Practical Ethics by Peter Singer Review by: James Fishkin Ethics, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Jul., 1981), pp.

665-666 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380303 . Accessed: 26/09/2012 02:13
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BOOK REVIEWS
Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Pp. viii+237. $6.95 (paper). In Practical Ethics, Peter Singer attempts to rehabilitate a form of utilitarianism and apply it to a host of current moral controversies. Singer has written a provocative and thoughtful book which should receive wide use in the classroom. However, it is less than successful in its central ambitions. Singer begins with a derivation of utilitarianism from the notion of "universality." His aim is to "show that we very swiftly arrive at an initially utilitarian position once we apply the universal aspect of ethics to simpler, pre-ethical decision-making." For this reason, he believes, "the onus of proof" is on antiutilitarians. The utilitarian position must be the point of departure. It is "a first base which we reach by universalizing self-interested decision-making. We cannot, if we are to think ethically, refuse to take this step" (p. 13). Singer believes that an impartial consideration of interests ("that my own interests cannot count for more simply because they are my own") implies what he calls "a form of utilitarianism" (that "I must choose the course of action which has the best consequences, on balance, for all affected"). It is this kind of impartiality-or "equal consideration" of interests-which "requires me to weigh up [emphasis added] all these interests and adopt the course of action most likely to maximize the interests of those affected" (p. 12). The difficulty in this argument is in the move from (1) "equal consideration" or "impartiality" to (2) equal "weighing" according to an aggregate principle of the overall best consequences. For one can evaluate the interests of everyone impartially without adding them up or "weighing them over-all." From Rawls's original position, for example, we would take account of everyone's interests in the same way, yet this impartiality does not imply an aggregate principle of utility. On the contrary, it yields maximin or some other distributive principle favoring the less advantaged. From the bare notion of impartiality or equal consideration, in other words, there is no presumptive case for utilitarianism rather than competing principles of justice. Depending on the precise account of impartiality, a variety of principles will appear initially plausible. If Rawls's original position is merely admitted as a possible alternative account of impartiality, then this claim of Singer's must be mistaken: "We cannot, if we are to think ethically, refuse to take this step" (of accepting the presumptive case in favor of utilitarianism). For we can think ethically-and impartially-about everyone's interests without adding them up or weighing them overall in utilitarian fashion. A more striking and successful portion of the book is taken up with what Singer describes as the "replaceability argument." It might be paraphrased as follows: If persons are merely viewed as receptacles for utility, then there would seem to be no moral issue, in utilitarian terms, about which persons exist, or come to exist, over time-so long as the aggregate utility in the receptacles remains the same. If individuals, or even whole populations, die-but are replaced by equivalent numbers of equally happy persons-then on this view, the state of the world must be as good (i.e., have as much utility) as before. Ethics 91 (July 1981): 665-691
? 1981 by The University of Chicago.

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Singer attempts to avoid this difficulty by distinguishing "preference" utilitarianism from hedonistic forms of utilitarianism defined in terms of experienced states of consciousness: "According to preference utilitarianism, an action contrary to the preference of any being is, unless this preference is outweighed by contrary preferences, wrong. Killing a person who prefers to continue living is, therefore, wrong, other things being equal. That the victims are not around after the act to lament the fact that their preferences have been disregarded, is irrelevant" (p. 81). In Singer's formulation, the preferences of persons to continue living-and not be "replaced"-cannot be left out of the calculation, even if they could be painlessly supplanted by other, equally happy "receptacles" for utility. The state of the world is not equally good so long as there is an equivalent number of equally happy people; if a whole population has been destroyed in the meantime, the frustration of all those preferences must be included in the moral comparison. While Singer discusses the replaceability argument at length in his attempt to rehabilitate utilitarianism, he does not confront two less exotic but crucial difficulties: (a) interpersonal comparisons of utility, and (b) distributive objections to aggregative utilitarianism. After decades of discussion of these two issues, no attempt to defend utilitarianism could be called successful unless it explicitly confronted them both. It is surprising that Singer ignores a completely. It is equally troubling that the real difficulty of b goes unstated because of Singer's focus on two-person cases. Wherever Singer discusses distributive issues, he focuses on two persons (or two comparable groups). So he asks us to consider the interests of two earthquake victims in the distribution of medicine (p. 21), the interests of "Jack and Jill" in equal opportunity (p. 24), the interests of blacks and whites in reverse discrimination, the interests of humans and animals in the consumption of meat and the interests of affluent Westerners and starving refugees in famine relief. All of these problems are important and deserve discussion. Yet, by formulating them in terms of two persons (or two comparable groups), Singer leaves unstated what has become the central distributive objection to utilitarianism-that it can justify sacrificing the essential interests of some for the minor interests of others. A policy change which imposes severe deprivations on a few can be justified-in utilitarian terms-if it improves, in a small way, the position of a sufficiently large number of others. This possibility cannot arise, however, when only two persons (or two equal blocks of persons) are involved. For then A's significant interests must always outweigh B's minor interests-provided that those are the only interests considered. But once the minor interests of enough C's, D's, E's, etc., are admitted, it is possible for all of the minor interests to outweigh A's significant interests (by any principle of aggregate utility). This is the error in Singer's claim that: "The principle of equal consideration of interests does not allow major interests to be sacrificed for minor interests" (p. 55). Within the confines of the two-person case, this claim is correct. But once multiperson (or group) cases are admitted, distinctive distributive issues arise for utilitarianism. These difficulties are too important to be omitted in a book that purports to defend utilitarianism as a guide to practical ethical problems.
JAMES FISHKIN

Yale University