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Jurisprudence CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS [G.R. No. 115908. March 29, 1995.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

DANNY GODOY, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 115909. March 29, 1995.] JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., * complainant, vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR., and EVA PONCE DE LEON, respondents. The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect, primarily, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court, and, secondarily, his compulsory performance of some act or duty required of him by the court and which he refuses to perform Due perhaps to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal. However, the line of demarcation between acts constituting criminal contempt, as distinguished from civil contempt, is quite indistinct. The confusion in attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts is due to the fact that there are contempts in which both elements appear; or there are contempts which are either wholly civil nor altogether criminal, but partake of the characteristics of both; or it is also possible that the same act may constitute both a civil and criminal contempt. A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court. It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to

commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt. 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AS TO PURPOSE FOR WHICH POWER IS EXERCISED. A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for which the power is exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. A criminal contempt involves no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power and dignity of the court; private parties have little, if any, interest in the proceedings for punishment. Conversely, if the contempt consists in the refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending before the court, and the contemnor is committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the nature of an execution to enforce the judgment of the court; the party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real party in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings look only to the future. And it is said that in civil contempt proceedings, the contemnor must be in a position to purge himself. t has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the

protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved. Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil action is a proceeding in that action. Accordingly, where there has been a violation of a court order in a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an independent action in contempt or proceed in an independent prosecution to enforce the order. It has been held, however, that while the proceeding is auxiliary to the main case in that it proceeds out of the original case, it is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of new process. In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor. Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden. Under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, constitutes criminal contempt.

In whatever context it may rise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Partly because of administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt. The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned is that contempt proceedings ar sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempts are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes; and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. 21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.: 1. Indirect contempt committed against an inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty. 2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves questions of fact. 3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of thee authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal." 4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions. 5. Where the singular jurisdiction of a given matter has ben transferred from the contemned court to another court. 6. A new court wholly

replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act. 7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where contempt against the trial court has ben punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is taken is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court. 8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case, which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge is absent or otherwise unavailable and an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper court, the regular judge may punish for violations of orders so entered. 9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt against the other. 10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for contempt, the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to thee need to protect the courts and the people from improper professional practice. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court. 11. Some contemptuous acts are also crimes, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable in other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done. 12. Finally, a conviction for contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the basis that the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be tried before the court actually contemned. 22. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE THE ENTIRE CASE HAS ALREADY BEEN APPEALED, JURISDICTION TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT RESTS WITH THE APPELLATE COURT OR WHERE THERE IS A TENDENCY TO AFFECT THE STATUS QUO OR INTERFERE WITH THE JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT. The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a

tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same. Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents of the court's basic power to oversee the proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial functions. (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.G.R. Nos. 79690-79707, October 7, 1988, 166 SCRA 316) [G.R. No. 129521. September 7, 1999.] SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS FE ELOISA C. GLORIA, EDIJER MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. CASIGURAN, petitioners, vs. MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T. RICALDE and CESAR P. MANALAYSAY, respondents. A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court. Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. If the contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real prosecutor. [People vs. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64, 79 (1995)]. The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. [Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 688, 697(1997)]; [People vs. Godoy, supra.] [G.R. No. 107671. February 26, 1997.]

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. Section 3, Rule 71, of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt: (1) the filing of a written charge and (2) an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses.

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1238. January 24, 2003.] ENGR. EDGARDO R. TORCENDE, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, respondent. Contempt is defined as "[a] disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. On the other hand, direct contempt consists of or is characterized by "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71. There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt. Section 3, Rule 71, of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the mode of commencing proceedings for indirect contempt, to wit: . . . After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel . . . Nazareno v. Barnes interpreted a "written charge" to mean that either: 1.] an order

requiring the person to be charged with contempt to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, be issued by the court; or 2.] a petition for contempt by way of a special civil action under Rule 71 be initiated in order for contempt proceedings to prosper: At the outset, let it be stated that the contempt proceeding against the petitioner was wrongly initiated. The nature thereof being that of indirect contempt, a written charge is necessary pursuant to Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The written charge may partake of the nature of (1) an Order requiring the respondent (not accused) to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having committed the contemptuous acts imputed against him; or (2) a petition for contempt by way of special civil action under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The first procedure applies only where the indirect contempt is committed against a court or judge possessed and clothed with contempt powers. The second, if the contemptuous act was committed not against a court nor a judicial officer with authority to punish for contemptuous acts. Strict compliance with the afore-cited guidelines is mandatory considering that proceedings against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt, as in this case, are commonly treated as criminal in nature. . . . Strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. [G.R. No. 137326. August 25, 2003.] ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS, INC., CORPORATE OFFICERS AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS, INC., and EDILBERTO YUJUICO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE LUIS R. TONGCO, Presiding Judge, Branch 155, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, PETER PAN CORP. and RMC GARMENTS, INC., respondents. To comply with the procedural requirements of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, there must be (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct, and (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct. The Court held in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that: "In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a

prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved. Civil contempt proceedings, on the other hand, are generally held to be remedial and civil in nature; that is, for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy resorted to, to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. " PENALTIES THEREFOR WERE AMENDED BY SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 22-95. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on 16 November 1995 amended Sections 1 and 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which provide the penalties for direct and indirect contempt committed against superior and inferior courts. . . . Under the amendment, in case of violation of writs of injunction or restraining orders, the rule now provides that the court may order complete restitution through the return of the property or the payment of the amount alleged and proved. As aptly pointed out by RMC, restitution is defined as the "act of making good or giving equivalent for any loss, damage or injury; and indemnification." Petitioners are not excused from complying with the writ of injunction on the ground a fire destroyed the machines, considering that the fire occurred years after the court had ordered petitioners to return the machines. [A.M. No. MTJ-05-1587. April 15, 2005.] [Formerly IPI No. 04-1588-MTJ] PILAR BARREDO-FUENTES, LOURDES J. ESTRELLADO, CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR, and FLORENDA ESTRELLADO-DIAZ, complainants, vs. JUDGE ROMEO C. ALBARRACIN, MTCC, Branch 3, Davao City, respondent. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants or their witnesses during litigation. There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as

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a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt. The employment of delaying tactics to obstruct the administration of justice falls under this latter category. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the following requisites prior to conviction of indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) to be heard by himself or counsel. With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed without the actual presence of the court, it is essential that a hearing be allowed and the contemner permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense to the charges before punishment is imposed. The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. The modes of procedure and rules of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar in nature to those used in criminal prosecutions. [G.R. No. 190171. March 14, 2011.] ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI, petitioners, vs. THE HON. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 52, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit: Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: xxx xxx xxx (d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; xxx xxx xxx. Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. AaDSTH

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In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. [A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076. October 12, 2010.] OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA, respondent. [A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077. October 12, 2010.] ATTY. LOURDES A. ONA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA, respondent. [A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078. October 12, 2010.] Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. The procedural requirements are mandatory considering that contempt proceedings against a person are treated as criminal in nature. 32 Conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. 33 [G.R. No. 153157. October 14, 2003.] PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. ARTHUR B. TONGSON, respondent.

[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1805. October 14, 2003.] (OCA IPI 02-1378-RTJ) TEODORA A. RUIZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROLANDO G. HOW, RTC-Br. 257, Paraaque City, respondent. In Patricio v. Suplico, this Court made a clear-cut distinction between direct and indirect contempt All courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt, this being essential to their right to self-preservation. Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect or constructive. Direct contempt is "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect towards the court or judge, offensive personalities towards others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition

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when lawfully required to do so. Where the act of contumacy is not committed in facie curiae, or "in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, " i, e., perpetrated outside the sitting of the court, it is considered indirect, or constructive, contempt, and may include "(m)isbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions," "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge," "(a)ny abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt," or "any proper conduct tending, directly, or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice" Wicker v. Arcangel made it clearer that in case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may be punished only "after charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel," whereas in a direct contempt, the respondent may summarily be adjudged in contempt. ATCEIc 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DIRECT CONTEMPT; MISBEHAVIOR MUST BE COMMITTED IN THE PRESENCE OF OR SO NEAR A COURT AS TO OBSTRUCT OR INTERRUPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT; CASE AT BAR. Consideration of these legal propositions patently discloses the impropriety of finding complainant guilty of direct contempt. The willful display of abusive and disrespectful language hurled by complainant towards the court did not constitute direct contempt but may, if at all, amount to indirect contempt, subject to the defenses which may be raised in the proper proceedings. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 71-of the-Revised Rules of Court, to constitute direct contempt, the alleged misbehavior must have been committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the court. Stress must be given to the fact that at the time the derogatory words were uttered by complainant, no proceedings were being held nor was it shown that respondent was performing judicial functions. In fact, a cursory reading of the contempt citation issued by respondent would show that the alleged abusive conduct and intemperate language uttered by complainant was supposedly overheard merely by a certain Atty. Pormento and relayed to respondent. Apparently, the alleged insolent and contumacious outbursts not only did not occur "in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the court" but that respondent had no personal knowledge of them. ACDIcS