e r v e r , and p a r t a k e of the involvement of l a n g u a g e in this h a p p e n i n g of liv ing. Therefore, it is in the explanation of the h a p p e n i n g of l i v i n g t h r o u g h the c o h e r e n c e s of language th at an o b s e r v e r can c l a i m t h at the structure of a l i v i n g s y s t e m that d e t e r m i n e s its c h a n g e s of st a t e in the p r e s e n t always embodies its history of interactions because it continuously arises in the present in a structural drift c o n t i n g e n t to s u c h h i st or y . ix) Th e n e r v o u s s y s t e m e x p a n d s the d o m a i n of s t a t e s of the l i v in g s y s t e m . For l i v i n g s y s t e m s to o p e r a t e in l a n g u a g e , the d i v e r s i t y an d p l a s t i c i t y of their i n t e r n a l s t a t e s m u s t m a t c h the d i v e r s i t y of the changing circumstances generated in their recursive c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s . In o t h e r words , although language does not take pla ce w i t h i n the b o d y h o o d of the living system, the structure of the l i v i n g s y s t e m m us t p r o v i d e the diversity an d p l a s t i c i t y of s ta te s r e q u i r e d for l a n g u a g e to take p l ac e. T h e n e r v o u s s y s t e m c o n t r i b u t e s to the f u l f i l l m e n t of this requirement by e x p a n d i n g the d o m a i n of s t a t e s of the organism through the richness of its d y n a m i c s as a c l o s e d network of changing r e l a t i o n s of n e u r o n a l a c t i v i t i e s (see Maturana 1983), an d by e x p a n d i n g in the o r g a n i s m the d o m a i n of its c h a n g e s of states tha t f o l l o w in it a c o u r s e c o n t i n g e n t u po n b ot h its own c h a n g e s of s t a t e s and its i n t e r a c t i o n s in the me di u m . And this the n e r v o u s s y s t e m does: a) by a d m i t t i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n s of the o r g a n i s m as o r t h o g o n a l p e r t u r b a t i o n s f r om the m e d i u m , a c o n d i t i o n t h a t m a k e s its s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t as a c e l l u l a r n et w o r k , as we ll as the s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t of the o r g a n i s m and its p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the generation of behavior, c o n t i n g e n t u p o n the h i s t o r y of tho se i n t e r a c t i o n s ; and b) by admitting orthogonal interactions f ro m the components of the o r g a n i s m , a condition that makes its s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t as a c e l l u l a r ne t w o r k , as w el l as the s t r u c t u r a l drift of the o r g a n i s m and its p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the g e n e r a t i o n of behavior, r e c u r s i v e l y c o n t i n g e n t u po n the d y n a m i c s of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s of the o r g a n i s m . T h e r e s u l t of all this for the o r g a n i s m (including its nervous system) is the possibility of the

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recursive i n v o l v e m e n t of its d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s wi th the o n g o i n g f lo w of its own d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s t h r o u g h its b e h a v i o r , if it ha s s u f f i c i e n t p l a s t i c i t y in the n e r v o u s s y s t e m and participates in a s u f f i c i e n t l y lar ge d o m a i n of r e c u r r e n t interactions with ot h e r organisms. I nd e e d , this r e c u r s i v e i n v o l v e m e n t is w h a t permits the production of l a n g u a g e as th is arises w h en the internal r e c u r s i v e n e s s of the d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s of the nervous s y s t e m c o u p l e s w i t h the r e c u r r e n c e of s o c i a l c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a ti o ns of actions, g i v i n g ris e to the r e c u r s i o n of c o n s e n s u a l coordinations as an o n g o i n g p r o c e s s in the g e n e r a t i o n of s o c i a l behavior, The o n g o i n g r e c u r s i v e c o u p l i n g of b e h a v i o r a l and s t r u c t u r a l changes th at g i v e s o r i g i n to l a n g u a g e , is p o s s i b l e because a structure determined system exists in two nonintersecting phenomenal domains realized through orthogonally dependent structur e s, namely, its d o m a i n of s t a t e s and its d o m a i n of interact i on s. It is our basi c d o u b l e e x i s t e n c e as s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d systems in two nonintersecting but orthogonally coupled phenomenal d o m a i n s th at p e r m i t s us in our o p e r a t i o n in language to g e n e r a t e e n d l e s s o r t h o g o n a l l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n t and yet n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s in the h a p p e n i n g of our l i vin g. x) O b s e r v i n g t a k e s pl a c e in l a n g u a g i n g . T h e n e r v o u s s y s t e m is a closed n e t w o r k of i n t e r a c t i n g a c t i v e n e u r o n a l e l e m e n t s ( ne ur o n s , effectors, and receptors) that are structurally realized as c e l l u l a r c o m p o n e n t s of the o r g a n i s m . As such, it o p e r a t e s as a closed network of c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s of a c t i v i t y between its components; that is, it is c o n s t i t u t i v e to the o r g a n i z a t i o n of th e nervous system that an y c h a n g e of relations of activity between its c o m p o n e n t s l e a d s to f u r t h e r c h a n g e s of r e l a t i o n s of a c t i v i t y b e t w e e n them, and that in that s e n s e it o p e r a t e s w i t h o u t inputs or o u t p u t s . Therefore, any a c t i o n u po n an environment tha t an o b s e r v e r s e es as a r es ul t of the o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s sy s t e m , is a f e a t u r e of the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that t a ke pl ac e in the n e r v o u s s y s t e m as a c e l l u l a r n e t w o r k , and not a f e a t u r e of its operation a s such. In de ed, the o p e r a t i o n of the nervous system and the a c t i o n s of the o r g a n i s m t a k e pl a c e in noninter secting phenomenal domains realized by orthogonally related structures. S i m i l a r l y , any p e r t u r b a t i o n of the m e d i u m i m p i n g i n g up o n the organism is a p e r t u r b a t i o n in the structure of the nervous system, not an input into the n e r v o u s s y s t e m ' s d y n a m i c s of st a te s, an d if th is d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s c h a n g e s , it doe s so because the s t r u c t u r e of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m c h a n g e s in a m a n n e r c o n t i n g e n t to the p e r t u r b a t i o n , not b e c a u s e it a d m i t s an in p u t to its o p e r a t i o n . As a re s ul t, all th at t a k e s p l a c e in the n e r v o u s system is a d a n c e of c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s of neuronal activities th at in the d o m a i n of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g w h e r e the o b s e r v e r beholds the o r g a n i s m a p p e a r s as a d a n c e of changing configurati o n s of e f f e c t o r - s e n s o r c o r r e l a t i o n s . An o b s e r v e r tha t s ee s an effector-sensor correlation as an a d e q u a t e behavior d oe s so because he or s he b e h o l d s the o r g a n i s m in the d o m a i n of struct u r a l c o u p l i n g in w h i c h the d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e h a v i o r ta k e s p l a c e in the f l o w of its c o n s e r v a t i o n of a d a p t a t i o n . T h e o r g a n i s m in its o p e r a t i o n d o e s not ac t up on an e n v i r o n m e n t , nor doe s the n e r v o u s

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system operate wi th a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of an e n v i r o n m e n t in the g e n e r a t i o n of the a d e q u a t e b e h a v i o r of the o r g a n i s m ; the e n v i r o n m en t e x i s t s only for an o b s e r v e r (see s e c t i o n 6,p a r a g r a p h xiii), and as s u ch it is a p h e n o m e n o n of l a n g u a g i n g . That the n e r v o u s s y s t e m s h o ul d o p e r a t e as a c l o s e d ne tw o r k of c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s of a c t i v i t y b e t w e e n its c o m p o n e n t s , and not w it h representations of an environment, has two fundamental c o n s e q u e n c e s a ) For the o p e r a t i o n of the nervous system, e v e r y t h i n g is the same. Or, in othe r w o r ds , all that tak es place in the o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m are c h a n g e s of relations of a c t i v i t y b e t w e e n its c o m p o n e n t s , and it do es not d i s t i n g u i s h in its o p e r a t i o n w h e t h e r its c h a n g e s of st a t e a r i s e th ro u g h its i n t e r n a l d y n a m i c s or as a r e s u l t of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s triggered in it through w ha t an o b s e r v e r se es as external structural perturbations. b) For the o b s e r v e r , the o r g a n i s m o p e r a t e s in m an y different d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g which intersect operationally in the d o m a i n of s t a t e s of the nervous system through the structural p e r t u r b a t i o n s t r i g g e r e d in it by the interactions of the o r g a n i s m in the se d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s . As a result of thi s c i r c u m s t a n c e , several things happen that are r e l e v a n t for the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the d o m a i n s of r e a l i t y that the o b s e r v e r b r i n g s for th (see the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s ) . F i r s t l y , an observer ca n always trea t a s ta t e of a c t i v i t y of the nervous s y s t e m (a c o n f i g u r a t i o n of c h a n g e s of r e l a t i o n s of a c t i v i t y ) that arises as a r e s u l t of a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r a c t i o n of the organism, as a representation of th at i n t e r a c t i o n , and can do so by constituting the domain of d e s c r i p t i o n s as a m e t a phenomenal domain in w h i c h bo th the o r g a n i s m and the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of its interactions are d i s t i n g u i s h e d together. Secondly, different states of a c t i v i t y of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m that for an observer represent interactions of the organism in nonintersecting phenomenal domains ( d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l coupling), can a f f e c t e a c h o t h e r and g iv e ris e to b e h a v i o r s of the organism that c o n s t i t u t e m et a d o m a i n s of r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the phenomena that t a ke place in tho se n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g phenomenal do m a i n s . Thirdly, the m e t a d o m a i n s of r e l a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h their operational i n t e r s e c t i o n in the d o m a i n of s t a t e s of the nervous system of o t h e r w i s e n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g p h e n o m e n a that a r i s e in the o p e r a t i o n of the o r g a n i s m in its d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of structural coupling, constitute, through the b e h a v i o r s that t h e s e intersections generate, n ew d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g of the o r g a n i s m th at do not i n t e r s e c t w it h the ot he r s . And, f o u r th ly , the o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e r s e c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of intera c t i o n s ( d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g ) of an o r g a n i s m in the o p e r a t i o n of its n e r v o u s s y s t e m , a l l o w s it to o p e r a t e in recurrent interactions w i t h o t h e r o r g a n i s m s in the continuous recursive g e n e r a t i o n of m e t a d o m a i n s of r e l a t i o n s which b e c om e phenomenal domains in t h e i r own r i g h t in the o n g o i n g flow of those recurrent interactions. T h e r e s u l t of all this intersection of d o m a i n s of r e l a t i o n s in the c l o s e d o p e r a t i o n of the nervous system t h r o u g h its c o u p l i n g to the i n t e r a c t i o n s of the organism, is the p o s s i b i l i t y of the a r i s i n g of self o b s e r v i n g as the c l o s e d o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m b e c o m e s r e c u r s i v e when it c o u p l e s to the d y a n m i c s of o b s e r v i n g as two or m o r e organisms
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generate a r e c u r s i v e d o m a i n of c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions. Th at is, the o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m as a c l o s e d n e t w o r k of interactions permits observing and the o b s e r v e r to a r i s e as operations in language brought forth through the operational coherences of languaging. Or, in ot h e r words, si n c e the operation of the nervous system appears in the d o ma in of operation of the o r g a n i s m as sensory-effector correlations, observing is c o o r d i n a t i o n s of b o d y h o o d s of observers through t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n of a c h o r e o g r a p h y of i n t e r l a c e d s e n s o r y e f f e c t o r correlations, b e c a u s e all tha t t h e r e is for the o p e r a t i o n of the nervous system of the o b s e r v e r in observing is its c l os ed dynamics of c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n its n e u r o n a l components. It is only for an o b s e r v e r who see s two or more interacting organisms in his or her p r a x i s of li vin g, t ha t the sensoryeffector correlations of these organisms appear recursively involved with each o t h e r in a n e t w o r k of recursive sensorye f f e c t o r c o r r e l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h the o r t h o g o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s of the ir n e r v o u s s y s t e m s . And, f i n a l l y , it is only for an o b s e r v e r that such a n e t w o r k of r e c u r s i v e s e n s o r y - e f f e c t o r c o r r e lations becomes l a n g u a g e and c o n s t i t u t e s a m e t a domain (with respect to the o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m ) w h e r e explanations and o b s e r v i n g tak e p l ac e, w h en the organism's recurrent interactions become a r e c u r s i v e s y s t e m of c o n s e n s u a l coordinati o n s of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s . 10. T H E D O M A I N OF P H Y S I C A L E X I S T E N C E A d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e is a d o m a i n of o p e r a t i o n a l coherences entailed by the d i s t i n c t i o n of a uni ty by an o b s e r v e r in his or her p r a x i s of li vi n g . As such, a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e a r i s e s as the d o m a i n of the o p e r a t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of the p r o p e r t i e s of the u n i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d if it is a s i m p l e unit y, or as the d o m a i n of validity of the properties of the components of the uni ty d i s t i n g u i s h e d if the u n i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d is a c o m p o s i t e one. As a consequence, the d i s t i n c t i o n of a un it y e n t a i l s its d om ai n of existence as a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y t h at i n c l u d e s the distinguished unity as a c o m p o n e n t * Therefore, t h e r e are as m a n y d o m a i n s of e x i s t e n c e as k i n d s of u n i t i e s an o b s e r v e r may b r i n g f o r t h in his or her o p e r a t i o n s of d i s t i n c t i o n . In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , si nc e the notion of determinism a p p l i e s to the operation of the properties of the c o m p o n e n t s of a unit y in its c o m p o s i t i o n (see s e c t i o n s 6 i x , and 7 iy), all d o m a i n s of e x i s t e n c e , as c o m p o s i t e entities that include the unities tha t specify them, are deterministic systems in th e s e n s e i n d i c a t e d a b o v e . T hi s has c e r t a i n c o n s e q u e n c e s for us l i v i n g s y s t e m s e x i s t i n g in l an gu ag e, and for the e x p l a n a t i o n s t h a t we g e n e r a t e as s u c h be in g s . Th e f o l l o w i n g are so me of t h e s e c o n s e q u e n c e s : i) O ur d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as the c o m p o s i t e u n i t i e s that we are as m o l e c u l a r a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s , is the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of our component molecules, and entails all the operational coherences p r o p e r to the m o l e c u l a r existence. Therefore, our existence as a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s i m p l i e s the s a t i s f a c t i o n of all the c o n s t r a i n t s that the d i s t i n c t i o n of m o l e c u l e s entails, and o ur operation as m o l e c u l a r systems implies the determinism

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entailed in the d is ti n ct i on of molecules. ii) If we d i st in gu is h mole cu le s as c omposite entities, they exist in the domain of exi st en ce of their components, and as such their e x is te nc e implies the satisfaction of the d e t e r m i n i s m that the di stinction of the latter entails. The same a p pl i es to the decom po si tio n of the compone nt s of molecules, and so on recursively. Since unities and their domains of exis te nc e are brought forth and specified in their dis ti nct io n in the happening of living of the observer, the only limit to the r e cu rs io n in distin ct ion s is the limit of the diversity of ex pe ri e nc es of the o bserver in his or her h appening of living (praxis). iii) Since the ob server as a living system is a c o m p os i te entity, the observer makes d i s t in ct io n s in his or her i n te r ac ti on s as a living system through the o peration of the p ro pe rt i es of his or her components. If the observer uses an inst ru me nt , then his or her d is tin ct io ns take place through the ope r at io n of the properties of the instrume nt as if this were one of its components. The result of all this is that an ob se rv er cannot make d is ti nc ti on s outside its domain of e x i s t en ce as a co mposite entity. iv) D es c ri pt io ns are series of consensual d i s t i n c t i o n s subject to recursive consens ua l d i st i nc ti on s in a c om mu ni ty of observers. Obs er ve rs operate in language only through their recursive i n te r ac ti on s in the domain of structural c oup li ng in which they recursively co or di n at e consens ua l actions as o p e r a t i o n s in their d omains of e xp er i en c es through the praxis of their living. Therefore, all i nt er a ct io n s in language between o bs er v er s take place through the op er a ti on of the properties of their c om po ne nt s as living systems in the domain of their rec ip ro ca l structural coupling. Or, in other words, we as human beings ope ra te in language only through our interac ti ons in our d om ai n of e xistence as living systems, and we cannot make d e s c r i p t i o n s that entail i ntera ct io ns outside this domain. As a c o n s e qu e nc e , although language as a domain of recu rs iv e consen sua l d i s t i n c t i o n s is open to unending recursions, language is a closed o p e r a t i o n a l domain in the sense that it is not possible to step o ut s i d e language thr ou gh language, and d es c ri p t i o n s cannot be c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of i nde pe nd en t entities. v) Since ev ery th in g said is said by an ob se r ve r to another observer, and since o bj ec ts (entities, things) arise in language, we cannot oper at e with obj ec ts (entities or things) as if they exist ed outside the d i s t i n c t i o n s of d is t in c t i o n s that co ns ti t ut e them. Furthermore, as e nt ities in language, o b jec ts are brought forth as exp la na to ry el em en ts in the explanation of the oper at io na l co h er e nc es of the happening of living in which langua gi ng takes place. Wit ho ut o b ser ve rs not hi ng exists, and with o bservers e v er y th in g that e xists exists in ex pla nations. vi) As we put o bj e ct i v i t y in p ar entheses beca us e we that we cannot e xp e r i e n t i a l l y di st in g ui sh between social ly call p er ce pt io n and illusion, we ac cept that recognize what we e xistence

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is s p e c i f i e d by an o p e r a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n : nothing pre-exists its distinction. In this s en se , h ous es , pe rso ns , a to m s or elementary particles, a re not d i f f e r e n t . A l so in this sense, existence as an e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r a x i s of living of the ob s er v e r , is a c o g n i t i v e p h e n o m e n o n that r e f l e c t s the o n t o l o g y of o b s e r v i n g in su ch pra x is of li vin g, and not a c l a i m a bo u t o b j e c tivity. Therefore, wit h o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s , an e n ti ty has no c o n t i n u i t y beyond or o u t s i d e that specified by the coherences that c o n s t i t u t e its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as this is br o u g h t f o r t h in its d i s t i n c t i o n . Th e c l a i m that the h o u s e to whic h I r e t u r n eve ry e v e n i n g fro m w o rk is the same that I left in the morning, or that w h e n e v e r I see my m o t h e r I see the sam e p e r s o n that ga ve bi r th to me, or that all the p o i n t s of the path of an e l e c t r o n in a b u b b l e c h a m b e r are tr ac es left by the s am e electron, ar e c l a i m s that c o n s t i t u t e c o g n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t s that d e f i n e s a m e n e s s in the d i s t i n c t i o n of the un i t y (hous e, m ot h e r , or e l e c t r o n ) as this is s p e c i f i e d in the o p e r a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n that brings it for th t o g e t h e r w i t h its domain of e x i s t e n c e . S i n c e a c c o r d i n g to all that I h av e said, c o g n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t s are not, an d cannot be, statements ab o u t the properties of independent objects, s a m e n e s s is n e c e s s a r i l y a l w a y s a r e f l e c t i o n by the o b s e r v e r in the p r o c e s s of o b s e r v i n g in the domain of e x i s t e n c e tha t he or she b r i n g s fo r t h in his or her d i s t i n c t i o n s . Furthermore, since no e n t i t y can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d o u t s i d e its domain of e x i s t e n c e as the d o m a i n of o p e r a t i o n a l coherences in which it is p o s s i b l e , every distinction specifies a domain of e x i s t e n c e as a d o m a i n of p o s s i b l e d i s t i n c t i o n s ; th at is, ev e r y distinction specifies a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as a v e r s u m in the multiversa, or, colloquially, every distinction specifies a d o m a i n of r e a l i t y . vii) A scientific explanation entails the proposition of a m e c h a n i s m (or c o m p o s i t e e n t i t y ) that, if r e a l i z e d , w o u l d g e n e r a t e the phenomenon to be e x p l a i n e d in the domain of experiences (p r a x i s or h a p p e n i n g of l iv i n g ) of the o b s e r v e r (see s e c t i o n 4). T h e g e n e r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r of the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n is c o n s t i tutive to it. I nd e e d , this o n t o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n in science carries w i t h it the l e g i t i m a c y of the f o u n d a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of the phenomenal domain in which the generative explanatory mechanism takes pl ace , as well as the l e g i t i m a c y of treating ev e r y e n t i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a c o m p o s i t e unity, a s k i n g for the o r i g i n of its p r o p e r t i e s in its o r g a n i z a t i o n and s t r u c t u r e . And because thi s is a ls o the cas e for our c o m m o n s e n s e explanations in our e f f e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n in our d a i l y life, it s e e m s n a t u r a l to us to as k for a s u b s t r a t u m i n d e p e n d e n t of the o b s e r v e r as the u l t i m a t e m e d i u m in w hi c h e v e r y t h i n g ta ke s place. Yet, although it is an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y to e x p e c t suc h a s u b s t r a t u m , we c o n s t i t u t i v e l y c a n n o t a s s e r t its e x i s t e n c e through distinguishing it as a c o m p o s i t e e n t i t y and t h e r e b y c h a r a c t e r i z e it in te r ms of c o m p o n e n t s and r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n c o m p o n e n t s . In or d e r to do so, we wo u l d h a ve to d e s c r i b e it, that is, we wo u l d h a ve to br i ng it f or t h in l a n g u a g e and g iv e it for m in the domain of recursive c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s in w h i c h we exist as hum a n beings. However, to do so wo ul d be tantamount to characterizing the substratum in te rm s of e n t i t i e s (th in gs,

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properties) that arise through languaging, and which, as c o n s e n sual distinctions of consensual c o o r d i na t io ns of actions, are c o n st it ut iv el y not the substratum. T h r ou g h language we remain in language, and we lose the su bs tr a tu m as soon as we attempt to language it. We need the substratum for epistemological reasons, but in the s ub st r at u m there are no objects, entities, or p r o p e r ties; in the s ub st ra tu m there is nothing (no-thing) because things belong to language. In other words, nothing exists in the substratum, viii) D i s t i n c t i o n s take place in the domain of experiences, in the h a pp en in g or praxis of living of the observer as a human being. For this reason, the domain of operational c o he re n ce s that an ob se rve r brings forth in the d is ti nc ti on of a unity as its d om ai n of existence, also o cc ur s in his or her domain of exp er ie nc es as a human being as part of his or her praxis of living. Therefore, since language is op eration in a domain of recursive c on s en su al coo rd in at io ns of co nse ns ua l coordinations of actions in the domain of e xperiences of the observers as human beings, all dimen si on s of the d om ai ns of experiences of the o bservers exist in language as c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions between observers. As such, all de sc r ip ti o ns co ns ti t ut e co nf ig u ra t io ns of c o o r d i n a t i o n s of acti on s in some dime nsi on of the doma in s of e x per ie nc es of the members of a c om m un i ty of obs er ver s in c oo ntogenic s tr uc tu r al drift. Physics, biology, mathematics, philosophy, cooking, politics, etc., are all different doma in s of languaging, and as such are all di f fe re nt domains of rec ur si ve c onsen su al c o o r d i na t io ns of consen su al c o ord ina ti on s of act io ns in the praxis or happ eni ng of living of the members of a c ommunity of observe rs . In other words, it is only as di ff e re nt domains of l an gu a gi n g that physics, biology, philosophy, cooking, politics, or any cogni ti ve domain exists. Yet, this does not mean that all c og ni ti ve domains are the same; it only means that different c o g n it i ve domains exist only as they are brought forth in language, and that langua gi ng c o n s t i t u t e s them. We talk as if things exist ed in the a b se nc e of the observer, as if the d omain of op er a ti o na l c oh ere n ce s that we bring forth in a d i s t i n c t i o n would o pe r a t e as it o pe rates in our d i s ti n ct io ns regardl es s of them. We now k n ow that this is c o n s t i t u t i v e l y not the case. We talk, for example, as if time and m at te r were i n de pe nd en t d im en si o ns of a physical space. Yet, it is apparent from my e x p l an a ti o n of the phenom en on of c o g n i t i o n that they are not and cannot be. Indeed, time and m atter are ex planations of some of the operational c o he re nc es of the doma in s of existence brought forth in the d i s t i n c t i o n s that c o n s t i t u t e the ongoing l an gu ag i ng in the p raxis of living of the m em b er s of a co mmunity of observers. Thus, time with past, present, and f uture a r i s e s as a feature of an exp la na tor y m e c h an i sm that would generate what the o bs er ve r e x p e r i e n c e s as s uc ce s si v e no ns i mu l ta ne o us phenomena; and m atter a ri s e s as a feature of an e xp l an a t o r y m echanism that would generate what he or she e xp e ri e n c e s as m ut ual ly i m p en et ra bl e s i m u lt a ne o us di st in ct i on s. Without o b s e r ve r s nothing can be said, not hi ng can be explained, nothing can be claimed,... in fact, without o b s e rv e rs nothi ng exists, because ex istence is speci fi ed in the o pe r at i on of distinction of the

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observer. For epistemological reasons, we ask for a s u b s t r a t u m that could provide an i n d e p e n d e n t ultimate justification or v a l i d a t i o n of d i s t i n g u i s h a b i l i t y , bu t, for o n t o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s , such a s u b s t r a t u m r e m a i n s b e y o n d o u r r e a c h as observers. All that we ca n say o n t o l o g i c a l l y a b o u t th e s u b s t r a t u m t h a t we ne ed fo r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s , is t h a t it p e r m i t s w h a t it p e r m i t s , a n d t h a t it p e r m i t s a l l t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s t h a t w e bring f o r t h in the h a p p e n i n g of l i v i n g as we e x i s t in l a n g u a g e . ix) As we operate in l a n g u a g e we o p e r a t e in a domain of reciprocal structural coupling in o u r d o m a i n of existence as composite unities (molecular autopoietic systems), that is, we o p e r a t e in t h e d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of o u r c o m p o n e n t s . Therefore, a n y t h i n g t h a t we say, a n y e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t we p r o p o s e , ca n o n l y entail d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t i n v o l v e t h e o p e r a t i o n of o u r c o m p o n e n t s in their domain of e x i s t e n c e as we o p e r a t e as observers in language. Accordingly, it is in t h e d o m a i n w h e r e we e x i s t as composite entities, t h a t we d i s t i n g u i s h molecules, atoms, or elementary p a r t i c l e s as e n t i t i e s t h a t we b r i n g f o r t h in l a n g u a g e through o p e r a t i o n s of d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t s p e c i f y t h e m as well as the operational c o h e r e n c e s of t h e i r d o m a i n s of e x i s t e n c e . If w h a t w e c a l l th e p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e is the dom a i n where p h y s i c i s t s d i s t i n g u i s h m o l e c u l e s , a t o m s , or e l e m e n t a r y p a r t i c l e s , then we as living systems specify the domain of physical existence as our l i m i t i n g c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n as we operate as o b s e r v e r s in l a n g u a g e , i n t e r a c t i n g in th e d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of o u r c o m p o n e n t s as we b r i n g f o r t h t h e p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as an e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e h a p p e n i n g of o u r l i v i n g . We do not e x i s t in a p r e - e x i s t i n g d o m a i n of p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e ; w e b r i n g it f o r t h a n d s p e c i f y it a s we e x i s t as o b s e r v e r s . T h e e x p e r i e n c e of the p h y s i c i s t , be t h i s in c l a s s i c , r e l a t i v i s t i c , or quantum physics, does not reflect t h e n a t u r e of "the universe"; it r e f l e c t s th e o n t o l o g y of th e o b s e r v e r as a l i v i n g s y s t e m as he or s h e o p e r a t e s in l a n g u a g e b r i n g i n g f o r t h th e p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s a n d the operational coherences of their domains of existence. Einstein made th e a s s e r t i o n t h a t s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s (explanat i o n s ) a r e f r e e c r e a t i o n s of t h e h u m a n m i n d ; and then, in what s e e m e d t o r e v e a l a p a r a d o x , he a s k e d t h e q u e s t i o n , " H o w is it, if that is the case, t h a t t h e u n i v e r s e is intelligible through them?" In t h i s a r t i c l e I h a v e s h o w n t h a t t h e r e is no p a r a d o x if one reveals the ontology of o b s e r v i n g and the ontology of scientific explanations through putting objectivity in parentheses. Indeed, I have shown that a scientific explanation entails: a) the p r o p o s i t i o n of a p h e n o m e n o n to be explained, b r o u g h t f o r t h as s u c h a p r i o r i in t h e p r a x i s of l i v i n g ( d o m a i n of experiences) of th e o b s e r v e r ; b) th e p r o p o s i t i o n of a n ad hoc generative mechanism, a l s o b r o u g h t f o r t h a p r i o r i in t h e p r a x i s of living of t h e o b s e r v e r , t h a t if a l l o w e d to operate would generate the p h e n o m e n o n b e i n g e x p l a i n e d as a c o n s e q u e n c e to be w i t n e s s e d by th e o b s e r v e r in h e r or h i s p r a x i s of l i v i n g ; c) t h e operational coherence of th e f o u r o p e r a t i o n a l conditions that c o n s t i t u t e i t s c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n , as they are r e a l i z e d in t h e p r a x i s of l i v i n g of t h e o b s e r v e r ; an d d) t h e s u p e r f l u i t y an d i m p e r t i n e n c e of the a s s u m p t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y . F r o m al l t h i s it follows t h a t th e e x p l a n a t o r y m e c h a n i s m p r o p o s e d in a scientific

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e xpl a na ti o n is c on s ti tu t iv e ly "a free creation of the human mind" because it is brought forth con st it ut iv el y a priori in the praxis of living of the observer, that is, without any other ju st i fi ca t ion than the ad hoc g en er ati ve character of the phenomenon explained. It also foll ow s from all this, that a scientific e xp la n at i on co ns ti t ut iv e ly explains the uni ve rs e (versum) in which it takes place because both the exp lanatory mech an ism and the phenomenon being expl ai ne d occur, in a g en er at iv e relation, as n o ni n te rse ct in g phe no me na of the same o pe r at i o n a l domain of the praxis of living of the observer. Or, in other words, it also follows from all this, that since the op eration of di st in ct i on specifies the entity dist in gui sh ed as well as its d om ai n of existence, a scient if ic e xp la na ti on consti tu ti ve ly ex pl ai ns the universe (versum) in which it takes place because it brings with it the domain of o pe rational c o h e r e n c e s (the versum of the multiversa) of the praxis of living of the observer that it makes intelligible. Strictly, then, there is no paradox: s ci en ti fi c ex pl an at io ns do not explain an i n de pe nd en t world or universe; they explain the praxis of living (the domain of e xp er ie nc es ) of the o bserver, making use of the same oper at io nal c o he r e n c e s that c on s ti t ut e the praxis of living of the observer in languaging. It is here that science is poetry.

REALITY The word "reality" comes from the Latin noun res that means "objec t" (thing), and as it is co mmonly used signifies o b je c ti vi t y without p ar en th es es . The real, and s o me ti me s the really real, is meant to be that which exists in d ep e nd en t ly of the observer. Now we know that the concepts e n ta i le d in this way of speaking cannot be sustained. Objects, things, arise in l an guage when a co n se ns u al c oo rd in at ion of a ctions, by being c on s en s u a l l y d is ti ngu is he d in a recursion of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a tions of actions, o bs cu re s the actions that it c o o r d i n a t e s in the praxis of living in a c o n s e n s u a l domain. Since a cc o rd in g to this c i rc um st an ce , an object, a unity, is brought forth in language in an o pe r at i on of di st in c ti on that is a c o n f i gu r at io n of consensual coordinations of action s, when an object is d is t in g u i s h e d in l a n gu a ge its domain of e x i s te n ce as a coherent do ma in of consensual c oo r di n at io n s of a c ti on s becomes a d omain of objects, a d om a in of reality, a v e r s u m of the m u lt ive rs a such that all that is in it is all that is en ta il ed in the c on s en s ua l c o o r d in at i on s of a c tio ns that c on st i tu t e it. Every domain of e xi st en ce is a do ma in of reality, and all doma ins of reality are equa ll y valid d o ma in s of e xistence b r ou gh t forth by an ob ser v er as domains of c oh er e nt consen su al a c t i o n s that specify all that is in them. O n c e a d omain of reality is brought forth, the o b s er v er can treat the objects or entities that c ons ti t ut e it both as if they were all that there is and as if they existed i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the o p e r a t i o n s of di st i nc t io n that bring them forth. And this is so beca us e a domain of r e ali ty is brought forth in the praxis of l iv in g of the observer as a domain of o p er at i o n a l c oh er en c es that r e q ui r es no internal j u s t i f i ca ti o n. It follows from all this, that an o b s er v er o p er at in g in a

11.

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domain of reality n ece ss ar i ly op er at es in a domain of e ffective actions, and that another observ er claims that the first one commits a m i sta ke or has an illusion only when the first observer begins to o pe ra te in a domain of reality di fferent from the one that the second observ er expected. Thus, if we specify the o pera ti on of d i st in ct io n "ghost," then ghosts exist, are real in the domain of e x is te nc e brought forth in their distinction, and we can do e ff ec ti ve acti on s with them in that domain, but they are not real in any other domain. Indeed, e ve ry th in g is an i llusion o ut si de its domain of existence. In other words, every domain of reality as a domain of o pe rat ion al co he re n ce s brought forth in the hap pe ni ng of living of the ob se rv er in language, is a closed domain of effe ct iv e c on se ns u al actions, that is, a c o g nit iv e domain; and conversely, every cogn it iv e domain as a domain of o p e ra ti o na l c oh er en ce s is a domain of reality. What is uncanny, perhaps, is that although d i ff er en t domai ns of reality are seen by an ob ser ve r as different dom ai ns of c o o r d in a ti on s of act io ns in an enviro nm en t, they are lived by the ob server as dif fe re nt domains of l an gu ag in g which differ only through their ongoing t r a n s f or m at i on in the d if fe ren t c i r c u ms t an c es of recursion in which they arise. We as o b se rv er s can explain this now by saying that, as we opera te in langu age through our c on se ns ual i n t er a c t i o n s in the h ap pe ni ng of living of a comm un it y of observers, our st r uc tu r al drift in the ha pp en i ng of our living becomes co nt in ge nt upon the course of those c o ns e ns ua l interactions, and that this takes place in a manner that keeps the tr an sf or m at io n of the h ap p en in g of our living c on gr ue nt with the domain of reality that we bring forth in that comm un it y of observers, or we d i si n t e g r a t e as m em be rs of it. It is this that makes us o b s e r ving systems s y st em s capable, through language, of an endless re cu rs i ve generation of new cogni ti ve domains (new dom ai ns of reality) as new domains of praxes of obse rv in g in our c o nt inu ou s st ru ct ur al drifts as living systems.

12. S E L F - C O N S C I O U S N E S S AND REALITY The self a ri se s in language in the linguis ti c recursion that brings forth the observ er as an entity in the e x p la na t io n of his or her o pe r at i on in a domain of co ns en su al di st inctions. Self c o n s c io u sn e ss a ri s es in language in the l in gu is tic recu rs io n that brings forth the d i st in c t i o n of the self as an entity in the exp la na ti on of the o p er at io n of the ob server in the d i s ti nc t io n of the self from other en tities in a c on s en su a l domain of di st in ctions. As a result, reality arises with selfc o n s c io u sn e ss in la ng ua ge as an e x pl a na t io n of the di sti n ct io n between self and no n-s el f in the praxis of living of the observer. Self, se lf - co ns c io u sn es s , and reality exist in la nguage as explanations of the ha pp en i ng of living of the observer. Indeed, the observer as a human being in language is primary with respect to self and s el f- c on sc io u sn es s , and these arise as he or she o pe ra te s in l an guage ex pl ai n in g his or her experience, his or her praxis of living as such. That the e nt it ie s brought forth in our e xp l an a t i o n s should have an u n av oi da bl e pr es en c e in our domain of existence, is because we are realized as o bs er ver s as we d i s ti ng u is h these en ti ti es in the

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domain of operational coherences tha t they de fi ne as we distinguish them. We do not go t h r o u g h a w a l l in the p r a x i s of living b e c a u s e we ex i s t as l i v i n g s y s t e m s in the same d o m a i n of operational coherences in w h i c h a wall e x i s t s as a m o l e c u l a r en t it y, and a w a l l is d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a c o m p o s i t e entit y in the molecular space as th at e n t i t y t h r o u g h w h i c h we c a nn ot go as molecular entities. The o b s e r v e r is p r im ar y, not the o b j e c t . Better , o b s e r v i n g is a g i v e n in the p r a x i s of l i vi ng in language, and we are a l r e a d y in it w h e n we be gi n to r e f l e c t up on it. Matter, en e rg y , ideas, notions, mind, sp ir i t , G o d , . . . are e x p l a n a t o r y p r o p o s i tio ns of ( ab o u t ) the p r a x i s of l i vi ng of the ob s er ve r. Furthermore, matter, e ne r g y , ideas, not io n s, mind , spirit, or God, as explanatory p r o p o s i t i o n s e n t a i l d i f f e r e n t m a n n e r s of l i v i n g of the observer in r e c u r s i v e c o n s e r v a t i o n of adaptation in the domains of operational coherences brought fo rt h in thei r different distinctions. Thus, w he n the o b s e r v e r o p e r a t e s w i t h objectivity without parentheses, he or sh e operates in an explanatory avenue th at entails neglecting the e x p e r i e n t i a l i n d i s i n g u i s h a b i l i t y b e t w e e n wh at we call p e r c e p t i o n and i l l u s i o n , and w h e n he or sh e o p e r a t e s w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s he or she o p e r a t e s in an e x p l a n a t o r y a v e n u e th at e n t a i l s a c c e p t i n g this indistinguishability as a s t a r t i n g poi n t. In the e x p l a n a t o r y path of o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h o u t p a r e n t h e s e s , the o b s e r v e r , l a n g u a g e , and p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t be e x p l a i n e d s c i e n t i f i c a l l y b e c a u s e in this explanatory path it is a s s u m e d that the observer can mak e reference to e n t i t i e s th at ex i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y of wha t he or she does, an a s s u m p t i o n w h i c h is in c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h the s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r m i n i s m of l i v i n g s y s t e m s ; w h i l e in the e x p l a n a t o r y p a th of objectivity in p a r e n t h e s e s ther e is no s u c h contradiction. At the same time, as on e o p e r a t e s w i t h i n an y g i v e n d o m a i n of r e a l i t y one can operate with objectivity without parentheses without contradiction, but when a disagreement arises wi th another observer, a nd on e t h i n k s that it is not a m a t t e r of a s i m p l e l o g i c a l m i s t a k e , one is f o r c e d to c l a i m a p r i v i l e g e d a c c e s s to an objective r e a l i t y to r e s o l v e it, and to d e a l w i t h e r r o r s as if they w e re m i s t a k i n g s of w h a t is. If in s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s one is o p e r a t i n g w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s , o ne fin ds t ha t the d i s a g r e e i n g p a r t i e s o p e r a t e in d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of r e a li ty , and that the d i s a g r e e m e n t d i s a p p e a r s on ly w h e n th ey be g in to o p e r a t e in the s a m e one . Furthermore, on e a l s o f i n d s that e r r o r s are c h a n g e s of d o m a i n of r e a l i t y in the o p e r a t i o n of an o b s e r v e r that he or she n o t i c e s on ly a p o s t e r i o r i . Finally, by o p e r a t i n g in th e explanatory p a t h w a y of o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h o u t parentheses we cannot e x p l a i n h o w an o b s e r v e r o p e r a t e s in the g e n e r a t i o n of a scientific e x p l a n a t i o n b e c a u s e we ta ke for g r a n t e d the a b i l i t i e s of the observer. C o n t r a r y to thi s s t a t e of affairs, if we o p e r a t e in the e x p l a n a t o r y p a t h w a y of o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s , scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s and the o b s e r v e r a p p e a r as c o m p o n e n t s in a single closed generative explanatory mechanism, in w h i c h the properties or a b i l i t i e s of the o b s e r v e r a r e s h o w n to a r i s e in a d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n than the one in w h i c h its components operate.

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We human beings exist only as we exist as self-conscious entities in language. It is only as we exist as self-conscious entities that the domain of physical existence exists as our limiting cognitive domain in the ultimate explanation of the human observer's happening of living. The physical domain of existence is secondary to the happening of living of the human observer, even though in the explanation of observing the human observer arises from the physical domain of existence. Indeed, the understanding of the ontological primacy of observing is basic for the understanding of the phenomenon of cognition. Human existence is a cognitive existence and takes place through languaging; yet, cognition has no content and does not exist outside the effective actions that constitute it. This is why nothing exists outside the distinctions of the observer. That the physical domain of existence should be our limiting cognitive domain does not alter this. Nature, the world, society, science, religion, the physical space, atoms, molecules, trees,... indeed all things, are c o g n i t i v e entities, explanations of the praxis or happening of living of the observer, and as such, as this very explanation, they only exist as a bubble of human actions floating on nothing. Every thing is cognitive, and the bubble of human cognition changes in the continuous happening of the human recursive involvement in coontogenic and cophylogenic drifts within the domains of existence that he or she brings forth in the praxis of living. Every thing is human responsibility. The atom and the hydrogen bombs are cognitive entities. The big bang, or whatever we claim from our present praxis of living gave origin to the physical versum, is a cognitive entity, an explanation of the praxis of living of the observer bound to the ontology of observing. That is their reality. Our happening of living takes place regardless of our explanations, but its course becomes contingent upon our explanations as they become part of the domain of existence in which we conserve organization and adaptation through our structural drifts. Our living takes place in structural coupling with the world that we bring forth, and the world that we bring forth is our doing as observers in language as we operate in structural coupling in it in the praxis of living. We cannot do anything outside our domains of structural coupling; we cannot do anything outside our domains of cognition; we cannot do anything outside our domains of languaging. This is why nothing that we do as human beings is trivial. Everything that we do becomes part of the world that we live as we bring it forth as social entities in language. Human responsibility in the multiversa is total.

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ONTOLOGY OF OBSERVING

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BIBLIOGRA P H Y

Maturana H. R . (1970) "Biology of Cognition", In Autopoiesis and Cognition by Haturana E. B. and F. G. Varela. Reidal 1980.

Maturana H. R . and F. G. Varela (1973) "De naquinas y seres vivos" in english "Autopoiesis: the organisation of the liv ing", in Autopoiesis and Cognition by Maturana H. R . and F. G. Varela, Beidel 1960.

Maturana H. R . (1973) The organisation of the living: a theory of the living organisation. Internet. J. of Man-Machisna Studlea 7 ; 313-332

Maturana H . R .(1978) "Biology of language: epistemology of reality", in Psychology and biology of language and thought. Editors: G. A. Miller and Elizabeth Lenneberg. Acadenlc Press.

Maturana H . R .(l960) "Autopoiesis: reproduction, heredity and evolution", in Autopoieeis, dissipative structures and spontaneous social orders. Edited by Milan Zeleny. AAAS Selected Sym posium 55. Westviev. Maturana H. B. and P. J. Varela (1987) The tree of knowledge. New Science Library. Shambhala. Margulis Lynn (1961) Symbiosis in cell evolution. Freeman.

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