COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs CAMPOS DOCTRINE: Taxation, Estate and inheritance taxes; Reciprocity in exemption does not require

the foreign country to possess international personality.

FACTS: Collector of Internal Revenue held respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. De Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national (by reason of marriage to a Spanish citizen) having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Ruedas request for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption. However, CIR denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity with Tangier, which was moreover a mere principality, not a foreign country. When the matters elevated to Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last provision of Section 122 of our Tax Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites of statehood or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section122 of the National Internal Revenue Code DECISION: The Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals ruling on the basis of De Lara ruling: If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law.

It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. It has been referred as body-politic organized by common consent of mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote general welfare. ( certain Esmein was mentioned that this has been described the juridical personification of nation. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that evens a tiny principality that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category. WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court Tax Appeals is affirmed.

QUA CHEE GAN vs. DEPORTATION BOARD DOCTRINE: Philippine Bill and the Jones Law in which the right to be secure is one's person, house, papers and effects was granted only to citizens; under the 1935 Constitution, it became a popular right available to citizens and aliens alike. FACTS: Prosecutor Emillio Galang charged Qua Chee Gan et. al, before the Deportation Board with having purchased $130,000.00 without the necessary licensing from the Central Bank and having clandestinely remitted the same to Hong Kong, with having attempted to bribe officers of Philippines and US governments After the filing of the deportation charges, a warrant of arrest was issued for Qua Chee Gan, et al. pending investigation by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. They were granted provisional liberty upon their filing of a surely bond for P10,000.00 and a cash bond for P10,000.00. Qua Chee Gan, et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges on the ground, among others, that such charges are not legal grounds for deportation ad that the Board has not jurisdiction over such charges. The motion to dismiss was denied. Qua Chee Gan, et al. then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition. The Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the President to the Deportation Board the power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court likewise sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. ISSUES 1) Whether or not the President has the power to deport aliens and if such power is validly delegated to the Deportation Board. 2)Whether or not the authority to deport aliens includes the power to order the arrest of such aliens. HELD

1) Yes, under Section 69 of Act No. 2711 of Revised Administrative Code: No alien can be deported by the President except upon prior investigation, conducted by said executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of Immigration the power to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners, but such power was not intended to be delimited to the Immigration Commissioner as Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code, although not expressly conferring such power, lays down the procedure for such deportation proceedings for the President. Under the present and existing laws, therefore deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in 2 ways: a) By order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and b) By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. And although the charges against Qua Chee Gan are not enumerated in CA No. 613, as they contended. The court ruled that contention is not without merit. The act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations, which is tantamount to economic sabotage, is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. 2)Yes, but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of deportation. Arrest would have been necessary for deportation to take effect. However, in the case at bar, investigations were still ongoing and no order for deportation was yet made. Rationale: Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien charged in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in order to secure their appearance.

It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.

However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's power to deport is predicated, does NOT provide for the exercise of the power to arrest.

Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of the Constitution: ...no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce...

As observed by Justice Laurel concurring in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the requirement "to be determined by the judge" to any public officer who may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation. However, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in EO69.

Note the conflicting views of: The Supreme Court doubted the power of the President to issue an order of arrest, even assuming the grant of such power under sec. 39 of the Rev. Admi. Code since under the 1935 Constitution, the power to order the arrest of a person has been unmistakably a judicial power meaning whether the arrest of an individual maybe ordered by authority such as the President other than the judge the purpose of determining the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. It was even more doubtful if the President could delegate such a power to the Deportation Board. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. The Court noted that unlike in the Philippine Bill and the Jones Act in which the right to be secure is one's person, house, papers and effects was granted only to citizens; under the 1935 Constitution, it became a popular right available to citizens and aliens alike. ( what understand is that the above view of SC is the general rule but the exception to the rule is the rationale of each laws as explained in question no. 1 and 2. )

IN THE VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence The order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.