Olsen vs.

Aldanese 43 Phil 64, April 28, 1922 Facts The Philippine Legislature, passed on February 4, 1916, Act No. 2613 entitled "an act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein." They empower the Collector of Internal Revenue to establish certain general and local rules respecting the classification, marking and parking of tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation to the United States. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations." The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco," and represented that the cigars were made from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual examination and inspection of said cigars, and stated to the petitioner that he did not see his way clear to the granting of petitioner's request, in view of the fact that the cigars which the petitioner was seeking to export were not made with long-filler nor were they made from tobacco exclusively the product of any of the three provinces, as provided in Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations" promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue and the said cigars were neither inspected nor examined by the said officer. Respondents allege that under section 11 of Act No. 2613 and section 5 of the Administrative Code of 1917, the Collector of Internal Revenue has discretionary power to decide whether the manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export to the United States fulfills the requisites prescribed by Administrative Order No. 35. That it is not within the jurisdiction of this court to order the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate to the petitioner. to the effect that the manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export is a product of the Philippine Islands, but it is for the Collector of Internal Revenue to exercise the power of issuing said certificate if after an inspection of said tobacco, he should find that "it conforms to the conditions required by Administrative order No. 35 with the exclusion of those conditions which, according to the said decision of the Supreme Courts, the Collector of Internal Revenue is not authorized to required under Act No. 2613." Issue 1. Whether or not the acts performed by the Collector of Internal Revenue are wrongful or illegal. 2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate to the petitioner.

Ruling 1. Yes. It appears from the whole purport and tenor of the answer that, in their refusal, the defendant were acting under, and relying upon, those portions of Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," which this court held to be null and void. 2. Yes. Although in this class of cases, as a general rule, a demand and refusal is prerequisite to the granting of a writ, it is not necessary where it appears from the record that the demand, if made, would have been refused. By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and we have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to examine or inspect the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very apparent that a request thereafter made to examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused.

The Public Schools District Supervisors Association vs Hon. Edilberto C. De Jesus G.R. NO. 157286, June 16, 2006 Facts Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic Education Act 2001," became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. On January 6, 2003, DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus issued DECS Office Order No. 1, which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9155. On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to declare as unconstitutional Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003. Issue Whether or not the IRR of R.A. No. 9155 as promulgated under DepEd Order No. 1, Series of 2003 expanded the law and included provisions which are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the subject law. Ruling It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law. Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. It was found in the review of the IRR that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid except Section 6.2(11), Rule VI thereof which provides that "donations or grants shall be reported only to the division superintendents." Such donations or grants must also be reported to the appropriate school district supervisors, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9155.. The other provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs. Drilon 176 SCRA 24, August 2, 1989 Facts Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988. 1. For the first year which will be paid on January 14, 1986 P200 to each covered employee. 2. For the second year which will be paid on January 16, 1987-P 200 to each covered employee. 3. For the third year which will be paid on January 16, 1988 P300 to each covered employee. Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, in sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to Inspection Authority No. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. Upon completion of the inspection, and based on payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows: 1. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83,200.00); and 2. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987, representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00). Issue Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement. Ruling As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in

collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640 do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus, petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic 6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This decision is immediately executory.

Romulo, Mabanta Law Office vs. Home Development Mutual Fund G.R. No. 131082, June 19, 2000 Facts Petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995, from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement plan. The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund. Petitioner submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules are invalid. In that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF. HDMF disapproved PETITIONERs application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase and/or, and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law. The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use and only instead of or in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing and, the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of and/or in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended. PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed. Issue Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power. Ruling YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or. It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or.

Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. Philippine Coconut Authority G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998 Facts Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. While the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. Issue Whether or not the resolution of the Philippine Coconut Authority which declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business is valid. Rulings In the first place, it could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned which setup the regulatory system by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988 she was no longer vested with legislative authority. The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA

Lupangco vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 77372, April 29, 1988 Facts PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.

Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the abovementioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Issue Whether or not the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination? Ruling We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors

Taada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 Facts The petitioner calls upon the court to subject all laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, executive orders, and administrative orders being enacted to be published first in the Official Gazette as well as a fifteen day period before said law can be made valid in accordance to Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Issue Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official Gazette is a requirement for its effectivity. Ruling For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about certain laws or decrees being enacted by their government, sufficient appropriation of time and publication is necessary. According to Article 2 of the Civil Code, all laws must be given 15 days upon its publication in the Official Gazette for it to be enacted. This is to give sufficient time for the people to learn of such laws as well as to respect their right to be informed. The respondents however brought up the fact that the Official Gazette may not be the most effective medium for the people to be educated of certain new laws given its erratic publication dates as well as its limited number of readers, with lieu of more potent mediums of instructions such as newspapers of general circulation because of its wide readership and regular dates of printing. The court nevertheless rules that such periodicals are not what is required by the Civil Code and such amendments are left to the legislative branch of the government. Having said this, the court finds in favor of publishing all laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, executive orders, and administrative orders with a 15 day leeway, or unless stated, for them to take into effect

De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998 Facts On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758, entitled An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. To implement Rep. Act 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides: Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, xxx shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds. Issue 1. Whether or not paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 can supplant or negate the express provisions of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758 which it seeks to implement. 2. Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Petitioners are of the view that par. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 prohibiting fringe benefits and allowances effective November 1, 1989, is violative of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758 which authorizes payment of additional compensation not integrated into the standardized salary which incumbents were enjoying prior to July 1, 1989. Rule 1. The DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are not listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758. 2. On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres 225 SCRA 417, Facts DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same. The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers. Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for HK. Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars. Issue Whether or not the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars. Ruling No. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging. The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino land based workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. The administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

People vs. Maceren 79 SCRA 450, October 18, 1977 Facts Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing. Section 76 penalizes violation of such with a fine of not less than P500 nor more than P5,000, and by imprisonment of not less than 6 months nor more than 5 years. And Section 83 provides that any other violation of the law or of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with it, shall be punishable with a fine of not more than P200 or imprisonment of not more than 6 months, or both. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon recommendation the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 prohibiting electro fishing in all fresh water fisheries. Such order imposed the penalty of a fine not exceeding P500 or imprisonment of not extending 6 months, or both. The municipal court quashed the complaint upon motion of the accused. On appeal, this was affirmed by the Court of First Instance on the ground that electro fishing is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in the Fisheries Law. It held that since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. In its appeal, the prosecution cites the following as the legal bases for the administrative order: 1. The rule-making power of the Department Secretary under Section 4 of the Fisheries Law; 2. The function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations promulgated under it and execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Commission of Fisheries; 3. The declared national policy to encourage, promote, and conserve our fishing resources; and 4. Section 83 of the Fisheries Law. Issue Whether or not Administrative Order No. 84-1 is valid. Ruling Yes. The prosecutions reference to Section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under the challenged administrative order is not the same as the penalty fixed in Section 83. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of

Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Administrative Order No. 84-1 and this order is not warranted under the Fisheries Commission. The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. And since it is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Order No. 84-1 is devoid of any legal basis. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. In the instant case, the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. The order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No 119761, August 29, 1996 Facts Fortune Tobacco manufactured the following cigaretter brands: Hope, More and Champion. Prior to RA 7654, these 3 brands were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax of 20 to 45%. Applying the amendment, the 3 brands should fallunder Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC and shall be taxed from 20 to 45%. However, on July 1, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued. Revenue Memorandum Circular37-93 which reclassified the 3 brands as locallymanufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. There classification was before RA 7654 took effect. In effect, the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC imposing upon these brands a rate of 55% instead of just 20 to45% under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC. Issue Whether or not Revenue Memorandum Circular 37-93 was valid and enforceable. Ruling No. There was lack of notice and hearing violated due process required for promulgated rules. Moreover, it infringed on uniformity of taxation/equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing foreign brands had not been included within the scope of the memo circular. Contrary to petitioners contention, the memo was not a mere interpretative rule but a legislative rule in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. Promulgated legislative rules must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules only provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.BIR, in reclassifying the 3 brands and raising their applicable tax rate, did not simply interpret RA 7654 but legislated under its quasi-legislative authority.

Philippine Consumer Foundation Inc. V. DECS Secretary GR Number 78385, August 31, 1987 Facts: The respondent issued a Department Order increasing school fees from 15% to 20% in all private schools as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS. The rate was reduced to 10% to 15% as sought by the petitioner for reconsideration. However, despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increase. Petitioner maintains that such Department Order was issued in violation of due process clause of Constitution as petitioner was not given DUE NOTICE AND HEARING before such order was issued. Thus, students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. Hence this petition for prohibition, seeking the judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. Issue Whether or not due process clause requires that prior notice and hearing are indispensable for the Department Order to be validly issued by an administrative agency. Ruling Petition is without merit. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. The assailed Department Order is meant to all private schools in the country for the school year 1987 to 1988. Thus, it is in the exercise of LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance. Thus, the Department Order is constitutional.

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board 192 SCRA 363, December 18, 1990 Facts On September 10, 1990, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation preferred separate applications with the Board for permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. And on September 21, 1990, the Board, in a joint (on three applications) Order granted provisional relief follows: Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172, this Board hereby grants herein applicants' prayer for provisional relief and, accordingly, authorizes said applicants a weighted average provisional increase of ONE PESO AND FORTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P1.42) per liter in the wholesale posted prices of their various petroleum products enumerated below, refined and/or marketed by them locally. Issue Whether or not the ERB acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Ruling No. Under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. Section 37 paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex parte, and which are subject to the resolution of the main case. Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. However, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority. However, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one. The Board, upon its own discretion and on the basis of documents and evidence submitted by private respondents, could have issued an order granting provisional relief immediately upon filing by private respondents of their respective applications. In this respect, the Court considers the evidence presented by private respondents in support of their applications i.e., evidence showing that importation costs of petroleum products had gone up; that the peso had depreciated in value; and that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) had by then been depleted as substantial and hence constitutive of at least prima facie basis for issuance by the Board of a provisional relief order granting an increase in the prices of petroleum products.

The Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of taxation. It is authorized by Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137. In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Board in issuing its questioned Order.

Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs. Secretary Michael Defensor GR. No. 163980, August 3, 2006 Facts Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association Inc. prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003 for being inconsistent with the law it seeks to implement and for being arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any right over the NGC East Side. Also, the OSG contends that since petitioner association is not the duly recognized peoples organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC. Issue Whether or not courts may review an IRR issued by an administrative office. Ruling Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies.