The bombing of Libya:

Operation Eldorado Canyon

Jan van Waarde

Pictured on Ramsteins platform is F-111F 70-2415 in the markings of 493rd TFS/48th TFW. This particular aircraft did not take part in the attack on Libya, but was one of the spare aircraft and took off from Lakenheath as Karma 54. (Scott Wilson)

THE SITUATION SO FAR

It is 1986, exactly twenty years ago. Ronald Reagan was President of the USA and the Soviet Union still was the Evil Empire. The Iron Curtain was still up, in other words: the Cold War was in full swing. International terrorism still wasnt as common as it is now and countries around the Mediterranean were affected the most by it. The PLO in Israel, Hezbollah in Lebanon, all nanced by countries like Iran and Libya. In the middle of the 1980s Libya trained 8000 terrorists annualy, gave them new (fake) passports, money, houses and transportation. In March 1986, US carriers were involved in Operation Prairie Fire, sailing the Gulf of Sidra and crossed the Line of Death (32.30N) instigated by Libyan president Qadaf. This was well outside Libyan territorial waters and accordingly not internationally recognized. Libya quickly reacted and the US Fleet initially encountered Libyan patrol boats. Then, on March 24th, two Libyan MiG-25PDs carried out recce missions close to the US Battle Group. When these were intercepted by Tomcats of VF-33, the Tomcats were red upon by SA-5 missiles. The next day, US Navy aircraft attacked the SAM site involved as well as the patrol boat base; two of these were sunk. Qadaf wanted revenge, but a military response was impossible. On April 2nd, Libyan sponsored terrorists exploded a bomb on board TWA ight 840 over Greece. Four passengers were sucked out of the resulting hole in the fuselage. On the evening of April 5th a bomb exploded in the La Belle discotheque in Berlin. La Belle was frequented by US military personnel and out of 230 injured 79 were American. Three people were killed: two Americans and a Turkish female, the girlfriend of one of them. The German and US authorities quickly found irrefutable evidence that this attack was the doing of Libyan sponsored terrorists. Also, the CIA had intercepted a message from president Qadaf ordering the attack and making as much casualties as possible. Another intercepted message gave more details of the attack, but this info came too late to prevent the bombing. Quickly, military action against Libya was decided upon.

that terrorism was not the road ahead. The US National Security Council selected a number of targets; these were presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense who in turn picked ve; these were then ratied by President Reagan. These targets were: - Aziziyah Barracks in Tripoli, Libyan terrorist operations were led from here. Qadaf also stayed at these barracks from time to time. - Al Jumahiriyah Guard Barracks / Benghazi Military Barracks in downtown Benghazi, another terrorist command center. Also the home of the Jumahiriyah Guard, Qadafs bodyguards. - Murrat Sidi Balal in Tripoli, a maritime training camp, where divers were trained. - Tripoli Airport, targets here were the military facilities and the Il-76 aircraft that were used on behalf of the terrorists, often under the cover of diplomatic operations. - Benina AB, southeast of Benghazi. This was the only nonterrorist target, chosen to prevent the based MiGs from scrambling to meet the attacking US aircraft. The targets at Benghazi were assigned to the Navy, those at Tripoli to the USAF; this was done for ease of planning. Military planners were concinced that the only aircraft that were capable of conducting a night strike were the US Navys A-6 Intruder and the USAFs F-111. A number of months before the attack in Berlin 48th TFW planners had drawn up a number of possible scenarios for a mission against Libya. The Navy was involved in these as well. One of the rst plans consisted of a formation of six F-111s only, this would need considerably less support than the later attack. 48th TFW also conducted a number of training missions proving the feasability of such an attack but just 72 hours before the actual mission it was decided in Washington that it was to be conducted by eighteen aircraft. In April 1986, the Navy had two carriers in the Mediterranean, the USS America and the USS Coral Sea. To attack all ve targets 36 aircraft, apart from supporting aircraft, would be needed; both carriers combined could not eld more than twenty Intruders. Bringing in a third carrier or possibly a fourth would mean a delay; the element of surprise would alo be lost in that case. Thus far the simple solution: the exclusive use

PLANNING
The attack would target a number of specic and terrorism-related targets in Libya, with the hope of forcing Qadaf to believe

Eldorado Canyon

of carriers. From now on the F-111Fs from Lakenheath came in. The F-111Es from Upper Heyford were not considered as these had not been equipped with the at the time highly secret and advanced AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack system, which consisted of a infrared camera and a laser designator with which targets could be attacked at night, using the 2000 lb GBU-10 Paveway II LGB. It was also prudent that the Intruders as well as the F-111s would carry out the attack at the exact same moment to surprise the Libyan air defences the most. According to later studies, from 1988 and 1997, it was concluded that the F-111s were not needed after all... The element of surprise was long gone, beacause rumors were spreading quickly about an imminent attack. Information was leaked by high-ranking ofcials in the White House. Then another problem arose: France, Spain, Italy and Germany denied the use of their airspace for the US attack, forcing the F-111s to y around Portugal and Spain, an extra 2000km, six to seven hours more ight time and an additional aerial refueling. All the ingredients for a very complex operation! The French refusal became known on April 12th, until that time planners had routed the mission over France.

KC-10s were present for a base efciency exercise named exercise Salty Notion. It was clear something else was going on! On 12 April, USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Charles A Gabriel arrived at RAF Mildenhall from Brussels and Heathrow aboard C-135C 61-2669 of 4950th TW. He brought in the strike orders for the attack.

PREPARATIONS
The rst preparations for the attack started on 8 April. On that date, RC-135V 64-14842 and RC-135W 62-4139 (both assigned to 55th SRW at Offutt AFB) ew to RAF Mildenhall. The next day they continued to Hellenikon AS in Greece, from where they conducted several recce missions along the Libyan coast. Around this time EA-3Bs and EP-3Es from NAS Rota in Spain will also have made several recce ights. Over the next days, more reconnaissance aircraft were involved: on saturday 12 April, two TR-1As of 17th RW from RAF Alconbury left for Ramstein, from where they continued to RAF Akrotiri on Cyprus, joining the U-2R of 9th SRW det.3. These aircraft also focused their attention to Libya. Also, a SR-71A from RAF Mildenhall made at least one mission over Libya (this ight was not allowed to go over France either). Neither of these recce missions were opposed by the Libyan air defences. For the onlookers on the ground (us aircraft spotters!) it became very obvious that something was due to happen on Friday 11 April. Between 11 and 14 April, unusual numbers of KC-10As arrived at RAF Fairford and RAF Mildenhall. These joined the TDY KC-135s already present here. RAF Mildenhall was in complete turmoil with every inch of the bases platforms covered by tanker aircraft; their crews sometimes had to sleep in the corridors of the barracks and there were protost groups and news crews outside the base. The coverstory was that the

Among the aircraft based on the USS America were A-7Es of VA-46 Clansmen. On this photograph, one of their aircraft is being prepared for the attack on Libya later that night. The Corsairs were used for SEAD missions. (Department of Defense)

An example of the large number of KC-10As that participated in the operation is this photograph of 82-0192 of 2nd BW from Barksdale AFB (LA), it is seen landing at Soesterberg here on 1 june 1984. (Roel Reijne) Eldorado Canyon

KC-10As taking part in Operation Eldorado Canyon: RAF Fairford (unit/arrival/departure) 79-0434 2nd BW 14apr86 79-1713 2nd BW 11apr86 79-1949 22nd ARW 11apr86 79-1950 22nd ARW 14apr86 82-0193 22nd ARW 13apr86 83-0076 22nd ARW 11apr86 83-0078 22nd ARW 13apr86 83-0080 22nd ARW 13apr86 84-0186* (2nd BW) 11apr86 22apr86 22apr86 25apr86 23apr86 25apr86 25apr86 25apr86 25apr86 22apr86

RAF Mildenhall 79-1710 2nd BW 13apr86 27apr86 79-1712 2nd BW 13apr86 24apr86 79-1950 22nd ARW 11apr86 14apr86 82-0191 22nd ARW 13apr86 late apr86 83-0075 2nd BW 12apr86 late apr86 83-0077 2nd BW 13apr86 01mei86 83-0079 2nd BW 11apr86 01mei86 83-0082 2nd BW 11apr86 late apr86 84-0188* (2nd BW) 14apr86 27apr86 84-0190* (2nd BW) 13apr86 27apr86 84-0191* (22nd ARW) 13apr86 late apr86 85-0027* (22nd ARW) 13apr86 24apr86 85-0029* (2nd BW) 11apr86 26apr86 85-0030* (68th ARG) 11apr86 26apr86 85-0031* 68th ARG 11apr86 26apr86 86-0027* (2nd BW) 11apr86 26apr86 Aircraft marked * carried the dark grey KC-10 camouage, the others the normal white scheme. The aircraft with the unit in parenthesis did not carry markings, but were assigned to the units mentioned. On 12 April, a 67th ARRS contingent from RAF Woodbridge departed for Italy. That morning, HH-53Cs 69-5784, 69-5796 and 69-5797 departed for Italy via Lyon in France. During the afternoon, HC-130Ns 69-5826 and 69-5827 ew to Naples in Italy direct. These aircraft would provide CSAR coverage for the operation. Another participating unit was 305th ARW with three of their rare KC-135A(RT) aircraft. These operated from an unknown base, but two aircraft (58-0124 and 58-0126) transited RAF Fairford on 15 April, followed by 58-0018 on 22 April. On saturday night 12 April, the ground crews at RAF Lakenheath were busy preparing the F-111s for the mission; a large number of shelters were open, there was a lot of activity, LGBs were brought to the aircraft and several aircraft had their engines tested. The next morning the sunday morning curfew for RAF Mildenhall was cancelled following which another batch of aircraft arrived; another clue that something was going on. On monday morning 14 April, several radio stations reported that something was about to happen, possibly an attack on Libya. The BBC TV-news also jumped in and reported that the F-111s were loaded with LGBs and even broadcasted video footage. You can imagine that the bases personnel was not at all happy with the situation. The rest of the monday the base became somewhat of a tourist attraction....

More images from the carriers: on top one of the pilots is being strapped in in A-7E 160615/AB-405 of VA-72 on the USS America, on the night of the attack (US Navy photo, JOC Dave Lee). The other photos show a load of Mk.83 bombs, ready to be loaded on A-6E 159317/AK-501 (middle) and 155695/AK-503 (bottom) of VA-55 on board the USS Coral Sea prior to the mission. (Department of Defense) direction was changed at the last moment, following which one of the KC-10As had a near-collision with an RAF Tornado from RAF Honington. In order of take-off the KC-10As were 83-0077, 85-0030, 85-0027*, 79-1712*, 86-0027*, 85-0031*, 84-0191, 82-0191, 79-1710 and 85-0029. A number of these aircraft (marked *) continued to predetermined refueling areas, the remaining six remained in a holding pattern over the aireld, awaiting the take-off of the F-111Fs from Lakenheath. The rst wave of tankers took off from RAF Fairford on 18.12Z. Within a matter of minutes the following were airborne: 83-0080, 820193, 83-0076 (all KC-10A), 63-8018 (410th BW, KC-135A), 56-3615 (19th ARW, KC-135A) and 84-0186 (KC-10A). Again, the KC-135s were used to refuel the KC-10s and on 21.15Z they returned to Fairford. The Fairford KC-10s were used to escort the EF-111As.

INGRESS
Operation Eldorado Canyon was conducted on the night of 14 and 15 April. The crews came to the base on monday morning; most of them were still unaware if they had been chosen to y the mission until the brieng started. At the brieng, all important information was discussed like targets, times and refueling points. This was the start of the rst bombing mission to be conducted from British soil since the end of World War II. On monday night 14 April, the rst aircraft to take off in support of the operation were six KC-135s, the rst of which departed RAF Mildenhall at 17.45Z (all times Zulu time). These were, in order, 56-3603 (2nd BW), 63-8878 (5th BW), 58-0050 (380th BW, a KC-135Q), 58-0073 (96th BW), 63-8884 (410th BW) and 61-0295 (97th BW). These were primarily used to refuel the KC-10As. This was followed by the mass take-off of the KC-10As from 18.00Z. This nearly went wrong as the runway

Eldorado Canyon

During Eldorado Canyon, both the USS Coral Sea and the USS America, with CVW-13 en CVW-1 on board respectively, were stationed off the Libyan coast. Below a list of the squadrons that were present on the carriers, with a list of aircraft assigned to them at that time. The underlined aircraft were noted shortly before and after the cruise, and there is no 100% certainty that these aircraft were actually present on the carriers on 14 en 15 April 1986, but this was most likely the case. USS CORAL SEA - CVW-13/AK (cruise from 1 october 1985 to 19 may 1986) VFA-131 F/A-18A 100/162421, 101/..., 102/162425, 103/162432, 104/162436, 105/162423, 106/162440, 107/162442, 110/162444, 111/162450, 112/162452 VFA-132 F/A-18A 200/162433, 201/162424, 202/162451, 203/162426, 204/162443, 205/162437, 206/162430, 207/162428, 210/162441, 211/162453 VMFA-314 F/A-18A 300/162397, 301/162401, 303/162406, 304/162409, 305/162414, 306/162416, 307/162418, 310/162434, 311/ VMFA-323 F/A-18A 400/162407, 401/162405, 402/162403, 403/, 404/162446, 405/162420, 406/162431, 407/162417, 410/162415, 411/162434 VA-55 A-6E 500/161675, 501/159317, 502/161681, 503/155695, 504/155718, 505/152607, 506/159315, 507/152642, 510/155712, 511/149955, 512/161084, 513/161106, 514/... and KA-6Ds 520/155583, 521/155597, 522/152919, 523/155598, 524/155619 VAW-127 E-2C 600/160008, 601/160416, 602/161095, 603/160987 VAQ-135 EA-6B 604/161776, 605/160791, 606/161115, 607/161350, but codes had changed by the time the attack happened and included 622 and 623 HS-17 SH-3H 610/148052, /148981, /149708, /149735, /152107, /152122, /152702 USS AMERICA CVW-1/AB (cruise from 10 march 1986 to 10 september 1986) VF-102 F-14A 100/159466, 101/159458, 102/159447, 103/159006, 104/159459, 105/159452, 106/159004, 107/159460, 110/..., 111/159589, 112/161150, 113/161286. 114/161135 VF-33 F-14A 200/161142, 201/161151, 202/159426, 203/159445, 204/159450, 205/159440, 206/159015, 207/159429, 210/159427, 211/159609, 212/159446, 214/159448 VA-46 A-7E 300/159974, 301/159301, 302/160613, 303/159660, 304/159268, 305/159969, 306/158667, 307/..., 310/158004, 311/158831, 312/..., 314/160865 VA-72 A-7E 400/160552, 401/160549, 402/159997, 403/160547, 404/159996, 405/160615, 406/..., 407/160550, 410/160859, 411/..., 412/159640, 413/157478 VA-34 A-6E/KA-6D 500/161231, 501/152599, 502/155602, 503/155651, 504/158045, 505/159314, 506/155616, 507/161667, 510/152948, and KA-6Ds 521/149484, 522/152927, 523/152939 VAW-123 E-2C 600/161097, 601/158641, 602/160697, 603/161098 VMAQ-2 det.Y EA-6B 604/..., 605/, 606/159911, 607/ HS-11 SH-3H 610/152128, 611/148045, 612/148995. 613/148997, 614/148039, 615/156501 VS-32 S-3A 700/160145, 701/159767, 702/159753, 703/159762, 704/159755, 705/158866, 706/160121, 707/159765, 710/159751, 711/159760

Moments before the start of the operation, the rst Tomcats of VF-33 and VF-102 are ready to take off from the USS America to y CAP missions in support of the F-111s which were on their way to Libya at that very moment. For serial number, see the list above. (US Navy photo, JOC Dave Lee) Eldorado Canyon

F-111F 70-2386/LN of 493th TFS/48th TFW on Ramsteins concrete on 27 August 1983. This aircraft was an air spare for the attack as Jewel 64. (Scott Wilson) These were six F-14A Tomcats and three E-2Cs; they were supporting the USAF operation with the Tomcats ying CAP for the F-111s. Ten minutes later another two F-14As and two EA6Bs took off that were to cover the Navy strike. Between 22.45Z and 23.15Z the main force was launched from the America. These were six A-6Es, six A-7Es, an EA-6B and another eight F-14As. The Coral Sea contributed eight A-6Es, an EA-6B and eighteen F/A-18As. The Hornets were armed with HARM missiles and would provide CAP over the target area. The Tomcats ew CAP for the eet. The F-111 force consisted of six ights with three aircraft each. The tiring transit was quickly forgotten and the crews started checking the equipment like the terrain following radar and the weapons systems. The location was checked again and they started preparing to acquire the targets. During their approach to Libya the EF-111As joined their assigned ights. The lead KC-10A was used as an airborne command post, from where the USAF part of the attack was led by a high-ranking ofcer. An E-2C and the command center on board the USS America were in command of the Navy attack. Additionally, an E-3 was orbiting nearby to provide the whole group with AEW intel. The command of the entire operation was in the hands of VAdm Frank B. Kelso II, commander of the US Sixth Fleet. In the meantime, at RAF Mildenhall, the KC-10As that had been refueling the force shortly after take-off, retturned to the base between 23.40Z and 00.15Z. They were, in order of arrival: 850027, 79-1712, 85-0031, 86-0027.

EF-111A 67-0034/UH of 42nd ECS/66th ECW is seen landing at RAF Fairford on 12 July 1985. (Erik Sleutelberg) At 17.36 GMT (18.36Z), the rst of 24 F-111Fs took off from RAF Lakenheath. Six of these aircraft were air spares and would return to Lakenheath following the rst refueling over the Bay of Biscay (they all landed at Lakenheath around 21.00Z). Immediately following take-off the F-111s, in groups of four aircraft, with IFF transponders turned off, started ying in close formation with their mother tanker (each group was assigned a KC-10A), so that the unusually large formations of aircraft would not be noticed by controllers on the ground. From that moment on, there was strict radio silence. Around the same time at RAF Upper Heyford, six EF-111As of 42nd ECS/66th ECW taxied to the runway. These were 66-0030, 66-0033*, 66-0057, 67-0034, 67-0041* en 67-0052. Five of these aircraft actually took off, the sixth was a ground spare. One of the other ve was an air spare that returned to Upper Heyford following the rst refueling, the other four (including those marked *) continued on to Libya. Three of those actually took part in the attack, the fourth was a reserve that stayed feet wet off the Libyan coast. The KC-10As, which took care of the navigation, were used as a ying gas station by the F-111 crews. They were refueled themselves by the KC-135s. On the way to Libya, the F-111s were refueled four times, the rst time at around 19.40Z northwest of the Spanish coast, the second time south of Portugal. These refuelings took place at 26,000 ft. The third refueling took place just east of Gibraltar and the fourth and last just east of Tunis. One of the pilots said this about the night refuelings: night refueling is just like day refueling, except you cant see a fucking thing! Just east of Gibraltar the task force commander realized that the entire formation was ten minutes behind schedule due to a planning mistake. Speed was increased to make up for the lost time; the attack had to start at midnight exactly. While the F-111s were approaching the target area, the carriers in the Mediterranean were very active as well. The rst participating aircraft were launched from the USS America on 22.20Z.

ELDORADO CANYON
The attack itself started at exactly 02.00h Libyan time (this was 00.00Z) and lasted a grand total of sixteen minutes. In this space of time, 120,000 lbs of ordnance was dropped. In just three minutes from 23.45Z, the Hornets from the Coral Sea and the A-7s from the America red 30 HARMs and Shrikes at the Libyan radar sites, covered by the EA-6Bs. This was such a erce attack that several of the radar crews ed the scene in a panic, much to the dismay of the Russian advisors! Following the attack, the Hornets started ying CAP over the target area. Then the rst wave of A-6Es arrived, and exactly at 00.01Z the rst wave of Intruders of VA-55 crossed the coastline. VA-55 headed for the aireld at Benina near Benghazi, the A-6Es of VA-34 from the America went for the Al Jumahiriya Barracks. Two VA-55 aircraft had to abort at the last moment due to technical malfunctions. According to a B/N of VA-34 it had been difcult to obtain accurate target information. On the

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The following 48th TFW F-111Fs took part in Operation Eldorado Canyon. The list includes assigned squadron, callsign and results of the attack. F-111F 70-2363 495 TFS Elton43 aborted in target area 70-2371 495 TFS Jewel61 missed target 70-2382 493 TFS Remit34 air spare 70-2383 493 TFS Jewel62 missed target 70-2386 493 TFS Jewel64 air spare 70-2387 495 TFS Lujac23 missed target 70-2389 494 TFS Karma52 shot down 70-2390 495 TFS Remit31 hit target 70-2394 492 TFS Puffy13 missed target 70-2396 492 TFS Elton42 aborted 70-2403 492 TFS Elton41 aborted in target area 70-2404 493 TFS Elton44 air spare 70-2405 494 TFS Lujac24 missed target 70-2413 494 TFS Karma51 missed target 70-2415 493 TFS Karma54 air spare 70-2416 494 TFS Puffy12 aborted in target area 71-0888 492 TFS Lujac22 missed target 71-0889 493 TFS Karma53 aborted in target area 71-0893 492 TFS Puffy11 hit target (Il-76s) 72-1445 492 TFS Remit32 aborted in target area 72-1449 493 TFS Lujac21 aborted after take-off 73-0707 494 TFS Puffy14 air spare 74-0177 492 TFS Jewel63 hit target 74-0178 495 TFS Remit33 hit target

aireld, four MiG-23s, two Fokker F-27s and two Mi-8 helicopters were destroyed, with another twelve MiG-23s damaged. The attack on the barracks was a success; a number of large buildings was destroyed here and some 80 military personnel on the ground were killed. The Intruders used Mk.82 and Mk.83 Snakeye bombs. Two of these landed on civilian targets. Even though the Libyan air defences were in a panic, they managed to re some SAMs. One B/N of VA-34 clearly remembers this: After we attacked the target we came into trouble. We knew SAM sites were active and started evasive manoeuvres but doing this we ended up at 1200 ft. Two SA-3s locked onto us and were red immediately. I yelled at the pilot to get down on the deck, but before he was able to do that one of the SAMs passed behind us and exploded. Everything happened at an incredible speed. We nearly ew into the ground and leveled off at 150 ft, but successfully evaded the SAMs and were on the way back safely!. At 00.13Z, all Navy aircraft were feet wet again. In the meantime, the F-111s also arrived in the target area on the other side of the Gulf of Sidra, near Tripoli. The EF-111As (callsign Harpo) started jamming Libyan radar sites at 23.54Z. At 00.01Z, ying at 500 mph at 200 ft altitude, the F-111s crossed the coastline. The rst three ights (callsigns Remit, Elton and Karma) attacked the Azziziyah Barracks from 500ft. Only two out of nine aircraft managed to nd their assigned targets and actually dropped bombs. Following the rst wave, the air defences had been alerted and during one of the evasive manoeuvres a Pave Tack system on one of the aircraft lost its lock-on at the very moment the bombs were dropped. These then fell into a civilian housing area 1,5 mile from the intended target. They damaged a number of foreign embassies upon impact. Immediately following the attack the USA said erroneously that the damage was caused by parts of SAMs fallaing back to the ground. The second group, consisting of three aircraft (callsign Jewel) attacked Sidi Balal, the training camp. This was a succesful attack and the target was hit by bombs from the rst two aircraft. The third aircraft missed because the target was rendered invisible by the smoke from the bombs of the rst two aircraft. The nal two groups (callsigns Puffy and Lujac) were armed with 500lb Mk.82 Snakeye bombs. They approached their target, Tripoli aireld, from land and dropped their bombs from a height of 200ft between 00.07Z and 00.11Z. Three Il-76s were damaged (and another three damaged). These were the only bombs that actually scored direct hits). Also, a Boeing 727, a Fiat G.222, two Twin Otters, two Cessna 402s and two Cessna 152s were destroyed. Apart from the EF111As, the aircraft were protected by Navy A-7Es and a EA-6B that red HARM and Shrike missiles to silence the radar sites. Because of the navigational error made during the ferry ight

A visitor to Soesterberg in 1986 was this F-111F of 493rd TFS/48th TFW, the 70-2374/LN. The Pave Tack pod can clearly be seen below the fuselage. (Roel Reijne)

Landing at RAF Upper Heyford on 11 July 1985 is EF-111A 67-0041/UH of 42nd ECS/66th ECW. This aircraft actually took part in the attack on Libya. (Erik Sleutelberg) Eldorado Canyon

F-111F 70-2389/LN of 494th TFS/48 TFW is parked on the platform of Ramstein op 18 September 1985. This is the aircraft that was shot down over Libya over half a year later, ying with callsign Karma 52 . It crashed into the sea, sadly both crewmembers were killed. (Scott Wilson) the inertial navigation system on some aircraft was off by a fraction which made it hard to nd the targets in the target area; this was the reason one of the aircraft actually aborted the attack. The F-111 attack lasted just eleven minutes. Even though the air defences were less intense than expected, the still stiff opposition meant that they knew they were coming. One F-111F, 70-2389 with callsign Karma 52, was shot down. The aircraft had dropped its bombs when it suddenly became a ball of re at 00,10Z some 20 miles north of Tripoli, and fell into the Gulf of Sidra. It was probably hit by a SAM but this was never conrmed. At 00.15Z the SAR helicopters were alerted of a possible shoot-down and during the next few days Navy and USAF SAR helicopters searched in vain for the crew, covered by F-14s and F/A-18s. The search was called off at 03.00Z on 16 April. On board Karma 52 were Capt Fernando L. Ribas-Dominicci and Capt Paul F. Lorence. The body of the rst was returned to the USA three years later following intervention of Pope John-Paul II (following autopsy, it was determined he had drowned, possibly inside the capsule after it had landed on the water). Both men were promoted to Major posthumously. An interesting fact is that 70-2390, the last F-111F which ew from Cannon AFB to the museum at Wright Patterson AFB years later, did this with callsign Karma 52 in remembrance of the crew of 70-2389. had been broadcasted on Armed Forces Radio. The rst of sixteen remaining F-111Fs landed at RAF Lakenheath at 06.30Z; the nal one (70-2406) nally landed at 07.52Z. At around the same time, the KC-10s also landed at RAF Mildenhall and RAF Fairford, as did the EF-111As at RAF Upper Heyford. The F-111s had been airborne between thirteen and fourteen hours and had own 6400 miles, concluding the longest combat mission with tactical aircraft ever. It turned out that some aircraft had near-dry tanks when they landed. Normally, a combat mission to a target in Eastern Europe would take something like three hours, but the systems of the aircraft just were not made for the extremely long mission they had just completed and none of them landed with fully functioning systems! Even before the F-111s returned to England a post-strike reconnaissance mission took off from RAF Mildenhall. Between 01.30Z and 03.20Z four KC-135Qs and two KC-10As took off, followed by two SR71As, one at 04.00Z (64-17980) and the next one (64-17960) at 05.15Z. This was the rst time the two Blackbirds of the Mildenhall det were airborne simultane-

EGRESS
In the meantime, the US Navy force was on the way back. The A-6s had all landed on board the USS Coral Sea at 00.46Z and on the USS America on 00.53Z. The last supporting aircraft trapped on board one of the carriers on 01.58Z. After the attack, each F-111 transmitted the codewords Tranquil Tiger after a succesful attack run, and Frostee Freezer after a failed one. One of the aircraft had an INS that had malfunctioned and in spite of the strict radio silence he asked if someone could give him a vector so he would know which direction to go. One of his colleagues then dumped a small amount of fuel and lit the afterburner, creating a ame (like the Australians do during air shows) for him to aim for. He was then able to nd his tanker and return home safely. Another aircraft also had problems due to an overheating engine and on 03.15Z this aircraft made an emergency landing at NAS Rota in Spain. The rest of the force prepared itself for the long ight back to England. They refueled twice en route; rst off the coast of Tunisia at around 01.00Z. At that time the crews knew one of them had been shot down and even before they landed at Lakenheath the results of the attack

Eldorado Canyon

Two SR-71 reconnaissance photographs of Benina aireld after the attack. ously, and also the rst time that KC-10As were involved in a Blackbird mission. A short while after take-off the Blackbird pilots encountered the returning F-111 formations, a magnicent sight as the low morning sun sharply illuminates the formations of tankers and ghters, according to one of them. The Libyans and Russians called these missions the third and fourth attack, even though no bombs were dropped. Moreover, they even claimed to have shot down 20 aircraft during this attack! Needless to say the truth was quite different as both SR-71As returned to RAF Mildenhall, at 08.35Z and 09.48Z respectively. As the results of these missions were less than satisfactory due to bad weather and equipment malfunctions, more missions were executed with both SR-71As on 16 April and 17 April. This was reasonably special, as it rarely happened that the same aircraft ew on consecutive days. The Blackbirds were tracked by Libyan air defences on all missions, there even were some SAM launches, but they remained invincible.

(Department of Defense)

ers had not been able to take off as well. In a later study, the Libyan air defences had been compared with the air defences in the Soviet Union and it transpired that the Soviets only had three places that had better defences than Tripoli. The Libyans did not remain idle completely, however. Several SAM and AAA batteries had been moved around the city, ghters had been dispersed to other airelds to make them less vulnerable to attack and medical teams were on 24-hour stand-by in the hospitals. On the other hand, the city remained brightly lit! Initially, the results of the attack were not too good. All three targets had been hit, but only 4 F-111s succesfully dropped their bombs. Seven others simply missed and six others aborted due to various problems. The nal aircraft had been shot down. During the attack there also was some unfortunate collateral damage, hitting the French embassy. Ironically, it had been the French that had refused the Americans to overy their country! The embassies of Iran, Austria, Finland and Switzerland also received slight damage. Even though the results of the attack were not too good, the whole mission was as great technical success and they proved it was possible to mount an attack over such a long distance. The mission also highlighted the weaknesses of the F-111 and the areas in which improvements could be made. This experience proved fruitful during the rst Gulf War. Libya did not remain idle following the attack. They red a small number of Scud missiles against a USCG outpost on the island of Lampedusa halfway between Tunisia and Malta, but these fell into the sea and no damage was done. In Lebanon, two British and an American hostage were executed by Hezbollah. The two carriers remained on alert and even though Libyan ghters were airborne daily, they didnt venture to anywhere near the carriers. The results of the attack were very satisfactory in the long run. Qadaf was really shaken up by the attack and over the next year the number of Libyan-sponsored attacks by terrorists dwindled dramatically. Immediately following the conclusion of the operation President Reagan gave a speech in front of the national and international press during which he emphasized that this operation was an act of self defense against Libyan-sponsored terrorism. He said: Self defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission... a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Nothing has really changed...... Credits: US Air Force Association, Naval Historical Center, The Hook, BAR, Scott R. Wilson, Roel Reijne, Takafumi Hiroe, US Navy, Force for Freedom Michael J. F. Bowyer, Raid on Qadda Col Robert E. Venkus, The Untouchables Brian Shul & Walter Watson, Globalsecurity.org, orbat.com, usscoralsea.net

EPILOGUE
The F-111 crews had accomplished the impossible. They had just own one of the longest and most difcult combat missions in the history of aviation. Most of the pilots had never experienced combat except for a few ight leaders that had been in Vietnam. Most of them had never refueled from a KC-10A, let alone refueled from one at night and under complete radio silence! The Libyans knew they were coming and everything had to be coordinated with a simultanuous US Navy strike. Some mean feat! Unfortunately these factors did not bring the unit the recognition they rightly deserved. Even a proposal for a Presidential Unit Citation was turned down later. The unit as a whole never received any USAF citation or award for the mission, much to the dismay of the people at Lakenheath. They did, however, receive the US Navy Meritorious Unit Citation; the rst time ever that a USAF outt received such a Navy award. In reaction to all the bad press and the less than enthousiastic response from their superiors the unit made up all kinds of T-shirts, badges and baseball caps with sometimes politically rather incorrect texts, like LIBYA (Lakenheath Is Bombing Your Ass) and 48 TFW winner of North African Bombing Competition 86! The wings commanding ofcer, Col Sam W. Westbrook III, was worried by the large size of the attacking force, but he received his orders from, amongst others, the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. He was afraid that there would be too many aircraft over the target for a prolonged period, which would make them easy targets for the air defences. These had been on alert for some time already but the Libyans ignored the Russian warning about an impending attack on 13 April. The majority of the air defences did not see any action during the attack. According to the reports most AAA only started ring after the aircraft had departed. When they did re, they often used the aircrafts afterburners as an aiming point. Even the 3000 Russian advisors had not been able to properly motivate and control the Libyan military personnel and the Libyan ght-

Eldorado Canyon

KC-10A 79-1713 is another Eldorado Canyon veteran; it operated from RAF Fairford, supporting the EF-111A force. The photograph above as taken in 1985, during the mission it still carried the white scheme. (USAF photo)

F-111F 70-2413/LN of 494th TFS/48th TFW on the ightline at RAF Bentwaters during a visit to the base on 14 October 1983. This aircraft was part of Karma Flight and attacked the Azziziyah Barracks. (Kevin Foy)

Another aircraft of 494th TFS/48th TFW, this time 70-2405/LN, on the platform of Ramstein on a beautiful summers day in 1983. This aircraft, using callsign Lujac 24, attacked Tripoli airport with 500lb Snakeye bombs, but missed its intended targets. Initially, the aircraft acted as an air spare, but following the abort of Lujac 21, the aircraft continued to Libya. (Scott Wilson) Eldorado Canyon