People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis GR No.

L5867477, July 11, 1990 FACTS: On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private respondent. The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto. Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.

G.R. No. 178774December 08, 2010Brion, J. Third DivisionPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AppelleeVMARLYN P. BACOS, AppellantSinel, Rachel Ann A. Series No. 1 Facts: Appellant Marlyn Bacos and her common law husband husband Efren Dimauyga were charged of illegalrecruitment in large scale before the RTC based on the complaints based on the complaints of 10individuals. They pleaded not guilty and trial ensued however Dimayuga died during the trial. Thecomplainants claimed that Dimayuga represented himself as a recruiter and Bacos assured that theycould sent them to work in Japan. Based on these representations and assurances, they parted with theirmoney as placement and processing fees and were given receipts, but were not deployed within theperiods promised. However, Bacos denied her participation by claiming that she only served snacks tothe complainants when they came to their house. The RTC held that Bacos gave indispensable assistanceto Dimayuga in perpetuating the fraud and found them engaged in illegal recruitment activities. The CA affirmed CAs decision finding Bacos guilty as principal. Issue: Can Bacos be held guilty of illegal recruitment as principal albeit any direct and clear of activeparticipation? Laws Applicable: Republic Act 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act Ruling: The SC affirmed Bacos conviction. RA 8042 defines recruitm ent and placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contactservices, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Bacos and Dimayuga committed illegal recruitment activities. The prosecution evidence clearly showed that despitethe lack of license or authority to engage in recruitment, Bacos admitted that she gave assurances to the complainants that she and dimayuga could deploy them for employment in Japan. Bacos accepted theplacement fee, informed the complainants of their departure and gave them information on how to paytheir balance. Her liability cannot be considered as that of a mere accomplice, but as a principal whodirectly and actively engaged in illegal recruitment activities. The argument that she did not derive anyconsideration for cannot serve to exonerate her from the crime. Opinion: The Courts were correct in convicting Bacos. By its very definition, illegal recruitment is deemed committed by mere act of promising employment without a license or authority and whether for profit ornot. Whether the accused profit or not from such act is immaterial. The time when the misrepresentationwas made, whether prior or simultaneous to the delivery of the money of the complainants is onlymaterial in the crime of estafa under Revised Penal Code as amended, and not on the crime of illegalrecruitment.The acts of Bacos fall within the prohibited acts of illegal recruitment as provided for by law. She cannotescape liability by merely alleging that she did not gain any monetary benefits out of those acts. Heradmission that she gave assurances to the complainants is deemed as promising for employment withoutlicense. Hence, the decision of the Court must be upheld.