Industrial Buildings

COSTActionTU0904
IntegratedFireEngineeringandResponse
WG1ChristophKlinzmann,c.klinzmann@hhpberlin.de
16FIRESAFETYENGINEERINGINANAIRCRAFTHANGAR(DEFINITIONOFFIRE
SCENARIOSANDDESIGNFIRES)
Summary
On the premises of the new airport of the city of Berlin, a line maintenance hangar for aircrafts was
plannedandwillbefinisheduntilthesecondhalfof2012.Thefiresafetyconsultantshhpberlindeveloped
the relevant fire scenarios and defined design fires as a basis for CFD simulations. The possibility of
successful fire fighting measures and the design of the loadbearing steel structure of the roof and the
upper parts of the columns without protective coating were investigated on the basis of results of the
simulations.
16.1DESCRIPTIONOFTHECONSTRUCTION
The hangar has the outer dimensions of 83.40 m width and 77.60 m depth and thus an inner area of
approx. 6,472 square meters. The hangar has a horizontal orientated roof, which is supported by an
external two truss girders on steel supports that are located on the outside. A secondary internal load
bearing system is attached below the main loadbearing elements. The hangar has a medium interior
heightofapprox.18.10m,theheightoftheloweredgeofthesecondaryloadbearingstructureis15.25m.
16.2SAFETYOBJECTIVES
The building was designed on the basis of the German guidelines for industrial constructions. The first
objective that has to be fulfilled is the sufficient structural safety in case of fire. The second objective for
buildings that have an area of more than 1,600 squaremetres is the proof of the possibility of successful
firefighting.
InGermanythissafetyobjectiveisachievedincaseasmokelayerheightofatleast2.5misverified
foreverylevelofthebuilding.
Inthepresentaircrafthangarthishastobedifferentiatedmoreprecisely,becauseforeffectivefire
fightingatleastthefuselageoftheaircraftparkedandmaintainedinthehangarmustberecognizableand
mustresideoutsidethesmokelayer.Thesmokeexhaustmeasuresmustbedesignedtokeepthetopedge
ofthehighestaircraftoutofthesmokelayer.
ThepresentcaseinvolvestheBoingB747,whichhasamaximumheightofapprox.10matthetop
ofthecabin.Theminimumheightofthesmokelayertoaccountforisthus10m.
177
COSTActionTU0904
ThesafetyobjectiveofensuringasmokelayerheightwasfulfilledinaCFDsimulation.Ascriteriato
prove the safety objective the socalled optical smoke density is evaluated. It can be assumed that the
safetyobjectiveismetwhentheopticalsmokedensitydoesnotexceedavalueof0.151/m(vfdbLeitfaden
2009).
In addition to the use of the results from the simulation for the design of the smoke exhaust
systems, they are used for the structural fire design of the steel structure according to the simplified
calculationproceduresof(Eurocode3)(columnsandroofstructure).
16.3FIRESCENARIOS
Fortheproofofthesafetyobjectivesalltherelevantfirescenariosmustbeinvestigated.
Variousaircraftsaretobeservicedinthehangar.Todemonstratethestabilityoftheloadbearing
structureoftheroof,itistheworstcasetoassumethatthefireoccursashighaspossibleinthebuilding.
To prove the effectiveness of the smoke exhaust measures for successful fire fighting operations, the
amount of smoke gases produced by a fire at the lowest point in the building is relevant, because the
longerthedistanceonwhichfreshairisentrainedintotheplume,thegreateristhequantityofproduced
smokegas.
Because of the wingspan of the aircrafts and the specified distance of the aircraft from the
supportingstructuretherewillnotbehighheatreleaseratesfromafireclosetotheloadbearingcoloums.
Itcannotbeexcludedthatafireeruptsdirectlynearthesupportsoftheroofstructure,forexampledueto
firesoftechnicalequipmentortemporarilypositionedstoragegoods.Forthisreasonanotherfirescenario
3 ("local fire") must be investigated in addition to fire scenarios 1 and 2 ("aircraft fires"). This fire is
consideredexamplarilyinthepositionsofrelevantcoloumsofthemainsupportingstructure.
ThelargestaircraftinthehangarandthusthepotentiallylargestoriginofafireistheBoeingB747.
Theaircraftmeasures71metresinlengthandhasawingspanofabout69m,aswellasabodydiameterof
around7,30matthehighestpoint,withaheightabovethefloorofapprox.2.70m.
In principle fire events have to be expected in the disadvantageous place in the building. If a fire
occursinacornerareaofthebuildingthetemperaturesitcausesaretypicallyhigherduetoaccumulation
effects.Duetothefactthatthehangardoorsatthefrontofthebuildingareopenedintheeventofafire,
positionsatthebackofthebuildingareviewedasdisadvantagues.
The aircraft (B747), which is considered most relevant for assessment, has two levels. In the front
sectionoftheBoeingB747anupperdeckislocated.Itisthereforenolongerapparentwhereadesignfire
willleadtohighertemperaturesinthebuildingoratthebottomedgeoftheroofstructure.Thereforetwo
aircraft fire scenarios (see Fig. 16.1) were adopted, where the place of the fire was assumed at the back
cornerofthehangarinbothcases.
178
COSTActionTU0904
- Scenario 1: fire in the cabin of a B747400 with participation of part of the wings (plastics and
kerosenefire),firesurface100m,firesinaheightofapprox.6m.
- Scenario2:cabinfireinaB747400intheupperdeck(plastics)withoutparticipationofthewings,
firearea50m,firesinaheightofapprox.8m.
- Scenario3:localfire,forexamplelargercarorasimilarmajortechnicaldeviceorstoragegood,fire
area10m,firesataheightof4.0m.
Fig.16.1Floorplanofthehangarwiththepositionoftheoriginofthefire
Fire scenario 2
Plane on fire
(Upper Deck Cabin)
Fire scenario 1
Plane on fire
(Cabin + Wing)
Fire scenario 3
Local fire
(In the area of a support)
179
COSTActionTU0904
16.4DESIGNFIRES
Toensuredesignfiresonthesafeside,therelevantinputparametersmustbeadoptedconservatively,so
thatallrelevantfireeventsarecovered.
With regard to the course of the heat release rate, it is assumed that the fire does not extinguish
after the depletion of the fire load but will remain at the maximum rate of the heat release. For that
reason,onlythenatureofthefireload,butnottheamountissignificanttheforthefiresafetydesign.
The safety objectives in the building will be proven when a stationary state, i.e. a balance of the
energysuppliedbythefireandtheenergydissipatedbythesmokeandheatexhaustmeasuresisreached.
In all fire scenarios extinguishing measures, for example, by the extinguishing system or the airport fire
brigade, are not considered to have a direct effect on the heat release rate. They are accounted for
conservativelybythepartialfactor
fi,HRR
,accordingto(DINEN199112/NA).
Due to the fact that a fire develops higher temperatures if it burns with a high heat release rate
concentrated in a small area and on the other hand a higher smoke gas production occurs in a larger fire
area,therealisticfireareasmentionedabovearechosenfortheaircraftfirescenarios.
Inthefollowingthecurveprogressionsoftheheatreleaseratesaredefinedforall3firescenarios.
The maximum of the heat release rate Q
max
is dependent on the speed of the fire development or the
resultingfireareaA
f
,aswellastheareabasedheatreleaserateofq.Additionallyapartialsafetyfactorto
account for firefighting measures according to the safety concept of the Eurocode (DIN EN 199112) is
considered.
Q
max
[kW]=q[kW/m]*A
f
[m]*
fi,HRR
(1)
Accordingtotheliteraturesuchasthe(vfdbLeitfaden),areaspecificheatreleaseratesofbetween
150kW/m
2
and500kW/marerealistic.Inindividualcasesalsovaluesover600kW/m
2
canoccurespecially
in plastics and lubricants. This adds up to the following design fires for the defined fire scenarios (partial
safetyfactorsinaccordancewithDINEN199112/NA):
- Scenario1(Fireincabin+wing):q=600kW/m
Q
max
[kW]=600kW/m*100m*1,075=64500kWafterapprox.930s (2)
- Scenario2(Fireinupperdeckcabin):q=450kW/m
Q
max
[kW]=450kW/m*50m*1,075=24187.5kWafterapprox.720s (3)
- Scenario3(Localfireatsupport):q=500kW/m
Q
max
[kW]=500kW/m*10m*1,075=5375kW (4)
The illustrations in Fig. 16.2, Fig. 16.3 and Fig. 16.4 show the curve progressions of the heat release over
time.
180
COSTActionTU0904
Fig.16.2Chronologicalsequenceofheatreleaserate(HRR)inthefirescenario1("aircraftfire")
Fig.16.3Chronologicalsequenceofheatreleaserate(HRR)inthefirescenario2("Fireinupperdeckcabin
")
181
COSTActionTU0904
Arapidfirepropagationspeedisassumed,sothataheatreleaserateof1MWisachievedafter150s(see
Fig.1.4).
Fig.16.4Chronologicalsequenceofheatreleaserate(HRR)inthefirescenario3("Localfire")
The specification of the source of a fire is required for fire simulations. The calculations are based
on a mixed load of fire, which consists of 33% wood, 33% polystyrene, and 33% polyurethane and thus is
based by 2/3 on plastics. In the light of the existing flammable substances in the hangar this is to be
regardedasconservative.
The mean value of the heat of combustion of the fuel mixture was derived from the specific
parametersoftheindividualsubstancestobeapproximately27MJ/kg.
Duetotherelationbetweentheheatreleaseq,themassflowmandtheheatofcombustionH(m=q/H)
ahigherheatofcombustionleadstoalowermassflowincaseaheatreleaseratewasspecified.Thusthis
leadstoalowerproductionofsmokegas,sothatthisvaluespecifiedisconsideredtobeconservative.
The soot yield was set to an average value of 0.09 g / g. This definition of soot production was
derivedfromtheinformationinthe(vfdbLeitfaden2009)andisadoptedconservatively.
182
COSTActionTU0904
16.5CONCLUSIONS
Thecasestudydiscussestherelevantdesignfiresandfirescenariosforanappropriatedesignofstructural
fireprotectionmeasuresoftheloadbearingstructureoftheaircrafthangar.Thedescribeddesignfiresand
fire scenarios were the basis of simulations carried out to derive a temporal and spatial temperature
distributioninthehangarasinputintothefiresafetydesignmethodsofEurocode3part12.
References
DIN EN 199112/NA: National Annex National festgelegte Parameter Eurocode 1 Einwirkungen auf
Tragwerke Teil 12/NA: Allgemeine Einwirkungen Brandeinwirkungen auf Tragwerke; December
2010.
Eurocode 3, Part 12 (DIN EN 199312): Bemessung und Konstruktion von Stahlbauten Teil 12:
AllgemeineRegelnTragwerksbemessungfrdenBrandfall,December2010.
vfdb Leitfaden 2009: Hosser, D. and vfdb (publisher.): Leitfaden Ingenieurmethoden des Brandschutzes.
TechnischerBerichtvfdbTB04/01,2.AuflageMai2009.Altenberge,Braunschweig:vfdb,2009.
183
COSTActionTU0904

WG1ZdenkSokol,zdenek.sokol@fsv.cvut.cz
WG1KamilaHorov,kamila.horova@fsv.cvut.cz
17PRODUCTIONANDSTORAGEHALLOBJECT
Summary
The main objective of the case study is to examine fire resistance of steel structure of production and
storagehallobjectlocatedinMnichovoHradit,CentralBohemia,CzechRepublic.Theinvestigatedpartof
theobjectisofirregulargroundplan.Itsmaximaldimensionsare90.0x114.0m,13.25mheight.Insidethe
hall there is the area for production of lemonade and area for storage of the product. The structure is
composed of precast concrete columns and steel trusses of 22.5 m length. Roof deck is designed from
trapezoidal sheet, vertical cladding from sandwich panels. The requirement for the fire resistance of the
bearing structure is REI 15. The fire resistance of steel trusses, stiffeners and other members of roof deck
andverticalcladdingareinvestigated.Regardinglargedimensionsofthehallasonecompartmentlocalised
firesofwoodenpalletsandhighlifttruckareconsidered.
17.1DESCRIPTIONOFTHEHALL
The object of production and storage hall of lemonade is located in Mnichovo Hradit, Central Bohemia,
Czech Republic. The subject of the study is only part of the object which is of irregular ground plan. Its
maximaldimensionsare90.0x114.0m,heightoftheatticis13.25mandroofdeclensionof2%.Theone
floorhallincludesanareaofproductionoflemonadeandareaforstorageoftheproduct.Thestructureis
composed of precast concrete columns and steel trusses of 22.5 and 20.0 m length, simply supported on
the head of concrete columns, see Fig. 17.1. The span length between steel trusses is 19.0 m. Both, steel
trussesandsteeltrusspurlinsconsistofHsectionupperchordandlowerchord,diagonalsarefromsquare
tubular section. In roof plane there are stiffeners of round tube section. Roof deck is designed from
galvanized trapezoidal sheet S.A.B. 150/280/0.75 as twospan continuous beam 2 x 5.625 m. Vertical
claddingofthehallconsistsofsandwichpanelsonintermediatecolumnsfromHsectionandverticalbeams
of5.625mspanlength.
17.2FIREENGINEERINGAPPROACH
17.2.1Subjectofexaminationoffireresistance
The objective of the case study is to investigate fire resistance of steel trusses (steel truss P1 is shown at
Fig. 17.2), steel stiffeners and other members of the roof, bearing members of cladding as intermediate
184
COSTActionTU0904

columns (see Fig. 17.3) and horizontal beam above the portal door. The fire resistance of concrete
columns, roof cover and sandwich panels is not subject of the case study. The requirement for the fire
resistanceofthemainbearingstructureisREI15.
Fig.17.1Steeltrussesof22,5mlength
Fig.17.2SteeltrussP1
Fig.17.3Bearingmembersofcladding
17.2.2Processofexaminationoffireresistance
Theexaminationoffireresistanceofsteelstructurecoversseveralsteps:
1. Selectionofdesignfires
2. Descriptionofdesignfires
3. Heattransferanalysis
4. Mechanicalresponseanalysis
17.3DESIGNFIRESCENARIOS
Regardinglargedimensionsofthehallasonecompartment(areaof13234m
2
)fullydevelopedfireisnot
expected.Twolocalisedfiresareconsidered:
185
COSTActionTU0904

1. Localisedfireofwoodenpalletsproductisstoredonwoodenpalletsofweight138000kgonarea
of9259m
2
.Fireloadof14.9kg/m
2
isconsidered.
2. Localisedfireofhighlifttruck
Localised fire parameters are assessed by using the expressions given in EN 199112:2002 Annex C. By
calculation of influence of localised fire to roof members it is assumed that the centre of fire is directly
undertheexaminedmember.Whilebyexaminationofintermediatecladdingcolumnsthemethodofheat
transferbyradiationisused.
17.3.1Localisedfireofwoodenpallets
ThedesignvalueofthefireloadisdefinedusingEN199112:2002AnnexE:
2
,
/ 2 , 577 m MJ q
d f
=
wherecharacteristicfireloaddensityperloadareais
2
,
/ 8 , 260 m MJ q
k f
=
factor 12 , 2
1
=
q
o
factor 00 , 1
2
=
q
o
sum of factors 305 , 1
,
=
[ i n
o (no automatic water extinguishing system, no independent water
supplies, installed automatic heat detection, no automatic smoke detection, no automatic alarm
transmission to fire brigade, no work fire brigade, off site fire brigade, safe access routes are
designed,firefightingdeviceareavailable,nosmokeexhaustsystem)
TocalculatetimedependantrateofheatreleaseRHR
f
,
thetimeneededtoreacharateofheatreleaseof1
MWisusedas s t 300 =
o
,RHR
f
=1250kW/m
2
(woodenpalletsof0.5mheight)andthefirediameterD=3
m. The maximum heat release of wooden pallets is 8836 kW. The rising phase takes 14 min 52 s and
stationary phase 28 s. Fuel burns out in 19 min 59 s, see Fig. 17.4. The length of the flame is calculated
according to EN 199112:2002 Annex C. Fig. 17.5 shows the maximum length of the flame of 5.83 m (the
flameisnotimpactingtheceiling).
186
COSTActionTU0904

Fig.17.4Rateofheatreleaseofwoodenpalletsfire
Fig.17.5Lengthoftheflameofwoodenpalletsfire
17.3.2Localisedfireofhighlifttruck
Rate of heat release of highlift truck is taken as the value of fire of a car from project DIFISEK. The fire
diameterDis3.91m.Fig.17.6showstimedependenceofrateofheatrelease.Themaximumheatrelease
ofthetruckis8300kW.Thefiretakes70min.Themaximumlengthoftheflameis4.68m(theflameisnot
impactingtheceiling),seeFig.17.7.
187
COSTActionTU0904

Fig.17.6Rateofheatreleaseofhighlifttruckfire
Fig.17.7Lengthoftheflameofhighlifttruckfire
17.4HEATTRANSFERANALYSIS
17.4.1Steelmembersofroofconstruction
Thegastemperatureinheightofz=10m(heightoflowerchordofsteeltruss)iscalculatedusingEN1991
12:2002AnnexC.Themaximumgastemperatureduringfireofwoodenpalletsis221Cfrom14min52sto
15 min 20 s. During the fire of highlift truck the maximum gas temperature is 184C in 25 min, see Fig.
17.8.
The temperature of unprotected steel structure is calculated using stepbystep method from EN
199312:2005.Fig.17.9showsthetemperatureoflowerchordofsteeltrussP1(crosssectionHE180A,z=
10m,A/V=234m
1
,k
sh
=0,62)duringconsideredfireofwoodenpallets.Themaximumtemperatureofthe
188
COSTActionTU0904

memberis122Cin18min.Temperatureintime15minis102C.Duringfireofhighlifttruckthemaximum
temperature of the member is 103 C in 30 min, in 15 min the temperature is 49 C, see Fig. 17.10.
Temperaturesofothermembersofroofstructurearedescribedinoriginalreport.
Fig.17.8Gastemperatureinheightoflowerchordofsteeltruss
Fig.17.9TemperatureoflowerchordofsteeltrussP1duringfireofwoodenpallets
189
COSTActionTU0904

Fig.17.10TemperatureoflowerchordofsteeltrussP1duringfireofhighlifttruck
17.4.2Bearingmembersofcladding
The temperature of intermediate columns of the cladding during localised fire is derived using physics
fundamentals and methods described in EN 199112 and EN 199312. Following assumptions are
considered:
1. Flamesoflocalisedfirearesubstitutedbycylindricalsurfacewithdiameterofthefire.
2. Columnsofthecladdingarenotinsidethecylinder.Heattransferisrealizedduetoradiation.
3. Temperature of column differs with its height. Heat conduction is neglected (assumption gives
highertemperatures).
4. Nonuniformdistributionoftemperatureisneglected.
Fig.17.11showsplacingoflocalisedfireandintermediatecolumnofthecladding.Heattransferdueto
radiationfromcylindricalsurfaceiscalculatedwheretemperatureofradiantcylindricalsurfacedependson
theheightofflamesz.Theformulatocalculatetemperatureoflocalisedfireisused.
Due to temperature dependence of flames on the height cylindrical surface is divided into several rings
with constant temperature. Temperature of selected column is calculated as sum of heat fluxes of all
ringsofcylindricalsurface.
Surfaceofthecolumnisaffectedbyradiationfrom3sides.UsingrulesfromEN199112AnnexGa
rectangularenvelopeisdrawnaroundthecrosssectionofthemembertodescribeshadoweffects.Inthis
case the configuration factor is defined numerically. The cylindrical surface is divided into rings with
constant temperature. From each ring only a part which is directly visible from surface of the column is
taken into account, see Fig. 17.11. The configuration factor is determined for flange and both sides of
190
COSTActionTU0904

rectangular envelope parallel to column web. Final heat flux is defined as difference of heat profits and
loss.Thetemperatureinanypointofthecolumniscalculatedbytheaidofstepbystepmethod.

Fig.17.11Modeloflocalisedfireaffectingintermediatecolumnofthecladding
Fig.17.12Temperatureheightdependenceofcolumnin15min
191
COSTActionTU0904

Tocalculatetemperatureofsteelcolumnsofcladdingthefireofwoodenpalletsisused(thefireofhighlift
truckgiveslowertemperature).Distancebetweenthecentreofthecolumnandcentreofthelocalisedfire
x=1900mm.Thenfacesideofthecolumnisfrom285to295mmfromflames(dependsoncrosssection
ofthecolumn).ColumnsofthecladdingareofHE220A,HE240A,HE240A+U230x185x3crosssections.Its
heightis12.5m.AtFig.17.12thereistemperatureheightdependenceduringthefireofwoodenpallets.
Temperatureofhorizontalbeamabovetheportaldoorisdefinedassumingthatthefireofwooden
pallets is situated under the member. Because of absence of pallets in this place the assumption is over
conservative. Temperatures of other members of cladding from hollow square and rectangular sections
aredescribedinoriginalreport.
17.5MECHANICALRESPONSEOFTHESTRUCTURE
17.5.1Steelmembersofroofconstruction
Temperature in 15 min of members of roof construction does not exceed 140 C. Reduction factor for
effective yield strength k
y,
= 1,00. In this case resistance of the steel members is not influenced by fire.
Considering lower load during the fire in comparison with load for limit state at normal temperature, the
resistanceofthemembersissatisfactorywithoutnextcalculation.
17.5.2Intermediatecolumnsofcladding
Themaximumtemperaturein15minofcolumnsis320C.Reductionfactorforeffectiveyieldstrengthk
y,

= 1,00 (resistance of the steel members is not influenced by fire). Because of lower value of slope of the
linear elastic range E
a
the design buckling resistance is also lower. The column HE 240A is loaded by
combination of compression (weight of the cladding) and bending (wind). Its length is 12.5 m, it is held
becauseofbucklingandlateraltorsionalbucklingbytheaidofsandwichpanels.
Normal force in column is kN N
k E
50 , 8
,
= (load acts on the width of 5.625 m, sandwich panels Kingspan
withPURinsulationof70mm,KS1000TFM/MB,11.44kg/m
2
,13.2mhigh).
Bending moment is kNm M
k E
6 , 58
,
= (wind speed is 26 m/s, c
e
= 1,8 (III. category), c
pe
= +0.7,
'
/ 00 , 3 m kN w
k
= ).
Load combination with normal force as permanent load (
G
= 1,00) and wind load as variable load
(
Q
= 1,00,
1
= 0,2) isused.
Resistanceofthecombinationofcompressionandbendingofthecolumnduringthefirecanbecalculated
withfollowingvalues:
slendernessatambienttemperature is 8 , 123 =
y

nondimensionalslendernessforthetemperature is 479 , 1
,
=
u
y

192
COSTActionTU0904

theratioofimperfectionforbucklingcurves is 65 , 0 = o
149 , 4
0
= |
geometricalimperfectionis 125 , 0
,
=
fi y
_
Calculated column HE 240A uses up to 10 % of its resistance during the fire of wooden pallets. Regarding
thesamemechanicalloadofothercolumnsofthecladdingnextcalculationisnotnecessary.
17.6SUMMARY
Thechaptersummarisestheexaminationoffireresistanceofsteelstructureofproductionandstoragehall
object.Thefireresistanceofsteeltrusses,stiffenersandothermembersofroofdeckandverticalcladding
are investigated. Regarding large dimensions of the hall as one compartment localised fires of wooden
palletsandhighlifttruckareconsidered.Therequirementforthefireresistanceofthebearingstructureis
REI 15. According to previous calculation all members of the steel structure satisfy the resistance
requirement of15minwithoutanyfireprotection materials.Theprojectofexaminationoffireresistance
of steel structure of production and storage hall object in Mnichovo Hradit was approved without any
problemsbythestakeholderandauthorities.
References
EN199112:2002ActionsonstructuresPart12:GeneralactionsActionsonstructuresexposedtofire.
EN199312:2005DesignofsteelstructuresPart12:GeneralrulesStructuralfiredesign.
Franssen, 2005: Franssen J.M., Zaharia R., Design of Steel Structures subjected to Fire, Background and
DesignGuidetoEurocode3,UniversityofLiege,2005.
Sokol, 2009: Sokol Z., Wald F., Prediction of Column Temperature Exposed to Localised Fire, in: Technical
Sheets 2008 Part 3. Praha: CIDEASCentrum integrovanho navrhovn progresivnch stavebnch
konstrukc,2009,vol.3,p.5960.ISBN9788001044612.
Sokol 2011: Sokol Z., Temperature of Steel Columns Exposed to Localised Fire, in: Proceedings of
InternationalConferenceApplicationofStructuralFireEngineering,p.269274,CTUPrague,2011.
193
COSTActionTU0904
WG1TsatsoulasDimitrios,fire123@otenet.gr
18REDUCINGTHERISKOFTIMBERFIRESACASESTUDY
Summary
A case study of aSeriousfire in a Timber industry located in Northern Greece is presented. In this work
summarized : ignition source, fire location, first and secondary ignited materials, fire behaviour as
extracted from fire investigation report. Details from fire structure report have been given (number of
occupants, product/equipment, total injuries or fatalities, economical losses information and property
valueatriskfromthefireconditionetc).
Also, it is described how existed fire safety measures behave during pre flashover conditions.
Methodstoimproveindustryfireprotectionhavebeenproposedinordertoavoidspreadingoffireandto
minimize toxic emissions. This proposition has been validated by small and medium scale experimental
work.
FireBrigadeinterventionandthetimetakentoundertakeitsactivitiesatafirescenehasbeenevaluated.
18.1INTRODUCTION
This study examines a case of a Serious fire in a Timber industry located in the industrial area of
Thessaloniki. This Timber industry was complied with fire safety measures as predicted by the Greek
Government Desicion (1589/104/2006) Industrial Fire protection. (so, it has been supplied with passive
protection measures i.e means of escape, emergency lighting and signs , and active measures i.e. fire
detection , permanent fire water supply network but with no sprinkler installation).The Timber industry
was a 9.480 m
2
concrete building with 120 employees. Processed materials were raw wooden pine
materialsandfinalproductswerefurnitureandotherwoodenconstructions.
18.2INCIDENTANALYSIS
The fire has been caused by spark friction originated in the production area below wooden pallets. First
ignited materials were unprotected wooden pallets and secondary materials were raw pine wooden
material. These factors were leading to the rapid fire growth and flash over conditions. Fire almost
immediately spread from first to second ignited materials. It was not contained to the room of origin and
spreadbeyondtothewholebuilding.FireCompartmentswereinadequatetostopthefireandfirewasnot
beenbepossibletobesuppressedbypermanentfirefightinghosereelsbyindustrialfirestaff.
194
COSTActionTU0904
Almost the whole wooden material and electromechanical equipment of industry has been
destroyedbythefire.Estimatedpropertyloss1,200,000euro.Ontheotherhand,thereinforcedconcrete,
columns,beamsperformedverywellinsuchaseverefireduetohighfireresistanceofreinforcedconcrete
(abovetwohours).Estimatedpropertyvaluesaved1,000,000euro.
(a) (b)
Fig.18.1Fireincidentduringpostflashoverperiod(a)productionarea,(b)storagearea.
Because of the size of the fire, a sitewide evacuation was immediately initiated. Unfortunately,
eightworkerssustainedminorinjuriesincludingscrapesandsmokeinhalation.
18.3EMERGENCYRESPONCE
The initial call reporting this incident was at 14.06 hours i.e in the middle of working day at 270710.
Timber complex had a trained and equipped Emergency Response Team (ERT) that included 20 members.
Onthedayoftheincident;10trainedemergencyresponderswereimmediatelyavailable.Firedurationwas
eight (8) hours. Firefighters from the surrounding fire stations were in emergency alert providing 25 fire
vehicles with 60 fire fighters deployed at the scene of fire. Fire extinguished after eight (8) hours. In an
efforttosustainfirefightingoperationswhiletryingtoestablishacontinuouswatersupply,tankwaterfrom
multipleapparatuswastransferredtothefireengines.
18.4LESSONSLEARNED
Itisclearfromtheabovethatpreventionoffirespreadbehindthewoodenfirstitemignitedwouldhavea
significantimpactonthereductionoffirelosses.
In this case where the first material ignited is wood, it is considered that ignition and fire spread
could be prevented or minimized by treating the timber surfaces with suitable flame retardants. Fire data
195
COSTActionTU0904
on the effects of flame retardants on wooden surfaces is not available, since the relevant market is quite
recentandnotparticularlywidespreadinGreece.
18.5EXPERIMENTALINVESTIGATIONS
Therefore, in order to investigate this possibility, commonly used timbers, untreated and treated were
testedandcomparedusingsmallscale(ConeCalorimeter)andmediumscale(EnclosedFireRig)equipment
combinedwithonlineeffluentgasanalysisequipment(FTIR).Themostwidelytypesoftimberusedinthe
Greekindustry(Pine),weretestedwithbaresamples,aswellasusingflameretardants(SmallandMedium
scale).
Fig.18.2PineexposedatHeatflux35kW/m2 Fig.18.3Untreatedcribat350secintothetest
Analysisinvolvedthermalbehaviorandtoxicspeciesanalysisofthesamples:
o Noignitionandlowertoxicemissionscomparedtountreatedsampleswereobservedat35kW/m
2
(smallscale).
o The same behavior was observed in those cases where wooden surfaces located next to ignition
sourcehadbeentreated(mediumscale).
o
18.6CONCLUSIONS
Themainfactorsleadingtotherapidfiregrowthandthefirespreadtoalmostthewholebuilding
were:
o thelackofeffectivefiresuppressionmeasuresclosetoignitionsource,
o theuntreatedwoodenfirstandsecondaryignitedmaterials
It is proposed that the application of intumescent flame retardants on wooden surfaces located close to
ignitionsourcesinthemostprobableareasforafiretobreakout,couldbeasafeandeffectiveapproachin
reducingfirelossinTimberindustry.
196
COSTActionTU0904

Fig.18.4FlameretardedPineexposed Fig.18.5Flameretardedcribat350secintothe
atheatflux35kW/m2 test
18.7SUGGESTIONS
Performing of more small and medium scale experiments, treated with the updated technology of the
intumescent paints (different parts of wooden cribs or some other form of samples), and using various
ventilation rates to achieve both establishing and documentation of the contribution of intumescent
technologyinfiresuppression,aresuggested.
Reference
Directorate of Fire Investigations Arson Crimes Control. Greek Fire Service Special investigation reports
2010,Thessaloniki2010.
Tsatsoulas, 2008: D. Tsatsoulas, Industrial fires in Northern Greece, The influence of Flame retardant on
TimberFires,Ph.D.Thesis,Leeds(UK)2008.
D.Tsatsoulas, Thermal behaviour and toxic emissions of various timbers in Cone Calorimeter tests
InternationalJournalofSafetyandSecurityengineering,Vol.1,N01(2011)4564.
Tsatsoulas, 2010: D.Tsatsoulas Thermal behaviour and toxic emissions of flame retarded timber in Fire
Enclosure tests,pp 295306, Seventh International Conference on Risk Analysis 2010, 1315
September,Algarve,Portugal.
Tsatsoulas, 2009: D.Tsatsoulas, H.N.Phylaktou and G.Andrews, Thermal behaviour and toxic emissions of
various timbers in Cone Calorimeter tests, Third international Conference on Safety and Security
Engineering, 13July 2009, Rome, In the proceedings of First International Conference on Disaster
ManagementandHumanHealthRisk,pp.181194,2325September2009,NewForest,UK.
197
COSTActionTU0904
WG2JanBedn,jan.bednar@fsv.cvut.cz
WG1ZdenkSokol,sokol@fsv.cvut.cz
WG2FrantiekWald,wald@fsv.cvut.cz
19TOFIREDESIGNOF142mHIGHBOILERHOUSEINLEDVICEPOWERPLANT
Summary
The building of the boiler house in Ledvice power
plant is 81.6 x 88.5 m with clear height 139m, see
Fig. 19.1. The structure of unique power unit with
output of 660MW was built from 2009 to 2011.
The underground part of construction is steel and
concrete and aboveground structural steel with
reinforced concrete floor slabs. The envelope of
the building was created by light hooked sandwich
surface in vertical part and as composed roof
surface. The fire design is based on closed boiler
technology and large open space inside the
building with fire risk from oil medium in 49
locations.
19.1INTRODUCTION
Theboilerhousewithconnectedtworeinforcedconcretetowerscreatesproductionblockofnewsourceof
powerplantLedvicewithcapacity660MW.Themainloadbearingconstructionformsfourhollowcolumns
withsizes2.4to2.4mwiththicknessofthewall65mmtoheight51mandthestructureoftheboileritself.
Thethicknessofthewallofthecolumnupto51mheightis50mm,seeFig.19.2.Boilerhouseintermsof
firesafetyisbuildingwithoneundergroundandoneabovegroundfloor.Theabovegroundfloorisdivided
indifferentheightlevelsbytechnologicalfootbridge.
19.2ENGINEERINGAPPROACH
19.2.1Firesafetyconcept
The fire safety solution, see (Bebk 2009), covers all the asked requirements for fire hazard of industrial
building.Duetoatypicalstructuralsolutionwereasked,exceptofCzechNationalrulesutilisingsimplified
Fig.19.1Erectionoftheboilerhousebuildingin
powerplantLedvicewithtwoconcretedbraced
towersprovidinghorizontalstiffness.
198
COSTActionTU0904
procedure, see (Reichl 2008 and 2011), also the performance based evaluation of fire resistance of the
main bearing structure assuring the stability of the boiler, see (Rottschaefer 2011). The procedure was
developed and the results approved at Czech Technical University in Prague, see (Sokol and Wald 2011).
The building divided into eight small fire compartments, as cable, pump, and turn cocks rooms and one
largewithboilitselfwith area6064m
2
.In compartmentofthe boilerhouse areexceptofmajorfireload
bycoalinclosedtechnologywithitsfiresafetyequipmentinstalledthe deviceswithoiling. Under devices
with amount of oil 400l were create the reservoirs.The major risk locations due to oil are summarized in
Tab.19.1.
Fig.19.2Erectionofthemainframeoftheboiler
house(29/10/2010).
Fig.19.3Finalisedexternalstructureonthe
buildingoftheboilerhouse(13/2/2012).
Tab.19.1Themajordeviceswithamountoftheoil
Technology Number Releaseoilvolume(l) Totaloilvolume(l)
Beatermills 8 450 3600
Airpreheater 1 320 320
Forcedraftfan 1 400 400
Beaterwheelcarriage 1 300 300
Submergescrapeconveyor 1 120 120
Startupvalves 2 300 600
HPbypassunit 4 200 800
199
COSTActionTU0904
Thefirescenariosconsideredinevaluationoffireresistancearebasedonlocalisedfireofinstalled
machineequipment.Theinputdatawerederivedfromparametersoftheinstalledequipment(diameterof
thefire,areaofthefire,fireloaddensity,firegrowthrate,rateofheatrelease).Thefirescenarioassumed
for the localised fire is based on pool fire of hydraulic oil spilled on the floor because of failure of the oil
pipes.Itisassumedtheinitialamountofoilonthefloorissuppliedbyleakoftheoiltogetsteadyburning
during the period of required fire resistance, i.e. 45 min. In addition, burning of cables on cable trays is
assumed to increase the rate of heat release. The fire is modelled based on rate of heat release given in
(NUREG1805). Model of localised fire according to EN 199112 Annex C is used to predict the gas and
steeltemperature.
19.2.2Fireloadbycoal
Thecoalisthemainfireloadofboilerhouseeven,ifallthefacilitiesaredesignedasclosedsystem.Three
modelsituationoffireofcoalweretakenintoaccount,see(Bebk2009):thefireloadbycoalatlevel0m
due to the accident of coal mill, at level 26 m due to conveyer belts, and at level 51m due to coaling
bunker. With automatic warning, camera systems, and the firemens attack till 10 min it is expected free
burningofcoalatallthreepotentiallocationstill15min. Therequiredfireresistanceofstructuresdue to
allinstalledactivemeasuresandautomaticfoamfireextinguisherswascalculatedto30min.
Thedesignfireofcoalmillisexpectedduetofailureofsurfacestructureofcoalclosedtechnology
andburningallcoalinfilling1000kg.Amillislocatedonareaof50m
2
,whichcreatescharacteristicfireload
density of timber equivalent 248 MJ/m
2
Note: According to Czech standard SN 73 0802: 2000 are
combustible materials in checked space determined by variable and permanent fire actions, which is put
out to the floor area and expressed by timber equivalent with heating value 16,5 MJ/kg. The fire load by
coalonconveyerbeltsexpectthefractureofsurfacestructureandpouroutofthematerialfrombelt.Due
to automatic stop alarm it is expected to burn 500 kg of coal. The area under the longest bell is 26m x
1,5m, e.g. 39 m
2
which creates characteristic fire load density of 310MJ/m
2
. A coaling bunker has area
50m
2
, which allow of burning away of surface layer of about 2100 kg of coal. This fire load creates
characteristicfireloaddensityof193MJ/m
2
.
Duetoclosedsystemfortransportofcoalandtheactivefiremeasurementsincludinggasdetection
itisnotexpectedpotentialfireofcoalcombustiblegases.
19.2.3Fireloadbyoil
Theparametersofhydraulicoilwere takenfrom(IqbalandSalley2004).Parametersofhydraulicoilwere
modelledlikemoredescribedparametersoftransformeroil.Effectivecalorificvalueoftransformeroilwas
expected as H = 46 400 MJ/kg, oil density as = 760 kg/m
3
, burning mass rate as m= 0,039 kg/m
2
and
200
COSTActionTU0904
empirical constant k = 0.7 m
1
. The diameter D of the fire is derived from the equivalent area concept,
i.e.thenoncircularpoolofoilisreplacedbycircularareaofthesamearea.
Equivalent fire area
Oil spill - liquid pool fire
Fig.19.4Equivalentareaofthefire
Therateofheatreleaseoftheliquidpoolfireisgivenby
( )
D k
f
e 1 A H m Q
= (1)
Asthefirespreadsquicklyonthepoolareaaftertheignition,thefirespreadsat10cm/secto2m/sec,itis
consideredassimplificationtherateofheatreleaseisconstantduringtherequiredfireresistance.
Durationofthefirecanbeevaluatedaccordingto
m D
V 4
t
2
= (2)
Whennecessary,theoilspillissuppliedwithadditionaloiltoobtaindurationoffireatleast15min,i.e.the
required fire resistance to get the maximum temperature of steel structure. The amount of oil supplied
mustbeequalatleasttheamountofoilburned(theinitialoilspillandincreaseofpoolareaisneglected).
Theamountofoilburnedisgivenby60mA
f
( ) min / kg whichis60mA
f
/(l/min).
Therearecablesnearwhichcanbeaffectedbythelocalisedfire.Therateofheatreleaseofthecabletray
was evaluated from (NUREG1805) and added to rate of heat release from the oil spill. The rate of heat
releaseisgivenby
Q=0.45Q
b
A
f
(3)
whereQ
b
israteofheatreleaseobtainedfrombenchtestsandA
f
isareaofthecabletrayaffectedbythe
fire.Asthetypeofcablesarenotknown,thePE/PVCtypecableswereusedwithQ
b
=589kW/m
2
.Thisis
the most flammable cable type given in the references. It is assumed the rate of heat release from the
cablesisconstantduringthefiredurationasthecablesareignitedfromtheburningoil.
19.2.4Temperatureofsteelstructure
For columns in large and high compartments, the temperature of the upper part is low and the
temperature of the lower part close to the heat source would be critical. The column temperature in the
lower part can be calculated when the effect of heat gained from radiation and heat loses by convection
201
COSTActionTU0904
andradiationtothesurroundingspaceistakenintoaccount.StandardstepbystepmethodasinEN1993
12:2005 was utilised, for the procedure see in (Sokol, 2011). The beams were fire unprotected and fire
protected.ThetemperatureswereevaluatedbasedonEN199312:2005procedureforlocalisedfiresand
thetransferofheatbystepbystepprocedureaccordingtoEN199112:2002.
19.3EXAMPLEOFTEMPERATUREEVALUATIONTHECOLUMNCLOSETOTHEBEATERWHEELCARRIAGE
For the calculation it is assumed there is fire of oil leaking on the floor/reservoir. The oil spills on the
surface creating a pool. After the fire starts, the pool is supplied with continuous oil leaking from broken
tubeorfaultsealinginsuchamountthedurationoffireis15minstogetmaximumsteeltemperature.The
totaloilspillis300l,i.e.0,300760=228kg.Thediameteroftheequivalentcircularareaofthefireis
= =
m t
V
D
4
m ,
,
,
88 2
039 0 60 15
760 300 0 4
=

(4)
andtheequivalentfireareais
= =
4
2
D
A
f
2
2
51 6
4
88 2
m .
.
=
(5)
Therateofheatreleaseoftheliquidpoolfireisgivenby
( )= =
D k
f
e A H m Q - 1 ( ) kW 218 10 e 1 51 . 6 400 46 039 . 0
88 . 2 7 . 0
=

. (6)
Therateofheatreleasefromcablesiscalculatedforestimatedfireareaofthecabletraysequaltothetotal
fireareaA
f
.
Q=0.45Q
b
A
f
=0.455896.51=1727kW. (7)
Thetotalrateofheatrelease(oilandcables)is
Q=10218+1727=11945kW. (8)
Thelengthoftheflame,seeFig.19.5,is
L
f
=1:,02D+0:,0148Q
2/5
=1.022.88+0.14811945000
2/5
=7.09m. (9)
Thevirtualoriginz
0
is
z
0
=1,02D+0,00524Q
2/5
=1.022.88+0.0052411945000
2/5
=0.612m. (10)
andthetemperaturealongtheheightoftheflameis
g
=20+0.25Q
c
2/5
(zz
0
)
5/3
=20+0.25(0.811945000)
2/5
(z0.612)
5/3
=20+154.9(z0.612)
5/3
. (11)
butlimitedto900C.
202
COSTActionTU0904
Thecolumncentreislocatedatdistance2.4mfromthecentreofthelocalisedfire.Ifthedistance
from the fire to the column increases the column temperature would be smaller. The maximum column
temperatureattime15minsisreached2.6mabovethefloor,thetemperatureis169C,seeFig.19.6.The
calculationindicatesthecolumntemperaturedoesnotexceed350Cevenduring45minsoffireexposure
ifthefirewouldcontinuetoburnatthesamerate.
19.4SUMMARY
The contribution summarises the approach for evaluation of temperature of steel structure of the boiler
houseinthepowerplantLedvice,whichsupportstheFiresafetysolutionofthebuilding.
Acknowledgement
ThepreparationofthepaperwassupportedbythegrantMMTNo.LD11039.Thephotosofstructureof
boilinghousewerekindlyofferedbyAlstoms.r.o.,L.Martnek.
Temperature, C
Height, m
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Flame height
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 100 200 300 400
5 min
Temperature, C
Height, m
10 min
20 min
45 min
Flame height
15 min
Fig.19.5Temperaturealongtheflames,fireofbeater
wheelcarriage
Fig.19.6TemperatureofcolumnRHS100020,fireof
beaterwheelcarriage
203
COSTActionTU0904
References
BebkM.,Technicalreport,Firesafetysolutionofthebuilding,2904112/PO2T,6/2009,K.B.K.fire,s.r.o.,
draft,Ostrava2009,54p.
SN 73 0802 Fire safety of buildings non industrial buildings, in Czech, Porn bezpenost staveb
Nevrobnobjekty,NI,Prague2000.
EN 199112:2002 Actions on structures, Part 12: General actions, Actions on structures exposed to fire,
Brussels,2002.
EN199312:2005Designofsteelstructures,Part12:Generalrules,Structuralfiredesign,Brussels,2005.
Iqbal N., Salley M.H., Fire Dynamics Tools (FDT): Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG1805), United States
NuclearRegulatoryCommission,WashingtonDC,2004.
ReichelV.,ExpertisereportELENZ660MW,Ledvice,Expertiznstediskopornbezpenostistaveb,Praha,
12/2008.13p.and5/2011.9p.
Rottschaefer J., Design of New unit at Ledvice power station: Fire resistance of steel structure
IngenieurpartnerschaftKarvanekEbenau,Essen,2011.
Sokol Z., Temperature of Steel Columns Exposed to Localised Fire, in Proceedings of International
ConferenceApplicationofStructuralFireEngineering,pp.269274,CTUinPrague,2011.
Sokol Z., Wald F., Comparison of fire resistance of selected elements of steel structure at Ledvice Power
Plant,Technicalreport,CTUinPrague,2011.
WaldF.,Summaryofverificationoffiresafetyperformancebaseddesignofsteelstructureofboilerhouse
atLedvicePowerPlant,Technicalreport,CTUinPrague,2011.
204
COSTActionTU0904
WG2FredericMarimon,frederic.marimon@upc.edu
WG2AlbertJimnez,albert.jimenez@construsoft.com
WG2MiquelFerrer,miquel.ferrer@upc.edu
20APRACTICALAPPROACHTOSTUDYOFFIRERESISTANCEOFASTEEL
STRUCTUREWITHOPENBUILTUPMEMBERSANDCOLUMNS
Summary
The case study exposes a practical evaluation of fire resistance of an old structure of Spanish industrial
building composed of steel builtup members; the truss members are angles connected through packing
platesandthecolumnsarebattenedchords.
A simple calculation model was used element by element. First, heat is transferred to individual
steelelementsbyconvectionandradiationinthermalstudy.Thecontributionsofthesetwomodesofheat
transferweretreatedbyapracticalapproach.Inmechanicalstudy,thesecondorderanalysiswasusedwith
globalimperfections.Finally,thefireresistancewasevaluatedR15aftersomeproposals.
20.1PRECEDENTSOFTHECASE
Theanalyzedindustrialbuildingisasteelworkshopthatwaserectedmorethan25yearsago.Inthepast,
there were no specific mandatory rules in Spain to regulate this kind of industrial structures against fire,
consequentlythefireresistancewasnottakenintoaccountinthestructuraldesignprocess.
In2006,inordertorenovatetheactivitiespermissions,theauthoritiesrequestedthecompanyto
be in accordance with the current Spanish standard for industrial buildings (RSIEI, 2005). Following this
standard, the requirement was to resist 15 minutes in an ISO 834 standard, R15. The Spanish standard
(RSIEI,2005)allowstheuseofEurocode3(EN199312,2005)forcheckingstructuralfireresistance.
The company contacted the university in order to know if the current structure could be able to
resistR15withoutanyspecificfireprotection.
20.2BUILDINGDESCRIPTION
Thestructureofthisindustrialbuildingismadebyseveralframesseparated5mbetweenthem.Eachframe
has 17,2m of span and the total length and total surface of the building are 76,2m and 1341,5m
2
respectively. The frame is symmetric about its centre. Fig. 20.1 below, shows a detail of geometry (Tekla,
2011).
205
COSTAction
IntegratedF
Columnsco
the part be
foundations
builtup me
memberso
Alo
forces up to
provide fixe
0,23kN/m
2
20.3ASSUM
Thesimple
12,2005).
members,f
nTU0904
FireEnginee
onsistofbatt
ellow the cr
sandpinned
embers usin
fthetrussar
ng the longi
o this height
ed points to
.
MPTIONSFO
calculationm
Thismethod
forinstance:
ringandRes
Fi
tenedbuiltu
ane runway
dtothetruss
ng two UPN
respacedbu
tudinal direc
t. As shown
the frame;
Fig.20.2Con
ORTHEANAL
modelmemb
disbasedon
sponse
ig.20.1Built
upmembers
beam, and
s.Theupper
N 80 profile
uiltupmemb
ction, a resis
in Fig. 20.2,
columns and
nventionalb
LYSISANDRE
berbymemb
nsomeappr
upmember
of7mheigh
being a clo
randbottom
s. They are
bersmadeu
stant wall of
, the longitu
d truss. This
racingsystem
EGULATORY
berwasused
ropriatehyp
rsofthefram
tusingtwoU
osed box ab
mchordsoft
connected
pofbattene
f 2,4m heigh
udinal bracin
constructio
msinthewa
REQUIREME
dtoproceed
othesesfor
me
UPN160pro
ove it. The
thetrussare
through pa
edequalangl
ht offers a pr
g systems in
n results in
allsandrafte
ENTS
dintheresis
theirapplica
ofiles,beings
e column is
madebyclo
acking plate
lesL40.4or
rotection fro
n the walls a
a very light
r
tancedoma
ationtosing
separatedat
fixed to the
oselyspaced
es. The web
L50.5.
om the wind
and the roof
structure of
in(EN1993
lestructural
t
e
d
b
d
f
f
l
206
COSTAction
IntegratedF
- No
solv
- Effe
First,in
trussandco
The
at normal
unchanged
Eurocode3
20.4RESOL
Tosolvethe
wehaveus
freeform o
empirical co
nTU0904
FireEnginee
interactionb
vedindepend
ectsofaxialo
thermalstu
olumnsinor
en,aglobals
temperature
throughout
Part12(EN
Fig
LUTIONOFT
ethermalpr
edcommerc
objects (Brist
onvection in
ringandRes
betweenthe
dently.
orinplanet
udy,theunif
derverifyR1
Fig.20.3
secondorde
e design, 20
the fire exp
N199312,2
g.20.4Schem
HETHERMA
roblemandt
cialfiniteele
taPhysibel,
n enclosures
sponse
ermalandme
hermalexpa
formfiresta
15requireme
Uniformfire
relasticana
0C. The bo
posure. Fina
2005).TheFi
meofsimple
ALPROBLEM
toknowhow
ementsoftw
2011) where
s and bound
echanicalact
ansionsmay
ndardISO83
ents(Fig.20.
estandardIS
lysiswascar
oundary con
lly, the resis
g.20.4show
calculation
wthetemper
are.Itallow
e the view f
daries. In pra
tions.Therm
beneglected
34wasassum
.3)
SO834inthe
rriedoutwit
nditions at s
stance and b
wstheproced
modelinres
ratureincrea
sthesimula
factor is bas
actice, the r
malandmech
d.
medforexte
structure
thconstante
supports we
buckling wer
durescheme
sistancedom
asesinthes
tionoftrans
ed on nonl
esults were
hanicalprobl
ernaltemper
elasticmodu
ere assumed
re checked a
e.
main
pecificbuilt
sientheattr
inear radiati
very similar
lemsare
ratureofthe
ulusforsteel
d to remain
according to
upsections,
ansferin2D
ion, and the
r as use the
e
l
n
o
,
D
e
e
207
COSTAction
IntegratedF
conventiona
(EN19931
not conside
foreachcro
Fig.2
20.5RESOL
A2Dmodel
usingthese
inthelongit
20.5.1Mod
Thetrussb
sectionsin
differentlin
Fig.20.6
nTU0904
FireEnginee
alconcepto
2,2005).Ot
ered since lo
osssectionty
20.5Temper
LUTIONOFT
lwasusedto
econdorder
tudinaldirec
del
eammembe
thesoftware
nesforeach
6Thebuiltup
ringandRes
ofthecorrect
thermodels
ower temper
ypeafterISO
raturedistrib
HEMECHAN
osolvegloba
analysisbyc
ctionbytheb
ers havemo
e.Inordert
UPNchordc
pcolumnsw
sponse
tionfactorfo
basedinpa
ratures were
O834firecur
butioninbui
NICALPROBL
alanalysisan
conventiona
bracingsyste
deledasthe
oobtainmo
connectedby
weresimulate
ortheshado
rtialheatra
e obtained. F
rve.
ltupmembe
LEM
ndtoknowt
lstructurals
ems.Thenex
eircenterof
orerealistice
ythebattens
edbyindivid
oweffectfor
diation,limit
Finally, Fig. 2
ersafter15m
theinternalm
software(Po
xtsubsteps
gravityaxis
efforts,thec
sintheirrea
dualbeamsin
rsectionsun
tedinsideof
20.5 shows t
minutesfire
mechanicale
werFrame,2
havebeend
lineswithth
columnshav
lpositions(s
naconventio
ndernomina
fbuiltupse
the tempera
standardISO
effortsinaf
2011).Thefr
one:
heirrespecti
vebeen mod
seeFig.20.6
onalglobal2
lfireactions
ctions,were
ature results
O834
firescenario,
rameisfixed
ivesbuiltup
deledastwo
)
2Dmodel
s
e
s
,
d
p
o
208
COSTAction
IntegratedF
Rigid links
eccentricitie
crane.
20.5.2Appl
Allloadstak
in accordan
and load co
craneinfire
(Fig.20.10)
nTU0904
FireEnginee
has been in
es due to th
liedloadsan
kenintoacco
nce to the Sp
ombinations
escenario,o
Fig.20
ringandRes
troduced in
he change of
Fig
ndrelevantc
ountaresho
panish Techn
in fire scen
onlyselfweig
Fig.20
0.9Windload
sponse
the model,
f section in
.20.7Eccent
combination
ownbelow.I
nical Code (C
ario (see Fig
ghtofthecr
.8Selfweigh
ds;twoload
as showed
battened co
tricitiesofcr
ns
Itmustbesa
CTE, 2006),
g. 20.8 and 2
raneandits
ht,permanen
casesfromS
in Fig. 20.7
olumns and t
ranebeamlo
aidthatload
which descr
20.9). Specia
accessories
ntloadsand
SpanishTech
7, in order to
the exact po
oads
dsforallkind
ribes climatic
al considerat
wereusedin
snowloads
hnicalCode(
o take into
osition of th
dofbuilding
c loads, maj
tions were d
ntworeleva
(CTE,2006)
account the
e load from
shavetobe
ority factors
done for the
antpositions
e
m
e
s
e
s
209
COSTActionTU0904

Fig.10Loadsfromthecraneinfirescenariofortworelevantpositions
The effect of actions was determined using combinations factors

1,1
and
2,i
according the Spanish
TechnicalCode(CTE,2006):
E G
k,j
+
1,1
Q
k,1
+ E
2,i
Q
k,I
(1)
ThesevalueshavesignificantdifferencesfronttherecommendednationalvaluesofEurocode.Forinstance,
incaseofwindactionthefactor
1,1
=0,5versusrecommendednationalvalue
1,1
=0,2fromEurocode.
20.5.3AnalysisType
A global second order elastic analysis, including global imperfections at the top of the columns, has been
carried out. No information was found about special indications to apply global imperfection in battened
columnsunderfireconditions;so,thecommonvalueL/500forstandardconditionswasused.
Fig.20.11Imperfectione
0
usedinbattenedbuiltupcolumns
20.5.4Flexuralbucklingcriticallengthinmembers
The existence of two possible buckling planes shall be taken into account, requiring different checks. As
longasthesimplifiedmethodisusedtosolvethefireproblem,thecommonbucklingcriticallengthsused
innonfirecaseswereimplemented.
- Bucklinglengthsinupperchordoftruss.Thelengthofeachsplitmemberforthebucklingintheplane
(
y
=1) was taken as buckling length. For the out of plane buckling, the original bracing system was
modifiedtofixeverynodeoutplane(
z
=1).Noconsiderationsofdiaphragmeffectareconsidered.
- Bucklinglengthsinbottomchordoftruss.Thereisnocompression.
500
2
0
L
e
=
210
COSTAction
IntegratedF
- Buckling
distance
imperfe
buckling
second
modific
Fig.20.13M
20.6CHECK
For verifyin
memberof
(EN19931
20.7CONCL
Spanishsta
allowstheu
Spanish bui
nTU0904
FireEnginee
Fig.20
g lengths in
e between
ection (see 2
ganalysisw
eigenvalue
cationoforig
Modelwithb
KINGALLME
ng standard
theframeis
2,2005):
LUSIONS
ndardforind
useofstruct
ilding was ve
ringandRes
0.12Fixedpo
n battened c
two battens
20.5.3). In or
ascarriedo
was used
ginalbracing
boundaryres
EMBERSOFT
fire resistan
scheckedat
dustrialbuild
uralEurocod
erified. This
sponse
ointsforout
columns. Pl
s (=1) beca
rder to know
utusing the
to calculate
system.No

strictionsan
THEFRAME
nce requirem
tcalculated
dingsletsthe
des.Apresc
s building ha
, fi d
E s
ofplaneflex
lane bucklin
ause a seco
w the out of
commercial
e the out o
diaphragme
dthefirst(in
ment, for ins
temperature
eengineerto
riptiverequi
ad a problem
, , fi d t
R
xuralbuckling
g length of
nd order an
f plane buck
lsoftware(C
of plane bu
effectwasco
nplane)and
stance R15, a
eandcompa
oapplymod
rementfors
matic light st
goftrussme
chords of c
nalysis was
kling length
Consteel,20
uckling lengt
onsidered.
second(out
a member a
aredwithth
ernconcept
structuralre
tructure com
embers
columns is e
carried out
of the colum
11)(seeFig.
th. It was
tplane)buck
analysis is en
eeffortsinf
soffireengi
sistanceofo
mposed of st
equal to the
with global
mns, a eigen
20.13).The
necessary a
klingmodes
nough. Each
firescenario
(2)
ineeringand
oldindustrial
teel builtup
e
l
n
e
a
h
o
d
l
p
211
COSTActionTU0904
members.Thethermalandmechanicalstudyoftheseopenmemberswastreatedbyapracticalapproach
usingseveralcommercialsoftware.Thesimplecalculationmodelinresistancedomainwasenoughtoverify
therequirementofR15.Onlythebracingsystemmustbereconsidered.
References
RSIEI,2005:SpanishSecurityCodeagainsttoFireinIndustrialActivities,fromMinistryofIndustry,Tourism
andTrade(Spain).RSIEIReglamentodeSeguridadcontraIncendiosenEstablecimientosIndustriales.
www.ffii.nova.es/puntoinfomcyt/Archivos/Dis_4539.pdf
CTE, 2006: Spanish Technical Building Code, from Ministry for Housing (Spain). CTE Cdigo Tcnico de la
Edificacin.www.codigotecnico.org/web/cte/
EN 199312, 2005: Eurocode 3. Design of steel structures Part 12: General rules Structural fire design.
EuropeanCommitteeforStandardization.2005CEN.
BristaPhysibel,2011:Softwareforheattransfer.www.physibel.be/v0n2vo.htm
Tekla,2011:Softwarefor3Ddesignandautomaticdrawings.www.tekla.com
PowerFrame,2011:Softwareforstructuralanalysis.www.buildsoft.eu/es/product/powerframe
Consteel,2011:Softwareforstructuralanalysis.www.consteel.hu
212
COSTActionTU0904
SGSPKrzysztofBcki,klacki@sgsp.edu.pl
WG2PaweA.Krl,p.krol@il.pw.edu.pl
21QUESTIONABLEFIRESAFETYASSESSMENTOFTHEBAKERYPLANTBUILDING
Summary
Thebuildingbroaderpresentedinthispaperisabakeryplantconsistingofseveralpremisesofadifferent
purpose and method of use, e.g.: technical facilities, production depot, distribution and storage spaces,
longterm storage cool rooms, etc. The whole building that consists of singlestorey technological
(productionandstorage)partand(locatedontwostoreys)officepartswasapprovedasasingularfirezone
withatotalusableareaof6280m
2
.Thetechnologicalareaincludesproductionfacilities,storagedepotsof
raw materials, packages and finished products, as well as cold stores and a number of auxiliary function
rooms.Inthesecond(havingtwostoreys)partofthebuildingsomesocialrooms,administrativeareasand
officesarelocalized.
The total height of the building (at the highest point) does not exceed 10.5 m. Due to the Polish
regulations the parameters determining the firerelated requirements of individual structural elements of
thebuilding(especiallyintermsoftheirfireresistance)arethesurfacearea,theaveragevalueofthefire
load density and the presence of the risk of possible explosion. The building was designed based on the
assumption thattheaveragefireload densitydoes notexceedthelevelof1000MJ/m
2
. Theanalysisand
calculations carried out during the exploitation phase of the building confirmed the compatibilitywith the
assumptionsadopted,buttheactualvolume,estimatedatthelevelof974MJ/m
2
provedtobeveryclose
to the limit value. Exceeding of the limit value of 1000 MJ/m
2
due to provisions given in a state
regulations would automatically double the formal requirements for the resistance of the structural
elements from R30 to R60. When assessing the real risk, especially in case of the largesurfacearea
buildingswithvaryingwaysofuseofthepremises,theaveragevaluesoffireloaddensitymaynotproperly
reflect the real threat of fire. This is confirmed in the present facility, where in approximately 47% of the
total area ofthe building the fireload density doesnt exceed 100 MJ/m
2
. Surfaces for which the fire load
density exceeds 4000 MJ/m
2
(in extreme cases, its 5644 MJ/m
2
) represent only about 11% of the total
area. It is worth mentioning that the fireload density exceeding 4000 MJ/m
2
due to the national
regulations and codes of design must meet the criterion of R240. A completely separate issue is the fact
that the oldest part of the building was completed in violation of some basic technical and construction
requirements,sothatthestructureofthispartofthebuildingcurrentlydoesnotmeetanycriteriaforfire
213
COSTActionTU0904
resistance. This prompted the owner to implement some solutions that will not only lead the property to
become fully consistent with the state regulations but also raise the level of security over the required
standards, especially in the areas particularly vulnerable to fire. Presented case study shows that the
methodofdeterminingtherequirementsforfireresistance,especiallybasedontheaveragevalueoffire
load density, in selected cases can lead to significant underestimations and result in incorrect assessment
ofabuildingfiresafety.
21.1GENERALBUILDINGDESCRIPTION
The building presented in the paper is a freestandingbakery plant building, consisting of singlestorey
production hall with two mezzanines locatedin two separated zones of production part, and the internal
patioaswellasatwostoreypartcontainingthestaffroomsforemployeesandofficerooms.
Fig.21.1Generalviewofthebakeryplantbuilding
In a production depothave beenlocalized some technological lines for bread production, storage
spacesforrawmaterials,packagingandfinishedproductsareas(includinglongtermstoragecoolroomsfor
storing bread at temperatures of about 25
o
C). In addition, in this part of the building designers also
predicted other auxiliary facilities, such associal rooms for employees, and both electrical or repair shops,
garage offorklift trucks, and a number of technical areas housingchillers, water treatment plant, electrical
switchingstation,boilerroomandaircompressoroperatingapneumatictransportofflour.
The groundfloor of the twostorey office part houses reception room, security agency office and
hygienic rooms as well as restroom facilities for workers. On the second floor of the building a social and
administrativeareaislocated.
214
COSTActionTU0904
Functionally plant can be divided into technological part and the socialadministrative office part
(Fig.21.2).
Thetechnologicalpartisconsistingof:
9 thestorageroomofrawmaterials,
9 silosforflour(2externalandthreeinsidethebuilding),
9 twoindependentproductionlines,
9 thepackagingwarehouse,
9 arefrigeratedwarehousesandrelatedtechnicalareas,
9 thestorageoffinishedretailproductswithadistributioncentre,
9 thewashingstationforcontainerboxes.
Fig.21.2Functionofpremises
The building in its present form was erected in three stages (Fig. 21.3). Initially, it was the
productionhallonly,whichwasthenextendedtootherfacilitiesareasasthehallforthesecondproduction
line and the socialadministrative office part. Ultimately, in the last stage the warehouse for retail
productsandanewwashingstationforcontainerboxeswerebuilt.
Thebuildingwaserectedasofthesteelstructureobject.Curtainwallsandinternalpartitionshave
beenmade of sandwich panels and the roof is finished with trapezoidalmetal sheets with appropriate
215
COSTActionTU0904
thermal insulation layers. The socialadministrative office part uses mixed steel and reinforced concrete
structure, supported at the one end on the main structure of the technological (production) hall. Curtain
wallshavebeendesignedasamultilayeredstructurebuiltwithclaybricktiles,insulatedwithpolystyrene
boardsandfinishedwithclinker.Partitionwallsaremadeofbrickorplastercardboards.Roofingisfinished
withsandwichpanelswithtrapezoidsheetslocatedonbothsides.Thewalllocatedbetweentheofficeand
technologicalpartshavebeenmadeofsandwichpanels.
Fig.21.3.Stagesofexpansion
The number of employees of the plant fluctuates around 189, while at the same time about 65
peoplemaystayinthebuilding.
Thepropertynowformsaverticalprojectionoftherectanglelikeshapewithexternal dimensions
of127mx67m.Asitwasmentionedbeforebuildingheightdoesnotexceed10.5mandtheusableareais
equal6280m
2
.
21.2FIRESAFETYENGINEERINGSOLUTIONSUSED
According to available documentation, despite the fact the building consists of premises of different
functions,theobjecthasbeendesignedtofunctionentirelyasawholeinwhichitwasassumedthat:
thefireloaddensitydoesnotexceed1000MJ/m
2
,and
doesnotcontainanyspacesandhazardousareas.
DuetoPolishregulationsandconsideringassumptionsgivenabove,itisallowedtoassessthebuildingasa
singular fire zone. In the newest part of the property (storage and distribution of retail products area and
washingstationforcontainerboxes)thestructurewasprotectedusingtheintumescentpaintingsystemto
ensuredesignedflameresistancelevel.
216
COSTActionTU0904
Thebuildingisequippedwithafireplumbingsystem,whichinthesocialadministrativeofficearea
andinthetechnologicalarealocatedintheoldestpartoftheobject,isfinishedwithhydrantsDN25.Inthe
remainingparts of the building the fire hydrants type DN52 have been installed. The property is also
equippedwithanelectriccurrentfirebreaker.
Importantfromtheviewpointofevacuationsafetyisthefactthatthemaintenanceofrefrigeration
equipmentinthefacilityusesammoniasystem.Forthisreason,intheroomwherethechillersarelocated
have been installed asystem of ammonia leak detection and signalling, as well as the mechanical
ventilation. Some escape masks with ammonia absorbent filters were deployed in the building to ensure
theemergencyescapeincaseofammoniasystemsfailure.
Theemergencylightinglampshavebeenpositionedalongtheemergencyexittofacilitatetheexit
ofthebuildingbyemployeesincaseofemergency.
Evacuationofthebuildingwasplannedbyanumberofemergencyexitsleadingdirectlyoutofthe
technologicalpartofthepropertyandthroughthetwostaircasesinthesocialadministrativeofficearea.In
the walls between the staircases and corridors the fire doors of EI30 fire resistance were mounted. The
corridorwasprotectedwithasmokeinsulatingdoormountedinahalfwayofitslength.
In addition, in a close neighbourhood of the building four external fire hydrants were placed
(poweredbydeepwellwhichisthemainsourceofwaterfortechnologicalpurposesandtheliving),which
provideasecuritysourceofwatertoextinguishthefireforthefireservice.
21.3REGULATORYREQUIREMENTS
Due to the Polish state legislative regulations the classification of buildings for fire safety is based on the
total heightandtheway, thebuilding isused.Thebuildingsin generalaredividedintofivegroups:low(no
higher than 12m), mediumhigh (more than 12m to 25m), high (more than 25m to 55m) and highrise
buildings(over55m).
After determining the primary way of use or function of the building, one can assign it to one of
threecategories:riskytohumans(objectswheretheprimaryfunctionisassociatedwithatleasttemporary
stayofpeople),manufacturingwarehouse(wheretheprimaryfunctionistoproduceand/orstorage)and
livestock(designedforplantgrowingand/oranimalbreeding).
Due to presented rules the object in question, described in the paper, should be classified as
thelow building (below 12m of height). Uncertainty may arise in assessing the primary function and
qualifyingitdependentlyonthewayofusage.Therearenospecialdoubtsaboutthefact,thatpartofthe
building serves as the technological production and warehouse zone. The question arises how about the
socialadministrative office area? This is the area which primary function is associated with its occupation
bypeopleformorethan4hours/day.Insuchcases,thetechnicalstateregulationsrequiretheseparation
217
COSTActionTU0904
of different parts of building with various functions as a separate fire zones, unless they are linked
functionally.
Except the two previously mentioned parameters there are two other ones that have a direct
impact on fire protection requirements for production/storage buildings: the presence of the risk of
possibleexplosionandtheaveragevalueoffireloaddensity.
Asmentionedearlier,theobjectwasdesignedandbuilttofunctionentirelyasawholewiththefire
loaddensitylessthan1000MJ/m
2
whichdonotcontainanyhazardousareasorspaces.Intermsofheight
the building has been classified as a low category , due to way of use as the production/warehouse
industrialobject.
These are relatively comfortable assumptions, which allow the design and execution of the object
as a singular fire zone (with no separate fire zoning for office and technological areas), while putting little
demandsintermsoffireresistanceforthemainconstructionofwhichwillbediscussedlater.
Havinginformationaboutaclassificationofabuilding,basedonitsheightandthe densityoffire
loadonecandeterminethesocalled"classoffireresistance"(denotedbyoneofthefivesuccessiveletters
of the alphabet: A, which is the highest to E, which is the lowest). Assignments are made based on Tab.
21.1,below.
Tab.21.1.Therequiredglobalfireresistanceclassofabuilding
Maximumfireloaddensityina
firezoneofthebuilding
Q[MJ/m
2
]
Singlestoreybuilding
(withoutlimitationsofheight)
Multistoreybuilding
low Mediumhigh High Highrise
(L) (MH) (H) (HR)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Q=<500 "E" "D" "C" "B" "B"
500<Q=<1000 "D" "D" "C" "B" "B"
1000<Q=<2000 "C" "C" "C" "B" "B"
2000<Q=<4000 "B" "B" "B" * *
Q>4000 "A" "A" "A" * *
Thelegislationcontainsanumberofcasesinwhichtherequiredclassoffireresistancecanbeloweredor
when it should be increased. Directly from a determined class of the global fire resistance precise
requirements for fire resistance of individual building components can be derived, as shown in Tab. 21.2,
below.
Tab.21.2.Requirementsforthemajorstructuralelementsregardingcriteriafortheglobalfireresistance
class
SpecifiedFire
ResistantClassof
aBuilding
FireProtectionRequirementsforMajorStructuralElementsofBuildings(ratesinminutes)
Mainsupporting
structural
members
(columns,walls)
Structureofthe
roof
Floorslab Externalwall Internalwall
Rooffinishing
layers
"A" R240 R30 REI120
EI 120
(oi)
EI60 RE30
"B" R120 R30 REI60
EI 60
(oi)
EI30 RE30
"C" R60 R15 REI60
EI 30
(oi)
EI15 RE15
218
COSTActionTU0904
"D" R30 () REI30
EI 30
(oi)
() ()
"E" () () () () () ()
Itshouldbenotedthatinthisspecificcasenoadditionalsolutionsthatmakeitpossibletoreduce
therequiredfireresistanceclassDwereappliedandthusthesupportingstructuremustmeetthecriterion
ofR30incaseoffire.
On the basis of aclassification of a building, based on its height and the value offireload density
one can also set an acceptable fire zone area in the facility. The final value is dependent not only on the
mentioned parameters but also on a number of storeys and the presence of zones with risk of possible
explosion.TheserelationshipsaresummarizedintheTab.21.3,below.
Tab.21.3.Allowablesizeofafirezone
Typeoffirezone
FireloaddensityQ
[MJ/m
2
]
Allowablesizeofafirezone[m
2
]
Inasinglestoreybuilding
(withoutanylimitationof
height)
Inamultistoreybuilding
Low&Mediumhigh
(L)and(MH)
High&Highrise
(H)and(HR)
1 2 3 4 5
Firezoneswith
potentiallyexplosive
premises
Q>4000 1000 * *
2000<Q4000 2000 * *
1000<Q2000 4000 1000 *
500<Q1000 6000 2000 500
Q500 8000 3000 1000
Remainingfirezones
Q>4000 2000 1000 *
2000<Q4000 4000 2000 *
1000<Q2000 8000 4000 1000
500<Q1000 15000 8000 2500
Q500 20000 10000 5000
As seen above, allowable area of the fire zone in this building is equal 8 000m
2
. As with the
requirementsforfireresistance,thesurfacecanbechangedusingtheappropriatesolutionsintermsoffire
protectionsystems(e.g.smokeremoversorpermanentfireextinguishingdevices).
21.3.1Requirementsfortheevacuation
Polish regulations impose an obligation to ensure the evacuation of any room that may be occupied by
people.Bythisitismeanttoenableasafeemergencyexittoleavethebuilding,eitherdirectlyorthrough
channelsofgeneralcommunicationtoanysafeplaceoutsidethebuildingortoanadjacentfirezone.The
law differentiates between the two parameters of the length of an escape route: transition routes and
accessroutes.
Thetransitionroutesapplyforroomsandspaceswheretherearenoseparatecorridors.Thelength
is measured from the farthest place where the individual human being can stay, to the exit on an escape
route (corridor), or to another fire zone, or outside the building. Measurement should be made by the
219
COSTActionTU0904
shortestpossibleroute.Inthecaseconcerned,lengthofthetransitionrouteshouldnotexceed75m.One
canincrease the permissiblelengthof about25%butonly inareaswitha height exceeding5m.Itshould
benotedthatifinabuildingtherewouldbearoomofpotentiallypossibleexplosionitspermissiblelength
oftheevacuationpassageisthenreducedto40m.Theevacuationroute mustbeofadequatewidth tobe
calculated in proportion to the number of persons for whom it is designed, taking at least 0.6 m per 100
people,butnotlessthan0.9m.Intheobjectinquestionthelatterconditionapplies.
Theaccessroutesshallbemeasuredintheaxisofanescaperoutestartingfromtheexitoutofthe
roomonthisrouteuptotheexittoanotherfirezone,oroutsidethebuilding,ortheenclosedstairway.The
stairway should be then closed by the door of the fire resistance class EI30 at least, and equipped
additionally with devices to prevent against smoke accumulation or used to smoke removal. In case of
presented building, the length should be 30m when only one access route is provided (including no more
than20mofthehorizontalescaperoute)or60mwithtwoormoreroutesdesigned.Inthe lattercaseits
allowedthatthelengthofthesecondaccessroutecanbeabout100%greaterthantheshortestoneinthe
same fire zone. These access routes cannot overlap or cross with each other. With the presence of
explosionendangeredareas,whatseemsthecrucialroleincaseofpresentedbuilding,thelengthofaccess
routes should be reduced to 10m when exists only one access route or to 40m with two or more routes
designed.
Moreover,duetotechnicalandbuildingrelatedregulations:
total width of the door, which exits from the room, should be calculated in proportion to the
number of people who can reside inside at the same time, taking at least 0.6 m of width for 100
people,butnotlessthan0.9m,
minimumwidthofstaircaseshouldnotbelessthan1.2mandthewidthoflandingnotlessthan
1.5 m both values are measured in the most unfavourable location and finally the total required
widthisdeterminedaccordingtotheruleprovidingof0.6mforevery100people,
an emergency exit door of a building designed for more than 50 people should open outwards,
widthoftheoutsidedoormountedontheemergencyexitofthebuilding(unlesstheyarenotthe
only exit from the separate room), and the width of the door to escape through the stairway
leadingoutsidethebuildingortoanotherfirezone,shouldnotbelessthantherequiredwidthofa
staircase(incaseoftheconcernedbuilding1.2m).
21.3.2Requirementsforfireequipmentandotherinstallations
Duetothefirerequirementsintheconcernedbuilding,fireequipmentcomprisesof:
220
COSTActionTU0904
fireplumbingequippedwithhydrantstypeDN52(intheproductionpartofthebuilding)and
DN25(intheofficezone),
firepowerswitch.
The building is also equipped with a gas installation. Thegas is used in a gas boiler with a capacity of 340
kW and in the process of baking. According to the state technical requirements when the total nominal
outputofgasappliancesinstalledisgreaterthan60kWthensuchareasshouldbeequippedwithsignalling
installationandshutoffthegassupplydevices.A valveshuttingoffthegas supply,whichisa component
of signalling installation and shutoff devices should be located outside the building, between the main
valveandtheentranceofgaspipeintothebuilding.Additionally,thebuildingconcernedalsorequiressome
waterforfireprotectionprovided,(inthevolumeof40dm
3
/s),andconvenientaccessforthefirefighting
brigades,i.e.thefireroad.
21.4ASSESSMENTSTRATEGY
The basis for the verification of previously mentioned formal technical and fire requirements has become
the idea to extent a building with a small storage space for baking molds. The room was to enlarge the
existingfirezonewhich,accordingtoPolishregulationsmeansthatabuildingmustmeetcurrentfiresafety
requirements,regardlessoflegalstatusatdifferentstagesofreconstruction.Duetotheownerswishnext
tothereviewofexistingcurrentsolutionsforcompliancewithfiresafetyrulessomeassessmentwasmade
what level of safety all these solutions provide. Assessment for compliance of applied solutions with
currentfiresafetyrulesandevaluationofsecuritylevelofthebuildingwerebasedonthesocalled"Terms
of fire protection" given in form of fourteen keypoints defining the main requirements for building fire
safety,i.e.:
1. Sizeoffloorarea,heightandnumberofstoreys,
2. Thedistancefromneighbouringobjects,
3. Fuel/thermalparametersofpresentflammablesubstances,
4. Fireloaddensity,
5. Category of building understood as the substitute of risk to people, estimated number of
personsenableoneachfloorand/orindividualrooms,
6. Assessmentofexplosionriskatroomsandoutdoorspaces,
7. Thewaytheobjectisdividedontoseparatefirezones,
8. Globalfireresistanceclassofthebuilding,fireresistanceclassofbuildingcomponentsandthe
degreetheyspreadthefire,
9. Conditionsofevacuation,emergency(evacuationandbackup)andobstaclelightingsystems,
10. Theappliedmethodsoffireprotectiontoprotecttheserviceinstallations,
221
COSTActionTU0904
11. Selectionoffirefightingequipmentusedinthebuilding,
12. Numberandtypeoffireextinguishersthebuildingisequippedwith,
13. Watersupplyforexternalfirefighting,
14. Presenceandquality/parametersoffireroads
21.5DESCRIPTIONOFTHEAPPROVALPROCES
Theinvestmentprocessbeginswiththeclassificationoftheobjectintermsofthetotalheightandtheway,
thebuildingisused.Then,thedesignerassumesaccordingtotheirknowledgethepresenceofapotentially
explosivepremisesandtheleveloffireloaddensity(averagevalueinawholefirezone).
Thenextstageofinvestmentprocessistoobtainabuildingpermitissuedbyanauthorizedbodyof
territorial administration based on industry experts agreement in relation to: fire protection, safety and
hygiene of work and epidemiologicalsanitaryas well. After obtaining a building permit an object is being
erected under the supervision of a certified construction manager and supervising inspector. Supervising
persons after completion the construction work shall declare that the execution of an object was done
according to the project design, and the law, and the principles of technical expertise. This statement
makes these people responsible for the correct execution of the property, even in case of some design
errors. If any of them occur and are found out during the erection of the building it is the duty of the
supervisortostopongoingworkanddiscusswiththedesignerwhatkindofalternativesolutionexistswhich
isconsistentwiththerulesandtechnicalexpertise.
Dueto thePolishlegislation,existingbuildingsshouldbeadaptedforcurrent requirementsoffire
safety,suchas:development,superstructure,reconstructionandchangesoffunction(theway,thebuilding
isused)orwhenbasedonlegalregulations[3]ifitsconsideredthreateningpeople'slives.
The building presented in this case study, as it was already mentioned, was expanded twice during its
lifetime.
State authority empowered to control buildings in the meaning of fire safetybefore they are permitted to
be exploited(which in Poland is the State Fire Service), during the reception after the third stage of
developmentpointedoutseveralinconsistencieswhichshouldbeadaptedtocurrentrequirements.
Inconsistencieswiththeprovisionsstatedarelistedbelow:
DN25hydrantsusedintheoldestpartofthetechnologicalhallincontrarytorequiredDN52type,
corridor (in the office part of the building) of a length exceeding 50 m not divided onto the
shortersegmentswiththesmoketightdoor,
surgicalstairsinthestairwellsoftheofficepartofthebuilding.
In the first two cases, the necessary changes were done. Implementation of the third one would require
demolition of the existing stairs. Polish regulations allow for the use of alternative solutions that would
222
COSTActionTU0904
compensatethenoncompliance.Therecommendedavailablesolutionsaredefinedbycertifiedfiresafety
expert. However, they must be approved by the State Fire Service. In the presented building it was
suggested to close the stairwells with doors satisfying the criterion EI30 of fire resistance. Finally, after
applyingthesuggestedsolutionsthepropertywasconsideredcompliantwiththetechnicalrules,butsome
doubtsaboutthelevelofsafetyguaranteedbyprotectionusedwereindicated.
21.5.1Fireloaddensity
In the analysed building the fire load density (due to the assumptions of project) does not exceed 1 000
MJ/m
2
. Based on detailed analysis of the distribution of a fire load density it can be assumed that the
design assumption is correct (Fig. 21.4). It should be noted that the presented value is the average one.
Whenassessingtherealrisk,especiallyincaseofthelargesurfaceareabuildingswithvaryingwaysofuse
ofthepremises,theaveragevaluesoffireloaddensitymaynotproperlyreflecttherealthreatoffire.This
is confirmed in the present facility, where in approximately 47% of the total area of the building the fire
load density doesnt exceed 100 MJ/m
2
. Surfaces for which the fire load density exceeds 4000 MJ/m2 (in
extremecases,its5644MJ/m
2
)representonlyabout11%ofthetotalarea.Inthelowestrangeofthefire
load density which one can find in the technical regulations (i.e. of less than 500 MJ/m
2
) falls to
approximately 74% of the floor area of the analysed object.The estimated average fire load density [6]
reached974MJ/m
2
.Suchalowvaluewithsuchalargeshareofthefloorareawithrelativelysmalloreven
negligible fire loadsuggests that there exist someareas where the small area accumulated large quantities
of combustible materials. In these places the fire load density reaches a value that extends beyond the
otherendofthescalewhichwemetearlierinregulationsover4000MJ/m
2
(compareTableX.1).Surfaces
for which the fire load density exceeds 4000 MJ/m
2
(in extreme cases, its 5644 MJ/m
2
) represent only
about11%ofthetotalarea.Intheseareas,constructionofabuildingdesignedandexecutedbasedonthe
assumptionquotedatthebeginningofthechapterisnotadequatelypreparedforthelikelyfireconditions
thatmayoccurthere.
223
COSTActionTU0904
Fig.21.4Distributionofafireloaddensity
21.5.2Firezoning
Claiming that the office/administrative part of the building is linked functionally with the
technological/productionpart(whatwasthemainargumentthatmadeitunnecessarytodividetheobject
ontotheseparatefirezones)seemsratherquestionable.
Inaddition,theallowedsurfaceareaofindividualfirezoneinalowmultistoreybuilding,inwhichthereare
nopotentiallyexplosiveareas,andthefireloaddensityfitstherange500<Q1000is8000m
2
(compare
Tab.21.3).Surfaceoftheanalysedobjectisnownearly79%ofthelimit.
As already mentioned, the design assumptions have been positively verified with the amount of
combustiblematerialstakenforanalysisonthebasisofthestateinMay2011,whenacalculatedfireload
densitywas97%oftheassumedthreshold,soveryclosetothelimitvalue.
Iftheoreticallytheestablishedthresholdof1000MJ/m
2
wouldbeexceeded(whichinpracticeis
possible when storing larger quantities of materials, raw materials or products) the requirements for the
maximum fire zone area would increase, and the real floor area of the analysed facility would then reach
157%ofthelimit.
The existing building and its fire zoning is consistent with the current rules, but it cannot be
regardedasbeneficialinthemeaningofsafetyreasons.
224
COSTActionTU0904
21.5.3Assessmentofexplosionrisk
Design assumptions imply that there are no rooms with potentially explosive atmospheres. A preliminary
assessment confirmed this assumption. It does not mean that inside the building there is no risk of
explosion. Factor posing a threat of explosion may be, for instance, the dust layer located on the floor,
machines, or in inaccessible locations, which can be easily undermined, and mixed with air by a gust of
wind. The inspection carried out in the building revealed that there are some surfaces permanently not
cleaned, which were enveloped by the dust layer. In some cases, these were the areas of elevated
temperatures:theelectricmotorsorenclosuresofbakerymachines.
21.5.4Fireresistanceofbuildingelements
ThebakeryplantwasdesignedandbuiltinclassDoffireresistance.Asmentionedbefore,theareasofthe
buildingwheretheaveragefireloaddensityexceeds4000MJ/m
2
representabout11%ofthearea.When
therequirementswouldbeimposedonthebasisoflocalratherthanaveragefireloaddensitydistribution
intheseareastheywouldbethehighestpossible,(ClassAofglobalfireresistance).
Inaddition,itshouldbealsonotedthatinspacesexecutedduringthefirsttwophasesofinvestment(the
majorityoftheareaoftheplant)the mainstructureofonobjectisnotprotectedtotherequiredlevelof
fireresistanceequalR30.
21.5.5Waterforexternalfirefighting
Water for external firefighting provide four external landline hydrants located on the property, supplied
with its own water intake and one fire hydrant located in a neighbouring plant, water supply network
powered. The owner of the neighbouring building, where this hydrant is localised has agreed to use it to
protect the bakery plant concerned. These two fire hydrants located on the bakery site do not provide
adequateamountsofwaterforfirefightingpurposesanddonotmeetproperefficiencyrequirements.
Analysingthetechnicalcapabilitiesofthewatersourceused,whichisthewellwithacapacityof50
m
3
/hitshouldbenoted thatthisamountwouldonlybesufficienttomeetwaterdemandforoneoutside
hydrant only (13.9 dm
3
/s at the required flow 10dm
3
/s). Taking into consideration the fact, that the same
source is also providing water for the internal water fireplumbing system, it must be assumed that it is
insufficient to power the external hydrants. Therefore it was necessary to ensure supply of water in a
properamountwhichresultsfromamissingrelativeflowandtheestimateddurationofthefire,according
to Polish Standard PNB02852:2001. In the presented case a missing amount of water is equal 30 dm
3
/s
andarelativedurationofthefireisequalto3600seconds.Sothatitsobligatorytoguaranteereserve of
water to extinguish a fire from the outside in the amount of 108 m
3
.The solution that complies with the
rulesistheuseoffirefightingwatertankcomplyingwiththerequirementsofPolishStandards.
225
COSTActionTU0904
21.6RECOMMENDATIONSFORTHEFIREENGINEEREDSOLUTIONSTOBEAPPLIEDATTHESITE
Items below summarize some recommendations arising from the analysis carried out and the local
considerationsthatallowtoadaptthebuildingforfiresafetyconditions:
1. It is reasonable to design additional protection in areas where a large fire load density occurs in
tandem with the high threat of fire. The recommended solution is a permanent water or foam
extinguishingequipment.
2. Some fire and explosion prevention recommendations were formed, aimed at minimizing the risk
ofexplosionwhereitwasindicatedasabasicfunctiontheneedofsystematiccleaningofsurfaces
onwhichdustofflourand/orsugarcansettle.
3. For fire zoning: It was recommended to separate the office part of the building from the
technological part (as different fire zones) and to create completely new fire zone consisting of
somestorageareaswithahighfireloaddensity.
4. Forthefiresafetyofstructuralsystem:TheneedtoprovidetherequiredfireresistanceR30ofthe
structure in the whole plant has been indicated. As the optimal solution it was suggested to
separate the office part of the building from warehouses with a high level of fire load density as
prettyindividualfirezones.Inalltheseareasstructuralelements(membersandsystems)shouldbe
protectedtotheleveladequateforthistypeoffirezones.
5. For water supply: It was recommended to provide water to extinguish a fire from the outside by
buildingafirefightingwatertank.
6. For fire protection equipment: It was recommended to install inside the premises a fire alarm
system that will protect the entire facility. Optional connection with the monitoring system will
optimize,incaseofemergency,thefiredepartmentrescueteamstraveltime.
21.7CONSEQUENCESOFTHECHOSENSOLUTIONONTHEWHOLELIFECYCLEOFTHEBUILDING
Due to technical provisions the firefighting equipment should be maintained in accordance with the
manufacturersinstructionsbutnotlessfrequentlythanonceayear.Boththefirealarmsystemandfixed
firefighting systems require regular controls exercised during specified periods of time and involving
inspections and some specific activities weekly, monthly or every year. Water firefighting reservoir and
related equipment are also subject to maintenance (every year) but also require to continuously monitor
theirtechnicalcondition.Thisgeneratesadditionalcoststhatappearperiodically.
21.8CONCLUSIONS
The presented case demonstrates that during the whole investment process, there may occur some real
problemswhentryingtoobtainanadministrativedecisionauthorizingtheuseofthebuilding,despitethe
226
COSTActionTU0904
seemingly simple and uncomplicated function of the building. Worrying is the fact that, despite the
thoughtful and tight system of control and supervision at both the design and implementation phases,
there are still problems with the successful completion of the investment which reconciles directly in the
interestoftheinvestor.
The authors of this study want to pay a particular attention to the trap that creates a building
designbasedontheformalrequirementsconditionedbythefireloaddensityparameter.
The present case shows clearly, that the average fireload density especially in fire zones and/or
premises of large areas can lead to significant underestimations of building fire safety and result in
incorrectassessmentoftheconstructionlocatedinareasofhighfireloaddensitylevels.Thisproblemisnot
generallydiscussedinthelegalregulations.
Thereisalsononeedtoprovethatthefireload,which,paradoxically,isthegreatestinareaswitha
highprobabilityoffiredeterminesthepossibilityofstructuretosurviveinfireconditions.
References
Ustawa z dnia 7 lipca 1994 r. Prawobudowlane [Construction Law Act of Jul. 7,1994] (consolidated text
Dz.U.2010vol.243,item1623withamendments).InPolish.
Rozporzdzenie Ministra Infrastruktury z dnia 12 kwietnia 2002 roku wsprawie warunkw technicznych,
jakimpowinnyodpowiadabudynkiiichusytuowanie[RegulationoftheMinisterofInfrastructureon
the technical requirements to be met by buildings and theirlocation], (Dz.U. 2002, vol. 75, item 690,
withamendments).InPolish.
RozporzdzenieMinistra SprawWewntrznychiAdministracji z dnia7czerwca2010r.w sprawieochrony
przeciwpoarowej budynkw, innych obiektw budowlanych iterenw [Regulation of the Minister of
Internal Affairs and Administration on fireprotection of buildings, otherbuildingobjects and sites ]
(Dz.U.2010vol.109,item719).InPolish.
Rozporzdzenie Ministra Spraw Wewntrznych i Administracji z dnia 24 lipca 2009 r. wsprawie
przeciwpoarowego zaopatrzenia wwod oraz drg poarowych [Regulation of the Minister of
InternalAffairsandAdministrationon thefirewatersupplyandfireroads],(Dz.U.2009,vol. 124,item
1030).InPolish.
Rozporzdzenie Ministra Spraw Wewntrznych i Administracji z dnia 16 czerwca 2003 r. w sprawie
uzgadniania projektu budowlanego pod wzgldem ochrony przeciwpoarowej [Regulation of the
Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration agreeing on a constructionproject in terms of
fireprotection](Dz.U.2003,vol.121,item1137,withamendments).InPolish.
PNB02852:2001 Ochrona przeciwpoarowa budynkw Obliczanie gstoci obcienia ogniowego oraz
wyznaczaniewzgldnegoczasutrwaniapoaru[FireprotectioninbuildingsCalculationoffireloadand
relativelengthoftimeoffirePolishStandard].InPolish.
227
COSTActionTU0904
WG2DaphnePantousa,dpantousa@gmail.com
WG3EuripidisMistakidis,emistaki@gmail.com
GeorgeLambrou,arkgll@ath.forthnet.gr
22FIREDESIGNOFANEWFACTORYBUILDINGINATHENS
Summary
The paper concerns the fire design of the new industrial building in Athens. It is a new, one storey steel
buildingwithatotalareaofabout50.000m
2
.Thesteelstructurehousethefactoryplant,customerservices
andwarehouse.Thebuildinghasbeen designedagainstfire,accordingtothe currentnationalregulations
forthefireprotectionofstructures.Alltheactiveandpassiveprotectionmeasuresareconsideredandthe
requiredfireresistanceofstructuralmembersisobtainedthroughfireprotectionmaterials.
In the present paper an alternative approach for the fire design of the structural members is also
presented. New crosssections of the steel members are calculated so that the required fireresistance is
achievedwithoutanyprotectionmaterials.ThisalternativefiredesignisbasedontheISOfirecurveandto
theregulationsofEurocode3Part12.Thetwosolutionsarecomparedwithrespecttothetotalcosts.
22.1DESCRIPTIONOFTHEBUILDING
Thiscasestudyreferstoanewindustrialbuilding.Theaimoftheprojectistheconstructionofamultiarea
building, combining the production, the logistics centre and the customer service, in order to provide
integratedservicestothepublic.ThebuildingisgoingtobeplacedinAttiki,veryneartothecityofAthens
inGreece.Thetotalareaoftheonestoreysteelstructureis56040.78m
2
whilethemaximumheightis12
m.Itisestimatedthattheindustrywillofferworkspaceforabout300persons.
The usage of the building is multiple, as it combines an industrial part and an office area. The
industrialsectorcanbedividedtothreedifferentparts,theinbound,theproductionandthelogisticsarea.
Theproductionzone,oftotalareaequalto14098.11m
2
,
accommodatesalltheappropriatefacilitiesforthe
manufacturingandthequalitycontroloftheproducts.Theinboundzone,oftotalsurfaceequalto3482.52
m
2
,isapartoftheoverallproductionarea.Theinboundbuilding,oftotalarea10957.35m
2
,consistsoftwo
different halls that are used for the storage of the products. The customer service building, of total area
equal to 3460.40 m
2
, hosts offices, meeting rooms, storage place, workshop for the electronic devices,
kitchenarea,restaurantsfortheemployees,salesdepartmentandreceptionhallforthecustomers.Finally,
theMechanicalEngineeringbuilding(M&Ebuilding)isareinforcedconcretestructure,whichhousesallthe
228
COSTActionTU0904
mechanicalequipment.Itistheareathewatertanksareinstalled.Fig.22.1illustratestheplanviewofthe
industry.
Thecomplexofthebuildingshasthreeaccesspointsfrompublicroads.Twoofthemarededicated
tostaffandvisitorswhilethethirdoneservestheheavygoodtrafficanditcanbeusedbythefirebrigade
vehicles.
Fig.22.1Planviewofthebuilding
22.2FIREPROTECTIONREQUIREMENTSACCORDINGTOTHENATIONALREGULATIONS
According to the national guidelines, the fireprotection design of the industrial building is based on the
P.D. 71 Regulations for the fireprotection of buildings (F 32, issue /17.2.1988) and specifically on
article11whichisreferredtoindustryandstoragebuildings.Theregulationsspecifythat,theindustrialand
storagebuildingsshouldbeclassifiedaccordingtotheriskoftheoccurrenceofthefireeventoraccording
tothefireloaddensity.SpecificallythreecategoriesaredefinedthatarecalledZ1,Z2andZ3.Theprevious
arecorrespondingtosmall,mediumandhighriskbuildingsrespectively.Thefireprotectionmeasuresthat
are taken into account are strongly dependent on the category of the building. In this case study, the
229
COSTActionTU0904
production building is coded as Construction of home and professional appliances, that is a Small Risk
IndustrywhichcorrespondstoZ1category.ThewarehousebuildingfitstoZ2categoryduetohighdensity
ofthefireload.Therequiredfireresistancetimeisdependentontheexistenceornotofsprinklersystems
andonthenumberofstoreys.Eventhoughtheindustryisonestoreygroundlevelbuilding,itisexamined
as multistore due to the existence of mezzanines in the Production and the Warehouse area. Tab. 22.1
presentstherequiredfireresistanceforthebuildings.
Tab.22.1Requiredfireresistancetime
Building Classification RequiredFireresistance
Production Z1 30mins
Inbound Z1 60mins
Logistics Z2 90mins
Customerservice Z1 60mins
Another important issue that is considered during the fire design of the building is the size of the
fire compartments. Specifically, limitations should be taken into account considering the maximum area
andthevolumeofthefirecompartmentaswellasthelengthoftherealandthedirectescaperoots.Inthis
casestudy,difficultiesarearisingontheapplicationofthepreviouslimitations,duetothelargesizeofthe
buildingandthespecialitiesofitsusage.
According to the regulations, the maximum area of the fire compartment is 5000 m
2
considering
thecaseoftheproductionareawhichischaracterisedasindustry(categoryZ1).Thisareacanbeenlarged
bythefactorof2.5,iftheappropriatesprinklersystemisgoingtobeused.Alsothepermittedareacanbe
scaledbythefactorof1.5,iftheapproachofthefirefightingvehiclesisassuredbyanaccessroadonthe
perimeter of the building. Taking into account the increasing coefficients the maximum area of the fire
compartmentiscalculatedequalto18750m
2
.Ifthebuildingisconsideredasonestoreystructure,whichis
the most convenient scenario, the maximum permitted volume of the fire compartment is equal to
28000m
3
.Accordingtotheaforementioned,theheightofthebuildingshouldbe1.49m,whichisextremely
paradox. Taking into account the expected height of the building (h=11m), the maximum allowed area of
the fire compartment is calculated equal to 2545 m
2
. This means that the production area, should be
dividedinto6,atleast,differentfirecompartments,butthisisnotfeasibleforthefunctionoftheindustry.
Moreover,followingthecorrespondingguidelinesforthewarehouse,themaximumpermittedareaofthe
firecompartmentis15000m
2
whilethemaximumpermittedvolumeisdefinedequalto15000m
3
.Taking
intoaccountthegeometriccharacteristicsofthebuilding,thewarehouseareashouldbedividedinto16,at
least, different fire compartments or the maximum height of the building should be 1.00 m. None of the
previous is reasonable, taking into account the proper function of the logistics centre. Considering the
230
COSTActionTU0904
customerserviceandtheinboundarea,thedimensionsofthefirecompartmentsaremainlydefinedfrom
the limitations of the escape roots. Fig. 22.2 presents the arrangement of fire compartments according to
thenationalregulationsforthefiredesignoftheindustry.
Fig.22.2Firecompartmentsaccordingtothenationalregulationsforthefireprotection
Concluding, in this case study, the application of the national guidelines regarding the F.C. is
impossible.Thereforedeviationfromtheexistingruleswasaskedfromtheauthorities.Tab.22.2presents
thecharacteristicsofthefinalfirecompartmentswhileFig.22.3illustratesthenewarrangementaccording
tothedeviation.
Tab.22.2Characteristicsofthefinalfirecompartments
FireCompartment Use Area(m
2
) Height(m) Volume(m
3
)
FC1 Production 15133.6 11 155.079
FC2 Inbound 3706.52 11 380307
FC3 Logistics1 10957.35 11 120530
FC4 Logistics2 10973.65 11 120710
FC5 Customerservice 4300 11 38064
231
COSTActionTU0904
Fig.22.3Firecompartmentsaccordingtothedeviationfromtheexistingrules
22.3STRUCTURALFIREDESIGNOFBUILDING
The required fireresistance of the structure can be fulfilled either through fireprotection materials (fire
proof paintings, fireresistant boards etc,) either by using the appropriate crosssections of the members.
Here, the study will be focused on the structural fire design of the Customer Service building. Specifically
two different approaches are examined. The first approach is based on the use of the fireprotection
materialsinordertoachievetherequiredfireresistance.Thesecondapproachproposesalternativecross
sections and the fireresistance is achieved without fireprotection materials. Finally, the effectiveness of
thetwodifferentapproachesiscompared,intermsoffinancialcost.
Fig. 22.4a presents the plan view of the building and a typical frame of the steel structure is
illustratedinFig.22.4b.Thetypicalframeisrepeatedevery13.5m.
It should be noted that the steel structure is primary designed against earthquake events and the fire
design is the second step. The seismic design is performed according the national regulations [EAK 2000].
ThecrosssectionsthatarecalculatedduringthisstagearesummarizedinTable3.
232
COSTActionTU0904
Fig.22.4aPlanviewoftheCustomerServicebuilding
20.0m
20.0m
9.3m
1.9m
Fig.22.4bThetypicalframeandthecrosssectionscomingfromtheseismicdesign
22.3.1StructuralfiredesignofbuildingFirstapproach
According to the first approach, the required fireresistance time, that is indicated equal to 60 minutes, is
achievedthroughfireproofpainting.Specificallytheseismicdesignisthefirststepandthesecondstepis
the estimation of the characteristics of the required fireproof painting. The thickness of the painting and
consequentlythetotalfinancialcostisdependentonthefireresistancetimeandonthedimensionsofthe
crosssections. Tab. 22.3 presents the required thickness of the painting for the structural members
includingthetypicalframeandthepurlins.Thecalculationsareconductedforfireresistancetimeequalto
30 minutes and 60 minutes. It is noted that the total financial cost that is calculated includes the cost of
the painting and the working cost for the application of the painting taking into account the Greek
commercialmarket.
233
COSTActionTU0904
Tab.22.3Resultsofthefirstapproach
Seismicdesign
Firedesign
R30 R60
Section Length
(m)
Self
weight
(kN)
Thicknessof
thepainting
(m)
Weightof
thepainting
(kg)
Cost
()
Thicknessof
thepainting
(m)
Weightof
thepainting
(kg)
Cost
()
HEB500 27.9 52.3 265 36.2 333 504 68.8 451
HEA220 81.9 41.3 330 78.2 634 1026 243.0 1227
HEA120 243.0 48.3 368 139.5 1951 1933 737.7 4086
RHS120/6.3 8.2 27.4 860 140.4 748 2000 326.5 79
RHS100/5 24.7 29.8 1135 157.6 833 3560 380.5 296
QHS80/3.6 315.2 27.2 1650 383.4 2269 5720 1329.2 5673
RHS80/5 6 0.7 1135 5.0 25 3560 15.7 63
RHS70/3 16.6 1.4 1150 15.6 73 5090 50.6 199
RHS60/4 23.8 1.7 1150 15.1 74 5090 66.9 260
QHS50/4 142.2 8.2 1150 75.4 522 5220 342.0 1482
QHS40/2.9 124.6 4.2 1600 73.5 440 2290 105.2 554
TOTAL 214.7 14006.3 6421 46033.3 14223
22.3.2StructuralfiredesignofbuildingSecondapproach
In this approach the required fireresistance time is achieved without fireprotection materials and the
calculation of the alternative crosssections of the structural members is based on Eurocode 3 Part 12
using the ISO fire curve. It is indicated that no thermal analysis takes place and that the temperature is
assumed to be uniform in the crosssections and along the members. Specifically, the temperature of the
structuralmembersiscalculatedaccordingtosection4.2.5ofEN199312anddependsonthegeometric
characteristics of the crosssections taking into account the corrections about the shadow effects. The
target is to estimate the appropriate crosssections of the structural members in order to resist in fire for
30and60minutesrespectively.Thestartingpointofthecalculationdealswiththecrosssectionsthatare
comingfromtheseismicdesign.Thiscalculationisactuallyaniterativeprocedureandthesubsequentsteps
arethefollowing:
Step 1: Calculation of the temperature of structural members of the typical subframe and the purlins, at
thedesiredtimet
Step2:StaticanalysisforthefirecombinationG+
2
Q
Step3:Checkingifthecrosssectionsareadequateforthefirecombinationatthedesiredtimet.Iftheyare
adequatethecalculationisfinished.Otherwisestep4follows.
Step4:Calculationofthenewcrosssections
Step5:RepeatStep2,3and4forthenewcrosssections
234
COSTActionTU0904
TheresultsoftheiterativeprocedurearepresentedinTab.22.4,indicatingtheincreaseoftheself
weightofthesteelstructureinrelevancewiththefireresistancetime.Itisobservedthatinthecaseof30
minutes required fireresistance the selfweight of the structure is increased 34.75%, while the
correspondingvaluefortheR90requirementis76.33%.
Tab.22.4Variationoftheselfweightofthestructureaccordingtothedesignrequirements
Seismicdesign R30 R60
Selfweightofthestructure 214.72 kN 289.33 kN 378.68kN
22.4COMPARISONOFTHEALTERNATIVEAPPORCHES
Thealternativeapproachesarecomparedintermsoffinancialcost.Thecomparisonspecifiesthatthemost
economicalapproachseemstobethefirstonewhichusesthefireproofpaintings(Tab.22.5).Theresults
ofthesecondapproachcanbereconsideredifglobalelasticplasticanalysisofthesteelstructureis taken
intoaccount.Itisexpectedthatinthiscasetheoutcomesofthesecondapproachwouldresulttoreduced
financialcost,comparingwiththeresultsofthesameapproachinthisstudy.
AnotherissuethatshouldbenotedisthatthesecondapproachisbasedontheISOfirecurveasit
is indicated in the guidelines. Alternatively, this approach can be based on parametric fire curves, zone
models or CFD temperature results. This is a critical parameter for the variation of the results of this
approach.
Tab.22.5Comparisonofthealternativeapproaches
Selfweight Financialcost Fireproofpainting Financialcost Totalfinancialcost
R30
Approach1 21472kg 34355 842 kg 6421 40776
Approach2 28933kg 46293 46293
R60
Approach1
21472kg 34355 3011kg 14229 48584
Approach2
37862kg 60580 60580
22.5SUMMARY
This paper presents the fire design of an industrial building that is going to be placed in Athens. Primary,
the fire design requirements, according to the national regulations, are presented. It is concluded that in
this case study, the guidelines concerning the fire compartment limitations are not applicable. Therefore,
the final arrangement of the firecompartments, according to the deviation from the existing rules, is
presented.Inthesecondpartofthepaper,twoalternativeapproachesforthestructuralfiredesignofthe
Customer service building are studied. The results indicate that the most economical approach is the one
thatisbasedontheuseoffireproofmaterials.
235
COSTActionTU0904
Acknowledgement
ThisresearchhasbeencofinancedbytheEuropeanUnion(EuropeanSocialFundESF)andGreeknational
funds through the Operational Program "Education and Lifelong Learning" of the National Strategic
Reference Framework (NSRF) Research Funding Program: Heracleitus II. Investing in knowledge society
throughtheEuropeanSocialFund.
References
F32,Issue/17.2.1988,P.D.71/1988,Regulationsforthefireprotectionofbuildings,Article11:Industry
andStoragebuildings,1988.
EAK2000,Greekseismicdesigncode,2000.
EN 199312, European Committee for Standardization, Eurocode 3.Design of steel structures Part 12.
Generalrulesstructuralfiredesign,2003.
236

Industrial Buildings

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Industrial Buildings

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

COSTActionTU0904

The effect of actions was determined using combinations factors

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi