EXEMPTING

[G.R. No. 185285. October 5, 2009.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAUL ALIPIO, accusedappellant. Facts: AAA is a 41-year old mentally retarded woman whom Marilou Gipit Alipio often hired to watch over her children whenever the latter is out of her house. Sometime in June 2000, Marilou sent AAA to Sitio Liman, San Francisco, Bulan, Sorsogon to borrow money from Marilou's father, Saul. While about to head for home, AAA heard Paul, brother of Marilou, calling her from his house, then he held her hand, pushed her inside and, while covering AAA's mouth, brought her to his bedroom. From there, by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with AAA. Paul threatened AAA with death should she disclose to anybody what had just happened between them. However, BBB, AAAs mother noticed that she had missed her monthly period, then the former told what Paul had done to her. AAA was then founded to be 7 months pregnant, and afterwards gave birth to a girl. Psychiatric evaluation done by Dr. Escuadra revealed that AAA, although 42 years old at that time, had the mental capacity and disposition of a nine or 10 year-old child, clearly indicating a mental retardation case, but founded to be capable of being a witness. On the defense, Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist at the Bicol Medical Center, conducted a psychiatric examination on Paul. Her diagnosis: Paul was suffering from schizoaffective disorder, a temporary and reversible psychiatric condition affecting basically an individual's thinking, perception, and emotion. In Paul's case, this psychiatric disorder manifested itself after his brother's death in 1987, and was aggravated when a sister committed suicide in 1990. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant can avail of insanity as an exempting circumstance for the crime of rape he committed. Held: No. The moral and legal presumption is always in favor of soundness of mind; that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. It is improper to assume the contrary. This presumption, however, may be overcome by evidence of insanity, which, under Art. 12 (1) of the RPC, exempts a person from criminal liability.

In People v. Formigones, it was held that, for insanity to be appreciated in favor of the accused, there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason or there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The evidence offered by the defense in this case miserably failed to establish clearly and convincingly the presence of the stringent criterion for insanity. On the contrary, the evidence tended to show, albeit impliedly, that accusedappellant was not deprived of reason at all and can still distinguish right from wrong when, after satisfying his lust, he threatened AAA not to tell anybody about what he had done; otherwise, she would be killed. This single episode irresistibly implies, for one, that accused-appellant knew what he was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to keep it a secret. And for another, it indicated that the crime was committed during one of accused-appellant's lucid intervals. In this regard, no less than his father admitted in open court that there were times when his son was in his proper senses. From Dr. Belmontes testimony, it is clear that the mental disorder of accused Paul Alipio is only temporary in character and can be treated. Moreover, although the probability is high that in year 2000 when the rape incident took place accused was already suffering from schizoaffective disorder, said doctor has not come up with any categorical findings yet relative to the sense of discernment of the accused when it comes to what is RIGHT and what is WRONG. The prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. And needless to stress, guilt beyond reasonable doubt only denotes moral certainty, not absolute certainty. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. Appeal is DENIED.

[G.R. No. 172695. June 29, 2007.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO, appellant. Facts: On or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, accused Isaias Castillo y Completo, while conveniently armed with illegally possessed sling and deadly arrow, with intent to kill his wife Consorcia Antiporta with whom he was united in lawful wedlock did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife Consorcia Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on the right side of her neck causing the laceration of the jugular vein which caused her instantaneous death. On the defense, the accused stated that he was just practicing the use of the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow. But from all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia was preceded by a quarrel between her and the accused. Issue: Whether or not the fatal injury sustained by the victim was accidental. Held: Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta, father of the deceased, categorically testified that appellant was alone with his wife inside their house when the incident happened. Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking buddies and headed home at about 9:00 p.m., as in fact he was already in bed at about 10:00 p.m. when he saw that Consortia was being rushed to the hospital. Thus, there could not be other person to commit the crime except for the accused. In the given issue, there is no merit in appellant's contention that assuming he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides: ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability: xxx xxx xxx 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. "Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. 21 The defense miserably failed to

discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are: 1. A person is performing a lawful act; 2. With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4. Without fault or intention of causing it. 22 By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident. Also, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon can not attain the standards as an instrument for archery competitions. The defense failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta's testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house to sustain the accused's assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident. Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility, and to prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. Other than his claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove the same. Petition is DENIED.

[G.R. No. 187503. September 11, 2009.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TECSON LIM Y CHUA and MAXIMO FLORES Y VITERBO, accused-appellants. Facts: In the early afternoon of 3 December 1999, the PNP Narcotics Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, received information from their reliable informant that appellant Lim is engaged in illegal drug activities. Immediately, a buy-bust operation team was organized to conduct a buy-bust operation at the designated place, which was at McDonald's along Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Sucat, Paraaque City. P/Sr. Insp. Mata, as the team leader. During the briefing, the team was apprised that the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) involved in their buy-bust operation PO1 Amerol was about nine meters away from them, while P/Sr. Insp. Mata, who was standing beside the road as if waiting for a ride, was about 10 meters away from appellant Lim and their informant. Appellant Lim and their informant approached him, and the latter introduced him to appellant Lim as Mike Amerol, a Muslim who wanted to buy shabu. Flores alighted from the car carrying a black bag. Both appellants approached PO1 Amerol. Appellant Flores opened the black bag and showed him its contents. PO1 Amerol saw therein a tape-sealed transparent plastic bag containing shabu weighing about one kilo. Appellant Lim then asked for the agreed amount of P700,000.00 in payment thereof. 16 PO1 Amerol handed the money to appellant Lim, and appellant Flores gave him the black bag with a tape-sealed transparent plastic bag containing shabu. Sale was consummated, then, PO1 Amerol executed their prearranged signal by lighting his cigarette. P/Sr. Insp. Mata and SPO1 Sorreda immediately responded and arrested both appellants. The buy-bust money was recovered from appellant Lim. Requests for the examination of the specimen 20 and for the physical and medical examination of the appellants were likewise made. Forensic Chemist Forro of the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the specimen. Examination of the said specimen, and the same yielded a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The physical and medical examination of appellants, on the other hand, yielded negative results, meaning, there was no showing that they were physically harmed. On contrary, appellant Lim testified that he is engaged in buy-and-sell business in Baclaran and Divisoria. On 3 December 1999, he was in Baclaran to collect money from some of his customers therein. That they arrived at the house of customer of Olan (a dealer of pants and garments) in Paraaque between 2:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Suddenly, while they were inside the house, some men barged in and immediately handcuffed and boarded them to a car, where appellant Lim was blindfolded and beaten up on the way to the PNP Narcotics Group's office in Quezon City. The police authorities who arrested him never gave him any chance to talk because,

whenever he would try to do so, they would hit him on his mouth. After, pictures and fingerprints of them were taken.

Issue: Whether or not P/Sr. Insp. Mata, the team leader of the buy-bust operation, failed to perform his regular duty to conduct a test-buy before the buy-bust operation. Held: In People v. Beriarmente 44 citing People v. Tranca, 45 this Court has held that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. It is of judicial notice that drug pushers sell their wares to any prospective customer, stranger or not, in both public and private places, with no regard for time. They have become increasingly daring and blatantly defiant of the law. Thus, the police must be flexible in their operations to keep up with the drug pushers. Practice buy-bust operations will not only hinder police efforts to apprehend drug. Further, the choice of effective ways to apprehend drug dealers is within the ambit of police authority. Police officers have the expertise to determine which specific approaches are necessary to enforce their entrapment operations. Thus, there was no irregularity in the performance of duty on the part of the members of the buy-bust team, even though they did not anymore conduct a test or trial buy-bust operation. The absence of conducting a test or trial falls on the exempting circumstance (Article 12, paragraph 7) of the Revised Penal Code, stating a failure to perform an act required by law upon being prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause.

[G.R. No. 183819. July 23, 2009.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARSENIO CORTEZ y MACALINDONG a.k.a. "Archie", accused-appellant. Facts: On or about October 26, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, ARSENIO CORTEZ, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to SPO2 Dante Zipagan, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing four (4) centigrams (0.04 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the tests for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. Issue: Whether or not doubts should be raised as to the identity of what was seized when the apprehending police officers failed, after the buy bust, to make an inventory of the seized item and mark the container of the substance allegedly recovered from him. Held: No. A close examination of the IRR of RA 9165 readily reveals that the custodial chain rule admits of exceptions. Thus, contrary to the brazen assertions of Cortez, the prescriptions of the IRR's Sec. 21 need not be followed with pedantic rigor as a condition sine qua non for a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not, by itself, render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused". In the instant case, there had been substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item. Its integrity and evidentiary value had not been diminished. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case has not been shown to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case yields the following: After SPO2 Zipagan confiscated the 0.04 gram of shabu in question, as well as the marked money, following Cortez's arrest, the seized sachet of suspected shabu was without delay

brought to the Pasig City police station and marked as AMC 10-26-03. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance, with a letter of request for examination, was referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per Report No. D-206103E, the specimen submitted contained methamphetamine hydrochloride. The examining officer, P/Insp. Perdido, duly marked the sachet with his initials, JMP. The contents of the seized plastic sachet had been found to be the same substance identified and marked as Exhibit "E-1" and adduced in evidence in court. In Malillin v. People, 26 the Court stressed the importance of the testimonies of all persons, if available, who handled the specimen to establish the chain of custody. Thus, the prosecution offered the testimony of SPO2 Zipagan who first had custody of the seized shabu. The testimony of the next handling officer, P/Insp. Perdido, was, however, dispensed with after the public prosecutor and the defense counsel stipulated that Exhibit "E-1" 27 is the same specimen mentioned in Exhibits "B-1" 28 and "C-1", 29 and that the said specimen was regularly examined by the said witness.

[G.R. No. 180508. September 4, 2009.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO RAMOS Y VIRAY, appellant. Facts: On or about the 13th day of September 2005, in the City of Makati Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, under Crim. Case No. 051712, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport zero point zero one (0.01) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug in consideration of the amount of two hundred (Php200.00) pesos and of ZERO POINT ZERO FIVE (0.05) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug as provided in another instance under Crim. Case No. 051713 after the conduct of a buy-bust operation coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Issue: Whether or not the law enforcement officers had observed the procedure laid down in Section 21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 a requirement essential to preserving the integrity of the corpus delicti in these cases, the Court rules in the negative. On that score alone, appellant's acquittal is in order. Held: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to apprehend prohibited drug law violators in the act of committing a drugrelated offense. Because of the built-in dangers of abuse that the operation entails, it is governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from the general law procedures geared to ensure that the rights of people under criminal investigation and of the accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded. The records indicate that the buy-bust team did not follow the outlined procedure on the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs, despite its mandatory character as indicated by the use of the word "shall". Appellant's contention that the apprehending policemen were remiss in complying with the statutory requirements is thus well-taken. The Court is of course mindful of its pronouncement in People v. Pringas 21 that:

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. However, the prosecution had not substantiated PO2 Aseboque's claim that team leader PO3 Ruiz had made an inventory of the seized items, as he in fact, confessed not knowing whether said team leader had made an investigation report. IN FINE, the failure of the police officers to comply with the procedure in the custody of seized drugs puts to doubt their origins, and negates any presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of their official duties. Appellant's acquittal is thus in order. Antonio Ramos y Viray is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged.

ALTERNATI VE

[G.R. No. 172324. April 3, 2007.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CELINO NABONG y OSENAR (a.k.a. Salvador Abaquita), ALVIN LAGUIT y BRENDO and NOLFE LADIAO (a.k.a. Roel Salutario), accused-appellants. Facts: On or about the 23rd day of March 1999 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, the four accused, construction workers of EEI in Makati City, Celino Nabong, Alvin Laguit, Nolfe Ladiao and Arnel Miraflor, after having a drinking session, conspired, confederated and mutually helped each other and took advantage of nighttime, superior strength and by means of treachery, evident premeditation, force and violence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to have sexual intercourse with a woman, 22-year-old accountant employed as junior auditor at the Alba and Romeo Auditing Firm, AAA, against her will and consent, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of rape as a consequence by reason of causes independent of their own spontaneous desistance, that is, AAA resisted; and by reason or on the occasion of the attempted rape the accused, with intent to kill, attack, assault and stabbed with a bladed weapon AAA on the different parts of her body thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused her death. Issue: Whether or not the lowered courts erred in not appreciating the intoxication and low degree of instruction in his favor. Held: For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the will power of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. This, the appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any evidence that the quantity of liquor they had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact that appellants could recall details of what had transpired after their drinking

session is the best proof that they knew what they were doing during that occasion. The deception, the device, the place and manner of perpetrating the crime all point to the fact that appellants had complete control of their minds. Neither can appellant Nabong's alleged lack of instruction be appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy alone will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's act. Besides, one does not have to be educated or intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person.