2000digests - Labor

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CASE DIGESTS in LABOR LAW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, 2000-2001
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES
A. EMPLOYER- EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP ANGEL JARDIN, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000
In a number of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. We explained that in the lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the business is in the owner's hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the abovestated doctrine to the relationships between bus owner/operator and bus conductor, auto-calesa owner/operator and driver, and recently between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers. Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities that are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer.
RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY vs. NLRC, ET AL G.R. No 103606

The contention of CDSPB that the designation of the parish priest as director was not unilateral but by mutual agreement between the diocese of Malolos and the petitioner thus making him merely a member of the school administration which is under the actual and direct control and supervision of the congregation, is not tenable. As the court has consistently ruled, the power of control is the most decisive factor in determining the existence of employeremployee relationship. There was therefore no basis in finding that petitioner had a greater degree of autonomy and independence in running the affairs of the school. The presence of the school director, whose vast powers negates any suggestion or semblance of autonomy.
B. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT PEOPLE V. MERIS G.R. Nos. 117145-50 & 117447, March 28, 2000
Although accused-appellant was not an employee of the alleged illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence shows that she was the one who approached complainants and prodded them to seek employment abroad. It was through her that they met Julie Micua. This is clearly an act of referral. Worse, accused-appellant declared that she was capable of placing them in jobs overseas. Suffice it to say that complainants recruitment would not have been
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LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS COMMITTEE: JUBERT JAY C. ANDRION, Chairperson, PAULITO DEJESUS, EDP MEMBERS: RJ Nolasco, Michelle Marquez, JoMarie Lazaro, AnnaLeah Lee, Grace Tenorio, Allan Alda, Jono DeGuzman, Elmer Guerzon, Angeluz Torres, Sheila Sulit, Liezel DeLeon, Ana Marie Gayos, Liza Sato , Mac-Mac Romero, Filmar Callejo
consummated were it not for the direct participation of accused-appellant in the recruitment process. Illegal recruitment is conducted in large scale if perpetrated against three or more persons individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art. 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
PEOPLE V. BULU CHOWDURY G.R. Nos. 129577-80, February 15, 2000

An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.
PEOPLE V. BENZON ONG G.R. No. 119594, January 18, 2000

To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.
C. ARTICLE 95: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE VIVIAN Y. IMBUIDO V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 114734, March 31, 2000
Under Article 95 of the Labor Code, every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay. Having already worked for more than three (3) years at the time of her unwarranted dismissal, petitioner is undoubtedly entitled to service incentive leave benefits, computed from 1989 until the date of her actual reinstatement. As we ruled in the recent case of Fernandez vs. NLRC, "since a service incentive leave is clearly demandable after one year of service whether continuous or broken or its equivalent period, and it is one of the "benefits" which would have accrued if an employee was not otherwise illegally dismissed, it is fair and legal that its; computation should be up to the date of reinstatement as provided under Article 279 of the Labor Code.
D. ARTICLE 97: WAGES
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AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED (AKELCO) V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 121439 , January 25, 2000
The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or management and employee of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining employees' wages. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed, or otherwise illegally prevented from working,.
E. ARTICLE 100: NON-DIMUNITION OF BENEFITS DOUGLAS MILLARES, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 110524, March 14, 2000
Petitioners did not voluntarily terminate their employment with private respondents. They merely expressed their desire to avail of the optional early retirement plan in the mistaken belief that such plan existed and that they would still receive the benefits due them under the CEIP. Neither were they dismissed for any of the causes, i.e., poor performance, misconduct, unavailability, etc., which would result in forfeiture of the aforesaid retirement benefits. Rather, their dismissal was without just cause and, therefore, deemed illegal under the law. Hence, having been in the employ of private respondents for a good 20 years or 240 months, petitioners are entitled to the retirement benefits under Section III, paragraph (c) of the CEIP.
F. ARTICLE 106: LABOR ONLY/ JOB CONTRACTING VINOYA vs. NLRC G.R NO. 126586, FEBRUARY 2, 2000
It is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools. equipment, machineries, and work premises among others to be considered as an independent contractor. In fact jurisprudential holdings are to the effect that in determining the existence of an independent contractor relationship, several factors might be considered such as; but not necessarily confined to the contractors; is coming on an independent business, nature and extent of work / skill required contract and supervision of workers, power of employer with respect to firing others.
G. ARTICLE 194: DEATH BENEFITS

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BEBERISA RIO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

Under the Labor Code, as amended, the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is a sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.
H. ARTICLE 217: JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS AND THE NLRC: CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BEBIANO M. BAEZ V. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA, ET AL.
Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code, which was already in effect at the time of the filing of this case, reads: ARTICLE 217.Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
I. ARTICLE 223: APPEAL CORAL POINT DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 129761, February 28, 2000
Article 223, second paragraph, of the Labor Code states that when a judgment involving monetary award is appealed by the employer, the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment. This is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case the monetary award will be given to them upon dismissal of the employers appeal. It is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the employees.
EVELYN CATUBAY, ET AL. V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 119289 , April 12, 2000
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or a surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The posting of a cash or surety bond is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Moreover, the perfection of the appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional and that failure to comply with such
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requirements rendered the decision of the labor arbiter final and executory and placed it beyond the power of the NLRC to review or reverse it.
JOSELITO LAGERA V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 123636, March 31, 2000
The precipitate filing of this special civil action for certiorari without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed judgment of NLRC warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had.
RODENTO NAVARRO, ET AL V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 116464, March 1, 2000

The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Such requirement cannot be trifled with. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
NUEVA ECIJA ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, ET AL. V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 116066, January 24, 2000
However, in a number of cases, this Court relaxed the rule to resolve controversies on the merits, specifically, when there are special meritorious circumstances and issues. We relaxed the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal, when there was substantial compliance with the rule, so that on balance, we made technical considerations to give way to equity and justice. In the case before us, the decision of the labor arbiter was issued on December 21, 1992. Private respondents filed their appeal on December 28, 1992, barely seven days from receipt thereof. The bonding company issued the bond dated January 4, 1993, the last day for filling an appeal. However, it was forwarded to respondent NLRC only on the following day, January 5, 1993. Considering these circumstances and the holiday season, we find it equitable to ease the rules and consider that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
PGA BROTHERHOOD ASSOCIATION, ET AL. V. NLRC G.R. No. 131085, June 19, 2000
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We note that neither a motion for reconsideration nor appeal was ever taken by petitioners on this point. This procedural lapse is fatal. It is an established principle that a final and executory decision cannot be altered nor amended by any tribunal except where a supervening cause transpires which renders its execution unjust or impossible, or in cases of special and exceptional nature, where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution. Neither discernible supervening cause nor exceptional circumstance obtains in this case to prevent its execution.
WORKERS OFANTIQUE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. NLRC G.R. No. 120062, June 8, 2000
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. Non-compliance therewith renders the judgment sought to appeal final and executory. An appeal is perfected when there is proof of payment of the appeal fee and in cases where the employer appeals and a monetary award is involved; there is payment of the appeal bond. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting of an appeal. However, in the higher interest of justice, we have in meritorious cases allowed late appeals from decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC. We cannot allow an exception in the case at bar. Even on the substantive questions, the petition must fail.
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000
Ordinarily, once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. However, a careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the instant case warrants liberality in the application of technical rules and procedure. It would be a greater injustice to deprive the concerned employees of the monetary benefits rightly due them because of a circumstance over which they had no control.
J. ARTICLE 224: EXECUTION OF ORDERS, DECISIONS CHONA P. TORRES V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 107014, April 12, 2000
Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It can not be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. A writ of execution may however be refused on equitable grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or when certain circumstances, which transpired after judgment became final, rendered execution of judgment unjust. The fact that the decision has become final does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.
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INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. V.. NLRC, ET AL.

A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. In a joint obligation each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a part of the correlative rights. Well-entrenched is the rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.
K. ARTICLE 241: RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP/ VALIDITY OF CHECK-OFF AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL V. SECRETARY OF LABOR , ET AL. G.R. No. 115949, March 16, 2000
Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union's incidental expenses, attorney's fees and representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned. Clearly, attorney's fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written consent.
L. ARTICLE 242: RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION/ VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. V. NLRC GR NO. 113666-68, JANUARY 19, 2000
Even if a class majority of the Union members agreed to a settlement with the employer, the Union has no authority to compromise the individual claims of members who did not consent to such settlement. The rules of Court require a special authority before an attorney may compromise his client's litigation.
M. ARTICLE 243- 246: COVERAGE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF- ORGANIZATION
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DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY V. DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA) and BUENAVENTURA MAGSALIN G.R. No. 109002, April 12, 2000
On the first issue involving the classification of the computer operators assigned at the Universitys Computer Services Center and discipline officers, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the express exclusion of the computer operators and discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the parties may not only renew the existing collective bargaining agreement but may also propose and discuss modifications or amendments thereto. With regard to the alleged confidential nature of the said employees functions, after a careful consideration of the pleadings filed before this Court, we rule that the said computer operators and discipline officers are not confidential employees. As carefully examined by the Solicitor General, the service record of a computer operator reveals that his duties are basically clerical and non-confidential in nature. As to the discipline officers, we agree with the voluntary arbitrator that based on the nature of their duties, they are not confidential employees and should therefore be included in the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LAGUESMA G.R. No. 101738, April 12, 2000
In United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, we had occasion to elucidate on the term "managerial employees." Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task of First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization. Under this distinction, "managerial employees" therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely, the "managers" per se composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the "supervisors" composed of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated manager" does not ipso facto make him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, for it is the job description that determines the nature of employment.
N. ARTICLE 248- 249: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE/ UNION SECURITY CLAUSE DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY V. DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA), ET AL. G.R. Nos. 109002 & 110072, April 12, 2000
The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs.
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MSMG-UWP, ET AL. V. CRESENCIOJ. RAMOS, ET AL. G.R. No. 113907, February 28, 2000
Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The reason behind the enforcement of union security clauses, which is the sanctity, and inviolability of contracts cannot override one's right to due process. As earlier discussed, union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements, if freely and voluntarily entered into, are valid and binding. Corrolarily, dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor union's demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice. However the dismissal was invalidated in this case because of respondent company's failure to accord petitioners with due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to their termination. Also, said dismissal was invalidated because the reason relied upon by respondent Federation was not valid. Nonetheless, the dismissal still does not constitute unfair labor practice.
O. ARTICLE 253 DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000
It is clear from the above provision of law that until a new Collective Bargaining Agreement has been executed by and between the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification as to which of the economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain force and effect; therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement. When a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the union representing the employees and the employer, even the non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the contract. To accord its benefits only to members of the union without any valid reason would constitute undue discrimination against nonmembers. It is even conceded, that a laborer can claim benefits from a CBA entered into between the company and the union of which he is a member at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, after he has resigned from said union.
P. ARTICLE 253- A: RETROACTIVITY OF CBA
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MERALCO V. LEONARDO QUISIMBING, ET AL. G.R. NO. 127598, FEBRUARY 22,2000

"Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof." It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However, the arbitral award can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement, which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties. The terms or periods set forth in Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award by the Secretary considering the absence of an applicable law. Under Article 253-A: "If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof." In other words, the law contemplates retroactivity whether the agreement is entered into before or after the said six-month period. The agreement of the parties need not be categorically stated, for their acts may be considered in determining the duration of retroactivity.
Q. ARTICLE 254: LABOR INJUNCTION DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES V. FERNANDO P. CABATO, ET AL. G.R. No. 118216, March 9, 2000
Moreover, it must be noted that the Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264). As correctly observed by court a quo, the main issue and the subject of the amended complaint for injunction are questions interwoven with the execution of the Commission's decision. No doubt the aforecited prohibition in Article 254 is applicable. The power of the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his decision and to consider whatever supervening events might transpire during such execution. Moreover, in denying petitioner's petition for injunction, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-honored principle that a Regional Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the National Labor Relations Commission, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.
R. ARTICLE 263- 266: STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
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SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA SA MOLDEX PRODUCTS, INC. V. NLRC

It has been shown that the results of the strike-votes were never forwarded to the NCMB, as admitted by petitioners themselves and as attested to by certification of Non Submission of the strike vote issued by the NCMB there is thus no need for additional evidence on the matter, as it would not change the fact that the results of the strike-vote, the strike was illegal, pursuant to article 264 of the labor code, which reads: Art. 264 Prohibited activities --- (a) no labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with title VII of this book, without first having filed the notice required in the preceding article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the ministry.
S. ART. 260-266: GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION JESUS B. DIAMONON V. DOLE, ET AL. G.R. No. 108951, March 7, 2000
When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions dictated the remedy for intra-union dispute, such as petitioner's complaint against private respondents for unauthorized or illegal disbursement of unions funds, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to give the grievance machinery or appeals' body of the union the opportunity to decide the matter by itself, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies. Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, as in this case, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. Petitioner's premature invocation of public respondent's intervention is fatal to his cause of action.
T. ARTICLE 277- 279: SECURITY OF TENURE PERMEX, INC. ET AL. V. NLRC G.R. No. 125031, January 24, 2000
To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. This means that an employer can terminate the services of an employee for just and valid causes, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. It also means that, procedurally, the employee must be given notice, with adequate opportunity to be heard, before he is notified of his actual dismissal for cause.
A PRIME SECURITY SERVICES vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 107320, January 19, 2000.
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The Court holds that the latter became a regular employee upon completion of his sixmonth period of probation. Private respondent started working on January 30, 1988 and completed the said period of probation on July 27, 1988. Thus, at the time private respondent was dismissed on August 1, 1988, he was already a regular employee with a security of tenure. He could only be dismissed for a just and authorized cause.
U. ARTICLE 280: KINDS OF EMPLOYMENT ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU), ET AL. V. OSCAR ABELLA, ET AL. G.R. No. 100518, January 24, 2000
Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection with such termination. What is required of the company is report to the nearest Public Employment Office for statistical purposes.
VIVIAN Y. IMBUIDO V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 114734 March 31, 2000
The principal test for determining whether an employee is a project employee or a regular employee is whether the project employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for that project. A project employee is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
DOUGLAS MILLARES, ET AL. V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 110524 March 14, 2000.
The primary standard to determine a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
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V. ARTICLE 281- 283: TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT V.1. ABANDONMENT CRUZ vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. NO. 116384, FEBRUARY 7, 2000
Her unexplained absence does not constitute abandonment since there must be a clear deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employees to continue his employment without any intention of returning. Two requisites should concur: 1. Failure to report for the work or absence without valid justifiable reason, and 2 clear intention to sever the employer employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. In the case at bar petitioners absence was explained by the undeniable fact that she was confined for treatment in several hospitals for about three months.
LEAH ICAWAT ET AL. V. NLRC ET AL. G.R. No. 133573, June 20, 2000
To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. To prove abandonment, the employer must show that the employee deliberately and unjustifiably refused to resume his employment without any intention of returning.
ALLAN VILLAR, ET AL. V. NLRC, ET AL.

Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. Mere absence of the employee is not sufficient. The burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning rests on the employer.
V.2. CESSATION OF OPERATION/ CLOSURE OF BUSINESS
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CHENIVER DECO PRINT TECHNICS CORP. V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 122876, February 17, 2000
It must be stressed that the phrase "closure or cessation of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or reverses" under Article 283 of the Labor Code includes both the complete cessation of all business operations and the cessation of only part of a company's business. In Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. vs. NLRC, a company transferred its tobacco processing plant in Balintawak, Quezon City to Candon, Ilocos Sur. The company therein did not actually close its entire business but merely relocated its tobacco processing and redrying operations to another place. Yet, this Court considered the transfer as closure not due to serious business losses for which the workers are entitled to separation pay.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 127718, March 2, 2000
While the Constitution provides that "the State . . . shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare", that constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy capital and management. Thus, the capital and management sectors must also be protected under a regime of justice and the rule of law.
V.3. DISEASE CRUZ V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. NO. 116384, FEBRUARY 7, 2000
Under Sec. 8 Rule I Book VI of the Rules and regulations Implementing the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the employee, the continued employment of such employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or the health of his co- employees, and there must be certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that is cannot be cured within a period of six months, even with proper medical treatment .
V.4. LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE CONDO SUITE CLUB TRAVEL V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 125671, January 28, 2000
It must be stressed that loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised by the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. In the case of supervisory personnel occupying positions of responsibility, this Court has repeatedly held that loss of trust and confidence justifies termination.
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Termination of an employment on this ground does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct. It is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
ANGELITO P. DELES V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 121348, MARCH 9, 2000

As regards a managerial employee, moreover, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
WENIFREDO FARROL V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 133259, February 10, 2000
It should be noted that the term "trust and confidence" is restricted to managerial employees. It may not even be presumed that when there is a shortage, there is also a corresponding breach of trust. Cash shortages in a cashier's work may happen, and when there is no proof that the same was deliberately done for a fraudulent or wrongful purpose, it cannot constitute breach of trust so as to render the dismissal from work invalid.
VIRGINIA G. RAMORAN V. JARDINE CMG LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY G.R. No. 131943, February 22, 2000
Dismissal on the basis of loss of trust and confidence calls for substantial evidence only, defined as the amount of relevant evidence, which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. It does not demand proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 126805, March 16, 2000
The fact that petitioner failed to show it suffered losses in revenue as a consequence of private respondent's questioned act is immaterial. It must be stressed that actual defraudation is not necessary in order that an employee may be held liable under theafore-quoted rule. That private respondent attempted to deprive petitioner of its lawful revenue is already tantamount to fraud against the company, which warrants dismissal from the service.
V.5. SERIOUS MISCONDUCT

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RUFINO NORBERTO F. SAMSON V. NLRC, et. Al. G.R. No. 121035, April 12, 2000
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause for his separation.
V.6. VIOLATION OF COMPANY RULES/ POLICIES AND REGULATIONS VH MANUFACTURING V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 130957, January 19, 2000
The petitioners reliance on the authorities it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal, is misplaced. The authorities cited involved security guards whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times inasmuch as their function, to use the words in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, is "to protect the company from pilferage or loss." Accordingly, the doctrine laid down in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar.
V.7. MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE OSS SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES V. NLRC G.R. NO. 112752, February 9,2000
The mere fact that it would be inconvenient for her, as she has been assigned to VM Condominium II for a number of years, does not by itself make her transfer illegal. Even private respondent admitted that she was assigned to render security service to the different clients of petitioner. An employee has a right to security of tenure, but this does not give her such a vested right in her position as would deprive petitioner of its prerogative to change her assignment or transfer her where her service, as security guard, will be most beneficial to the client.
DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY V. DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA), ET AL. G.R. No. 109002 & 110072, April 12,2000
As an exercise of management prerogative, the University has the right to adopt valid and equitable grounds as basis for terminating or transferring employees. As has been consistently upheld in our jurisdiction, that except as provided for, or limited by special laws, an
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employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment.
ROLANDO APARENTE v. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 117652, April 27, 2000
It is recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably through negotiation, by competent authority. Company's management prerogatives were constantly upheld so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.
AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED (AKELCO) V. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 121439, January 25, 2000
The employer as owner of the business, also has inherent rights, among which are the right to select the persons to be hired and discharge them for just and valid cause; to promulgate and enforce reasonable employment rules and regulations and to modify, amend or revoke the same; to designate the work as well as the employee or employees to perform it; to transfer or promote employees; to schedule, direct, curtail or control company operations; to introduce or install new or improved labor or money savings methods, facilities or devices; to create, merge, divide, reclassify and abolish departments or positions in the company and to sell or close the business. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose can not be denied.
V.8. ILLEGAL DISMISSAL PHIL. AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE UNITED CORP. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000
For misconduct and improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal: it must be serious; must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and must be shown that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or entire absence of care. Moreover, the negligence, to warrant dismissal from service, should not merely be gross but also habitual. Likewise, the ground willful breach of trust must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest.
RICARDO S. MEDENILLA,et al. vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK

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G.R. No. 127673. , March 13, 2000

In cases of illegal dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that there was a valid ground for dismissal. Mere allegation of reduction of costs without any proof to substantiate the same cannot be given credence by the Court. As the respondents failed to rebut petitioners' evidence, the irresistible conclusion is that the dismissal in question was illegal.
VH MANUFACTURING, INC., vs. NLRC and HERMINIO C. GAMIDO, G.R. No. 130957, January 19, 2000.
In termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause. Petitioner's reliance on the authorities it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal, is misplaced. While an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.
DANIEL LEONARDO ET.AL. v NLRC GR NO.125303, JUNE 16,2000

Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest.
V.9. CONSEQUENCES OF TERMINATION SERRANO VS. NLRC AND ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000
However, the Supreme Court noted that if the Wenphil rule imposing a fine on an employer who is found to have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice is deemed ineffective in deterring employer violations of the notice requirement, the remedy is not to declare the dismissal void if there are just or valid grounds for such dismissals or if the termination is for an authorized cause. The remedy is to order the payment to the employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for just cause. For the same reason, if an employee is laid off for any of the causes in Art 283-284, but the employer did not give him and the DOLE a 30 day written notice of termination in advance, then the termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual and he should be paid backwages. However, the termination of his employment should not be considered void but he should simply be paid separation pay as in Art. 283 in addition to backwages.
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V.10. SEPARATION PAY ALEMAR'S SIBAL & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. NLRC G.R. No. 114761, January 19, 2000.
There is no legal impediment for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of separation pay when receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner's rehabilitation receiver and liquidator has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been rendered functus officio.
V.11. RULES OF PROCEDURE IN LABOR CASES/DUE PROCESS BALAGTAS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
In this connection therefore, the aforesaid cooperative is entitled for exemption as provided for under Article 62 (7) of R.A. 6938 otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the submission of said financial statement together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules were made, their aim would be defeated.
ANGEL JARDIN, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000
The rationale for allowing only one motion for reconsideration from the same party is to assist the parties in obtaining an expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor cases. For obvious reasons, delays cannot be countenanced in the resolution of labor disputes. The dispute may involve no less than the livelihood of an employee and that of his loved ones who are dependent upon him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine, and education. It may as well involve the survival of a business or an industry.
ELIZABETH SUBLAY vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 130104, January 31, 2000
The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that clients are bound by the action of their counsel in the conduct of their case. Otherwise, if the lawyer's mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.
ROLANDO APARENTE vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 117652, April 27, 2000
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It is a well-settled rule that the essence of due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. In labor cases, the filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfill the requirements of due process.
V.12. JURISDICTION ABBOTT LABORATORIES PHIL. VS. ABBOTT LAB. EMPLOYEES UNION G.R. No. 131374, January 26, 2000
Clearly, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of ABBOTT. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of its exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction over decisions of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate power to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel the unions certificate of registration, said decisions being final and inappealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL DEVT. CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 112139, January 31, 2000
It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended enumerated the cases wherein the labor arbiters exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite; and there is none in this case.
V.13. JURISDICTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM UNDER THE CARP LAW (R.A. 6657)
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HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 109992, March 7, 2000
For the case to be under the primary jurisdiction of the DARAB, it must be an agrarian dispute defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law) as (d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
A. EMPLOYER- EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP ANGEL JARDIN, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL.

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G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000
Facts: Petitioners were drivers of private respondent, Philjama International Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of "Goodman Taxi." Petitioners used to drive private respondent's taxicabs every other day on a 24-hour work schedule under the boundary system. Under this arrangement, the petitioners earned an average of P400.00 daily. Nevertheless, private respondent admittedly regularly deducts from petitioners' daily earnings the amount of P30.00 supposedly for the washing of the taxi units. Believing that the deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect their rights and interests. Upon learning about the plan of petitioners, private respondent refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs when they reported for work and on succeeding days. Petitioners suspected that they were singled out because they were the leaders and active members of the proposed union. Petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint against private respondent for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees. The labor arbiter dismissed said complaint for lack of merit. Issue: Are petitioners-taxi drivers employees of respondent taxi company?
Held: YES . In a number of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. We explained that in the lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the business is in the owner's hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the abovestated doctrine to the relationships between bus owner/operator and bus conductor, auto-calesa owner/operator and driver, and recently between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers. Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities, which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer.
RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY vs. NLRC, ET AL G.R. No 103606

Facts: Private respondent Colegio de San Pascual Baylon (CDSPB), a religious educational institution, represented by the Bishop of Malolos, entered into an Agreement with petitioner Religious of the Virgin Mary (RVM), a religious congregation, to run, administer and operate the CDSPB Girls Department. The agreement was for a term of 10 years, commencing in the school year 1983-1984. Said Agreement among others stipulated that the RVM had the sole responsibility and expense over the administration, management and operation of the Girls Department, as well as the authority to employ teachers needed by the school, impose and collect tuition fees, and pay the expenses of operations. On April 10, 1987, the Bishop of Malolos pre-terminated the Agreement. As a result, the petitioner moved out of the school premises, and CDSPB, through the Bishop of Malolos and his representatives, took over the administration of the Girls Department. Apparently, the teaching and non-teaching personnel hired by petitioner for school year 1986-1987 continued
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to render services even after the Agreement was terminated, but they were not paid their salaries for the month of May 1987. They filed a complaint for unpaid salaries before Labor Arbiter Ramos, who ordered CDSPB to pay them their claim for salaries. Petitioner was absolved from any liability. Petitioner contends that CDSPB is the employer of complainants. It maintains that it is not an independent contractor but merely the manager or administrator of the Girls Department, and that after the Agreement was terminated on April 10,1987, it no longer had access to the income of the school to entitle and enable it to pay the salaries of complainants. CDSPB, on the other hand, contends that petitioner is not an independent contractor but the sole employer of private respondents-complainants. Issue: Was CDSPB is the employer of the complainants and should therefore be held liable for their unpaid wages? Held: Yes. The contention of CDSPB that the designation of the parish priest as director was not unilateral but by mutual agreement between the diocese of Malolos and the petitioner thus making him merely a member of the school administration which is under the actual and direct control and supervision of the congregation, is not tenable. As the court has consistently ruled, the power of control is the most decisive factor in determining the existence of employeremployee relationship. In this case, CDSPB reserved the right to control and supervise the operations of the Girls Department. As noted by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC, although CDSPB actually exercised minimal supervision over petitioner, it could exercise substantial supervision and control as it did when it preterminated the Agreement. There was therefore no basis in finding that petitioner had a greater degree of autonomy and independence in running the affairs of the school. The presence of the school director, whose vast powers negates any suggestion or semblance of autonomy. Nor is there any merit in the claim that actual and effective control was exercised by the petitioner since the designation of the parish priest as director was a mere formality, as he did perform functions which are purely ministerial and figurative in nature.
B. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT PEOPLE V. MERIS G.R. Nos. 117145-50 & 117447, March 28, 2000
Facts: Accused-appellant denied the charges of engaging in recruitment activities and of receiving money from complainants. She described herself as a public school teacher living in Pangasinan with her four children and unemployed husband. Like the other complainants, she claimed she was a victim of Julie Micua. She first met Micua on December 17, 1990, at the house of Lina Salcedo in Sampaloc, Manila. Micua was introduced to her as a recruiter of overseas worker. Interested, she applied for a job abroad. Micua informed her that she would be a factory worker and showed her a contract. Accused-appellant was required to submit her medical certificate and passport as well as to make an advance payment of P5,000.00 as part of the P40,000.00 placement. When complainants learned that she had applied for overseas employment, they sought her help in going to the agency where she applied. Hence, on January 12, 1991, accused-appellant accompanied the complainants to see Julie Micua who assured them that they would be leaving for Hongkong within two or three months. They were also informed that their placement fee would be P45,000.00. On that day, accused appellant and complainants gave the corresponding payments. The receipts were signed by Micua.
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Issue: Did trial court erred in finding that the accused appellant recruited the private complainants for deployment as land workers in Hongkong? Held: NO. The prosecution undoubtedly proved that accused-appellant, without license or authority, engaged in recruitment and placement activities. This was done in collaboration with Julie Micua, when they promised complainants employment in Hongkong. Art 13, par (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, local or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Although accused-appellant was not an employee of the alleged illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence shows that she was the one who approached complainants and prodded them to seek employment abroad. It was through her that they met Julie Micua. This is clearly an act of referral. Worse, accused-appellant declared that she was capable of placing them in jobs overseas. Suffice it to say that complainants recruitment would not have been consummated were it not for the direct participation of accused-appellant in the recruitment process. Article 38, par (a) of the Labor Code provides that: Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees and or non-holders of authority shall be illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. Illegal recruitment is conducted in large scale if perpetrated against three or more persons individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art. 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
PEOPLE v. BULU CHOWDURY G.R. Nos. 129577-80, February 15, 2000
Facts: Sometime in August 1994 to October 1994, Chowdury representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport workers for employment abroad, recruited Complainants A, B and C, for employment as factory workers for Korea. Chowdury is a consultant of Craftrade. Complainants were charged a processing fee, the amount of which they respectively paid. Later, they were informed that they would no longer be deployed for employment abroad. This prompted them to withdraw their payment but they could no longer find Chowdury. Thus, they went to the POEA where they discovered that Craftrade's license had already expired. They tried to withdraw their money from Craftrade but to no avail. Complainants, then, charged the Accused before the RTC of Manila with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. The trial court found against Chowdury. Hence, this appeal. Issues: (1) Can an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal? (2) Did the accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged?
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Held: (1) YES. As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be. (2) The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer. Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that accusedappellant was aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. This is not to say that private complainants are left with no remedy for the wrong committed against them. The Department of Justice may still file a complaint against the officers having control, management or direction of the business of Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade), so long as the offense has not yet prescribed. Illegal recruitment is a crime of economic sabotage which need to be curbed by the strong arm of the law. It is important, however, to stress that the government's action must be directed to the real offenders, those who perpetrate the crime and benefit from it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. BENZON ONG G.R. No. 119594, January 18, 2000.
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and seven counts of estafa. In the first case, the information for illegal recruitment in large scale alleged that sometime during and between the period from November, 1993 to January, 1994, in the City of Baguio, the accused, representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist, hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, promised employment/job placement to nine persons, without first obtaining or securing license or authority from the proper governmental agency. Eight informations for estafa were also filed. The trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and of seven counts of estafa. In his appeal, he claims that when complainants filled out their respective bio-data, application forms and other documents for employment in Taiwan, they knew that they were applying for employment abroad through the Steadfast Recruitment Agency. He claims that he merely suggested to them the opportunity to work overseas but that he never advertised himself as a recruiter. Issue: Is the accused-appellants acts of suggesting to the victims constitute referral within the meaning of recruitment defined in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code? Held: Yes. Accused-appellant is charged with violation of Art. 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, which provides that any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Art. 34 of said Code, undertaken by persons who have no license or authority to engage in recruitment for overseas employment is illegal and punishable under Art. 39. Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, "recruitment and placement" refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, is
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considered engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other hand, "referral" is defined as the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau. To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. Accused-appellant represented himself to complainants as one capable of deploying workers abroad and even quoted the alleged salary rates of factory and construction workers in Taiwan. The acts of accused-appellant created the distinct impression on the eight complainants that he was a recruiter for overseas employment. There is no question that he was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. What he claims is that he merely "suggested" to complainants to apply at the Steadfast Recruitment Agency, which is a recruitment agency. Even if accused-appellant did no more than "suggest" to complainants where they could apply for overseas employment, his act constituted "referral" within the meaning of Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code.
C. ARTICLE 95: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE VIVIAN Y. IMBUIDO vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 114734, March 31, 2000
Facts: Petitioner was employed as a data encoder by private respondent International Information Services, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the business of data encoding and keypunching, from August 26, 1988 until October 18, 1991 when her services were terminated. Within said period petitioner entered into thirteen (13) separate employment contracts with private respondent, each contract lasting only for a period of three (3) months. On October 18, 1991, petitioner received a termination letter from private respondent, allegedly "due to low volume of work." Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for service incentive leave pay and 13th month differential pay, with the NLRC. Petitioner alleged that her employment was terminated not due to the alleged low volume of work but because she "signed a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of respondents," thus charging private respondent with committing unfair labor practices. Petitioner further complained of non-payment of service incentive leave benefits and underpayment of 13th month pay. Issue: Is petitioner entitled to service incentive leave?
Held: Yes. Under Article 95 of the Labor Code, every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay. Having already worked for more than three (3) years at the time of her unwarranted dismissal, petitioner is undoubtedly entitled to service incentive leave benefits, computed from 1989 until the date of her actual reinstatement. As we ruled in the recent case of Fernandez vs. NLRC, "since a service incentive leave is clearly demandable after one year of service whether continuous or broken or its equivalent period, and it is one of the "benefits" which would have accrued if an employee was not otherwise illegally dismissed, it is fair and legal that its; computation should be up to the date of reinstatement as provided under Article 279 of the Labor Code.
D. ARTICLE 97: WAGES AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED (AKELCO) vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 121439, January 25, 2000
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Facts: Complainants alleged that prior to the temporary transfer of the office of AKELCO from Lezo Aklan to Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan, complainants were continuously performing their task and were duly paid of their salaries at their main office located at Lezo, Aklan. That on January 22, 1992, by way of resolution of the Board of Directors of AKELCO allowed the temporary transfer holding of office at Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan per information by their Project Supervisor, Atty. Leovigildo Mationg, that their head office is closed and that it is dangerous to hold office thereat; Nevertheless, majority of the employees including herein complainants continued to report for work at Lezo Aklan and were paid of their salaries. On February 11, 1992, unnumbered resolution was passed by the Board of AKELCO withdrawing the temporary designation of office at Kalibo, Aklan, and that the daily operations must be held again at the main office of Lezo, Aklan; That complainants who were then reporting at the Lezo office from January 1992 up to May 1992 were duly paid of their salaries, while in the meantime some of the employees through the instigation of respondent Mationg continued to remain and work at Kalibo, Aklan; That from June 1992 up to March 18, 1993, complainants who continuously reported for work at Lezo, Aklan in compliance with the aforementioned resolution were not paid their salaries; That on March 19, 1993 up to the present, complainants were again allowed to draw their salaries; with the exception of a few complainants who were not paid their salaries for the months of April and May 1993; On February 25, 1994, a decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter Dennis D. Juanon dismissing the complaints. Dissatisfied with the decision, private respondents appealed to the respondent Commission. On appeal, the NLRC Fourth Division, Cebu City, reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and held that private respondents are entitled to unpaid wages from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993 Issue: Are the complainants entitled to their wages during the time that they did not render services at the temporary main office of the company? Held: NO. The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or management and employee of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining employees' wages. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed, or otherwise illegally prevented from working, a situation which we find is not present in the instant case. It would neither be fair nor just to allow private respondents to recover something they have not earned and could not have earned because they did not render services at the Kalibo office during the stated period.
E. ARTICLE 100: NON-DIMUNITION OF BENEFITS DOUGLAS MILLARES, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 110524, March 14, 2000.
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Facts: Petitioners were employed by private respondent ESO through its local manning agency, as machinist and the other as wiper or oiler. Both were promoted as a chief engineers. Petitioners apply for leave of absence which was approved. Petitioners informed ESO of their intentions to avail the optional retirement plan under the CEIP considering that they already rendered more than 20 years of continuous service. ESO denied petitioners request on the following grounds: (1) he was employed on a contractual basis; (2) his contracts of enlistment did not provide for retirement before the age of 60 years; and (3) he did not comply with the requirement for claming benefits under the CEIP. They requested for an extension of leave of absence. Afterwards they were advice that in view of their absence without leave and unavailability for contractual sea service, they had been drop from the roster of crew members. Issue: (1) Are the petitioners entitled to any retirement benefit under the optional early retirement policy announced by respondents? (2) Are the petitioners still entitled to receive 100% of the total credited contributions to the CEIP?
Held: (1) NO. The evidence of petitioners regarding the supposed announcement by Captain Estaniel of the controverted optional retirement plan which consisted merely of the affidavits of petitioners and their witnesses was successfully rebutted by the evidence adduced by private respondents. Furthermore, nowhere in the CEIP is there a reference to the alleged optional retirement plan, nor is there a provision for retirement upon service of 20 years in the company. Contrary to the allegations of petitioners, provisions on retirement benefits are specifically embodied in the CEIP which was part and parcel of the contract of enlistment signed by the petitioners. Moreover, we note that petitioners are in fact anchoring their claim for retirement benefits, in the alternative, under Section III, paragraph (c) of this same CEIP. Hence, they cannot validly deny the existence of the provisions on retirement benefits, and rely merely on the alleged unilateral issuance of private respondents. (2) Petitioners can nevertheless properly claim 100% of the total amount credited to their account under Section III of the CEIP, as well as paragraph 2 (h) of the Memorandum dated March 9, 1977. CEIP provides, among others, (c) that when the termination is for a reason other than retirement, death or permanent and total disability, without any misconduct on his part, he shall be entitled to 50% (for 36 months credited service), 75% (48 months) and 100% (60 months) of the total amount credited to his account. The CEIP, further, provides that when the employment is terminated due to his poor performance, misconduct, unavailability, etc., or if the employee is not offered re-engagement for similar reasons, no distribution of any portion of the employee's account will ever be made to him. Petitioners did not voluntarily terminate their employment with private respondents. They merely expressed their desire to avail of the optional early retirement plan in the mistaken belief that such plan existed and that they would still receive the benefits due them under the CEIP. Neither were they dismissed for any of the causes, i.e., poor performance, misconduct, unavailability, etc., which would result in forfeiture of the aforesaid retirement benefits. Rather, their dismissal was without just cause and, therefore, deemed illegal under the law. Hence, having been in the employ of private respondents for a good 20 years or 240 months, petitioners are entitled to the retirement benefits under Section III, paragraph (c) of the CEIP.
F. ARTICLE 106: LABOR ONLY/ JOB CONTRACTING VINOYA V. NLRC G.R NO. 126586, FEBRUARY 2, 2000
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Facts: Alexander Vinoya was working as a sales representative of private respondent Regent Food Corp. (RFC) for which he was issued a company ID. Petitioner alleges that he reported daily to the office of the RFC to take the latters van for delivery of its products, He was assigned to various supermarkets and grocery stores where he books sales orders and collected payments for RFC. He was required to put up a monthly bond of P200 as security deposit to guarantee the performance of his obligations as sales representative. He contends that he was under the control of RFC. He said he was transferred by RFC to Peninsula Manpower Co. INC. (PMCI), an agency which provides RFC with additional contractual workers pursuant to a contract for the supply of manpower services. After his transfer to PMCI, petitioner where allegedly reassigned to RFC as sales representative. Subsequently RFC terminated him due to the expiration of the contract of the service between RFC and PMCI. Furthermore RFC showed the articles of the incorporation of PMCI which shows that it has an authorized capital stock of P1,000,000 of which P3,000,000 is subscribed and P750,000 is paid in therefore it is and independent Contractor. Issue: Whether in order to be considered a job contractor, it is enough that a contractor has a substantial capital? Held: No. It is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, and work premises among others to be considered as an independent contractor. In fact jurisprudential holdings are to the effect that in determining the existence of an independent contractor relationship, several factors might be considered such as; but not necessarily confined to the contractors; is coming on an independent business, nature and extent of work / skill required contract and supervision of workers, power of employer with respect to firing others. First of all in the case at bar, while PMCI has an authorized capital stock of P1,000,000, only P750,000 of which is actually paid in which to our mind cannot be considered as substantial capitalization. Second PMCI did not carry on an independent business nor did it undertake the performance of its contract according to its own manner and method free from the control and supervision of its principal, RFC. Third, PMCI was not engaged to form a specific and special job or service which is one of the strong indicators that entity is an independent contractor. Lastly, in labor only contracting, the employees recruited, supplied or placed by the contractor perform activities which are directly related to the main business of its principal . In this case, the work of petitioner as sales representative is directly related to the business.
G. ARTICLE 194: DEATH BENEFITS BEBERISA RIO vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.
Facts: Virgilio T. Rio Sr., husband of herein complainant, was employed by Allied Port Services Inc. as stevedore since July, 1982. His duties included: (1) handling of steel cargoes; (2) loading and unloading of silica sand; (3) handling, loading and unloading of lumber products; (4) supervising other stevedores; and (5) performing other related work. On July 19, 1992, Virgilio Rio collapsed while working at the South Harbor, Manila. He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) because of "melena, fever, chills and abdominal pains 8 days [prior to confinement] . . ." He died three days later. According to the Medical Certificate the cause of death was "uremia [secondary] to chronic renal failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis. . . ."
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Complainant Beberisa Rio, his spouse, filed a claim for death benefits before the Social Security System (SSS). However, the SSS denied the claim stating that the cause of death of the husband cannot be considered work-connected because based on the clinical abstract submitted, the husband had already on and off attack of edema and hypertension which are signs of kidney disease even before his employment with the company. On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the SSS ruling that complainant failed to present relevant evidence to establish the causal connection between the deceaseds ailment and his work as stevedore. Issue: Can complainants claim for death benefits prosper under the increased risk theory?
Held: No. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is a sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Rios death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, complainant should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husbands employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. This the petitioner failed to do.
H. ARTICLE 217: JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS AND THE NLRC: CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BEBIANO M. BAEZ vs. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA, ET AL.
Facts: Complainant was the sales operations manager of defendant in its branch in Iligan City. In 1993, complainant filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in view of the indefinite suspension meted out to him by defendant. In its decision, the Labor Arbiter found complainant to have been illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and of backwages and attorney's fees. The decision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of time. Elevated by petition for certiorari before this Court, the case was dismissed on technical grounds; however, the Court also pointed out that even if all the procedural requirements for the filing of the petition were met, it would still be dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Later, defendant filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Misamis Oriental. Complainant filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint. He interposed in the court below that the action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code and is barred by reason of the final judgment in the labor case. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above Order was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Issue: Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over defendants claim for damages?
Held: Yes. Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code, which was already in effect at the time of the filing of this case, reads: ARTICLE 217.Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
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jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: xxx xxx xxx 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; xxx xxx xxx Presently, and as amended by R.A. 6715, the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in Article 217 is comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages "arising from the employer-employee relations". There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, defendant's claim against complainant for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. Defendant would not have taken issue with complainant's "doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee. Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint below are: first, those amounting to lost profits and earnings due to complainant's abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager, having been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and second, those equivalent to the value of defendants property and supplies which complainant used in conducting his "business".
I. ARTICLE 223: APPEAL CORAL POINT DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 129761, February 28, 2000
Facts: The controversy stemmed from the complaints for illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter by private respondents against petitioner. In his decision of 30 April 1996, Labor Arbiter Dominador Almirante found that private respondents were project employees who worked for petitioner for more than one year and could not, therefore, be dismissed without clearance from the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Policy Instruction 20. On 7 June 1996, petitioner appealed to the NLRC contending that the clearance required under Policy Instruction 20 was abolished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in 1981 and Rule XIV Book V of the Labor Code, and that private respondents were project employees whose work ended with the project. Allegedly on the same date, petitioner also filed a motion for the reduction of the supersedeas bond from P655,866.41 to P100,000, and thereafter posted a cash bond of P100,000. The NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for insufficiency of the cash bond, since under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal of the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that in Star Angel Handicrafts v. NLRC this Court relaxed the rule on the posting of supersedeas bond as a condition for perfecting appeals and allowed the filing of a motion for the reduction of bond within the reglementary period to appeal. The NLRC denied the motion in its Resolution of 14 July 1997 on the ground that petitioner did not file a motion for the reduction of bond within the reglementary period but instead posted a bond in an amount not equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Petitioner filed with this Court a motion for the reduction of the supersedeas bond to P100,000, the amount deposited at the NLRC, or at the most to P200,000. This motion was, however, denied; and so was the motion for reconsideration. In its Memorandum, petitioner reiterates that it filed with the NLRC a motion for the reduction of bond, which should have been resolved first before the appeal was dismissed. Issue: Is the filing of a supersedeas bond a condition for perfecting an appeal?
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Held: YES. Article 223, second paragraph, of the Labor Code states that when a judgment involving monetary award is appealed by the employer, the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment. This is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case the monetary award will be given to them upon dismissal of the employers appeal. It is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the employees. In Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. NLRC, this Court said: The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the provision that the appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer may be the exclusive means by which an employers appeal may be perfected. In meritorious cases and upon motion of the appellant, the NLRC may reduce the amount of the bond. Also in some cases the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal was relaxed, but the decisions were justified due to substantial compliance with the rule. We recognized in Star Angel Handicrafts v. NLRC that neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically provide for a situation where the appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond, and inasmuch as in practice the NLRC allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that effect may be filed within the reglementary period for appealing. Such motion may be filed in lieu of a bond which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the appeal is not deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC has acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.
EVELYN CATUBAY, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 119289, April 12, 2000
Facts: Petitioners, who were employees of private respondent company, filed a complaint against the lattter for payment of salary differentials and separation pay, when the company refused to take them back after they went on unpaid sick leave due to work related illness, unless they first apply with an employment agency and accept new terms of employment. The labor arbiter decided in their favor and issued a writ of execution. Private respondents moved to quash the aforesaid writ of execution alleging that the writ was premature because they filed their appeal memorandum within the ten-day reglementary period. The motion was denied by the labor arbiter noting that there was no record showing that private respondents posted the required cash or surety bond pursuant to the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and of the Labor Code. Private respondents posted the surety bond, even beyond the reglementary period, and the labor arbiter, on the same day, issued an order quashing the writ of execution. Issue: Did public respondent NLRC abused its discretion in taking cognizance of private respondents appeal notwithstanding the fact that the appeal bond was filed out of time? Held: YES . In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from, and the appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period of 10 days from receipt of the decision. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforementioned shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
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Clearly, for an appeal to be perfected, the appellant must not only file the appeal memorandum and pay the appeal fee, but must also post the required cash or surety bond. The posting of a cash or surety bond is mandatory. Moreover, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Failure to comply with the requirements for perfection of appeal rendered the decision of the labor arbiter final and executory and placed it beyond the power of the NLRC to review or reverse it. While the application of the rules on appeal in labor cases can be relaxed, it can only be done when the failure to comply with the requirements for perfection of appeal was justified or where there has been substantial compliance with the rules, which does not appear in the case at hand. There was no justifiable reason put forth by the private respondents for their late filing of the required bond.
JOSELITO LAGERA vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 123636, March 31, 2000
Facts: On November 28, 1994, the Labor Arbiter handed down a decision finding defendant guilty of illegal dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared the dismissal of complainant as valid. Complainant received a copy of the assailed decision on November 27, 1995 but did not file a motion for reconsideration. Instead, he went straight to this Court through this special civil action for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC in reversing the decision of the labor arbiter. Issue: May complainant go directly to Supreme Court on certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs decision? Held: No. The precipitate filing of this special civil action for certiorari without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed judgment of NLRC warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had. It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the case at bar, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the impugned decision, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned judgment of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence, original action of certiorari, as in this case will not prosper. Further, not having filed a motion for reconsideration within the ten-day reglementary period, the questioned order, resolution or decision of NLRC, becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Thus, as regards complainant, the decision of NLRC became final and executory on December 7, 1995. Consequently, the merits of the case can no longer be reviewed to determine if the NLRC could be faulted of grave abuse of discretion.
RODENTO NAVARRO, ET AL vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 116464, March 1, 2000
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Facts: Petitioners are jeepney drivers of private respondents on boundary system. Due to some problems with the employer, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor artbiter ruled in their favor. On April 3, 1992, private respondents were served a copy of the decision of the labor arbiter. Aggrieved, they filed on April 13, 1992 with NLRC their memorandum on appeal. Nevertheless, it was only on April 30, 1992 , that private respondents filed the appeal bond. Unfortunately, the aforesaid bond was later discovered to be spurious because the person who signed it was no longer connected with the insurance company for more than ten years already. It was only on July 20, 1993, that private respondents posted a substitute bond issued by another company in the amount of P95,550.00. In a decision dated July 29, 1993, public respondent ruled for private respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Has the decision became final and executory for non-filing of the supersedeas bond within the reglementary period to appeal? Held: Yes. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Such requirement cannot be trifled with. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides: "ARTICLE 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Perfection of an appeal includes the filing, within the prescribed period, of the memorandum of appeal containing, among others, the assignment of error/s, arguments in support thereof, the relief sought and, in appropriate cases, posting of the appeal bond. In case where the judgment involves a monetary award, as in this case, the appeal may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC. The amount of the bond must be equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The decision became immutable and it can no longer be amended nor altered by the labor tribunal. Accordingly, inasmuch as the timely posting of appeal bond is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a mere technicality of law, the NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to set aside the decision of the labor arbiter in this case.
NUEVA ECIJA ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, ET AL. VS. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 116066, January 24, 2000
Facts: On March 1992, petitioners instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch against private respondent company. The Labor Arbiter decided the case against private respondent company. Private respondents elevated the case to respondent NLRC. They filed their appeal on December 28, 1992 and posted a surety bond on January 5, 1993. But petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss on the ground of late appeal, claiming that insufficient bond was filed by the respondent only on January 5, 1993. The bond excluded the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of litigation. NLRC denied the motion and instead gave due course to the appeal. Petitioners contend that although respondent company filed its appeal on December 28, 1992, such appeal was not completed for its failure to file the
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necessary supersedeas bond, during the period prescribed by law or until January 4, 1993. Hence no appeal was perfected. Issue: Was the appeal filed by the respondent company not perfected for its failure to file the supersedeas bond, during the period prescribed by law? Held: No. Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision involving a monetary award in labor cases may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, clearly provides: ARTICLE 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Also, the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. However, in a number of cases, this Court relaxed the rule to resolve controversies on the merits, specifically, when there are special meritorious circumstances and issues. We relaxed the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal, when there was substantial compliance with the rule, so that on balance, we made technical considerations to give way to equity and justice. In the case before us, the decision of the labor arbiter was issued on December 21, 1992. Private respondents filed their appeal on December 28, 1992, barely seven days from receipt thereof. The bonding company issued the bond dated January 4, 1993, the last for filling an appeal. However, it was forwarded to respondent NLRC only on the following day, January 5, 1993. Considering these circumstances and the holiday season, we find it equitable to ease the rules and consider that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
PGA BROTHERHOOD ASSOCIATION, ET al. vs. NLRC G.R. No. 131085, June 19, 2000
Facts: Complainants contend that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal from the Labor Arbiters denial of their motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution to enforce their claims under their status as payroll-reinstatement employees. They claim that as early as 25 February 1991 defendant PSVSIA had unequivocally opted to reinstate complainants in the payroll. This being the case, PSVSIA is bound by its election. Hence the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their claim for unpaid benefits in contravention of RA 6715 amending Art. 223 of the Labor Code which grants the employer in case of illegal dismissal the option to actually reinstate his employee or to reinstate him in the payroll. They submit that the NLRC decision of 9 July 1993 did not pass upon the controversy arising out of the payroll reinstatement considering that it was never mentioned in the decision. Issue: Was the appeal proper?
Held: No. A cursory examination of the 9 July 1993 NLRC decision readily shows that the grant of three (3) years back wages entitled complainants to a relatively smaller monetary award than if they were to be paid their payroll back wages which could be reckoned from the promulgation of the Labor Arbiters decision ordering complainants reinstatement up to either
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the finality of the NLRC decision or their actual reinstatement. In other words, the two (2) reliefs would bring about divergent effects on the economic condition of complainants. The fact that defendant PSVSIA chose to limit the award of back wages to three (3) years demonstrates its preference over the other relief, i.e., grant of payroll back wages. Moreover, as correctly observed by PSVSIA, the 9 July 1993 decision of the NLRC has become final and executory, and complainants are now barred from resurrecting the back wages issue which had lapsed to finality. We note that neither a motion for reconsideration nor appeal was ever taken by complainants on this point. This procedural lapse is fatal. It is an established principle that a final and executory decision cannot be altered nor amended by any tribunal except where a supervening cause transpires which renders its execution unjust or impossible, or in cases of special and exceptional nature, where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution. No discernible supervening cause nor exceptional circumstance obtains in this case to prevent its execution.
WORKERS OFANTIQUE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. NLRC June 8, 2000, G.R. No. 120062
Facts: The DOLE conducted a routine inspection on ANTECO. The results showed an underpayment of wages during the period of November 1, 1984 to November 15, 1987 and non-payment or underpayment of 13 th month pay for the years 1984, 1985 and 1986. The wage differentials were computed at P1,427,412.75. Respondent failed to pay the wage differentials because of its cash position. On September 19, 1989, the DOLE Regional Director for Iloilo City issued an order requiring ANTECO to pay its workers the sum of P1,427,412.75 within ten days from receipt of the order. The NLRC reiterated the order. Subsequently, 108 workers of ANTECO signed a waiver stating that the undersigned coop employees are agreeable with the negotiation of the management for the implementation of backwages in the amount of P500,000.00 only. The DOLE approved the waiver as it is not contrary to law, good custom and public policy. Later on, petitioner filed with DOLE a motion for reconsideration alleging that the waiver was void for being contrary to the Constitution and public policy and for having been executed under undue influence, coercion, intimidation, and without assistance of counsel. The motion prayed for an an alias writ of execution commanding the sheriff to collect the unpaid balance stated in the order dated September 19, 1989. DOLE denied the motion for reconsideration. Issue: Does respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the appeal was filed out of time? Held: No. Respondent NLRC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the appeal was filed out of time. When it declared that the appeal was filed personally, it made a factual finding. Factual findings of labor officials when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case, the official receipts covering payment of appeal and legal research fees, are binding on the parties. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. Non-compliance therewith renders the judgment sought to appeal final and executory. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. An appeal is perfected when there is proof of payment of the appeal fee and in cases where the employer appeals and a monetary award is involved, there is payment of the appeal
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bond. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting of an appeal. However, in the higher interest of justice, we have in meritorious cases allowed late appeals from decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC. We cannot allow an exception in the case at bar. Even on the substantive questions, the petition must fail.
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY vs. NLRC, ET AL. FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000
Facts: The National Federation of Labor (NFL) was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. As such, NFL started to negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit which it represented. However, the same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by petitioner Company, so that the former was prompted to file a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of refusal to bargain collectively. Then Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abulwahid issued an order declaring (a) herein petitioner Company guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the regular rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner Company. Petitioner Company appealed the above order to the NLRC, which order was dismissed. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. Labor Arbiter Reynaldo S. Villena then issued an Order directing petitioner Company to pay the 142 employees entitled to the aforesaid benefits the respective amounts due them under the CBA. Petitioner complied and the corresponding quitclaims were executed. The case was considered closed following NFL's manifestation that it will no longer appeal the Order of Villena. However, notwithstanding such manifestation, a "Petition for Relief" was filed in behalf of 186 of the private respondents "Mariano J. Akilit and 350 others claiming that they were wrongfully excluded from enjoying the benefits under the CBA since the agreement with NFL and petitioner Company limited the CBA's implementation to only the 142 rank-and-file employees enumerated. They claimed that NFL's misrepresentations had precluded them from appealing their exclusion. Treating the petition for relief as an appeal, the NLRC entertained the same and later issued a resolution declaring that the 186 excluded employees "form part and parcel of the then existing rank-and-file bargaining unit" and were, therefore, entitled to the benefits under the CBA. Meanwhile, four separate groups of the private respondents, including the original 186 who had filed the "Petition for Relief, filed individual money claims. However, Villena dismissed these cases. The employees appealed the respective dismissals of their complaints to the NLRC which consolidated these appeals with the aforementioned motion for reconsideration and then issued a resolution directing petitioner to pay the individual complainants their CBA benefits. Issue: Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition for relief filed by the private respondents and treated it as an appeal, even if it was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing an appeal? Held: No. Ordinarily, once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. However, a careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the instant case warrants liberality in the application of technical rules and procedure. It would be a greater injustice to deprive the concerned employees of the monetary benefits rightly due them because of a circumstance over which they had no control. As stated above, private
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respondents, in their petition for relief, claimed that they were wrongfully excluded from the list of those entitled to the CBA benefits by their union, NFL, without their knowledge; and, because they were under the impression that they were ably represented, they were not able to appeal their case on time. The Supreme Court has allowed appeals from decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. Moreover, under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code, the NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate powers, "correct, amend or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form." Further, Article 221 of the same provides that: "In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
J. ARTICLE 224: EXECUTION OF DECISIONS, ORDERS CHONA P. TORRES vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 107014, April 12, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Chona P. Torres was hired by respondent E & R Security Agency, Inc. as a security guard. She was dismissed due to an alleged unbecoming behavior during a routinary meeting, prompting her to file a complaint against the security agency for illegal suspension and violation of R.A. No. 6727. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, which was affirmed by the NLRC-NCR. A writ of execution was issued on the reinstatement aspect, but it was not implemented because the monetary aspect of the decision remained to be determined. Petitioner asked the Labor Arbiter to issue an alias writ of execution , but respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Quash the Alias Writ of Execution on the ground that there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable contending that the petitioner accepted employment from another security agency without previously resigning from it. Thus, NLRC ordered the Labor Arbiter to immediately resolve respondent agency's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. Issue: Did the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the Labor Arbiter to resolve the motion to quash alias writ of execution? Held: YES. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. A writ of execution may however be refused on equitable grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or when certain circumstances, which transpired after judgment became final, rendered execution of judgment unjust. The fact that the decision has become final does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts. However, respondent agency's contention that there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable because petitioner accepted employment from another agency without resigning from it is patently without merit, because the recent ruling of the Court is that back wages awarded to an illegally dismissed employee shall not be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
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INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORP vs. NLRC, ET AL.

Facts: Complainant Enrique Sulit and several co-workers filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment against Industrial Management Development Corporation (INIMACO), for payment of separation pay and unpaid wages. The Labor Arbiter held in favor of complainants. No appeal was filed within the reglementary period thus, the above Decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution but it was returned unsatisfied. As such, the Labor Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution which ordered ordered INIMACO to pay the claims of complainants or forward the same to this Office for appropriate disposition. Should they fail to collect the said sum in cash, complainants are hereby authorized to cause the satisfaction of the same on the movable or immovable property(s) of defendant not exempt from execution. Defendant filed a "Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution and Set Aside Decision," alleging among others that the alias writ of execution altered and changed the tenor of the decision by changing the liability of therein defendants from joint to solidary, Issue: Is the defendants liability, pursuant to the decision of the Labor Arbiter, joint or solidary? Held: Upon careful examination of the pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds that petitioner INIMACOs liability is not solidary but merely joint. A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. In a joint obligation each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a part of the correlative rights. Well-entrenched is the rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires. In the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter, the word "solidary" does not appear. Nor can it be inferred therefrom that the liability of the six (6) defendants in the case below is solidary, thus their liability should merely be joint.
K. ARTICLE 241: RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP/ VALIDITY OF CHECK-OFF AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENT EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR ET AL. G.R. No. 115949, March 16, 2000.
Facts: The majority of all union members approved and signed a resolution confirming the decision of the executive board to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel. As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total economic benefits that may be secured through the negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as attorney's fees. It also contained an authorization for SolidBank Corporation to check-off said attorney's fees from the first lump sum payment of benefits to the employees under the new CBA and to turn over said amount to Atty. Lacsina and/or his duly authorized representative. The new CBA was signed on February 21, 1992. The bank then, on request of the union, made payroll deductions for attorney's fees from the CBA benefits paid to the union members in accordance with the abovementioned resolution.
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On October 2, 1992, private respondents instituted a complaint against the petitioners and the union counsel before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of attorney's fees as well as for quantification of the benefits in the 1992 CBA. Issue: Was the payroll deductions for attorney's fees from the CBA benefits paid to the union members a valid check-off? Held: No. In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them directly to the union. It assures continuous funding for the labor organization. As this Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees. Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union's incidental expenses, attorney's fees and representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned. Clearly, attorney's fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written consent. The General Membership Resolution of October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union did not satisfy the requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence for the validity of the ten percent (10%) special assessment for union's incidental expenses, attorney's fees and representation expenses. There were no individual written check off authorizations by the employees concerned and so the assessment cannot be legally deducted by their employer.
L. ARTICLE 242: RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS/ VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. Nos. 113666-68, January 19, 2000.
Facts: Complainants were members of KMDD-CFW. During the CBA negotiations, the management panel arrived late prompting the union panel to walk out from the meeting and subsequently refused for a continuance of the negotiations. The union held a strike. Alleging that the strike was illegal, petitioner filed a Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction seeking a) to declare the strike illegal and to dismiss all officers of the union and members who participated in the commission of illegal acts. The unions counsel pleaded for a compromise agreement, and which was subsequently entered into by and between the parties. Among the agreed points were the withdrawal/dismissal of any and all cases filed against each other and that said strikers shall be given their separation pay. Out of the said 262 striking force, only the five (5) complainants disagreed, arguing that the compromise agreement was entered into by their counsel and the President of the Union without their individual consent and/or authority and that the same was not approved nor ratified by the majority of the union membership. The Labor Arbiter upheld the dismissal of complainants, ruling that they were bound by the compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioners. NLRC reversed said ruling ordering reinstatement plus backwages limited to 3 years from the time of dismissal up to reinstatement. ISSUES: (1) May a union compromise or waive the rights to security of tenure and money claims of its minority members, without the latter's consent?
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(2) Will the compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioner company, which has not been consented to nor ratified by respondent minority members, has the effect of res judicata upon them? Held: (1) No. Even if a clear majority of the union members agreed to a settlement with the employer, the union has no authority to compromise the individual claims of members who did not consent to such settlement. Rules of Court requires a special authority before an attorney may compromise his client's litigation. "The authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed and should be duly established by evidence." In the case at bar, minority union members did not authorize the union to compromise their individual claims. Absent a showing of the union's special authority to compromise the individual claims of private respondents for reinstatement and back wages, there is no valid waiver of the aforesaid rights. As private respondents did not authorize the union to represent them in the compromise settlement, they are not bound by the terms thereof. "Money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected by a union or counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. The beneficiaries are the individual complainants themselves. The union to which they belong can only assist them but cannot decide for them." (La Campana case) (2) No. The judgment of the Labor Arbiter based on the compromise agreement in question does not have the effect of res judicata upon complainants who did not agree thereto. We have consistently ruled that "a compromise is governed by the basic principle that the obligations arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties." Consequently, private respondents may pursue their individual claims against petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. Where the compromise agreement was signed by only three of the five respondents, the non-signatories cannot be bound by that amicable settlement, (SMI Fish Industries, Inc. vs. NLRC). This is so as a compromise agreement is a contract and cannot affect third persons who are not parties to it. Private respondents were not parties to the compromise agreement. Hence, the judgment approving such agreement cannot have the effect of res judicata upon them since the requirement of identity of parties is not satisfied. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, hence conclusive only upon parties
M. ARTICLE 243- 246: COVERAGE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF- ORGANIZATION DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs. DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA) and BUENAVENTURA MAGSALIN G.R. No. 109002, April 12, 2000
Facts: Petitioner-UNIVERSITY and respondent-UNION, which is composed of regular nonacademic rank and file employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a life span of three (3) years. During the freedom period, the Union initiated negotiations with the University for a new collective bargaining agreement which, however, turned out to be unsuccessful, hence, the Union filed a Notice of Strike. Thereafter, a partial collective bargaining agreement was executed by the parties, and subsequently entered into a Submission Agreement, identifying the remaining six (6) unresolved issues for arbitration, one of which is the "(1) scope of the bargaining unit, xxx. The parties appointed a voluntary arbitrator who rendered the decision in question. Issue: Did the voluntary arbitrator commit grave abuse of discretion in including the computer operators and discipline officers in the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees, and in
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excluding the employees of the College of St. Benilde from the bargaining unit of the employees of Dela Salle University ? Held: NO. The express exclusion of the computer operators and discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the parties may not only renew the existing collective bargaining agreement but may also propose and discuss modifications or amendments thereto. With regard to the alleged confidential nature of the said employees functions, the service records of the computer operators reveal that their duties are basically clerical and non-confidential in nature, and based from the nature of the duties of the discipline officers, it shows that they are not confidential employees and should therefore be included in the bargaining unit of rankand-file employees. Moreover, the Court also ruled that the employees of the College of St. Benilde should be excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of Dela Salle University, because the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LAGUESMA G.R. No. 101738, April 12, 2000
Facts: Complainant Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) is engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber products. It has over 9,000 employees, 944 of whom are supervisory and technical staff employees. More or less 487 of these supervisory and technical staff employees are signatory members of the private respondent PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and Technical Staff Employees Union (PBSTSEU). On August 9, 1989. PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for collective bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes. The Secretary of the Labor issued a Resolution which upheld the Med-Arbiter's Order dated September 17, 1989, with modification allowing the supervising and staff employees in Cebu, Davao and Iligan City to participate in the certification election. During the pre-election conference on January 18, 1990, PICOP questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were reclassified as managerial employees in the light of the reorganization effected by it. Following the submission by the parties of their respective position papers and evidence on this issue, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order, holding that supervisors and section heads of the complainant are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the list of voters for purposes of certification election. Issue: Are the managerial employees disqualified from joining or forming a union represented by co-respondent PBSTSEU, in view of a supervening event brought about by the changes in the organizational structure? Held: Yes. In United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, we had occasion to elucidate on the term "managerial employees." Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task of First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization. Under this distinction, "managerial employees" therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely, the "managers" per se composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the "supervisors" composed of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere fact that an employee
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is designated manager" does not ipso facto make him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, for it is the job description that determines the nature of employment. A thorough dissection of the job description of the concerned supervisory employees and section heads indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory employees since they do not lay down company policies. PICOP's contention that the subject section heads and unit managers exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not supreme but merely advisory in character. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of employees is still subject to confirmation and approval by their respective superior. Thus, where such power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.
N. ARTICLE 248- 249: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE/ UNION SECURITY CLAUSE DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs. DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA), ET AL. G.R. Nos. 109002 & 110072, April 12, 2000
Facts: Petitioner-UNIVERSITY and respondent-UNION, which is composed of regular nonacademic rank and file employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a life span of three (3) years. During the freedom period, the Union initiated negotiations with the University for a new collective bargaining agreement which, however, turned out to be unsuccessful, hence, the Union filed a Notice of Strike. Thereafter, a partial collective bargaining agreement was executed by the parties and subsequently, they entered into a Submission Agreement, identifying the remaining six (6) unresolved issues for arbitration, one of which is the validity of the union security clause xxx.. Issue: Is the union security clause valid?
Held: YES. The inclusion of a union shop provision in addition to the existing maintenance of membership clause in the collective bargaining agreement is valid. It is not a restriction of the employees constitutional right of freedom of association, but rather a valid form of union security while the CBA is in force and accordance of the constitutional policy to promote unionism. Also, the right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs.
MSMG-UWP, ET AL. vs. CRESENCIOJ. RAMOS, ET AL. G.R. No. 113907, February 28, 2000
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Facts: The petitioner, Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc., (MSMG), hereinafter referred to as the "local union", is an affiliate of the private respondent, United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), referred to as the "federation". MSMG and M Greenfield, Inc. entered into a collective bargaining agreement, which includes, among others, a union security clause On September 30, 1988, the officials of ULGWP called a Special National Executive Board Meeting where a Resolution was passed placing the MSMG under trusteeship and appointing respondent Cesar Clarete as administrator. On November 26, 1988, petitioners replied questioning the validity of the alleged National Executive Board Resolution placing their union under trusteeship; justifying the action of their union in declaring a general autonomy from ULGWP due to the latter's inability to give proper educational, organizational and legal services to its affiliates and the pendency of the audit of the federation funds; advising that their union did not commit any act of disloyalty as it has remained an affiliate of ULGWP;giving ULGWP a period of five (5) days to cease and desist from further committing acts of coercion, intimidation and harassment. However, as early as November 21, 1988, the officers were expelled from the ULGWP for committing acts of disloyalty and/or acts inimical to the interest and violative to the Constitution and by-laws of the federation, and since they were no longer members of good standing, it recommended their termination from employment. Thereafter, the Federation filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to compel the company to effect the immediate termination of the expelled union officers. On March 7, 1989, under the pressure of a threatened strike, respondent company terminated the 30 union officers from employment. In subsequent letters dated 21 February and 4 March 1989, the ULGWP reiterated its demand for such dismissal. On that same day, the expelled union officers assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily brought out of the company premises by the company's security guards. Likewise, those assigned to the second shift were not allowed to report for work. This provoked some of the members of the local union to demonstrate their protest for the dismissal of the said union officers. Some union members left their work posts and walked out of the company premises. On the other hand, the Federation, having achieved its objective, withdrew the Notice of Strike filed with the NCMB. On March 8, 1989, the petitioners filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB, on grounds of discrimination, interference in union activities, mass dismissal of union officers and shop stewards, threats, coercion and intimidation, and union busting. In a strike vote referendum was conducted and out of 2,103 union members who cast their votes, 2,086 members voted to declare a strike. Issue: Was respondent company/employer justified in dismissing petitioner-employees merely upon the labor federations (ULGWPs) demand for the enforcement of the union security clause embodied in the CBA Held: No, the respondent employer was not justified in dismissing the petitioner-employees merely upon the labor federations (ULGWPs) demand for the enforcement of the union security clause embodied in the CBA. The court recognized that the CBA as a contract is the law between the parties and that by reason of the stipulations provided therein, the respondent employer my validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security clause of the CBA upon recommendation of the union. However, the court also ruled that such stipulation or agreement should not be implemented hastily and summarily thereby eroding the employees right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure. As held in the case of Carino vs. NLRC, the right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union is not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, there was no unfair labor practice on the part of
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the respondent company nor the federation officers as the union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal. But the dismissal was invalidated in this case because of respondent companys failure to accord petitioners with due process, that is notice and hearing prior to their termination. .
O. ARTICLE 253 DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000
Facts: The National Federation of Labor (NFL) was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. As such, NFL started to negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit which it represented. However, the same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by petitioner Company, so that the former was prompted to file a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of refusal to bargain collectively. Then Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abulwahid issued an order declaring (a) herein petitioner Company guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the regular rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner Company. Petitioner Company appealed the above order to the NLRC, which order was dismissed. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. Labor Arbiter Reynaldo S. Villena then issued an Order directing petitioner Company to pay the 142 employees entitled to the aforesaid benefits the respective amounts due them under the CBA. Petitioner complied and the corresponding quitclaims were executed. The case was considered closed following NFL's manifestation that it will no longer appeal the Order of Villena. However, notwithstanding such manifestation, a "Petition for Relief" was filed in behalf of 186 of the private respondents "Mariano J. Akilit and 350 others claiming that they were wrongfully excluded from enjoying the benefits under the CBA since the agreement with NFL and petitioner Company limited the CBA's implementation to only the 142 rank-and-file employees enumerated. They claimed that NFL's misrepresentations had precluded them from appealing their exclusion. Treating the petition for relief as an appeal, the NLRC entertained the same and later issued a resolution declaring that the 186 excluded employees "form part and parcel of the then existing rank-and-file bargaining unit" and were, therefore, entitled to the benefits under the CBA. Meanwhile, four separate groups of the private respondents, including the original 186 who had filed the "Petition for Relief, filed individual money claims. However, Villena dismissed these cases. The employees appealed the respective dismissals of their complaints to the NLRC which consolidated these appeals with the aforementioned motion for reconsideration and then issued a resolution directing petitioner to pay the individual complainants their CBA benefits. Issues: 1. May the term of a CBA as to its economic provisions be extended beyond the term expressly stipulated therein, and, in the absence of a new CBA, even beyond the threeyear period provided by law? 2. Are employees hired after the stipulated term of a CBA entitled to the benefits provided thereunder? Held: 1. Yes. Article 253 of the Labor Code explicitly provides:
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ARTICLE 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. It is clear from the above provision of law that until a new Collective Bargaining Agreement has been executed by and between the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification as to which of the economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain force and effect; therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement. In a recent case, the Court had occasion to rule that Articles 253 and 253-A mandate the parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Consequently, the automatic renewal clause provided for by the law, which is deemed incorporated in all CBAs, provides the reason why the new CBA can only be given a prospective effect. 2. Yes. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that when a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the union representing the employees and the employer, even the non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the contract. To accord its benefits only to members of the union without any valid reason would constitute undue discrimination against nonmembers. It is even conceded, that a laborer can claim benefits from a CBA entered into between the company and the union of which he is a member at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, after he has resigned from said union. In the same vein, the benefits under the CBA in the instant case should be extended to those employees who only became such after the year 1984. To exclude them would constitute undue discrimination and deprive them of monetary benefits they would otherwise be entitled to under a new collective bargaining contract to which they would have been parties. Since in this particular case, no new agreement had been entered into after the CBA's stipulated term, it is only fair and just that the employees hired thereafter be included in the existing CBA.
P. ARTICLE 253- A: RETROACTIVITY OF CBA MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. LEONARDO QUISUMBING, ET AL. G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000
Facts: This petition had its origin in the renegotiation of the parties' 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the last two-year period thereof is concerned. When the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and granted the arbitral awards, there was no question that these arbitral awards were to be given retroactive effect. However, the parties dispute the reckoning period when retroaction shall commence. Petitioner claims that the award should retroact only from such time that the Secretary of Labor rendered the award, invoking the 1995 decision in Pier 8 case where the Court citing Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC, said: "The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed by the parties was promulgated on June 5, 1989, the expiry date of the past CBA. Based on the provision of Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon by the parties. But since no agreement
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to that effect was made, public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving the said CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public respondent is within the ambit of its authority vested by existing law." On the other hand, the Union argues that the award should retroact to such time granted by the Secretary, citing the 1993 decision of St. Luke's. Issue: Whether the arbitral awards granted by the Secretary of Labor should retroact from the time the award was rendered or from such time granted by the Secretary. Held: The effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be properly applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and as held in the 1997 case of Mindanao Terminal "Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof." It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However, the arbitral award can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties. The terms or periods set forth in Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award by the Secretary considering the absence of an applicable law. Under Article 253-A: "If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof." In other words, the law contemplates retroactivity whether the agreement be entered into before or after the said six-month period. The agreement of the parties need not be categorically stated for their acts may be considered in determining the duration of retroactivity.
Q. ARTICLE 254: LABOR INJUNCTION DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES vs. FERNANDO P. CABATO, ET AL. G.R. No. 118216, March 9, 2000
Facts: Herein private respondents, as victorious litigants in an illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice (ULP) case, filed before the Commission a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution as their employers appeal to the Commission was denied. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued directing NLRC Deputy Sheriff to execute the judgment against private respondents employer, Green Mountain Farm. Sheriff then proceeded to enforce the writ by garnishing certain personal properties of the latter. Finding that said judgment debtor does not have sufficient personal properties to satisfy the monetary award, Sheriff Ventura proceeded to levy upon a real property. Thereafter, Sheriff caused the publication on the July 17, 1994 edition of the Baguio Midland Courier the date of the public auction of said real property. A month before the scheduled auction sale, herein petitioner filed before the Commission a third-party claim asserting ownership over the property levied upon and subject of the Sheriff's notice of sale. Labor Arbiter Rivera thus issued an order directing the suspension of the auction sale until the merits of petitioner's claim has been resolved. However, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet a complaint for injunction and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against Sheriff, reiterating the same allegations it raised in the third party claim it filed with the
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Commission. Meanwhile, private respondent-laborers, moved for the dismissal of the civil case on the ground of the court's lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Can the trial court take cognizance of the complaint filed by petitioner and consequently provide the injunctive relief sought? Held: NO. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Having established that jurisdiction over the case rests with the Commission, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Cabato in denying petitioner's motion for the issuance of an injunction against the execution of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. Precedents abound confirming the rule that said courts have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards or orders. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. Moreover, it must be noted that the Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264). As correctly observed by court a quo, the main issue and the subject of the amended complaint for injunction are questions interwoven with the execution of the Commission's decision. No doubt the aforecited prohibition in Article 254 is applicable. The power of the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his decision and to consider whatever supervening events might transpire during such execution. Moreover, in denying petitioner's petition for injunction, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-honored principle that a Regional Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the National Labor Relations Commission, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.
R. ARTICLE 263- 266: STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA SA MOLDEX, PRODUCTS INC VS NLRC
Facts: In 1993, petitioners and private respondents negotiated for renewal of their CBA the negotiations ended in a deadlock due to the economic difference. Subsequently, petitioners filed a notice of strike with the NCMB, thereafter, petitioner union conducted a strike vote among its members, and the results of the voting where conveyed to the alliance of nationalist and genuine labor organization (ANGLO) for submission to the NCMB, but for some unknown reason, the same was not made. Thus, Petitioners went to strike without the report of the strike vote submitted to the NCMB. Private respondents filed A Petition to declare the strike illegal and authorized dismissal of the officers and other employees for illegal acts with the NLRC alleging that petitioners Barricade the three Gates of Private Respondent (Moldex) and committed acts of violence, threats and Coercion declared.
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Issue:
Is the strike conducted by petitioners was illegal?
Held: YES. The strike was illegal. It has been shown that the results of the strike-vote were never forwarded to the NCMB , as admitted by petitioners themselves and as attested to by certification of Non Submission of the strike vote issued by the NCMB there is thus no need for additional evidence on the matter , as it would not change the fact that the results of the strike-vote, the strike was illegal , pursuant to article 264 of the labor code, which reads: Art. 264 Prohibited activities --- (a) no labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with title VII of this book , without first having filed the notice required in the preceding article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the ministry. Aside from not submitting the result of the strike vote to the NCMB, petitioners also committed acts of violence, threats, coercion and intimidation during the strike as found by the labor arbiter and affidavits of witnesses of respondents. It bears stressing that factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding on the S.C. when supported by substantial evidence.
S. ART. 260-266: GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION JESUS B. DIAMONON vs. DOLE, ET AL. G.R. No. 108951, March 7, 2000
Facts: Petitioner served as the National Executive Vice President of the NACUSIP and Vice President for Luzon of the PACIWU. In a letter dated March 23, 1991, petitioner learned of his removal from the positions he held in both unions in a resolution approved during a meeting of the National Executive Boards of both unions. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the resolution on his removal. At the same time, he initiated a complaint (hereafter referred to as FIRST) before the DOLE against the National President of NACUSIP and PACIWU, private respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de la Cruz, Jr., and the members of the National Executive Boards of NACUSIP and PACIWU questioning the validity of his removal from the positions he held in the two unions. While the FIRST case was pending with the Med-Arbiter, petitioner filed on May 16, 1991 a second complaint (hereafter referred to as SECOND) against private respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de la Cruz, Jr., and the National Treasurer of NACUSIP and PACIWU, Sofia P. Manaay. He accused them of three (3) offenses, namely: (a) wanton violation of the Constitution and By-Laws of both organizations, NACUSIP and PACIWU; (b) unauthorized and illegal disbursements of union funds of both organizations; (c) and abuse of authority as national officers of both organizations. On December 27, 1991, public respondent Laguesma, acting as the then Undersecretary of DOLE, decided on the FIRST case on appeal and issued a Resolution which affirmed the assailed Order dated August 2, 1991 declaring as null and void petitioner's removal from the positions he held. In view of the adverse Order dismissing the SECOND case, petitioner appealed to the public respondent DOLE. Public respondent Laguesma, issued the assailed Order dated December 29, 1992, holding that petitioner's failure to show in his complaint that the administrative remedies provided for in the constitution and by-laws of both unions, have been exhausted or such remedies are not available, was fatal to petitioner's cause. Resultantly, he affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
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Issue: Did public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners complaint for non-exhaustion of remedies provided in the constitution and by-laws of the unions involved? Held: NO. In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to comply with Section 2, Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code as amended but also the record reveals that neither did he exhaust the remedies set forth by the Constitution and by-laws of both unions. His failure to seek recourse before the National Convention on his complaint against private respondents taints his action with prematurity. When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions dictated the remedy for intra-union dispute, such as petitioner's complaint against private respondents for unauthorized or illegal disbursement of unions funds, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to give the grievance machinery or appeals' body of the union the opportunity to decide the matter by itself, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies. Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, as in this case, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. Petitioner's premature invocation of public respondent's intervention is fatal to his cause of action.
T. ARTICLE 277-279: SECURITY OF TENURE PERMEX INC. ET AL. VS. NLRC G.R. No. 125031, January 24, 2000
Facts: Private respondent, an employee of Permex, was terminated by petitioners allegedly for flagrantly and deliberately violating company rules and regulations. More specifically, he was dismissed allegedly for falsifying his daily time record. Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, which the latter dismissed for lack of merit. The decision was reversed by the NLRC on appeal. Issue: Was private respondent illegally terminated form his employment?
Held: Yes. Whether private respondent was illegally dismissed or not is governed by Article 282 of the Labor Code. To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and depend himself. This means that an employer can terminate the services of an employee for just and valid causes, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. It also means that, procedurally, the employee must be given notice, with adequate opportunity to be heard, before he is notified of his actual dismissal for cause. Such dismissal, in our view, was to harsh a penalty for unintentional infraction, not to mention that it was his first offense committed without malice, and committed also by others who were not equally penalized.
A PRIME SECURITY SERVICES vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 107320, January 19, 2000.
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Facts: Private respondent herein had been working as a security guard for a year with the SSSI, a sister company of petitioner; that he was rehired as a security guard on January 30, 1988 by the petitioner and assigned to the same post at the U.S. Embassy Building that he was among those absorbed by the petitioner when it took over the security contracts of SSSI with the U.S. Embassy; that he was forced by petitioner to sign new probationary contracts of employment for six (6) months; that on August 1, 1988, his employment was terminated. Private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner, for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and underpayment of wages. Petitioner, for its part, alleged that the private respondent was hired on January 30, 1988, on a probationary basis, and that he was given a copy of petitioners rules and regulations which provide that sleeping on post is punishable by warning, suspension and dismissal and he was caught sleeping on post on March 17, 1988, for which he was sent a memorandum giving him a last warning; that on March 25, 1988, he figured in a quarrel with another security guard, which resulted in a near shootout; that at the end of his probationary employment, he was given a psychological test and on the basis of the foregoing, petitioner told him that his probationary employment had come to an end as he did not pass the company standard and therefore, he could not be hired as a regular employee. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondent and ordered reinstatement plus backwages. Issues: 1. Was private respondents employment with petitioner was just a continuation of his employment with SSSI? 2. Whether private respondent is a regular or probationary employee of petitioner? 3. Was the dismissal unjust and illegal? Held: 1. Yes. The Court cannot uphold and give weight to private respondents resignation letter which appears to have been written and submitted at the instance of petitioner. Its form is of the companys and its wordings are more of a waiver and quitclaim. Moreover, the supposed resignation was not acknowledged before a notary public. Petitioners failure to deny that SSSI is its sister company and that petitioner absorbed SSSI security contract and security personnel assumes overriding significance over the resignation theorized upon, evincing petitioners design to ignore or violate labor laws through the use of the veil of corporate personality. The Court cannot sanction the practice of some companies which, shortly after a worker has become a regular employee, effects the transfer of the same employee to another entity whose owners are the same, or identical, in order to deprive subject employee of the benefits and protection he is entitled to under the law. 2. Private respondent is a regular employee. The Court holds that the latter became a regular employee upon completion of his six-month period of probation. Private respondent started working on January 30, 1988 and completed the said period of probation on July 27, 1988. Thus, at the time private respondent was dismissed on August 1, 1988, he was already a regular employee with a security of tenure. He could only be dismissed for a just and authorized cause. There is no basis for subjecting private respondent to a new probationary or temporary employment, considering that he was already a regular employee when he was absorbed by A Prime from Sugarland. 3. Yes. Private respondents dismissal was unjust and illegal. The dismissal of private respondent was presumably based on the results of his behavioral and neuropsychological tests and on his violation of a company rule on sleeping on post and quarrelling with a coworker. However, these may not be proper grounds for dismissal, as the same were first infractions and were not punishable by dismissal according to the company rules. What is more, as found by the NLRC, the private respondent was not given a chance to contest his dismissal. He was deprived of an opportunity to be heard.
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U. ARTICLE 280: KINDS OF EMPLOYMENT ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU), ET AL. VS. OSCAR ABELLA, ET AL. G.R. No. 100518, January 24, 2000
Facts: Respondent company is a domestic corporation engaged in road construction projects of the government. From 1968 to 1989, it engaged the services of certain workers to work on various projects on different dates. Their contracts indicate the particular project they are assigned. The duration of their employment and their daily wage. In 1989, respondent company terminated the employment of these workers owing to the completion of its projects or the expiration of the workers contracts. The aggrieved workers filed with Regional Branch of the NLRC their individual complaints against private respondent company for illegal dismissal, among others. The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal illegal. The NLRC, on appeal modified the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal. Issue: Held: Were the aggrieved workers regular or project employees of respondent company? The aggrieved workers were project employees. The Labor Code defines regular, project, and casual employees as follows: Article 280: Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. And employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. Thus, regular employees are those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer even if the parties enter into an agreement stating otherwise. In contrast, project employees are those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. Furthermore, Policy Instruction No. 20, which was in force during the period of petitioners employment, stated: Project employees are those employed in connection with a particular construction project. Non-project (regular) employees are those employed by a construction company without reference to any particular project.
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Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection with such termination. What is required of the company is report to the nearest Public Employment Office for statistical purposes.
VIVIAN Y. IMBUIDO vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 114734, March 31, 2000
Facts: Petitioner was employed as a data encoder by private respondent International Information Services, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the business of data encoding and keypunching, from August 26, 1988 until October 18, 1991 when her services were terminated. Within said period petitioner entered into thirteen (13) separate employment contracts with private respondent, each contract lasting only for a period of three (3) months. On October 18, 1991, petitioner received a termination letter from private respondent, allegedly "due to low volume of work." Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for service incentive leave pay and 13th month differential pay, with the National Labor Relations Commission. Petitioner alleged that her employment was terminated not due to the alleged low volume of work but because she "signed a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of respondents," thus charging private respondent with committing unfair labor practices. Petitioner further complained of non-payment of service incentive leave benefits and underpayment of 13th month pay. Issue: Is the petitioner a project employee or a regular employee?
Held: Both. Firstly, petitioner is a project employee. The principal test for determining whether an employee is a project employee or a regular employee is whether the project employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for that project. A project employee is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. In the instant case, petitioner was engaged to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, as admittedly, petitioner worked as a data encoder for private respondent a corporation engaged in the business of data encoding and keypunching, and her employment was fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which had been determined at the time of her engagement, as may be observed from the series of employment contracts between petitioner and private respondent, all of which contained a designation of the specific job contract and a specific period of employment. Secondly, petitioner is also a regular employee. In the recent case of Maraguinot, Jr. vs. NLRC, we held that "[a] project employee or a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a regular employee when the following concur: 1) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after [the] cessation of a project; and 2) The tasks performed by the alleged "project employee" are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. The evidence on record reveals that petitioner was employed by private respondent as a data encoder, performing activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of her employer, continuously for a period of more than three (3) years, from August 26, 1988 to October 18, 1991 36 and contracted for a total of thirteen (13) successive projects. We have previously ruled that "however, the length of time during which the
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employee was continuously re-hired is not controlling, but merely serves as a badge of regular employment." Based on the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner has attained the status of a regular employee of private respondent.
DOUGLAS MILLARES, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 110524, March 14, 2000.
Facts: Petitioners were employed by private respondent ESO through its local manning agency, as machinist and the other as wiper or oiler. Both were promoted as a chief engineers. Petitioners apply for leave of absence which was approved. Petitioners informed ESO of their intentions to avail the optional retirement plan under the CEIP considering that they already rendered more than 20 years of continuous service. ESO denied petitioners request on the following grounds: (1) he was employed on a contractual basis; (2) his contracts of enlistment did not provide for retirement before the age of 60 years; and (3) he did not comply with the requirement for claming benefits under the CEIP. They requested for an extension of leave of absence. Afterwards they were advice that in view of their absence without leave and unavailability for contractual sea service, they had been drop from the roster of crew members. Issue: Are the petitioners regular employees?
Held: YES . The primary standard to determine a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners were employees of private respondents until their services were terminated on September 1, 1989. They served in their capacity as Chief Engineers, performing activities which were necessary and desirable in the business of private respondents Esso International, a shipping company; and Trans-Global, its local manning agency which supplies the manpower and crew requirements of Esso International's vessels. It is, likewise, clear that petitioners had been in the employ of private respondents for 20 years. The records reveal that petitioners were repeatedly re-hired by private respondents even after the expiration o their respective eight-month contracts. Such repeated re-hiring which continued for 20 years, cannot but be appreciated as sufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability of petitioners' service to the private respondents' business or trade. Verily, as petitioners had rendered 20 years of service, performing activities which were necessary and desirable in the business or trade of private respondents, they are, by express provision of Article 280 of the Labor Code, considered regular employees. Being regular employees, petitioners may not be dismissed except for a valid or just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code. In the instant case, clearly ,there was no valid cause for the termination of petitioners.
V. ARTICLE 281- 283: TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

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V.1. ABANDONMENT CRUZ vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. NO. 116384, FEBRUARY 7, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Viola Cruz was hired and employed by respondents Norkis Distributors Inc. as cashier/bookkeeper. While petitioner were busy packing up and making and inventory, she suddenly collapsed and was rushed to a hospital in the evening of the same day but was able to report for the work the following day. She was transferred to another hospital and was confined. She was diagnosed to be suffering from CNS infection. She stopped retuning for work. Norkis was informed by petitioners collapse. Petitioner send a letter to verify states of her employment as answer, respondent sent her a termination letter citing health reasons as cause for her dismissal. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal praying for payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, service incentives leave and others before the labor arbiter decided in her favor. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision favor. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and also denied the motion for reconsideration. Issue: Was the petitioner was validly dismissed on the ground of abandonment?
Held: No. Her unexplained absence does not constitute abandonment since there must be a clear deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employees to continue his employment without any intention of returning. Two requisites should conquer: 1. failure to report for the work or absence without valid justifiable reason, and 2 clear intention to sever the employer employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. In the case at bar. Petitioners absence was explained by the undeniable fact that she was confined for treatment is several hospital for about three months.
LEAH ICAWAT ET AL. v. NLRC ET AL. G.R. No. 133573, June 20, 2000
Facts: Private respondent, Jose Yape started working with petitioners, Leah and Romeo Icawat, as driver of their passenger jeepneys. On December 27, 1994, private respondent lost his driver's license. To secure a new one, he sought petitioners permission to go on vacation leave. After obtaining his license, private respondent reported for work but was informed by petitioners that another driver had already taken his place. Aggrieved, private respondent, on January 27, 1995, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against herein petitioners before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) praying that he be reinstated and be paid his 13th month pay and service incentive leave credits. Issue: Was there abandonment of work by the jeepney driver?
Held: NO. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. To prove abandonment, the employer must show that the employee deliberately and unjustifiably refused to resume his employment without any intention of returning. Private respondent, after his vacation leave, immediately reported back for work but was not allowed by the petitioners on the ground that he was already replaced by regular
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drivers. After he was notified of his termination, private respondent lost no time in filing the case for illegal dismissal against petitioners. He cannot, therefore, by any reasoning, be said to have abandoned his work or had no intention of going back to work. It would be illogical for him to have left his job and later on file said complaint. We have consistently ruled that a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ALLAN VILLAR, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL.

Facts: Complainants, who were members of the Federation of Free Workers Union, filed before the Department of Labor a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of HI-TECH, a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing cartons for commercial purposes. The petition was granted and a certification election was conducted inside the company premises. However, complainants lost in the election as the HI-TECH employees voted for "No Union." Thereafter, complainants failed to report for work. They alleged that they were barred from entering the premises of HI-TECH; hence, they immediately filed before the Labor Arbiter separate complaints for illegal dismissal and labor standards claims against HI-TECH, Herman T. Go, owner, and Carmen Belano, general manager. Issue: Did complainants deliberately and unjustifiably abandon their employment or were they illegally dismissed by the management of Hi-Tech? Held: NO. It is clear from the records that immediately after complainants supposedly "refused to work" having lost earlier in the certification election, several complaints for illegal dismissal against HI-TECH were filed by complainants. These are sufficient proofs that they were never guilty of leaving their jobs. The concept of abandonment of work is inconsistent with the immediate filing of complaints for illegal dismissal. An employee who took steps to protest his layoff could not by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. Mere absence of the employee is not sufficient. The burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning rests on the employer. HI-TECH failed to discharge its burden. We conclude that complainants did not abandon their jobs but were illegally dismissed therefrom by defendant. As a consequence, they are entitled to reinstatement with full back wages, undiminished by earnings elsewhere, to be computed from their illegal dismissal to their actual reinstatement.
V.2. CESSATION OF OPERATION/ CLOSURE OF BUSINESS CHENIVER DECO PRINT TECHNICS CORP. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 122876, February 17, 2000
Facts: Petitioner informed its workers about the transfer of the company from its site in Makati to Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Petitioner decided to relocate its business in view of the
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expiration of the lease contract on the premises it occupied in Makati and the refusal of the lessor to renew the same. Earlier, the local authorities also took action to force out petitioner from Makati because of the alleged hazards petitioner's plant posed to the residents nearby. In view of the impending transfer, petitioner gave its employees up to the end of June 1992 to inform management of their willingness to go with petitioner, otherwise, it would hire replacements. On August 4, 1992, petitioner wrote its employees to report to the new location within seven days, otherwise, they would be considered to have lost interest in their work and would be replaced. Five days later, the union advised petitioner that its members are not willing to go along with the transfer to the new site. Nonetheless, petitioner gave its workers additional time within which to report to the new work place. However, not one reported for work at petitioner's new site. It appears that several employees decided not to work at the new site but just opted to be paid financial assistance offered by petitioner. The labor arbiter directed petitioner to pay private respondents their separation pay and other money claims as well as attorney's fees. Petitioner contends that the transfer of its business is neither a closure nor retrenchment, hence, separation pay should not be awarded to the private respondents. Issue: Held: Was the award of separation pay proper?
Yes, the award of separation pay was proper. It must be stressed that the phrase "closure or cessation of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or reverses" under Article 283 of the Labor Code includes both the complete cessation of all business operations and the cessation of only part of a company's business. In Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. vs. NLRC, a company transferred its tobacco processing plant in Balintawak, Quezon City to Candon, Ilocos Sur. The company therein did not actually close its entire business but merely relocated its tobacco processing and redrying operations to another place. Yet, this Court considered the transfer as closure not due to serious business losses for which the workers are entitled to separation pay. There is no doubt that petitioner has legitimate reason to relocate its plant because of the expiration of the lease contract on the premises it occupied. That is its prerogative. But even though the transfer was due to a reason beyond its control, petitioner has to accord its employees some relief in the form of severance pay. Now, let it be noted that the termination of employment by reason of closure or cessation of business is authorized under Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides: "ARTICLE 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year." Consequently, petitioner herein must pay his employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service. Since the closure of petitioner's business is not on account of serious business losses, petitioner shall give private respondents separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month or one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 127718, March 2, 2000
Facts: Petitioners were employed in the 354-hectare Patalon Coconut Estate located at Patalon, Zamboanga City. Patalon Coconut Estate was engaged in growing agricultural products and in raising livestock. In 1988, Congress enacted into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which mandated the compulsory acquisition of all covered agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries under the socalled Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to the Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Association (PEARA), a cooperative accredited by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), of which petitioners are members and co-owners. As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation of the Patalon Coconut Estate and the employment of the petitioners was severed. Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. The cooperative took over the estate. Being beneficiaries of the Patalon Coconut Estate pursuant to the CARP, the petitioners became part-owners of the land. Petitioners filed individual complaints before the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Zamboanga City, praying for their reinstatement with full backwages on the ground that they were illegally dismissed. The petitioners were represented by their labor organization, the NFL. The RAB rendered a decision dismissing the charges for lack of merit. ISSUE: Must an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because of the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes of agrarian reform, liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees? Held: NO. The closure of the Patalon Coconut Estate was not effected voluntarily by private respondents who even filed a petition to have said estate exempted from the coverage of RA 6657. Unfortunately, their petition was denied by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Since the closure was due to the act of the government to benefit the petitioners, as members of the Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Association, by making them agrarian lot beneficiaries of said estate, the petitioners are not entitled to separation pay. The termination of their employment was not caused by the private respondents. The blame, if any, for the termination of petitioners' employment can even be laid upon the petitioner-employees themselves inasmuch as they formed themselves into a cooperative, PEARA, ultimately to take over, as agrarian lot beneficiaries, of private respondents' landed estate pursuant to RA 6657. The resulting closure of the business establishment, Patalon Coconut Estate, when it was placed under CARP, occurred through no fault of the private respondents. While the Constitution provides that "the State . . . shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare", that constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy capital and management. Thus, the capital and management sectors must also be protected under a regime of justice and the rule of law.
V.3. DISEASE CRUZ vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. NO. 116384, FEBRUARY 7, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Viola Cruz was hired and employed by respondents Norkis Distributors Inc. as cashier/bookkeeper. While petitioner were busy packing up and making and inventory,
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she suddenly collapsed and was rushed to a hospital in the evening of the same day but was able to report for the work the following day. She was transferred to another hospital and was confined. She was diagnosed to be suffering from CNS infection. She stopped retuning for work. Norkis was informed by petitioners collapse. Petitioner send a letter to verify states of her employment as answer, respondent sent her a termination letter citing health reasons as cause for her dismissal. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal praying for payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, service incentives leave and others before the labor arbiter decided in her favor. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision favor. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and also denied the motion for reconsideration. Issue: Was the petitioner validly dismissed on the ground of disease?
Held: NO. Under Sec-8 Rule I Book VI of the Rules and regulations Implementing the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the employee, the continued employment of such employment is prohibited by law or Prejudicial to his health or the health of his Co- employees, and there must be certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such mature or at such a stage that is cannot be cured within a period of six months, even with proper medical treatment . Considering that in the present case, the alleged reason for the dismissal of petitioner was her illness, the private respondents have to move that their decision to terminate the services of the petitioner was reached after compliance with the aforestated requisites under Sec. 8 Private respondents having failed to substantiate the same, the dismissal of petitioner on the ground of illness cannot be upheld.
V.4. LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE CONDO SUITE CLUB TRAVEL vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 125671, January 28, 2000
Facts: Private respondent was employed by Suite Club Travel Inc. until his dismissal although he was then already performing the duties and responsibilities of a front desk supervisor in petitioner's hotel. Aside from his employment with petitioner, private respondent owned a car-for-hire, which he regularly rented to a certain Joselito Landrigan. Landrigan, in turn, operated the car as a taxi with himself as driver. On August 15, 1994, Landringan approached Editha Mariano, front desk clerk at petitioner's hotel. He requested Mariano that his alleged collectible from a certain In Hu, a Korean guest in the hotel, be included in the hotel bill of said guest. Acceding to Landrigan's request, Mariano entered the amount in the statement of account of the guest. While in Korea, Mr. Hu noticed the discrepancy between the statement of account issued by petitioner and the charge slip of his credit card. Thus, on coming back to the Philippines, he dropped by at petitioner's hotel and complained about the overbilling. In the investigation that ensued, it was shown that there was really no car accommodation as claimed by Landringan. Eventually, petitioner's staff confirmed the error in the billing of Mr. Hu. On September 26, 1994, petitioner terminated the services of private respondent on the ground of loss of confidence for the latter's malicious intent to defraud a guest of the hotel. Issue: Was there a valid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence?
Held: The fundamental guarantee of security of tenure dictates that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law, and after due process. The
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just and authorized causes are enumerated under Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. The due process requirement of notice and hearing is set-out in Article 277 (b) of the said Code. As provided for in the Labor Code: "ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: . . . (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. . . ." But it must be stressed that loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised by the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. In the case of supervisory personnel occupying positions of responsibility, this Court has repeatedly held that loss of trust and confidence justifies termination. Termination of an employment on this ground does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct. It is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. The Court, however, has repeatedly stressed that the right of an employer to dismiss employees on account of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily. Just cause must be shown, so as not to render the employee's constitutional right to security of tenure nugatory. Besides, for loss of confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, the basis thereof must arise from particular proven facts. In other words, this ground must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest; otherwise the dismissal will be rendered illegal.
ANGELITO P. DELES vs. NLRC, ET AL.

Facts: Respondent company operates a pipeline system which transports petroleum products from the refineries by Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and Shell (Phil.) Inc. in Batangas to terminal receiving facilities in Metro Manila. Petitioner was employed by respondent company as shift supervisor. He was assigned at its joint terminal facility in Pandacan, Manila, where he was the highest ranking officer at the terminal during his shift. On the night of March 19, 1993, petitioner was the shift supervisor on duty while Eduardo Yumul and Leonardo Espejon were the assigned shift operator and gauger, respectively. During this shift, there was a scheduled delivery for Shell through respondent company's pipeline of about 3,000 barrels of kerosene (KE), to be followed by a delivery of aviation turbine fuel (AV). Forthwith, petitioner instructed his chief operator (Yumul) to effect a batch change from the kerosene tank to the aviation fuel tank when the joint terminal facility turbine meter registers 2,944 barrels of kerosene delivered. Apparently, Yumul failed to execute correctly petitioner's order. Instead of effecting the batch change at the prescribed reading of 2,944 barrels, Yumul caused the batch change when the reading already reached 3,341 barrels. Thus, about 397 barrels of the succeeding batch of aviation turbine fuel went to the kerosene batch thereby downgrading the former. When informed of the incident, respondent company required petitioner to explain why he should not be charged administratively for neglect of duty in view of his failure: (a) to witness the actual batch change (b) to see to it that a batch change checklist was prepared and followed, and; (c) to see to it that a batch change report was prepared. Respondent company conducted a joint formal investigation of the cases of the three aforementioned personnel. After conducting formal investigation, respondent company terminated the employment of petitioner. Issue: Was the petitioner illegally dismissed?
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Held: NO. Petitioner challenges the legality of his dismissal from the service. He insists that respondent company has no ground to loose trust and confidence on him to justify his dismissal. It must be emphasized that loss of trust and confidence constitutes a valid ground for dismissing an employee. As provided for in the Labor Code: "ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: . . . (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. . ." Of course, it must be stressed also that loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds where an employee or official of the company is entrusted with responsibility involving delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. In the case of company personnel occupying such positions of responsibility, the Court has repeatedly held that loss of trust and confidence justifies termination. As regards a managerial employee, moreover, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. In the case at bar, petitioner is tasked to perform key functions; he is bound by an exacting work ethic. He should have realized that his position requires the full trust and confidence of his employer in every exercise of managerial discretion insofar as the conduct of his employer's business is concerned. However, as found a quo, he committed acts which betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him by tampering with very sensitive equipment at the joint terminal facility. In doing so, he exposed the terminal complex and the residents in adjacent communities to the danger of a major disaster that may be caused by tank explosions and conflagration. Verily, he committed acts inimical to the interest of his employer which is mandated by law to observe extraordinary diligence in its operations to ensure the safety of the public. Indeed, we are constrained to conclude that petitioner's admitted infraction as well his past violation of safety regulations is more than sufficient ground for respondent company to terminate the employment of petitioner.
WENIFREDO FARROL VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 133259, February 10, 2000
Facts: Petitioner was formerly employed as station cashier of respondent RCPI Cotabato City Station. During RCPIs field auditors report, it was discovered that there was a cash shortage of P 50, 985.37 of the Cotabato branch cash fund. As a result, petitioner, as station cashier was given notice to explain such cash shortage. The following day, petitioner paid to RCPI P 25,000 of the cash shortage with the explanation that the missing funds were previously used sometime in June 1993 to pay the retirement benefits of RCPIs employees after due notice thereof was given by his district manager to the main office. Several days thereafter, several sums were advanced by petitioner as payment of the cash shortage. Nevertheless, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by the company and was thereafter terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. As the case remained unresolved before the grievance committee for more than 2 years, the conflict was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The voluntary arbitrator ruled in favor of petitioner ruling that he was illegally dismissed by the company from employment. However, on appeal, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
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Issue: Was the dismissal of the petitioner on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is valid? Held: No. The dismissal is illegal. A perusal of RCPI'S dismissal notice reveals that it merely stated a conclusion to the effect that the withholding was deliberately done to hide alleged malversation or misappropriation without, however, stating the facts and circumstances in support thereof. It further mentioned that the position of cashier requires utmost trust and confidence but failed to allege the breach of trust on the part of petitioner and how the alleged breach was committed. On the assumption that there was indeed a breach, there is no evidence that petitioner was a managerial employee of respondent RCPI. It should be noted that the term "trust and confidence" is restricted to managerial employees. It may not even be presumed that when there is a shortage, there is also a corresponding breach of trust. Cash shortages in a cashier's work may happen, and when there is no proof that the same was deliberately done for a fraudulent or wrongful purpose, it cannot constitute breach of trust so as to render the dismissal from work invalid. Assuming further that there was breach of trust and confidence, it appears that this is the first infraction committed by petitioner. Although the employer has the prerogative to discipline or dismiss its employee, such prerogative cannot be exercised wantonly, but must be controlled by substantive due process and tempered by the fundamental policy of protection to labor enshrined in the Constitution. Infractions committed by an employee should merit only the corresponding sanction demanded by the circumstances. The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee and imposed in connection with the employer's disciplinary authority. RCPI alleged that under its rules, petitioner's infraction is punishable by dismissal. However, employer's rules cannot preclude the State from inquiring whether the strict and rigid application or interpretation thereof would be harsh to the employee. Petitioner has no previous record in his twenty-four long years of service this would have been his first offense. The Court thus holds that the dismissal imposed on petitioner is unduly harsh and grossly disproportionate to the infraction which led to the termination of his services. A lighter penalty would have been more just, if not humane.
VIRGINIA G. RAMORAN vs. JARDINE CMG LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY G.R. No. 131943 , February 22, 2000
Facts: On December 18, 1993, Yolanda S. Carreon, HRD Clerk, together with Amelia F. Castillo, HRD Assistant, in the course of preparing and post-auditing payroll payments, noticed some irregularities in the overtime slips, dated December 6 and December 14, 1993, submitted by petitioner. On February 1, 1994, respondent Jardine conducted an administrative investigation concerning petitioner. On April 4, 1994, petitioner was terminated from employment for violation of Rule 32 of the Company Rules and Regulations penalizing with dismissal, the offense of "falsification of personnel, medical and other company records" in pursuit of personal gain. Jardine filed a complaint on July 19, 1994 against petitioner for violation of Article 172 in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 6 of the Revised Penal Code. On December 28, 1995, the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators rendered a decision of even date, upholding the termination of petitioner's employment and denying her claim for moral and exemplary damages. On May 14, 1996, Judge Maximo Contreras, Presiding Judge of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, rendered a decision convicting petitioner in one of the cases and acquiting her of the other because her alleged guilt was not satisfactorily shown. Petitioner questioned her conviction in before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City which
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subsequently rendered a decision reversing petitioner's conviction. Believing that the decision of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators may now be overturned following her acquittal in the two criminal cases filed against her, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing said decision. The CA denied due course to the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration later filed. Issue: Can an employee who has been dismissed due to lost of trust, entitled to reinstatement upon his acquittal in a criminal action? Held: No. Entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies are accorded great respect and, at times, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. "That the panel reached the conclusion it did is a product of evidentiary standard before quasi-judicial bodies. Dismissal on the basis of loss of trust and confidence calls for substantial evidence only . . . defined as the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion . . . . It does not demand proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct. . . . As pointed out by the panel, the petitioner submitted the case for decision without any evidence, documentary or testimonial, other than her own allegations, adopting only as her proof the overtime authorization slips involved. It should be noted that the panel did not have the benefit of examining the other evidence apparently adduced by RAMORAN in the criminal prosecution and there is no showing that the evidence in the latter proceeding was ever introduced before the panel. The voluntary arbitrators, therefore, cannot be faulted for so deciding based on the evidence made available to them. It cannot even be said that they disregarded the result of the criminal proceedings, for the judgment of acquittal came after they had rendered the decision. Be that as it may, even if the trial court found the same documentary evidence to be inadequate to sustain Ramoran's conviction, by no means does it prevent the panel from considering the evidence sufficient to warrant dismissal, inasmuch as: 'the fact that the employee has been absolved in a criminal prosecution involving said misconduct does not preclude the employer from attempting to prove the same before the labor arbiter or the latter from accepting that evidence as sufficient foundation for a finding of lawful termination from employment. . . .'
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 126805, March 16, 2000.
Facts: Private respondent Marcelito Pescante and another PAL employee, Edgar Vicente, were assigned to handle petitioner's flight PR 841 bound for Cebu as load controller and check-in clerk, respectively. It appears that Vicente reflected a lighter weight of baggage on Cominero's ticket to make it appear that the same was within the allowable level. Cominero's excess baggage was pooled with other passengers with lesser baggage weight or no baggage at all. After checking-in, Cominero left. When questioned, Cominero insisted that she had paid one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos as excess baggage charges at the check-in counter although she was not issued any receipt when the anomaly was discovered, Vicente hastily went to the cashier, Loreto Condez, to pay the excess baggage fee. On January 29, 1993, petitioner filed an administrative case against private respondent and Vicente with "fraud against the company" as defined under petitioner's Code of Discipline. Accordingly, private respondent and Vicente submitted their respective affidavits in answer to the charge. After several hearings, both were found guilty as charged and were meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. Private respondent filed before the labor arbiter, a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, damages and attorney's fees. The NLRC declared that the alleged defrauding of petitioner's excess baggage revenue was not the handiwork of private respondent.
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Issue: Is material damage necessary for the validity and legality of dismissal due to loss of trust and confidence? Held: NO. There is substantial evidence showing that private respondent had direct involvement in the illegal pooling of baggage. First, private respondent urged Pelayo to checkin Cominero by proxy. Failing to convince Pelayo, he chided the latter by saying "Pare ang laki naman yata ng daga mo sa dibdib", and then called Vicente who in turn willingly cooperated in checking-in Cominero. Second, when the anomaly was uncovered, private respondent approached Sgt. Tompong and said, "Sarge, pakibalik mo na lang ang pera dahil mayroon itong problema". Third, private respondent handed the money amounting to P1,000.00 to Vicente, which the latter used to pay the excess baggage fee. Fourth, private respondent instructed Vicente to call a fellow load controller in Mactan airport to intercept Cominero and fix the matter. Fifth, private respondent did not report the matter to his supervisors although it is the practice whenever one is confronted with situation of the same nature. Surely, had the irregularity not been accidentally discovered, private respondent would have enriched himself at the expense of petitioner. Worth mentioning at this point is the failure of the private respondent to refute the oral testimony of Vicente during the clarificatory hearing on March 25, 1993, conducted by the Administrative Panel, which convincingly shows the actual participation of the private respondent in the commission of fraud against the petitioner. Obviously, private respondent's act is inexcusable as it constitutes a serious offense under petitioner's Code of Discipline. The fact that petitioner failed to show it suffered losses in revenue as a consequence of private respondent's questioned act is immaterial. It must be stressed that actual defraudation is not necessary in order that an employee may be held liable under the aforequoted rule. That private respondent attempted to deprive petitioner of its lawful revenue is already tantamount to fraud against the company, which warrants dismissal from the service.
V.5. SERIOUS MISCONDUCT RUFINO NORBERTO F. SAMSON vs. NLRC, et. al. G.R. No. 121035, April 12, 2000
Facts: Complainant was placed under an indefinite preventive suspension on 25 January 1994'; and was arbitrarily and summarily terminated from employment on 03 February 1994 on ground of loss of confidence.' As culled from the records of the instant case, what really precipitated complainant's preventive suspension culminating to his dismissal is the incident that took place on December 17, 1993. In a letter dated 25 January 1994 addressed to the complainant Mr. Samson signed by one J.L. Estingor, the latter called the attention of the complainant's conduct in a manner inimical to the interests of SPC. The labor arbiter rendered his Decision, dated 25 August 1994, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal. The labor arbiter ruled that petitioner's conduct is not so serious as to warrant his. Petitioner filed a partial appeal of the denial of his claim for holiday pay and the cash equivalent of the rice subsidy. In reversing the labor arbiter's decision, the NLRC found that there was just cause, i.e., gross misconduct, for petitioner's dismissal. Issue: Was there grave misconduct sufficient to warrant dismissal? Held: NO. To constitute valid dismissal, two (2) requisites must be met: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself.
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Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause for his separation. In this case, the alleged misconduct of petitioner, when viewed in its context, is not of such serious and grave character as to warrant his dismissal. First, petitioner made the alleged offensive utterances and obscene gesture during an informal Christmas gathering of respondent company's district sales managers and marketing staff. The gathering was just a casual get-together of employees. It is to be expected during this kind of gatherings, where tongues are more often than not loosened by liquor or other alcoholic beverages, that employees freely express their grievances and gripes against their employers. Employees should be allowed wider latitude to freely express their sentiments during these kinds of occasions which are beyond the disciplinary authority of the employer. Significantly, it does not appear in the records that petitioner possessed any ascendancy over the employees who heard his utterances as to cause demoralization in the ranks. Second, petitioner's outburst was in reaction to the decision of the management in the "Cua Lim" case. Admittedly, using the words "bullshit" and "putang ina" and making lewd gesture to express his dissatisfaction over said management decision were clearly in bad taste but these acts were not intended to malign or cast aspersion on the person of respondent company's president and general manager.
V.6. VIOLATION OF COMPANY RULES/ POLICIES AND REGULATIONS VH MANUFACTURING vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 130957, January 19, 2000
Facts: Since November 5, 1985 private respondent was employed in petitioners business of manufacturing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. He served as a quality control inspector with the principal duty of inspecting LPG cylinders for any possible defects and earning P155.00 a day. His service with the company was abruptly interrupted on February 14, 1995, when he was served a notice of termination of his employment. His dismissal stemmed from an incident on February 10, 1995 wherein petitioners company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco, allegedly caught private respondent sleeping on the job. On that same day, private respondent was asked through a written notice from the petitioners Personnel Department to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his violation of Company Rule 15-b which provides for a penalty of separation for sleeping during working hours. Issue: Was there a valid dismissal based on the company rules and regulations? Held: NO. The petitioners reliance on the authorities it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal, is misplaced. The authorities cited involved security guards whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times inasmuch as their function, to use the words in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, is "to protect the company from pilferage or loss." Accordingly, the doctrine laid down in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar. While an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the case at
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bar, the dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job, under the attendant circumstances, appears to be too harsh a penalty, considering that he was being held liable for first time, after nine (9) long years of unblemished service, for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to the employer, aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense. The authorities cited by petitioner are also irrelevant for the reason that there is no evidence on the depravity of conduct, willfulness of the disobedience, or conclusiveness of guilt on the part of private respondent. Neither was it shown that private respondents alleged negligence or neglect of duty, if any, was gross and habitual. Thus, reinstatement is just and proper.
V.7. MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE OSS SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES VS. NLRC G.R. NO. 112752, February 9,2000
Facts: Respondent was formerly employed as a lady security guard of OSS Security Agency. As a lady guard, she was assigned to render security services to the different clients of petitioner company. She was last assigned at the VM Condominium II in Makati. As the building administrator of the said condominium complained of the laxity of the guards in enforcing security measures, it requested the petitioner to replace the guards assigned to it. In compliance therewith, petitioner relieved respondent of their assignment therein and reassigned them to Minami International Corporation in Taytay, Rizal. However, respondent did not report for duty at her new assignment. A few days thereafter, respondent filed a complaint against the company for constructive dismissal. Issue: Was the transfer of assignment of private respondent by petitioner was illegal and is tantamount to unjust dismissal? Held: NO. Service-oriented enterprises, such as petitioner's business of providing security services, generally adhere to the business adage that "the customer or client is always right". To satisfy the interests, conform to the needs, and cater to the whims and wishes of its clients, along with its zeal to gain substantial returns on its investments, employers adopt means designed towards these ends. These are called management prerogatives in which the free will of management to conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose, takes form. Accordingly, an employer can regulate, generally without restraint, according to its own discretion and judgment, every aspect of business. In the case at bench, nowhere in the record does it show that that the transfer of private respondent was anything but done in good faith, without grave abuse of discretion, and in the best interest of the business enterprise. First. No malice should be imputed from the fact that private respondent was relieved of her assignment and, a day later, assigned a new post. We must bear in mind that, unlike other contracts of service, the availability of assignment for security guards is primarily at heart subservient to the contracts entered into by the security agency with its client-third parties. As such, being sidelined temporarily is a standard stipulation in employment contracts. When a security guard is placed "off detail" or on "floating" status, in security agency parlance, it means "waiting to be posted." Private respondent has not even been "off detail" for a week when she filed her complaint. Second. Evidence is wanting to support the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that petitioner discriminated against private respondent when it ordered her relief and transfer of assignment. Petitioner proved that such transfer was effected in good faith to comply with the reasonable request of its client, for a more disciplined service of the security guards on detail. Besides, a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment relationship between a security
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guard and her agency. Neither was the transfer for any ulterior design, such as to rid itself of an undesirable worker or to penalize an employee for his union activities and thereby defeat his right to self-organization. Third. But the mere fact that it would be inconvenient for her, as she has been assigned to VM Condominium II for a number of years, does not by itself make her transfer illegal. Even private respondent admitted that she was assigned to render security service to the different clients of petitioner. An employee has a right to security of tenure, but this does not give her such a vested right in her position as would deprive petitioner of its prerogative to change her assignment or transfer her where her service, as security guard, will be most beneficial to the client.
DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs. DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA), ET AL. G.R. No. 109002 & 110072, April 12,2000
Facts: Petitioner-UNIVERSITY and respondent-UNION, which is composed of regular nonacademic rank and file employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a life span of three (3) years. During the freedom period, the Union initiated negotiations with the University for a new collective bargaining agreement which, however, turned out to be unsuccessful, hence, the Union filed a Notice of Strike. Thereafter, a partial collective bargaining agreement was executed by the parties and subsequently, they entered into a Submission Agreement, identifying the remaining six (6) unresolved issues for arbitration, one of which is the propriety of the Unions proposal for the use of last-in-first-out method in case of lay-off, termination due to retrenchment and transfer of employees xxx. Issue: Is the Unions proposal proper and tenable? Held: NO. While the Union relies on social justice and equity to support its proposition, and submits that the Universitys prerogative to select and/or choose the employees it will hire is limited, either by law or agreement, especially where the exercise of this prerogative might result in the loss of employment, the Court ruled that as an exercise of management prerogative, the University has the right to adopt valid and equitable grounds as basis for terminating or transferring employees. As has been consistently upheld in our jurisdiction, that except as provided for, or limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment.
Facts: Petitioner was an employee by private respondent corporation until he was terminated for alleged violation of company rules and regulations, which was premised from the fact that, sometime prior his termination, petitioner while driving without drivers license sideswiped a ten-year old girl using the companys truck. Hospital expenses was shouldered by the company but was not reimbursed by the insurance company. Thereafter, private respondent conducted an investigation of the incident where petitioner was given the
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opportunity to explain his side and to defend himself, and in result thereof, petitioner was dismissed from employment for having violated the company rules and regulations for blatant disregard of established control procedures resulting in company damages of considerable amount. Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a case for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter. Issue: Is the dismissal valid and lawful?
Held: YES. Petitioners dismissal was justified by the companys rules and regulations. It is recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably through negotiation, by competent authority. The Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. Also, under the Labor Code, in order that an employer may dismiss an employee on the ground of willful disobedience, there must be concurrence of at least two requisites: the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Which are present in this case, as evidenced by the willful act of petitioner in driving without a valid driver's license, which is a clear violation of the companys rules and regulations.
AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED (AKELCO) vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 121439, January 25, 2000
Facts: Complainants alleged that prior to the temporary transfer of the office of AKELCO from Lezo Aklan to Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan, complainants were continuously performing their task and were duly paid of their salaries at their main office located at Lezo, Aklan. That on January 22, 1992, by way of resolution of the Board of Directors of AKELCO allowed the temporary transfer holding of office at Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan per information by their Project Supervisor, Atty. Leovigildo Mationg, that their head office is closed and that it is dangerous to hold office thereat; Nevertheless, majority of the employees including herein complainants continued to report for work at Lezo Aklan and were paid of their salaries. That on February 6, 1992, the administrator of NEA, Rodrigo Cabrera, wrote a letter addressed to the Board of AKELCO, that he is not interposing any objections to the action taken by respondent Mationg . . . That on February 11, 1992, unnumbered resolution was passed by the Board of AKELCO withdrawing the temporary designation of office at Kalibo, Aklan, and that the daily operations must be held again at the main office of Lezo, Aklan; 4 That complainants who were then reporting at the Lezo office from January 1992 up to May 1992 were duly paid of their salaries, while in the meantime some of the employees through the instigation of respondent Mationg continued to remain and work at Kalibo, Aklan; That from June 1992 up to March 18, 1993, complainants who continuously reported for work at Lezo, Aklan in compliance with the aforementioned resolution were not paid their salaries; That on March 19, 1993 up to the present, complainants were again allowed to draw their salaries; with the exception of a few complainants who were not paid their salaries for the months of April and May 1993; On February 25, 1994, a decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter Dennis D. Juanon dismissing the complaints. 5
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Dissatisfied with the decision, private respondents appealed to the respondent Commission. On appeal, the NLRC's Fourth Division, Cebu City, 6 reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and held that private respondents are entitled to unpaid wages from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993 Issue: Did the Employer exercised its management prerogative validly?
Held: Yes. The employer as owner of the business, also has inherent rights, among which are the right to select the persons to be hired and discharge them for just and valid cause; to promulgate and enforce reasonable employment rules and regulations and to modify, amend or revoke the same; to designate the work as well as the employee or employees to perform it; to transfer or promote employees; to schedule, direct, curtail or control company operations; to introduce or install new or improved labor or money savings methods, facilities or devices; to create, merge, divide, reclassify and abolish departments or positions in the company and to sell or close the business. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.
V.8. ILLEGAL DISMISSAL PHIL. AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE UNITED CORP. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000
Facts: Private respondent was a company nurse of petitioner corporation until her termination grounded on serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud and willful breach of trust, for allegedly throwing a stapler at her superior, and uttering invectives against him; for losing an amount of money entrusted to her by her superior; for asking a coemployee to punch-in her time card; and for delaying the processing of ATM applications of her officemates. Private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal. Issue: Is private respondents dismissal valid?
Held: NO. The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee, has ruled that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. Thus, in order to consider it a serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. In this case, the acts complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a nurse and the company failed to prove private respondents neglect or willful act. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. The negligence, to warrant removal from service, should not merely be gross but also habitual. Likewise, the ground "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest. All these requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence are wanting in the case at bar.
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RICARDO S. MEDENILLA,et al.vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, RENAN V. SANTOS, PACIFICO U. CERVANTES, LOIS OLARTE G.R. No. 127673, March 13, 2000
Facts: Petitioners were employees of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). Their services were terminated as a result of the liquidation of PVB pursuant to the order of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank embodied in MB Resolution No. 612. On the same day of their termination, petitioners were rehired through PVB's Bank Liquidator, Antonio T. Castro, Jr. However, all of them were required to sign employment contracts which provided that: (1) The employment shall be strictly on a temporary basis and only for the duration of the particular undertaking for which a particular employee is hired; (2) Such temporary employment will not entitle an employee to any benefits except those granted by law; (3) The Liquidator reserves the right to terminate the services of the employee at any time during the period of such employment if the employee is found not qualified, competent or, efficient in the performance of his job, or have violated any rules and regulations, or such circumstances and conditions recognized by law. Later on, petitioners received a uniform notice of dismissal effective a month from the date of receipt, which notice contained the reasons justifying the termination: The petitioners instituted a case for illegal dismissal before Honorable Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo. The said Labor Arbiter came out with a decision declaring petitioners' dismissal illegal. Respondent Bank appealed the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the Complaints for lack of merit. The petitioners presented a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. The same was denied by the NLRC. Thus, the said decision became final and executory. Issue: 1. Did the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there was a valid fixed-period of employment? 2. Did the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was illegal dismissal? Held: 1. NO. There is tenability in the contention of the respondents that the employment of petitioners was really for a fixed-period. As can be gleaned from the said case, the two guidelines by which fixed contracts of employment can be said NOT to circumvent security of tenure, are either: a) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or b) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter. The employment contract entered into by the parties herein appears to have observed the said guidelines. Furthermore, it is evident from the records that the subsequent re-hiring of petitioners which was to continue during the period of liquidation and the process of liquidation ended prior to the enactment of RA 7169. 2. YES. The reason given by the Liquidator for the termination of petitioners' employment was "in line with the need of the objective of the Supervision and Examination Sector, Department V, Central Bank of the Philippines, to reduce costs and expenses in the liquidation of closed banks in order to protect the interest of the depositors, creditors and stockholders. In cases of illegal dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that there was a valid ground for dismissal. Mere allegation of reduction of costs without any proof to substantiate the same cannot be given credence by the Court. As the respondents failed to
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rebut petitioners' evidence, the irresistible conclusion is that the dismissal in question was illegal. Since findings by the Labor Arbiter are binding on this Court if supported by substantial evidence, the Court rules that there was illegal dismissal absent just cause, which is one of the facets of a dismissal. Such illegal dismissal warrants reinstatement and payment of backwages. However, since petitioners' reinstatement is now considered impractical because the new Philippine Veterans Bank has been rehabilitated by virtue of RA 7169, the Court limits the relief to be granted to the petitioners to the unpaid wages during the remaining period of their employment contract.
VH MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and HERMINIO C. GAMIDO, respondents. G.R. No. 130957, January 19, 2000
Facts: Since November 5, 1985 private respondent was employed in petitioner's business of manufacturing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. His service with the company was abruptly interrupted on February 14, 1995, when he was served a notice of termination of his employment. His dismissal stemmed from an incident on February 10, 1995 wherein petitioner's company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco, allegedly caught private respondent sleeping on the job. Public respondent found and declared that the petitioner's allegation that private respondent slept on the job on February 10, 1995 was not proven and, as a result, there was no just and valid cause for his dismissal, and that even if there was, the penalty of dismissal was too harsh a punishment for violation of petitioner's Company Rule 15-b. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that the dismissal was not anchored on a just and valid cause, and that the same was too harsh a penalty for violation of a company rule. Held: NO. In termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause. What is at stake here is not only the job itself of the employee but also his regular income therefrom which is the means of livelihood of his family. Petitioner's claim that private respondent slept on the job on February 10, 1995 was not substantiated by any convincing evidence other than the bare allegation of petitioner. Petitioner's reliance on the authorities it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal, is misplaced. The authorities cited involved security guards whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times inasmuch as their function, to use the words in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, is "to protect the company from pilferage or loss." While an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the case at bar, the dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job, under the attendant circumstances, appears to be too harsh a penalty, considering that he was being held liable for first time, after nine (9) long years of unblemished service, for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to the employer, aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense.
DANIEL LEONARDO ET.AL. v NLRC GR NO.125303, JUNE 16,2000
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Facts: Complainant AURELIO FUERTE was originally employed by defendant REYNALDO'S MARKETING CORPORATION as a muffler specialist, receiving P45.00 per day. He was later appointed as supervisor with an increased compensation of P122.00 a day. On the other hand, DANILO LEONARDO was hired by defendant as an auto-aircon mechanic at a salary rate of P35.00 per day. His pay was increased to P90.00 a day when he attained regular status six months later. Complainant alleges that he was instructed to report defendant's main office where he was informed by the company's personnel manager that he would be transferred to its Sucat plant due to his failure to meet his sales quota, and for that reason, his supervisor's allowance would be withdrawn. For a short time, complainant reported for work at the Sucat plant; however, he protested his transfer, subsequently filing a complaint for illegal termination. On his part, LEONARDO alleges that defendant was approached by the same personnel manager who informed him that his services were no longer needed. He, too, filed a complaint for illegal termination. Issue: Were the complainants illegally dismissed? Held: NO. The practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed to make the work quota has been recognized in this jurisdiction. (Philippine American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA 634, 639) . In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest.
V.9. CONSEQUENCES OF TERMINATION SERRANO VS. NLRC AND ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000
Facts: Defendant Isetann Department Store moves for reconsideration of the decision in this case insofar as it is ordered to pay complainant full backwages from the time the latter's employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time it is determined that the termination of employment is for an authorized cause. The decision is based on defendants failure to give complainant a written notice of termination at least thirty (30) days before the termination of his employment as required by Art. 283 the Labor Code. Defendant argues that payment of thirty (30) days pay in lieu of the thirty (30) days prior formal notice is more advantageous to an employee because instead of being required to work for thirty (30) days, the employee can look for another job while being paid by the company. Issue: Was the employers failure to accord the twin requirements of notice and hearing before dismissing an employee for a just or authorized cause renders the dismissal ineffectual? Held: YES. It is mandatory for an employer to accord to the supposed errant or unwanted worker the legal requirements of written notice of the specific reason for the retrenchment and eventual termination of complainant and he should have been given a chance to present his side, otherwise, the worker's security of tenure would be at the pleasure of the employer. The
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purpose of such previous notice is to give the employee some time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job as well as the DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the verity of the alleged authorized cause of termination. Such purpose would not be served by the simple expedient of paying thirty (30) days salary in lieu of notice of an employees pending dismissal, as by then the loss of employment would have been a fait accompli. Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an employee for any of the authorized causes the employer must serve a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In the case at bar, petitioner was given a notice of termination on October 11, 1991, on the same day, his services were terminated. He was thus denied his right to be given written notice before the termination of his employment. In Sebuguero vs. NLRC, the Supreme Court held: It is now settled that where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and so proven to be, but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be liable for damages for non-compliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process. The rule reversed a long standing policy; that even though the dismissal is based on a just cause or the termination of the employment is for an authorized cause, the dismissal or termination is illegal if effected without notice to the employee. The shift in doctrine took place in 1989 in Wenphil Corp. vs. NLRC. However, the Supreme Court noted that if the Wenphil rule imposing a fine on an employer who is found to have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice is deemed ineffective in deterring employer violations of the notice requirement, the remedy is not to declare the dismissal void if there are just or valid grounds for such dismissals or if the termination is for an authorized cause. The remedy is to order the payment to the employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for just cause. For the same reason, if an employee is laid off for any of the causes in Art 283-284, but the employer did not give him and the DOLE a 30 day written notice of termination in advance, then the termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual and he should be paid backwages. However, the termination of his employment should not be considered void but he should simply be paid separation pay as in Art. 283 in addition to backwages. Thus, if the dismissal is with a valid cause he should be given only a separation pay, on the other hand, If the employee's separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or only granted separation pay, he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance. On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the just causes mentioned in said Art 282, then, in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his employment without legal effect.
V.10. SEPARATION PAY ALEMAR'S SIBAL & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NLM-KATIPUNAN (representing the group of CHARITO ALIMORONG), respondents. G.R. No. 114761, January 19, 2000
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Facts: On April 29, 1985, Labor Arbiter Emilio V. Pealosa rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one-half () month pay for every year of service. On December 23, 1985, the Research and Information Unit of the NLRC submitted its computation of the separation pay due to private respondent, which amounted to a total of P207,365.33. On January 4, 1988, private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a motion for execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. At the hearing held on April 19, 1988, petitioner and private respondent agreed to the computation of the separation pay. Thus, Labor Arbiter Jose de Vera directed petitioner to pay the agreed amount of P20,736.53 representing 10% of the total amount of the separation pay due the complainants on May 16, 1988. On June 10, 1988, the Rehabilitation Receiver of petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion, alleging that petitioner was not yet in a position to comply with the directive of Labor Arbiter de Vera for the reason that it was still under Rehabilitation Receivership by virtue of the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) dated August 1, 1984. Thus, it sought deferment of such payment until the SEC will issue an order formally approving the rehabilitation of petitioner and allowing complainants to file their claims with the Rehabilitation Receiver. Due to the failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay the first batch of complainants their separation pay, the Labor Arbiter granted the motion for execution of private respondent in an order dated July 18, 1988. Issue: Does the stay of execution of monetary award justified in this case because of the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending all claims against petitioner pending before any court, tribunal or body? Held: NO. Petitioner pointed out that the SEC's order suspending all claims against it pending before any other court, tribunal or body was pursuant to the rehabilitation receivership proceedings. Such order was necessary to enable the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company. 18 Since receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner's rehabilitation receiver and liquidator has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been rendered functus officio. Thus, there is no legal impediment for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of separation pay. Considering that petitioner's monetary obligation to private respondent is long overdue and that petitioner has signified its willingness to comply with such obligation by entering into an agreement with private respondent as to the amount and manner of payment, petitioner can not delay satisfaction of private respondent's claim. However, due to events subsequent to the filing of this petition, private respondent must present its claim with the rehabilitation receiver and liquidator of petitioner, subject to the rules on preference of credits.
V.11. RULES OF PROCEDURE IN LABOR CASES/DUE PROCESS BALAGTAS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
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Facts: Petitioners appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but did not post either a cash or surety bond. 2 Instead, they filed a MANIFESTATION and MOTION, stating, among others, that under Article 62(7) of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, 3 petitioners are exempt from putting up a bond in an appeal from the decision of an inferior court. On July 20, 1998, the NLRC issued an Order requiring petitioners to post a cash or surety bond. The NLRC justified its order as follows: The matter of posting a cash or surety bond is mandated by law of which respondents are presumed to be aware. Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715 and pursuant to Sections 3 and 6, Rule VI of the 1990 New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, provides that: SECTION 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. (a) the appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rules; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rules. . . . (Emphasis supplied). SECTION 6. Bond. In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator . . ., involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company . . . . Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition. Issue: Was the dismissal by the CA is proper?
Held: NO. It bears stressing that the petition before the Court of Appeals did not involve the validity of respondent's dismissal from employment. The only issue raised before the Court of Appeals is whether petitioners are exempt from posting a cash or surety bond. The motion for reconsideration, the financial statement, the complaint (sumbong), the position papers and the resignation letter of respondent though mentioned in the petition, are therefore hardly material, relevant or pertinent thereto or to the resolution of the issue therein. Clearly, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners for their failure to attach these documents. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the financial statement is material to the question of petitioners' exemption from the posting of bond as a requisite for the perfection of its appeal. In this connection therefore, the aforesaid cooperative is entitled for exemption as provided for under Article 62 (7) of R.A. 6938 otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the submission of said financial statement together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.
ANGEL JARDIN, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL. G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners were drivers of private respondent, Philjama International Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of "Goodman Taxi." Petitioners used to drive private respondent's taxicabs every other day on a 24-hour work schedule under the boundary system. Under this arrangement, the petitioners earned an average of P400.00 daily. Nevertheless, private respondent admittedly regularly deducts from petitioners' daily earnings the amount of P30.00 supposedly for the washing of the taxi units. Believing that the deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect their rights and interests. Upon learning about the plan of petitioners, private respondent refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs when they reported for work and on succeeding days. Petitioners suspected that they were singled out because they were the leaders and active members of the proposed union.
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Petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint against private respondent for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees. The labor arbiter dismissed said complaint for lack of merit. Issue: Does NLRC have jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's second motion for reconsideration, which is admittedly a pleading prohibited under the NLRC rules, and to grant the same on grounds not even invoked therein? Held: NO. In labor cases, this Court has declared in several instances that disregarding rules it is bound to observe constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of labor tribunal. In this case before us, private respondent exhausted administrative remedy available to it by seeking reconsideration of public respondent's decision dated April 28, 1994, which public respondent denied. With this motion for reconsideration, the labor tribunal had ample opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. Thus, when private respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, public respondent should have forthwith denied it in accordance with Rule 7, Section 14 of its New Rules of Procedure which allows only one motion for reconsideration from the same party, thus: "SECTION 14.Motions for Reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished within the reglementary period the adverse party and provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained." The rationale for allowing only one motion for reconsideration from the same party is to assist the parties in obtaining an expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor cases. For obvious reasons, delays cannot be countenanced in the resolution of labor disputes. The dispute may involve no less than the livelihood of an employee and that of his loved ones who are dependent upon him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine, and education. It may as well involve the survival of a business or an industry. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the second motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent is indubitably a prohibited pleading which should have not been entertained at all. Public respondent cannot just disregard its own rules on the pretext of "satisfying the ends of justice", especially when its disposition of a legal controversy ran afoul with a clear and long standing jurisprudence in this jurisdiction as elucidated in the subsequent discussion. Clearly, disregarding a settled legal doctrine enunciated by this Court is not a way of rectifying an error or mistake. In our view, public respondent gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance and granting private respondent's second motion for reconsideration as it wrecks the orderly procedure in seeking reliefs in labor cases.
ELIZABETH SUBLAY vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 130104, January 31, 2000
Facts: The Labor Arbiter ordered private respondent EURO-SWISS to pay petitioner her separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service or a total of P50,400.00. On 9 December 1996 petitioner appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On the basis of the facts established by the NLRC, petitioner's counsel of record Atty. Gabriel Marquez received the Labor Arbiter's decision on 21 November 1996, hence, she had until 2 December 1996 (1 December 1996 being a Sunday) within which to appeal. However, petitioner through Atty. Raymond Paolo Alikpala filed her appeal only on 9 December 1996 or seven (7) days late; consequently, the NLRC dismissed her appeal.
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Issue:
Did the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioners appeal on mere technicality?
Held: NO. It is doctrinally well-entrenched that the perfection of appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court or body of the legal authority to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain, the appeal. It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. Such does not obtain in this case. The rule is that when a party is represented by two (2) or more lawyers, notice to one (1) suffices as a notice to the party represented by him. Hence, the Labor Arbiter was not in error when he served a copy of the decision only on Atty. Marquez who after all was still the counsel of record when the decision was rendered. Likewise petitioner cannot claim that although Atty. Marquez was not asked to formally withdraw he has for all intents and purposes withdrawn because, by failing to actively represent petitioner, he virtually relinquished his responsibility over the case to Atty. Alikpala. The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that clients are bound by the action of their counsel in the conduct of their case. Otherwise, if the lawyer's mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.
Facts: Petitioner was an employee by private respondent corporation until he was terminated for alleged violation of company rules and regulations, which was premised from the fact that, sometime prior his termination, petitioner while driving without drivers license sideswiped a ten-year old girl using the companys truck. Hospital expenses was shouldered by the company but was not reimbursed by the insurance company. Thereafter, private respondent conducted an investigation of the incident where petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and to defend himself, and in result thereof, petitioner was dismissed from employment for having violated the company rules and regulations for blatant disregard of established control procedures resulting in company damages of considerable amount. Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a case for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter. Issue: Is the dismissal effected with the observance of due process?
Held: YES . Entrenched is the rule that the essence of due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. In labor cases, the filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfill the requirements of due process. In this case, petitioner was fully aware that he was being investigated for his involvement in a vehicular accident and its corresponding sanctions under the companys rules and regulations, so that he should have taken it upon himself to present evidence to lessen his culpability.
V.12. JURISDICTION ABBOTT LABORATORIES PHIL. VS. ABBOTT LAB. EMPLOYEES UNION G.R. No. 131374, January 26, 2000
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Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of the Certificate of Registration of the respondent union in the Regional Office of the Bureau of Labor Relations. The Regional Director decreed the cancellation of the Unions certificate of registration. The Bureau of Labor Relations, on appeal, reversed the decision of the Regional Director. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The latter refused to act on petitioners appeal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Bureau of labor relations on appeals in cancellation cases emanating from the Regional Offices. Issue: Is the Secretary of Labor and Employment empowered to review the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Regional Director in cases involving cancellations of certificates of registrations of labor unions. Held: NO. The Secretary of Labor and Employers refusal to take cognizance of ALEUs appeal from the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations is in accordance with the provisions of Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended by Department Order No. 09. The rule governing petitions for cancellation of registration of any legitimate labor organization or worker association, as it now stands, provides: SECTION 4. Action on the petition; appeals The Regional or Bureau Director, as the case may be, shall have thirty (30) days from submission of the case for resolution within which to resolve the petition. The decision of the Regional or Bureau Director may be appealed to the Bureau of the Secretary, as the case may be, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the aggrieved party on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or any violation of these Rules. The Bureau or the Secretary shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the records of the case within which to decide the appeal. The decision of the Bureau or the Secretary shall be final and executory. Clearly, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of ABBOTT. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of its exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction over decisions of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate power to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel the unions certificate of registration, said decisions being final and inappealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL DEVT. CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 112139, January 31, 2000
Facts: Private respondent alleges that the suit filed before the trial court is for the purpose of securing the upgrading of the Guard Service Contract entered into by herein petitioner and private respondent in June 1983. The enforcement of this written contract does not fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRC because the money claims involved therein did not arise from employer-employee relations between the parties and is intrinsically a civil dispute. Thus, jurisdiction lies with the regular courts. Private respondent further contends that petitioner is estopped or barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time before the Supreme Court after having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the regular courts below and having lost its case therein. Issue: Does the NLRC had the jurisdiction to resolve the issue?
Held: NO. We agree with the respondent that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employerPage 78
employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended enumerated the cases wherein the labor arbiters exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite; and there is none in this case .
V.13. JURISDICTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORMS UNDER THE CARP LAW (R.A. 6657) HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 109992,March 7, 2000
Facts: The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989. In accordance with said levy on execution, the subject land was sold at public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos, now substituted by his heirs represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia Vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50. On April 1, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless." The DARAB then issued an order allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board. On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Also, the Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue raised in the above-mentioned complaint. Intervenor Pantaleon Antonio subsequently filed with the DARAB a Motion to Withdraw Intervenor's deposited share. The motion was granted and he was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of P 174,600.00 harvest proceeds. Corollarily, the DARAB recognized Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted agricultural tenant of the subject land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the DARAB ordering the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing with the Board the proceeds thereof, and the Order allowing the withdrawal of intervenor's share in the proceeds and recognizing him as the duly constituted agricultural tenant. Issue: Does the DARAB have jurisdiction over the ancillary matter/s raised by the intervenor despite the fact that the DARAB itself has admitted involvement of question of ownership? Held: NO. For the case to be under the primary jurisdiction of the DARAB, it must be an agrarian dispute defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law) as
Page 79
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. (Morta v. Occidental, et al)
In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties, necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand.
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MERALCO V. LEONARDO QUISIMBING, ET AL. G.R. NO. 127598, FEBRUARY 22,2000

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