Chapter 1 1.PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS.

CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacityas Director of the Philippines Patent Office FACTS:A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against CeledonioAgrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondentDirector issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before thePhilippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinationsand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in goodstanding, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondentDirectors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violationof the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involveentirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technicalknowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, hestressed that for

the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has beenquestioned formally.ISSUE:Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and theprosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.HELD:The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before thePatent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and theprosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretationand application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to beestablished in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is notlimited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connectedwith the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the SupremeCourt from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in thePatent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, thenlogically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991 Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges

and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. PEOPLE VS. VILLANUEVA

FACTS:The Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. The complainantwas represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearanceas private prosecutor in the case, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. Thecondition of his appearance as such, was that he would not receive any payment for his services.Such appearance by Atty. Fule was questioned by the counsel of the accused, invoking the caseof Aquino vs. Blanco, wherein it was ruled that when an attorney had been appointed to theposition of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, heceased to engage in private law practice. The counsel argued that the JP Court in entertainingthe appearance of City Attorney Fule is a violation of the above ruling. The JP Court issued anorder is sustaining the legality of the appearance of Atty. Fule and ruled, in a Motion to InhibitFiscal Rule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case, by upholding the right of Fule toappear and further stating the Fule was not actually engaged in private law practice. The counselof the accused appealed to the CFI of Laguna which affirmed the decision of the

JP Court findingthe appeal as not in violation of the law since his appearance is such as an agent or friend of theoffended party. It also does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that hisappearance was in a professional capacity. Furthermore, Atty. Fule has no control or interventionwhatsoever on the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna,because the prosecution of criminal cases coming frim Alaminos are handled by the Office of the

Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo to point out that there could be nopossible conflict in the duties of City Attorney Fule as City Attorney and private prosecutor. Andso an appeal to Supreme Court was passed. ISSUE:Whether or not the capacity of City Attorney Fule in appearing before a court in a trial isin violation of the law which says that City Fiscal, after being appointed, shall cease to engage inprivate law practice. HELD:The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney Fule did notconstitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is morethan an isolated appearance, for it

consists of frequents or customary actions, a succession of facts of the same kind or frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, ascustomarily and demanding payment for such services. The mere appearance as counsel on oneoccasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. It is alsoworth noted that, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission byhis immediate superior to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee. In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO. Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf. DIAZ, J.: In a motion filed in this case, which is pending resolution because the second motion for reconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who represents the herein petitioner, has not been acted upon to date, for the reason

that the question whether or not the decision which has already been promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the first assignment of error relied upon in said petitioner's brief, has not yet been determined, for which purpose the case was set for hearing on August 5, 1935, said attorney inserted a paragraph the translation of which reads as follows: We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,

increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. When the court's attention was called to said paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J. Francisco to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten days for that purpose. In this answer attorney Vicente J. Francisco, far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth. The phrases: . . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls . . . . . . . because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage . . . . and ... we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the administration of

justice", disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceed in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words "outrage" and "mockery" used therein are derived, mean exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132 and 513). The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by

reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution. There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain

its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously. As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is : a priest of justice ( In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief. It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2 of Legal Ethics, which reads as follows: It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be protected. In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C.J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense: "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not

admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." ( In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves. Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that the act committed by Attorney Vicente J. Francisco constitutes a contempt in the face of the court ( in facie curiae) and, reiterating what this court said on another occasion that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts in order that there be due administration of justice (In reKelly, 35 Phil., 944), and so that the institution of the courts of justice may be stable and said courts may not fail in their mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within the period of ten days, and to be reprimanded, and he is hereby reprimanded; and it is ordered that the entire paragraph of his motion containing the phrases which as has been stated, constitute contempt of court be stricken from the record de oficio. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions MALCOLM, J., dissenting: From 1918 when in the case of the United States vs. Bustos (37 Phil., 731), it was declared that "The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct", until the present, I have consistently and steadfastly stood for the fullest expression of freedom of speech. I stand for the application of that basic principle now. The language which the majority of the court finds contemptuous and punishes as such is found in a second motion of reconsideration in an election case, a class of cases out of which arise more bitter feelings than any other. The motion is phrased in vigorous language, in fact vigorous and convincing enough to induce the granting of a rehearing on the merits. It is hardly necessary to add that that action was taken entirely uninfluenced by the peroration of the motion here judicially penalized. Following microscopic examination in the majority opinion of the paragraph, attention is directed to words

which prophesy the loss of public confidence in the courts and the growth of Sakdalism. If, however, the passage flowing from the pen of Mr. Francisco be set side by side with passages written by the late Mr. Justice Johnson in the case of Garchitorena vs. Crescini and Imperial ( [1918, 39 Phil., 258), little difference in phraseology will be noted. One came from a lawyer and is condemned; the other came from a judge and is accepted. The main burden of the charge is that threats against this court were made by the respondent. Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts. Any attempt on the part of a lawyer to influence the action of the court by intimidation will justify not alone punishment for contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone believe that the action taken in this case has been obtained by coercion or could be obtained by such methods? Judges are of sterner stuff than weak plants which bend with every wind.1avvphil.et The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the face of a hostile court. He owes entire devotion to the interests of his client. His zeal when a case is lost, which he thinks should have been won, may induce intemperate outbursts. Courts will do well charitably to overlook professional improprieties of the moment induced by chagrin at losing a case.

So that it may not be assumed that the position taken by me is isolated or peculiar, permit me to offer a few corroborative authorities. Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the pioneer authority in the subject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court in one case, he said: "No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system." (Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.) Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas and subsequently was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the former capacity, in sustaining a contempt of court, he nevertheless observed: "We remark again, that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that, in every case where a judge decidesfor one party, he decides against another;

and ofttimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of such outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence." (In re Pryor [1877], 26 Am. Rep., 747.) The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States was until recently the leader of progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In a dissenting opinion in a famous case, he said: "When it considered how contrary if is to our practice and ways of thinking for the same person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive, may involve strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by the necessities of the case 'to insure order and decorum in their presence'. ... I confess that I cannot find in all this or in the evidence in the case anything that would have affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less can I find there anything that obstructed the administration of justice in any sense that I possibly can give to those words." (Toledo Newspaper Co. vs. United States [1917], 247 U.S., 402.)

In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged with having said in effect that the Supreme Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles because GovernorGeneral Wood, out of friendship for Cailles, had invited members of the court to Malacaang previous to formulating the decision, and there, following a secret conference, had offered them a banquet. The proceedings for contempt initiated against the respondent by the Attorney-General were halted by the court. In he opinion it was said: "We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that memory of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. ... We feel also, that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language." (In re Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.) To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulous care. The members of the court sit as prosecutors and as judges. Human sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust aspersions on judicial character may induce too drastic action. It may result in the long run in making of lawyers weak exponents of their clients' causes. Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial

course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case. Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his intention to be recreant to the respect and consideration which he has always shown the highest tribunal in the Philippines, and that the language of the last paragraph of his motion of June 19 was not meant to offend the dignity of the court. I do not think that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion constitutes contempt of court, but conceding that it did require explanation, I would accept his disavowal of wrong intent at its face value. I would not mark the record of a member of the bar of long and honorable standing with this blemish. With due deference to the opinion of the majority, I must strongly dissent therefrom. Chapter 2 JESUS MA. CUIvs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUIG.R. NO. L-18727AUGUST 31, 1964

FACTS: -Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence bylegislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, inthe order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio untilher death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became theadministrator.-Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio"

entered into between them andembodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter tothe defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and the demand nothaving been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui lateron intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui,another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications tothe position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equalcircumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among thelegitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al

estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospiciode Barili .

-Court a quo - decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of a fullfledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donationand considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given astrict interpretation

but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by theintervenor. ISSUE : WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. (YES)RATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not merepossession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after dueadmission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone,conferredby a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle itsholderto exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of personswho are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, andupon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as aconsequence.In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of theSupreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the

Barexaminations,taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificatebeing his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws initself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with therequirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all theprescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there areinstances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had notgone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Barexaminationsand to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessaryqualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such personsdo not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelorof Laws from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili

must have established the foregoing testadvisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator shouldbea doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be theonewho pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids andincapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it thattherules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of theAct; and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would beadistinct asset.Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of administrator.As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatementtothe office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant wasrestored to the roll of

lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previousdisbarment were wiped out.For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandsonof Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in thedeed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contendsthat the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successivelytothe descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, heargues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenorbelongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

In Re: GarciaFacts:

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting tothe required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizenborn in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as"Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and thatunder the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RPand Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the requiredbar examinations. Issue: Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar? Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. Ratio Decidendi:

The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spaincannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring topractice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in thePhilippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is thereforesubject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationalsdesiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant aremade expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desiredto exercise the legal profession.The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended tomodify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for thereason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of theSupreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power torepeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines

Chapter 3 Re: Arthur Cuevas, Jr. B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998 En Banc, Francisco

FACTS: (1) Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, for his participation in the September 1991 initiation rites of LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITY (San Beda College of Law) wherein a neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a result of personal violence inflicted upon him. (2) Petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case was closed and terminated. (3) Petitioner was allowed to take the bar examinations subject to the condition that; should he pass he will not be allowed to take the lawyers oath pending approval by the Court.

(4) Petitioner passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. Petitioner prays that he be allowed to take the lawyers oath.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not petitioner Cuevas has the moral fitness required to take the lawyers oath?

HELD: Petitioner is allowed to take the LAWYERS OATH and sign the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

RATIO: The Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Camaligan, father of hazing victim Raul Camaligan, and condoles with the untimely death of a son who is expected to become a lawyer and succeed his father. In his comment submitted to the Court, Atty. Camaligan submits petitioners plea to be admitted to the membershop to the Philippine Bar, to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.

The deliberate participation of Cuevas in the senseless beating of a helpless neophyte which resulted to his death indicates that petitioner does not possess the moral fitness required for admission to the Bar. However, petitioner was discharged from probation without any infraction thereafter of the conditions of the probation and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Camaligan. The Court then decides to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it allowed AL ARGOSINO, petitioners co-accused to take the lawyers oath.

Cobb-perez vs. Lantin A debt was contracted when oneDamaso Perez bought leathermaterials from Hormoso for his shoemanufacturing business. On February1959, Hormoso filed suit against Perezand one Gregorio Sumbong for therecovery of unpaid purchases in t heamount of P17,309.44. On April, 1960,the petition was granted by

thepresiding judge (Lantin, respondent)and thus ordered Perez and Sumbongto fulfill their pecuniary obligation. They appealed but they weredismissed. They brought the action tothe SC but it was also dismissed. Hormoso moved for the execution of judgment and this was granted onAugust 15, 1961. The Sheriff levied the shares of common stock of Perez from RepublicBank but Perez urged to stay theexecution alleging that the levy wasexcessive and unjust because he onlyowed P17,309.44 but the shares leviedwere worth P357,000. Sheriff was thusstopped from auctioning the sharespending resolution of Perezs newmotion. But after respondent JudgeLantin denied both the appeal and thestay of execution, the sheriff againserved a notice for auctioning theshares. This was subsequentlycancelled by the CA pending hearing of another petition filed by Perez onOctober 5. CA resolved that the levywas indeed excessive but regardlesssustained that such should be paid.Sheriff again published a notice of action but time auctioning only 210shares of stock. The wife of Perez, Mrs. Cobb-Perez,filed a complaint against Hormoso,Republic Bank and the Sheriff alleging that the

levied shareswere conjugal property and thusshould not be liable for Perezs Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0

Page No. 65 exclusive debt . CFI once moreenjoined the sheriff from executing theauction but later, upon resolving thecase 45 , it lifted its earlier order. Amonth before the writ of execution waslifted, however, the wife filed anothermotion for recall/lifting of writ of execution granted on August 15, 1961on the same grounds enunciated initalics in this paragraph. Lantin deniedthe motion 46 . This paved the way forthe sheriff to, once more, give noticeof the action and execute the sale.What followed after this was a series of delaying tactics

47 which finally endedwith Damaso Perez filing an urgentmotion for reconsideration using nowhis wifes reasons (see italics inparagraph above) and at the sametime offered instead of his shares of stocks, the dividends of suchamounting to P19,000. Sheriff wasthen stopped for the fifth time but themotion was still denied.After the sheriff scheduled the auctionfor the sixth time, the present petitionwas now filed which alleged that graveabuse of discretion was committed innot recalling the writ of execution(ordering the levy of 210 shares of stock which were deemed conjugaland thus not answerable to personalobligations made by the husband). Issue/Held/Ratio: WON levied shares are conjugal andthus liable for debt of the husband,Perez.No. Perez is estopped from claimingthat said shares were conjugalbecause in the case where he challenged it as being excessive andunjust, he had given the impressionthat such stocks were exclusive. This isfurther confirmed by the fact that thesaid stocks were registered in hisname alone. Wife is also barred by judgment made on husband becauseshe stands in privity with him. Shecannot feign ignorance to justify alapse of

seventeen months inquestioning the legality of the levymade on the stocks. They claim that Art. 160 of the CC isapplicable but no proof was presentedthat such stocks were acquired duringthe marriage. No evidence wasadduced as to when the shares of stock were acquired.Conceding that they were acquiredduring the marriage and is conjugal, itmust be shown that the partnership isnot liable for the judgment debt. Noevidence pointing to this waspresented. 48 Petition dismissed. Treble costs areassessed against the petitioners,which shall be paid by their counsel

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan Facts Raul Roco and his colleagues from the ACCRA Law Officewere charged together with Eduardo Conjuangco foracquiring ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG based its charge fromthe refusal of the law firm to divulge information as to whohad been involved in PCGG Case No. 0033, despite thenature of the services performed by ACCRA (e.g. the law firmknows the assets, personal transactions,

and businessdealings of their clients).Later, the PCGG amended the complaint, resulting in theexclusion of Roco from the list of defendants. Such exclusionwas based from the manifestation of Roco that he wouldidentify the persons and stockholders involved in the saidPCGG case.The law firm petitioned for the PCGG to grant them the sametreatment as what had been accorded to Roco. It was only atthis point that the PCGG answered with a set of requirements and conditions for exclusion which were:1) disclosure of the identity of the clients2) submission of documents purporting to the substantiationof the lawyer-client relationship3) presentation of the deeds of assignments which thelawyers executed in favor of its clients, covering theshareholdings of the latterTo bolster this set-up, the PCGG presented supposed proof tothe effect that Roco had complied with such conditionsThe 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the petition of ACCRA. Issue/s 1) whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving thelaw firm equal treatment as that of Roco despite the fact thatthe confession of Roco did not really reveal the informationbeing asked by the PCGG2) whether or not

the Sandiganbayan strictly applied theconcept of agency3) whether or not the Sandiganbayan did not uphold thesanctity of the lawyer-client relationship Resolution 1) yes violation of the equal protection clause2) no3) yes violation of the confidentiality privilege Rationale 1) the inclusion of the ACCRA lawyers was merely being usedas a leverage to compel them to name their clientsclassifying persons as to those who can give valuableinformation apart from those who cannot is not a validclassification espoused by the equal protection clause2) an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant becausehe possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposedon him by his client 3) as a general rule, the identity of theclient should not be shrouded with mystery, as arequirement of due process, except when :a) revealing the name of a client would implicate thelatter in the very activity for which he sought the adviceof the lawyerb) the disclosure would expose the client to civil liabilityc) the content of the client communication is relevant tothe subject matter of the legal problem on which theclient seeks legal assistance

 the case of the prosecution must be built uponevidence gathered by them from their own sources,not from compelled testimony requiring them toreveal information prejudicial to their client the confidentiality privilege extends even after thetermination of the lawyer-client relationships Pepsi Cola vs Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 518 (1998) Facts: The case is a petition for review and certiorari by the petitioner upon the denial by the lower and appellate court on their motion for reconsideration for the postponement of the hearing due to unavailability of their witnesses and for declaring that the petitioner waived its right to present evidence in support to its defense. The case began from the civil action filed by private respondents who won from the Pepsi Number Fever Promotion" sponsored by petitioner Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc., wherein numerous holders of the supposedly winning "349" crowns were not honored and paid by petitioner due to an alleged mistake in the security codes in the crowns. While the private respondents are

finished presenting their evidence, the petitioner continues to file a motion for postponement due to unavailability of witnesses. The schedule for presentation of evidence began on May 28, 1993 and with frequent postponement, the court issued a warning to the petitioners counsel that the scheduled hearing on January 20, 1995 shall be intransferrable in character. Notwithstanding said warning, petitioner moved for postponement again which motion was denied by the court for unreasonable delay on the case. The court of appeals affirmed the said decision hence this petition for certiorari ISSUE: WON the court erred in denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. RULING: The court held that the petitioner was given ample time to prepare for their witnesses causing the trial to take up to 2 years due to their motion for postponement and reminded the counsel of the petitioner that they have the duty to give proper administration of justice without any delay and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. STA. MARIA VS. TUASON 11 SCRA 562 (Ethics)

January 29, 2010 at 9:24 am FACTS:

(1)

This is a petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason, instituted by Emilio Sta. Maria.

Sometime in June 1955, Atty. Tuason represented the partnership of Sta. Maria, Guanzon and Chincuanco in a collection case against Enriqueta de Hidalgo, involving a promissory note of P50,000.00. Defendant Hidalgo in this case was declared in default and was ordered to pay. By virtue of a writ of execution, the provincial sheriff of Pampanga was able to obtain the amount of P22,930.64.

Respondent Tuason got the whole amount from the sheriff and applied it in the following manner : P10,000 attorneys fees, P1,648 supposed expenses of litigation which he claimed to have advanced during the prosecution and the balance of P11,282.64 to Fausto Chincuanco, his uncle.

Despite demands from Sta. Maria to turn over the money to him or to the sheriff, respondent failed to comply and contempt proceedings were instituted against Tuason. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General who made the findings and recommendation that: respondent Tuason was not in connivance with his uncle Chincuanco in depriving petitioner of his lawful share in the liquidation of partnership assets, however, the collection of P10,000 as attorneys fees after the case was terminated after one brief hearing is unreasonable. There was also no evidence presented to show that Tuason actually spent P1,648 for the expenses.

The Sol. Gen. recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would otherwise deserve, respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with a warning that a more severe penalty be imposed for the repetition of the same of similar acts.

ISSUE : Whether respondent committed acts that would merit his disbarment.

RULING:

The fact that the respondent placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his clients constitutes a breach of the lawyers oath, to say the least. Call it professional indiscretion or any other name, but the cold fact remains that the act is not conducive to the health growth of the legal profession. Respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of similar acts will merit more drastic action

1 LEDESMA V CLIMACO FACTS:Ledesma is counsel de parte of one accused. Thereafter, he was appointed as Election Registrar of Cadiz, NegrosOccidental by COMELECLedesma withdrew as counsel on the basis that his appointment as Election Registrar would require full timeservice as well as on the volume or pressure of work will prevent him from handling adequately the defense.Judge Climaco denied his motion, and even appointed him as counsel de officio of the accused.ISSUE: WoN the withdrawal of

Ledesma should be allowedHELD: No.RATIO:1.There is obvious reluctance of Ledesma to comply with his responsibilities as counsel de oficio. Then, evenassuming that he continues his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less than present. There isno excuse for him to shirk from his obligation as member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing,should fulfill.2.Ledesma was not mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to know that membership in the bar is aprivilege burdened with conditions. Being appointed as counsel de oficio requires a high degree of fidelity (law is aprofession and not a mere trade). Requires counsel of repute and eminence.3.In criminal cases, right to counsel is absolute. No fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to beheard by counsel.4.The denial by Judge Climaco was due to the principal effect to delay the case (case has already been postponedfor 8 times) 2 IN RE SYCIP FACTS:

This is a consolidated petition. The first one filed by the surviving partners of atty. Alexander Sycip and the

otherfiled by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ovaepa. They pray that they be allowed to continue using thenames of partners who had passed away.

Petitioners based their petitions on the following arguments: o Art. 1840 of the Civil Code, o in regulating other professions, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without anyrestriction as to the use of the name of a deceased partner, o the Canons of Professional Ethics allows the continued use of a deceased partner when permissible bylocal custom.ISSUE:

W/N law firms may continue to use the names o deceased partners in their firm namesHELD:

NO!

Art. 1840 primarily deals with the exception of liability on cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individualproperty of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person who continues the business using thepartnership name. what the law contemplates is a hold over situation preparatory to formal reorganization. Art.1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than a professional partnershipwhose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members.

A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or forbusiness. a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is not a partnership formed for thenpurpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property. Thus, assumed or trade name in law practice isimproper. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege orfranchise.

It must be considered that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceasedpartners name. Therefore, the cited provision on Canons of Professional Ethics is not applicable.DISSENTING OPINION:

Petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the 2 firms that Sycip andOvaepa are dead or the period when they served as partners sould be stated therein.

Ulep vs Legal Clinic June 17, 1993 Facts: Petitioner prays that respondent cease and desist from issuing ads similar to annexes A and B and to prohibit them from making ads pertaining to theexercise of the law professions other than those allowed by law- Annex ASECRET MARRIAGE?P560 for a valid marriageInfo on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 52220418:30am-6pm7F Victoria Bldg, UN Ave, MlaAnnex BGUAM DIVORCEDON PARKINSONAn Atty

in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce thru theLeg Clinic beg Mon-Fri during office hours Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Probs, Visaext. Quota/Non-quota Res and Special Retirees Visa.Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for FilipinaSp/Shil. Call Marivic THE LEGAL CLINIC, etc Petitioners Claim:-Ads are unethical and demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.-As a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the ads Respondents Comment:-They are not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of leg support services thru paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronicmachines- Even if they are leg services, the act of advertising them should be allowed under Bates v. State bar of Arizona Issues:1. WON the services offered by The Legal Clinic constitutes practice of law?2. WON their services can be advertised? Held:1. Yes. The Practice of law involves any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training andexpertise- To engage in the practice is to perform those acts which are

characteristic of the profession; to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legalknowledge/skillNot limited to the conduct of cases in court; includes legal advice and counsel and preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights aresecured regardless of WON theyre pending in court3 types of legal profession activity:1. legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations2. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman3. appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty and property according to law, in orderto assist in proper inter and enforcement of law 2

Respondents description of its services shows it falls within the practice of law:Giving info by paralegals to laymen and lawyers thru the use of comps and modern info tech- computerized legal research, document search, evidence gathering, locating parties/witnesses to a case, fact finding investigations, assistance to laymen inneed of services from agencies like birth, marriage, prop, bus

registrations, etc.*even if some of the services offered merely involve mechanical and technical know how like installing computer system for law offices, this doesnt make itan exception to the general rule- gives out leg info to laymen and lawyersnot non-advisory and nondiagnosticex. foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption have to explain to client the intricacies of the law and advise him on the proper course of action- what its ads represent and what it will be paid for- It doesnt matter that they dont represent clients in court since practice of law isnt limited to ct appearances but also leg research, leg advice and draftingcontracts Phil Star Art Rx for Leg Probs, int by proprietor Atty Nogales:- Takes care of probs as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic sit- lawyers, who like drs, are specialists in various fields and can take care of it (taxation, crim law, medico-leg probs, labor, litigation, fam law)- backed up by paralegals, counselors and attys- caters to clients who cant afford big firms- can prepare a simple deed of sale or affidavit of loss and also those w/ more extensive treatment-The fact that they employ paralegals to carry out its services doesnt matter; whats important is that its engaged in thepractice of law cause of the nature of the services it renders, which brings it within the statutory

prohibitions against ads only a person duly admitted as amember of the bar and whos in good and regular standing is entitled to the practice of law- public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character to protect the public, court,client and bar from incompetence/dishonesty of those unlicensed to the practice and not subject to the discipline of court 2.No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services, shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified andobjective info/statement of facts- not supposed to use any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement re his qualifications/legal services- not supposed to pay representatives of the mass media in return for publicity to attract legal businessCanons of professional Ethics (before CPR) provides that lawyers shouldnt resort to indirect ads for professional employment like furnishing newspapercomments, publishing his pictures with causes the lawyers been engaged in, importance of his position and other selflaudationStands of legal profession condemn lawyers advertisement of his talents like a merchant does of his goods because of the fact that law is a profession. The

canons of profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust whichmust be earned as the outcome of character and conductGood and efficient service to a client and the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention; this shouldnt be done thru propaganda EXCEPTIONS:1. expressly allowed publication in reputable law lists of informative data thats not misleading and may include only: name, professional assoc, adds, nos,branches of law practiced, date and place of birth and admission to the bar, schools attended w/ dates of grad, degrees , public offices, posts of honor, legalauthorships, legal teaching positions, membership and offices in bar association, legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities, listings in other reputablelaw lists, names and adds of references with written consent and clients regularly represented- cant be mere supplemental feature of paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical thats published fo r other purposesnever in a law list that are calculated or likely to deceive/injure the public/the bar or lower the dignity/standing of the profession- ordinary simple professional card allowed name, law firm, add, no and special branch of law practiced- publication of simple

announcement of the opening of a law firm or change in partnership, assoc, firm name or office add, for the convenience of theprofession- have name listed in phone directory but not under designation of special branch of law2. necessarily implied from the restrictionsBates v. State Bar of Arizona: allowed lawyer to publish a statement of leg fees for an initial consultation or give, uponrequest, a written schedule of fees or estimate for spec services as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers 33 DIAO v MARTINEZFacts:

Telesfor Diao was admitted to the Bar in 1953.

Two years after, Severino Martinez charged him for having falsely represented his application: that he had therequisite academic qualifications.

The Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diaos name be erased from the roll of attorneys.

Diao has not completed BEFORE taking up law, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education: o Diao did not complete his HS training; and o Diao never attended Quisumbing College

Diao claims that he left HS in his third year, he entered the US Army, passed the General Qualification Test, whichaccording to him, is equivalent to a HS diploma, and upon return to civilian life, the education authoritiesconsidered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year HS. Also, he claims that he really got his college diploma from Arellano University in April 1949. He says he waserroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing Collge, in his school records. Issue: W/N Diao should be removed from the roll. Held:

Yes. Diaos name is removed from the roll. The error or confusion was to his own making. Had his application showed that he graduated from Arellano, itwould have showed that he took up law 6 months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. He then wouldhave not been permitted to take the Bar. Rule: That PREVIOUS to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required prelegaleducation as prescribed by the Department of Education. The fact that he hurdled the bar is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorneyat-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essentia