LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and WILSON C. YAO, respondents. G.R. No.

103200 August 31, 1994 FACTS: Respondent Yao was the owner of a commercial building, a portion of which isleased to herein petitioner. However, during the renewal of the contract of lease, the twodisagreed on the rental rate, and to resolve the controversy, they submitted theirdisagreement to arbitration. Two arbitrators (Alamarez and Sabile) has been appointed bythe parties while the appointment of the third arbitrator (Tupang) was held in abeyancebecause La Naval Drug instructed its arbitrator to defer the same until its Board of Directorscould convene and approved Tupangs appointment. This was theorized by the respondent as dilatory tactics, hence, he prayed that a summary hearing be conducted and direct the 2arbitrators to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with Contract of Lease and theapplicable provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and confirming the appointmentof the Third Arbitrator; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be ordered to immediatelyconvene and resolve the controversy before it. The respondent court announced that thetwo arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloisa R. Narciso as the third arbitrator and ordered the partiesto submit their position papers on the issue as to whether or not respondent Yao's claim fordamages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitrationagreement. In moving for reconsideration of the said Order, petitioner argued that in SpecialCase No. 6024, the respondent court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdictionand is not competent to act on respondent Yao's claim for damages, which poses an issuelitigable in an ordinary civil action. However, respondent court was not persuadedby petitioner's submission, hence, it denied the motion for reconsideration. While theappellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 876, acourt, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine theissue of whether the litigants should proceed or not to arbitration, it, however, consideredpetitioner in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hearand decide in the summary proceedings private respondent's claim for damages, it(petitioner) having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the court a quo. ISSUES: 1. 2. WON THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON WON THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon theother hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune. Eustacio Atwel, Lucia Pilpil and Manuel Melgazo v.Concepcion Progressive Assoc. Inc. Topic: Estoppel on Questioning Courts Jurisdiction Facts: Then Assemblyman Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Assoc. (CPA) in Hilongos, Leyte.Said organization aimed to provide livelihood and generate incomefor his supporters. Emiliano, after elected as CPA president, boughta parcel of land in behalf of the association which was later onconverted into a wet market, which also housed a cockpit and anarea for amusement. The rentals from the vendors were then paidto CPA. When Emiliano died, his son Manuel Melgazo succeededhim as CPA President and administrator of the property. While inthe process of registering as a stock corporation, its other electedofficers and members formed their own group and registeredthemselves in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) asofficers os Concepcion Progressive Assoc. Inc. (CPAI). Later, CPAIobjected to petitioners collection of rentals from the wet marketvendors. CPAI then filed a case in the SEC for mandatory injunction.With the passage of R.A. No. 8799, the case was transferred toBranch 24 of the Southern Leyte RTC and subsequently to Branch 8of Tacloban City RTC. Both were special commercial courts.Petitioners alleged that the property was purchased using themoney of petitioner Emiliano. The Special Commercial Court ruled for the CPAI; in that thedeed of sale covering the property was in the name of CPA, notEmiliano. The latter signed the deed for and in behalf of the CPA,thus, there is no doubt as to who the vendee is. Petitioners aredirected to cease and desist from collecting the rentals. On appealwith the CA, the petitioners contested the jurisdiction of the specialcommercial court over the case. The CA found that the specialcommercial court should not have tried the case since there was nointra-corporate dispute among CPAI members. However, the saidcourt denied the appeal based on the doctrine of estoppel. Issue: WON the petitioners are barred from questioning the courts jurisdiction over the case when they Held:

HELD: As to the first issue, it was held that jurisdiction over the person must be seasonablyraised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense inan answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion,however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as an estoppel or as a waiverof such defense. With regard to the second issue, it was held that where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocationof this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties toviolate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter beinglegislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such asherein before exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must then

The SC held in the negative. Originally, Sec. 5 of P.D. 902-Aconferred on SEC the original and exclusive jurisdiction over xxxcontroversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, orassociation relations between and among stockholders xxxmembers or associates, however, upon the enactment of R.A. No.8799 in the year 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intracorporate controversies and other cases enumerated in Sec. 5 of P.D. 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. Ithas been proven that the special commercial court has no jurisdiction over the case since petitioners were notmembers/officers of CPAI, but of CPA. The two associations aredistinct of each other. In previous cases, the SC ruled that

theoperation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seeminglydepends on whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction ornot. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decidedupon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred,on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must existas a matter of law, and may not be conferred by the consent of theparties or by estoppel. The rule remains that estoppel does notconfer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI, noexceptional circumstance appears in this case to warrantdivergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not availablehere. The decision grants the petition of Melgazo and others; inthat the case filed by CPAI before SEC is hereby dismissed for lackof jurisdiction. City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc. GR No. L-25134, October 30, 1969 Facts: The City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949 imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation engaged in the manufacturer bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, ... a fee of ONE TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year," upon "such local manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned who will be delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the ordinance. In 1959, this ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by increasing the fee from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks. Appellant refused to pay the additional fee and challenged the validity of the whole ordinance. Appellee sued appellant in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The trial court decided in favor of petitioner city. Since it also failed to collect the surcharge provided for in the ordinances in question, the petitioner city filed a second action to collect the said surcharges. On July 24, 1964, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. This motion was denied by the court a quo. Issue: Should the case be dismissed for being barred by res judicata and splitting of suits?

two or more parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints. . SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. If separate complaints were brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others. It is well recognized that a party cannot split a single cause of action into parts and sue on each part separately. The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old maxim nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa(no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). Whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on any of the other possible reliefs arising from the same violation, whether the first action is still pending, in which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it has already been finally terminated, in which case, the defense would be res adjudicata. Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata, on the one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on the other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since either of the former is by law only the result or effect of the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it. Joseph v. Bautista 170 SCRA 540 (1989) Facts: Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela. Petitioner boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that

Ruling: Yes. The SC ruled that position was essentially correct. There is no question that appellee split up its cause of action when it filed the first complaint on March 23, 1960, seeking the recovery of only the bottling taxes or charges plus legal interest, without mentioning in any manner the surcharges. The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in force then provided: SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. A single cause of action cannot be split up into

respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement. The trial court decided in favor of respondents. Issue: Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action. Ruling: A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law. The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment. Sarsaba vs. Fe Vda. De Te (2009) ** SORRY GUYS, ang haba ng case na toh! -KARA PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI WITH PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ASSAILING THE ORDER OF THE RTC DIGOS CITY FACTS: Feb 1995, NLRC found Sereno to have been illegally dismissed, ordering Gasing to pay him his Monetary claims. There was a writ of execution that was returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Sancho issued an Alias Writ of Execution directing Sheriff Lavarez of the NLRC to satisfy the judgment award. Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, ATTY. SARSABA levied a truck in possession of Gasing. o The truck was sold at public auction, Sereno was the highest bidder. Fe Vda. De Te represented by her counsel Atty Castaeda filed with the RTC for recovery of the truck o Damages with prayer of delivery of the truck o Case was filed against Sereno and Lavarez FE alleged that the registered owner of the truck was her late husband -

She had the official receipt and Cert of registration Gasing rented the truck from her Lavarez erroneously assumed Gasing owned the truck because it was in his possession o She should not be made to answer the judgment award because she nor her late husband was not a party to the labor case. SARSABA filed a motion to dismiss o FE had not legal personality to sue because she had no real interest over the property subject of the complaint o Allegations do not state a cause of action o No sufficient cause of action against him o There was also no affidavit of merit and bond that would entitle the delivery of the truck pendent lite NLRC ALSO filed a motion to dismiss o Lack of jurisdiction o Lack of cause of action Lavarez filed an answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and 3 rd party complaint o RTC had no jurisdiction over the SM o Complaint had no cause of action JAN 21, 2000, RTC issued an order denying SARSABAs MTD for lack of merit o SARSABA denied the material allegations in the complaint Stated that the respondent had no legal personality to sue TRUCK was actually sold by JESUS MATIAS, who in turn bought the truck from the Sps. Te. THEREFORE, Gasing was the lawful owner. o LAVAREZ filed a motion for inhibition which was opposed by FE OCT 13, 2000, RTC issued an order of inhibition and directed the records be transferred from BRANCH 19 to BRANCH 18, RTC MAY 19 2003, denied the separate MTD filed by NLRC and LAVAREZ o It also set the pre-trial conference on July 2003 OCT 2005, SARSABA filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the case o Lack of jurisdiction o Discharge respondents counsel (CASTAEDA for lack of legal personality) APRIL 12, 2005, FE TE DIED. Okay it gets weird ha? She dies BUT THEN. FE through her lawyer filed an opposition contending that the failure to serve summons to SERENO is not a ground for dismissing the complaint because respective pleadings were already given (NOTE THAT THIS CASE INVOLVES PARTIES TO A CIVIL ACTION) (Im sorry? I dont understand how she can file an opposition when shes dead. KUDOS to her lawyer for reading her mind. WOOOOHOO SABAW MOMENT. ) o SARSABA and FE already filed their separate MTDs which was denied for the lack of merit FEs DEATH DID NOT RENDER functus officio her right to sue, since her lawyer CASTAeda has already testified in her behalf. MAR 2006 RTC denied SARSABAs motion He then filed a MR with motion for inhibition o Claiming that the judge that ordered the decision was biased and partial o The judge should have inhibited herself from trying the case since her husband is a defendant in a petition for judicial recognition of which SARSABA was the counsel

o o o

CASE was re-raffled OCT 2006, SARSABAs MR was denied for lack of merit. SO NOW, SARSABA appealed based on QUESTIONS OF LAW o Note: questions of law1 vs. question of fact2 o There are a lot of issues which involve certiorari under R 45 and R65 as well as interlocutory orders, just in case Maam asks.

2.

Should her counsel, Casteeda be discharged because he no longer has legal personality to sue in behalf of FE? NO. SUBSITUTION OF THE DECEASED o The counsel is required to inform the court of the death of his client, as well as give the name and address of the latters legal representative The only actions that survives and may be filed against the decedents representatives are Actions to recover real or personal property/ or an interest therein Actions to enforce liens Actions to recover damages for an inquiry to a person/property o The rule on substitution is governed by S 16, Rule 3. It is not a matter of jurisdiction but DUE PROCESS Designed to ensure that the deceased would be properly represented Non-compliance would result to a denial of due process CASTAEDA failed to make any manifestation before the RTC of Fes death. o He did not show proof that he has been retained by FEs legal representative or any of her heirs o THIS FAILURE would not invalidate all proceedings in the RTC. o The trial court's jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party. SARBASA raised that the SPA executed in favor of CASTAEDA has already expired, rule on agency o Agency is extinguished by death of the principal o This is correct but it is not enough to cause the dismissal of the complaint because, THE ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY is one of the exceptions that survives, and therefore, such action is not extinguished by the death of a party. What is the legal effect of FEs death during the pendency of the case? It definitely didnt eradicate Castanedas right to prosecute the case When the case was filed, FE was still alive Records reveal that the Attorney-in-fact has testified long before in behalf of the said plaintiff and more particularly during the state when the plaintiff was vehemently opposing the dismissal of the complainant He offered documentary evidence, and as such, ONCE THE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION IT ATTACHES UNTIL THE CASE IS DECIDED. o THE PROPER REMEDY is the substitution of Heirs, and not the dismissal of this case

ISSUES and HELD: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case considering that one of the defendants (SERENO) was not served summons since he passed away? NO JURISDICTION with respect to SERENO Since SERENO died before summons was served, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint against defendants, and it should have been filed against SERENOs ESTATE. 1997, Sheriffs Return of Service states that he could not serve the summons because SERENO is dead. o Therefore, the complaint must be dismissed against all defendants, SARBASA, SERENO, LAVARES, NLRC why? Because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of SERENO o Jurisdiction is acquired by Service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or a proper court officer, Personally handing a copy to the defendant or By substituted service (I think this is via snail mail) o Service of summons means that the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person MTD are deemed waived when all defenses and objections were not raised o EXCEPT When the court has no jurisdiction over SM There is another action pending between the parties for the same cause The action is barred by prior judgment or by statue of limitations THE COURT states that the MTD based on the court not acquiring jurisdiction of the person cannot be raised on appeal FOR THE FIRST TIME o But then the Court also states that they cannot counter this argument because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over SERENO o So technically, the dismissal is valid only to SERENO and not the other defendants (SARSABA, petitioner in this case) because they were properly served summons FAILURE to effect summons to SERENO dies not render the action DISMISSIBLE

3. -

question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. (CERTIORARI RULE 45)
2

"question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.

In fine, We hold that the petition should be denied as the RTC Order is interlocutory; hence, not a proper subject of an appeal before the Court. In the same breath, We also hold that, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for certiorari as a relaxation of the judicial hierarchy of courts, the same is also dismissible for being substantially insufficient to warrant the Court the nullification of the Order of the RTC.

Let this be an occasion for Us to reiterate that the rules are there to aid litigants in prosecuting or defending their cases before the courts. However, these very rules should not be abused so as to advance one's personal purposes, to the detriment of orderly administration of justice. We can surmise from the present case herein petitioner's manipulation in order to circumvent the rule on modes of appeal and the hierarchy of courts so that the issues presented herein could be settled without going through the established procedures. In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, We stressed that this should be the constant policy that must be observed strictly by the courts and lawyers, thus: x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. G.R. Nos. 159669 & 163521 March 12, 2007

Rosemoor defaulted in the payment of its various drawings under the LCs and promissory notes. In view of the default, the Bank caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the Nueva Ecija properties on 22 May 1998 and the Bulacan properties on 10 August 1998. On 8 October 1999, the Bank caused the annotation of the Notarial Certificate of Sale covering the Nueva Ecija properties. Later, on 16 March 2001, the Notarial Certificate of Sale covering the Bulacan properties was annotated. Rosemoor filed separate complaints against the Bank, one before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Manila RTC) and the other before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Malolos RTC). The Manila Case On 5 August 1998, Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual filed a Complaint, originally captioned as one for "Damages, Accounting and Release of Balance of Loan and Machinery and for Injunction" before the Manila RTC. The Bank moved for the dismissal on the ground that the venue had been improperly laid. The motion was denied. On 15 August 2002, the Bank filed another motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the ground of forum-shopping since, Rosemoor had filed another petition earlier on 11 March 2002 before the Malolos RTC. Manila RTC denied the motion to dismiss.

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. (formerly WESTMONT BANK), Petitioner, vs. ROSEMOORE MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and DRA. LOURDES PASCUAL, Respondents. We resolve these two consolidated cases, which though with distinct courts of origin, pertain to issues stemming from the same loan transaction. Respondent Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (Rosemoor), a Philippine mining corporation applied for and was granted by petitioner Westmont Bank (Bank) a credit facility in the total amount of P80 million consisting of P50,000,000.00 as long term loan and P30,000,000.00 as revolving credit line. To secure the credit facility, a lone real estate mortgage agreement was executed by Rosemoor and Dr. Lourdes Pascual (Dr. Pascual), Rosemoors president. The agreement covered six (6) parcels of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan (Bulacan properties), all registered under the name of Rosemoor, and two (2) parcels of land situated in Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Nueva Ecija properties), owned and registered under the name of Dr. Pascual.

The Bank challenged the Manila RTCs denial of the Banks second motion to dismiss before the Court of Appeals, through a petition for certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the petition. The Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. The Malolos Case After the complaint with the Manila RTC had been lodged, on 11 March 2002, Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual filed another action against the Bank, this time before the Malolos RTC for Injunction with Damages, with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. As it did before the Manila RTC, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Rosemoor had engaged in forum-shopping, adverting to the pending Manila case. The Bank further alleged that Dr. Pascual has no cause of action since the properties registered in her name are located in Nueva Ecija. The Malolos RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Bank filed a motion for reconsideration. Malolos RTC issued an order denying the Banks motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and at the same time declaring the Bank in default for failure to file its answer.

Bank filed a second petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition. Bank filed the petition in G.R. No. 159669 before this Court. The two petitions before this Court have been consolidated. We find one common issue in G.R. No. 159669 and G.R. No. 163521. W/N the Malolos RTC has jurisdiction over the action to nullify the foreclosure sale of the Nueva Ecija properties along with the Bulacan properties? SC = Yes. The rule on venue of real actions is provided in Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads in part: Section 1. Venue of Real Actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. Following the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, the venue of real actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated. MAGASPI vs. RAMOLETE *okay guys, this case is just about the 2 parties arguing about the freagin docket fee. Quite lengthy, sorry, but I feel that I have to include just in case dean asks for little details. Basta, theyre all arguing about how the docket fee should be calculated. Also, theyre questioning if the 1st docket fee that has been paid is enough to say that the case has been filed. Ganito lang yung drama nung case. Sorry. This is a petition for certiorari to review the actuations of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No.R-11882 in respect of the correct amount to be paid for the filing of the case as provided in Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. FACTS: September 16, 1970, petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages against The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and/or The Shell Refining Co. (Phil.) Inc., Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings & Loan Association in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon filing and the payment of P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00 for sheriff fees, the complaint was assigned Civil Case No. R11882. The complaint contains the following:

o o o o

Declare TCT issued in the name of the Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. as null and void and hence of no legal effect; Declare the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Sps. Magaspi as owners of the land in question; Order the RD of Cebu to cancel TCT and issue a neew one under the name of the plaintiffs; For the defendants to pay the plaintiffs damages.

September 18, 1970, Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings and Loan Assn. filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to pay the correct amount for docket fee. The motion reads: o The complaint of the plaintiffs contains or states two, if not three alternative causes of action: Reconveyance of real property. If the plaintiffs are unable to have the property reconveyed and the title cancelled, having passed to an innocent purchaser for value, their recourse would be for damages, i.e., recovery of the value of the land and other damages. Cancellation of Titles. o Further, until such time as the correct docket fee is paid, the time for filing of responsive pleadings by the defendants be suspended. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) who claimed that the main cause of action was the recovery of a piece of land and on the basis of its assessed valued, P60.00 was the correct docketing fee and that although the Revised Rules of Court do not exclude damages in the computation of the docket fee, damages are nonetheless still to be excluded. October 5, 1970, the presiding judge ordered the Clerk of Court to comment on the motion and the opposition. The following comment was submitted: o That in the matter of fixing the amount of fees that shall be collected by the Clerks of Court of First Instance for the filing of an action or proceeding, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. o If the case concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof shall be considered in computing the fees. In case the value of the property or estate of the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be. o o That a reading of the complaint in this case would show that the action is not only for recovery of property but also for actual and moral damages as well as for attorney's fees; Accordingly, the correct amount of the legal fees for the filing of this case should be fixed at P3,164.00 plus P2.00 Legal Research fee;

October 14, 1970, Judge Mateo Canonoy issued the following order: o This is a motion of the defendants to order the plaintiffs to pay a filing fee of P6,730.00 on the ground that the total demand of the said plaintiffs should be the basis for computing the filing fee and not the value of the land alone. The plaintiffs paid the amount of P60.00 as filing fee in this case.

The damages are not merely incidental or ancillary but are principal demands. Besides, Rule 141, Sec. 5 (a) of the new Rules of Court no longer excludes damages, like interest, from computing the filing fees. o The exclusion of damages from the exemption in the computation of the filing fees in the new Rules of Court is intentional, since oftentimes, as in the present case, the claim for damages far exceeds the value of the land. To thus exempt the plaintiffs from paying the filing fee for damages is against reason. Besides, in determining the jurisdiction of the court, the amount of damages claimed is taken into account. o The Court hereby overrules the opposition of the plaintiffs and orders them to pay an additional sum of P3,104.00 as filing fees. October 19, 1970, the Shell companies filed their respective answers. October 23, 1970, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed another manifestation stating that an additional sum of P1,000 be imposed in accordance with the ROC. November 3, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to include the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant. The amended complaint still sought the return of the lot in question but the pecuniary claim was limited to the extent that the Government of the RP is except from the joint and solidary liability of paying damages. November 12, 1970, the defendants (herein respondents filed an opposition to the admission of the amended complaint. They based their opposition on the following grounds: o That while the only reason given for the amendment of the complaint is the inclusion of the Government of the Philippines as an indispensable party; the plaintiffs have taken the improper liberty of amending portions of the allegations in the complaint and even has eliminated entire paragraph; o That these amendments are obviously intended to circumvent, it not entirely subvert, the lawful Order of this Honorable Court for the plaintiff to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as docket fee, on the basis of the total amount claimed for damages (plus Pl,000.00 docket fee on the P500,000.00 exemplary damages, pending resolution before this Honorable Court); November 16, 1970, Judge Canonoy admitted the amended complaint although the plaintiffs had not yet complied with his Order of October 14, 1970, that they should pay an additional P3,104.00 docket fee. December 2, 1970, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed the motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs do not pay the proper docket fee within 7days as ordered by the court. The above motion was opposed by the plaintiffs on the ground that the amended complaint which had been admitted by the court had replaced the original complaint. February 12, 1971, the Republic filed its answer to the amended complaint and the plaintiffs filed a reply on February 23, 1971. March 13, 1971, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed a petition to have their motion of December 2, 1970, resolved by the court. April 3, 1971, Judge Jose R. Ramolete who had replaced Judge Canonoy issued the following order: o It is a rule that the correct docket fee must be paid before the Court will act on the petition or complaint. The Court of Justice is not called upon to act on a complaint or a petition in the absence of payment of a

corresponding docket fee. Before the payment of the docket fee, the case is not deemed registered and docketed. o The original complaint, up to the present, is not deemed registered or docketed. It follows, therefore, that there is likewise no amended complaint deemed to have been filed and admitted. The petitioners assail the above order. They insist that they had correctly paid the docketing fee in the amount of P60.00, or in the alternative, that if they are to pay an additional docketing fee, it should be based on the amended complaint. For initial determination is the question as to The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court., (Malimit vs. Degamo, No. L17850, Nov. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 450, 120 Phil. 1247; Lee vs. Republic, L-15027, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65.) Is the case at bar covered by the above rule? It is not because the question posed in the Malimit and Lee cases was the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee whereas the case at bar has no reference to the time of payment but concerns the amount that has to be paid.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Civil Case No. 11882 may be considered as having been filed and docketed when P60.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court even on the assumption that said payment was not sufficient in amount. HELD: The petition is granted. The petitioners shall be assessed a docket fee on the basis of the amended complaint; and after all of the lawful fees shall have been paid, the proceedings in Civil Case No. R-11882 shall be resumed. No special pronouncement as to costs. RATIO: The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Is the case at bar covered by the above rule? It is not because the question posed in the Malimit and Lee cases was the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee whereas the case at bar has no reference to the time of payment but concerns the amount that has to be paid. The case at bar can be distinguished from the Lazaro case in at least two respects, namely: (a) The Lazaro case involved the timeliness of the perfection of the appeal which was made to depend in turn on the timeliness of the full payment of the docket fee whereas the instant case does not involve an appeal nor the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee; and (b) in the Lazaro case, the amount (P8.00) which was initially paid was palpably inadequate, whereas in the case at bar there is an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee. The Garcia case, supra, appears to favor the petitioners. In that case, a will was sought to be probated in Special Proceeding No. 62818. Docket fees amounting to P940.00 were paid. Later, a second will was sought to be probated in the same

special proceeding. This Court held that there was no need to pay a separate docket fee because the probate of the second will was not sought in another proceeding. We hold that under the circusmtances, Civil Case No. R. 11882 was docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular. The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as docket fee. Judge Canonoy on October 14, 1970, ordered the payment of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee based on the original complaint. However, the petitioners assert as an alternative view, that the docket fee be based on the amended complaint which was admitted on November 14, 1970, also by Judge Canonoy. The petitioners have a point. "When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the amended pleading only. " On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid by the petitioners should be based on their amended complaint.

Facts: This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P78.75M damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fees paid was only P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P10M only. Issues: When does a court acquire jurisdiction? Does an amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court? Ruling: The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. Sun Insurance vs. Asuncion G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989 Facts: Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorneys fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees? YES. It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.

Manchester Development v. CA, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) Facts: Body of the complaint specified amount of damages, but the prayer did not. Complaint was amended deleting all amounts. Only after court order did complainant specify the amount, but still only in the body, not in the prayer. Held: In civil cases, all pleadings should specify in both the body and prayer the amount of damages sought. The court does not acquire jurisdictions until the proper docket fee has been paid. Where an action is both for specific performance and damages, the docket fees must be based on the total damages sought to be recovered, even if it is not spelled out in the prayer. Where the prayer clearly shows that the action was one for damages, there can be no honest difference of opinion as to the amount of filing fees. Where payment was insufficient and there was no honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount of filing fees, the cour t never acquired jurisdiction over the original complaint. There was thus no complaint to amend. Docket fees must be based on the original, not amended complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Henceforth, the amount sought to be recovered should be stated both in the body of the complaint and in prayer. The SC in Manchester prohibited plaintiffs in civil cases from not specifying the amount of damages.

Manchester Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals GR No. 75919 May 7, 1987

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Issue: Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid? Ruling: Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect. The Court dismissed petitioners motion and ordered the Clerk o f court to re-asses the docket fees. Personal Observation: The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid the docket fees on its amended complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence that the respondent has the intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket fees. [G.R. No. 150107. January 28, 2008.] TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED,ALMA PEALOSA, KIMIO HOSAKA, SUMITOMI NISHIDA, TERESITAH. QUIAMBAO and ANTONIO B. LAPID,petitioners , v. JORGEVALDEZ,respondent

Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989) Facts: Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P50M. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

.Topic: What is forum shopping?FORUM SHOPPING: the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgement.Facts: Respondent Jorge Valdez was a former unit manager of Petitioner Tokio Marine pursuantto a Unit Management Contract entered into August 16, 1977. Oct 15, 1998: Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioner with the RTC for violationof the terms of the Unit Management Contract, stating that he was not paid his commission andbonuses. Thus he prayed for a) actual damages in the total amount of P71,866,205.67 and thecorresponding interests; b) moral damages of P10,000,000.00; c) exemplary damages amountingto P10,000,000.00; d) attorney's fees corresponding to 30% of the said amounts; and e) costs of the suit. Eventually, respondent filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Authority to Litigate asIndigent Plaintiff which was granted. Thus, his complaint was filed without payment of filingfees computed at Php 615,672.83. However, this amount constituted as a lien upon any judgment rendered in his favor.

It should also be noted that the respondent filed various criminal complaints against thepetitioners. This fact was manifested before the trial court. Petitioner now argues, among others, that the respondent engaged in forum shopping.

Issue: DID THE RESPONDENT ENGAGE IN FORUM SHOPPING? Ruling: NO. Forum shopping, as enunciated in Gatmaytan vs CA, is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously orsuc cessively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts andcircumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolvedadversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not inone court, then in another In this case, the respondents certificate of Non Forum Shopping attached to the Civil Case statesthe ff: FURTHER, that he has not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, except the criminal case for SWINDLING (ESTAFA) under Art. 315,paragraph 1 (b) and for FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS under Art. 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code to be filed before the Makati Prosecutor's Office, criminal case for violation of the Insurance Code of the Philippines to be filed before the Makati Prosecutor's Office, and the administrative case for violation of the Insurance Code Commission; that to the best of his knowledge no such other action is pending in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.HISAET This is considered SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE with Section 5 of Rule 7 as follows:Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:STcEIC SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafterlearn that same or similar action or claim has been filed or ispending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom tothe court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleadinghas been filed

.Failure to comply with the foregoing requirement shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. It should be noted that the fact that he has commenced criminal cases was manifested beforethe trial court (Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati)

TOPIC: Certification against forumshopping in initiatory pleading. Counsel cannot signcertification. DIGITAL MICROWAVE CORPORATION, petitioner , vs. COURT OFAPPEALS and ASIAN HIGH TECHNOLOGYCORPORATION, respondents . FACTS: December 14, 1994: Private respondent Asian High Technology Corp. filed a complaintagainst petitioner Digital Microwave Corp. for a sum of money and damages before theRegional Trial Court of Pasig City. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint. RTC: Denied the motion, as well as petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then initiated a special civil action forcertiorari before the Court of Appeals,alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Court of Appeals: Dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Revised Circular No.2891, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 04-94. oRequires the petition filed before the Court of Appeals to be accompaniedby a sworn certification against forum shopping, signed bypetitioner himself oPetitioner's certification was signed by counsel; the petition was, thus, dismissed. MR to CA: submitted a sworn certification against forum shopping duly signed by one of its senior officers. The motion was, however, denied, with the Court of Appeals statingthat:

o"In the present case, absent any compelling reason for petitioner's failure tocomply, at the first instance, with Revised Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, theCourt cannot therefore, accept its subsequent compliance." Hence this petition. PETITIONER CONTENTION Petitioner contends that in the case of a corporation as petitioner, the certification againstforum shopping may be signed by a natural person authorized to do so and with knowledge of the required facts. The authorized person may be anyone authorized by the corporation, notnecessarily an officer thereof. In such a case, petitioner argues, the counsel of record has theauthority to execute the certification on behalf of the corporation, particularly considering thatunder the Rules of Court, counsel's authority to represent his client is presumed. No writtenpower of attorney is required for counsel to appear for his client .ISSUE: WHETHER CERTIFICATION OF NON FORUM SHOPPING MAY BE SIGNED BY COUNSEL AND WILL RESULT TO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REVISED CIRCULAR? NO. Counsel cannot sign certification. IT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PETITIONERHIMSELF. The reason the certification against forum shopping is required to be accomplishedby petitioner himself is because only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether ornot he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. Even hiscounsel may be unaware of such fact.The Revised Circular No. 28-91 provided: "To avoid [forum shopping], every petition or complaintfiled with the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any othertribunal or agency, shall comply with the following requirements, aside from pertinent provisionsof the Rules of Court and existing circulars: . . . 2. Certification. The party must certify underoath that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in theSupreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal oragency, and that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in theSupreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal oragency. If there is any other action pending, he must state the status of the same. If he should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he shouldnotify the court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from such notice." This requirement isnow found in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The requirement for a sworncertification against forum shopping was extended by Administrative Circular No. 0494 tocomplaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings filed in all courts or

agencies otherthan the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.The Court disagrees with petitioner that a corporation cannot possibly hope to complywith the requirement laid down by Revised Circular No. 28-91 because it is a juridical entity andnot a natural person. If this were so, then it would have been impossible for a corporation todo anything at all. Needless to say, this is the reason why corporations have directors andofficers, to represent it in its transactions with others. The same is true for the certificationagainst forum shopping. It could easily have been made by a duly authorized director or officerof the corporation. In the recent case of Spouses Valentin Ortiz and Camilla Milan Ortiz vs.Court of Appeals, et al. , 299 SCRA 708, 711-712 (1998), the Court ruled that"Regrettably, we find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matterinvolving strict observance as provided for in Circular No. 2891. Theattestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requirespersonal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court'sconsideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure topersonally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court thatthe outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice." In this case, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to havethe certification against forum shopping signed by one of its officers. Neitherhas it shown any compelling reason for us to disregard strict compliance withthe rules. As the Court further stated in Spouses Ortiz , "Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberalconstruction."