European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management

C AT R I O N A G O U R L AY

The European Union can draw on a broad range of instruments and capabilities for conict prevention, crisis management and post-conict reconstruction, but its institutional structure and limited approach to developing crisis management capabilities within the intergovernmental decision-making context of the European Security and Defence Policy mean that its response to crises is neither integrated nor coherent. EU military operations and the deployment of police and rule-of-law experts are institutionally and practically divorced from activities supported by the Commission in pre-, active and post-crises situations. This division presents serious obstacles to EU ambitions to become a capable, active and coherent actor in crisis management.

It is widely recognized that effective crisis management requires an integrated approach, utilizing military and civilian elements. Indeed, it is commonplace to hear EU representatives argue that the greatest strength of the Union in crisis management is that it can draw on a panoply of military and civilian instruments. However, these instruments have been created at different times, within different institutional structures and for different purposes. Ensuring that they are now used in a coordinated and coherent manner in support of crisis management objectives remains a formidable challenge. While few dispute the EUs potential as a security actor, this article demonstrates that the EUs approach to crisis management has been a self-limiting one, largely conducted within the intergovernmental framework of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and institutionally divorced from EU activities that use European Community instruments. The development of short-term crisis management instruments has not built on the external relations acquis of the Commission, but rather follow a distinct intergovernmental approach. This decoupling of second-pillar1 instruments of ESDP from other EC policy decisionmaking structures and nancing mechanisms means that the EU is still far from developing an integrated approach to crisis management.
International Peacekeeping, Vol.11, No.3, Autumn 2004, pp.404421
ISSN 1353-3312 print=1743-906X online DOI:10.1080/1353331042000249019 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

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The article begins by categorizing the procedures for EU crisis management. It notes that the intergovernmental decision-making procedures that relate to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP are distinct from those that govern deployment of tools by the Commission according to the community method.2 Given that the procedures for the deployment of non-military tools in the areas of Community competence are well documented elsewhere,3 the article focuses on the legal framework and procedures that have been developed for the deployment of EU crisis management operations within the context of ESDP. This includes the new procedures developed for the conduct of autonomous military operations, those that rely on NATO assets and civilian operations. Since the military resources that the EU can draw on are also described elsewhere in this special issue, the discussion of resources for crisis management focuses on the EUs approach to developing its capacities for civilian crisis management. The article describes how both the Council and the Commission have competence in this area and identies shortfalls in relation to the coordination of their activities as well as the Councils approach to developing new civilian instruments in the framework of ESDP. This undermines the notion that, with the development of ESDP, the EU is now institutionally well equipped to provide a comprehensive and coherent response to crises. An Overview of EU Crisis Management Decision-making Procedures Until the 1980s, EU ofcials took decisions that shaped the economies of other countries but did so without overtly politicizing the process. Although the EU had a record of diplomatic interventions carried out in the framework of CFSP, these were not generally linked with decisions relating to the EUs powerful trade or development assistance policies. It was only with the end of the Cold War, and the experience in the Balkans, that EU ofcials and member states argued that EU instruments be augmented with crisis management tools and that attempts be made to synchronize the different instruments that the EU had at its disposal. Since 1999, new procedures and structures for the deployment of military and civilian crisis management have been introduced rapidly in the framework of ESDP, but the EU institutions and member states are still grappling with the challenges of coordinating policies across the three pillars that the EU is built on, and that were codied in the Maastricht Treaty. The challenge of coordinating EU crisis management policies is particularly acute because the broad spectrum of conict prevention, crisis management and post-conict activities span these three pillars and are

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therefore governed by distinct decision-making processes and implemented by different institutional actors. EU military instruments for crisis management unambiguously form part of ESDP, a sub-set of CFSP, which comprises the intergovernmental second pillar of the European Union. In the area of CFSP the decisionmaking instruments include common positions, common strategies and joint actions, whereby the decision to launch a military or civilian crisis management operation takes the form of a joint action agreed at ministerial level within the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). Member states are directly responsible for initiating and implementing EU military crisis management operations, although the rotating Presidency and the Secretary-General/High Representative of CFSP (SG/HR) also exercise powers of initiative and it is through these two positions that recommendations for potential operations are most often introduced to the member states. The Commission and the European Parliament are informed of these decisions but not directly involved. The nancing of EU military operations also rests entirely on member states, with the vast majority of spending covered on a costs lie where they fall basis.4 The procedures for decision-making and nancing of other EU external activities, managed by the European Commission within the areas of Community competence (rst and third pillars), such as humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development, differ fundamentally from the strictly intergovernmental nature of ESDP.5 In this context the Commission generally initiates policy and is responsible for its implementation. Member states guide Community policy on the basis of qualied majority voting, and the European Parliament exercises budgetary control. The decision-making and nancing procedures with regard to civilian crisis management are less clear-cut since these activities span both rst (Community) and second (CFSP) pillars. Moreover, the question of competence is complicated by the fact that the term civilian crisis management means different things to different people. From the Councils perspective, all EU crisis management activities occur within the framework of ESDP over which member states have direct political control, while Commission activities relate to the provision of humanitarian assistance, through the European Community Humanitarian Ofce (ECHO) or the provision of longer-term technical assistance and aid for institution-building and postconict reconstruction efforts. In contrast, the Commission notes that while EU civilian operations conducted by member states within the ESDP context are a politically important tool, there is a whole range of tools for civilian crisis management, the bulk of which are organized under the rst pillar and managed by the Commission.6 These include, but are not limited to, activities in the elds of police, rule of law, civilian

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administration and civil protection (the four priority areas of civilian crisis management in the ESDP context), although they are typically implemented by other international organizations such as the UN or the OSCE, or specialized non-governmental organizations. In brief, military crisis management follows strictly second-pillar intergovernmental procedures while longer-term civilian peace-building efforts including reconstruction, institution-building and conict-sensitive development assistance are conducted according to the rst-pillar Community method. Although competence for civilian crisis management is contested, short-term activities designed to de-escalate crisis and prepare for longerterm reconstruction efforts are presently conducted by member states through the ESDP intergovernmental procedures and through Community mechanisms supporting a broader range of implementing actors. This article will rst detail the structures and procedures developed for intergovernmental crisis management, before exploring the grey area of civilian crisis management characterized by parallel decision-making processes and overlapping intergovernmental and Community instruments. Decision-Making Structures for CFSP and ESDP The institutional framework for making decisions on crisis management operations within the intergovernmental CFSP and ESDP frameworks, including military and civilian operations, has been developed within the Council General Secretariat (CGS). The functions of the new crisis management decision-making bodies were clearly dened by the Nice European Council in December 2000.7 Figures 1 and 2 sketch these structures and describe their composition and principal tasks.
FIGURE 1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES OF THE EU

FIGURE 2 C O M P O S I T I O N A N D TA S K S O F C R I S I S M A N A G E M E N T S T R U C T U R E S O F T H E E U I N C F S P A N D E S D P

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Procedures for the Conduct of Military Operations This section describes the procedures developed since 2000 for the conduct of EU-led military operations conducted either autonomously or with recourse to NATO assets. Both procedures were tested in practice in 2003 in EU Operations Artemis and Concordia respectively. Alternative options that have yet to be realized include the EU mandating an operation that is conducted by an ad-hoc coalition of the willing, or a coalition engaged in structured cooperation, and the EU undertaking a military operation at the request of the OSCE. Procedures for Autonomous Operations The Nice European Council codied the procedural arrangements for EU crisis management actions.8 In brief, these foresee a pre-operational phase in which consultation is intensied at all levels. During this time the PSC is likely to request an Initiating Directive from the Military Staff, which would include a list of options for an EU-led operation. Once this document has been amended and approved by the Military Committee, it is submitted to the PSC, which then decides on the best option and authorizes an Initial Planning Directive. While considering an EU-led operation, consultations will take place with non-EU countries that might wish to contribute to the operation. At this stage the EU will inform non-EU countries of the military options being envisaged. Once the Council has chosen the strategic military option and approved the operation concept, further consultations with third countries will allow them to conrm their contributions at a Force Generation Conference, following which the operation will be formally launched and a Committee of Contributors will be established. The Committee of Contributors is the main forum for discussing all problems relating to day-to-day management that are not exclusively the responsibility of the operation commander. It will also make recommendations on the withdrawal of forces and the PSC will take its recommendations into consideration. It will include those states participating in an operation, even if this excludes some EU member states. Regarding operational planning, the Nice European Council established that for an autonomous EU operation [operational planning] will be carried out within one of the European strategic level headquarters.9 This refers to the national headquarters that can also operate as multinational operational headquarters. This is currently limited to headquarters in the UK and France and will soon also include headquarters in Germany, Italy and Greece, which are being developed for this purpose. The December 2003 agreement on operational planning

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conrmed that the main option for operational planning for autonomous operations will be the national headquarters, but opens the door for operational planning to take place in the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in particular where a joint civil/military response is required and where no national headquarters is identied.10 In future the EUMS will have a capacity to rapidly set up an operations centre for a particular operation, reinforced with personnel from the EUMS and member states. The EUs rst autonomous operation was Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a separate article in this issue points out, the operation was conducted using a Nation Framework concept, with France responsible for the headquarters and operational command elements. Procedures for Operations Using NATO Assets After over three years of negotiations, begun after the Cologne European Council meeting of June 1999, in late 2002 NATO and the EU nally reached agreement on a comprehensive package of cooperation arrangements that grant the EU assured access to NATO military assets and operational planning capabilities. This is commonly referred to as the Berlin Plus accord. It derives its name from a 1996 NATO accord with the Western European Union (WEU), which allowed the WEU to use separable but not separate military assets and capabilities in WEU-led operations.11 The four main elements of the Berlin Plus permanent arrangements are: assured access to NATO planning; presumption of availability of pre-identied NATO common assets and capabilities; European command options including the role of the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces, Europe (D-SACEUR); and a NATO EU Security Information Agreement, allowing the exchange of classied information between the two organizations. The agreements currently dene the EU NATO operational relationship and bind the EU to using NATO planning and assets for operations which EU member states choose not to, or cannot, conduct autonomously using their national planning assets and capabilities.12 The procedure for the decision to conduct an EU-led operation using NATO assets is identical in form to one that does not use NATO assets, although the nature of the pre-operational consultations is clearly different and in practice involves conrming the support of key NATO nations. In an EU-led operation using NATO assets, the operational planning takes place within the NATO framework, at SHAPE.13 Plans to develop a permanent EU cell in SHAPE became more concrete during the nal phase of negotiating the defence deal in the 2003 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).14

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Under Berlin Plus, the command and control arrangements are designed to create a discrete EU chain of command that reects the operational need for coordination with NATO. The Operation Commander is the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces Europe (D-SACEUR) who operates from SHAPE. During an operation he reports to the EU Military Committee and the Chairman of the Military Committee reports regularly to the Political and Security Committee, which exercises political control and strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council. An example of an operation conducted with use of NATO assets in accordance with the Berlin Plus agreement was Operation Concordia in Macedonia, as examined in Catriona Maces contribution in this issue. Early reections on the implementation of EU NATO cooperation in the conduct of this operation suggest that the operation has validated the Berlin Plus arrangements including the involvement of EU military staff embedded in the NATO operational headquarters at SHAPE. Nevertheless, one French ofcial observed that, in practice, many of the functions of operational command were performed from AFSOUTH [the headquarters of Allied Forces Southern Europe], thereby adding another layer to the chain of command that did not respect the political control of the PSC.15

Structured Cooperation as a Potential Future Model? In future EU operations may be conducted by coalitions of member states that have entered into structured cooperation with each other on the basis of provisions agreed in the 2003 4 Intergovernmental Conference. These allow member states which have made more binding commitments to one another and which are prepared to engage more intensively in the development of defence capabilities to engage in structured cooperation within the Union framework.16 While broadly capabilities-driven, structured cooperation may potentially be used for increasing the integration of the forces of some member states enabling them to rapidly conduct EU-led operations in accordance with permanent arrangements rather than on the basis of purely ad hoc coalitions of the willing. However, at the time of writing, it is unclear what structured cooperation will involve in practice. It might result in a process of deepening integration in the defence area of some member states, enabling rapid multinational deployments in accordance with permanent arrangements, or it might lead to capabilities generation within national frameworks, resulting in operations by ad hoc coalitions of the willing without signicant integration of national forces.

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Choosing the Right Organisational Framework: Test Case Moldova The consideration in late 2003 of a potential operation in Moldova, in response to a request by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), demonstrates the institutional options that EU member states have in deciding how best to manage an operation. This option was introduced to the PSC in early July by the Netherlands, who then held the chair of the OSCE. The Netherlands argued that a small armed force would be necessary to help deter the outbreak of violence during the transitional period when a new OSCE-brokered political settlement is implemented between Moldovan and Transdniestrian parties. The prior agreement of a political settlement and the agreement of both parties to an external security presence were pre-conditions for any peace support operation. Nevertheless, a number of post-settlement options for how such a limited security operation could be managed were considered by the PSC at a meeting on 5 September 2003. One option was that the operation could be mandated by the OSCE but conducted outside a multinational framework by a coalition of the willing. The advantage of this option was that it would allow for maximum exibility, but disadvantages included the fact that the operation would enjoy less political and military support since only the states participating in the operation would contribute to and have a say in its conduct. Alternatively, the OSCE could effectively subcontract the operation to the EU or NATO. If NATO were to lead the operation, this could be under the political control of the NATO Russian Council. This formula would ensure that Russia would be an equal partner in the operation, but press reports in late July indicated that NATO was not keen to get involved in the peace support in Moldova.17 If the EU were to lead an operation under an OSCE mandate, the PSC would exercise political control but would regularly report to the OSCE Permanent Council. An EU operation would also allow for the participation of third states, most notably Russia and the Ukraine, and it could, in principle, be conducted with or without recourse to NATO assets. This pre-decision consultation procedure reveals that member states actively consider a number of institutional options before deciding to act within the EU context. Member state decisions about whether to act in ad hoc coalitions of the willing or within an EU, NATO or UN framework are made on a case-by-case basis and depend on institutional capabilities and other geopolitical factors. Nevertheless, the experience of EU military crisis management to date suggests that states are most ready to act within the EU framework under a UN or OSCE mandate, with the commitment of a lead Framework Nation.

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Procedures for Civilian Crisis Management The decision-making procedures for civilian crisis management operations conducted in the framework of ESDP are largely the same as those envisaged for military operations; the General Affairs and External Relations Council decides on the basis of unanimity to undertake an operation, with a Joint Action serving as its legal basis. The PSC exercises political control and provides strategic direction for the operation, but in the case of civilian operations much of this work is prepared by the Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which formulates recommendations and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC. It considers proposals for civilian missions and develops strategies for the deployment of police, rule of law and civilian administration experts. The chain of command for civilian operations is distinct from that in military operations in that it is entirely civilian. How this operates in practice is illustrated in the case of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as discussed in the article by Kari Osland in this issue. Resources for Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) The Union is seeking to build capacity in civilian crisis management, and has prioritized its ability to provide assistance in the areas of executive and community policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. These developments are largely taking place within the framework of the second pillar, but certain executive competencies are shared with the Commission (rst pillar) or implemented using mechanisms developed in the third pillar. Although the Commission has a long history of providing nancial support for a number of conict prevention, crisis management and post-conict reconstruction activities, the current trend appears to be in the direction of the second pillarization of civilian crisis management with the Council gaining greater control over the development of training, planning and mission support for civilian operations, and member states retaining absolute control over the recruitment of personnel for EU civilian operations. CCM Capabilities within the Framework of ESDP: The Four Priority Areas At the 2000 Feira European Council, civilian instruments for civilian crisis management within the context of ESDP were broken down into advisory, training and monitoring as well as executive tasks within four priority areas police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil

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protection and it is these priorities that have shaped the EUs approach to the development of civilian capabilities. The EU method for enhancing civilian capabilities has been borrowed from the military and consists of setting quantitative targets, holding pledging conferences at which member states have committed a specic number of relevant national experts (generally civil servants) and, in working groups within the Council Secretariat, developing concept papers in each of the four priority areas outlining the conditions for the deployment of an operation and what it might do on the ground. Briey, in the area of police, this has led to member states pledging collectively over 5000 police ofcers available for international police missions, 1000 of them to be deployable within 30 days. The EU has also launched the European Union Police (training) Mission in BosniaHerzegovina and Operation Proxima in Macedonia. In the area of rule of law, member states have collectively pledged over 200 judges, prosecutors, lawyers and correctional ofcers for use in civilian operations. In the area of civil administration, member states are looking to identify civil administrators to set up, or ensure the existence of, a functional administrative apparatus, while promoting transition to local ownership as early as possible. Member states noted that civilian experts could provide: general administrative functions such as registration of property, elections and taxation; social functions such as education, social services and medical services; and infrastructure functions such as water supply, energy supply and telecommunications. Both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the EUs goals in this area still require further elaboration, however. Within the area of civil protection, it is envisaged that member state civil protection mechanisms, developed for protection and rescue tasks at the national level, will be adapted to provide assistance during and after a crisis to, inter alia, humanitarian actors in covering the immediate survival and protection needs of affected populations in such tasks as search and rescue, construction of refugee camps and systems of communication. The quantitative targets that have been reached are for: 23 assessment teams of 10 experts to be dispatched within 37 hours; civil protection intervention teams of up to 2,000 persons; and supplementary specialized services from governmental or non-governmental services to be dispatched within a week. In this context of capability development in the four priority areas, it is worth noting that civilian capabilities effectively consist of personnel from member states that are essentially civil servants, employed by the state to work in national or local structures. While some member states recruitment procedures include experts outside the civil service, most national systems are limited to the internal recruitment of civil servants and therefore non-governmental expertise is largely excluded from ESDP civilian

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operations. Given the generic problems associated with extracting civilian experts from their domestic duties and providing sufcient incentives for them to leave on foreign missions, the pool of suitable personnel available is thereby far more limited than if it were to include non-state experts. Moreover, there is no coordinating mechanism to help manage inputs from member states, although member states recognize that this can lead to delays and shortfalls in the deployment of personnel. Likewise, member states have so far resisted any move to link EU training with deployment at a European level. Although member states are selecting personnel for participation in EU training courses and operations, it is estimated by EU trainers that over half of the participants in the EC-funded training courses hosted to date had no intention of ever being deployed on an EU civilian crisis management mission and there is no centralized record kept of individuals that attended these courses. Nevertheless, the member states support the development of common training initiatives and there is a trend towards bringing training under the political control of CIVCOM in the Council, despite the fact that it is funded largely from the EC budget. There is also a trend towards making this training available to civilian and military personnel.18 CCM and First-Pillar Activities The Commission has long been engaged in post-conict institutionbuilding. For instance, while the rst ESDP crisis management exercise was launched in Bosnia eight years after the Dayton accords, between 1990 and 2000, the Commission provided E10 billion for the Stabilization and Association Process for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenego/Serbia, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.19 More specically, the Commission has experience in managing electoral observation missions, the civil protection mechanism and providing personnel and support to UN, the OSCE and operations of other partners including NGOs in the elds of rule of law, civilian administration and police. It also provides support to reconciliation efforts such as assistance to truth and reconciliation commissions and investigations of genocide. In addition to crisis management and reconstruction efforts, the Commission also currently supports a number of pre-crisis, conict prevention activities including, but not limited to: human rights monitoring, democracy and human rights programmes that aim to build capacity in civil society as well as promote good governance, including security-sector reform, and support for the independent media. (For a detailed discussion see the article by Richard Youngs in this issue.)

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More recently, it has been responsible for supporting the EUs rst efforts to train civilian personnel for ESDP operations. In 2002 the Commission launched an initiative on training for civilian aspects of crisis management in order to improve the preparation and readiness of civilian personnel. The initiative is now in its third phase. In its rst phase, a network of EU-wide training bodies developed proposals for common approaches and harmonized training programmes. In the second phase, these programmes were implemented by an informal EU Group on Training, composed of project partners from 12 member states. The second phase was evaluated at a conference in Rome 20 21 October 2003 and a broadly positive evaluation means that more resources will now be available for further training courses. Noteworthy features of the Commissions engagement in conict prevention and civilian crisis management include the fact that the actors typically implementing Commission-funded conict prevention, crisis management or post-conict reconstruction activities are usually other international organizations (typically the UN or the OSCE) or non-governmental organizations. The Commission is therefore not in the business of managing large-scale deployments of personnel from member states. It is also important to note that the Commission remains responsible for the nancial management of all such operations (including ESDP operations for civilian crisis management), and is accountable to the European Parliament for budgetary control. While budgetary procedures and nancial regulations ensure democratic and legislative control, they are, however, cumbersome and not conducive to exible and rapid funding required in anticipation or response to crises. The exception is the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) that was introduced in 2000. This has a budget of approximately E35 million per year and it enables the Commission to rapidly disburse funds to projects, often with overtly political aims, with a variety of conict prevention and post-conict reconstruction functions. Even in the case of the RRM, however, the fact that it can only support actions for up to six months has limited its usefulness since many if not all post-conict reconstruction projects cannot be completed within such a short time frame, and follow-on funding is difcult to secure from other budget lines. Shortfalls in the Current Institutional Approaches An Inefcient and Fragmented Approach to Planning and Mission Support The current approach to planning and mission support is divided along institutional lines with the Council providing (limited) operational

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support to military and civilian ESDP operations and the Commission engaged in the management of its rst-pillar instruments. This split of responsibilities means, for example, that expertise in the Council Police Unit is available to support the ESDP police mission in Bosnia, but not to the neighbouring police mission in Albania, which is analogous in all substantive respects except for the legal basis.20 As indicated above, in seeking to reinforce its operational and planning capacity for civilian operations, the Council has proposed that operational and nancial responsibilities be split between the Council, (either within the Council General Secretariat or a small cell in the EU Military Staff), and the Commission. Yet the UNs Department for Peacekeeping Operations and the OSCE have found that it is most efcient to integrate planning aspects with logistics and administrative management and there are compelling functional and efciency arguments for the development of a crosspillar integrated planning and mission support service. A Fragmented and Outdated Approach to Deployment The four priority areas approach to developing civilian capacities for crisis management has included little conceptual or practical crossover between the priority areas. Nor has comprehensive attention been paid to the operational links between military and civilian instruments, especially relating to the management of the transition from military to civilian operations. The same can also be said for the strategic and operational linkages between short-term crisis management and longer-term reconstruction and peace-building efforts supported by the Commission. This approach not only limits the EUs capacity for action, it also goes against international thinking about crisis response since the 1990s. Specically, the UNs Brahimi report, which reects on lessons learned from UN operations, calls for packages of rapidly deployable civilian instruments. It is not police or rule of law, but police, judicial, penal and civil administrators working together in coherent framework that is required. We should focus on developing integrated teams of civilian experts capable of being rapidly deployed in pre-active- or post-crisis situations to and alongside military operations if need be, to set the strategic groundwork for longerterm institution-building.21 Similarly, the OSCE has adapted its crisis response along these lines, with the establishment of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT). As stated in the OSCEs Charter for European Security agreed in Istanbul in 1999, this rapidly deployable capability will cover a wide range of civilian expertise. It will give us the ability to address problems before they become crises and to deploy quickly the civilian component for a peacekeeping operation when needed. These teams could also be used as a surge capacity to assist the

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OSCE with the rapid deployment of large-scale or specialised operations. In short, the ESDP focus on distinct priority areas and distinct missions is not sufciently exible or comprehensive to provide the EU with rapidly deployable experts that can set the ground-work for follow-on largerscale Council or Commission missions/programmes. A Fragmented and Limited Approach to Training and Recruitment for Civilian Operations The second-pillar approach to civilian crisis management focuses on the training and recruitment of national civil servants for EU crisis management operations. This may be well suited for police operations, which seek to deploy large numbers of personnel to substitute for local actors and effectively establish and run the police and justice sector for a transitional time until local capacity is developed. It may also be well suited for civil protection operations, which draw on national personnel that have already been identied for similar operations within the EU. However, within the area of rule of law it is clear that both national civil servants and independent experts have relevant expertise and national civil servants are not necessarily best suited for EU monitoring missions or post-conict institution-building activities, including in the areas of civil administration and post-conict reconstruction and reconciliation. In order to maximize the chances of recruiting the most suitable personnel for such tasks, ESDP recruitment mechanisms should be adapted so that they are more open to recruiting a broader range of state and non-state experts. This will require the development of new mechanisms at the national level, potentially supplemented with recruitment through European-wide mechanisms managed from the Council Secretariat and/or the Commission. Moreover, mechanisms need to be introduced to ensure that those trained in EU programmes are also willing and able to take part in EU operations, and coordination with parallel training initiatives (including those of the UN and the OSCE) should be improved. EC Funding Mechanisms Ill-suited for Civilian Crisis Management The only new funding mechanism that has been developed since the EU took on crisis management tasks and developed ESDP is the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. While this new mechanism is a welcome development, it falls short of its potential since it is limited to funding projects of only six months, and most projects have a life cycle well beyond this. Finding follow-on funding for these projects is, however, difcult in the current system, which is geared towards large-scale technical assistance or procurement programmes in the context of humanitarian or development assistance. Moreover the pillar divide means that there is no strategic

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link between the Unions external priorities and development assistance. For instance, the decision to launch the EU Police Mission in early 2002 prompted no reassessment of the Commissions funding and budgetary strategies for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Coherence of EU action requires that EC funding mechanisms be made more exible and rapid, and more conict sensitive in line with the EUs efforts to mainstream conict prevention in development policy and programming. Incoherence in the Absence of an Overarching Framework The above-mentioned shortfalls all stem from the fact that even within the limited context of the intergovernmental second-pillar mechanisms for EU crisis management, military and civilian capabilities are not developed or implemented in a fully integrated framework. However, ESDP is still in its infancy and initiatives are underway to generate further capabilities and combine civil and military planning, with the prospect of improved civil-military coordination in short-term ESDP interventions. ESDP interventions are, however, structurally independent from shortterm and long-term crisis management rst pillar activities supported by the Commission, and as of yet there is no institutional solution for bridging this deep institutional divide. The proposal to create a double-hatted EU Foreign Minister to be supported by a Joint External Service, which gained support in the 2003 intergovernmental negotiations, provides a potential partial solution however. The Council and the Commission will have to agree on the organization of such a service but, in principle, it has the potential to provide the EU with a common platform on which to manage a wider spectrum of crisis management instruments within the rst and second pillars in a more integrated fashion. Conclusion The development of crisis management capabilities and actions within ESDP is not simply an extension of the traditional Community approach to external engagement. How EU member states choose to use the ESDP intergovernmental institutional arrangements for crisis management is driven by a complex equation of national interests and perceived political value of using the EU framework, rather than working within ad hoc coalitions of the willing or the OSCE, NATO or UN structures. In the case of civilian actions, the ESDP framework also provides member states with an alternative means for the direct deployment of national civilian experts to crisis situations rather than providing the Commission with further competence and resources to engage in activities related to short-term crisis management.

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The distinct ESDP approach to crisis management has equipped the EU with new military and civilian tools for short-term interventions in crises. However, this approach is not institutionally linked with the short- or long-term conict prevention, crisis management or postconict reconstruction instruments developed by the Commission. This institutional disconnect is particularly unhelpful in the area of civilian crisis management where both the Council and the Commission are active in implementing intergovernmental decisions and community external relations policy, respectively. It has led to an inefcient and fragmented approach to planning, deployment, mission support, training and recruitment for civilian crisis management operations. The institutional division between intergovernmental and Community procedures and instruments also presents serious structural obstacles to the EUs stated ambitions to bring together its different instruments and capabilities to become a more coherent and effective actor in crisis management. A potential structural solution might be found in the creation of a double-hatted Foreign Minister, supported by a Joint External Service, negotiated at the 2003 4 Intergovernmental Conference. In the meantime, there is signicant scope for the pragmatic evolution of EU crisis management, with member states and EU ofcials seeking practical ways to coordinate disparate instruments in accordance with best practice at national and international levels, despite the formidable institutional obstacles to an integrated approach that the EU pillar structure imposes.
NOTES 1. The Maastricht Treaty created the EU on a three-pillar structure: the rst pillar is responsible for economic, monetary and social policies, including international economic policies and external development aid; the second pillar is responsible for foreign and security policy; and the third pillar is responsible for Justice and Home Affairs. 2. For a description of the community method and the intergovernmental method see Alexander Stubb, Helen Wallace and John Peterson, The Policy-Making Process, in Elizabeth Bomberg and Alexander Stubb (eds), The European Union: How Does it Work? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.13655. 3. Ramses A. Wessels, The European Unions Foreign and Security Policy, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999 (see section on Specic Legal Basis of CFSP Decisions); Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels, The CFSP Institutions and Procedures: A Third Way for the Second Pillar, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.1, 1996, pp.2954. 4. On the nancial aspects of ESDP operations involving the deployment of military forces see Antonio Missiroli, Euros for ESDP: Financing EU Operations. Occasional Papers No.45, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2003. 5. The decision-making procedures of the European Commission in relation to external relations are explained in detail in Neill Nugent, External Relations in the European Commission, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, pp.297322. 6. Comments by the services of the European Commission on the paper presented by the Secretary General/High Representative on a planning and mission support capability for EU civilian missions, European Commission, internal document.

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7. European Council, Nice, 7 9 Dec. 2000. Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, Annex VI. 8. Ibid., Annex VI, III: Arrangements during crisis periods. 9. Ibid. 10. European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations, European Council, 15 Dec. 2003, accessed at http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.htm. 11. NATO, Final Communique , Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996, NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(96)63, accessed at http:// www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm. 12. The Berlin Plus accord is comprised of four texts, agreed in close succession. The rst is the agreement of 25 October by the European Council in Brussels on the participation of non-EU NATO states in ESDP operations (Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council, 24 and 25 October 2002: Presidency Conclusions, document 14702/02, Brussels, 26 Nov. 2002, Annex II: ESDP implementation of Nice provisions on the involvement of the non-European allies, accessed at http://ue.eu.int/ pressData/en/ec/72968.pdf.) The second was the Declaration of the Copenhagen Council Meeting on 12 December 2002, containing the principles of the Berlin Plus arrangements and their implementation. (European Council, Presidency conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 12 13 December 2002, Annex II, Declaration of the Council meeting in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002 accessed at http://europa.eu. int/council/off/conclu/) The third was the EUNATO declaration on ESDP. (NATO, EUNATO Declaration on ESDP: Communique , Press release 2002 142, 15 Dec 2002, accessed at http://nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm.) The nal element of the Berlin Plus accords was the NATOEU Security of Information Agreement that was reached and signed in Athens on 14 March 2003. For a list of relevant GAERC and NATO documents relating to the detailed implementation of Berlin Plus, see Renata Dwan and Zdzislaw Lachowski, The Military and Security Dimensions of the European Union, in SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, note 85, p.230. 13. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is located in Mons, Belgium. 14. European Council press release (see n.7 above). 15. Catriona Gourlay, EU Operations Update: Past, Present and Future, European Security Review, No.19, International Security Information Service, October 2003, accessed at www.isis-europe.org 16. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, IGC 2003-Defence, Document CIG 57/03, Brussels, 2 Dec 2003, accessed at http:// ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cgoo/cg00057.en03.pdf. 17. Dana Spinant, EU eyes controversial peace mission to strife-torn Moldova, European Voice, 1723 July 2003. 18. The Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy will launch the rst training course in which both civilian and military representatives will participate. 19. European Commission. CARDS Assistance Programme to the Western Balkans Regional Strategy Paper 20022006, Brussels: EU Commission Directorate Western Balkans (adopted in October 2001), p.17. Accessed at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/cards/sp02_06.pdf 20. This police operation was originally carried out in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). Since 2001 these activities fall within the framework of the EC Police Assistance Mission to Albania, which in turn forms part of the EC CARDS programme to support the participation of Albania in the Stabilization and Association Process. 21. Dr. Renata Dwan, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, made this observation in a presentation at a seminar on the issue of coherence and capabilities in the European Security Strategy, hosted by the Swedish Institute for International Affairs in Stockholm on 20 October 2003.