OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O.

2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Moday vs. CA February 20, 1997 | Romero Facts: Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89 which authorized the municipal mayor to expropriate one hectare portion of a lot along the national highway owned by Percival Moday to be used as a site for the Bunawan farmers center and other government facilities. The resolution was approved by the municipal mayor but upon transmission to the Sangguniang Panglalawigan, it was disapproved with a comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." Despite the disapproval, the municipality of Bunawan filed a petition for eminent domain against Moday before the RTC. It also filed a motion to enter upon the possession of the said land since it already had deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount for the expropriation. RTC granted the motion to take possession, and held that Sangguniang Panlalawigans failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. The sangguniang panlalawagians duty is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337. CA held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. (During the pendency of the case, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property.) Petitioners contend that the expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other municipal properties available for the purpose. Issue: WON the expropriation proceedings were proper Held: YES. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.

The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in LGC. The disapproval of the Sangguniang Panlalawagin doesnt render the said resolution null and void. The law gives the Sangguniang Panglalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cant disallow the resolution because the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain. The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. No evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations that the expropriation proceeditng was politically motivated was given. There was also no competent evidence of respondent municipality's "other available properties available for the same purpose." Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA May 17, 1993 | Quiason Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. Its governor filed two cases for expropriation against Ernesto and Efren N. San Joaquin. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. RTC denied the MTD and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court also issued a writ of possession. CA set aside the order of the trial court. also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the DAR to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land. Issues: (1) WON the expropriation proceedings are done for public use (2) WON the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform Held:

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(1) YES. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. (2) NO. It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use. ** This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan vs. IAC January 29, 1988 | Gutierrez, Jr. Facts: Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing.

The Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed Resolution No. 258 to show their intention to expropriate the a part of the respondent's parcel of land. The special committee created by the Office of the Provincial Governor to investigate on the matter recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road. The Provincial Board passed a resolution disapproving the proposal to expropriate the said land. However, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, also passed a resolution for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondents land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution, which prompted the petitioner Municipality to file special civil action for expropriation. After depositing the amount which corresponded to the market value of the land to PNB, the RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. It also issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the property. Upon respondents petition for review, CA reversed the RTC decision. However, upon MR by respondent, the decision was re-examined and reversed again. It held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. Issue: WON the CA erred in concluding that there is no genuine necessity for the expropriation of the land in question Held: NO. This is a factual issue that is outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (limited to errors of law only). There is no evidence on record, which shows a change in the factual circumstances of the case. There is no showing that some of the six other available cross roads have been closed or that the private roads in the subdivision may not be used for municipal purposes. What is more likely is that these roads have already been turned over to the government. The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity.

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There is a more appropriate lot for the proposed road. It has not been shown why that has not been the subject of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road. City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta June 24, 1983 | Gutierrez Facts: Ordinance No. 6118 was passed by the petitioner, which aimed to regulate the operation of a private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of QC. Section 9 provides that 6% of the total area of the cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers that have been residents of QC for at least 5 years before their death. The area designated should be used not later than 6 months from the approval of the application. Several years has passed and still the provision for the charity burial has not been enforced. Seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, a resolution was passed enjoining the city engineer from selling any more memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The city engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc that the ordinance would be enforced. This prompted the respondent to file a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus. The RTC declared the ordinance null and void. Since there are no factual issues involved, the city government and city council filed this petition. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. The respondent contends that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration. Issue: WON Section 9 of the ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power Held: NO. An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.

Police power is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by the charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. This simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. National Power Corporation vs. Jocson February 25, 1992 | Davide, Jr. Facts: Petitioner is a GOCC created by virtue of RA 6395 for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydraulic power, the production of power from any source. Petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases before the RTC to acquire a right-of-way easement for its Negros-Panay Interconnection Project. It will be utilized to construct its tower and trasmission lines, which alleges to cause little injury since the primary use of the lands will not be impaired by the transmission lines. RTC issued an order fixing the provisional values of the subject areas and directed petitioner to deposit the amount with the PNB. The market values mentioned in the Order are the same values appearing in the tax declarations of the properties. The defendant filed an MR saying that the provisional values had been set much too low. RTC issued another order increasing the provisional values of the properties. The RTC required the defendants to state in writing if they accept the adjusted provisional values. Upon a manifestation by the defendants, the RTC directed the

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petitioners to pay the defendants the full payment of their expropriated property. Petitioner filed this petition claiming that the provisional values were excessive and unconscionable amounts. Nevertheless, due to its urgent need for the areas to be able to complete the interconnection project as soon as possible, petitioner deposited the amounts representing the provisional values fixed by the respondent Judge. Still, petitioner laments, the latter persisted in his stubbornness by not issuing a writ of possession. The Rules provide that upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer its value. Petitioner claims this is a ministerial duty of the part of the respondent judge. Petitioner also contends that it was error for the judge to allow the defendants to fix the provisional value, considering that respondent Judge's valuation may still be overruled by the latter since they were given twenty-four (24) hours to state in writing whether or not they are accepting and withdrawing the amount already deposited by petitioner. Issues: WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in the manner he set the values for just compensation Held: YES. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and is otherwise either unmindful or ignorant of the law: when he fixed the provisional values of the properties for the purpose of issuing a writ of possession on the basis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitioner may derive in violation or in disregard of P.D. No. 42; in increasing the same without hearing; in directing the defendants to manifest within 24 hours whether they are accepting and withdrawing the amounts or not, representing the provisional values, deposited by the plaintiff for each of them as final and full satisfaction of the value of their respective properties; in declaring the provisional values as the final values and directing the release of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to the defendants even if not all of them made the manifestation; and in suspending the issuance of the writ of possession until after the suspending the amounts shall have been released to and received by defendants. There are two stages in every action of expropriation: 1) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit, and 2) the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken."

(This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than 3 commissioners.) However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner, after due notice to the defendant, to deposit with the PNB in its main office or any of its branches or agencies, an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. This assessed value is that indicated in the tax declaration. Notice to the parties is not indispensable. P.D. 42 effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining the provisional value. What is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purpose. No hearing is required for that purpose. All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned. In any event, petitioner deposited the provisional value fixed by the court. As a matter of right, it was entitled to be placed in possession of the property involved in the complaints at once, pursuant to both Section 2 of Rule 67 and P.D. No. 42. Respondent Court had the corresponding duty to order the sheriff or any other proper officer to forthwith place the petitioner in such possession. Instead of complying with the clear mandate of the law, respondent Judge chose to ignore and overlook it. He issued a new Order increasing the provisional values of the properties involved therein. No hearing was held on the motions. After having fixed these provisional values, respondent judge had lost plenary control over the order fixing the amount of the deposit, and has no power to annul, amend or modify it in matters of substance pending the course of the condemnation proceedings. The reason for this is that a contrary ruling would defeat the very purpose of the law which is to provide a speedy and summary procedure whereby the peaceable possession of the property subject of the expropriation proceedings "may be secured without the delays incident to prolonged and vexatious litigation touching the ownership and value of such lands, which should not be permitted to delay the progress of the work." City of Manila vs. Arellano College February 28, 1950 | Tuason Facts: This action arose from the expropriation proceedings of several parcels of land located on Legarda Street, City of Manila. Section 1 of RA 267 provides that cities and municipalities are allowed to contracts loans from from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Philippine National Bank, and/or other entity or person at the rate of interest not exceeding 8% per annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their jurisdiction and reselling them to residents at cost.

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The lower court ruled that this provision authorizes cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action. Issues: WON the expropriation of the parcels of land is proper Held: NO. To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifices for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises. R. A. No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for homesites. The word expropriating, taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only one meaning. This power to expropriate, however, is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions provided in the legislation. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interest involved are of considerable magnitude. In the present case, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. The land in question has cost the owner P140,000. The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, unless they intend to borrow the money with a view to disposing of the property later for a profits. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants' needs and means, if really they only want to own their own homes, are plenty elsewhere. While a handful of people stand to profit by the expropriation, the development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed. Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of a young men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake. Rural Progress Administration: "the necessity of the Arellano Law College to acquire a permanent site of its own is imperative not only because denial of the same

would hamper the objectives of that educational institution, but it would likewise be taking a property intended already for public benefit." Even the mayor of the city believes the plaintiff is entitled to keep this land. City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila October 31, 1919 | Johnson Facts: The city of Manila filed a petition for the expropriation of certain lands in the district of Tondo for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila, answered the petition alleging that it was not necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes because there are existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation. It explained that the lands in question had been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes and if exprorpation proceedings will be granted, it will disturb the resting place of the dead, which would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites RTC decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. Plaintiff argues that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question. Issue: WON courts could inquire into the necessity of expropriation Held: YES. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right, some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must find not only 1) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but also 2) that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions. It is true that many decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use is a legislative question, and many

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other decisions declaring with equal emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately a judicial question. The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff. The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. Malcolm, J., concurring: The case, then, is one of where the city of Manila, under a general authority permitting it to condemn private property for public use, is attempting to

convert a property already dedicated to a public use to an entirely different public use; and this, not directly pursuant to legislative authority, but primarily through the sole advice of the consulting architect. Street, J., dissenting: The authorities of the city of Manila are the proper judges of the propriety of the condemnation and that this Court should have nothing to do with the question of the necessity of the taking. Moir, J., dissenting: It is a right of the city government to determine whether or not it will construct streets and where, and the court's sole duty was to see that the value of the property was paid the owners after proper legal proceedings ascertaining the value. The law gives the city the right to take private property for public use. It is assumed it is unnecessary to argue that a public road is a public use. The legislature, in providing for the exercise the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement or public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for these of the representatives of the people. The fact that lands have previously been devoted to cemetery purposes does not place them beyond the reach of the power of eminent domain. That is an absolute transcendent power belonging to the sovereign which can be exercised for the public welfare whenever the sovereign authority shall determine that a necessity for its exercise exists. By its existence the homes and the dwellings of the living, and the resting-places of the dead may be alike condemned. Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation July 20, 1998 | Panganiban Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 9395, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a complaint for expropriation against respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. The sangguniang bayan made an offer to respondent which it didnt accept hence, this proceeding. RTC gave due course to the petition and authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15

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percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. In its answer, respondent alleged that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by LGC; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Later on, RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Issues: (1) WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action (2) WON principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is applicable when public interest is primarily involved Held: (1) NO. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous LGC. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain (2) NO. The principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment

or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use." While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. The power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. City of Cebu vs. Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo May 7, 2002 | Davide, Jr. Facts: Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondent spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. Petitioner city claims it needs the lands for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. Petitioner argues that only a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc., will benefit the said expropriation and not the general public. During pre-trial the parties have partially settled the case. On the basis of the commissioners report, RTC ordered the plaintiff to pay the Dedamo spouses. Petitioner later on questioned the accuracy of the commissioners report, saying that it included an area, which was not subject to expropriation in this case. The commissioner amended the report and fixed the amount of just compensation to be paid at around P20.8 million. In the CA, petitioner alleged that the amount given by the commissioner was erroneous, claiming that the just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. CA affirmed the RTC decision. Issue: WON just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint (1993) or at the time the property was actually taken (1994) Held: It should be determined at the time the property was taken (since petitioner agreed to it during the pre-trial and thus, is in estoppel). Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. However,

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the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor. The petitioner has misread the ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. That case did not categorically rule that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. HOWEVER, the rule admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment. While Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law. Republic of the Philippines (represented by Philippine Information Agency) vs. CA July 2, 2002 | Vitug Facts: 1969: Petitioner filed expropriation proceedings of the contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner took over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. 1979: Nine years after the institution of the exporpriation proceedings, RTC finally issued an order for the condemnation of the properties of the defendants. 1984: Respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property since the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the earlier decision. The RTC issued a writ of execution which was not complied with again. This prompted the respondents to file another motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969. The RTC granted the motion. President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine

carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. Despite this, the Santos heirs remained unpaid. 1999: Petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court the amount earlier agreed for the expropriated property subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. The heirs filed a countermotion adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents; it vacated its earlier decision and declared it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription. CA denied the petition outright due to a procedural defect but the petition was given due course due to it being imbued with public interest. Respondents contend that the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment within five years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. Petitioner claims that the receipt by respondents of partial compensation constituted partial compliance and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription. Issue: (1) WON the lower court correctly ruled in vacating its earlier judgment (NO) (2) WON the respondents are entitled to the return of their property (NO) (3) WON the respondents deserve to be paid the fair market value of the land at present (NO. They are entitled to be paid the just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC with legal interests of 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property until the due amount is fully paid.) Held: The power of eminent domain is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining public use, two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the

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The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. The difference in purpose between the original use and present use of the property is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.