MANILA LODGE 761 VS CA FACTS: RTC & CA decided that the property in question is a public park or plaza therefore

e part of the public domain Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1.360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. And at the north end, a hotel was to be constructed which may be leased to persons or corporations for a period of 99 years at max Philippine Commission passed Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site. The almost 25 hectares reclaimed land was registered in the name of the City of Manila. 5500+ sq. m was sold to Manila Lodge, BPOE and the latter was issued a title for the property a new TCT was issued to the City of Manila to refer to the property, excluding that portion already sold to MANila Lodge 5500+ sq. m sold to Manila Lodge was later on sold to Elks Manila Lodge wants the court to cancel the rights of the City of Manila to repurchase the property; said petition was granted BPOE sold the property to TDC for Php4.7; 1.7 was paid as downpayment and the remaining balance was paid by virtue of a mortagge over the same property no annotation of the subsisting lien over the property, City of Manila filed for a reannotation of its right to repurchase, which was granted by the court (50 years); appealed by BPOE with reservation on the rights of TDC to clear his rights over the property Issue: What kind of property of the City is the reclaimed land? Answer: it is of public dominion, intended for public use. Ratio Decidendi: The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a "public" nature, the same having been made to a local political subdivision. Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need of authorization to do so from the lawmaking body. Act No. 1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking body. If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside . . . lease . . . or sell . . . given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila." 40 If the reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta a power to extend (or continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. 42 Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the Manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open to public use. These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain. When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being

property for public use Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel site. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article. properties of provinces and towns for public use are governed by the same principles as properties of the same character belonging to the public domain. 46 In order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient. It is only the executive and possibly the legislative department that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property is no longer required for public use, and until such declaration is made the property must continue to form part of the public domain. In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or unequivocal declaration. CEBU OXYGEN VS BERCILLES Facts: The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193 declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Being the highest bidder, Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene was granted the lot for a consideration of P10,800.00. (Deed of Sale) Petitioner applied for the registration of the said property Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Cebu on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man, Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. Issue: WON the City of Cebu has the power to declare as abandoned a property of public domain, thus converting it to patrimonial property which can be the object of a valid contract. Answer: Affirmative Sec. 31, RA 3857 (City Charter of Cebu) Ratio Decidendi: clear from the Charter that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. The city council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code ROPPONGGI CASES (LAUREL VS GARCIA/ OJEDA VS EXEC. SECRETARY) Facts: 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan

 The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. Issue: Answer: Ratio Decidendi: SALAS VS JARENCIO Facts: RTC declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid in that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process and payment of just compensation. CFI 4, land registration court, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. OCT was issued to it City of Manila sold portions of land to Pura Villanueva; original OCT was cancelled and other certs were transferred to Villanueva for the portions she purchased Issue: Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution? Answer: 1st issue: the Court finds and holds that the land in question is communal property of the City of Manila. 2nd issue: RA 4118 constitutional/ vaild Ratio Decidendi: 1st issue: The Torrens Title expressly states that the City of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of the said land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the decree of confirmation and registration in favor of the City of Manila . . . shall be conclusive upon and against all persons including the Insular Government and all the branches there . . . is nothing in the said certificate of title indicating that the land was 'communal' land as contended by the respondents. Congress has the power to classify 'land of the public domain', transfer them from one classification to another and declare them disposable or not. Such power does not, however, extend to properties which are owned by cities, provinces and municipalities in their 'patrimonial' capacity. Art. 324 of the Civil Code although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial property except those that were granted by the State not for its public but for private use. Other properties it owns are acquired in the course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which category a municipal corporation pertains. It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. 2ND ISSUE: presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a law the law assailed does not in any manner trench upon the constitution Republic Act No. 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution

and the Government program of "Land for the Landless". The property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of Manila expressly recognized the paramount title of the State over said land when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested "His Excellency the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof ." If it were its patrimonial property why should the City of Manila be requesting the President to make representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers. Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. Ra 4118 IS VALID converted the lot in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable or alienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration" CAISIP VS PEOPLE Facts: CA & RTC convicted petitioners of the crime of Grave Coercion complainant Cabalag, wife of Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land; The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of Cabalag Caisip, overseer of Hacienda Palico (owned by Roxas y Cia) Guevarra filed an action with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia the Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a resolution Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Guevarra for forcible entry, praying that Guevarra be ejected from the premises lower court ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot Cabalag was charged with grave coercion & unjust vexation; said cases dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt Cabalag was dragged by herein petitioners to the municipal police station; Cabalag was then released with the help of Zoilo Rivera, the leader of the tenant org. to where Cabalg is affiliated. Issue: WON Art 429, CC, as relied upon by the petitioners, is applicable Answer: negative, (Art. 429 is inapplicable) Ratio Decidendi: Cabalag was given a 20-days grace period, thus, when the dragging incident happened, which is within the 20-day grace period, Cabalag did not invade nor usurp the land Appellants did not "repel or prevent in actual or threatened . . . physical invasion or

usurpation." although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses. It is, accordingly, clear that the petitioners had, by means of violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Caisip, in spite the fact that he did not lay hands on Cabalag, is not acquitted from the crime, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction.

CUSTODIO VS CA Facts: Mabasa filed a civil action for the grant of right of easement against Custodios before the RTC of Pasig The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Taguig such property was acquired by Mabasa by virtue of a sale in favor of Rayos Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. Mabasa saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was constructed by the Santoses (petitioners) RTC & CA decided in favor of Mabasa (ordering herein petitioners to give them permanent ingress and egress ) Issue: WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper WON the award of damages to herein respondents is proper Answer: 1st issue: petitioners are already barred from raising the issue as they did not appeal such grant of right of way from the court a quo 2nd issue: award of damages improper; damnum absque injuria Ratio Decidendi: The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. 16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon." At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract.

 It was only the decision of the RTC which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right. prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. CA decision reversed ANDAMO VS IAC Facts: Sps. Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners filed a crim case against officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of injunction under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners subsequently filed a civil case for damages RTC issued order suspending the civil case until after the judgment on the crm case has been promulgated Issue: whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages Answer: affirmative Ratio Decidendi: It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

NAPOCOR VS IBRAHIM Facts: civil case filed by Ibrahim et al against NAPOCOR for recovery of possession of land and damages Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of land described

in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three (3) lots NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCORs projects. respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well but his request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives and property RTC & CA ruled in favor of Ibrahim et al

Issue:
WON respondents are entitled to just compensation Answer: Affirmative Ratio Decidendi: the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. (Republic vs CA & Dela Rosa) the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with respondents enjoyment of their property and deprived them of its full use and enjoyment, In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible. Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law. respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss and is ordinarily determined by referring to the value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the expropriating authority. Just compensation computed from the year of 1992, valuation as computed by CA is upheld REPUBLIC VS CA & DELA ROSA (supra)

DEL BANCO VS IAC Facts: The Pansacola brothers purchased the Island in 1859 as common property and agreed on how they would share in the benefits to be derived from the Island.

 On April 11, 1868, they modified the terms and conditions of the agreement so as to include in the co-ownership of the island the children of their deceased brothers Eustaquio and the other children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pea) who were committed in the agreement of February 11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing proportion and distribution of the Island among the co-owners. About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that the Cagbalite island has already been partitioned by the original co-owners CA reversed said decision Issue: WON Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola. Answer: Ratio Decidendi: There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island. With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected such portion is merely an ideal share, not concretely determined in the previous case involving the Cagbalite island, the Court used the word "partition" to refer to the distribution of the Cagbalite Island agreed upon by the original owners and in the later agreements, by the heirs and their subsequent successors-in-interest. There need not be a physical partition; a distribution of the Island even in a state of indiviso or was sufficient in order that a co-owner may validly sell his portion of the co-owned property There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as agreed upon by the original co-owners in their agreement of April 11, 1868. What is important in the Court's ruling in the three aforementioned cases is that, the fact that there was a distribution of the Island among the co-owners made the sale of Domingo Arce of the portion allocated to him though pro-indiviso, valid. He thus disposed of all his rights and interests in the portion given to him. A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court (Rule 71 of the Old Rules), adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners no individual co-owner can claim any definite portion thereof It is therefore of no moment that some of the co-owners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been proven that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear

repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners petition denied