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G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909 PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant. ARELLANO, C.J.: FACTS: Casiano Abaya died intestate in 1899. In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Casiano, his brother Roman Abaya, who had been appointed administrator of the estate, filed a petition whereby he moved that he be declared as the sole heir of the decedent. Paula Conde, mother of Teopista and Jose, unacknowledged natural children of Casiano, opposed Roman's petition. She contended that the right of her two natural children by the decedent, and consequently, her rights as heir of such natural children, was superior to that of Roman. Teopista died in 1902 and Jose in 1903, after their father's death but before the institution of this action. ISSUE: Is the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation transmitted to his descendants? HELD: No. The right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child. As legal basis, the Supreme Court made a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce acknowledgment. Art. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action. The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not lapsed before then. Art. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: 1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its majority. 2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged. In this case the action must be instituted within the six months following the discovery of such instrument. From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter. But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.

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G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980 CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners, vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents. GUERRERO, J.: FACTS: Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781, 544 and 1,021 square meters respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega." The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto. Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, died intestate leaving as heirs herein private respondents. On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna. On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A"). On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as

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regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same. HELD: Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the other. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate properties located in different places but they abut each other. This is not disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale. Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transferring the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation. The sale made and executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid in its entirely. G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO, defendants-appellants. MEDIALDEA, J.:p FACTS: Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of robbery. The policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing crime against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). As Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the presence of his parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the police headquarters and was informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the police investigators if something could be done to determine the source of the marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but other minors in the community. Previous to the case of Pierre Pangan was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him. Aside from said case, accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco Manalo and told him the social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like marijuana being peddled to minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made to him by the policeman and agreed to help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him in some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before the sala of Judge Eriberto Rosario. cWith the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. Few minutes there after (sic), Manalo

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returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. Hence, the appellant was convicted by the lower court. The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court committed reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood. Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements of the crime of which she was charged were never established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the court a quo. She also stressed that the court's verdict of conviction is merely based on surmises and conjectures. However, the plaintiffappellee through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing several criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. "His testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers." ISSUE: w/n Francisco Manalo is qualified to become a witness. HELD: Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. iThe testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

G.R. No. L-33365 December 20, 1930 Estate of the deceased Paulino Diancin. TEOPISTA DOLAR, proponent-appellant, vs. FIDEL DIANCIN, ET AL., oppositors-appellees. MALCOLM, J.: FACTS: A will was allegedly executed by Paulino Diancin on November 13, 1927. A thumb mark appears at the end of the will and on the left hand margin of each of its pages. The will was detailed in nature and disposed of an estate amounting to 50K.A document of sale containing an admittedly genuine thumb mark of Paulino was presented. Photographs of the thumb mark were also offered in evidence. Carlos Jaena, attempted to qualify as an 'expert,' and thereafter gave his opinion that the thumb marks had not been made by the same person. Jose Villanueva likewise attempted to qualify that the thumb marks were authentic. ISSUE: 1. Fingerprints 2. Proof? HELD: 1. Yes Admissible. The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only the customary written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumb mark .Expert testimony as to the identity of thumb marks or fingerprints is of course admissible. The method of identification of fingerprints is a science requiring close study .Where thumb impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated by experts as showing the identity or lack of identity of the impressions, the court is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts and in substituting its own opinion that a distinct similarity in some respects between the admittedly genuine thumb mark and the questioned thumb marks, is evident. 2. Testimonies of witnesses.

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G.R. No. 6845 September 1, 1914 YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee, vs. YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants. JOHNSON, J.: FACTS: Perfecto Gabriel (representative of petitioner Yap Tua) presented a petition in CFI-Manila asking that the will of the deceased Tomasa Elizaga Yap Cong (Tomasa) be admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa. Attached thereto wasthe will signed by Tomasa, as well as those of Zacarias, Tabora, and Perez. During the hearing, Paez and Pablo Agustin (witness to the execution of the will and testament) corroborated the event which took place during the execution of the will and testament. Furthermore, the witnesses testified that Zacarias and Tabora signed the will and that Tomasa signed the will voluntarily, and with possession of her faculties. CFI-Manila ordered that the will be allowed and admitted to probate and ordered Yap Tua as executor of the will. No further proceedings took place. Meanwhile, respondents Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu presented a petition, alleging their interest in the will. A guardian ad litem was appointed by the court to represent respondents. Gabriel La O admitted in their motion: (1) that the will was null for lack of authorization and was not signed by the witnesses; (2) that Tomasa was not mentally capacitated to execute the will due to her sickness; (3) that the signature was obtained through fraud. Moreover, another will was also executed with all the formalities required by law. Third, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and were negligent in presenting their petition. A rehearing took place/ witness Gabriel La O and Zacarias admitted having drawn the first and second wills under the instructions of Tomasa and her brother, Lorenzo respectively. Tomas Puzon, on the other hand, testified that Tomasa was mentally incapacitated to make the second will. Judgment was rendered on the matter which declared that the will attached to the record was the last will and testament of Tomasa and admitted to probate. ISSUE: (1) W/N Tomasa was of sound mind when she executed the second will. (2) W/N the signature of Tomasa in the first will is identical with that which appears in the second will. HELD: (1) Yes. Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink, and the will in her possession for 10 or 15minutes and then finally signed it. (2) Yes. If Tomasa signed any portion of her name to the will with the intention to sign the same, that will amount to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of executing a will, then the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted or a clear indication of her intention to execute the will. G.R. No. 15566 September 14, 1921 EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia, objectors-appellants. STREET, J.:

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FACTS: In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified - with details not necessary to be here specified - that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. After the cause had been submitted for determination, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. From this judgment an appeal was taken in behalf of the persons contesting the will, and the only errors here assigned have reference to the two following points, namely, first, whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two; and, secondly, whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin. ISSUE: Whether, under section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is essential to the validity of a will in this jurisdiction that the names of the testator and the instrumental witnesses should be written on the left margin of each page, as required in said Act, and not upon the right margin, as in the will now before us; HELD: No. We are of the opinion that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court. Still some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial it would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature could have attached any decisive importance to them. The provision to the effect that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page - rather than on the right margin - seems to be this character. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or the other. In Caraig vs. Tatlonghari (R. G. No. 12558, decided March 23, 1918, not reported), this court declared a will void which was totally lacking in the signatures required to be written on its several pages; and in the case of Re estate of Saguinsin (41 Phil., 875), a will was likewise declared void which contained the necessary signatures on the margin of each leaf ( folio), but not in the margin of each page containing written matter. The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point of deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin instead of the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted without discovering the slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other. In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument. It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.

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G.R. No. L-21755 December 29, 1924 In the matter of the testate estate of Antonio Mojal, deceased. FILOMENA NAYVE, petitioner-appellee, vs. LEONA MOJAL and LUCIANA AGUILAR, opponents-appellants. ROMUALDEZ, J.: FACTS: Filomena Nayve filed a petition for the probate of the will of his late husband, Antonio Mojal. The petition was opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, of the deceased. The CFI of Albay admitted the will to probate. The will is composed of foursheets with written matter on only one side of each. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the margin, left side of the reader. HELD: 1. Signed in middle - Yes. As to the signatures on the margin, it is true, as above stated, that the third page actually used was signed by the testator, not on the left margin, as it was by the witnesses, but about the middle of the page and the end of the will; and that the fourth page was signed by the witnesses, not on the left margin, as it was by the testator, but about the middle of the page and at the end of the attestation clause. The document contained the necessary signatures on each page, whereby each page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded against any possible alteration. In that case, the validity of the will was sustained, and consequently it was allowed to probate. Applying that doctrine of Avera the instant case, we hold that, as each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not detract from the validity of the will. 2. Numbers not letters - Yes. Still within the spirit of the law.; 3. Attestation clause did not state # of pages - last paragraph of the will stated number of pages so the will is still valid. 4. Signed in the presence of each other - Yes. in the attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator signed the will "in the presence of each of the witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence of each other and of the testator." So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement was clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is whether the testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will.

G.R. No. L-47931 June 27, 1941 Testamentaria del finado Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil. ADRIANO MENDOZA, solicitante y apelado, vs. CALIXTO PILAPIL Y OTROS, opositores y apelantes. DIAZ, J.:

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G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner, vs. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents. CARPIO, J.: FACTS: Abada and his wife died without legitimate children. Alipio Abaja filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the probate of the will of Abada. The latter allegedly named his children as his testamentary heirs. Eulogio is the son of Abada's child. Nicanor Caponong opposed the petition. The alleged intestate heirs of Abaja also filed their oppositions. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray. Alipio filed another petition before the RTC of Kabankalan for the probate of the will. Caponong filed a petition, praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration. The RTC of Kabankalan admitted the probate of the will. MR was denied. During the proceedings, the presiding judge discovered that the former presiding judge had already submitted the case for decision. Will was allowed for probate. The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The CA affirmed the resolution of the trial court. HELD: ATTESTATION CLAUSE 1. Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written and that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page in the

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presence of three witnesses. The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses. Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial compliance. While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it. EVIDENCE ALIUNDE 2. No. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law G.R. No. L-18076 August 31, 1962 ELEUTERIO CANEDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO S. NARVASA, and/or the Presiding Judge of the Fifth Branch and/or Court of First Instance of Manila, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BOHOL, PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., CELERINO DELGADO and PEDRO LABRA, respondents. LABRADOR, J.: FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and testament at his residence attested by three witnesses and assisted by his lawyer, stating therein that he was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to persons who do not appear to be related to the testator one of whom what Benoni Cabrera. Mateo sought the probate of his last will and testament but before it could be heard, Mateo passed away. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sought for his appointment as special administrator of the testators estate which was approved by the probate court. Herein petitioners instituted a second petition claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator. According to them, on the date of its alleged execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that Mateo was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will. The probate court rendered a decision declaring the said will as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero. Petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals wherein they asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The respondent Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: WON the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code HELD: No. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same. Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately

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preceded by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis , is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which states that in the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805. While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.

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G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999 EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents. PARDO, J.: FACTS: Calugay, Salcedo and Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seno filed with the RTC, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased. Codoy and Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery. Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. Pets filed a demurrer. RTC granted the demurrer. The CA reversed the RTCs decision. ISSUE: WON the provisions of Article 811 are permissive or mandatory. HELD: Yes. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denote an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. We cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. Comparing the signature in the holographic will and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit and a letter the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994 SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents. PUNO, J.: FACTS: The testator named as devisees petitioners Ajero, private respondents Sands and Arong.Petitioners instituted a petition for the allowance of the will. PRs opposed the petition on the grounds that neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and

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undue influence. The TC allowed the probate of the will. The CA reversed the decision. It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. HELD: 839 enumeration is exclusive. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810) G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960 FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J.: FACTS: Fortunata S. Vida de Yance died in Quezon City. The petitioner submitted the deceaseds holographic whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased, Cesario Singson. Azaola was the only witness that testified that the penmanship appearing in the will is the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present 3 witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested. ISSUE: Whether or not the proponent/petitioner is bound to produce more than one witness. HELD: No. Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness, but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. It is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of the testator and can declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency if the Court deems it necessary. Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present and the rule requiring production of three witnesses shall be permissive.

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G.R. No. 131641 February 23, 2000 NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NAPOLEON V. DILAG, Presiding Judge, RTC-Cavite, Branch XV, ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: FACTS: Natividad is the sole and absolute owner of a land located in Naic, Cavite. She contends that her brother Romeo and his wife convinced her to lend them the TCT of the lot to be used as acollateral for a loan for the construction of a cinema. Natividad agreed on the condition that the property would be returned within one year from the completion of the cinema. Thus, Natividad executed a DOS. The cinema was completed but the spouses refused to return the title, instead, they had the property transferred to their name. The spouses averred that the property did not belong to Natividad and that it formed part of the estate of the late Maximo Nazareno. According to Romeo, the property was his share in their inheritance. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses. But the CA ruled otherwise. Hence, the RD was ordered to restore the TCT in favor of Natividad. Natividad filed a Manifestation and Motion with the RTC praying for the issuance of a writ of execution as well as a writ of possession. The spouses opposed the motion on the ground that Natividad never prayed that she be placed in possession of the subject premises. Neither did the CA order the pet to be placed in possession of the property. The RTC granted the writ prayed for but denied the issuance of a writ of possession. MR denied. HELD: No. Lot 504-A-3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51798 was owned by the appellant in her own right as vendee and not appellee's share in the estate of their deceased father. The Court of Appeals categorically declared that the claim of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the disputed lot has utterly no factual basis. Therefore, they have no reason to remain in possession of the property. But the same could not be said of the Naic Cinema. The matter of ownership and possession of the Naic Cinema was never put in issue. Consequently, petitioner cannot ask for a writ of possession to place her in physical occupancy of the Naic Cinema. Being declared owner of subject lot does not also mean that she is automatically entitled to possession of all the improvements therein. Otherwise, the actual possessor would be deprived of his property without due process of law. Pet cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since in her complaint and subsequent pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner thereof. On the contrary, she claims that the Naic Cinema belongs to the estate of her father. On the other hand, respondent spouses have asserted dominion over the Naic Cinema. Plainly, petitioner cannot wrest possession of the movie house from respondent spouses through a mere writ of possession as she herself even disclaims being the owner thereof. Ownership over the Naic Cinema must be threshed out in a proper proceeding. A mere prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession will not suffice

G.R. No. 74249 January 20, 1989 ATTY. CORNELIO T. RIVERA and AUGUSTO PALOMAR, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

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G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR, respondents-appellees. PARAS, J.: FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will. On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador. Subsequently,Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that the Original Certificate of Title has been cancelled. In 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. Sagrado filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already

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acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968. The trial court rendered a joint decision, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declared the Deed of Absolute sale null and void. Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals which later rendered judgment denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated . ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged holographic will of Melecio Labrador is dated, as provided for in Article 810 2 of the New Civil Code HELD: The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will. Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death." Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that that he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.VERS The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is approved and allowed probate.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006 DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, vs.

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HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents. AZCUNA, J.: FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition contended that Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that the intestate proceedings should be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, was filed by petitioners before the RTC where they reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over intestate proceeding because testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows: Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana Tantunin ng sinuman Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw. Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking. At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia. Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana. Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. (signed) Segundo Seangio Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. HELD: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. The intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.

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With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 (Probate proceeding) for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.

G.R. No. 169193 November 30, 2006 SPOUSES ILUMINADA CAPITLE and CIRILO CAPITLE, Petitioners, vs. FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA and ROSALINDA C. OLAR, Respondents.

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CARPIO MORALES, J.: BELLA GUERRERO, Petitioner, vs. RESURRECCION BIHIS, Respondents. FACTS: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTC QC. Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence. Petitioner Guerrero was appointes special administratrix. Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. ISSUE: Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? HELD: No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. 6 This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. 7 In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void

G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008 PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner, vs. LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent. QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: On April 27, 1987, Margarita S. Mayores died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins Paz Samaniego-Celada (Paz) and three others. Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament on February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at Singalong Manila to Lucia Abena (Lucia), her lifelong companion since 1929, and two others in equal shares. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at San Antonio Village, Makati to Lucia and two others in equal shares. Margarita also left all her personal properties to Lucia whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will. After Paz filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati, Lucia filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The two cases were consolidated and the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and Lucia as the executor of the will. Paz appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals which but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling, hence she appealed to the SC. Paz argued that Margarita's will failed to comply with the formalities required under Article 805 of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will was procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will, Margarita was weak,

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sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon Lucia and her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Lucia, for her part, that the petition for review raises questions of fact, not of law and as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Margaritas will conformed to the formalities required by law. HELD: Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of FACTS. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of those recognized exceptions. Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal that petitioner's arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.

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