The "Gulag Archipelago" and the Left Author(s): Boris Frankel Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 1, No.

4 (Winter, 1974), pp. 477-495 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/656913 . Accessed: 02/01/2011 02:57
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Theory and Society.

http://www.jstor.org

477

Review Article

THE "GULAG ARCHIPELAGO"AND THE LEFT

BORIS FRANKEL

1
One can wholeheartedly sympathize with Roy Medvedev'sprefatory comment that this is a "provisionalopinion" on the GulagArchipelago."No one will," Medvedevbelieves, "risefrom his chairafter readingthis book the same as he sat down to open it at page 1. In this sense there is quite simply nothing in either Russian literature or the literature of the world with which I can compare Solzhenitsyn's book."' While Medvedevis undoubtedly correct in his estimation of the traumatic consequences which a readingof the Gulag will induce for Soviet readers, he over-estimatesthe sensitivity of most Westernreaderswho have either not experiencedSoviet conditions or who do not care about the meaning of the October Revolution because they have always opposed it, or because they grew to oppose it. Solzhenitsyn'sbooks have been evaluatedby non-Sovietcriticslargelyin termsof literarystyle and quality, and not enough in terms of what social repercussionswould follow from the publicationwithin the U.S.S.R. of works such as The First Circle. With the Gulagit is different. Everywhereduringthe last year, governments, the media, critics, all have been endorsingor condemningthe book. Thereis no doubt about the massiveanti-communistpropaganda campaignwhich has been associatedwith Westernpublication,just as there is no doubt about the political capital which Soviet authoritieshave manipulatedby pointing to the Gulag'spromotionin the capitalistworld. But the aftermath of Solzhenitsyn'sexpulsion, the rocking of detente, etc., witnessed the absorption of the Gulag into the accumulatedrepertoire of anti-communist"totalitarian"literaturemuch to the smugsatisfactionof the political Right. After being momentarilysickened by the horrendousdetails, Westernliberalstoo will not be greatly touched by the political implications of the Gulag;most have long ago disassociatedthemselvesfrom the repressive quality of Soviet practice, even if they are still sympathetic to the Soviet
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

478 Union's great material achievements. Moreover, liberals have increasingly revealed their affinity with conservativeviews of "humannature."Whereas many pre-war liberals could still believe in the ideal of the Enlightenment because the U.S.S.R. was implementingscientific planningfor the improvement of humanity (as opposed to Nazi Germany),Solzhenitsyn'srevelations about Soviet history have only compounded the post-war disillusionment with technology and the possibilityof movingtowardsthe "perfectibility"of scientism, man. While one can endorse their rejectionof the Enlightenment's liberals have unfortunately replaced one ontology-progress-with another: the conviction that man will alwaysbe inherently"defective."The Gulagwill thus enforce all those who seek evidence of "man's eternal depravity,"and comfort those who knew all along what could happenif people subscribedto holistic and messianicdoctrines.2 But even if variousconservativesand liberals dispute the theses presentedin th Gulag, it is my belief that they are already too favourably disposed to Solzhenitsyn'sargumentsto derivethe benefit of criticalself-reflectionwhich the book should hopefully instigate. The only audience which can have a critically meaningful relationshipto Solzhenitsyn'sdocument is the Marxist Left. However,it is clear that not all the variousMarxistgroups,partiesand individualsare disposed to examine critically Solzhenitsyn'sbook, let alone acknowledgehis theses. By concentratingon Solzhenitsyn'shistoriographical of method I hope to comparethe Gulag with variousMarxistinterpretations Soviet history, and, at the same time, show the interrelationshipbetween and political practice. historiography 2 It is importantto keep in mind the fact that Solzhenitsyn'swork belongsto the first generation of non-Western(including Russian emigre), and nonParty, post-1953 historiography.In contrast to the work of exiled Trotsof the RussianRevolution, kyists, Mensheviksand other Russian participants Solzhenitsyn's generation is not interested in merely cleansing the grossly distorted account given by Party history books. Although there are certainly this and Sakharovs, enough differencesbetween the Solzhenitsyns,Medvedevs beliefs their no defined is respective of by critics longer new generation Party and practices in 1917. Solzhenitsyn did not have the luxury of being in contact with alternativesocio-culturalsources and materiallife as did other Russianemigresor Westernacademics.His dialecticwith Soviet authoritiesis the dialectic of one who was socialized and educated within the sphere of dominant Soviet norms: and while Solzhenitsyn attempts to transcendthe norms of Soviet culture and legality, his very criticisms are often in them-

479 selves perverted reflections of the very logic and practice which he abhors. Insofar as Solzhenitsyn is a total victim (and product) of the Soviet "experience," the strengthsand weaknessesof his appraisalare in proportionto his empathy with contemporarySoviet "populist" perceptionsof, and relations with, Soviet institutions. The Gulag is written as half documentaryand half autobiography.By using his own experiences as focal points for the elucidation of the collective experience, Solzhenitsyn'svery sensitivityleaveshim open to attack. Writtingin the GuardianIrwin Silber expresses "methodological"disbelief: "I was prepared to defend 'The Gulag Archipelago'(he states), if it offered us reasonable documentation, let alone punctilious proof, of the gross violations of socialist legality of the Stalin era. For there can be little question, it seems to me, that grave distortions of proletariannorms and widespreadmiscarriages of socialist justice took place in those years. But both 'The Gulag Archipelago' and the incrediblepublicity campaignsupportingit are, to put it bluntly, frauds."3 In his preoccupation with exposing the political ramificationsof the book's receptionin the West, Silberbecomes blind and insensitiveto what Solzhenitsynis exposing. It is relativelyeasy to point to Solzhenitsyn'spartial reliance on rumours and exaggerated statistics (e.g., his account of the Leningrad purges) as a means of substantiating his failure to produce "punctilious proof." The Gulag is not lacking in numerousweaknesses(as I will discuss later on), but it is hardly a fraud. Unfortunately,the Silbersof this world can only comprehend the dehumanizingatrocities depicted by Solzhenitsyn as "gravedistortions of proletariannorms." Silber is so caught up in the use of reified euphemisms such as "proletariannorms" and the "widespreadmiscarriages of socialist justice" that he fails to see that he is directly affirming Solzhenitsyn's worst accusations against the Party. "Is Solzhenitsyn a deliberate liar?" Silber asks with incredible opaqueness, "Probablynot. He seems to be of that breed of self-pityingpetty bourgeois intellectual who is constantly reproducingthe entire universe in his own image." At last we have the Maoist prognosis of Solzhenitsyn and his 227 "informants," they are suffering from severe petty bougeois subjectivism, and have thus misconstruedthe objective world of "socialistconstruction"by creating"images"of mass sufferingand brutality. But then Solzhenitsyn understandswhy the Silbers are imperviousto the "unbelievable"events he depicts. "From childhood on," he notes, "we are educated and trained-for our own profession; for our civil duties, for military service; to take care of our bodily needs; to behave well; even to appreciatebeauty (well, this last not really all that much! ). But neitherour education, nor our upbringing,nor our experiencepreparesus in the slightest

480 for the greatest trial of our lives: being arrestedfor nothing and interrogated about nothing."4 The truth of the Gulag lies in Solzhenitsyn'saccumulation of personal and mass experiences of arrest, interrogation, torture and incarceration.In the first four chapters of "The Prison Industry" Solzhenitsyn vividly depicts all those formerly cold and lifeless sociological categories such as atomization which theorists of totalitarianismmainly used for model building.One identifies with Solzhenitsyn'sdescriptionof arrestas "an instantaneous, shatteringthrust, expulsion, somersault from one state into another."5 Just as "both the most sophisticated and the veriest simpleton among us, drawingon all life's experience, can gasp out only: "Me? What for?,"6 so too, the most sophisticatedand the veriestsimpleton of readersis draggedby Solzhenitsyn in a dazed state through the "SewageDisposalSystem." Even the readerwho is most familiarwith the Soviet terrorcannot help but still be shakenby the numerousincidentswhich Solzhenitsynrelates.The countless petty frame-ups,irrationalitiesassociatedwith the cult of personality, the imaginationand deviousness of the Bluecaps in stagingarrestsand then providingthe appropriatetortures,and accommodation."Arrestsrolled through the streets and apartmenthouses like an epidemic. Just as people transmit an epidemic infection from one to another without knowing it, by such innocent means as a handshake,a breath, handingsomeone something, so too, they passed on the infection of inevitablearrestby a handshake,by a breath, by a chance meeting on the street."7Pageafter pageis full of endless lists of victims of every conceivable variety. But just as the long-seasoned prisonerprobably ceased to be surprisedabout the scope or natureof Soviet repression,so too, the readerbecomes hardenedby the middle of the book. Solzhenitsyn has strippedbare whateverinnocence we initially possessedand now proceedsto document the institutionalizationof variousnormsof Soviet legality. However, at that point when our attention has flaggedthroughsheer system exhaustion, Solzhenitsyn unveils all the horrorsof the transportation and the ports of the Archipelago. "The prisoners considered April and Septemberthe best months for transports.But even the best of seasons was too short if the train was en route for three months."8 Will geography teachers ever be able to analyse the one-sixth of the world's land surface in the same way again? And what about Solzhenitsyn's effective method of dispellingconventionalimages of prison life. "In literaturethe latrinebucket has become the symbol of prison,a symbol of humiliation,of stink. Oh, how frivolous can you be? Now was the latrine bucket really an evil for the prisoner? On the contrary, it was the most merciful device of the prison administration.The actual horror began the moment there was no latrine bucket in the cell."9 that Because Solzhenitsyn is totally preoccupiedin the task of guaranteeing

481 none of us forget all the atrocitieswhich Soviet authoritiesdo not want us to remember-let alone discover-the historicaltruths of barbaricrepressioncannot be denied. As Barrington MooreJr. put it, "sympathywith the victims of historical processesand skepticism about the victors' claimsprovideessential safeguardsagainst being taken in by the dominant mythology."'10 While Solzhenitsynhas been fightingthe "dominantmythology" for years, this very strugglehas blinded him in his analysisof "historicalprocesses."If the Gulag was simply an answerto Khrushchev's distortion that "from approximately 1934, violations of Leninist norms of legality began,"' 1 then one could readilyidentify with the book. But then Solzhenitsynis not merely interested in showing that "violations of Leninist norms of legality" began as early as 1918. The truth of Solzhenitsyn'sdocumentationof pre-andpost 1934 terror emerges despite all his own distortions of history. How paradoxical(yet understandable)that Solzhenitsyn should unwittingly resort to the use of Stalinist historiographical methods as a means of exposing the dehumanized base of "socialist construction." Thus it is necessary to identify Solzhenitsyn's weaknessesbefore comparinghis truths with other analystsof Soviet history; only then can the myths attachedto "Leninism"and "Stalinism"be confronted. 3 Just as Soviet authorities have largely obliterated historical accounts of groups or individuals who held opposite views to the Party, so too, has Solzhenitsyn totally ignored the views and actions of the Bolsheviksby applying in reversethe Party's "control over the past." Because he is so intent on cataloguingall the victims of the "SewageDisposalSystem," Solzhenitsyn is almost totally obliviousof the historicallyspecific conditions in which mass sufferingoccurred.I will not repeat all the glaringinadequaciesof the Gulag which have been coveredby variousreviewers(especiallyErnestMandel)'2 in connection with the thoroughly one-sided account offered by Solzhenitsyn. But it is important that readers refer to Solzhenitsyn's Letter to Soviet Leaders in order to comprehendmore fully his brief but disturbinglyconfused Weltanschauung. One could not say that Solzhenitsyn is simply an anti-Sovietreactionaryin the classicalsense of the word;there is too much of the Stalinist heritage left in his thought. The statisticaldocumentationof the Gulag is related to Solzhenitsyn'sconcern for "sufferingRussia."Sixty-six to ninety million deaths are somehow all layed at the door of Soviet ideology. Although he mentions two world wars, Solzhenitsyn ultimately blames Marxismfor bearing "the entire responsibilityfor all the blood that has been shed."'3 Amidst the revelation of the most obnoxious chauvinistic, xenophobic and racist ideas, Solzhenitsyn championsa pervertedform of "social-

482 ism in one country." "Throw away the dead ideology that threatens to destroy us militarily and economically," he appeals, "throw away all its fantastic alien global missions and concentrateon opening up (on the prin' 4 His economy) the RussianNorth-East." ciples of a stable, non-progressive sexism also shines through his isolationist recommendationof the abandonso that Russianwomen can ment of financingSouth Americanrevolutionaries be relieved of doing heavy roadwork:"internalgrowth"requiresthat women confine their "slavery"to the domestic sphere so that good Russianfamilies will flourish.'5 To help understandSolzhenitsyn'sposition we can profit from MaxWeber's 1905 analysis of the capacity of Russia to develop bourgeois liberal institutions. One of the reasons he doubted the ability of Russian society to produce liberalismwas the crucial difference between Roman Catholicismand the RussianOrthodox Church.Accordingto Weber,the RussianChurch"has no Archimedianpoint outside the sphere of the state, in the form of a pope, and will never get one."' 6 Becauseof this dependenceupon the state, Weber argued that "the history and form of organizationof the Orthodox Church makes it quite improbablethat, however transformed,it could ever set itself up as a representativeof civil liberties against the power of the police state."'7 This authoritarianquality of Russian orthodoxy is amply manifested in Solzhenitsyn's praise of a thousand years of strong moral authoritarianism. Thus it is not authoritarianismwhich is intolerable, but only regimeswho lie to the people. Solzhenitsyncravesso much for authoritarian naivete a return to the spiritualdependenceof the past, that his embarrassing will protect leads him to believe that a morally upright authoritarianism freedom and cultivate"love of your fellow men" insteadof "classhatred."'8 It is importantto recognize Solzhenitsyn'sconfused beliefs in orderto comprehend his historiographicalmethod in the Gulag. There are numerous entries scatteredthroughout the book which do considerableinjusticeto the historical record and confirm Solzhenitsyn's intense chauvinism, religious sexist perspectiveand compromisedattitude to the struggle authoritarianism, for freedom. By comparingthe barbarityof Soviet repressionwith Tsarist Russia, Hitler'sGermany,South African racists, etc., Solzhenitsyn'smethod results in the depiction of the latter in a favourablelight-even though a relativeone. Moreover,Solzhenitsyn'sjustifiableanguishover the sufferingof Soviet citizens has resultedin his supportof a whole rangeof anti-Communist policies and beliefs simply because he detests the Soviet Government. Endorsementof WesternCold War theories about internationalevents, and as well as mockery of BertrandRussell'sWar the U.S. position in Indo-China, of the more glaringexamples.'9 In general, are some Crimesinvestigation just

483 Solzhenitsyn (for all his moral rhetoric), is incredibly insensitiveand inconsistent when it comes to opposing repressionin countries outside the Soviet Bloc. But not only does Solzhenitsyn adopt the Party's attitude of evaluating events in terms of "who is not wholly with us must be against us," his analysis of historical processes also suffers from lack of rigour(not due to lack of sources), and more importantly, a fundamentallyahistoricalvision of the world. Let me illustratethis with a few excerpts. Revealing his ascetic prescriptions and reliance on "populist" wisdom, Solzhenitsyn states that "there is a simple truth which one can learn only through suffering:in war not victories are blessed but defeats. Governments need victories and the people need defeats. Victory gives rise to the desirefor more victories. But after a defeat it is freedom that men desire-and usually attain. A people needs defeat just as an individualneeds sufferingand misfortune: they compel the deepeningof the inner life and generatea spiritual upsurge."20 Apart from the fact that Solzhenitsyn does not distinguish historicallybetween battles fought for the glory of kings and those fought for the mass protection or improvement of human life (e.g., the victory of Poltava comparedwith the victory over Hitler or the victory over ChiangKai Shek-the latter being an event which Solzhenitsyn laments! ), his endorsement of the necessity of suffering for the generationof "a spiritualupsurge" leads to a curiously contradictory position. As "defeats" are more "beneficial" than victories, Solzhenitsyn argues that "the Crimean War, and the Japanese War, and our war with Germanyin the First WorldWar-all these 1 defeats broughtus freedom and revolution."2 If 1917 usheredin "freedom and revolution," how does Solzhenitsynreconcile this favourablestatement with his accusation concerningthe responsibility for over sixty-six million deaths? In the Gulaghe beginsto document the "Sewage System" from November 1917 with the outlawing of the Cadets (whom he tries to convince us were "the most dangerousranksof revolution" under the Tsar! ). But in Letter to Soviet LeadersSolzhenitsyndeclaresthat "the Soviets, which gave their name to our system and existed until 6 July 1918, were in no way dependent upon ideology: ideology or no ideology, they always envisaged the widest possible consultation with all working people."22 Leavingaside the question of ideology until later, it is clear that Solzhenitsyn cannot have it both ways. If the "GulagArchipelago"was instituted in November1917, then Solzhenitsyncannot ignoreall the Bolshevik Party activities within the Soviets before November 1917 and up until July 1918. It was many of these same Soviets which endorsedthe Bolsheviks'early

484 policies creatingthe "Sewage System"-the Soviets which also partiallysupported an ideology that Solzhenitsynsimultaneouslycondemnsbut depicts as part of the "spiritualregeneration!" It also appearsthat Solzhenitsyn opposes the "defeat" at the Brest-Litovskpeace treaty because Russia was obliged to provide Germany with many carloads of food supplies-from a Russia he says "which had been deprivedof a protestingvoice, from the very provinceswhere famine would strike-so that Germanycould fight to the end in the West."23 Solzhenitsyn is so historically confused with his analogies, that his attempt to imply similaritybetween Brest Litovsk and Stalin's and Khrushchev'ssupport of external anti-Westernforces (at the expense of Russianconsumers),even goes againsthis own moralevaluationof "victories" and "defeats." Or would Solzhenitsyn have preferredno peace treaty and a return to mass slaughterand suffering which Germanarmieshad earlierinflicted upon the Tsar who was in quest of "Governmentvictory?" Which provinces "deprivedof a protesting voice" would have rushed to man the armies (in 1918) following so soon after the mass desertionsfrom the antiGerman front lines! There is little doubt that the food requisitionedby Germanycontributedto the overall scale of the famine. But Solzhenitsyn is characteristicallyoblivious of the historical context of Brest-Litovskand many other events. It is importantto emphasizeSolzhenitsyn'sahistoricalmethodology because it is vital when one is forced to confront his frequent comparisonsof the "Sewage System" with Tsarist Russia and Hitler's Germany.If one were to merely compute the numberof victims, tortures,generalsuffering,etc., then historical meaningwould be an unnecessaryburden: computers could easily show that the number of deaths and suffering within the Soviet State was quantitativelyas great or greaterthan within Nazi Germany.At one level of analysis Solzhenitsyn's comparative approach is valid; there is enough evidence to show that Soviet methods of terrorwere of sufficient varietyand scope to rivalthe Nazis. But the "technique"of terroronly tells us something about the material and intellectual capacitiesat the disposal of a particular historical epoch. Documentingthe systematic and random natureof particular manifestationsof social and individualirrationalitydoes not, in itself, tell us enough about the rationale(or lack of it) behind the irrational.Terroris not ahistorical.Only those who ignore the objectives of the terroristsas well as the specific historical conditions which allow terror to be inflicted, and passivelyreceived,will arriveat somethingmore than a mere comprehension of the quantitative.Insofar as Solzhenitsyn is quite explicit in his evaluation of who is guilty, there is no pretence of being a dispassionatecomputer.But to the extent that Solzhenitsyn has almost no time or space for historicity, his analysis barely surmounts the positivismof "totalitarian"models which

485 evaluate pure technique. It is only his literaty synthesis of personal and collective experiences that preservesthe truth of events depicted. Thus the old conflict between literary and scientific truths emergesonce more. With Solzhenitsynthe problemis associatedwith the very concept of an "Archipelago." From actual geographicallocations, Solzhenitsynextends the reality of Siberian camps to a "national Archipelago"-"'inthe psychological sense, fused onto a continent-an almost invisible, almost imperceptible country inhabited by the zek people."24 This symbol of the Soviet terrorsystem only compounds Solzhenitsyn's historical distortions. While a literary metaphor can encapsulate the accumulated feelings and events of a generation,closer examinationalso revealsthe majorshortcomingswhich generalizedextrapolations such as the "Gulag Archipelago"create. By using the concept of an "Archipelago"Solzhenitsyn argues for the continuity of a system of terror from 1918 to the present day. But neither the victims of the "SewageSystem" nor the extent (or very systematic nature) of its operations was the same in 1918, 1938, or 1958. Solzhenitsyn attributesa certainhomogeneity of objectives and logic to the "Gulag"even though he clearlyrecognizesthe differences between victims such as kulaks, party chiefs, church leaders or CrimeanTartars.Only detailed historicalanalysiscan adequatelydifferentiate the victims and methods of Soviet repression from one another and from pre-Sovietand non-Sovietterror.In short, Solzhenitsyn'smethodology makes it impossible to distinguishbetween that historical form of violence waged out of social necessity (no matter how far it got out of control of explicit instructions from the Party or its opponents, e.g., the Civil War),and that terror which was used indiscriminatelyin the 1930's, or is being used for selectiverepressionof dissidentsat the moment. 4 Up to this point I have been quite critical of Solzhenitsyn'smethodological approach to Soviet history. But despite his glaring inconsistencies, Solzhenitsyn providesa greatdeal of materialwhich can be fruitfully comparedwith Marxist historical accounts. Generally, Solzhenitsyn is not interested in depicting Stalin as a super-monster.If anything, there is an obvious understatement of Stalin's importance or responsibility compared with accounts given by Roy Medvedev or a whole range of Western Marxistsand nonMarxists. According to Solzhenitsyn, the Bolshevik Party was a necessary accomplice: "the majority of those in power, up to the very moment of their own arrest,were pitiless in arrestingothers, obediently destroyed their peers in accordancewith those same instructions and handed over to retribution any friend or comrade-in-arms of yesterday. And all the big Bolsheviks,who now wear martyrs'halos, managedto be the executionersof other Bolsheviks

486 (not even taking into account how all of them in the first place had been the executioners of non-Communists)."25 This thesis is also concisely phrasedin his now famous comment that Stalin "followed the beaten path exactly as it had been signposted,step by step."2 6 Insofar as Solzhenitsyn overlooks the many differences between Stalin's predecessors,successorsand contemporaries,his interpretationis not acceptable either as a credible account of the many Party personalitiesinvolved,or as an analysis of the possibilitiesof Soviet development,which is only conpath. This is not the place to engagein a detailed ceded a rigid predetermined Stalin necessary?". But insofaras question-"was discussionof the perennial Solzhenitsyn exaggeratesthe homogeneity of Soviet Party terror,his thesis of Marxistaccountsof instigatesthe need for a brief, but criticalreassessment post-1917 history. Except for the various defenders of Stalin, there appears to be substantial unanimity among liberals, Marxists and conservativesin condemning the by mass slaughter,directedat period of Stalin's power as being characterized of both the old Bolsheviksand the great variety ever increasing"enemies of the people." Solzhenitsyn reinforces this interpretationof the Stalin years with numerous revelations of how irrational, paranoic witch-hunts for "wreckers" and all forms of scapegoats, severely retarded industrial and agrariandevelopments and a whole range of social and military goals and capacities.The new "feudal"laws of punishmentfor absenteeism,failure to work a set numberof days for the new industrialoverlord,etc., were felt by countless numbers.Stalin'sterroris still excused by apologistswho arguethat had not Hitler would never have been defeated if "forced" industrialization been carried out. According to Silber, ChairmanMao's precept that Party controversiesshould be settled in a democraticmanner"did not consistently prevail during the period of Stalin's leadership.But at the same time, one must not fall into the trap of seeing such errors as the principalaspect of Stalin's leadership.To do so is to deny the realitiesof socialistreconstruction and the heroic achievementsof the anti-Nazi war."27 Despite Silber'scontinued belief in the Stalinist propagandamachine, substantial historical evidence has been accumulatedto show that not only "socialist reconstruction" but also the "heroic achievements" of the anti-Nazi war were won despite Stalin's government.The purgesof militaryranks,the costly blunders and incompetenceduringthe crucialearly years of the war of unpreparedness are only one side of Stalin's tarnishedimage. The myths of his "leadership" qualities were accentuated by a combination of the patriotism ignited by Hitler'sbrutal treatment of the Soviet population, the ruthlesscommandsof generalssuch as Zhukovwho absolutelyforbaderetreatin key battles, and of

487 course the large punishment battalions which were used as cannon fodder against superior German technology. While one should never discount the importanceof the build-upof industry before 1941, it would be a complete whitewash of Stalin's policies to let the myth of "socialist construction"be doubly vindicatedby the non-socialistconduct of the anti-Naziwar. Given the growing (but not unanimous)consensusover Stalin'srole in Soviet history, the dispute between Solzhenitsyn and Marxists is over Stalin's predecessorsand contemporaries. If Solzhenitsynwants to establishcomplete continuity of governmentfrom 1917 on, Marxistsare anxious to show a clear discontinuity of development. Depending on whether you follow Lenin or Trotsky, discontinuity will be establishedwith Stalin in the period between 1921 and 1929; if one follows Luxemburg, the Council Communists, anarchists,etc., the discontinuity of 1917 with Stalin (and Lenin) will begin in the period between 1918 and 1921. Each group subscribesto different reasons for the betrayal of the revolution, but yet also ignores(to a lesseror greaterdegree)the historicalcontext and capacitiesof the actors involved. Because of their interest in apologizing for Stalin, people like Silber link Solzhenitsyn to the bourgeoisieand Trotskyists. As the largest anti-Stalinist Marxist groups in the West, the various Trotskyist organizationsare vitally interested in refuting Solzhenitsyn and yet defending "Leninism."But the Trotskyists are unable to surmount all of Solzhenitsyn's accusationsagainst the BolshevikParty because of their involvementin the defence of the Lenin and Trotsky cults of personality. Too much emphasis is placed upon the "bureaucratic counterrevolution"after Lenin's death, and thus the pre-1924 actions of the Party are defended on inadequateor dubious grounds. Ernest Mandel (in an otherwise reasonable critique of Solzhenitsyn), claims that "our epoch is the epoch of the death agony of the capitalist system. The longer this death agony is prolonged, the more featuresof barbarism, bloody repression,and contempt for humanlife will proliferate.In this historic sense, Stalin is a product of capitalism, just as much as Hitler, Auschwitz, Hiroshima,and the bombing and defoliation of Vietnam. He is not the pro-. duct of Soviet society or the October Revolution."28 This projection of internal atrocities onto the shouldersof capitalismis an historical distortion equal to Solzhenitsyn's accusation against Marxist ideology. For too long Marxistshave lived off the myth associatedwith the failure of world revolution to break out. In 1922 Trotsky stated that "if our October Revolution had taken place a few months, or even a few weeks, after the establishmentof the rule of the proletariatin Germany,France,and England,there can be no doubt that our revolution would have been the most "peaceful,"the most "bloodless" of all possible revolutionson this sinful earth."29 One can cer-

488 tainly agree that foreign intervention, etc. would have been substantiallyless or non-existent, but to think that socialist revolution would have been accepted or implemented smoothly without mass internal resistance,is being historicallynaiveor blind. In their anxiety to distinguishthe "truth" of Leninism from the "perversions" of Stalinism,contemporaryMarxistsgive too much ammunitionto the Solzhenitsyns,because of the reluctanceto acknowledgethe far from admirable role which the Party played in pre-1924 events, While Solzhenitsyn is grossly unjust in depicting the Party as havingbasicallythe same policies and attitudes throughout its entire existence, the truth of complicity by Party members in their own and national repressionis beyond doubt. Just as one needs to emphasizeSolzhenitsyn'sfailureto considerthe historicalcontext of civil war violence comparedto the purgesof the 1930's, etc., so too, one must avoid the pitfall of historicallylocating terror, and thereby using this historical context as a means of excusing its excesses away. The reason why defenders of "Leninism"cannot totally surmountSolzhenitsyn'scritique of the Party, is because their defence of the Partyis basedon a defence of only the smallest part of it-the leadershipand CentralCommittee. Solzhenitsyn may be totally unjust when it comes to evaluating the responsibility of ideology, or his quantitativecomparisonof victims, but his sensitivityto the injustices carried out by the "faceless" lower ranks of the governmentis convincing. Discussing the Revtribunals of the early years, Solzhenitsyn observesthat "every time a city was capturedduringthe CivilWarthe event was markednot only by gunsmoke in the courtyardsof the Cheka, but also by sleepless sessions of the tribunal. And you did not have to be a White officer, a senator, a landowner,a monk, a Cadet, an SR, or an Anarchistin order to get your bullet."30 Duringthe Stalin years the Bluecapswere even more ruthlessin their enforcement of policy. The Civil Wartribunalslacked the systematic quality of the 1930's Bluecap divisions-there were no quotas and plannedallocationsof arrestsaccordingto cities and districts.But Solzhenitsyn's description of the security service as not being populated by "educated people of broad cultureand broadviews . . ." and that "Theirbranchof service requiresonly that they carry out ordersexactly and be imperviousto suffering. . .,3 is an historicalfact which has to be confronted.The division population,is between broadly educated men of culture and a semi-illiterate the reality of the Party history which Marxistsare strangelyslow to acknowledge. ArthurRosenbergignores the "many wild tales" told about the Cheka because "the Cheka is only an executive organof the Government,i.e. of the Bolshevik Party. On no single occasion has the Cheka pursued a different political policy from that of the Government,and at no time has it been in 2 possessionof a political authoritydifferent from that of the Party leaders."3

489 Writingin 1932, Rosenbergwas eager to defend the Chekaagainstchargesof being an autonomous secret body, and thus inadvertentlylends support to to suffering"personalities.Moreover, Solzhenitsyn'sthesis of the "impervious his adherenceto the principleof Party disciplineresultsin Rosenbergnaively overlooking the quality of many rank and file Party memberswho did not WithIsaacDeutscher,the Party's share the ideals of the Bolshevikleadership. history is not so clear cut. On the one hand Deutschergives much supportto those aspects of the Gulag which document the mass sufferingof innocents. Trotsky is criticized by Deutscher for his militarizationof labour, his contribution to the growthof strongbureaucratic centralistorgansand attack on intra-Partydemocracy before 1921. "No body politic can be nine-tenths mute and one-tenth vocal. Havingimposed silence on non-BolshevikRussia, Lenin's party had in the end to impose silence on itself as well."33 Deutscher also recognized that between 1917 and 1922 the membershipof the Party had risen from about 23,000 to 700,000. Most of this growth, he says, "was already spurious. By now the rush to the victor's bandwagonwas in full progress.The party had to fill innumerableposts in the government,in into fill them with dustry, in trade unions, and so on; and it was an advantage people who accepted party discipline.In this mass of new-comersthe authen4 tic Bolshevikswere reducedto a smallminority."3 Although Deutscher's account of the rise of "non-authentic" Bolsheviks makes Solzhenitsyn'sdepiction of the early "Gulag"comprehensible in terms of the wide abuse of power (in the form of unwarranted slaughter,scapegoat arrests,etc.) applied by an opportunistic,revengefuland intolerantrankand file, Deutscher is not consistent when he claims that the "authentic Bolsheviks"were less subjectto acceptingPartydiscipline(becausethey comprehended the goals of the revolution) comparedto these new "inauthentic"Party members.The abuse of power among 23 to 250,000 membersmust have been sufficiently high given the extraordinarycrisis of the civil war which often demandedan on-the-spot interpretationof what "discipline"meant and how imperativeit was that it be maintainedat all costs. Closer examination of the Party under Lenin and Trotsky raises the fundamental question about what aspect of the Bolshevikrecordneeds no apology without compromisingone's adherenceto "Leninism."With the currentcall of "returnto Lenin"by variousLeft groups, "Leninism"is usually contrasted with "Stalinism" by pointing to all those quotes in Lenin's or Trotsky's works, etc., which advocate anti-bureaucratic party democracy, yet enough discipline for an organizedbut flexible struggle.Perhapsthe problemis that it is too easy to find passagesin Lenin's works which condenm abuse of power by bureaucrats.After all, the early years of the new Soviet state were full of

490 practiceswhich concernedleaderssuch as Lenin mistakes and anti-democratic or Trotsky would have noticed. But Deutscher says that by 1921 the Bolshevik Party represented only itself; it "maintaineditself in power by usurpation.Not only its enemies saw it as a usurper-the party appearedas a usurpereven in the light of its own standardsand its own conception of the revolutionary state."3-' As a result, all the "temporary"measuresbrought down by the Party leadersin order to maintainpower, became "permanent" as both precedentsfor the future, and recordsof the past. This is not to argue that democratic centralism leads inevitably to the type of terror present duringStalin'sgovernment. There are numerousapplicationsof "Bolshevik"organizationalstructuresin twentieth-centuryhistory which did not resultin similardevelopmentsas the Soviet Union experienced.Criticswho establish the continuity of terror between Lenin and Stalin eliminate the subjectivewill and praxis of particular historical party members, and attribute an inexorable life to the objective structures of the organization. On the other hand, many Marxistsdefend "Leninismby actually defending only the praxis of Lenin as an individual. overlooks the vital fact The often-coupled banner of "Marxism-Leninism" that "Leninism"cannot be reduced to the praxisof a singleman in the same way that historicalmaterialismcan be accepted as Marx'sanalysisof capitalism. "Leninism,"as the thought and action of Lenin, is not separablefrom party activity and organization;it is not simply an interpretationof society, but the sum total of many other peoples' activity. Yet, Marxistsfall into two basic errorsof elitist analysiswhen they evaluate On the one hand, there is the theoretical the Second and ThirdInternationals. analysis which mainly concentrates on debates between Lenin, Kautski, Luxemburg, etc., and reduces problems of organization and strategy to philosophical problems posed by Kant, Hegel, and others. This "history of ideas" approachis based on a partialcomprehensionof "Leninism"similarto that which the non-theoreticalactivistshold. Just as earlierhistorianswrote about the history of a nation or empire in terms of the history of its kings, emperors and princes, so too, do many Marxists conceive of their Internationals in terms of "kings" and "princes" of theory and organizations. Somehow the hundreds of thousands of party members are given token acknowledgement,but the party's role is really conceived as the role of Bernstein, Lenin or Trotsky and their central committees. While the dominance of these men is not disputed, the identification with leader'spolicies can only be complete if one need not constantly rescuetheir praxisfrom the actual praxis of the rank and file. Lenin and Trotsky may have genuinely desired to educate the rank and file against bureaucraticdegeneration;but

491 there is also enough evidence to show that both men valued discipline and efficiency more than they valued mass democraticparticipationin decisionmaking.If "Leninism"embodies the notion of power to the Soviets, then this was crushed by the Party long before any bureaucraticdegenerationset in. This is why the call by Medvedev,Mandel,etc. of a returnto "Leninism"is so ambivalent.Just which aspect of pre-1921 or pre-1924 Bolshevismdo they want to returnto? 5 Trotsky said that Lenin thought "in terms of continents and epochs," but Solzhenitsyn writes about the everyday life of experience under Party rule. The problem associatedwith readingthe Gulag is to be able to acknowledge its truths, and yet defend the Russian Revolution without accepting the vested interests of either Solzhenitsyn or his "Leninist" critics. To Solzhenitsyn, Russia, even before the civil war, "was obviously not suited for any sort of socialismwhatsoever."36 As Mandelreplies, But what was it ripe for? For Tsarist barbarism? For eternal famine, poverty, and illiteracy? By challenging the legitimacy of the October Revolution-and the legitimacy of revolution in all relativelyundeveloped countries as well-Solzhenitsyn reveals yet another contradiction in moralistic politics. Should we weep only for the dead assassinatedby terror? Whatabout the deaths causedby inhumansocioeconomic regimes, the tens of millions who died of hunger duringthe great faminesin India and prerevolutionary China?37 Max Weber also argued that the Russian revolution was doomed to failure because the Bolshevikshad been forced to preserveor reintroduceabsolutely all the Tsarist and bourgeois things which they fought against.38 But this observation ignores substantial differences and over-emphasizes the similarities. Even Solzhenitsyn recognizes that Soviet Russia totally uprooted and destroyed most of the institutions and practices of TsaristRussia. It is precisely the thoroughness,the completely new applicationof terror,discipline, etc., which Solzhenitsyn contrasts with Tsarismand rejects as a mere Thermidorianreaction. Weber'sprojection of technical rationality preventedhim from recognizingthat the partial Soviet application of bourgeoistechnique did not mean that Soviet Russiawas simply destined to continue the rationality of the past. This ahistorical eternalizationof Westerncategoriesoverlooks the historical nature of rationality-even formal rationality. Unfortunately, Marxistsalso

492 extend categories applicable to Westerncapitalistsociety, and thus blur the differencesbetween the Soviet Union andthe West.In tryingto accountfor the failureof socialismto emergein the Soviet Bloc, Bettelheimand Sweezy situate the Soviet Union in that ahistorical position of "a society in transition." Soviet history is not conceived as something developing from its own logic, material resources,and interaction with the external world. Rather, Marx's categories, which he used to analyse capitalism (and not "the generalpath along which all mankind develops"), are artificially affixed onto Soviet reality. Therefore,the difference between Lenin and Stalin and their successors is linked to the notion of the emergenceof a "state bourgeoisie"and the restoration of a capitalist market economy. Space does not permit me to elaboratewhy the use of notions such as "bougeoisie"(to describethe Soviet administration) are fundamental distortions of Marx's conception of the objective role of the bourgeoisie in the accumulation process of capital, especiallyforeignexpansion.39 to confront the reality of the Soviet Union, because It is difficult for Marxists they are only in recent yearsdiscoveringthe meaningof historicalmaterialism which the Soviet Party repressedand distorted. Solzhenitsyn'sunderstanding of Marx is a product of all the mechanistic and reductionistqualities with which Soviet Marxismis permeated.It is little wonder, then, that his diatribe 0 But it is preciselythis againstMarxistideology is misdirectedand confused.4 which makesit importantto rescuethe Gulagfrom of Marxism understanding the chargemade by Silberthat it is a fraud.All the grosshistoricaldistortions made by Solzhenitsyn are genuine products drawn from the experience of Soviet society, and are unfortunatelysharedby many people livingwithin the Soviet Bloc. The reduction of Marx'stheory to an instrumentwhich justifies social control and repression,is the Marxismwhich millions of people grow up with daily. Solzhenitsyn forces us to confront the fact that the Soviet Union will not turn socialist in the event of revolution breakingout in the West. This mechanistic illusion is perpetrated by many groups (especially WesternCommunist Parties), and flows from a failure to appraisecritically the historically specific non-socialist and non-capitalistdevelopment of the Soviet Union. Together with the Chinese, Bettelheim and Sweezy see Eastern Europe as havingtaken the "capitalistroad,"by claimingthat the Soviet Bloc maintains a non-socialist "base" of commodity production, the "new economism" is forced into conceivingclass relations as being objectively similarto those in the West. But the rise of the proletariatin the West will not have similar repercussionsin Soviet countries because the "proletariat"and the "state bourgeoisie"are not interrelatedin any sense with their Western counter-

493 part-either objectivelyor subjectively-their relationsare virtuallya law unto their own. Bettelheim and Sweezy are arguingagainstthose people who see the Soviet Bloc as having an essentially socialist base with a parasiticState bureaucracy oppressingthe workers.Both conceptionsof the SovietUnion are fundamentallywrong. If Bettelheim and Sweezy fail to. see the basic differences between the capitalist bourgeois order and the Soviet society, other Marxistsignore the non-socialistquality of all aspects of Soviet life. Just as the continuity of capitalist production can no longer be accepted as the material base for socialism, so too, the Soviet mode of production cannot simply be taken over and democratized. When Stalin characterizedLeninism as "the combination of the Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency,"4 1 he was not far off the mark. It was these qualities which enabled him to lead the revolution forward,but also to hold it back. The truth of the matter is that Leninwas not revolutionary enough for the Russia of post-1917, let alone for the changesneeded today. Therefore,the ambiguityof "Leninism" justifies mass conformismand bureaucraticdisciplinein Westernparties, non-participation, tradeunions, etc. Solzhenitsyn'sGulag inevitablyraisesthe question of whether the Revolution was worth all the slaughter and repression. This question is an irrelevant academicpoint. It is only scholarswho sit aroundcontemplatingin the midst of social crises;regardlessof whether they support or oppose the status quo, events are usually pushed along by social groupswith less complex, and more immediate needs on their mind. The Max Webersof this world will never make or support a revolution, because they are at the same time too pessimistic and lofty in their evaluationof the capacitiesand needs of the man in the street. But, while Georg Lukacstook the opposite path from his friend Max Weber and ended up creating a revolution, his optimistic activismwas based on a similarpaternalistand elitist attitude to the masses. WhereasRosa Luxemburgattacked Lenin and the Bolsheviksfor crushingthe mass participationof workers and peasants in the Soviets, Lukaics branded Luxemburgas a utopian who was becoming more and more remote from an understanding of the real structureof events.42 Accordingto Lukacs, during the period of the dictatorship (of the proletariat)the nature and the extent of freedomwill be determinedby the state of the class struggle, the power of the enemy, the importanceof the threat to the dictatorship, the demands of the classes to be won over, and by the maturity of the classes allied to and influenced by the proletariat.Freedom cannot repre-

494 sent a value in itself (any more than socialisation).Freedom must servethe rule of the proletariat, not the other way round. Only a revolutionary party like that of the Bolsheviks is able to carry out these often very suddenchangesof front.4 3 Here lies the crux of the matter. The masses could not be left to judge the nature and power of the enemy; they lacked the "maturity" and the efficiency of the Party-they must be led to freedomin spite of themselves. qualitiesas Marxanalyzedcapitalistsociety both in terms of its dehumanizing and the universaliwell as the contributionsit made to materialimprovements zation of ideas and knowledge.One need not identify with the Partyin order to acknowledge similar positive and negative aspects of Soviet history. Solzhenitsyn amd his "Leninist"critics are all too involvedwith attackingor defending the Party's record to be in a position to providea consistentguide to contemporaryproblems.But the situationof the RussianRevolutionis not relevant to non-Soviet countries, because historical conditions are so different. The Gulag Archipelago is an important work in spite of its gross distortions. For, in order to honestly reject Solzhenitsyn'stheses, one must also be able to reject those dubious "Leninist"principleswhich many of the Left are not preparedto reflect upon. Ratherthan going back to the "golden Soviet and Westerncitizens would profit and virtuous"days of pre-Stalinism, more by reviving,not the "Leninist"Party, but the mass participatorycontrol and decision-making (outside the Party), which also existed in the early yearsof the Revolution.

NOTES
1 2 See R. Medvedev, "On Solzhenitsyn's 'Gulag Archipelago'," in Index, No. 1974, p. 65. During the last thirty years there have been numerous attempts to debunk Marxism by over-emphasizing it as simply another messianic religion. Michael Barkun's "Millenarianism in the Modern World," in Theory and Society, Summer, 1974, is one of the most recent attempts in this polemical school, and is riddled with numerous fallacious assumptions about the nature and role of Bolshevism in Russian society, to mention only one of the movements he covers. See Guardian, January 30, 1974. The GulagArchipelago (Collins/Fontana, 1974) p. 121.

3 4

495
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Ibid., p. 4. Ibid. Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 574. Ibid., p. 540. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (Beacon Press, Boston, 1966), p. 523. The Gulag, p. 408. See E. Mandel, "Solzhenitsyn's Assault on Stalinism ... And the October Revolution," reprinted in the Australian Militant, 22 July 1974. Letter to Soviet Leaders (London, 1974), p. 47. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., p. 40. Quoted in D. Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), p. 186. Ibid. See Letter to Soviet Leaders, p. 55. e.g., See The Gulag, pp. 259-260, 537, and Letter to Soviet Leaders, pp. 11-15. Ibid., p. 272. Ibid. Letter to Soviet Leaders, p. 53. The Gulag, p. 343. Ibid., Preface p. X. Ibid., p. 129. Ibid., p. 613. See Guardian, January 30, 1974. E. MandeL "Solzhenitsyn's Assault on Stalinism." L. Trotsky, "Terrorism and Communism," in I. Howe, (ed.) The Basic Writingsof Trotsky (London, 1964), p. 145. The Gulag, p. 302. Ibid., p. 145. See A. Rosenberg, A History of Bolshevism (New York, 1965), p. 120. See The Prophet Unarmed Trotsky: 1921-1929 (London, 1970), p. 16. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., pp. 9-10. The Gulag, p. 26. Mandel, op. cit. See "Politics As a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, 1958), p. 100. See P. Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, On The Transition to Socialism (Monthly Review Press: 1971). The authors have yet to show that Soviet production of surplus value could return to a similar form of monopoly capitalism with all the problems associated with consumption, markets, imperialist policies, etc. Moreover, the relations to production have only superficially resembled bourgeois and proletarian relations to the capitalist mode of production. Non-control by the Soviet people does not make their rulers bourgeoisie! See Letter to Soviet Leaders, pp. 42-49. See Foundations of Leninism (International Publishers, New York, 1939) p. 127. See "Critical Observations on Rosa Luxemburg's 'Critique of the Russian Revolution'," in History and Class Consciousness (London, 1971), p. 291. Ibid., pp. 292-293.

40 41 42 43

Theory and Society, 1 (1974) 477-496 ? Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam

Printed in The Netherlands