Wong vs. IAC 200 SCRA 792 Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda.

They had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from an officemate. Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature. Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. That he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties.

Issue: Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive properties of Romarico. Ruling: The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.

MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011 G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law Requirements in challenging the constitutionality of the law) FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same attempts to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective officials disregarding the terms previously served by them, which collides with the Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI). ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit. HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are welldelineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

ONG vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 97347 July 6, 1999 Facts: Petitioner Jaime Ong and Respondent spouses Robles an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (Nota Bene: Contract to Sell) with regards two parcels of land with a rice mill and piggery situated at Quezon for P2M. As part of the terms and conditions, petitioner shall advance downpayment of 300K, shall pay the loan of the spouses of the bank, and will pay the balance of the purchase price quarterly. Petitioner was able to pay the downpayment and subsequently occupied the property. However, he gave the spouses postdated checks which were dishonored due to insufficient funds. To make it worse, he was not able to fully pay the loan of the spouses in the bank. The bank threatened to foreclose the mortgage, so what the spouses did was to sell three of the transformers of the rice mill in order to satisfy the loan obligation. Respondents now want to rescind the contract on account of Ongs non-fulfillment of obligation and seek to recover the property with damages. RTC upheld the rescission and ordered mutual restitution as well as awarded exemplary damages. The CA deleted the award of exemplary damages.

Issue: 1. WON the respondent spouses may rescind the contract? YES, but rescind through 1191 and not 1381. 2. WON there was novation of obligation? NO. (But we wont tackle it here yet.) Held: The Robles spouses bound themselves to deliver a deed of absolute sale and clean title covering the two parcels of land upon full payment by the buyer of the purchase price of P2,000,000.00 (since it is a contract to sell diba?) This promise to sell was subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition of full payment of the purchase price by the petitioner. Petitioner, however, failed to complete payment of the purchase price. The non-fulfillment of the condition of full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. It must be stressed that the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligors failure to comply with an obligation. Failure to pay, in this instance, is not even a breach but merely an event which prevents the vendors obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force. Hence, the agreement of the parties in the case at bench may be set aside, but not because of a breach on the part of petitioner for failure to complete payment of the purchase price. Rather, his failure to do so brought about a situation which prevented the obligation of respondent spouses to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. 1191 vs. 1381 Although both presuppose contracts validly entered into and subsisting and both require mutual restitution when proper, they are not entirely identical. Articles 1380 is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract, even if this should be valid, by restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to the celebration of the contract. It implies a contract, which even if initially valid, produces a lesion or a pecuniary damage to someone. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code refers to rescission applicable to reciprocal obligations. Rescission under Article 1191 is a principal action which is based on breach of a party, while rescission under Article 1381 is a subsidiary action limited to cases of rescissible contracts.

Partosa-Jo vs CA GR 82606, December 18, 1992 FACTS: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings

of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property. HELD: SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.