NERVOUS SHOCK

Nervous shock is the branch of tort of its recent origin. In the year 1901 a Pigeon Hole was made to Nervous shock as a tort. Before it became tort it used to come under the tort of negligence. It must require two types of medium (i) Perception of Eye and (ii) Perception of Ear. As far back as 1888, the judicial committee of privy council in Victorian Railway Commissioner v. Coultas, did not recognize injury caused by a shock sustained through the medium of eye or ear without direct contact. They thought that an action could not be sustained unless there was a physical impact or something akin to it. Not long after the above-sated decision we, however, find that injury caused by nervous shock, without there being any physical impact, has been recognized. The crude view that the law should take congnizance only of physical injury resulting from actual impact has been discarded, and it is now well recognized that an action will lie for ijury bt shock sustained through the medium of the eye or the ear, without direct contact. In 1897, in Wilkinson v.Downton, the defendant was held liable when the plaintiff suffered nervous shock and got seriousy ill on being told falsely, by way of practical joke, by the defendant that her husband had broken both the les in an accident. In Dulieu v.White and Sons also, an action for nervous mshock resulting in physical injuries was recognized. There the defendants servant negligently drove a horse van into a public house and the plaintiff, a pregnant woman, who was standing there behind the bar, although not physically injured, suffeed nervous shock, as a result of which she got seriously ill and gave premature birth to a still both child. The defendants were held liable. Kennedy, J.although recognized an action ofr nervous shock but he imposed a very great limitation when he held that for such an action, the shock must be such as arises from reaspnable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself This meant that if by the negligence of X,danger is created for A,A

can bring an ction, if he suffers nervous shock, If , on the other hand, seeing or hearing of the danger to B, another person, say A, suffers nervous shock. A can not sue X, If by a negligent ct towards B, nervous shock to A can be fireseen, A is will with the area where injury through nervous shock could be caused to him n thre seemed to be no ljustification for debarring A from bringing an action. A person may suffer nervous shock even through he himself is not within the area of physical injury to himself. The case of Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., recognized an action when danger of physical injury to B caused a nervous shock to A. The facts of the case are as follows: Soon after having parted with her children in a narrow street, a ladyh saw a lorry violently running down the steep and narrow street. She was frightened about the saety to hber children. When tol by some by stander that a child answering the description of one of hr children had been injured, she suffered nervous shock which resulted in her death.. In an ction against the defendants, who has negligently lelft the lorry unattended there, they were held liable even thought the lady suffering the nervous shock was not herself within the area of physical injury. Expressly disapproving the above-stated lim itation imposed by Kennedy, J.in Dulieu v. White, AtkinL.J.said, Personally I see no reson for excluding the b ystanderinl the highway who receives injury in the same way from apprehension of or the actual sight of injury to a third party. There may well be cases where the sight of suffering will directly and immediately physically shock the most indurate heart, and it the suffering of another be the result of an act wrongful to the spectator, I do not see why the wrongdoer should escape.

In Dolley v. Commell Laird an Co., the plaintiff, the driver of a crane, suffered nervous shock when the saw that by the breaking of a rope of the crane, its load fell into the hold of a ship where some men were at work. The rope had broken due to the negligence of

the defendants and they were held liable to the plaintiff. In Owensv. Liverpool Corporation the Court of Appeal allowed the plintiffs action for nervous shock which was caused not because of nay peril to human life but by th imperilment of a coffin containing the corpse of a near relative. Peculiar susceptibility of the mourners at that time as held to be no defence. Mackinnon, L.J said: One who is guilty of negligence to another must put up with idiosyncrasies of his victim that increase the likelihood or extent of damage to him, it is no answer to claim for a fractured skull that its owner had an unusually fragile one.

Although, as has been stated above, it is not necessary that the plaintiff himself must be in the area of physical impact to bring an action for nervous shock, it is, however, necessary that that plaintiff must be so placed where injury through nervous shock can be foreseen. Where any kind of injury to the plaintiff cannot be foreseen by the defendant, the defendant does not owe ay duty of care to the plaintiff and will not be liable for the loss suffered by him. In Bourhill v.Youg, the plaintiff, a fishwife while getting out of a tramcar heard of an accident but could not see the same as hse was about 50 feet away from the scene and her view was obstructed by the tramcar. In the accident which had occurred, a neglientmotor cyclist had been killed. After the body of the motor cyclist had been removed, the fishwife happened to go to the scene of the accident and saw the blood on the road. As a result of the same, she suffered nervous shock and gave birth to a still born child. The House of Lords held that the deceased could not be expected to foresee any injury to the plaintiff and, therefore, he did not owe any duty of care to her and as such, his personal representatives could not be made liable.

In King v Phillips, the defendants servant was negligently backing a taxi-cab into a boy on a tricycle. The boys mother, who was in an upstairs window, at a distance of about 70 to 80 yards, could only see the tricycle under the taxi-cab and heard the boy scream but could not see the boy. The boy and the tricycle got slightly damaged but the mother suffered nervous shock. The mother was held to be wholly outside the area of reasonable apprehension and the defendants were held not liable. According to Singleton.L.J The driver owned a duty to the boy, but h knew nothing of the mother, she was not on the highway, he could not have known that she was at the window, nor was there any reason why he should anticipate that she would see his cab at all. The facts in this case do not appear to be much different from those in Ham brook v Stokes bros., where the mother suffering nervous shock because of fear of injury to her children could recover. For the purpose of an action for nervous shock, a person need not be in the area of physical injury to himself, it is enough that he is so placed that a shock could be caused to him by his seeing or hearing something. It, therefore, appears that the case of King v Phillips requires reconsideration.

NERVOUS SHOCK

An action lies for nervous shock and bodily illness or disorder supervening on it, thought the shock was caused not by the application of physical force to the body of the sufferer, but by words or acts calculalted to cause emorional disturbance like fear, sorrow, or distress to him. This is now settled by decisions in Egland and elsewhere and has been accepted as good law in India It is also well settled that mere emotional disturbance not lfollowed ny any appreciable illness will bot be a cause of action, thought it will be an element to agraavate damages where there is an independent cause of action, such as bidily barm, battery, orany other category of tort like defamation or malicious prsecution. The phrase nervous shock is generally used as a convenient caption for discussing the cases on this subject, but the words nervous, mental or emotional lshock are now used interchaneably in the presentcontext. In the cases in which action ofr such shock have been allowed, the plaintiff complained of some bodily illness capable of being proved by medical or lscientific evidence. The question has arisen in two clalsses of cases, (a) intenstional wrongding and (b) negligence, on the part of the defendant. Controversy. In Wilkinson v downton decided in 1897, the plaintiff complained that the defendant, out of mischief, frightened her with false news that her husband had met with a serious accident resulting in both his legs being broken and was lying in a hospital. She was awarded damages for the serous illness from which she suffered as a consequence of fear and anxieiety and in addition, the expenses of her going to the hospital. The reasons for the dcision were stated thus. The defendant was liabl because he had willfully done an act calculated ti cauyse harm to the plaintiff- that is to say-to infrigne her legal right to personal safety, and had in fact thereby caused physical harm to her, An intention to cause harm could be therefore imputed to him and no justification was alleged

therefore. This statement of principle has since been accepted as good law. It would not have been open to the defendant in that case to contend that the actual harm suffered by the plintiff was more serious than he intended or expected. On the other hand if there had been in fact, such an accident to the plaintiffs husband and the defendant who happended to know the plaintiff gave her the news, hw would not be liable. There was then a justification for his act and he would not commit any breachof duty in actingas hedid. There may be situations in which it may be proper or even necessary to impart bad news to a person in delicate health such as the death of a close relative and the informant cannot be hdl liable for the consequence, When there is no justification, the liablity will result from an intentioal act by which the actor su bjects another to emotional distress, and which he should, as a reasona ble man, recognise is likely to result in bodily harm. The harm may result to the person against whom the act is diectd. It may result to a third person. A makes, violent and noisy attack on B in the presence of Bs wife, C. who is pregnant C gets a shock and has a lmiscarrige, A will be liable to C.A forces his way into a hospital ward and violently abuses and threatens B against whom A has some grievance. In the ward there are patients who are in a dangerous condition and one of them, C, sufers a shock. A will be liable to C. In both these illustratious, A may have been unaware of the delicate or dangerious state of health of C, but his onduct is so unreasonable that the law makes him responsible for the consequences..

Nervous shock caused by Negliene

In this class of actions for negligence, as in others, the plaintiff must make out three points: (1) A duty oh the part of defendant to take reasonable care towards the plaintiff to avoid the damage cimokau ed if; (2) A breach of that duty by the deendant and (3) Causal relation between he breach of duty and the damage complained of.

Where A negligently causes fear of physical injury to B, and B, thought not actually injured, suffers shock and illness, it is now settled that B can sue A for the harm suffered. In Dulieu V White, the defendants servants negligently drove a horse van driven by house belonging to the plaintiff a pair of horses with the result that it broke into the public house belonging to the plaintiffs husband while she was standing behind the bar. The fright and shock thereby caused to plaintiff, who was then pregnant, resulted in a miscarriage and illness. It was held that she could recover damages for harm due to nervous shock. The contrary from Au view which had been taken in /Victorian Railway Commrs v Colts, a case from Austrlia decided earlier by the Pricy Council, may not now be regarded as good law. In that case, the plaintiff complained of shock and illness due to fear of being killed by a passing train which dashed past her in a level crossing kept open by the negligene of the defendants gate- keeper, while she and her husband were traveling across in a buggy, Her suit against the railway company was dismissed on the ground that it was difficult to say wheter the consequence alleged culd result from the defendants to say whether the consequence alleged could result

from the defendants negligence and that if such a claim were allowed, a wide door would be opened for imaginary claims. The decision may also be explained by the fact that the connection between mental or nervous disturbqnces and the physical system was not so clearly perceived formerly as it is now with the adv ance of medical science. The crude view that for y shinjury b the law should take cognizance only of physical injury resulting from actual impact has been discarded, and it is now well recognized that an action will lie for injury by shock sustained through the medium of the eye or the ear without direct contact. Nervous Shock Due to Injury or Fear of Injury to Another Person:-

Another problem has caused grater difficulty that the one discussed in the last paragraph. If, A by this negligence, caused physical injury or risk of it to B and by seeing or hearing of it, C suffers shock and illness, can C sue A ? He can if he can make out the three requirements of an action of negligence. In the above illustration they would be(a) A duty on the part of A towards C to take reasonable care to avoid the harm complained of, (b) A breach of this duty by a, and (c) The causal relation between the breach and the said harm. The proof of these matters would depend on he facts of the particular case. Reasonable care means the care and foresight of a reasonable man and therefore the plaintiff can succeed if he can show that the defendant as a reasonable man should have foreseen the king of damage that actually happened to him. Two cases illustrate this principle. The first case is Bourhill v Yound, decided by the House of Lords. The Other is King v Phillips, decided by the offside of the driverhe court of appeal. In the first case the plaintiff, a fishwife, had alighted from a tram and was unloading her fish

basket from the offside of the drivers platform . A motor cyclist passed the tram on the other side and shortly afterwards he ran into a motor car and sustained injuries resulting in his death. She heard the noise of the collision and also saw blood at the place of the collision where she went after the cyclists body had been removed. She complained that she sustained a nervous shock by hearing of the noise with the result that, being pregnant at that time, she had a miscarriage, the child was still-born and she suffered from physical disorders. As the collision was the result of the cyclists negligence in driving at excessive speed, she sued his executor for damages. The House of Lords dismissed her claim on the ground that there was no breach of duty on his part towards her. In other words, he could not have been expected to foresee that he would by his careless driving, place a person situated as she was, in danger of sustaining nervous shock and illness. This is a conclusion of fact which was fully supported by the Circumstances of the case to which the law lords referred in their judgments. One of these circumstances was that the cyclist could not have anticipated any injury to the plaintiff, physical or emotional, as she was beyond the area of potential danger that could arise from his careless driving. The decision cannot however be treated as an authority for an inflexible rule that a person cannot recover for shock due to fear of injury to another due to careless driving unless he was within the area of danger of physical injury to himself. There were two matters on which all the Law Lords concurred; first, that incases of nervous shock the question of duty is important and must be answered in the affirmative before that of remoteness is considered, and second, that they confined themselves to the facts of that case in holding that there was no duty. It is however clear,- this is implicit in the decision, that in the absence of special facts, a mere onlooker on or near the road cannot complain of shock due to seeing an accident from a safe distance from any chance of injury to himself. The reason is that person of normal susceptibility are expected to endure and do

endure such incidents on the road as the noise of a collision or the sight of injury to others. In King v Phillips, decided by the Court of Appeal In England, a taxicab driver negligently backed his taxicab into a small boy on a tricycle. The injury to the boy and his tricycle was slight, but his mother heard him scream and looking out of an upstair window some 70-80 yards away, saw the tricycle under the taxicab but could not see the boy. He eventually ran home but his mother had suffered nervous shock for which she claimed damages. The Court of Appeal dismissed her claim. The judge agreed that the driver could not have reasonably foreseen an injury, physical or nervous, to the mother by backing his taxicab careless This again was a conclusion of fact drawn from the circumstances of the case. However, they disagreed on the theoretical basis of this conclusion. Two of he judges, singleton and Hodson JJ, took the view that there was no duty on the part of the driver to anticipate emotional shock to the mother who was away from the road. Denning LJ, held that there was a b each of duty, but the damage was too remote because it was not reasonably foreseeable. The issue about duty in an action for negligence is not an abstract issue of law or of a rule of conduct but has reference to the facts of the case, such as the position in which the parties were placed and the harm complained of. The issued in the present case would, it is submitted,be in the following form. Whether the driver should have reasonably anticipated emotional shock to a person in the position in which the plaintiff was, by her happening to see her child being exposed to the risk of bodily harm by his want of care in backing his car.

The above two decisions rejected the claim of the kind now considered on the ground that on the facts there was no duty to the person who complained of shock from fear of harm to another. In another case in England, the plaintiff claimed damages for nervous shock due to her hearing of her husbands death caused by the defendants negligence. Both husband and wife were traveling

in a car driven by the defendant and on account of his negligence there was an accident resulting in serious injury to her, while she was lying in a hospital and after she recovered consciousness, she was told that her husband was killed outright in the accident. She claimed besides damage for personal injury, damages for nervous shock and consequent bodily ailments. The trial judge, Paul J, awarded damages for shock as part of her claim on her cause of action of action for personal injury to herself. Therefore, this decision is not an authority to support an independent claim for damages for shock caused by seeing or hearing of the injury or death of another. The facts in this case suggest a query. Could such a claim be made by the plaintiff, if she had not herself been injured ? In recent years, the trend appears to be that damages can be given for the nervous shock caused by the sight of an accident, at any rate, to a close relative. In Hinz v Berry the wife who witnessed the accident and saw her husband fatally injury and children hurt, suffered nervous shock and depression.. The wife was awarded damages for the illness caused by the shock of witnessing the accident. The principal of liability for negligence according to the authorities is that a reasonable man should have foreseen the harm to the person complaining of it. There appears to be no reason why a motorist should not be expected to have within his contemplation or foresight, serious shock to the wife or mother of the victim of a gruesome tragedy due to his want of care.

The case-law on this subject has proceeded on the basis of the threefold issue in an action for negligence, one of the issues being that of causal relation. The plaintiff must establish the necessary chain of causation in fact between his nervous shock and the injury or death of one or more third parties negligently caused by the defendant. While judicial policy rejected a claim for nervous shock as too remote a century ago, a different policy has come to prevail on account of the frequency of motor accidents. It,

therefore, allows claims for nervous shock. In Mc Loughlin v O Brain the House of Lords has accepted that the test of liability for damages for nervous shock is reasonable for seeability of the plaintiff being injured by nervous shock as a result of the defendants negligence. In the case the plaintiff was at home, two miles away from the scene of the serious road accident in which the plaintiffs husband and three children were involved. One of the plaintiffs children was killed immediately and her husband and other two children were severely injured. The plaintiff was informed of the accident by a motorist and she saw the injured members of her family in the hospital. As a result of hearing and seeing the result s of the accident he plaintiff suffered severe and persisting nervous shock. It was held that even though the plaintiff was not at or near the scene of the accident at the time or shortly afterwards, the nervous shock suffered by her was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants negligence and was entitled to damages, When the nervous shock suffered by the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant as a natural and problem consequence of breach of duty of are it was immaterial that a completely normal person would not have suffered the consequences actually suffered by the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff in such cases will have to show a close relationship of love and affection with the primary victim and also that his proximity to the accident was sufficiently close in time and space. Plaintiffs who suffered nervous shock when disaster at a football match was televised liver and in news bulletins, which did not depict the death or suffering o individuals and their identity, were held not entitled to damages.

A mere bystander not in the danger zone can not recover. A person cannot recover damages for an injury not foreseeable in a

person of ordinary fortitude. If foreseeable, damages could be granted for physical or psychiatric injury, since they were held to be same kinds of damages. If nervous shock results in some recognised psychiatric illness, damages can be awarded. The defendant must take his victim as he finds him,

The plaintiff was directly involved in a motor accident. He was not hurt but suffered magic encephalomyelitis, which is a psychIatric illness with which he had earlier suffered. He suffered the illness as a result of accident. It is not foreseeable injury in an ordinary person but it can be foreseen as a personal injury of physical harm, and hence, the plaintiff could recover damages.
Nervous shock is a term used in English law to denote psychiatric illness or injury inflicted upon a person by intentional or negligent actions or omissions of another. It is most often applied to psychiatric disorders triggered by witnessing an accident, for example an injury caused to one's parents or spouse. Although the term "nervous shock" has been described as "inaccurate" and "misleading", [1] it continues to be applied as a useful abbreviation for a complex concept. The possibility of recovering damages for nervous shock, particularly caused by negligence, is strongly limited in English law.

Definition
To amount in law to "nervous shock", the psychiatric damage suffered by the claimant must extend beyond grief or emotional distress to a recognised mental illness, such as anxiety neurosis or reactive depression. Damages for bereavement suffered as a result of the wrongful death of a close one are available under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, while courts can also award damages for "pain and suffering" as a result of physical injury.

Intentionally inflicted nervous shock

It is well established in English law that a person who has intentionally and without good reason caused another emotional distress will be liable for any psychiatric injury that follows. An example of this is a bad practical joke played on someone which triggered serious depression in that person. The joker intended to cause the other person emotional distress and will be liable for the medical consequences.

Negligently inflicted nervous shock

Before a claimant can recover damages for the nervous shock which he suffered as a result of the defendant's negligence, he must proof of all the elements of the tort ofnegligence: 1. The existence of a duty of care, i.e. the duty on the part of the defendant not to inflict nervous shock upon the claimant; 2. A breach of that duty, i.e. the defendant's actions or omissions in the circumstances fell below what would be expected from a reasonable person in the circumstances. 3. A causal link between the breach and the psychiatric illness, i.e. the nervous shock was the direct consequence of the defendant's breach of duty; 4. The nervous shock was not too remote a consequence of the breach. For fear of spurious actions and unlimited liability of the defendant to all those who may suffer nervous shock in one form or other, the English courts have developed a number of "control mechanisms" or limitations of liability for nervous shock. These control mechanisms usually aim at limiting the scope of the defendant's duty of care not to cause nervous shock, as well as at causation and remoteness.

Primary victims
A "primary victim" is a person who was physically injured or could foreseeably have been physically injured as a result of another person's negligence. An example of this is a claimant who is involved in a car accident caused by the defendant's careless driving and gets mildly injured (or even remains unharmed) as a consequence, but the fright from the crash triggers a serious mental condition. Such a claimant can recover damages for his car, his minor injuries and the nervous shock he had suffered. "Primary victims" also include rescuers (such as firemen, policemen or volunteers) who put themselves in the way of danger and suffer psychiatric shock as a result.

Secondary victims
A "secondary victim" is a person who suffers nervous shock without himself being exposed to danger. An example of this is a spectator at a car race, who witnesses a terrible crash caused by negligence on the part of the car manufacturers and develops a nervous illness as a result of his experience. It is in these cases where the courts have been particularly reluctant to award damages for nervous shock. In several decisions,

the courts have identified several strict requirements for the recognition of a duty of care not to cause nervous shock, as well as causation and remoteness:

The claimant must perceive a "shocking event" with his own unaided senses, as an eye-witness to the event, or hearing the event in person, or viewing its "immediate aftermath". This requires close physical proximity to the event, and would usually exclude events witnessed by television or informed of by a third party.

The shock must be a "sudden" and not a "gradual" assault on the claimant's nervous system. So a claimant who develops a depression from living with a relative debilitated by the accident will not be able to recover damages. If the nervous shock is caused by witnessing the death or injury or another person the claimant must show a "sufficiently proximate" relationship to that person, usually described as a "close tie of love and affection". Such ties are presumed to exist only between parents and children, as well as spouses and fiancs. In other relations, including siblings, ties of loved and affection must be proved. It must be reasonably foreseeable that a person of "normal fortitude" in the claimants position would suffer psychiatric damage. The closer the tie between the claimant and the victim, the more likely it is that he would succeed in this element. However, once it is shown that some psychiatric damage was foreseeable, it does not matter that the claimant was particularly susceptible to psychiatric illness - the defendant must "take his victim as he finds him" and pay for all the consequences of nervous shock (see "Eggshell skull" rule). A mere bystander can therefore hardly count on compensation for psychiatric shock, unless he had witnessed something so terrible that anybody could be expected to suffer psychiatric injury as a result. However, it seems that such a case is purely theoretic (see McFarlane v. EE Caledonia Ltd, where the plaintiff witnessed an explosion of a rig where he and his colleagues worked, but received no compensation).

Leading cases
Currently leading cases include two House of Lords decisions arising from the Hillsborough disaster:

Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C. 310 White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 A.C. 455

and a third House of Lords decision in a case arising from a road traffic accident:

Page v. Smith [1996] A.C. 155

See also McLaughlin v. OBrian [1982] 2 All ER 298, where the House of Lords outlines the concept of "immediate aftermath" of the accident and Attia v. British Gas plc [1988] QB 304, where the Court of Appeal considered whether damages for nervous shock as a result of witnessing the destruction of property were recoverable.

Criticism
The current position of the English courts has been criticised as leading to unfair results both in law and from the medical point of view. For example, it may be arbitrary that a mother who witnesses the death of her child with her own eyes can recover if she develops a mental illness, while one that hears of her child's death on the phone and suffers the same condition cannot. Reform has been widely advocated and in 1998 the Pariliamentary Law Commission has drafted a proposal, suggesting i.a. that the requirements of proximity in time and space to the accident and the "own unaided senses" rule should be abolished.

Nervous shock has no definite definition. It is known as any recognizable psychiatric illness caused by the breach of Duty by the defendant. Please refer to the case of Hinz v Berry. It is not ordinary grief sorrow or anxiety which occurs in normal incidents in life. Development of Nervous Shock

Initial Stage After the earlier stage the courts rejected liability for nervous shock because i. It is difficult to diagnosis not like physical injury ii. It is normal for human to be exposed to such shock Victoria Railway Comm v Coultas - - mere sudden shock unaccompanied by physical injury cannot claim. Delieu v White - - Nervous Shock produced by fear of immediate physical injury to oneself can claim. First Expansion Court develop that damages for nervous shock can be claimed if it is reasonably foreseeable that someone closely connected to victim will suffer nervous shock. Bourhill v Young - - a pregnant lady after alighting from a tramcar hear noise of collision and after the accident she went to the spot, saw blood spot and got shock. Court denied her claim because it was not reasonably foreseeable that someone not closely connected to the victim would suffer nervous shock. Hambrook v Stones Bros. - - a mother succeeded in recovering damages for nervous shock produced not for her own safety but for her childrens safety. A lorry without driver running down near her children and she got shock because did not see her child. Zainab Bt Ismail v Marimuthu & Anor - - a mother saw her daughter was runned down by a lorry. It was held that it is reasonably foreseeable that the mother will suffer shock and awarded the claim. The only local reported cases. Second Expansion Ear Shot Doctrine Near relatives who might not have witnesses the accident but was within earshot (vicinity) and likely to come upon the scene. In such a situation the claimant can claim for nervous shock. Broadman v Sanderson - - D injured a young boy while negligently backing his car out of a garage. The father heard scream and ran to his son to rescue him. Successfully claim. Hinz v Berry - - a mother witnesses a horrifying and tragic accident to her family from the other side of the road can claim.

Third Expansion Aftermath Doctrine Witnessed the immediate aftermath of an accident in the hospital and suffers nervous shock can recover claim because it is reasonably foreseeable the consequence of Ds negligence even though it is not within the sight and hearing. Mc Loughlin v OBrian - - a mother who stay 2 mile away who heard an accident of her family from neighbor went to hospital and saw her daughter has died and other children and her husband was upset with the death. She suffers nervous shock. House of Lords awarded the claim. The above ruling was made. Jaensch v Coffey - - P suffered nervous shock after seeing the effect of an accident on her husband at hospital. She was awarded damages. The court further held that immediate aftermath includes: i. being at the scene after accident. ii. Seeing treatment at hospital. Further Development Witnessing events on television at home or heard from radio. The House of Lord rejected such claim it does not satisfy the requirement of proximity. However it is not totally ruled out. Alcock v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police - - P (16) people suffered nervous shock in the aftermath of a tragedy which occurred at a stadium where 95 spectators were crushed to death and over 400 were injured at a major football match. The disaster was covered life in radio and tv. i. Some watched the incident from other side of scene. ii. Some watched in TV at home. iii. Other heard from radio or from friends or recorded pictures in TV. Trial Judge allows the first 2 claimants but rejected the third one. In the Court of Appeal: on the issue of witnessing event in TV was dismissed the claim because it does not satisfy the requirement of proximity. But on appeal the House of Lord dismissed all the claims.