SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132159. January 18, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAR GIVERA y GAROTE, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decisioni of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City finding accused-appellant Cesar Givera y Garote guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the suit. The information in this case, dated April 10, 1995, charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused [ CESAR GIVERA], conspiring together, confederating with EPEFANIO GAYON y GERALDE ii and ARTURO GAYON y GERALDE, and mutually helping one another who were charged with the same offense at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, and docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-44315, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS, by then and there stabbing him with a knife hitting him on the different parts of his body, and striking him with a piece of stone on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS. CONTRARY TO LAW.iii

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on April 10, 1996, whereupon he was tried. Accused-appellants companions, namely Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera, were separately prosecuted and found guilty of murder by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, Quezon City in a decision, dated June 6, 1994, in Crim. Case No. Q-93-44315. The three were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P100,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal to this Court, the decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. We instead find accused-appellants EPIFANIO GAYON, ARTURO GAYON and MAXIMO GIVERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER committed with grave abuse of superior strength and imposes upon each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law, and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eusebio Gardon in the amount of P100,000.00. Costs against accused-appellants.iv

For the prosecution, the victims daughter Milagros Gardon and his niece Melinda Delfin were presented as witnesses. On the other hand, only accused-appellant testified in his defense. The incident took place at about 4 p.m. on May 2, 1993 at Purok IV, Area 5, Laura St., Old Balara, in Diliman, Quezon City. Milagros Gardon testified on direct examination:v
Q: Particularly about 4:00 p.m., were you at your residence at that time? A: Yes, sir. Q: And what were you doing there at that time? A: I was in the house because I was watching my father, sir. Q: What was your father doing at that time? A: I let him go to sleep because he was a little bit drunk, and I was watching him so that he will not go outside. Q: Why do you say you were watching him so that he would not anymore go out? A: Because he was warned by [accused-appellant Cesar Givera] that if he goes outside, he will kill my father. Q: At that time and place while you were watching your father, what else happened if any? .... A: [O]ur house was being stoned. Q: Who was stoning your house? Could you tell us who was throwing stones to your house? .... COURT: She mentioned that because her father was not coming out of the house, the accused started stoning the house. Q: Who was stoning your house? A: Cesar Givera, sir. Q: Was he alone at that time? A: They were in a group, sir, but he was the only one stoning the house. And the other one, who was already arrested, by the name of Onying went inside the house. Q: You said a while ago that there was somebody with Cesar who went to your house, could you recall that somebody? A: Onying [Epifanio Gayon], sir.

Q: You said he was already nakakulong? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, what happened after this person Cesar and the other one Onying went inside the house? A: Onying asked my father to go out of the house while Cesar was stoning the house. Onying led my father out of the house, and when they were already outside, Cesar was waiting for them. Then Cesar scampered away and my father followed him. Cesar caused my father to run after him until they reached the place where there was another person, and that person stabbed my father. Q: So how many persons in all have you seen? A: They were four in all, sir. .... Q: What did these 4 persons do when her father was with them if any? .... A: Cesar was stoning the house. Then Onying got my father from the house. Turing [Arturo Gayon] told the other one to stab my father while the one who stabbed my father was waiting under the bridge. .... Q: What happened to your father after you said he was stabbed or mauled? A: After he was stabbed, the person who stabbed him ran away, sir.

On cross-examination, Milagros Gardon said:vi

Q: Who else were with you at that time? A: My brother and sister, sir. Q: They were Laura Gardon and Leonardo Gardon, correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And your father inside the house because he was already resting after having been from a drinking spree, correct? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: And you were watching TV at that time, correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And then suddenly you heard stones being thrown on the roof of your house, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: This Onying [Epifanio Gayon] suddenly entered your house, correct? A: Yes, sir.

Q: He was alone when he entered your house, correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: How did he effect his entrance in your house? A: He went inside directly, sir. .... Q: At that time were you in a position so as to see him actually effect his entrance through the front door? A: Yes, sir. Q: Why? Where were you at that time? A: I was in the sala, sir. Q: You were in the sala right next to your father, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And likewise with your two other companions Laura and Leonardo, they were situated right near to your father, correct? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: Now, when this Onying entered the house, did he call out the name of your father if you can remember? A: Yes, sir. Q: And your father, did he give any response thereto? A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was his response if any? A: He asked Onying if he need anything. And Onying asked him to go out with him. .... Q: And your father stood up and joined Onying in going out of the house? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: Then you together with your two other companions got back to watching the television show is that correct? A: No, sir. Q: But you stayed inside the house, you and your two other companions? A: No, sir. Q: Now, thereafter you heard stones thrown again towards your house, is that correct? A: Yes, sir.

Q: But just the same, you did not peep out through any opening of your house for safety? A: We were already outside when they were stoning the house. We followed him outside. .... Q: Was Onying also hit by any of those stones? A: No, sir. Only my father and my sister. Q: What is the name of that sister of yours who was also hit? A: Laura Gardon, sir. .... Q: And where was Laura hit? A: At her left shoulder, sir. Q: And how many stones if you know hit Laura? A: Only one, sir, because while they were stoning they were running away. Q: Who were these people running away? A: Onying and Cesar, sir. Q: Are you saying that Onying also stoned your father? A: No, sir. Q: Because he was right next by your father at that time, that is why he was not at all stoning your father, correct? A: He was boxing him. .... Q: You saw Cesar Givera actually stoning towards the direction of your father, is that what you mean? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: And your father followed Cesar Givera, is that what you mean? A: Yes, sir. Q: Likewise, with Onying, he followed Cesar Givera? A: Yes, sir. Q: And they ran quite a distance, correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And then you lost sight of them yes or no? A: No, sir. Q: But you stayed in the house, correct?

A: No, sir. I was outside the house. When the incident happened, I was already outside the house. Q: But because you did not state that you also followed your father as he ran after Cesar, does that mean that you just stayed in front of your house? A: We stopped because we already saw the place where my father was stabbed, that is why we did not follow them. Q: How far did they get, using as reference the front door of your house? How far did they get as they ran away? A: About fifteen meters away, sir. Q: Did they not turn corners? A: It is straight, sir. They only made a turn after the stabbing incident, sir. Q: They turned a corner after your father was stabbed? A: Yes, sir, because they ran away, sir. Q: Only one of the accused stabbed your father, correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And who was this? A: Bingo Givera [Maximo Givera], sir. Q: Did you actually see him stab your father? A: Yes, sir.

On re-direct examination, Milagros said:vii

Q: Madam witness, you said a while ago that you saw while your father was stabbed, and the name of that person is Onying who stabbed your father? A: Maximo Givera, sir. .... Q: Now, when you saw Maximo Givera stab your father, where was Cesar at that time? .... A: He was also at the same place, sir. Q: And the other 3 accused Arturo Gayon and Efipanio Gayon, could you tell us where they were when Maximo was stabbing your father? A: They were also at that place, sir.

Melinda Delfin, niece of the victim, corroborated the testimony of Milagros Gardon. She said:viii
Q: At about 4:00 p.m. of May 4, 1993, could you tell us where you were at that time? A: Yes, sir, I was about to reach the house of Eusebio Gardon. Q: What was your purpose in going there? A: Eusebio Gardon called me up because he has just come from Bicol and he will give me rice.

Q: You said you were about to arrive at the residence of Eusebio Gardon at 4:00 p.m. on May 4, 1993, what did you notice or observe when you were about to arrived at that place of his residence? A: I saw Onying [Epifanio Gayon] with his hand on the shoulder of Eusebio Gardon going out of their yard. (Nakita ko si Onying akbay akbay si Eusebio Gardon palabas sa bakuran nila.) .... Q: What else did you notice? A: When I came out of the gate I saw Cesar Givera boxed Eusebio Gardon. (Paglabas ko ng bakuran nakita ko si Cesar na sinalubong ng suntok si Eusebio Gardon.) .... Q: What else did you see aside from the fact that you saw Cesar Givera boxing Eusebio Gardon? A: Cesar boxed him and also Onying boxed him, they both helped each other in boxing Eusebio Gardon, and then they back to the house of Eusebio Gardon and my uncle followed them. Not quite far, Bingo [Maximo Givera] and Turing [Arturo Gayon] were there. .... Q: And what happened when you said this Bingo was there? A: Onying and Cesar gave fistic blows to Eusebio Gardon and he was also stabbed by Bingo, and they were also kicking Eusebio Gardon. Q: Eusebio Gardon was boxed by Onying and Cesar Givera? A: Yes, sir. Q: And stabbed by? A: Bingo, sir. Q: Actually, how many persons were there when [Eusebio] Gardon was stabbed and being boxed? A: I saw four of them, sir. Q: Would you made these four (4)? A: Turing, Bingo, Cesar and Onying. .... Q: And what happened to Eusebio Gardon, whom you said was boxed, mauled and then stabbed? A: He was lying down under the bridge for about thirty (30) minutes, and then his children arrived. .... Q: You said earlier that you saw Cesar Givera and Epifanio Givera threw stones towards the victims house, is that true? PROSECUTOR CONCHA: Excuse me, Your Honor, the witness said she saw that fellow by the name of Onying and Cesar

boxing - - ? WITNESS: Suntok, bato at sipa. ATTY. MASCALAS: Q: Where did you see them doing these acts on Eusebio? A: Outside the premises, sir. Q: Whose premises? A: The premises of Eusebio Gardon, sir. Q: Did you not say earlier that Onying came out with Eusebio Gardon from the latters house? A: I saw Onying, akbay-akbay niya.. Q: You even saw Onying embracing Eusebio Gardon, correct? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: Were there stones being hurled to Onying and Eusebio? A: Yes, sir. Q: Did you see who were throwing those stones? A: It was Cesar, sir. .... Q: Did you see if Gardon was hit by any of these stones? A: Yes, sir. Q: And you also saw Onying hit by stones, correct? A: No, sir. .... Q: Who boxed your uncle? A: Cesar, sir. Q: Are you saying that Cesar while throwing stones to your uncle was so close to him that he was able to box him? A: Because they were advancing towards my uncle and Onying. They were going towards them. .... Q: And when they were able to come near, how near did Cesar get to your uncle? A: Maybe three to four meters, sir. Q: That was when Cesar boxed your uncle? A: Not yet, sir.

Q: When did Cesar box your uncle? A: When they come near to my uncle. .... Q: And then Cesar Givera ran away and your uncle gave chase? A: Yes, sir. Q: And upon reaching the bridge which is about fifteen (15) meters away from the victims house, you saw Bingo stabbed your uncle? A: Yes, sir. Q: There were only -- You said that there were only four (4) persons in that place where your uncle was stabbed and those persons do not include Milagros Gardon? A: No, sir. Q: Because Milagros Gardon was still in their house? A: She was already outside their house. Q: She was outside their house -- although outside their house she was still inside the premises of their lot? A: She was still inside, but she saw the incident. Q: And that premises of the victim was about 15 meters away from the bridge where the alleged incident took place? A: Yes, sir. Q: Were you also with Milagros Gardon at the time that stabbing was done? A: We were not together but I was approaching their house. .... Q: So you were also about 15 meters away from the bridge where the alleged incident took place? A: Yes, sir. Q: And that is your distance when you were claiming that you saw this incident? A: It was just a little less. (Makalampas lang ng konti). .... Q: It was Turing Gayon [Arturo Gayon] whom you heard shout: Sige, todasin na yan! A: Yes, sir. Q: And it was Bingo [Maximo Givera] whom you saw stabbed your uncle? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: You said that it was Bingo who stabbed the victim Eusebio Gardon. You said that you saw it?

A: Yes, sir. Q: What was Cesar Givera doing when the victim was stabbed by Bingo? A: They were kicking and boxing my uncle. Q: Givera was doing that? I was asking you about Cesar Givera? A: He was boxing and kicking my uncle. Q: Who, Eusebio Gardon, the victim? A: Yes, sir.

To prove the fact and cause of death of Eusebio Gardon, the prosecution presented in evidence the testimonyix of medico-legal officer, P/Maj. Florante Baltazar, given in Criminal Case No. Q-93-44315. The testimony shows that the victim sustained one fatal stab wound possibly caused by a single bladed weapon.x In addition, he sustained abrasions in his lower chin, possibly hitting a rough surface, as well as an incised wound caused by a bladed weapon, on his posterior middle left arm.xi The stab wound appears to be fatal because it pierced the pericardium and left ventricle of the heart, which could be the immediate effect of hemorrhage, shock and eventual death of the victim.xii A death certificatexiii evidencing the death of the victim was presented by the prosecution. Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He was a resident of Laura St., Old Balara, Quezon City at the time of the incident. He denied any involvement in the killing of the victim who was his relative by affinity.xiv Accused-appellant claimed that at the time of the incident on May 2, 1993, at around 4:00 p.m., he was having a drink in his cousins house, some 30 meters away from the victims house. On the other hand, Maximo Givera and Arturo Gayon were in the victims house also having drinks. Accused-appellant said he was fetched by his cousin, Recto Gardon, because Maximo and the victim Eusebio Gardon were having an altercation. He went to pacify the protagonists and then led the victim to his house. Without his knowledge, however, Eusebio went back and again engaged Maximo in a fist fight, as a result of which the victim Eusebio was knocked down. Accused-appellant said he was going to help the victim get up, but he saw the victims son, Ronilo Gardon, coming with a bolo. He, therefore, ran away and left the victim behind. He added, that he did not see if his three companions did anything more than box the victim.xv Accused-appellant said he learned that the victim had died only two days after the incident.xvi Accused-appellant was arrested on May 4, 1996 at the East Avenue Medical Center. He stated that the children of the victim implicated him in the killing of Eusebio Gardon only because he was present when the incident happened.xvii On August 29, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:xviii
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Cesar Givera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged. The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants sole assignment of error is that

DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT, THE COURT A QUO HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED

The appeal has no merit. First. The prosecution presented evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant and his companions (Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera), all of whom were convicted of murder in another case, were responsible for the killing of Eusebio Gardon on May 2, 1993. Milagros Gardons testimony, an excerpt from which is quoted at the beginning of this opinion, is spontaneous, detailed, and consistent. The defense tried to discredit through cross examination, but, as shown earlier, the defense only succeeded in enabling her to give further details of her testimony in chief. There are apparent lapses in the testimony of Milagros, as when she testified that she knew at the very beginning that it was accused-appellant who was stoning their house when in fact, as she admitted, she only knew this because the victim said so. Moreover, it may be doubted whether the victims other daughter, Laura, was hit by the stones hurled by accused-appellant as she came out of their house, since the door of the house was so narrow that only one person at a time could pass through it. Nonetheless, a close reading of the records will show that indeed it was accused-appellant who was stoning the house because when the witness followed the victim outside, she saw accused-appellant throwing stones at their house. She then saw accused-appellant hitting the victim with stones. In the process, Laura was also hit. In any event, these discrepancies are minor and insignificant and do not detract from the substance of her testimony. This Court has time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony.xix Thus, according to Milagros Gardon, accused-appellant taunted the victim and challenged him to come out of the house. After succeeding in drawing the victim out of his house, accusedappellant and his companions ganged up on him, kicking and pummeling him and finally stabbing him. Milagros testimony belies accused-appellants claim that he was merely trying to pacify the victim and Maximo Givera and that he ran away because the victims son, armed with a bolo, charged at him (accused-appellant). There was no reason for the victims son to want to attack accused-appellant, if the latter was merely trying to help the victim. Nor is it probable that accused-appellant did not see what his companions did to the victim aside from giving him fist blows and kicks, because according to accused-appellant, he ran away shortly after they had attacked the victim. As accused-appellant said he saw the assailants run way, this could only be after they had been done with their victim. The defense also tries to discredit the testimony of the other prosecution witness, Melinda Delfin. It is contended that, contrary to her claim, she was not really present at the incident. For

this purpose, it is pointed out that she failed to give a sworn statement regarding said incident to the police. The contention has no merit. As Melinda explained, she did not give a statement to the police because she was told they would call on her later for her statement. Melinda testified:xx
Q: The police did not get your statement because you did not tell them that you were an eyewitness and if it is true, correct? A: No, sir. Q: You were only asked by your relatives - - You testified in this case in the sala of Judge Asuncion after the children of the victim asked you to? Correct? A: They did not tell me. I voluntarily testified, sir, because I saw the incident. Q: What do you mean by saying that you voluntarily testified? Did you just come to court and asked the court to take you as witness in this case? A: No, sir, because in the police station the police told me that they will not take my statement. They will just ihahabol na lang ako. Q: Did you not inquire from them why your statement will not longer be taken and what do you mean by that ihahabol na lang ikaw? A: I did not ask because I do not know anything about that. That was the first time that incident happened to my life.

It is noteworthy that both Milagros Gardon and Melinda Delfin knew accused-appellant and the other assailants, and that in fact some of them are related to the witnesses. Accused-appellant has not shown that these witnesses were motivated by ill will against him. As correctly observed by the trial court:xxi
[T]he court has no reason to doubt the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In the first place, accused Cesar Givera has not shown any motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify as they did against said accused. Second, accused Cesar Givera and the other accused in this case are all residing within the vicinity where the crime was committed, and are even related by affinity to the deceased. There is, therefore, no reason to doubt their identification by the prosecution witnesses.

All things considered, we think the trial court correctly dismissed accused-appellants claim and gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. From the fact that the victim died and that accused-appellant and his companions were the last persons seen with the victim before he died, it can be concluded that they are responsible for the victims death. Second. The allegations of conspiracy in the information have been established. The victim was at home sleeping after coming from a drinking session, when the accused-appellant and his companions stoned his house to force him to come out. When they failed, one of them, Epifanio (Onying) Gayon, went inside the victims house and told him to come out. Disoriented because he was drunk, the victim went with Onying. Once the victim was outside, accused-appellant pelted him with stones, while Onying started raining fistic blows on him. Then Onying and accused-appellant ran away to lure him to go toward the bridge where the other two, Arturo Gayon and Maximo Givera, were waiting. When the victim reached the place, he was attacked

by the gang. He was kicked and boxed by Onying and when Arturo shouted Sige todasin na yan!, Maximo stabbed the victim. The evidence thus clearly and convincingly shows a coordinated action by the group in the execution of the crime. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the victim. The act of each conspirator in furtherance of the common purpose is in contemplation of law the act of all. Consonant with this legal principle, accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of murder as if he himself dealt the deathblow that sent the victim to his grave.xxii Third. However, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case. Where conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be appreciated.xxiii But in an implied conspiracy, such as in this case, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that it cannot be determined if the accused had sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences. There should be a showing that the accused had the opportunity for reflecti on and persisted in effectuating his criminal design which the prosecution failed to establish in the case at bar.xxiv Nor can the qualifying circumstance of treachery be taken into account. The trial court held:xxv
. . . [T]reachery will also be deduced from the evidence on record. The deceased was unarmed when he was stabbed by on Maximo Givera and boxed and kicked by accused Cesar Givera and two other accused. . . . From the evidence adduced, accused Givera and Epifanio Gayon taunted and provoked the deceased by throwing stones at him and then lured him to run after them towards the bridge where the other accused were lying in wait ready to pounce on the deceased without risk to themselves as the deceased was then defenseless.

Treachery is the deliberate and unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown to be present at the inception of the attack, otherwise, even if present at a subsequent stage, it cannot be considered.xxvi In the instant case, the victim cannot be said to have been totally oblivious of the impending attack by all the group of accused-appellant. He thus had every opportunity to escape from the attack. In fact, his daughter Milagros testified that prior to the stoning incident, the victim had been threatened with harm by accused-appellant the moment he went out of his house, which is why she stayed beside her father to make sure he did not go out of the house. Indeed, the victim had been forewarned of the danger posed by accused-appellant and his group. Moreover, by coming out of his house and running after two of the assailants, the victim showed that he was prepared for the attack by accused-appellant and his gang and could have been hardly surprised when he was actually attacked. Treachery must be proven by convincing evidence. The fact that the victim may have been surprised because he had not expected that he

would be outnumbered when he saw two other attackers waiting for him under the bridge is not sufficient to show that the victim was completely unaware of the attack that might come from his assailants.xxvii However, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority was correctly appreciated in this case. The victim was unarmed and was clearly outnumbered by the four assailants, with one of them armed with a knife.xxviii Fourth. Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996 was made without a warrant. This is not true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the court on April 27, 1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest was returned unserved by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest. Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, 4 is only a directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a return to the court.xxix At any rate, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object thereto because he failed to move for the quashal of the information before the trial court, entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial.xxx As this Court has held, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.xxxi On the matter of the admissibility of the testimony of the medico-legal taken in the first case, involving the three other accused for the death of the same victim, offered in evidence in the case at bar, this Court must declare the same inadmissible. As correctly contended by the defense, because they did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Baltazar, his testimony cannot be used in evidence against accused-appellant. Indeed, where the opposing party failed to cross-examine a witness, this Court in several cases held:xxxii
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.

Still and all, the fact and cause of death of the victim had been sufficiently proved by the accounts of the two eyewitnesses, corroborated by the offer in evidence of the death certificate of the victim. Fifth. The award of damages by the trial court in favor of the victim should be modified. Aside from the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity, the heirs of Eusebio Gardon are entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages irrespective of proof thereof.xxxiii WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City finding accused-appellant Cesar Givera y Garote guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid as indemnity, accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of Eusebio Gardon amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 135682 March 26, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO REYES y BATAC, accused-appellant. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 18548-MN finding accused-appellant Danilo Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties and to pay the father of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P47,000.00 as actual damages. The amended information charged accused-appellant and accused Arnel Cergantes y Hadegero with Robbery with Homicide committed as follows: That on or about the 12th day of October 1997, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away one (1) gold necklace, one (1) gold ring, one wristwatch, all of an undetermined value, and a wallet containing unspecified amount of cash owned by and belonging to DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS to the damage and prejudice of the latter, and that on the occasion of or by reason of the said robbery the said accused, conspiring with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, stab with a bladed weapon, the said DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Accused-appellant was the only one arrested and, when arraigned, he entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts: On October 12, 1997, at 2:00 a.m., PO1 Eduardo C. Molato of Station 4, Western Police District, Sampaloc, Manila was on his way home on board a passenger jeepney. When he alighted at the corner of Lapu-lapu Street and Northbay Boulevard South he saw the victim being held up by two persons. The one in front of the victim forcibly took his wristwatch while the other one stabbed him at the back. He fired one warning shot which caused the three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu Avenue. He chased them but when he saw the victim, he hailed a tricycle and asked the driver to bring the victim to the nearest hospital. He continued chasing the suspects up to Phase II until he reached Agora, but the suspects were gone. The incident happened swiftly but PO1 Molato had a good look at the face of the one who stabbed the victim as he was about 8 to 10 meters away from them. Accused-appellant denies the charge against him and insists that he was merely mistaken for accused Arnel Cergontes who had the same protruding lips as he had and with whom he shares a common alias as "Buboy Nguso." He recalled that on October 12, 1997, he was sleeping in his house. He left only at 7:30 in the morning and went to the house of his uncle Dabong to ask for money. On October 16, 1997 at around 7:30 in the morning, police authorities came to Antorium St. looking for "Buboy Nguso." To his surprise, the policemen, without saying anything, handcuffed him and brought him to the Lapu-lapu detachment. Thereafter he was brought to Navotas Police station for further investigation. He claims that he was arrested for possession of a deadly weapon in violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and not in connection with the robbery-homicide case. After trial, the lower court rendered a judgment of conviction which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Danilo Reyes y Batac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294, Paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. Considering that no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime nor alleged in the amended information, said accused is hereby sentenced to the prison term of reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties thereof. Accused Reyes is also condemned to pay the father of the victim the total amount of P147,000.00 broken as follows: 1) P50,000.00 for the loss of the victims life, 2) P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for the pain and sorrow suffered by the victims family, and 3) P47,000.00 by way of actual expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the victim. No pronouncement on the claim for lost valuables and income can be made in view of the failure to substantiate the same. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the PNP Director General and the Director of the WPD so that the superiors of PO1 Eduardo Molato will know that in connection with this case, said policeman while already offduty responded to the commission of a crime, extended assistance to the victim thereof, tried to arrest the malefactors and cooperated with the authorities concerned in the prosecution of this case in a manner that can only be described as a laudable display of civic duty brought about by his orientation as a policeman and for which PO1 Molato is hereby commended. SO ORDERED.3 Hence, this appeal based on the following assigned errors: I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY AND IDENTIFICATION MADE BY PO1 EDUARDO C. MOLATO. Accused-appellant argued that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt for failure of the prosecution to prove the essential requisites of the crime charged. According to him, the vital element of animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established as the taking of the watch could have been a mere afterthought and the real intent of the malefactors was to inflict injuries upon the victim. Moreover, there was no evidence of ownership of the wristwatch, as it may have belonged to the two persons who attacked the victim. Lastly, there was no evidence of conspiracy. The arguments fail to persuade us. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.4 After reviewing the evidence on record of this case, we find that the facts established a clear-cut case of robbery with homicide. Great respect is accorded to the factual findings of the trial court. The trial judge had the best opportunity to observe the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses. It formed first-hand judgment as to whether particular witnesses were telling the truth or not. Thus, absent misapprehension or misinterpretation of facts of weight and substance, and absent any arbitrariness or irregularity, we will not overturn its findings.5 Accused-appellants contention that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established by the prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.6 In the case at bar, the act of taking the victims wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption. Accused-appellant also contends that the ownership of the wristwatch was not proved by the prosecution. He argues that the attackers probably owned the wristwatch and the reason they attacked the victim was to retrieve it. Accused-appellants contention deserves no merit. The detailed narration of how the victim was forcibly divested of the wristwatch by accused Cergontes and stabbed at the back by accused-appellant cannot be taken lightly on the argument that the attackers owned the wristwatch and they attacked the victim solely on their desire to retrieve it. Clearly, this contention is a mere conjecture and has no basis on record. In any event, in robbery by the taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code employs the phrase "belonging to another" and this has been interpreted to merely require that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact, it has been held that robbery may be committed against a bailee or a person who himself has stolen it. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latters will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, robbery is the offense imputable to the offender. If the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the offense is converted into the composite crime of robbery with homicide.7 Likewise unavailing is the contention of accused-appellant that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy. In conspiracy, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.8 In the case at bar, conspiracy was clearly manifested in the concerted efforts of the accused-appellant and his cohort. They were

seen together by PO1 Molato at the unholy hour of 2:50 a.m. forcibly taking the wristwatch of the victim and thereafter stabbing him at the back. Their simultaneous acts indicate a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.9 Accused-appellant faults the trial court for relying on the improbable testimony of PO1 Molato who testified that the victim upon seeing him ran away towards the direction where the two assailants also ran. It is well-settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response where one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience.10 The firing of the warning shot may have frightened the victim and made him act the way he did, especially since PO1 Molato did not identify himself as a police officer before he fired the warning shot. In a last ditch effort to obtain his acquittal, accused-appellant contends that PO1 Molatos testimony was inconsistent because while he initially testified that he boarded the victim on a tricycle and proceeded to chase the two assailants, he later said that upon reaching Agora he saw the victim lying down and sought help from the people around and that no one aided him so he decided to wait for the police. Moreover, despite the presence of bystanders no one was investigated and eventually presented in court in order to corroborate his testimony. We find the inconsistencies to be too trivial as to affect the credibility of PO1 Molato. Slight contradictions such as these even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed nor perjured. What is important is the fact that there is a sustained consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.11 Furthermore, the non-presentation of other witnesses to corroborate the testimony of PO1 Molato is of no consequence. The matter of deciding whom to present as witness for the prosecution is not for the accused or for the trial court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor. More importantly, the testimony of PO1 Molato is sufficient to convict accused-appellant. Courts are not precluded from rendering judgment based on the testimony even of a single witness. The weight and sufficiency of evidence is determined not by the number of the witnesses presented but by the credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony.12 As correctly held by the trial court, accused-appellants defense of alibi and denial cannot prevail over the clear, positive and convincing testimony of PO1 Molato. In the light of the positive identification of accused-appellant as one of the assailants, his denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defenses are negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.13 As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the father of the victim Donaldo Salmoren, Jr. and P50,000.00 as moral damages are in accord with current jurisprudence. 14 The award of actual damages in the amount of P47,000.00 should likewise be upheld, in view of the defenses admission as to the claim for actual damages.15 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 18548-MN, finding Danilo Reyes y Batac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P47,000.00 as actual damages, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

Per Judge Perlita J. Tria Tirona. Also referred in the Records as Efipanio Gayon. Rollo, p. 9. People v. Gayon, 269 SCRA 589 (1997).

ii

iii iv v

TSN, pp. 4-9, 11, Aug. 9, 1996. TSN, pp. 12-16, 18-20,22-24, Aug. 9, 1996. TSN (Milagros Gardon), pp. 26-27, Aug. 9, 1996. TSN (Melinda Delfin), pp. 5-9, 14-15, 18-19, 21-24, Aug. 12, 1996.

vi

vii

viii ix x

RTC Records, pp. 107-126; Exh. E.

RTC Records, pp. 117-118. Id., pp. 113, 115, 120-121. Id., p. 119. Exh. B. TSN (Cesar Givera), p. 4, Oct. 17, 1996.

xi

xii

xiii xiv xv

Id., pp. 5-9; TSN (Cesar Givera), pp. 3-7, 9, Oct. 22, 1996. TSN (Cesar Givera), p. 10, Oct. 17, 1996. Id., pp. 11-13. Rollo, p. 23.

xvi

xvii

xviii xix xx

People v. Barera, 262 SCRA 63 (1996); See People v. Claveria, 221 SCRA 34 (1993).

TSN, pp. 13-14, Aug. 12, 1996. Rollo, p. 66. People v. Alib, G.R. No. 130944, Jan. 18, 2000.

xxi

xxii

xxiii

People v. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 475 (1914); People v. Larion, 2 Phil. 476 (1903); People v. Maquiraya, 14 Phil. 243(1909); People v. Camias, L-4617, May 29, 1953; People v. Timbang and Mallari, 74 Phil. 295 (1943).
xxiv

People v. Custodio, 97 Phil. 698 (1955) People v. Mendoza and Sinuag, 91 Phil. 58 (1952); People v. Yturiaga, 86 Phil. 534 (1950); People v. Lazada, 70 Phil. 525 (1940); People v. Upao Moro, 101 Phil. 1226 (1957); People v. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27 (1934); People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968); People v. Pareja, 30 SCRA 693 (1969).
xxv

Rollo, p. 67. People v. Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222 (1997). See People v. Ramiscal, 49 Phil 103 (1926). See People v. Magnayon, 122 SCRA 23 (1983).

xxvi

xxvii

xxviii xxix xxx

2 F. D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 335 (2000).

People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761 (1998). People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199 (1998). Bachrach Motor Co, Inc. v. CIR, 86 SCRA 27, 32 (1978). See also Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines,

xxxi

xxxii

64 SCRA 610 (1975).

xxxiii

People v. Tolentino, 308 SCRA 485 (1999) citing People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998).

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 136251, 138606 & 138607. January 16, 2001]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERITO AMAZAN, JAIME AMAZAN, and DANILO VILLEGAS, accusedappellants. DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision,xxxiii dated July 8, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, finding accused-appellants Jerito Amazan, Jaime Amazan, and Danilo Villegas guilty of murder, and each of the latter two of attempted homicide and sentencing them accordingly. The informations against accused-appellants alleged:
Crim. Case No. 8494: The undersigned 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses JERITO AMAZAN, JAIME AMAZAN AND DANILO VILLEGAS of San Vicente, Dimasalang, Masbate of the crime of Murder, committed as follows: That on or about April 27, 1997, in the evening thereof, at Barangay San Vicente, Municipality of Dimasalang, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, superiority of strength and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with bolos Artemio Arma, hitting him on the head, thereby inflicting wounds, which caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW. Masbate, Masbate, August 5, 1997.xxxiii Crim. Case No. 8496: The undersigned 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses JAIME AMAZAN of San Vicente, Dimasalang, Masbate of the crime of Frustrated Murder, committed as follows: That on or about April 27, 1997, in the evening thereof at Barangay San Vicente, Municipality of Dimasalang, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and superiority of strength, did then

and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with a bolo Amparo Arma, hitting him (sic) on the left face, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Amparo Arma, which prevented her death. CONTRARY TO LAW. Masbate, Masbate, August 5, 1997.xxxiii Crim. Case No. 8497: The undersigned 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses DANILO VILLEGAS of San Vicente, Dimasalang, Masbate of the crime of Frustrated Murder, committed as follows: That on or about April 27, 1997, in the evening thereof at Barangay San Vicente, Municipality of Dimasalang, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with a bolo Antonio Arma, hitting him on the left face and arm, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Antonio Arma, which prevented his death. CONTRARY TO LAW. Masbate, Masbate, August 5, 1997.xxxiii

Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them, whereupon joint trial of the three cases ensued.xxxiii The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Alberto Arma,xxxiii Amparo Arma,xxxiii and Antonio Arma.xxxiii Their testimonies established the following: Alberto Arma, then 14 years old and son of the deceased Artemio Arma, testified that, at 7 oclock in the evening of April 27, 1997, he and his father, Artemio, went to their farm to graze their carabao.xxxiii The farm is about 30 meters from their house.xxxiii As Artemio was tethering their carabao to a coconut tree, he was struck on the head with a bolo by accused-appellant Jerito Amazan, a nephew of Amparo Arma, Artemios wife. Artemio then turned around, and was stabbed by Jaime Amazan, Jeritos younger brother. Alberto, who was at that time about five meters away, cried for help.xxxiii His mother, Amparo Arma, rushed from their house, accompanied by her daughter-in-law, Lorna. She saw accused-appellants Jerito and Jaime Amazan and Danilo Villegas, a neighbor, all armed with bolos, training their flashlights on the body of Artemio Arma. She asked Jerito what happened to her husband but, instead of receiving an answer, she was hacked on the face with a bolo by Jaime.xxxiii Amparo, Alberto, and Lorna ran towards their house. On the way they met Antonio, Amparos other son. The three (Amparo, Alberto, and Antonio) then went to the place where Artemio lay dead. But as he was trying to help his father, Antonio was struck with a bolo on the face and left hand by Danilo Villegas. Then accused-appellants ran away.xxxiii Amparo and Antonio brought the body of Artemio to their house. It was later brought by Barangay Captain Danilo Almocera to Dr. Ernesto L. Tamayo for autopsy. On the other hand,

Amparo and Antonio proceeded to the hospital of Dr. Alfonso H. Alino at Poblacion, Dimasalang, Masbate for treatment of their wounds.xxxiii Amparo Arma and her son Antonio suffered injuries which are described in the medical certificates (Exhs. D and E, respectively) issued by Dr. Alino, as follows:
April 29, 1997 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that Amparo Arma came to me on April 27, 1997 at 9:30 P.M. for treatment of stab wound on the left face, seven inches long and one inch deep extending from the left ear across the left face close to the left side of the nose. This wound can heal in (for) a period of two weeks unless complication occurs. The patient is confined in the hospital since April 27, 1997 up to this date of issuing the medical certificate. April 30, 1997 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that Antonio Arma came to me for treatment of stab wounds on the left face six inches from the left ear down to the left chin and from the left ear down to the left neck 1 1/2 deep. Then another wound on the dorsum of the left hand 4 long and 2 deep. Thes e wounds can heal in (for) a period of two weeks to three weeks unless complication occurs. The patient was confined on the 27th of April till the 29th of April. This certification is issued on request of the patient for whatever purpose this may serve.xxxiii

Dr. Alino testified that Amparos wound was not fatal. With regard to Antonios wounds, he opined that had medical assistance not been extended to Antonio, his wounds would have caused his death. However, on cross-examination, Dr. Alino admitted that when Amparo and Antonio arrived at the hospital at around 9:30 p.m. on April 27, 1997,xxxiii their wounds were no longer bleeding. He also opined that the wounds which Amparo and Antonio sustained could have been caused by a sharp instrument or a bolo.xxxiii On the other hand, Dr. Ernesto L. Tamayo of the Office of the Municipal Health Officer of Dimasalang, Masbate, who conducted a postmortem examination on the body of Artemio Arma, issued a medico-legal report (Exh. G) containing the following findings:
FINDINGS: = Hacking wound, 5 inches in length, with fructure (sic) of the affected area, parieto-occipital area, left; = Hacking wound, measuring 4 1/2 inches in length, also with fracture of the affected area, parietooccipital area, rt. = Longitudinal contusion, 3 inches in length, abdomen, left.xxxiii

Dr. Tamayo testified that the first two wounds on the head were fatal. Both sides of the skull were fractured and there was massive bleeding in both wounds. He was of the opinion that the two wounds were caused by a sharp-edged instrument, such as a bolo. As to the third injury, Dr. Tamayo opined that this could have been caused by a blunt instrument, i.e., a stone or a piece of wood. It is also possible that the three injuries were caused by two or more persons since the

first two injuries were caused by a sharp instrument, while the last was caused by a blunt instrument.xxxiii The prosecution witnesses disclosed that the probable motive for the killing of Artemio was Jaimes jealousy, because he suspected Artemio of having an affair with his wife.xxxiii The defense gave a different version of the events. Jaime Amazan testified that at 6:30 in the evening of April 27, 1997, he and his brother, Jerito Amazan, gathered tuba and afterward went to the house of Jerito near the boundary of the land of Hermogenes Apues and Amparo Arma. A short time thereafter, Jaime went out to defecate at the farm of the Armas, a little distant from Jeritos house. Before he could do so, however, he saw Amparo, Antonio, Artemio, and Alberto Arma, who were armed with bolos and pieces of wood, coming. He claimed that Artemio and Antonio tried to hit him with their bolos.xxxiii When Jerito Amazan saw his brother Jaime being attacked, he got his bolo and tried to help him. Artemio turned to him and tried to strike him with his bolo, but Jerito was able to parry the blow. At that point, Jaime grabbed Artemios hands, thus enabling Jerito to hit Artemio on the head with his bolo. Artemio dropped his bolo to the ground. Jaime picked it up and used it against Antonio. When Alberto Arma saw that his father and brother had been wounded, he ran away. Amparo tried to hit Jerito with a piece of wood, but the latter was also able to evade the blow and hit her with his bolo. Antonio and Amparo then ran away.xxxiii Jerito helped his wounded brother Jaime to his house and went to Danilo Villegas house to ask for help.xxxiii Danilo Villegas claimed he was then asleep after gathering coconuts. His wife and three children were with him. He said Jerito came to ask for help in bringing his brother to the hospital. With Danilos help, Jaime was taken to the hospital of Dr. Alino for treatment.xxxiii Jerito Amazan then went to the police station and surrendered.xxxiii Jaime also surrendered to the police after being confined in the hospital for four days and reported that he had wounded Antonio Rama.xxxiii As proof of Jaimes injuries and subsequent confinement, the defense presented the medical certificate (Exh. 1) issued by Dr. Alino, dated July 11, 1997, which contains the following:
July 11, 1997 TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that Jaime Amazan was confined in the hospital for treatment of stab wounds on the right shoulder; right forearm below the right elbow, at lateral and on the right leg below to right knee, posterior, on April 27, 1997 at around 9:00 oclock in the evening and discharged on April 30, 1997. The patient was jailed and treatment was continued outside.xxxiii

Dr. Alino testified that the wounds were not fatal, although they were serious. He opined that, if untreated, these wounds could have caused Jaime to bleed to death. He could also have been exposed to tetanus and other severe complications.xxxiii Danilo Villegas was invited by the police for interrogation at the police station and subsequently detained.xxxiii Warrants for the arrest of accused-appellants were issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dimasalang on May 9, 1997.xxxiii

The defense also presented Barangay Captain Daniel Almocera. He testified that at around 7 oclock in the evening of April 27, 1997, he received at home a report of a stabbing incident involving the Armas. He therefore went to the Arma residence with two barangay tanods and found Artemio Arma already dead. Seeing that Amparo and Antonio had been wounded, he had them taken to the hospital for treatment. He was informed by Amparos daughter-in-law that it was Jerito Amazan who caused their injuries. The next morning, he went to the site of the incident and found scattered bloodstains on the ground. The place was near the houses of Jerito Amazan and Hermogenes Apues. Upon further investigation, it was disclosed that the land belonged to the victim Artemio Arma.xxxiii The defense also presented Hermogenes Apues to establish the exact location of the incident. Apues testified that he had been a resident of San Vicente, Dimasalang, Masbate since birth. He knew accused-appellants and the victims. Artemio Arma was, in fact, a relative of his first wife.xxxiii On July 8, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds: 1. In Criminal Case No. 8494, accused Jerito Amazan, Jaime Amazan and Danilo Villegas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER for the killing of Artemio Arma without the presence of any aggravating circumstance, said accused are sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of Artemio Arma the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of life of the latter. 2. In Criminal Case No. 8496, accused Jaime Amazan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE for the wounding of Amparo Arma with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender credited in his favor, said accused is hereby sentenced to a straight penalty of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment. 3. In Criminal Case No. 8497, accused Danilo Villegas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE for the wounding of Antonio Arma, said accused is hereby sentenced to a straight penalty of ONE (1) YEAR and TEN (10) MONTHS imprisonment. Finally, the Provincial Warden of Masbate is hereby directed to ship to the New National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City the above-named accused within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision and to report to this court immediately his compliance thereon. IT IS SO ORDERED.xxxiii

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants raised the following assignment of errors:

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS ATTENDANT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN

JERITO AMAZAN, JAIME AMAZAN AND DANILO VILLEGAS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8494.
IV

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT JERITO AMAZAN.
V

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT JAIME AMAZAN FOR THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8496 HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
VI

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DANILO VILLEGAS FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8497.

First. In their first, fifth, and sixth assignment of errors, accused-appellants raise questions concerning the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They allege contradictions and inconsistencies in the witnesses testimonies, as follows:
A. Inconsistencies in testimony. (1) Alberto Armas confused testimony: (a) as to who between the brothers Amazan hacked Artemio twice; and

(b) that the killing of his father occurred prior to April 27, 1997, while the hacking of his brother and mother took place on April 27, 1997; (2) and (3) The alleged contradiction between Albertos testimony that Amparo was hacked on the trail by Jaime, and Amparos testimony that she was hacked by Jaime while she was asking Jerito what happened to her husband. B. Contradictions between sworn statements and testimony in open court. (1) The inconsistency between Amparos sworn statement that when she arrived at the farm she was hacked by Jaime on the face, and her testimony that Jaime hacked her while she was asking Jerito what happened to her husband; (2) The inconsistency between Antonios sworn statement where he claimed that he was hacked by Danilo Villegas while he was embracing his father, and his testimony in open court that he was hacked while he was standing near his father. Albertos admission on cross-examination that some of his statements were not true;

To begin with, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of substance that, if considered, could have affected the results of the case.xxxiii Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.xxxiii A. In Albertos case, the alleged inconsistencies in his testimony can be explained by his age, his inexperience with court proceedings, and the relative darkness of the place at the time of

the occurrence of the incident. Alberto was only 14 years old and finished only the sixth grade.xxxiii When he testified in court, he was only about 15 years of age. This Court has recognized that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true with young witnesses who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them an ample space for inaccuracy.xxxiii In this case, Alberto in fact cried during his direct examination. When asked on cross-examination why he cried, he answered he was nervous.xxxiii His answers to the defense counsels questions actually reflected his nervousness when he confusedly answered that his father was killed before April 27, 1997, while his brother and mother were hacked on April 27, 1997. This was obviously not true, as the records of the case show. Albertos failure to state categorically which of the Amazan brothers hit Artemio twice can be easily explained. At 7 oclock in the evening of April 27, 1997, in Brgy. San Vicente, Dimasalang, Masbate, the place was nearly pitch dark as the sun had already set at 5:58 p.m. and the moon did not shine until 10:00 p.m.xxxiii In fact, accused-appellants used flashlights in attacking the victims. The place was surrounded with corn plants and coconut trees, about 15 feet high.xxxiii Furthermore, considering the suddenness and violence of the attack, it is understandable why Alberto failed to perceive clearly what was happening around him as to enable him to keep track of the Amazans individual actions. Albertos statement that some parts of his testimony were not true was due to his failure to understand the questions interposed by the defense counsel. This is evident in the following portion of his testimony:
Q. Were you able to understand your answer when you were asked by the defense counsel, that while you are testifying, you feel nervous because you are not telling the truth, and your answer is yes, sir where you able to pathom (sic) or understand your answer? A. I did not understand. Q. Meaning, you were not able to understand the question asked by the defense counsel? A. Yes, sir.xxxiii

No sane witness would admit that he was nervous because he was not telling the truth. With regard to Amparos testimony, the contradictions pointed out by accused-appellants are more apparent than real. Amparos and Albertos testimonies, which accused-appellants claim are contradictory, are as follows:
Amparos testimony: Q. After that, what happened next? When you arrived there? A. I was asking Jerito as to what happened to my husband, suddenly, Jaime Amazan approached me and hacked me. (TSN, p. 5, April 13, 1998) Albertos testimony: Q. When you shouted for help to your mother what happened next?

A. My mother was hacked by Jaime when they met at the trail. (TSN, p. 12, March 17, 1998)xxxiii

There is really no contradiction between the two testimonies. Amparo and Albertos testimonies are consistent that Jaime Amazan had hacked Amparo. Amparo merely added more details to her narration, which is understandable since she was the one who asked Jerito what was going on. Alberto did not contradict his mothers claim that she was asking Jerito what happened when she was struck by Jaime with a bolo. B. With respect to the contradictions between the sworn statements and the testimonies in court of Amparo and Antonio, it has been observed that such inconsistencies are oftentimes due to the fact that affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves but by others, like police investigators, and are only signed by the affiants.xxxiii In any event, the witnesses should have been shown their prior inconsistent statements and given a chance to explain themselves, as required by Rule 132, 13. This was not done in this case. The witnesses were never confronted during the trial with the alleged inconsistencies between their affidavits and their testimonies and asked to explain them. It is only now on appeal that the question is raised. Moreover, Antonio was not the only one who identified Danilo Villegas as his assailant. Rather, both Amparo and Alberto Arma also testified to the same thing, claiming that they saw Danilo Villegas hack Antonio.xxxiii Antonios seeming uncertainty only reflects his shock at seeing his father lying dead on the ground. Second. Accused-appellants contend that the suddenness of the attack against Artemio Arma alone does not constitute treachery. There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by them to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend himself. Moreover, accused-appellants maintain that the attack was frontal. Hence, the deceased Artemio had a fair warning of the impending attack. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.xxxiii For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.xxxiii In the case at bar, Artemio had no warning of the impending attack. Accused-appellants assertion that the attack was frontal is belied by the report of Dr. Tamayo which shows that the deceased sustained two (2) head wounds at the parieto-occipital area, right and left. In other words, the wounds were inflicted on the upper back part of the skull, indicating that the attack was made from behind. In addition, according to Alberto, Jerito did not draw his bolo until he was near Artemio. Then he hit Artemio on the head.xxxiii The first wound was fatal.xxxiii It rendered the victim helpless against the subsequent attacks of accused-appellants. Third. Accused-appellants allege that there is no evidence of any conspiracy among them but that each one acted independently of the others. They claim that the prosecution failed to produce evidence indicating a common criminal purpose.

Accused-appellants contention has no merit. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.xxxiii In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the victim.xxxiii The agreement may be deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed.xxxiii In this case, all of accused-appellants came together at the place where Artemio was tethering his carabao; the three were present at the time of the attack on Artemio; they were all armed; none of them made any effort to stop the attack on the deceased; and all three of them fled together after attaining their purpose. In fact, both Jerito and Jaime participated in the assault on Artemio. On the other hand, Danilo Villegas participation in the conspiracy was shown by the fact that, after Artemio had fallen on the ground, he checked to ensure that Artemio was really dead. xxxiii Moreover, Villegas turned to Antonio when he saw the latter coming to the aid of his father. Fourth. Accused-appellants insist that it was the victim and the members of his family who were guilty of aggression. According to accused-appellants, when Jerito saw his brother Jaime being attacked, Jerito only tried to help him. But he was met by Artemio who tried to hit him with a bolo. When Artemio tried to strike Jerito again, Jaime caught Artemios hands. This enabled Jerito to strike Artemio with his bolo. As a result, Artemio dropped his bolo on the ground. Jaime then picked it up and used it against Antonio and Amparo. We think the trial court correctly rejected accused-appellants version. For the justifying circumstance of defense of relative to be credited in favor of an accused, the following requisites must be proven: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein.xxxiii The burden is on the accused to prove these elements of selfdefense or defense of relative.xxxiii Here, none of these requisites has been proven by accused-appellants. First, Jeritos claim that he was attacked by Artemio and that it was his defensive action of hitting him frontally which caused Artemios injuries is contrary to the evidence which shows that Artemio suffered wounds at the upper back portion of his head, indicating that the latter was attacked from behind. Second, no reason has been shown why the Armas should attack accused-appellants. Accusedappellants have been neighbors of the victim and the prosecution witnesses for years. Amparo Arma is in fact the aunt of the Amazans, and Alberto and Antonio are their cousins. Third, the seriousness of the wounds sustained by the Armas, compared to the minor injuries suffered by Jaime, makes it improbable that the former were the aggressors. That one of accused-appellants (Jaime Amazan) suffered some injuries which were not fatal only indicates that one or some of the victims fought back. Fifth. The information in Crim. Case No. 8494 (for murder) alleged the presence of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and nighttime. In Crim. Case No. 8496 and 8497 (for frustrated murder), the informations alleged the presence of evident premeditation and treachery. In addition, in Crim. Case No. 8496, the information

alleged the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In all three cases, the lower court correctly ruled that there was no aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Indeed, there is no evidence showing (a) the time when accusedappellants determined to commit the crime; (b) acts manifestly indicating that they had clung to their determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow them opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of their acts and to allow their conscience to overcome the resolution of their will.xxxiii With respect to the allegation of abuse of superior strength in Crim. Case No. 8494, this circumstance cannot be appreciated because it is deemed absorbed in treachery, xxxiii which is present in this case. In Crim. Case No. 8496, however, the trial court erred in not appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength against accused-appellant Jaime Amazan. In United States v. Consuelo,xxxiii it was held that when a man attacks an unarmed and defenseless woman, it constitutes taking advantage of superior strength. This circumstance is clearly shown in the present case by the fact that, without any warning, Jaime attacked Amparo, who was unarmed, as she came to find out what had happened to her husband. On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be appreciated since there is no evidence to show that nighttime was deliberately sought by accused-appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or prevent its discovery or evade capture or facilitate their escape.xxxiii The trial court also correctly credited Jerito and Jaime Amazan with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Jerito Amazan surrendered to the police authorities right after he had brought Jaime Amazan to the hospital.xxxiii The latter (Jaime Amazan) himself surrendered to the police four days later.xxxiii Although Jaime admitted that he surrendered because of fear of reprisal, this fact should not be taken against him for, as the Court has held in another case,xxxiii this circumstance does not detract from the spontaneity of the surrender, nor does it alter the fact that, by giving himself up, he has saved the State the time and trouble of searching for him until arrested. Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the absence of any other aggravating circumstance and the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of Jerito and Jaime Amazan, the trial court correctly found them guilty of murder in Crim. Case No. 8494 and imposed on them the penalty of reclusion perpetuaxxxiii in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court also correctly found Danilo Villegas guilty of murder in Crim. Case No. 8494 and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no other aggravating and mitigating circumstances present. xxxiii We hold, however, that it was error for the trial court to convict Jaime of attempted homicide in Crim. Case No. 8496 for inflicting injuries on Amparo. As the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, the crime committed is attempted murder, in accordance with Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Dr. Alino testified that Amparos injuries were not fatal. In fact, she only went to the hospital for treatment at 9:30 p.m. of April 27, 1997,

two hours after she sustained her injuries, which were no longer bleeding when Dr. Alino treated them.xxxiii But the fact that Jaime hit Amparo on the face with a bolo shows that his intent was not only to injure but to kill. The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. xxxiii The trial court imposed a straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment on Jaime Amazan. xxxiii This penalty should be modified. In accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be anywhere within the range of prision correccional, while the maximum should be prision mayor minimum, considering the absence of any aggravating circumstances and the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. In Criminal Case No. 8497, the trial court correctly found Danilo Villegas guilty of attempted homicide for the injuries inflicted on Antonio Arma. Antonios injuries were not fatal, as can be gleaned from Dr. Alinos testimony that Antonios wounds were no longer bleeding when he arrived at the hospital.xxxiii But the fact that Danilo hacked Antonio on the face shows that his intent was to kill and not merely to injure. The trial court erred in imposing on Danilo Villegas a straight penalty of imprisonment for one (1) year and ten (10) months. In accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the minimum of the penalty should be within the range of arresto mayor and the maximum should be prision correccional medium, in view of the absence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court also correctly awarded the heirs of Artemio Arma the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Artemio Arma.xxxiii However, in line with our recent rulings, the heirs of the victim are also entitled to an additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.xxxiii WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, is MODIFIED as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 8494, accused Jerito Amazan and Jaime Amazan are found guilty of murder and, taking into account the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the killing of Artemio Arma; (2) In Criminal Case No. 8496, accused-appellant Jaime Amazan is found guilty of attempted murder and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional minimum and the maximum of which is eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum. (3) In Criminal Case No. 8497, accused-appellant Danilo Villegas is found guilty of attempted homicide and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is four (4) months of arresto mayor medium and the maximum of which is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium. (4) Accused-appellants Jerito Amazan, Jaime Amazan and Danilo Villegas are ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Artemio Arma the additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

In all other respects the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 129306. March 14, 2003]

People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. James Patano y Marcaida, Ramil Madriaga y Lagonoy and Rosendo Madriaga y Banaag, appellants. DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

For automatic review is the decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 262 in Criminal Case No. 110089-H convicting appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of death. The Amended Information, dated May 15, 1996, charged appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga as well as Oswaldo Banaag, Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte and Jose Doe, with the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, committed as follows:
That on or about March 25, 1996, in Mandaluyong City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused grouping themselves together, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain/kidnap and/otherwise deprived VICENTE UY Y CHUA (NGO LIT POON) of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom, as in fact demand therefore in the amount of TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS had been made by the above-named accused, while detaining said victim in Antipolo, Rizal, until his rescue on March 27, 1996. CONTRARY TO LAW.xxxiii

All three appellants together with Oswaldo Banaag pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged. Their other co-accused Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte and Jose Doe remain at large. Trial ensued. The prosecution presented six witnesses. Kidnap victim Vicente Uy testified as follows -- On March 25, 1996, at around 10:30 in the evening, he was along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, on his way home driving his Nissan Sentra when a black Pajero bumped his car on the left door, drivers side. Both he and the driver of the Pajero got off their respective vehicles. When he told the driver that they have to call a police officer, he was told that the passengers

inside the Pajero were police officers. He was asked to look inside the Pajero. When he did so, the driver suddenly pushed him inside the vehicle while the four other passengers grabbed him. He was blindfolded and his feet and hands were tied. After traveling for about 30 minutes, the vehicle stopped and he was transferred to the baggage compartment of another vehicle. An object was placed on top of him and he was told that it was an armalite. They traveled again for 30 minutes, after which, he was moved, placed on a hard object and covered with something. He was asked if he has ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) to which he replied in the negative. They bargained for a while until the ransom money was pegged at five million pesos (P5,000,000.00). They asked for his telephone number which he gave. After some hours, Uy felt somebody lifting him up, telling him that he was already safe, removing his blindfold and untying him. His daughter Lucy Ngo then entered the room. He was asked if he wanted to go to the hospital but he declined.xxxiii On cross-examination, Uy stated that when his blindfold was removed, he saw two handcuffed men. He pointed to appellant Rosendo Madriaga who was in the courtroom, but Uy declared that he is not certain that Rosendo was the one he had seen handcuffed because the one he saw was wearing a moustache and Rosendo does not have one.xxxiii Chief Inspector Gilbert Cruz, in-charge of operations of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commissions (PACC) Task Force Habagat, testified as follows -- On March 27, 1996, his superior, Supt. Calinisan instructed him to proceed to the residence of Uy as the former received a call from Lucy telling him that there was someone in the house of Virginia Avelita, Uys common-law wife, who claims to know the location of the victim. He went to the house of Lucy and they agreed that he will pose as the familys lawyer. They then went to the house of Virginia. There, he was introduced to appellant Ramil Madriaga who told them that Uy was under the custody of the Antipolo police because he was arrested for swimming without authority at the Villa Cristina Resort (resort for brevity), Antipolo, Rizal, now Antipolo City. Upon his instructions, verification was made by a certain Chief Insp. Quidatoxxxiii who had gone to the resort and learned that the information was false. Together with Lucy and appellant Ramil, Maj. Cruz proceeded to the resort. Upon reaching the resort, Ramil dashed towards cottage no . 2 but Maj. Cruz stopped Ramil. In front of the cottage was a certain Richard Dimal to whom Cruz identified himself as a police officer. He found appellant Rosendo and victim Uy inside the cottage. Dimal and appellant Rosendo were then arrested, handcuffed and brought to the headquarters where they identified a certain Oswaldo Banaag as the tipster of the group.xxxiii Lucy Ngos testimony is as follows -- In the morning of March 26, 1996, she received a call from Virginia Avelita telling her that a certain Ramil Madriaga was at her place with information regarding the whereabouts of her father Vicente Uy, also known as Ngo Lip Poon. She called Maj. Gilbert Cruz and together, they went to Virginias house. There, they met appellant Ramil who informed them that he received a beeper message from his cousin, appellant Rosendo, telling him that the Antipolo police picked up their group and Uy was recovered. Maj. Cruz then instructed Maj. Winnie Quidato to check with the Antipolo police if there was really an arrest made on that day and it was

learned that there was none. Maj. Cruz instructed Quidato to proceed to the resort which they also did together with Lucys uncles and aunts. At the resort, appellant Ramil got off the car and talked to Maj. Cruz who ins tructed Ramil: (O)kay but slowly, do not run or make any move. Halfway towards his cousin, appellant Ramil ran and met appellant Rosendo. Maj. Cruz then ran, followed by his staff. Lucy and her companions were left waiting in the car until Quidato returned and told her that her father is safe, and they proceeded to the cottage. Appellant Ramil approached Lucy and asked her not to include his cousin Rosendo in the case because of Ramils help in the rescue of her father.xxxiii Richard Dimal who was arrested by Maj. Cruz on March 27, 1996, testified as follows -- In the evening of March 25, 1996, he was renting some VHS tapes at the Star Gazer video shop located at Pasig City where he saw his friend Nadel Francisco. They chatted until 12 oclock midnight. Appellant Ramil passed by in his white Toyota Corolla car between 12 oclock and 1 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1996 and invited Dimal to go around to which the latter acceded. They went to the house of Dimal at Cainta, Rizal. Dimal saw a black Nissan Patrol parked in front of his house. Appellant Ramil then called up a passenger of the Nissan Patrol on his mobile phone and told the latter, we cant do it here, we must find a darker place. Then they proceeded to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind its new market. Appellant Ramil alighted from the car and went to the Nissan Patrol. Thereafter, Dimal saw them put something inside the trunk of the car of Ramil. They left Taytay, Rizal and roamed around, with the Nissan Patrol tailing them. When they reached Bulacan, they stopped and Ramil talked to the passengers of the Nissan Patrol. Ramil returned to his car and told Dimal that they will go to Antipolo, Rizal. Upon reaching Antipolo, the passengers of the Nissan Patrol transferred to the car of Ramil. They left the Nissan Patrol behind. Dimal identified Manolo Babac as the driver of the Nissan Patrol and both appellants Rosendo Madriaga and James Patano as well as the two co-accused who are still at-large, Alan Duarte and Jose Doe, as its passengers. When they reached the resort located in Antipolo, Rizal, between 5 oclock and 6 oclock in the morning (March 26, 1996), appellant Ramil opened the trunk of his car. Jose and appellant Patano lifted a person out of the trunk and brought him inside cottage no. 2. Dimal asked appellant Ramil if he could go home but Ramil said that they will all leave together. Ramil and Duarte then left the place. Dimal, appellants Rosendo and Patano, and Jose were left inside the cottage. They all went to sleep. When Dimal woke up, it was between 12 oclock and 1 oclock in the afternoon (March 26, 1996). He went to the resorts restaurant and stayed there for about 30 minutes. When he went back to the cottage, the others were not there anymore. While waiting for Ramil and the others to come back, he took his dinner between 7 oclock and 8 oclock in the evening of March 26, 1996 and he laid down up to 1 oclock early morning of March 27, 1996. When he went out of the cottage to call up somebody because he was confused having been left alone, appellant Rosendo arrived together with Jose. Jose left again at 6 oclock in the morning (March 27, 1996) leaving Dimal and appellant Rosendo inside the cottage. They took their lunch in front of the cottage and waited until around 3 oclock to 4 oclock in the afternoon when appellant Ramil arrived with several companions who he later learned to be the kin of Uy and some police officers. Dimal and appellant Rosendo were left inside the cottage

together with some police officers to wait for their (Dimals and Rosendos) other companions. At 7 oclock in the evening, appellant Patano arrived. They stayed in the resort until the afternoon of the next day and they were brought by the policemen to Camp Crame.xxxiii On cross-examination, Dimal admitted that he was arrested that afternoon of March 27; that he was wearing a moustache at the time of the arrest and that he was the one who fed victim Uy.xxxiii Virginia Virgie Avelita, Uys common-law wife, corroborated the testimony of Lucy and Maj. Cruz regarding appellant Ramils contact with her. Virginia further testified that appellant Ramil related to her the whole kidnapping scenario; that Ramil informed her that the kidnappers were demanding one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) ransom; that Oswaldo Banaag is the gangs tipster; and that Ramil requested her not to involve his cousin Rosendo.xxxiii The last witness for the prosecution, Chief Inspector Winnie Quidato, Chief of the Intelligence and Operation Division of the Task Force Habagat, corroborated some portions of the testimony of Maj. Cruz on the episode at the resort. He also testified that appellant Patano arrived at the resort at around 9 oclock to 10 oclock in the evening of March 27, 1996 bringing with him one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) as payment for the cottage rental.xxxiii The defense presented five witnesses. First to be presented was accused Oswaldo Banaag, family driver of a certain Beverly Tan. He denied any complicity in the crime. Banaag testified that: he was arrested in White Plains, Quezon City, on March 29, 1996 by Maj. Cruz and was brought to Camp Crame; it was only when he was transferred to a detention cell that he met his co-accused; although he knew victim Uy, he thought that he was being charged with the killing of his employer, Reynaldo Tan; he was surprised when he learned that he was being implicated in the kidnapping of Uy.xxxiii Nadel Francisco, a college student taking up Management course, testified that at around 4 oclock to 5 oclock in the afternoon of March 25, 1996, Richard Dimal visited him at his house at de Castro, Pasig City. They chatted for about one hour. Dimal invited him to go swimming in Villa Cristina Resort but he declined because he has an examination the following day. Francisco belied Dimals statement that they were together until 12 oclock midnight as he was already asleep in his house at that time. He further stated that he did not see appellant Ramil Madriaga on said day. xxxiii On crossexamination, Francisco admitted that appellant Ramils girlfriend asked him to testify but he clarified that he was testifying not because of such request, but because of the subpoena issued to him.xxxiii Appellant Rosendo Madriaga testified thus -- At around 8 oclock in the evening of March 25, 1996, Richard Dimal, together with a certain Nestor, went to his house and invited him for a swim in Antipolo, Rizal, as it was Nestors birthday. They arrived at Villa Cristina Resort at around 10 oclock in the evening and rented a cottage table near the pool. While he and Nestor were swimming, he saw Dimal talk to some men and then go

upstairs. Later, he noticed that Nestor was no longer around. Afterwards, Dimal came back and invited him to drink. They went to a veranda and there, he saw Nestor drinking Fundador with the same men he previously saw talking to Dimal. Appellant Rosendo recalls the names of two of the men as Allan and Bong. At around 4 oclock in the morning (March 26, 1996), Dimal confided to him that they were going to actually stand guard over a person. Dimal pulled him towards a room where Rosendo saw a person with bound feet and hands lying on his belly on the floor. When Rosendo told Dimal that he wanted to leave, he was told that Bongs group had men post ed at the gate and he might be killed if he left. Scared, he stayed inside the room. Per instructions of Dimal, Rosendo burned all the things belonging to the captive but Rosendo kept a PLDT bill. When Dimal had gone asleep, Rosendo went to the resorts canteen and called the number of Virginia Avelita reflected on the PLDT bill but the person answering the phone hung up on him several times. He then called up his cousin, appellant Ramil Madriaga, and asked for his help. Ramil initially didnt want to intervene but eventually agreed to help him. He gave the number on the phone bill and appellant Ramil assured him that he will contact such person. He then went back to the veranda where he slept. The next day (March 27, 1996), between 3 oclock and 4 oclock in the afternoon, he heard somebody calling his name, and saw appellant Ramil who was with several armed men, running towards him. Dimal then ran and threw a gun near the trees.xxxiii Appellant Rosendo further testified that he saw appellant James Patano for the first time in the afternoon of March 28 on board a van at the resort,xxxiii while he saw Oswaldo Banaag for the first time at the PACC office.xxxiii Rosendo avers that Dimal implicated him because the latter thinks he was the one who caused his arrest. xxxiii Further, Rosendo testified that in the room where he, Patano and Dimal were brought by Maj. Cruz, victim Uy only pointed to Dimal as the one who kidnapped him.xxxiii Appellant James Patano recounted that: on March 28, 1996, after having gone for a swim, Maj. Quidato arrested him while he was urinating in one of the corners in the resort; he was brought inside a comfort room in one of the cottages where he was asked if he knew Dimal or appellant Rosendo; when he was brought out of the room, he was already unconscious as he was mauled and a plastic bag was placed on his head; he regained consciousness inside a vehicle; from the resort, he was brought to the PACC office; at the PACC office, Dimals kin, particularly Dimals sister Arlene and her husband Willie Pangan, asked him to testify against the Madriagas, but he turned them down; and he was also asked to sign an affidavit but he likewise refused. Patano further denied knowing his co-accused in the case.xxxiii Appellant Ramil Madriaga asserts his innocence of the crime charged. He testified as follows -- In the early morning of March 26, 1996, his cousin Rosendo called him up asking for his help. Rosendo told Ramil that he was in the resort and was unexpectedly mixed up in a kidnapping; that he could not get out of the resort because there were look-outs posted in the area. Rosendo gave Ramil a name and a number written in a PLDT bill. Appellant Ramil was hesitant because the results of the Bar examinations were coming out that day; but nevertheless, he went to see a certain Lt. Capitulo in Camp Aguinaldo and told him about his cousins predicament.xxxiii The next day, March

27, 1996, Ramil went to see Virginia Avelita, the name given by appellant Rosendo written on the PLDT bill. He showed her his school I.D. and asked her if she knows anybody who is missing, and the latter replied, si Vicente ko. He was then made to talk over the phone to Vicente Uys daughter, who asked him to wait. Virginia, meanwhile, told him that she was going out. After an hour, Virginia, Lucy, three old women, their driver, PACC operatives and Maj. Cruz arrived. After a short conversation, they left for the resort, leaving Virginia behind. He asked the latter to look after his white Toyota Corolla car which he left in her residence. Upon reaching the resort, they were approached by Maj. Quidato who asked him questions. He got off the car when he saw his cousin Rosendo near the pool with Dimal. He pointed the two to Maj. Cruz who instructed his men to scatter. He then started walking towards his cousin, and when appellant Rosendo saw him, he told the latter, mga kasama natin ito, huwag kang matakot. When he got to Rosendo, he pulled him and they leaned on the wall for fear that they might get shot. Dimal ran upstairs while Rosendo pointed to the place where Uy was being kept. They went inside the cottage and Ramil removed the plaster bindings on Uy.xxxiii The trial court convicted appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, but acquitted their co-accused Oswaldo Banaag. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. With respect to the Criminal Case No. 110090, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, all the accused are ACQUITTED. 2. With respect to Criminal Case No. 110089-H, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, accused OSWALDO P. BANAAG is hereby ACQUITTED. The jail warden of Mandaluyong City is hereby directed to immediately release his person unless there are other legal grounds to justify his continued detention. However, with respect to accused ROSENDO B. MADRIAGA, JAMES M. PATANO, and RAMIL L. MADRIAGA, judgment is hereby rendered finding them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, as provided for under said Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to suffer the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto, and to proportionally pay the costs. SO ORDERED.xxxiii

Appellants insist that they are innocent of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, arguing that:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GROSSLY IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WITHOUT BEING IDENTIFIED AS THE ABDUCTORS/KIDNAPPERS OR CULPRITS OF THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPING.

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE LONE AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR.xxxiii

Bearing in mind that it devolves upon the State to establish by proof all the essential elements of the crime with which appellants are charged and to establish beyond reasonable doubt that they are guilty of said crime,xxxiii the Court, after a meticulous examination of the evidence of the prosecution, finds that appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga should have been acquitted by the trial court. The prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of appellants. It failed to adduce the quantum of proof necessary to convict them. In convicting appellants, the trial court gave great weight and evidentiary value to the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Richard Dimal on appellants alleged participation in the crime. It stated that Dimals testimony is direct, straightforward and spontaneous thus justifying the conclusion that appellants acted in concert in carrying into effect the kidnapping of Vicente Uy. The trial court totally disregarded appellants testimonies on the ground that they failed to support their versions of the incident. It is well settled that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of evidence by the trial court.xxxiii It is likewise a settled doctrine that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of a trial court on such matter will not be disturbed unless the lower court overlooked, ignored, misapprehended, or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances which are so material such as to affect the outcome of the case.xxxiii Although the trial court described the testimony of Dimal as direct, straightforward and spontaneous, it should not automatically endow outright probative weigh t to his testimony or its veracity, to the exclusion of the testimonies of other witnesses. Many witnesses can give testimonies that are blatant lies, even if they appeared poker-faced and did not bat their eyelashes. After a careful scrutiny of the testimony of prosecution witness Dimal, the Court finds that the trial court failed to consider some significant facts and circumstances which affect his credibility. His version of the incident is so incredible that a complete reversal of the findings of the trial court is warranted. To begin with, Dimal testified that he was with Nadel Francisco on the night of the kidnapping when appellant Ramil passed by and invited him to go around. xxxiii Dimal likewise declared in his Sworn Statement dated April 1, 1996 that he was with Francisco when appellant Ramil Madriaga invited him at around 12 oclock midnight, viz.:
SAGOT - 13. Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay nagpunta sa Star Gazer Video Shop sa Azucena Street, De Castro, Pasig upang magarkila ng VHS tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si NADEL FRANCISCO at nagkuwentuhan kami doon sa tapat ng nasabing video shop hanggang bandang alas-dose ng hatinggabi. Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay napadaan sa harapan namin si kuya Amel na lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya akong sumama sa kanya at sinabing mayroon daw kaming happenings.xxxiii (Emphasis Ours)

But defense witness Francisco categorically denied Dimals assertions.

While he

admitted that he saw Dimal that day, he testified that they merely chatted for only about one and a half (1 ) hours and parted ways at around 5:30 oclock in the afternoon. Francisco testified thus:
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q You said you talked with Richard Dimal for one hour, more or less, will you tell this Honorable Court what time did Richard and you started to talk? Approximately 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, sir. It lasted around 5:30 oclock? Yes, sir. What subject matter did you talk with Richard Dimal? I cannot remember anymore, we just chat about the lives of our friends, sir. Who among your friends were talked about? I cannot remember anymore, sir. Before you and Ricard Dimal parted ways, what did Dimal tell you, if any? He invited me to go with him for swimming, sir. Will you tell this Honorable Court what place he is going to have swimming? Villa Cristina, sir. Tell this Honorable Court what was your reaction to the invitation of Ricahrd Dimal to go with him at Villa Cristina? I did not go with him, sir. Why? I have an examination on the following day, sir. I am showing to you a statement of Mr. Ricard Dimal attached to the records of this case found on page 64 consisting of 6 pages, on page 65 or the second page of the statement of Richard Dimal, question #13 and the answer thereto, Im reading it to you and please listen. Maaari bang ikuwento mo dito kung paano ka nadamay sa nasabing kaso? And the answer, Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay nagpunta sa Star GazarVideo Shop sa Azucena St., De Castro, Pasig upang mag-arkila ng VHS tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si Nedel Francisco at nagkuwentuhan kami sa tapat ng nasabing video shop hanggang bandang alas-dose ng hatinggabi. Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay napadaan sa harapan namin si Kuya Amel na lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya akong sumama sa kanya at sinabing mayroon day kaming happenings. Did you hear what I read? Yes, sir. Did you understand what I read? Yes, sir. What can you say about what I have read which is the statement of Richard

A Q A Q

Dimal? A Q A Q I do not know about that alleged happening, sir. On that date, around 12:00 oclock midnight, where were you? I was already sleeping during that time, sir. During your conversation with Richard Dimal from 4:00 to 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of March 25, 1996, tell this Honorable Court whether you saw Kuya Amel? I did not see him that day, sir.xxxiii

The trial court chose to ignore Franciscos testimony. It did not explain in its decision why it opted not to consider his testimony, why it relied on the testimony of Dimal despite Franciscos explicit testimony that he and Dimal talked only up to 5:30 oclock in the afternoon and that it is not true that he saw Ramil with his car around midnight or at any time of that day. The Court is confounded why the trial court entirely overlooked or disregarded the testimony of Francisco who is a disinterested witness and had nothing to gain from belying Dimals claim. Dimal regards Francisco as his friend;xxxiii and Francisco considers Dimal as a closer friend of his than Ramils.xxxiii Thus, when Francisco repudiated Dimals testimony, there was no reason for him to discredit Dimal except to tell the truth. The credibility of Dimal is thereby eroded. There is no reason for the trial court to discredit the testimony of Francisco. One may assert that while it may be true that after Francisco and Dimal parted ways at 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, it could have happened that Dimal and appellant Ramil had met at midnight. But this posture could not be upheld because of the testimony of Dimal himself that Francisco was present when Ramil invited him to roam around at about midnight, which could not be believed because Francisco was, in fact, not present. In effect, from the start, Dimal is shown to be concocting his version of the kidnapping incident. Furthermore, the trial court erred in accepting Dimals testimony as gospel truth considering that his account of the events that transpired is replete with incredible happenings that should not have been accepted by the trial court as part of ordinary human experience and common sense. For example, Dimal testified that he went with Ramil upon the invitation of the latter and they went to his (Dimals) house located at No. 046 Blk. I, PFCI Brgy. San Andres, Cainta, Rizal;xxxiii that through a cellular phone, Ramil told the passengers of the Nissan Patrol parked in front of Dimals house that they could not do what they have to do in that place and that they have to find a darker place.xxxiii Why then did Ramil have to meet the passengers of the Nissan Patrol in front of Dimals house when the place is not suitable to his (Ramils) plans in the first place? Why did Ramil have to go to Dimals house when he could have used the cellular to tell them the place where he thought would be a better place to meet them? There is nothing in Dimals testimony to explain said incongruities. In addition, Dimal testified that they went to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind the new market place where Dimal saw something transferred from the Nissan Patrol to the trunk of the Toyota Corolla of Ramil;xxxiii that thereafter, from Taytay, Rizal, they roamed around and then went to Bulacan with the Nissan Patrol still tailing Ramils car; that

upon reaching Bulacan, Ramil alighted from his car and talked with the passengers of the Nissan Patrol; that Ramil went back to his car and told Dimal that they will go to Antipolo, Rizal; that upon reaching Antipolo, the passengers of the Nissan Patrol transferred to Ramils carxxxiii and then they proceeded to Villa Cristina Resort in Antipolo, Rizal. From Taytay, Rizal, why do they have to roam around, go to Bulacan and then back to Rizal? From past midnight to 6 oclock in the morning, why did Dimal, Ramil and the passengers of the Nissan Patrol have to go around killing time when the final destination of all of them together is the resort in Antipolo, Rizal? Why did the Nissan Patrol have to tail them all the while from Taytay, Rizal to Bulacan after the victim was transferred to the car of Ramil only to go to Antipolo, Rizal, a nearby town of Taytay, Rizal? Said acts are so preposterous that no amount of stretching of imagination could bring the same within the realm of human understanding. The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.xxxiii Further, absent any other evidence to explain or corroborate such implausible actuations, the trial court committed a reversible error in considering the testimony of Dimal credible enough to sustain a conviction of all appellants. Evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself.xxxiii It may be posited that in the commission of the crime of kidnapping with ransom, the culprits usually adopt and pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies not only to avoid easy detection or monitoring of their movements, but to confuse the police authorities, the victim and the family of the victims; that the incredible happenings narrated by Dimal only highlight his knowledge of the details of the facts surrounding the kidnapping for ransom. This may be so if the credibility of Dimal on the fact that he and Ramil had met that night of the kidnapping is beyond question. In any event, if a set of facts admits of two interpretations, then the one consistent with the presumption of innocence and in favor of the accused should prevail.xxxiii The trial court declared that there was never any positive identification made on any of the accused, and that the prosecution presented evidence which are circumstantial in nature to support the charge.xxxiii It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence. The prosecution miserably fell short of this requirement. The trial court explicitly declared that the prosecution witness is not a co-conspirator and therefore his testimony may be taken in evidence against all the appellants without running counter to Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.xxxiii The court a quo seriously erred in this aspect. Based on Dimals sworn statement, marked as Exhibit A,xxxiii and his testimony, Dimal admitted and confessed as to his participation.xxxiii In addition, the following manifestation of Atty. Marcelino Arias, to wit:

Atty. Arias

Before the prosecution starts the direct examination, as per record, I learned that his Richard Dimal is one of the suspects and he was arrested in all these cases but he was not included as one of the suspects, I want to put that on record, as far as the record is concern, he is one of those who allegedly took the victim, he confessed by means of an affidavit, now he is a witness and not one of the accused, your Honor. Everything you have said will be put on record, and for your own information defense counsel, that is the prerogative of the prosecution and no longer of the defense. Considering that I noticed that the prosecution is in possession of an Affidavit of this witness which was not included in the records of this case, may I ask to be furnished of this affidavit.

Court

Atty. Arias

Fiscal Abesamis The purpose of the testimony of Richard Dimal is to show the circumstances before, during and after the kidnapping of Mr. Vicente Uy, to show the conspiracy acts of the accused in this case of said kidnapping and to identify some evidence and thereafter to identify the accused in this case. With the permission of this Honorable Court.xxxiii

was not refuted by the prosecution. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.

Thus, conspiracy must be proven by evidence other than the testimony of Dimal. Proof of conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the commission of the crime disclosing a common understanding between them relative to its commission.xxxiii In its assessment, the trial court declared that the evidence for the prosecution is purely circumstantial,xxxiii on which basis it ruled that appellants conspired in perpetrating the crime of kidnapping with ransom. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.xxxiii The following elements must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.xxxiii In the present case, the totality of the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of appellants. Not one of the

prosecution witnesses saw the actual abduction. Witness Dimal admitted during crossexamination that he did not see appellants actually kidnap or abduct Uy, viz.:
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A You know that you never saw Ramil kidnapped Vicente Uy? No, sir. You never saw your Kuya Sendong kidnapped kidnapped (sic) Mr. Uy? Yes, sir. You never saw Oswaldo Banaag kidnapped Mr. Uy? No. sir. You never saw James Patano kidnapped Mr. Uy? No, sir. Never did you see Mr. Ramil Madriaga kidnapped Mr. Uy? Yes, sir.xxxiii

There could not be any misinterpretation in the meaning of the above testimonies. If the testimony of Dimal is taken in its entirety, it mainly revolved around events that allegedly occurred after the abduction was already consummated. As such, one would readily conclude that Dimal did not really see the act of kidnapping and therefore, he did not see any of the appellants perform the actual act of kidnapping. Besides, the trial court itself declared that there was never any positive identification made on any of the accused.xxxiii Further, the prosecution evidence failed to sufficiently prove overt acts on the part of appellants that will convincingly show their direct participation or complicity in the kidnapping. In the case of appellant James Patano, he was condemned to death for his presence in the resort. The trial court held that since appellant Patano failed to corroborate his excuse that he was just there for a swim with friends, then, the same must be ignored.xxxiii The Court disagrees. If at all, what the prosecution was able to establish is that appellant Patano knocked on the door of cottage no. 2, and Maj. Quidato heard him say: (P)are kaibigan ninyo ito, dala ko ang pera.xxxiii Such alleged statement by Patano, even if true, is equivocal and ambiguous. He did not state for what purpose the money is to be used. No probative weight may be given to the testimony of Maj. Quidato that the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) is for the payment of the cottage because it is a mere conclusion on his part based on his bare claim that the security guard and the official of the resort were preventing the victim from leaving because the cottage has not been paid yet. Quidato did not testify that he heard appellant Patano say that the alleged money he had with him was for the rental of the cottage. In other words, even if appellant Patano really brought money to the cottage, the prosecution failed to connect the participation of Patano in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. Absent any other proof of overt act necessary or essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping, Patanos alleged presence and utterance cannot be a valid basis for his conviction. The Court cannot accept the trial

courts sweeping conclusion against Patano. The mere presence of appellant Patano at the resort after the commission of the crime does not imply conspiracy. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. xxxiii Conspiracy transcends companionship.xxxiii Neither can the Court rely on the uncorroborated testimony of Dimal whose testimony at the outset had been found not to be credible. The failure of appellant Patano to present the friends he was with is not sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An accused should be found guilty on the basis of the strength of prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.xxxiii Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Even though appellant Patano invokes the inherently weak defense of denial, such defense nonetheless acquired commensurate strength in the instant case where no positive and proper identification has been made by the prosecution witnesses of the offender, as the prosecution still has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused. The weakness of the defense does not relieve the prosecution of this responsibility. Besides, the Court has held that the testimony of witness Dimal is not credible and not worthy of belief. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt or participation in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. The doubt should therefore be resolved in favor of appellant James Patano.xxxiii As regards appellant Ramil Madriaga, the trial court refused to accept his testimony and found his claim that he was responsible for the rescue of Uy to be beyond ordinary human comprehension deserving of no evidentiary value.xxxiii Instead, it banked on the suspicions entertained by the police operatives that appellant Ramils actuations during the rescue were suspect, and that the latter failed to present Lts. Capitulo and Lim, often referred to by him in his testimony.xxxiii The Court does not agree. Mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. xxxiii The Court scrutinized the testimony of appellant Ramil Madriaga and there is nothing therein which is beyond ordinary understanding or which indicates any suspicious behavior on his part that would create doubt on his account of what really transpired. In fact, appellant Ramil exhibited candor and sincerity when he admitted that he was initially ambivalent in helping out his cousin Rosendo because of fear and of the fact that the results of the Bar examinations were coming out that day. xxxiii Also, the victims daughter, Lucy Ngo, did not sense any suspicious behavior on the part of appellant Ramil, and she testified that she even believed that the latter was trying to help them, thus:
Q A Will you tell us what do you mean by that? Nagmamagandang loob is parang tumutulong siya, sir.

x x x

Q A Q

The man who was nagmamagandang loob. Are you referring to Ramil Madriaga as the one who was nagmamagandang loob? He is the one who was nagmamagandang loob. Yes, sir. Even before, you knew Ramil Madriaga was incarcerated and one of the accused in this case, were you surprised to know that Ramil Madriaga who according to you nagmamagandang loob is now one of the accused in this case? Yes, sir.xxxiii

It cannot be denied that appellant Ramil played a major part in the rescue of Vicente Uy. The testimonies of Lucy Ngo, Virginia Avelita and Maj. Cruz all show that it was through the information given by appellant Ramil that they were able to locate Vicente Uy. If it were really true that appellant Ramil was one of the conspirators of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, it is absolutely incredible that Ramil would openly go to the house of the victims common-law wife and place himself at the risk of being identified as one of the conspirators when he could have accomplished the same purpose by other means at the same time protect himself from being identified by witnesses. Neither did Virginia Avelita nor Lucy Ngo testify that Ramil asked for ransom. What then could be the motive of Ramil in going to the house of Avelita if not to help his cousin out of his predicament? Whatever suspicions the police operatives entertained were pure speculations, insufficient to warrant the conclusion that appellant Ramil participated in the kidnapping. The required quantum of evidence is proof beyond reasonable doubt.xxxiii The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass.xxxiii The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maj. Cruz, Virginia Avelita and Chief Inspector Quidato were all based on what appellant Ramil had purportedly told them. The veracity of what they claimed was told them by Ramil is highly dubious in view of the testimony of prosecution witness Lucy Ngo, daughter of the victim, affirming that appellant Ramil was the one who was nagmamagandang-loob and who told them about the kidnapping of her father and where he could be found. The Court went over the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cruz, Avelita and Quidato and it found that certain portions thereof were tailored to suit the charges against appellants. Both Cruz and Quidato testified that appellant Ramil rushed to the cottage as soon as they arrived at the resort and that they found appellant Rosendo inside the cottage with victim Uy, giving the impression that appellant Ramil knew exactly where the victim was and, therefore, appellants Ramil and Rosendo were two of the kidnappers.xxxiii However, Lucy Ngo contradicted their testimonies. Lucy, instead, confirmed the testimonies of appellants Ramil and Rosendo that the latter was outside the cottage and that Ramil rushed to Rosendo only after getting instructions from Maj. Cruz.xxxiii The Court is likewise wary of the testimony of Virginia Avelita insinuating appellant Ramils complicity for knowing the details of the crime. If it were true that she suspected Ramil, then there was utterly no reason for her to tell Lucy Ngo when she called up the latter that there was a certain person who was offering his assistance

(nagmamagandang-loob) in locating Uy.xxxiii Instead, she would have forewarned Ngo about appellant Ramil. Consequently, the Court cannot give much weight to the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses as they suffer from infirmities. Besides, it is a settled rule that the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing is hearsay and has no probative valuexxxiii under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Neither could the same be validly regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule considering that the details testified to by said witnesses were directly refuted by appellant Ramil when he testified in court and asserted the fact that appellant Ramil merely went to Avelitas house to tell her of the location of her common-law husband, Vicente Uy, and to help his cousin, coappellant Rosendo; which fact is confirmed by prosecution witness Lucy Ngo. The failure of appellant Ramil to present Lts. Capitulo and Lim does not denigrate the credibility of his own testimony. As stated above, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the defense. Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution evidence lacks that degree of conclusiveness required to convict appellant Ramil Madriaga. With regard to appellant Rosendo Madriaga, the Court also finds that there is no sufficient evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that he was involved in the kidnapping of Vicente Uy. As with appellant Patano, there is lack of adequate evidence of conspiracy insofar as appellant Rosendo is concerned. No proof was adduced by the prosecution to show that Rosendo knew about the kidnapping and that he had actively participated in its execution. When victim Uy identified Rosendo in the courtroom as the person he saw handcuffed after his blindfold was removed, Uy admitted that he was not sure of Rosendos identity as the latter is without a moustache. The testimony of prosecution witness Dimal in this regard is quite revealing. Dimal admitted that he was the one who fed the victim and that he was wearing a moustache at the time of his arrest on March 27, 1996.xxxiii Appellant Rosendo testified that he called up his cousin Ramil and asked for his help as he got unintentionally mixed up in a kidnapping.xxxiii Appellant Rosendo convincingly explained that he could not do anything because he was afraid.xxxiii Such is not far-fetched or improbable. The Court is cognizant of the fact that fear is an effective anesthetic that can paralyze one into inaction. Rosendos failure to report his predicament with the police is not an indicium or positive proof that he actively took part in the crime and, therefore, it could not be a valid basis for a finding of guilt for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. What is clear is that appellant Rosendo called up his cousin, appellant Ramil, for help because he was in a predicament over which he had no control. All told, while the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom has been proven, appellants participation therein had not been adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, all three appellants must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 262 in Criminal Case No. 110089-H convicting appellants JAMES PATANO y MARCAIDA, RAMIL MADRIAGA y LAGONOY and ROSENDO MADRIAGA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING them of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellants, unless they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of their release or the ground for their continued confinement, within five (5) days from notice of this decision. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director- General of the Philippine National Police are directed to cause the arrest of accused Manolo Babac and Allan Duarte who have remained-at-large as well as other persons who appear criminally responsible for herein subject crime. The prosecution must exert more diligent efforts next time. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.