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G.R. No. L-38280 March 21, 1975 The general rule is that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when ordinary appeal is available. However, we have granted the writ in cases where it is shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained of. The grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, justify the giving of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for ordinary appeal will not be adequate. As many memorial lot buyers are affected, and the very integrity of the torrens system is at stake, public interest is involved. This rule for the granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of procedure, should be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities.

05 St. Peter Memorial Park v. Campos

Facts: Spouses Regino Cleofas and Lucia de la Cruz filed suit against St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. (St. Peter), Araceli Wijangco del Rosario, National Investment and Development Corporation (or NIDC), Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (or Banco Filipino for short), the Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Sheriff of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-15001). In their amended complaint, the spouses prayed that they be declared the rightful owners of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate, that the Torrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of their deceased predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, having been burned in a fire in 1933; that the certificates of title over said lot in the name of the Memorial Park, and that in the name of Wijangco del Rosario, and all the certificates of title from which these certificates were derived be declared null and void; that the mortgages over said, lot constituted in favor of Banco Filipino and the NIDC be declared null and void; and that the Memorial Park be ordered to pay plaintiffs damages. The amended complaint likewise sought issuance of preliminary injunction and the appointment of a receiver. The lower court ordered appointment of a receiver, but upon filing of a bond by the Memorial Park, the receivership was lifted. After trial, the lower court, on May 2, 1973, rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The Memorial Park and Banco Filipino, on June 23, 1973, filed their joint motion for reconsideration of the decision. On June 30, 1973, they filed a joint motion for new trial. On July 9, 1973, the Memorial Park filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration with prayer for new trial. Plaintiffs opposed the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. On January 10, 1974, the plaintiffs moved for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and restoration of receivership. On February 5, 1974, the trial court denied new trial. On February 21, 1974, Banco Filipino and the Memorial Park filed their notice of appeal from the decision of May 2, 1973, and filed their cash bond. Within the reglementary period they filed their joint record on appeal. On February 28, 1974, the Memorial Park filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (L-38280) against the trial judge and the plaintiff spouses, seeking annulment of the court's order denying new trial, on the ground that the same was issued in grave abuse of discretion. Issues: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the joint appeal of the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino in its order of July 8, 1974. YES. Whether or not the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied in its order of February 5, 1974 the motion for new trial of the Memorial Park. YES. Courts Ruling: Petition granted. The grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, justify the giving of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for ordinary appeal will not be adequate. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial, having disregarded in a capricious and arbitrary manner, the newly discovered evidence. Rationale: It must be noted that the petitioner in L-38280 is only St. Peter Memorial Park. Banco Filipino is not a party in that first proceeding before this Court. Thus, whatever may be the effect of the filing of a petition for certiorari, on the pending appeal, cannot affect the appeal of Banco Filipino. And the respondent Judge clearly committed a clear error and a grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the appeal of Banco Filipino due to the filing by the Memorial Park of its petition in L38280. Moreover, as will now be explained, the dismissal of the appeal violated the restraining order issued by this Court.

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GR: 163980 August 3, 2006 the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. So such special or important reason was given herein. Prohibition not the proper remedy against an Admin Agency exercising its quasi-legislative power A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. GR: 158290 October 23, 2006

08 Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v Defensor

Facts: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 which seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the National Government Center (NGC). It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. Respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center Administration Committee (Committee). The NGC is a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City covering a little over 440 hectares which was reserved by President Marcos thru a proclamation as a national government site. The properties were then distributed to the bona fide residents therein pursuant to their drive to help the urban poor by President Corazon Aquino. This law was further developed by President Ramos and President GMA who disposed of the West Side of the NGC. The Petitioner Homeowners herein seek to invalidate the IRRs issued by the NGC Administrative Committee. They allege that the IRRs run contrary to the object and purpose of the law. The assailed rules include the imposition of a limitation of the land area, which can be bought by the individual residents. According to them, there should be no limit and that the parameter used should be based on the land that is actually occupied by the resident and not those appropriated by the Committee. Further they also allege certain provisions which requires the execution of a Contract to Sell and the imposition of 700 Php/ sq. m. is also in contravention of the law. Thus, the Homeowners Association filed this petition for prohibition before the SC Issue: WON the petition for prohibition under Rule 65 is the proper remedy. NO Ratio: Heirarchy of Courts Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations, which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and

09 Henares Jr, vs. LTFRB

Facts: Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Citing studies made by various agencies including the Environmental Management Bureau, the Manila Observatory, the DENR, etc. on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards. Petitioner presented statistics showing the dire situation of the air pollution of the major cities in the Philippines. That pollutants are causing diseases, respiratory illnesses and even deaths. To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of propane and butane, is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and A2012 Eleazar Yoro Varon Cimagala Cruz


releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 14 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." Issue: WON the court should issue Mandamus against the LTFRB to compel PUVs to use CNGs? No Ratio: Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said, It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.) Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys." Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition. G.R. No. 176831 01/15/2010 proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She also asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in a civil case before the RTC of Valenzuela City. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus. Petitioners demurrer=RTC denied Petitioners MR=RTC granted Respondents Appeal=CA denied due to insufficient evidence CA set aside previous ruling; testimonial evidence sufficient to show mothers possession of will Petitioners MR=denied Petitioner to SC: mandamus not proper remedy. Issue/Held: Is mandamus the proper remedy? No. Petition for review on certiorari is granted; CAs order is reversed and set aside. Rationale: Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. An important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. A2012 Eleazar Yoro Varon Cimagala Cruz

10 Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon Lee

Facts: Alleging that his father passed away and left a holographic will, which is in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, a petition for mandamus with damages, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate


In the instant case, the Court rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original holographic will. Thus SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will. SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.A person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it. SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos. SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.

Petitioner denied that private respondents were dismissed from their employment, asserting that private respondents abandoned their work. Executive labor arbiter Latoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents 13th month pay, backwages, separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and attorneys fees. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which reversed and set aside the labor arbiters ruling. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. CA granted the petition and ruled that, since the findings of the labor arbiter were supported by substantial evidence, it should be respected by appellate tribunals. Petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of just cause for dismissing private respondents, hence, it was guilty of illegal dismissal. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CAs decision but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Issue/Held: Is an MR needed to be filed before Rule 65 can be resorted to? Generally yes, but this case is covered by the exceptions. Is Rule 65 the proper remedy? No. The case involves inquiry into factual matters. Petition is dismissed, CAs ruling is affirmed. Rationale: Petitioner faults the CA for reversing the decision of the NLRC. It asserts that the petition for certiorari of private respondents should have been dismissed outright for failure to file an MR with the NLRC before filing the petition for certiorari with the CA. Petitioner also maintains that the CA erred when it adopted the findings of the labor arbiter that private respondents were constructively dismissed, instead of the contrary finding of the NLRC. As a general rule, an MR is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. Private respondents petition for certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions. The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether private respondents were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same issue raised before the NLRC and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was proper for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case even if no MR had been filed with the NLRC. The other issues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether private respondents were illegally dismissed (as the CA and the labor arbiter ruled) or abandoned their work (as the NLRC held) and whether they were entitled to backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorneys fees, are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. They involve an inquiry into factual matters. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public respondents evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari fails insofar as it questions the affirmation by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that private respondents were illegally dismissed, entitling them to an award of backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorneys fees.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer. G.R. No. 1141637 06/08/2006

11 Romys Freight Service v. Castro

Facts: This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed jointly by Castro and Veloria against petitioner Romys Freight Service, represented by Roman Cruz, its owner/sole proprietor, with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Baguio City. Castro was hired as a mechanic, promoted to supervisor, and then suffered a stroke. On his doctors advice, he took a leave of absence from work. Pending recovery, he extended his leave several times. While on leave, however, petitioner Cruz sent him several letters first urging him to return to work. The succeeding ones assumed the nature of show cause letters requiring him to explain why he should not be disciplined for his prolonged absence. Cruz also filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft against him. Because of these, Castro was constrained to file a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner on the ground that Cruzs acts constituted constructive dismissal. On the other hand, Veloria was hired as carpenter, promoted to mechanic, then as senior mechanic. He met an accident (the overheated water coming from the radiator of a car he was repairing spurted onto his face, burning it). He was forced to absent himself from work to undergo recuperation. During his absence, he received several letters from Cruz. One letter required him to explain the loss of several tools, another ordered him to pay his loan and still another required him to explain his absences. He was later charged for qualified theft of the missing tools. Because of petitioners acts against him, Veloria joined Castro in filing a case for illegal constructive dismissal against petitioner.

A2012 Eleazar Yoro Varon Cimagala Cruz


Nevertheless, a perusal of the CA decision shows that the findings that petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving just cause for terminating the employment of private respondents and that private respondents did not abandon their work were supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, petitioners obstinate insistence on the alleged serious misconduct (i.e., the commission of estafa and/or qualified theft) of private respondents belies his claim of abandonment as the ground for the dismissal of private respondents. Rather, it strengthens the finding of petitioners discrimination, insensibility and antagonism towards private respondents which gave no choice to private respondents except to forego their employment. G.R. No. 145908 January 22, 2004 Rationale: What highlights the error of the Court of Appeals in not dismissing the complaint before the Naga court is the fact that PLTSCI withdrew its appeal from the decision of the Makati RTC. Said withdrawal had the effect of rendering final and executory the decision of the Makati court which (1) dismissed PLTSCIs complaint to recover damages and to annul the foreclosure and sale of its buses; and (2) ordered PLTSCI to pay the balance of the loan plus damages for filing a clearly baseless and unfounded suit. This is obviously a species of res judicata, specifically, "bar by former judgment," which exists when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. DBPs claim for damages, caused by PLTSCIs filing of a baseless suit, cannot be decided without going through the merits of the complaint filed by PLTSCI. DBPs counterclaim cannot therefore stand independently from PLTSCIs complaint, justifying the Makati courts denial of the motion to withdraw the complaint. PLTSCI was guilty of forum shopping and the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint. DBP correctly resorted to the extra-ordinary writ of certiorari in questioning the July 14, 1994 Order of the Naga court. Where the questioned order is a patent nullity, or where it was issued in excess or without jurisdiction, resort to certiorari may be allowed. Here, the violation of the rule on forum shopping is obvious. Disregarding such fact constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The remedy of certiorari is therefore proper to assail the patently null order of the Naga court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss.

12 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pingol Land Transport

Facts: Pingol Land Transport System Company, Inc. (PLTSCI) obtained loans from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the total amount of P20 Million. To secure payment, PLTSCI, represented by Remedios D. Pingol, Jesusito L. Pingol, and Josephine Pingol-Silo, its Chairman of the Board, President and Treasurer, respectively, executed, among others, a chattel mortgage over certain air-conditioned buses in favor of DBP. After PLTSCI defaulted in the payment of its loans, DBP applied for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties before the Office of the Clerk of Court of Naga City. PLTSCI filed with the Makati RTC a complaint for damages with injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-3121, against DBP, seeking the annulment of the foreclosure and seizure of its buses and the issuance of a restraining order and/or injunction to prevent their sale at public auction. Jesusito Pingol, President of PLTSCI also filed a "Motion to Withdraw Complaint. Judge Malaya of the Naga RTC issued the assailed Order annulling the writ of replevin previously issued. He ruled that the replevin bond posted by PLTSCI was inefficacious because the officer of Utility Assurance Corporation who signed the replevin bond had no authority to do so. Nevertheless, he denied the motion to dismiss ratiocinating that no pending case exists at the time PLTSCI filed the complaint with the Naga court considering that the prior motion to withdraw the complaint filed by Jesusito Pingol terminated all the proceedings before the Makati court. Judge Malaya held that said complaint can be withdrawn as a matter of right because the same was filed before the petitioner filed its answer. DBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, it elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, contending, among others, that Judge Malaya gravely abused his discretion in not dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum shopping. The CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by DBP. It ruled that assuming that the Naga court committed an error in not granting the motion to dismiss, said error is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari. Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the September 7, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35189 which dismissed the petition for certiorari questioning the July 14, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 94-3192 denying DBPs motion to dismiss. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the denial of DBPs motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 94-3192. YES. (2) If in the affirmative, whether or not such an error is correctible by certiorari. Courts Ruling: Petition is granted. Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaint before the Naga RTC is dismissed.

A2012 Eleazar Yoro Varon Cimagala Cruz


RULE 65 PROHIBITION G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996 a certiorari or prohibition case, only issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board and offices involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts. The issue of whether or not MIWPI is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one of fact, and which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and not in the prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the Secretary of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the execution of its order which is under scrutiny. Assuming, arguendo, that prohibition is the proper remedy for determining the propriety of piercing the separate personality of petitioner with its stockholders, the evidence presented at said trial does not warrant such action. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. Conversely, a stockholder cannot be made to answer for any of its financial obligations even if he should be its president.

01 Matuguina Integrated Wood Products v. Court of Appeals

Facts: The Acting Director of the Bureau of Forest Development issued Provisional Timber License No. 30, covering an area of 5,400 hectares to Ms. Milagros Matuguina who was then doing business under the name of Matuguina Logging Enterprises, a sole proprietorship venture. A portion, covering 1,900 hectares, of the said area was located within the territorial boundary of Gov. Generoso in Mati, Davao Oriental, and adjoined the timber concession of Davao Enterprises Corporation (DAVENCOR). Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI), was incorporated, having an authorized capital stock of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder of MIWPI. Milagros Matuguina requested the Director of Forest Development for a change of name and transfer of management of PTL No. 30 from a single proprietorship under her name, to that of MIWPI, which was favorably endorsed. Milagros Matuguina and MIWPI executed a Deed of Transfer transferring all of the former's rights, interests, ownership and participation in Provincial Timber License No. 30 to the latter for and in consideration of 148,000 shares of stocks in MIWPI. DAVENCOR, through its Assistant General Manager, complained to the District Forester at Mati, Davao Oriental that Milagros Matuguina/MLE had encroached into and was conducting logging operations in DAVENCOR's timber concession. After investigation of DAVENCOR's complaint, the Investigating Committee which looked into DAVENCOR's complaint submitted its report to the Director, finding that MLE had encroached on the concession area of DAVENCOR. MIWPI filed this action for Prohibition, Damages and Injunction, in order to prevent the Secretary of Natural Resources from enforcing its Order of Execution against it, for liability arising from an alleged encroachment of MIWPI over the timber concession of DAVENCOR located in Mati, Davao Oriental. The Davao City RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI, but on appeal, was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that MIWPI was an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina and/or Matuguina Logging Enterprises, to be liable to DAVENCOR for the illegal encroachment. MIWPI filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, alleging that there was grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned decision and its companion resolution, denying the motion for reconsideration. Issues: Was MIWPI denied due process when it was adjudged liable with MLE for encroaching upon the timber concession of DAVENCOR in the Minister's Order of Execution? YES. Was the failure to comply with the procedure in order to satisfy the requirements of due process cured by the present action for prohibition where the liability of appellee has been ventilated? NO. Courts Ruling: The decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED, and correspondingly, the Order of Execution of the Secretary of Natural Resources is declared NULL and VOID and without effect. Rationale: Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. In

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G.R. No. L-3452 December 7, 1949 remedy. The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so as to substitute the real parties in interest for it (the petitioner), or to show that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings. Otherwise, or of the petitioner does not amend its petition or does not show that it is a juridical entity, the petition will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall have been made, the writ prayed for will issue, without costs. 51 Phil 665 (1928)

04 Nacionalista Party v Bautista

Facts: It is averred, in support of the prayer for a writ of prohibition, that while the respondent held, as he still holds, the office of Solicitor General of the Philippines, the President designated him as acting member of the Commission on Elections, and on that same date the respondent took the oath of office and forthwith proceeded to assume and perform the duties of the office; that at the time of the respondent's designation he had not resigned from the office of Solicitor General of the Philippines nor does he intend to do so but continues to exercise all the powers and duties of the last mentioned office. It is contended that such designation invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because there was on 9 November 1949 no vacancy in the Commission on Elections, for the acceptance, approval, or granting of the application for retirement filed by Commissioner Francisco Enage on such date constitutes or amounts to abuse of discretion and was done in bad faith by the President and therefore null and void; and because Commissioner Enage is entitled to leave and until after the expiration of such leave he does not cease to be a member of the Commission on Elections. It is claimed, in the alternative, that even if there was on that date a vacancy in the Commission on Elections, still the respondent's designation to act as such member of the Commission, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General, pending the appointment of a permanent member, is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because membership in the Commission is a permanent constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and therefore, no designation of a person or officer in an acting capacity could and can be made; because a member of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any other office; and because the respondents as Solicitor General belongs to the executive department and cannot assume the powers and duties of a member in the Commission. Held: The last point is whether prohibition is the proper remedy. Strictly speaking, there are no proceedings of the Commission on Elections in the exercise of its judicial or ministerial functions, which are being performed by it or without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of its discretion. The only basis for the petition is that the designation of the respondent as temporary member of the Commission on Elections is illegal and invalid because it offends against the Constitution. This special civil action as our Rule call it, or this extraordinary legal remedy following the classical or chancery nomenclature, is in effect to test the validity or legality of the respondent's designation in a temporary capacity as member of the Commission on Elections pending the appointment of a permanent member or Commissioner. It is in the nature of a quo warranto, and as such it may only be instituted by the party who claims to be entitled to the office. The authorities and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court. In the case at bar, however, as we have found that the respondent's designation to act temporarily a member of the Commission on Elections is unlawful because it offends against the provision of the Constitution creating the Commission on Elections, the dismissal of the petition would deny and deprive the parties that are affected by such designation of a remedy and relief, because no one is entitled now to the office and a party who is not entitled to the office may not institute quo warrant proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor General, the only other party who may institute the proceedings, would not proceed against himself. In these circumstances, it is incumbent upon and the duty of this Court to grant a remedy. The foregoing authorities (omitted) are invoked in view of the peculiar and extraordinary circumstances obtaining in this case already referred to, to wit: that as no one is entitled to the office there is no party who in his name may institute quo warranto proceedings, and that the respondent the only other party who may institute the proceedings in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, would not proceed against himself. Were it not for this anomalous situation where there would be no remedy to redress a constitutional transgression, we would adhere strictly to the time-honored rule that to test the right to an office quo warranto proceedings is the proper

06 Asinas vs. CFI of Romblon and Asinas

Facts: This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Catalina Asinas against the CFI of Romblon and Felisa Asinas praying that the respondent court be required to refrain from ordering the payment of P200 to the respondent Felisa Asinas and permitting the latter to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of Mauricio Asinas' will, and the administration of his estate. On August 9, 1926, an application for the probate of what purports to be the will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas, a resident of the municipality of Looc of the Province of Romblon was filed in the CFI. Opposition was entered to said application by the respondent Felisa Asinas, alleging that she is an acknowledged natural daughter of Mauricio Asinas, and by Justo Asinas, brother of said deceased. After hearing the parties, and upon consideration of the evidence adduced, the respondent court, in spite of petitioner's objection authorized Felisa Asinas to intervene in said probate proceeding as well as in the administration of the said deceased's state, and granted her, moreover, P200 travelling expenses for herself and her witnesses, chargeable to the funds under administration. The petitioner took exception to said rulings issued by the respondent court and moved for a reconsideration, but said motion was denied by its order of November 19, 1927. And thus filed this petition. Issue: WON the writ of prohibition is the proper remedy? NO Ratio: The respondent court's resolution ordering the payment of said expenses to be charged to the funds under administration, is final in character, since by it a claim of the respondent (Felisa Asinas) is granted, without the administrator or the petitioner having had a day in court, and notwithstanding their subsequent opposition, thus giving an end to the controversy; and as such it is appealable, without the necessity of waiting for the termination of the administration. As there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of justice, namely, an appeal, prohibition cannot lie (So Chu and Limpangco vs. Nepomuceno and Reis, 29 Phil., 208; Quimpo vs. Salas, 41 Phil., 353). Summarizing the foregoing, we hold: 1. That a Court of First Instance does not exceed its probate jurisdiction in authorizing one claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a decedent to intervene in the probate of the alleged will of said decedent, upon presentation of prima facie evidence of such civil status. And, 2. That although a Court of First Instance does exceed its jurisdiction in ordering the payment from the funds under administration of the expenses incurred by a presumptive for his A2012 Eleazar Yoro Varon Cimagala Cruz


appearance and that of this witnesses with a view to opposing the probate of an alleged will of his predecessor, because such expenses are not necessary to the management of the estate, or its productivity, yet said decree being of a final character and appealable, and there existing a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, such as an appeal, the writ of prohibition cannot be issued. RULE 65 MANDAMUS G.R. No. 122728 : 02/13/1997 pursuant to the pronouncement of the Court in Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court, speaking through Justice Yap, said:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the board umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Right (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True--but the absence of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

01 Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman

Facts: Prior to his retirement, petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. The DOLE rendered a decision ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. (NIASSI) to pay its workers the sum of P1,281,065.505. The decision having attained finality, a writ of execution was issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his deputies to satisfy the same. Petitioner, as the assigned sheriff, caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily collections from its various clients. In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution, Atty. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., President of NIASSI, filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner. In addition to the civil case, Atty. Calo likewise fled before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to the enforcement of the writ of execution. Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman, in recommended its dismissal for lack of merit. Meanwhile, several workers of NIASSI filed letters-complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao alleging, among others things, that petitioner illegally deducted an amount equivalent to 25% from their differential pay. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed to the Court the administrative aspect of the complaints. The Court in an En Banc Resolution dismissed the case for lack of interest on the part of complainants to pursue their case. Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been dismissed, the criminal complaints remained pending and unresolved, prompting petitioner to file several omnibus motions for early resolution. When petitioner retired, the criminal complaints still remained unresolved, as a consequence of which petitioner's request for clearance in order that he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was denied. With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. Sad to say, even this motion to dismiss, however, has not been acted upon. Issue/Held: Is mandamus the proper remedy? Yes. Rationale: The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases

Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman in the instant case has failed to discharge its duty mandated by the Constitution "to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof." Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for. G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979

02 Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company

Facts: In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa seeks a reversal of the decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically: "(1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding A2012 Eleazar Yoro Varon Cimagala Cruz


the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative." Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa contends that under the provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from Manila Railroad Company's employees' wages and salaries. As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the Manila Railroad Company, which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa, and that, therefore, Manila Railroad Company, in issuing the documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the employees of Manila Railroad Company, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P" Manila Railroad Company, in effect, implemented the said provision of law. Issue: Does mandamus lie in this case? NO. Courts Ruling: Mandamus does not lie. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa was unable to show a clear legal right. Rationale: This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. The very law on which the action is based fails to supply any basis for this petition. Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. It is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act. It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful. Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. G.R. No. L-2245 May 20, 1949


FACTS: Carbungco filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against the defendant Vicenta Foz, in the municipal court of Manila, claming that the regular tenant who previously occupied the lots owned by petitioner had already vacated and deliver the the premises to him (upon his demand). The defendant Vicenta Fox who claims to have received as sublease said premises, particularly the second story of house, from the lessee, refused to vacate the same. Fox failed to either appear in the municipal court or answer the complaint. Judgment was rendered against her, ordering her to vacate the premises, restore possession thereof to the plaintiff, and to pay P100 as monthly rental until she shall have left the premises, with costs. The defendants appealed the case to the CFI Manila. Pending appeal, and because of the appellant's failure to deposit the rental for the month of April 1948 Carbungco filed a motion for execution of the judgment. After the filing, the appellant made the deposit of the rentals. Hon. Rafael Amparo, in the absence of Judge Buenaventura Ocampo who was on vacation, issued an order denying the motion for execution on the ground that the deposit had already been [subsequently] made. A motion for reconsideration filed by Carbungco was likewise denied by order of May 29, 1948. Carbungco has now filed in this Court a petition for mandamus praying that Judge Rafael Amparo be commanded to issue an order of execution against the defendants Vicenta Foz. ISSUE: w/n execution is proper? NO RULING: Contrary to the provisions of law, particularly Rule 72, section 8, Rules of Court, the appellant in this detainer case failed to deposit in court within the first ten days of the succeeding month (May 1948) the rental corresponding to the previous month (April 1948). This deposit was actually made three days after the end of the ten-day period, that is to say, on May 13, 1948. The law and the authorities are, however, clear that this legal provision about the deposit of the rental corresponding to the previous month within the first ten days of the succeeding month, is mandatory; that upon violation thereof by the defendants-appellant, the plaintiff-appellee has the right to ask for execution pending appeal; and that the court is left no discretion extend the period of deposit prescribed by law, postpone the making of said deposit, or otherwise relieve the appellant of the consequences of her on his failure to make the deposit within the precise prescribed by law. The fact that the actual deposit was made shortly after the expiration of the first ten days of the succeeding month should not and cannot make any difference. The law has prescribed a period, and this requirement should be complied with strictly, and its observance and compliance should be enjoined and enforced by the courts, not only for the protection of parties in whose favor the law happens to have been made and promulgated, but also for the information and guidance of those otherwise affected thereby. Otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding as to whether or not an appellant in a forcible entry and detainer case could avoid execution if he shall have made the monthly deposit, say, on the 11th, 12th, 13th or 14th day etc. of the succeeding month, just as long as the delay is not too long. We hold and declare that pending appeal, failure to make the deposit of rentals within the period fixed by law, however short the

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delay, gives the appellee the right to execution of the judgment, which the court is bond to grant and enforce. We are aware that it has been held that under Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, a tenant cannot be ejected for non-payment of rents unless such nonpayment be deliberate and intentional. In the present case, however, there is every reason to believe and to hold that appellant's failure to deposit within the period fixed by law was deliberate and intentional. No reason or explanation whatsoever was given for the delay in making the deposit. It could not have been due to inability to pay or to any financial embarrassment, for the reason that, since the appeal was perfected in April 1947, the appellant had apparently all along been able to make the deposit on time. Moreover, there is reason to doubt that appellant herein possession the status of a regular tenant. According to the uncontradicted claims of the plaintiff contained in his complaint in the municipal court, which appellant did not even answer, the appellant was a mere intruder or squatter, having had no previous contract or understanding with the plaintiff about the occupancy of the premises in question. In view of the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is hereby granted and the respondents judge, or anyone presiding over Branch V of the First Instance of Manila, or any other branch of said court taking cognizance of civil case No. 2886 is hereby commanded to order the execution of the appealed judgment rendered by the Municipal Court of Manila requiring the defendant Vicente Foz to vacate the premises in question. 191 SCRA 20 (1990) WON the court erred in dismissing his petition for mandamus based on laches. YES Ratio: Madrigal alleges that the one (1) year period prescribed in an action for quo warranto is not applicable in an action for mandamus because Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not provide for such prescriptive period. The declaration by the trial court that the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the period of one (1) year within which to file the petition for mandamus, should be confined to actions for quo warranto only. On the contrary, he contends that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition sine qua non before one can petition for mandamus. On the part of public respondents, they aver that it has become an established part of our jurisprudence, being a public policy repeatedly cited by the courts in myriad of mandamus cases, that actions for reinstatement should be brought within one year from the date of dismissal, otherwise, they will be barred by laches. The pendency of an administrative remedy before the Commission does not stop the running of the one (1) year period within which a mandamus case for reinstatement should be filed. The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. The reason behind this being was expounded in the case of Unabia v. City Mayor, etc., 99 Phil. 253 where We said: ..... [W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainty (sic), and the peoples interest require that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable. The fatal drawback of Madrigal's cause is that he came to court out of time. As aforestated, it was only after four (4) years and twenty (20) days from the abolition of his position that he file the petition for mandamus and damages. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor. And this one (1) year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. Actually, the recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a case where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot decide such issues with finality. In the present case, only a legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not the abolition of Madrigal's position was in accordance with law.

05 Madrigal vs. Lecaroz

Facts: In 1971, public respondents Governor Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Zoleta, Jr., and other Provincial Board of Marinduque members abolished petitioner-appellants Joventino Madrigal's possition as a permanent construction capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 thru a Resolution. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that his position was not essential. In 1972, Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission. In 1974, the Commission in its 1st Indorsement declared the removal of Madrigal from the service illegal On April 26, 1974, public respondent Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz moved for a reconsideration of said resolution. On February 10, 1975, the Commission denied the motion for reconsideration . On August 4, 1975, Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial Board requesting implementation of the resolution of the Commission and consequently, reinstatement to his former position. On August 18, 1975, the Provincial Board, through Resolution No. 93, denied Madrigal's request for reinstatement because his former position no longer exists. In the same resolution, it ordered the appropriation of the amount of P4,200.00 as his back salaries covering the period December 1, 1971 up to June 30, 1973 On December 15, 1975, Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Marinduque against public respondents for mandamus and damages seeking the (1) restoration of his abolished position in the Roads and Bridges Fund Budget of the Province; (2) reinstatement to such position; and (3) payment of his back salaries plus damages. The petition was dismissed based on laches. The court ruled that it was in 1971 that his position was abolished but it took him 4 years before filing a petition for mandamus. Issue:

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