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DFAN14A1ss179783_dfan14a.htmSCHEDULE14AINFORMATION UNITEDSTATES SECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSION Washington,D.C.20549 SCHEDULE14AINFORMATION
PROXYSTATEMENTPURSUANTTOSECTION14(a)OFTHE SECURITIESEXCHANGEACTOF1934

FiledbytheRegistranto FiledbyaPartyotherthantheRegistrantx Checktheappropriatebox: o PreliminaryProxyStatement o Confidential,forUseoftheCommissionOnly(aspermittedbyRule14a6(e)(2)) o DefinitiveProxyStatement o DefinitiveAdditionalMaterials x SolicitingMaterialPursuantto240.14a12 DellInc. (NameofRegistrantasSpecifiedInItsCharter) O.MasonHawkins ChairmanoftheBoardandC.E.O. SoutheasternAssetManagement,Inc. (NameofPerson(s)FilingProxyStatement,ifotherthantheRegistrant) PaymentofFilingFee(Checktheappropriatebox): x Feenotrequired. o FeecomputedontablebelowperExchangeActRules14a6(i)(1)and011. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) o o Proposedmaximumaggregatevalueoftransaction: Totalfeepaid: Feepaidpreviouslywithpreliminarymaterials. CheckboxifanypartofthefeeisoffsetasprovidedbyExchangeActRule011(a)(2)andidentifythefilingforwhichtheoffsettingfeewaspaidpreviously.Identifythepreviousfilingby registrationstatementnumber,ortheFormorScheduleandthedateofitsfiling. AmountPreviouslyPaid: Titleofeachclassofsecuritiestowhichtransactionapplies: Aggregatenumberofsecuritiestowhichtransactionapplies: PerunitpriceorotherunderlyingvalueoftransactioncomputedpursuanttoExchangeActRule011(setforththeamountonwhichthefilingfeeiscalculatedandstatehowitwas determined):

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Form,ScheduleorRegistrationStatementNo.: FilingParty: DateFiled:

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OnJune24,2013,SoutheasternAssetManagement,Inc.(Southeastern)presentedthefollowingmaterialstoInstitutionalShareholderServicesInc.:

PresentationtoISSOpposingtheProposedDellTakePrivateTransactionJune24,2013SouthernAssetManagement,Inc.AdvisortoLongleafPartnersFunds

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TheCaseforProtectingStockholdersoEvercorePartners,theadvisortotheBoard'sSpecialCommittee,hasreportedtotheboardofDellthat,basedonprojectionsbytheBostonConsultingGroup,theadvisortoDell,SilverLakecouldrealizeanaverageannualizedrateofreturnofupto44.7%andMichaelDellcouldrealizeanaverageannualizedrateofreturnofupto50.1%(1)duringthenext4to5yearsontheirinvestmentintheMichaelDell/SilverLaketakeprivatetransactionnowpresentedforstockholderconsiderationandactionatthespecialmeetingofDellstockholdersonJuly18.oInlightoftheBostonConsultingGroupprojectionsandEvercoreestimates,IcahnandSoutheasternbelievetheboardofdirectorsofDellshouldhaveactedtosecurethosegainsforstockholders.Instead,itagreedtoabreakupfeeofupto$450millionandaprotectiveMergerAgreementfortheMichaelDell/SilverLaketransaction,whichhavetheeffectofdampeningthirdpartyinterestinDellandwhichIcahnandSoutheasternviewashighlyinappropriateunderthecircumstances.oIcahnandSoutheasternbelievethatitwouldbeasadoutcomeforstockholdersandwouldreflectpoorlyonallwhoareinvolvedinthisprocessif,afterpurchasingsharesatwhatIcahnandSoutheasternperceivetobeasubstantiallyundervaluedprice,MichaelDellandSilverLakeearnedEvercore'sestimatedreturnsontheirinvestmentandthatitwouldbeevenworseifDellweresold(orbrokenup)byMichaelDellandSilverLakeinatransactionortransactionswithoneormorestrategicacquirersinthenearfutureandforaverylargeprofit.oIcahnandSoutheasternbelievetheboardcouldhavedonemoremuchmoretoaffordstockholdersanopportunitytoachievetheverysamegainsnowpursuedbyMichaelDellandSilverLake.However,DellinsteadappearstobeengaginginacampaigntohighlightDell'sbleakoutlookinthePCmarket,obscuringtherobustperformanceandfutureofthe~$13billioninacquisitionsDellhasmadeinrecentyears,whichwerepaidforbyDell'scurrentowners.IcahnandSoutheasternbelievethatDellisconductingthiscampaigntopromptstockholdersintosupportingwhatIcahnandSoutheasternbelieveisabaddealforstockholdersandaverygooddealforMichaelDellandSilverLake.oItisinterestingtonotethat,intherecentpast,ratherthanemphasizethenegativesofthePCbusiness,Dellhas highlightedthestrengthsoftheEnterpriseSolutionsbusinessacceleratedgrowth,strongmargins,andrecurringrevenues.WelookforwardtotheresultsofthediscoveryinthecurrentstockholderactionagainstDelltobetterunderstandthefinancialoutlookthatMichaelDell/SilverLakearesharingwithlendersincomparisontothedirepicturetheyarenowpaintingforstockholders.oIcahnandSoutheasternbelievethatDell'sownersdeservebetterandcanachievemorebyvotingagainsttheMichaelDell/SilverLaketransactionandbyelectingnewdirectorswhowillacttosecureforstockholderstheverysamegainsthatMichaelDellandSilverLakehopetolockinforthemselves.(1)EvercorePartners2/4/13presentationtotheBoard.

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OverviewWebelievethetakeprivatetransactionsubstantiallyundervaluesDellwhilesuperioralternativesexist.oMichaelDellandSilverLakewouldnotpursueatakeprivatetransactionunlesstheythoughtitwasagooddealforthem(3drightarrow)SilverLakehasdeliveredagrossIRRof27%sinceinception(1)oIcahnandSoutheasternbelievethat:1.ThetakeprivatetransactionsubstantiallyundervaluestheCompany2.TheEnterpriseSolutionsGroup(ESG)andDellServicesbusinessesarethefutureofDell3.StockholdershavefundedtheCompany'sturnaroundandshouldbegiventheopportunitytobenefitfromtheirinvestmentoIcahnandSoutheasternbelievethatthesaleprocesscouldnotmaximizevalue:1.Agoshopprocessseldomresultsinasuperiorproposalinmanagementledbuyouts2.TheMergerAgreement'srestrictivedefinitionofa"superiorproposal"wouldexcludemost,ifnotall,leveragedrecapitalizationtransactions,despitethefactthatsuchtransactionscouldbeeconomicallysuperiorandwouldgivestockholderstheoptionofsharingintheCompany'sfuture(1)Reutersarticle4/18/13,SilverLakeRaises$10.3BillionPrivateEquityFund.

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DellsStrategicRationale

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MichaelDell'sContributionMichaelDellreturnedtotheCEOpositiononJanuary31,2007.Duringhistenure,bothDell'sstockpriceandPCbusinesshavesignificantlyunderperformed.DELLTotalReturnvs.PeersSinceMichaelDell'sReturnTotalReturnsSinceJanuary31,2007200%CompanyTotalReturnLenovo141%IBM113%EMC74%ASUSTeK29%S&P50011%HewlettPackard(38%)DELL(44%)'07'08'09'10'11'12Source:FactSetasof6/21/13PCMarketShareSinceMichaelDell'sReturn%GrowthinCompany200720082009201020112012MarketShareSince2007Lenovo7.4%7.2%8.1%9.7%13.0%14.8%100%Acer8.9%11.1%13.0%12.9%11.2%10.4%17%HewlettPackard18.2%18.4%19.3%17.9%17.2%16.0%(12%)DELL14.3%14.3%12.2%12.0%12.1%10.7%(25%)Source:Gartner.

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Dell'sownmanagementconsultanthighlightedseveralpubliccompanytransformations.OurCommentsApple'smarketcapitalizationincreasedfromalowof$1.7BninJuly'97toapeakof$658BninSeptember'12asthecompanyreinventeditself.LouisGerstner'sdecisiontodiversifyawayfrommainframeswasmoresignificantthanthedecisiontoexitthePCbusiness.MegWhitmanhasbeenclearinhercommunicationsthatHP'stransformationwilltaketimeandhasconditionedstockholderstoaccepttheshorttermpaininexchangeforlongtermbenefit.Thestockhasappreciatedover100%sinceitsNovember'12low.Thesetransformationsfailedbecauseofacontinuedfocusonlegacyproducts.Dellhasspentapproximately$13Bnonacquisitionstopreventasimilarfate.Source:BostonConsultingGroup12/5/12presentationtotheBoard.TransformationCanContinueasaPublicCompanySuccessStillinTransitionFailureFirmYearChallengesTacticsUsed'97'93'90'06'07'08'97Shareloss,drivenbypoorproductInstallnewleadershipteamStreamlineproductlineandmajorinvestmentinR&DBuildintegratedecosystemdevice,software,contentSharelossinPCbusinessDecliningmarketExitPCbusinessAggressivelyenterhighmarginsoftwareandservicesTransformlegacycultureLowgrowthmarketMarginerosiondrivenbycompetitionFocusongrowing,highmarginBUsshedremainderofhistoricalcorebusinessesControlcostsandglobalizeorganizationSharelossMarginerosionGrowthroughlarge,expensiveaddonacquisitionsLeveragePCunitforcash,attemptfew(failed)innovationsChangeleadershipwhenstrategydidn'tdeliverresultsDecliningprintingmarketSharelossduetonewcompetitionExpandfromprintingtobroader"documentmanagement"ShiftintonewbusinessprocessesandIToutsourcingGraduallywinddownprintingbusinesswithoutmajorshiftsShareloss(highend)drivenbypoorproductMarginerosion(lowend)AttemptedinhouseOS,thenexited&partneredw/MSFTDecliningfilmmarketBusinessmodel(Gillettestyle)becomingobsoleteAttemptedtopreserveanalogphotographyprofitsthroughmajorcostcutsGraduallypushedintodigital,butwithoutclearvision

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Dell'sStrategicRationaleDell'sownmanagementconsultantfoundlittlestrategicrationaletotakeDellprivate.Believemanyofthe"takeprivate"valueleverscould(inprinciple)beapplicabletoDellaspubliccompanyPotentialvalueleversDescriptionApplicabletopublic?A"Committowin"inCoreDenali8DriveorganicgrowthinNewDenalioMaximizelifecyclecashflow,notmarginpercentDrivesharetopreservescale(e.g.$450product,Tier46Ch1na,etc)MovedecisionmakingcenteroforganizationtoAsiaoIntegrateproductstocreatedifferentiatedsolutionforclientsoIncreasefocusonadvantagedmidmarketsegmentoSegmentandupgradesellingorganization,buildsolutionsapproachCImplementaggressivecosttakeoutAggressivelyimplementsimplificationandcosttakeout(NDBM)ProgrammanagelargescalecostreductionprogramsDelayertheorganizationDAlignorgandtalentoCreateCOO,recruitIchangeseniortalenttoalignwithstrategyoAlignexternalreportingwithinternalroles,resourcing,andmetricsoDrivestrongexecutiondiscipline,withfocusonthe"68keypriorities"ETightlyalignmanagementincentivesFEnsuredisciplineofcapitalallocationGEnhancecapitalstrategyoRemovequarterlyEPSconstraint,drivetowards36yrexitprofile?oRequiremgtpurchaseofequity(moneyatrisk,notoptions)?oRevisitM&AactivityensureclearinvestmentthesisforacquisitionoDriveIntegrationofexistingacquisitionsoIncreasedebtleveragetoboostequityreturns?oAccessOUScashtaxefficientlyoArbitragevaluationmultiple(buylow,sellh1gh)Source:BostonConsultingGroup12/5/12presentationtotheBoard.

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QuestionstoDell'sStockholdersoDoDell'sownersneedtheBoardorMichaelDelltoprotectthemfromtherisksofanalternativetransactionasproposedbyIcahnandSoutheastern(1),ordoDell'sownersneedtoprotectthemselvesfromanopportunisticpurchasebyMichaelDellandSilverLake?oWefinditdifficulttobelievethatDell'sownersincludingmanyoftheworld'sleadinginstitutionalinvestors,hedgefundsandothersophisticatedinvestorsareincapableofabsorbingtherisksassociatedwithaconservativelyleveragedbalancesheet,whenMichaelDellandSilverLakeareeagerlyseekingtodojustthatandmuchmore.oWhyistheBoardpushingadealthatwouldforcestockholderstoselltheirsharesatwhatIcahnandSoutheasternperceivetobeasubstantiallyundervaluedprice?Haven'tDell'sownersearnedtherighttoshareinthesubstantialpotentialreturnsoninvestmentestimatedbyEvercoreforMichaelDellandSilverLake?(1)AnyalternativeproposalbyIcahnandSoutheasternwouldbecontingentupontheproposedtakeprivatetransactionbeingdefeated,theelectionofanewDellBoardofDirectors,andapprovalbythatnewBoard.

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OwnershipInterestoftheSpecialCommitteeTheDellSpecialCommittee,whichapprovedtheproposedmanagementbuyout,doesnothavesignificantstockownership.oSpecialCommitteeonlyownsanaggregateof203,367sharesSpecialCommitteeOwnershipTotalBeneficialOwnershipoThecurrentmarketvalueofthosesharesis$2.7MMoThisrepresents0.01%ofdilutedsharesoutstandingAlexMandl133,127LauraConigliaro28,762JanetClark28,762KenDuberstein12,716Total203,367%ofSharesOutstanding:0.01%Source:DellProxyStatementfiled5/31/13.

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OppositiontotheManagementBuyoutOfferOthersignificantinvestorshavepubliclystatedtheirunhappinesswiththeproposedmanagementbuyoutandareverycapableofevaluatinganypotentiallongtermrisksofthebusiness.IcahnEnterprises10.28%8.68%152.5T.RowePrice4.85%4.09%71.9SoutheasternAssetManagement4.83%4.08%71.7YacktmanAssetManagement1.00%0.85%14.9PzenaInvestmentManagement0.87%0.73%12.9Total21.83%18.43%323.9Source:Bloomberg.StatedOpposition(1)ExcludingsharesheldbyMichaelDell.(2)Basedonmostrecentfilings.%ofPublicFloat(1)(2)%ofSharesOutstanding(2)SharesinMillions(2)

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TheCaseforDell'sFuture11

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ItisNotAboutthePCDell'slongtermstockholdershavefundedtheCompany'sturnaroundandwestronglybelievetheyshouldbegiventheopportunitytobenefitfromtheirinvestment.oItisnotaboutthePC...itisnotaboutthePC...itisnotaboutthePC...oDellmanagementhasbeenexecutinganM&AstrategyaimedatmovingawayfromPCsandValueofRecentTransactionsNonPCacquisitionsmadetorepositiontheCompanyasanendtoendsolutionsproviderApprox.DealtowardshighergrowthandhighermarginBusinessUnitValueClosingDateEnterpriseSolutionsoDellhasspentapproximately$13billion(1)(over$7pershare)onthisstrategy,which:(3drightarrow)WillbenefitfromthesamecloudandmobilitytrendsthatarenegativelyimpactingthePCbusiness(3drightarrow)WillbenefitfromtheheavyR&DinvestmentsbeingmadebyDellrightnowoAttheJune2012AnalystMeeting,CFOBrianGladdennotedthatDellisdeliveringonits15%IRRtargetforacquisitions.Publiccommentsattheendof2012confirmthis.($MM)EqualLogicStorage(ESG)$1,400January2008PerotSystemsServices3,600November2009SecureWorksServices600February2011CompellentStorage(ESG)880February2011Force10Networking(ESG)660August2011SonicWallServices1,200May2012WyseServers(ESG)1,000May2012QuestSoftwareSoftware2,400September2012OtherVarious~1,300Total$~13,000Source:Companypresentationsandreports.(1)Source:Companypresentationsandreports.

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Dell'sAcquisitions"Theacquisitionswe'vemadeoverlastthreeyears,thecompoundgrowthrateassociatedwiththoseoverthattimeperiodhasbeengreaterthan90%.Sothereisnoquestiontonotonlydowegettherevenuefromtheacquiredentity,butoursuccesstodayininvestinginthoseassetsandgrowingthemhasbeenverystrong."DavidJohnsonFormerSeniorVPStrategy&BusinessDevelopmentCLSAInvestorForum9/12/12Source:Dell2012AnalystMeetingpresentation.

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EnterpriseSolutions(1)istheFutureInouropinion,MichaelDellandhispartnersatSilverLakewanttocapturetheupsideoftheCompany'srecentstrategicinvestmentsandgrowthinitiativesinEnterpriseSolutions.oInQ1,EnterpriseSolutionsaccountedfor65%ofsegmentoperatingincome:(3drightarrow)EnterpriseSolutionsGroup'soperatingincomeincreased71%(3drightarrow)DellServicesrevenuegrew2%evenasPCrevenuedeclined10%(3drightarrow)EnterpriseSolutionsaccountedfor65%ofoperatingincomedespitethefactthatDellSoftwarereportedalossduetoaccountingassociatedwithacquisitions:"Inapubliccompanytheaccountingrulesassociatedwithacquisitionsarequiteonerous.Youhavetotakealotofwriteoffsupfront,andbasicallytakeahaircutonthedeferredincomelikemaintenancerevenue...Thatmakesitverydifficultforasoftwarebusinessacquisitiontolookprofitableintheshortterm."(2)JohnSwainson,PresidentDellSoftwareoWebelieveEnterpriseSolutionswillcontinuetocontributeanoutsizedportionofDell'soperatingincomeascomparedtoEnterpriseSolutions'totalrevenuecontributionoWebelievethat,atthecompletionofthistransformation,Dell'sfutureownerswillrealizevaluationmultiplessignificantlyhigherthanthosereflectedintoday'sstockpriceduetothehigherpercentageofhighergrowthandhighermarginnonPCearnings(1)AlsoknownasNEWDell.IncludestheEnterpriseSolutionsGroup,DellSoftware,andDellServices.(2)TechWeekEuropearticle6/20/13,SoftwareWillMakeAQuarterofDell'sProfitsSwainson.

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ProductvityCostTakeOutConfidential($inmillions)SummaryofProductivityCostTakeOuts(1)ImpacttoEBITDAMarginsEfficiencyTypePotentialSavingsEffective25%50%75%COGSMarketingEndUserComputingSalesNewDenaliSales(2)OtherTotal($3,350)($838)($1,675)($2,513)PotentialSavingsFY14FY15FY16FY17RampUp10.0%50.0%100.0%100.0%Effectiveness25%($84)($419)($838)($838)50%(168)(838)(1,675)(1,675)75%(251)(1,256)(2,513)(2,513)Memo:RampupaccountsforthecashcostsrequriedtoachieveproductivitycosttakeoutNote:EBITAfiguresarepostSBCexpense.Denalimanagmenton02/01/13FY14EBITAmarginfromFY14InternalPlan(1)BasedondiscussionswithManagment,weunderstandthatallorpartoftheProductivityCostTakeOutsareimplicitinthe9/21Case(2)NewDenaliincludesEnterprise,SofewareandtheEnterpriserelatedpositionsoftheServcesandSofeware&Peripheralsbusinesses(3)AmorizationusedinEBITAmarginforAcer,LenovoandAsusbasedonhistoricalamortizationexpenseSource:BCG,DenaliManagment[]indicatesinformationthathasbeenomittedonthebasisofaconfidentialtreatmentrequestpursuanttoRule24b2oftheExchangeActandhasbeenfiledsepartelywiththeSEC.

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PositioningforLongTermProfitabilityDell'srecentaggressivePCpricingstrategyisdesignedtobuymeaningfulmarketsharewhilesacrificingneartermmarginsastrategythatwillbenefitfutureowners.ManagementQuotesfromRecentEarningsCall"Wecontinuedtofaceacompetitivepricingenvironmentandhavealignedourpricingstrategytoinvestingrowthaheadofplannedreductionsinourcoststructure,andthishasaffectedourprofitability.Weremainfocusedonpursuingstrategicrevenueopportunitiesthatwilldrivelongtermprofitabilityandcashflow."BrianGladden,CFOQ12014EarningsCall"Weareinvestingandacquiringnewcustomeraccountsthatwillbenefitourlongtermprofitabilityandcashflow."TomSweet,VPCorporateFinanceQ12014EarningsCall"It'sabsolutelytherightthingtodoforthelongterm.Buttheseareaccountsthatyouhavetogooutandtakeadifferenttackandpricingstrategywith,andthat'softentoprovideanentrylevelintothataccount."TomSweet,VPCorporateFinanceQ12014EarningsCall"Inmanycases,theseareaccountsthatwefeelverygoodabout[withrespectto]thelongtermprofitabilityandtheimpactonourcashflowovertime.SowhilewemaynotseethatshowingupasapositiveintheP&Lintheshortterm,wethinkforthelongtermit'stherightthingtodotogetourselvesbackinpricepositiontoscalethebusiness."BrianGladden,CFOQ12014EarningsCall

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OurDellValuationModelWebelievethe$13.65mergerconsiderationsubstantiallyundervaluestheCompanyevenwhenusingdepressedresultsfromFQ1'14asourbase.Icahn/SAMCalculatedCalculatedValueValue(InMM)PerShareSegmentsas%ofOperatingValueServers&Networking$8,0070.75xSales(1)$4.5Storage2,0351.2xSales(1)1.1EnterpriseSolutions(ESG)$10,0420.8xSales$5.6Services12,21011.0xNOPAT(1)6.8QuestSoftware2,400AtCost1.3EndUserComputing(EUC)3,6004.0xOI(1)2.0TotalOperatingValue$28,252$15.8UnallocatedExpenses(1,320)6.0xOI(0.7)CostOpportunity3,0006.0xOI(2)1.7Cash&Investments13,208(3)7.4Debt(7,248)(3)(4.1)DFSReceivables4,374(3)2.4TotalValuation$40,266$~23EUC13%Software8%ESG36%Services(1)BasedonFQ1'14annualizedresults.SeeAppendixforpubliccompsandmultiplederivation.(2)Assumes$500MMinannualcostsavingscomparedtoBostonConsultingGroupestimateofa$3.35Bnopportunity.(3)Asof5/3/2013.AssigningNOVALUEtothePCbusinesswouldstillresultinavaluationofapproximately$20pershare

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IllustrativeEPSofaPotentialDellSelfTenderAlternative(1)UsingVariousEarningsAssumptions(1/2)ADellselftenderwouldbehighlyaccretiveandresultinproformaEPSsignificantlyhigherthancurrentlevels.IllustrativeExample:1,118MMSharesTenderedEarningsCaseAssumedAdjustedLastQuarterBCGBaseCaseBCG25%CaseBCG75%CaseAnnualized(FY'15)(FY'15)(FY'15)NonGAAPOperatingIncome2,800(2)3,300(3)3,700(3)4,500(3)Less:Est.ForegoneDFSIncome(323)(250)(4)(250)(4)(250)(4)Less:NetInterestExpense(5)(556)(556)(556)(556)ProFormaPretaxIncome1,9212,4942,8943,694TenderOffer$14pershare$14pershare$14pershare$14pershareSharesTendered1,1181,1181,1181,118ProFormaSharesOutstanding670670670670ProFormaPretaxEPS$2.87$3.72$4.32$5.51(1)AnyalternativeproposalbyIcahnandSoutheasternwouldbecontingentupontheproposedtakeprivatetransactionbeingdefeated,theelectionofanewDellBoardofDirectors,andapprovalbythatnewBoard.(2)AssumesFQ'14annualizednonGAAPoperatingincomeof$590MMadjustedforDellSoftware'sacquisitionaccountingrelatedloss.AssumesDellSoftwareoperatingincomeof$100MM,whichisapproximatelyequaltoQuestSoftware'strailingtwelvemonthsoperatingincomeatthetimeoftheacquisition.(3)Source:DellProxyStatementfiled5/31/13.(4)AssumesinFY'15DESbeginstorebuildreceivablesbalance.(5)Assumes5.5%costofdebtand0.5%interestincome.

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IllustrativeEPSofaPotentialDellSelfTenderAlternative(1)UsingVariousEarningsAssumptions(2/2)Assumingonlyhalfofthe$3,350MMcostopportunityidentifiedbytheBostonConsultingGroupwouldfurtherincreaseEPS.IllustrativeExample:1,118MMSharesTenderedEarningsCaseAssumedAdjustedLastQuarterBCGBaseCaseAnnualized(FY'15)NonGAAPOperatingIncome2,800(2)3,300(3)Plus:CostSavings(4)1,6751,675Less:Est.ForegoneDFSIncome(323)(250)(5)Less:NetInterestExpense(6)(556)(556)ProFormaPretaxIncome3,5964,169TenderOffer$14pershare$14pershareSharesTendered1,1181,118ProFormaSharesOutstanding670670ProFormaPretaxEPS$5.37$6.22(1)AnyalternativeproposalbyIcahnandSoutheasternwouldbecontingentupontheproposedtakeprivatetransactionbeingdefeated,theelectionofanewDellBoardofDirectors,andapprovalbythatnewBoard.(2)AssumesFQ'14annualizednonGAAPoperatingincomeof$590MMadjustedforDellSoftware'sacquisitionaccountingrelatedloss.AssumesDellSoftwareoperatingincomeof$100MM,whichisapproximatelyequaltoQuestSoftware'strailingtwelvemonthsoperatingincomeatthetimeoftheacquisition.(3)Source:DellProxyStatementfiled5/31/13.(4)Assumeshalfofthe$3,350MMcostopportunityestimatedbytheBostonConsultingGroup.(5)AssumesinFY'15DESbeginstorebuildreceivablesbalance.(6)Assumes5.5%costofdebtand0.5%interestincome.

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ReasonableUtilizationoftheBalanceSheetIcahnandSoutheastern'sDellselftenderproposal(1)couldcomfortablybefinancedutilizingDell'sbalancesheet.oUndertheMichaelDell/SilverLakeProposal,theNetDebt/EBITDAmultipleisapproximately3.7x(2)oUnderIcahnandSoutheastern'sDellselftenderproposal,themaximumproformaNetDebt/EBITDAmultipleis1.7xoMichaelDellclaimsthatourproposalforaDellselftenderwouldrestricttheCompany'sfinancialflexibilityandjeopardizecustomerperceptionandemployeeretention(3).However,aDellselftenderproposalwouldresultinamaximumleveragemultipleof1.7xasopposedtothe3.7xleveragemultipleundertheproposedMichaelDell/SilverLaketakeprivatetransactionProFormaLeverage#OfSharesTendered(MM)ProFormaGrossDebt($MM)ProFormaCash($MM)ProFormaNetDebt($MM)ProFormaNetDebt/EBITDA(4)8757,0254,9002,1250.7x1,0008,8384,9003,9381.2x1,11810,5474,9005,6471.7x(1)AnyalternativeproposalbyIcahnandSoutheasternwouldbecontingentupontheproposedtakeprivatetransactionbeingdefeated,theelectionofanewDellBoardofDirectors,andapprovalbythatnewBoard.(2)AssumesFY'14FinalBoardCaseEBITDAof$3.6BnandproformanetdebtfortheMichaelDell/SilverLaketransaction.(3)Dellmaterialsfiled6/21/13.(4)AssumesFinalFY'14BoardCaseEBITDAof$3.3Bn,whichisproformaforlossofDFSincome.

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LongTermPotentialBostonConsultingGroup'scasesillustrateDell'slongtermpotential.BCGBaseCase$BnFiscalYear2014201520162017Revenue$56.4$55.5$55.1$54.3Grossmargin12.912.612.512.3NonGAAPOperatingIncome3.43.33.23.0BCG25%BaseCaseFiscalYear2014201520162017$56.4$55.5$55.1$54.3RevenueGrossmargin12.912.812.812.6NonGAAPOperatingIncome3.43.74.03.8BCG75%BaseCaseFiscalYear2014201520162017Revenue$56.4$55.5$55.1$54.3Grossmargin13.013.113.413.1NonGAAPOperatingIncome3.64.55.75.5Source:DellProxyStatementfiled5/31/13.

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StockPrice"Capped"byMergerConsiderationDell'sSpecialCommitteemayhaveobtaineda37%premiumforstockholders,butthenearestcomphasappreciatedalmost65%overthesameperiod(1).Dell(DELL)PriceChart10Sep2012to20Jun2013(Daily)DellInc.HewlettPackard(HPQ)PriceChart10Sep2012to20Jun2013(Daily)HewlettPackardCo.Rumorsoftransactionsurface90DayTradingAverageEnded1/11/13:$9.9790DayTradingAverageEnded1/11/13:$14.72Source:FactSetPricesSource:FactSetPricesSource:FactSet.Source:FactSet.DELL90DayTradingAverage(1)$9.97OfferPrice$13.65OfferPricePremium37%HPQ90DayTradingAverage(1)$14.72CurrentPrice(6/21/13)$24.15CurrentPriceAppreciation64%(1)Basedonthe90daytradingaverageended1/11/13beforerumorsofapossibleDelltakeprivatetransactionwerefirstpublished.

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ThereisNoPremiumforLongTermStockholdersClaiminga37%premiumisinsultingtolongtermstockholders.DellInc.Price5YearHigh:$30.60124%AbovetheOffer2YearHigh:$18.3234%AbovetheOfferTakePrivateOffer:$13.6537%Premium90DayAverageTradingPrice:$9.97Source:FactSet.Percentageovertheoffer5YearAverage:$16.5621%High:$30.60124%2YearAverage$14.144%High:$18.3234%

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Dell'sSaleandGovernanceProcess

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GoShopWithImpedimentstoValueMaximizationInJanuary2013,theSpecialCommitteewaseducatedonfactorsmaximizingtheimpactofagoshopprocessbyEvercorePartners.FactorsImpactingaGoShopProcessandtheActionTakenbyDell'sSpecialCommitteeDurationofGoShopAlongergoshopperiodincreasestheamountoftimeathirdpartyhastoevaluateapossibletransactionthesizeandcomplexityofthetargetcanincreasetheamountoftimeneededDell'sAction:45dayGoShopperiod(3060daysisaboutaverage)TerminationFeeAlowerterminationfeereducesthevalueleakagetostockholdersasuperiorproposalwouldhavetoovercometheterminationfeetoprovideincrementalvaluetostockholdersDell'sAction:Uptoa$450millionterminationfeepayabletoSilverLakeDefinitionofSuperiorProposal1.Broaderdefinitionofwhatconstitutesa"SuperiorProposal"givesmorelatitudetotheSpecialCommittee2.MatchingrightsservetodiscouragebiddersandthereforeshouldbeavoidedDell'sAction:Setarestrictivedefinitionof"SuperiorProposal"andincludedmatchingrightsforthebuyoutgroupSource:EvercorePartners1/18/13presentationtotheBoard.

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GoShopProcessesareRarelySuccessfulAgoshopprovisionoftenprovidescoverforaprechosendeal,especiallywhenmanagementisinvolved.oAgoshopprocessissupposedtooperateasapostsigning"marketcheck"thathelpsfulfilltheBoard'sfiduciaryresponsibilitiesoSince2005,therehavebeen137transactionswithanequityvalueover$100MMwithgoshopprovisions(1)(3drightarrow)Ofthosetransactions,only16haveresultedinasuperioroffer(3drightarrow)Superiorofferswereanaverageof20%higherthantheinitialbid"Thedatadoesindicatesomereasontobewary[ofGoShops]inthespecificcontextofmanagementbuyouts(MBOs).NonMBOswithapureGoShopclausearejumped23%ofthetime,whileMBOGoShopsareneverjumped."(2)GuhanSubramanianProfessorofLawandBusinessHarvardLawSchoolandHarvardBusinessSchool(1)Source:EvercorePartners1/18/13presentationtoBoard.(2)GuhanSubramanian,GoShopsvs.NoShopsinPrivateEquityDeals:EvidenceandImplications.

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EfficacyofGoShopProvisionsTheSpecialCommitteewasmadeawareofthelimitedefficacyofGoShopProvisions.EfficacyofGoShopProvisionsConfidentialoSince2005,therehavebeen137transactionwithequityvaluesgreaterthan$100millionwithgoshopprovisionsOfthosetransaction.only16or12%resultedinaupcriorofferThesuperioroffersonaveragewere20%grearerthantheinitialbid($inmillions)EVERCOREPARTNERSSource:EvercorePartners1/18/13presentationtoBoard.AnnouncedDealswith"GoShop"&ToppedInitialDateTargetInitialBidderCompetingBidderEquityValueTEVGoShopPeriod%Prem.onInitialBid3/09/12QuestSoftwareInsiteVenturePtrsDenali$2,148$2,27260days21.7%10/01/10DynamexGreenbriarEquityTransforce24422340days10.6%08/13/10DynegyBlackstoneIcahnEnterprises5424,76040days10.0%12/28/09AMICASThomasBravoMergeHealthcare21921145days18.7%11/13/09SiliconStorageTechnologyMgmt/ProphetEquityMicrochipTechnology201126.045days35.7%11/02/09DiedrichCoffeePeet'sCoffee&TeaGreenMountainCoffeeRoasters20020121days34.6%04/24/09SumTotalSystemAccelKKRVistaEquityPartners15211731days27.6%02/26/09CKERestaurantsThomasH.LeeApolloManagement6941,00540days13.6%02/05/09TriadHospitalsGoldmanSachs/CCMPCommunityHealthSystems4,4405,88240days7.5%06/16/08GreenfieldOnlineQuadrangleGroupMicrosoft/ZMCapital40837650days12.9%6/22/07BarneysNewYorkIstithmarWorldCapital/CVCFastRetailingCo94294230days14.2%6/01/07EverlastWorldwideHidaryGroupBrandsHoldings13316330days24.5%05/24/07EagleGlobalLogisticsJimCrane/Centerbridge/WoodbridgeCEVALogistics/ApolloMagmt1,9391,95220days31.9%03/08/07CatalinaMarketingCorpValueActCapitalHellmanFriedman1,5111,59145days1.2%03/02/07AeroFlexGeneralAtlantic/FranciscoPtrsVeritasCaptial1,0811,07143days7.4%05/19/05MaytagRipplewood/GSCapitalPartnersWhirlpool1,6772,58530days50.0%Note:UpdatedasofDecemeber31,2012.BoldindicatesultimatepurchasersSource:SDC,MergerMetrics

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ImpedimentsandDealProtectionsTheSpecialCommitteeagreedtoasuiteofdealprotectionmeasuresthatsignificantlyhandicapathirdparty'sabilitytopursueanalternativetransaction,especiallyonewhereexistingstockholdershavethechoicetoreceivecashorparticipateintheCompany'sfuture.TherestrictivedefinitionofaSuperiorProposal,togetherwithotherexpresstermsoftheMergerAgreement,actasalmostimpossiblebarriersforanypotentialbiddertobeasuperiorproposal:(3drightarrow)AsdefinedbytheMergerAgreement,aSuperiorProposalintheformofadividendorsharerepurchasemustresultinasingleperson(nottheCompany)owning50%ormoreoftheoutstandingshares(almostimpossible)evenifsucharecapitalizationwouldbeaneconomicallysuperioralternativetotheMichaelDell/SilverLakedealforALLstockholdersnotnamedMichaelDell(3drightarrow)BeforetheMergerAgreementwasfinalized,Southeasternmadeitclearthatitwouldviewarecapitalizationinwhichstockholderscanparticipateassuperior,buttheSpecialCommitteenonethelessapprovedtermsthatwouldmakesuchatransactionvirtuallyimpossibletoachieve(3drightarrow)IcahnandSoutheasternbelievethatstockholdersarecapableofevaluatingtheriskofthebusinessanddonotneedaSpecialCommitteethatownspracticallynostocktochoosetotransferthoserisks(andsignificantupside)toaverysophisticatedbuyoutgroupTheSpecialCommitteehasmadesecuringfinancingforanalternativetransactionachallenge:(3drightarrow)TheSpecialCommitteeisunabletoprovideinformationorengageindiscussionsconcerninganyofourproposalsunlesssuchofferfallssquarelywithinthedefinitionofa"SuperiorProposal"(3drightarrow)Thesignificantterminationfee(upto$450millionplusdiligencefees)payabletoSilverLake(3drightarrow)OnerousmatchingrightsforMichaelDell/SilverLakeStockholdersshouldbegivenaneasierpathtosupportanalternativetransactionbyvotingfornewdirectors:(3drightarrow)ByholdingacombinedAnnualMeetingandSpecialMeeting,stockholderswouldhavehadarealchoicetorejecttheMichaelDell/SilverLakedealandatthesametimeelectnewdirectorsonourproposedplatform(3drightarrow)Unfortunately,theBoardhaschosentoholdaseparateSpecialMeetingratherthanholdbothmeetingsconcurrentlySource:DellProxy Statementfiled3/29/13.

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Dell'sStockholdersDeserveBetterStockholdershavethepowertodemandandreceivemore.oIftheMichaelDell/SilverLaketransactionisrejected:1)Itcanbeamended2)TheBoardcan(and,inIcahnandSoutheastern'sopinion,probablywould)explorethemanyalternativestotheMichaelDell/SilverLakeproposal,asproposedbyIcahnandSoutheastern,amongothers3)Dell'sownerscanelectnewdirectorsinsupportofaplatformtoimplementtheproposed$14pershareDellselftender.IcahnandSoutheasternhavegivenadvancednoticeoftheirintenttorunaslateofdirectorsatthe2013AnnualMeetingoUnderthesecircumstances,IcahnandSoutheasternbelievethatpredictionsaboutaprecipitousdeclineinthemarketvalueofDellstockiftheMichaelDell/SilverLaketransactionisrejectedbyshareholdersareexaggerated

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ConclusionDell'sownersshouldrejecttheMichaelDell/SilverLaketransactionandforceBoardexplorationandpursuitofanalternativetransactionthatwouldenableDell'sexistingownerstoreapthebenefitsoftheirmultiyearinvestmentinDell'stransformationthevaluethatMichaelDellandSilverLakewouldkeepforthemselves.

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Appendix

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PublicCompsStorageNTMMultiplesCompanyEV/SalesEV/OCFEV/OIP/EEMC2.4x6.3x6.9x12.4xNetApp1.3x6.5x9.6x13.8xAverage1.9x6.4x8.3x13.1xServicesNTMMultiplesCompanyEV/SalesEV/OCFEV/OIP/EAccenture1.3x9.7x10.5x17.3xComputerSciences0.6x3.6x6.6x12.2xWipro2.6x9.0x9.8x12.8xCognizant2.7x8.6x8.9x14.5xAverage1.8x7.7x9.0x14.2xEndUserComputingNTMMultiplesCompanyEVEV/SalesEV/OCFEV/OIP/ELenovo6,4030.2x5.3x6.2x12.5xAcer1,0200.1x5.8x9.2x25.7xAsustek5,7760.4x6.4x6.8x9.6xAverage0.2x5.9x7.4x15.9xIntegratedSolutionsNTMMultiplesCompanyEVEV/SalesEV/OCFEV/OIP/EHewlettPackard60,5250.4x4.3x5.6x6.7xSource:FactSetasof6/21/13.

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DerivationofServers&NetworkingMultipleServers&NetworkingA5yeardiscountedcashflowmodelusingthefollowingassumptionsyieldsavalueofapproximately0.75xrevenues:Assumptions:AnnualRevenueGrowth:3.0%Gartner'sforecastedworldwideservermarketrevenueCAGRthrough2017asof6/14/13Year1OIMargin:6.0%BasedonFY'13operatingmarginsprovidedin9/24/12JPMpresentationtotheSpecialCommitteeIncrementalMargin:11.6%Basedonpeermedianoperatingmarginsprovidedin9/24/12presentationtotheSpecialCommitteeTerminalNetEarningsMultiple:12.5xDell'scurrentP/EmultipleDiscountRate:8.0%TaxRate:20.0%9/21managmentplanvs.peers'StreetprojectedperformanceComparisionofrevenue,grossmarginandoperatingmarginprojectionsDenaliPeermedianComparisonBasedonCYERevenuegrowth'12E13EGrossmargin'13EOperatingmargin'13ERevenuegrowth'12E'13EGrossmargin'13ERevenuegrowth'12E'13EGrossmargin'13EOperatingmargin'13EServers5.0%[]%6.2%3.3%40.1%11.1%ESGNetworking43.0%[]%(6.3%)5.8%63.519.3%Storage113.0%[]%2.4%6.8%49.7%13.3%S&P2.0%[]%8.4%2.5%8.7%2.3%EUC0.9%[]%2.5%8.0%11.7%3.2%Services4.1%[]%28.5%2.9%24.5%11.2%Software247.6%[]%(1.7%)5.3%85.2%35.9%Source:Denali'supdatedprojectionsas09/21/12,WallStreetresearch,FactSet,Companyfilings1NoperfectcomparablesavailablefortheStoragesegmentNetAppandEMCreferencedasclosestpeers22012Denalisoftwarerevenueassumedtobeconsensus2012Questrevenue[]indidicatesinfomrationthathasbeenomittedonthebasisofaconfidentialtreatmentrequestpursuanttoRule24b2oftheExchangeActandhasbeenfiledseparatelywiththeSEC.DENALIJ.P.MorganSource:J.P.Morgan9/24/12presentationtotheSpecialCommittee.

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ImportantDisclosureInformationSPECIALNOTEREGARDINGTHISPRESENTATIONTHISPRESENTATIONINCLUDESINFORMATIONBASEDONDATAFOUNDINFILINGSWITHTHESECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSION,INDPENDENTINDUSTRYPUBLICATIONSANDOTHERSOURCES.ALTHOUGHWEBELIEVETHATTHEDATAISRELIABLE,WEHAVENOTSOUGHT,NORHAVEWERECEIVED,PERMISSIONFROMANYTHIRDPARTYTOINCLUDETHEIRINFORMATIONINTHISPRESENTATION.MANYOFTHESTATEMENTSINTHISPRESENTATIONREFLECTOURSUBJECTIVEBELIEFICAHNENTERPRISESL.P.("ICAHN")ANDSOUTHEASTERNASSETMANAGEMENT,INC.("SAM")HAVEFILEDAPRELIMINARYPROXYSTATEMENTWITHTHESECREGARDINGTHEMANAGEMENTBUYOUTPROPOSALOFDELL,ASCONTEMPLATEDBYTHEAGREEMENTANDPLANOFMERGER,DATEDASOFFEBRUARY5,2013,BYANDAMONGDENALIHOLDINGINC.,DENALIINTERMEDIATEINC.,DENALIACQUIRORINC.ANDDELL.BEFOREMAKINGANYVOTINGDECISION,STOCKHOLDERSOFDELLAREURGEDTOREADICAHNANDSAM'SDEFINITIVEPROXYSTATEMENT,WHENITBECOMESAVAILABLE,CAREFULLYINITSENTIRETY,BECAUSEITWILLCONTAINIMPORTANTINFORMATIONABOUTTHEMANAGEMENTBUYOUTPROPOSAL.STOCKHOLDERSOFDELLMAYOBTAINFREECOPIESOFTHEDEFINITIVEPROXYSTATEMENT,WHENITBECOMESAVAILABLE,ANDOTHERDOCUMENTSFILEDWITH,ORFURNISHEDTO,THESECBYSAMANDICAHNATTHESEC'SWEBSITEATWWW.SEC.GOVORBYCONTACTINGD.F.KING&CO.TOLLFREEAT18003474750.INFORMATIONRELATINGTOTHEPARTICIPANTSINSUCHPROXYSOLICITATIONISCONTAINEDINTHESCHEDULE13DFILEDBYCARLC.ICAHNANDHISAFFILIATESONMAY10,2013,ASAMENDEDTHORUGHTHEDATEHEREOF,ANDTHESCHEDULE13DFILEDBYSOUTHEASTERNASSETMANAGEMENT,INC.ANDITSAFFILIATESONFEBRUARY8,2013,ASAMENDEDTHROUGHTHEDATEHEREOF.FORWARDLOOKINGSTATEMENTSCertainstatementscontainedinthispresentationareforwardlookingstatementsincluding,butnotlimitedto,statementsthatarepredicationsoforindicate futureevents,trends,plansorobjectives.Unduerelianceshouldnotbeplacedonsuchstatementsbecause,bytheirnature,theyaresubjecttoknownandunknownrisksanduncertainties.Forwardlookingstatementsarenotguaranteesoffutureperformanceoractivitiesandaresubjecttomanyrisksanduncertainties.Duetosuchrisksanduncertainties,actualeventsorresultsoractualperformancemaydiffermateriallyfromthosereflectedorcontemplatedinsuchforwardlookingstatements.Forwardlookingstatementscanbeidentifiedbytheuseofthefuturetenseorotherforwardlookingwordssuchas"believe,""expect,""anticipate,""intend,""plan,""estimate,""should,""may,""will,""objective,""projection,""forecast,""managementbelieves,""continue,""strategy,""position"orthenegativeofthosetermsorothervariationsofthemorbycomparableterminology.Importantfactorsthatcouldcauseactualresultstodiffermateriallyfromtheexpectationssetforthinthispressreleaseinclude,amongotherthings,thefactorsidentifiedunderthesectionentitled"RiskFactors"inDell'sAnnualReportonForm10KfortheyearendedFebruary1,2013andunderthesectionentitled"CautionaryStatementConcerningForwardLookingInformation"inDell'sDefinitiveProxyStatementfiledonMay31,2013.Suchforwardlookingstatementsshouldthereforebeconstruedinlightofsuchfactors,andSAMandIcahnareundernoobligation,andexpresslydisclaimanyintentionorobligation,toupdateorreviseanyforwardlookingstatements,whetherasaresultofnewinformation,futureeventsorotherwise,exceptasrequiredbylaw.

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AboutSoutheasternAssetManagement,Inc.

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Southeastern,headquarteredinMemphis,Tenn.,isaninvestmentmanagementfirmwith$34billioninassetsundermanagementactingasinvestmentadvisortoinstitutionalinvestorsandthefour LongleafPartnersFunds:LongleafPartnersFund,LongleafPartnersSmallCapFund,LongleafPartnersGlobalFundandLongleafPartnersInternationalFund,aswellastwoIrishdomiciledUCITS Funds:LongleafPartnersGlobalUCITSFundandLongleafPartnersUSUCITSFund.Southeasternwasestablishedin1975,andthefirstoftheLongleafPartnersFundswaslaunchedin1987. ImportantLegalInformation SoutheasternintendstofileotherdocumentswiththeU.S.SecuritiesandExchangeCommission(theSEC)regardingtheproposedacquisitionofDell,ascontemplatedbytheAgreementandPlanof Merger,datedasofFebruary5,2013,byandamongDenaliHoldingInc.,DenaliIntermediateInc.,DenaliAcquirorInc.andDell.Beforemakinganyvotingorinvestmentdecision,investorsand securityholdersofDellareurgedtoreadsuchotherdocumentsregardingtheproposedacquisition,carefullyintheirentirety,becausetheycontainimportantinformationabouttheproposed transaction.InvestorsandsecurityholdersofDellmayobtainfreecopiesofotherdocumentsfiledwith,orfurnishedto,theSECbySoutheasternattheSECswebsiteatwww.sec.gov. ForwardlookingStatements Certainstatementscontainedhereinareforwardlookingstatementsincluding,butnotlimitedto,statementsthatarepredicationsoforindicatefutureevents,trends,plansorobjectives.Unduereliance shouldnotbeplacedonsuchstatementsbecause,bytheirnature,theyaresubjecttoknownandunknownrisksanduncertainties.Forwardlookingstatementsarenotguaranteesoffutureperformance oractivitiesandaresubjecttomanyrisksanduncertainties.Duetosuchrisksanduncertainties,actualeventsorresultsoractualperformancemaydiffermateriallyfromthosereflectedorcontemplated insuchforwardlookingstatements.Forwardlookingstatementscanbeidentifiedbytheuseofthefuturetenseorotherforwardlookingwordssuchasbelieve,expect,anticipate,intend, plan,estimate,should,may,will,objective,projection,forecast,managementbelieves,continue,strategy,positionorthenegativeofthosetermsorothervariationsofthem orbycomparableterminology.

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